



Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



From the Commandant



Special Warfare

Today, more than one-third of the world's six billion people live in cities. But the United Nations predicts that by 2025, the world's population will increase to 7.8 billion people, and that more than half of that number will be urban residents. Moreover, the vast majority of the population growth is expected to take place in developing nations, burdening already strained infrastructures and possibly leading to dissatisfaction, violence or revolt. Because the United States is committed to maintaining global stability, the future will likely see U.S. forces engaged in urban operations.

It is also likely that those urban operations will require the capabilities of U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF. Operations conducted among city walls and in city streets do not permit the relatively clear-cut battle lines and the decisive maneuver of open battlefields. Urban warfare is often asymmetric, and in some cases, the superiority of U.S. technology and sophisticated weaponry will offer no advantages. But fortunately, SOF's unique capabilities are tailor-made for such situations. Whether performing direct-action missions, gathering intelligence, communicating the commander's message to the local populace, or assisting in the rebuilding of a country's infrastructure, SOF can offer a range of capabilities that can mean the difference between success and failure in urban operations.

To prepare SF detachments for conducting operations in urban areas, the Army Special Forces Command has implemented the Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course, or SFAUCC. SFAUCC teaches the collective tasks, combat skills and teamwork that are important in urban operations. Equally important in urban operations is SOF's understanding of the population. It is a SOF truth that humans are more important than hardware, and SOF have the necessary training and experience for dealing with the essential element of urban operations — the



human element. Recent operations in Afghanistan have reinforced SOF's ability to work with the soldiers and the citizens of other countries and other cultures. With their language skills, cultural awareness and knowledge of the various regions of the world acquired through specialized training and frequent deployments, SOF possess a familiarity with the human terrain that is unequalled in DoD. Because SOF are trained and skilled warriors, they have credibility with their counterparts.

Training ARSOF soldiers is more critical now than it has been at any time since the Special Warfare Center was founded in 1952. Training the soldiers and future leaders of ARSOF is a challenging responsibility, and it is a job of which we are justifiably proud. But our pride must never make us complacent. Although we will retain a reverence for our history and maintain continuity with our past, we will transform as necessary to meet the needs of the future and to continue to produce the finest SOF soldiers in the world. God bless America!

Major General William G. Boykin

Commander & Commandant
Major General William G. Boykin

Editor

Jerry D. Steelman

Associate Editor

Sylvia W. McCarley

Graphics & Design

Bruce S. Barfield

Automation Clerk

Gloria H. Sawyer



Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to *Special Warfare* and the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Special Warfare* is also available on the USASOC internal web (<https://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm>).

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Eric K. Shinseki
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. Hudson
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

0125001

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Features

- 2 Joint Urban Operations: Special Forces in Urban Campaign Planning**
by Colonel Joseph D. Celeski
- 14 The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and Army Special Forces**
by Dr. Keith D. Dickson
- 20 Urban Warfare: Lessons from the Middle East**
by Norvell B. DeAtkine
- 30 PSYOP Radio Operations in Bosnia: A Steady, Positive Drumbeat**
by Major John Mills
- 40 Historical Vignette: Two Combat Glider Landings in One Day**
by Dr. C.H. Briscoe
- 44 From OSS to USSOCOM: Lessons Learned**
by Colonel James M. Coyne

Departments

- 47 Letters**
- 50 2001 Index**
- 52 Enlisted Career Notes**
- 54 Officer Career Notes**
- 56 Foreign SOF**
- 57 Update**
- 60 Book Reviews**

Cover: This composite illustration provides a generic view of the conditions that SOF may face during urban warfare (graphic by Bruce Barfield).

Joint Urban Operations: Special Forces in Urban Campaign Planning

by Colonel Joseph D. Celeski



Photo by Thomas Witham

Trend predictions out to 2010 forecast increases in the likelihood of urban combat. Training for future urban operations must include lessons learned from recent urban operations.

Worst of all is to besiege their city fortifications. Besiege city fortifications only when no other option is left. The building of large protective shields and armored carriers and the preparation of siege equipment require three months. A city blockade requires another three months. When commanders cannot rein in their rage but order the scaling of city fortifications, one third of their warriors will be sacrificed, yet the city shall not be occupied: this is the tragedy of siege.

— Sun Tzu, “Planning an Offense”
(from *The Art of War*)

Every year, U.S. Army Special Forces, or SF, are deployed to more than 145 countries around the world. Because SF may at any given time be required to participate in global operations, they must possess an in-depth knowledge of many of the major urban areas that might see future conflict. This article provides guidance for SF operational planners, both at the SF group and at theater SOC J5 levels, to assist them in planning the employment of SF as part of the campaign plan for a joint urban operation, or JUO.¹

SF has a long history of urban-warfare operations, primarily at the operational level. During World War II, one of SF’s predecessors, the First Special Service Force, or FSSF (a combined U.S. and Canadian commando organization), served as the lead task force in the Allied operation to capture Rome. During the assault, Brigadier General Robert Frederick, commander of the FSSF, was provided tank and artillery assets.

Almost 45 years later, during Operation Desert Storm, members of the 3rd and 5th Special Forces groups provided advice to the coalition during the recapture of Kuwait City. Over the last 10 years, SF soldiers have conducted urban-combat operations in Somalia, and they have conducted urban-peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Recently, SF teams trained in unconventional warfare, or UW, assisted the Northern Alliance in regaining major



DoD photo

Because Special Forces soldiers are frequently deployed for training and for operations, they are experienced in applying cultural, language and interpersonal skills in a variety of environments.

cities throughout Afghanistan. In future campaigns, SF will likely focus on restricted and limited warfare in urban areas.

All trend predictions out to 2010 foresee increases in the size and in the populations of urban centers, as well as in the number of urban combat operations. The urban environment has changed, and if we are to remain relevant, we must change our concept of urban operations. Incorporating the lessons of urban warfare into an SF urban-campaign plan (in accordance with the demands of the national military strategy and the tenets of *Joint Vision 2020* and *SOF Vision 2020*) will ensure the viability of our SF teams as part of any JUO.

To ensure that the JFC will have the tools necessary for conducting an urban operation, SF must be properly orchestrated with other forces, and the roles assigned to SF must be consistent with SF's missions, capabilities and limitations. Given their unique roles and missions, SF, in conjunction with joint and coalition forces, can provide a unique capability for accomplishing the objectives of an urban campaign. Although SF are not sufficiently robust to conduct an urban campaign single-handedly, they can achieve a synergistic effect by performing their operational roles and missions

through, with or by coalition forces.

SF soldiers are trained to apply their wide range of cultural, regional, language and interpersonal skills in any operational environment. Acutely aware of the political implications of their missions, SF soldiers can work with coalition, multinational and non-governmental agencies to enhance the unity of effort in urban operations. Modern surveillance techniques and state-of-the-art communication equipment enable SF to provide precise and timely information to the JFC.

Characteristics of urban areas

It is easy to perceive the urban environment as just another medium in which SF soldiers operate and conduct their missions. After all, the U.S. has been conducting urban combat in varying degrees for the last half-century. So why are we now emphasizing the possibility of future war in urban areas? Simply put, the social dynamics of urbanization have changed the environment; as a result, we need to make minor adaptations to our current urban tactics, training procedures and equipment.

The urban environment is divided into various categories, each of which places

unique demands on operations and equipment. In order to be prepared for each category's demands, we must adapt and expand our urban capabilities.

Military operations in urban terrain have their own unique characteristics. These operations mandate that we be prepared for the change from clearly defined battles in a horizontal plane to ambiguous battles in the vertical battle plane (ranging from sewers and subway systems to pent-

which were quite useful in Mogadishu, will be more beneficial than paper maps. Precise, up-to-date information on the position and the status of enemy and friendly forces, as well as the numbers, locations and flow of civilians, will be the intelligence coin of the realm in urban combat.²

In the urban environment, information on civilians will be critical, because non-combatants are ubiquitous, and distinguishing between friend and foe can be challenging. The presence of civilians on the battlefield will force us to expand our forms of combat to include nonlethal means. Because our adversaries may range from military combatants to armed gangs to criminal elements, commanders will also need to protect noncombatants and infrastructure in accordance with The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions.

From the beginning, urban combat will be a war of information. Increased battlefield access for the media will call for new paradigms of openness for the military commander charged with conducting the urban operation. Media reporting will become more significant, given that urban combat usually produces high casualty rates. When information is targeted at the will of the people and at their reaction to casualties, the information war can well determine the outcome of the combat operation.

Urban warfare creates changing terrain conditions: Damage caused by weaponry will reduce many structures to rubble, and new structures (bunkers, refugee tent cities, etc.) will be formed almost overnight. Tarps, mirrors, lasers or high-intensity lights can be used to block or reduce visibility. With the increase of "urban sprawl" and the downsizing of modern armies, it is becoming impossible to marshal the military assets needed to completely surround a modern city. Cities are "porous," in that they provide several avenues for infiltration and exfiltration. Subterranean avenues of approach can be flooded, and air corridors in urban "canyons" can be blocked with cabling and netting devices, but attempts to shut off infil/exfil avenues will only lead to the creation of new avenues.

Urban warfare is the most resource-



Photo by Cesar Rodriguez

This aerial photo shows an intersection in Bosnia where clashes between ethnic groups have been frequent. During urban operations, aerial photos may be more up-to-date and more informative than paper maps.

houses). Urban areas consist of fragmented terrain that will isolate our operations and require that we have knowledge of urban planning, urban infrastructure, and support systems. Streets often cannot be bypassed, and obstacles may be insurmountable. While situational awareness will be a prized commodity on the urban battlefield, human intelligence, or HUMINT, will be the most prized commodity of all. Knowledge will be a key enabler.

If we view a city as an organism, we can see its interlocked municipal systems — power, water and sewage, information, transportation, emergency, and medical — as the organs that must function together in order to support life. These interlocked systems are not depicted on military maps. In urban operations, commanders will require databases that can provide blueprints, three-dimensional graphics, engineer studies and operational manuals for infrastructure nodes. Aerial photomaps,

intensive form of warfare, and it is also the most difficult to supply and support. Urban warfare is personal: Direct-fire weapons are preferred over indirect-fire weapons because of the need for precision and because of the need to limit collateral damage. Urban warfare is asymmetric. Its low-tech requirements negate the high-tech strength of modern conventional armies, making urban combat attractive to anyone who intends to fight U.S. and allied conventional forces.³

Recent urban operations have yielded the following lessons for conventional forces:

- Combined-arms teams operating as part of specially trained urban-warfare units that have decentralized control have been proven successful.
- Urban operations require surprise, speed, intelligence (particularly HUMINT), and the isolation and containment of enemy forces.
- Tanks employed in pairs, with infantry protection, provide the best means of achieving an overwhelming superiority in heavy direct-fire capability in urban combat.
- Vehicles equipped with some kind of armor protection are required in urban conflict if for no other reason than to ensure medical evacuation and logistics supply.
- Control of the key terrain surrounding a city can facilitate the use of indirect artillery fire and close air support, or

CAS, to prevent the enemy from either escaping or obtaining reinforcements.

- Any means of clearing an urban area of noncombatants prior to fighting is more desirable than having to account for and protect noncombatants during the battle.⁴

Unconventional conflict

The trend toward unconventional urban conflict is rising. The resistance activities in Kuwait City during the Gulf War, the pseudo-volunteer militia forces in Sarajevo, and the insurgents in Chechnya have demonstrated to their oppressors that defeating them can be expensive. Unconventional warriors use operating styles similar to those used by gangs and criminal factions, and in many cases, today's unconventional urban warriors were yesterday's urban criminals. The secretive meeting places, arms and weapons caches and clandestine communication systems used by criminal elements all have intrinsic military value in unconventional warfare. Quite often, pre-conflict smuggling routes become the guerrilla force's main avenues for moving supplies and for infiltrating and exfiltrating personnel.⁵

Information technology

High-tech, information-based warfare works best against enemies that possess equipment similar to ours. Such warfare will be less effective against enemies



Photo by Glenn W. Suggs

A U.S. Abrams tank defends a checkpoint in Bosnia. During urban operations, tanks can provide valuable assets such as direct-fire capability and armor protection.

Soldiers assigned to the 3rd SF Group set up communications equipment atop a hotel in Nigeria. Establishing communications in urban operations is difficult because of interference from high buildings and power sources.



Photo by Jim Hampshire

whose cultures have not yet entered the Industrial Age.

No government to date has been able to control the proliferation of cell phones, computers, night-vision devices, commercial surveillance-and-detection sensors, and radio-transmitting devices. Because access to the Internet cannot be controlled, the Internet has become a great medium for clandestine command and control. Novice PSYOP units, equipped with printing and copying devices, have the ability to print full-blown, sophisticated leaflets, newspapers and disinformation products.⁶

Establishing communications in an urban environment will be difficult because high-rise buildings, enclosed structures and subterranean systems will block electronic signals. The electrical and magnetic emanations from power sources and telecommunications nodes will also contribute to the distortion and interference of communications.

In urban operations, knowledge of the commander's intent will take on increased importance if units are forced to operate without communicating with their higher headquarters. Military communications systems are predominantly FM and UHF; in the urban landscape, communications systems consist of public telephones, cell phones, microwave repeater systems, fiber-optic-based communications systems, fax machines and computer nets. Military forces should train on all these systems so that they can use them to augment their

communications capabilities.

Employing directional transmitters, radio retransmitters and repeaters, and tapping into existing telephone, fiber-optic and computer networks are all good work-around methods for enhancing communications capabilities. The use of civilian communications systems will demand a high level of operations security, because the same systems can be accessed by the enemy. Finally, military forces should be able to monitor, jam and disrupt civilian cell-phone and electronic telecommunications emissions, in both the analog and digital bands.⁷

Close air support

CAS has been used in most urban battles since World War II, and its importance in urban combat will likely continue. CAS sorties should be performed above the ranges of shoulder-fired weapons and ground-fire. Russia's loss of two SU-25s in September and October 1999 during the Russian campaign to quell Islamic rebels in Grozny, Chechnya, demonstrated the impact that a low-tech air defense can have on low-flying aircraft.⁸ How will the need for CAS be reconciled with the need to comply with urban rules of engagement? U.S. war fighters exercise great care to limit collateral damage, but the recent air campaigns in Kosovo and in Afghanistan make clear how difficult doing that can be. Even during optimal conditions (e.g., air superi-

ority, suppressed enemy air defenses and good weather conditions), achieving pinpoint accuracy of CAS in urban areas remains challenging. Clusters of urban buildings that block the line-of-sight targeting needed for laser-designating devices, unreliable communications, the not-so-precise weapon that does not work as it was intended to, and the lack of clearly definable initial points for target run-ins all contribute to the difficulty of providing CAS in an urban environment. The platform of choice for providing urban-combat CAS to U.S. forces has been the AC-130U Spectre gunship, although it is the most vulnerable aircraft to enemy threats (one was shot down over Kuwait during Desert Storm). Nevertheless, the AC-130U proved itself in Somalia and continues to prove itself in Afghanistan. The pinpoint accuracy that can be provided by attack helicopters firing miniguns or laser-guided munitions has been proven repeatedly by the Israeli air force in its recent attacks against Palestinian terrorists. In the last year alone, the Israelis have achieved amazing accuracy in dozens of hits on key infrastructure and on moving vehicles.

Logistics

The Russian experience during the battle of Grozny, conducted in January and February 1995, provides a good example of the impact that urban combat can have on the operational level of logistics. The Russian army found itself not only having to provide food, medicine and shelter to the inhabitants of Grozny, but also having to repair and restore the civilian logistics infrastructure. Incorporating the basic necessities for the civilian and refugee populace into logistics planning proved to be an extremely difficult task. Acquiring clean water, operable sewage systems, electricity and medical facilities demanded time and effort that otherwise could have been dedicated to the battle.

Another logistics concern for the Russian army was its need for an armored combat resupply system operated by combat-trained infantrymen or logisticians. Supply trucks and vehicles were too thinly pro-

tected from enemy fires, and logistics soldiers lacked the combat training that would have enabled them to move throughout the urban fighting.

Three characteristics of urban warfare make logistics resupply a priority at the tactical and operational levels: Urban combat is intense, requiring the heavy use of ammunition and explosives; urban combat has a heavy requirement for medical-treatment facilities, equipment and supplies;



Photo by Brian D. Thompson

Italian soldiers and a U.S. Civil Affairs soldier survey damage to a rail bridge in Bosnia. Urban operations often involve restoring a country's logistics infrastructure.

and urban combat makes higher energy demands on soldiers, who require a caloric intake of about 5,000 calories per day.

Another logistics concern deals with the need to seize control of external lines of communication that support the urban battle space. To ensure an adequate flow of

supplies, forces should seize control of airports, rail lines, highways and port facilities early in the urban campaign. Aerial resupply methods will be in heavy demand for delivering urgently needed supplies to fighting pockets within the city.⁹

Medical

Urban combat will produce high numbers of battle casualties, psychological stress, and diseases such as cholera and typhoid. Comparing the medical casualty rates of two major urban-combat operations is illuminating.

The Russian experience in Grozny provides one recent lesson. The Russians suffered a high disease rate because of unclean drinking water and unsanitary conditions. Losses due to psychological stresses from sustained, high-intensity combat were extremely high. The lack of properly trained medical personnel, insufficient supplies of antibiotics, and insufficient capabilities for medical evacuation drove combat casualty statistics higher, to 4,379 KIA.¹⁰

More relevant to SF operators are the results from the analysis of combat casualties suffered by Army Rangers in Mogadishu, Somalia, during the Oct. 3, 1993, raid otherwise known as the “Battle of the Black Sea.” The statistics depict an urban battle typical of those in which SF troops may find themselves in the future —

battles involving ethnic, tribal and terrorist enclaves in overpopulated urban areas.

It is worth noting that in Mogadishu, small-arms fire and fragments from rocket-propelled grenades produced the highest percentage of injuries to U.S. soldiers. Because the soldiers were wearing protective vests and Kevlar helmets, most of the injuries involved wounds to the extremities.

Other factors of urban warfare are worth consideration: Urban warfare and open streets will produce increased numbers of casualties; well-aimed sniper fire is the number-one reason for fatal head wounds; more IVs will be required in forward areas during urban combat; evacuation will take longer, and medics should anticipate providing prolonged care at the scene of the fight; the liberal use of tourniquets will be crucial in preventing early blood loss; and because of the delay in getting casualties to surgery, antibiotic therapy will be increasingly given by medics in the field.

Medical evacuation will be challenging during urban combat. Medical personnel will have to perform triage at the battle scene, and litter teams will need to move casualties to areas that are relatively safe from enemy fires, from which the casualties will await medical evacuation. Prior to deployment, soldiers should receive inoculations that, when combined with the appropriate antibiotics, will help prevent not only the infectious illnesses common in populated areas, but also infections that can develop in open wounds.

Because medical evacuation can be difficult during urban operations, medics should anticipate providing prolonged care at the scene of the battle.



Photo by Victoria Romena

The unique capabilities, equipment and skills now typically seen in civilian urban-search-and-rescue teams will be required by military forces who assist in clearing debris and searching for casualties. Specially trained dogs may also play a role in locating victims. When there is a lack of sanitation measures, supplies of potable water will have to be brought in.

Adopting these lessons and incorporating new skills and new equipment into SF training will ensure the viability of SF urban-combat forces.

Levels of war

When a joint force commander analyzes the requirements of an urban campaign plan, he must consider the three levels of war — tactical, operational and strategic. Although the most important aspect of an operation is its contribution to the achievement of the strategic end-state, actions within urban conflicts may sometimes traverse all three levels of war.

Campaigns orchestrate battles and operations in order to achieve strategic objectives within given constraints of time and space. It is worth noting that a single theater of war may have more than one campaign plan. A campaign plan describes the way in which time, space and purpose connect the various operations.¹¹ Shaping events to achieve strategic results is the essence of the operational art of war.

There are a number of reasons why the JFC may choose to conduct a joint urban operation. He may wish to conduct a show-of-force mission in an urban area to demonstrate the presence of friendly armed forces. The JFC may wish to conduct an operation that will contain enemy forces inside the city or that will isolate them from reinforcements or from their command and control. He may seek to use an urban area as a major logistics base or as part of his communications zone. He may wish to conduct operations to retain the city and to ensure that it will not fall under the military or political control of his adversary.

The JFC may conduct denial operations outside the boundaries of the city to ensure

that approaching enemy forces will be unable to occupy the city. He could also deny the enemy legitimacy by using unconventional warfare (including subversion and sabotage activities) to mount a resistance campaign. Conversely, the JFC may decide to employ counterinsurgency forces if the adversaries are using asymmetrical forms of urban warfare, such as terrorism and insurgency, to gain an operational advantage.

On a larger scale, a city may be considered a political objective and a military strategic objective because of its historical, cultural or economic significance. In such a case, the JFC might initiate deliberate offensive actions to retake the city. The actions could be joint urban operations, or they could be coalition or multinational operations. Finally, as an economy-of-force measure, the JFC may bypass the hostile urban area and employ forces to keep it under surveillance.

Five phases

How can SF help establish the operational conditions for limited warfare in an urban environment? The draft concept for JCS Pub 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*, suggests a framework for an urban operation within a campaign plan. The operations may be sequential or simultaneous. The phases of the framework are *understand, shape, engage, consolidate and transition*.¹²

SF soldiers can perform their primary missions as part of urban operations, and they can participate throughout each phase of a joint urban operation's campaign plan. SF's primary missions are all relevant in joint urban operations: direct action, or DA (including command-and-control warfare, or C²W, as part of information operations); special reconnaissance, or SR; foreign internal defense, or FID; UW; and combatting terrorism. SF has two collateral missions that enhance urban operations: coalition support, and urban combat search and rescue. As global scouts during regional engagement, SF soldiers have unique access to the populace. That access allows them to perform

key activities during the understand and shape phases (e.g., providing information to build the operational net assessment concerning urban areas in each CINC's region).

Understand and shape phases. To determine the implications of an urban operation, the JFC must conduct a thorough mission analysis. Urban intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB, provides the critical information required by campaign planners. Knowledge of the urban area's terrain, noncombatants, infrastructure and politics will allow the JFC to determine the correct task organization and sequencing of forces for a particular JUO. It is worth noting that the Defense Intelligence Agency predicts that transnational infrastructure warfare, or TIW, will be one of the "new forms of warfare" in the coming decades.



Photo by Christina Ann Horne

An Albanian man in Kosovo receives relief supplies from CARE workers. To assist the commander, SF soldiers can coordinate force-protection activities with nongovernment organizations.

DIA defines TIW as follows:

*Attacking a nation's or subnational entity's key industries and utilities — to include telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation, water, government operations, emergency services, energy and power, and manufacturing. These industries normally have key linkages and interdependencies, which could significantly increase the impact of an attack on a single component.*¹³

SF soldiers' familiarity with various

urban environments could be a valuable asset when urban-operation planners are developing the personnel-recovery mechanisms for the operation, planning its information operations, establishing its intelligence and reconnaissance architecture, and planning its operational fires.

Because of their worldwide presence as global scouts, SF soldiers would be an excellent choice as an early-response force. During the early phases of an urban operation, SF soldiers could use their skills in SR, sensor-emplacement and information-gathering in several ways:

- To establish the conditions needed for surprise (operational art).
- To provide intelligence and communications that would enhance the JFC's battlespace awareness by adding "ground truth."
- To provide commanders with operational freedom of maneuver by coordinating with nongovernment organizations, private volunteer organizations, or the United Nations or other agencies to help with force protection.
- To increase maneuver commanders' force-protection capabilities by utilizing specialized SF skills and training. The force-protection capability could be further enhanced through employment of chemical-reconnaissance detachments and special-operations teams-Alpha.

During the first two phases, SF could conduct direct-action missions as part of operational fires, targeting enemy C²W nodes, weapons of mass destruction and lines of communication. If required, SF could assist the ongoing UW efforts of resistance forces or insurgents. SF could initiate FID missions to prepare coalition forces for urban combat. (Once hostilities begin, FID would transition to coalition-support operations.) Finally, SF could assist in or conduct non-combatant-evacuation operations to protect noncombatants from impending harm.

Engage phase. During the urban operation, the JFC will conduct offensive or defensive operational fire and maneuver in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the campaign plan. Urban operations will be costly to armies and to noncombatants alike. Political and public pressures will dictate some of the operational-level rules

of engagement, or ROE, and combat will be restricted in urban areas.

SF can help establish the operational conditions by continuing to provide DA as a means of precision engagement and by performing the SR needed to maintain information dominance. During penetration operations, SF may be required to seize key terrain or infrastructures. Most likely, the JFC will assign the direct, offensive urban-combat missions to coalition forces. SF will provide support to enhance the combat capabilities of coalition forces and to help prevent fratricide, and they will provide ground truth to the JFC commander.

During coalition urban mop-up operations, SF will ensure compliance with ROE and with the law-of-land-warfare protocols. Joint-force planners should ensure that SF soldiers are properly employed during deliberate offensive actions. Because of the constraints of urban environments, SF will operate closer than usual to conventional forces. It will be necessary to attach a command-and-control organization, such as a special-operations command and control element, or SOCCE, to the ground-force commander in order to conduct link-up operations and to help prevent fratricide.

During defensive operations, SF can provide operational support to economy-of-force measures designed to prevent the enemy from gaining control of an urban area. Unconventional warfare, conducted through, with or by guerrillas, insurgents or resistance forces, can be employed to tie down and harass enemy forces. SF can establish urban mechanisms for unconventional assisted recovery. Such mechanisms will facilitate efforts to recover isolated personnel from enemy-controlled areas of the city. SF can help isolate the enemy from the city by advising UW forces to conduct hit-and-run activities on key terrain and on the LOCs surrounding the urban objective. Conversely, SF can assist friendly forces whose counterinsurgency efforts are designed to contain insurgents in urban areas.

Consolidate phase. Consolidation activities are conducted in order to retain whatever advantages have been gained, to mitigate the impact of hostilities on the civilian



Photo by Jean-Marc Schaible

populace, and to deal with by-passed forces (or neutralized forces). To increase the JFC commander's battle-space awareness during this phase, SF will continue to provide SR in selected areas. During DA missions, SF soldiers can perform personnel recovery, and they can ensure that surrendered enemy forces remain compliant.

SF can contribute to the efforts of other special-operations forces, such as Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, in the conduct of civil-military operations. Until they are relieved by larger organizations, SF can help coordinate the provision of food, water, sanitation, and medical assistance to noncombatants. At the operational level, SF's assistance will help in winning the hearts and minds of noncombatants and in denying the enemy legitimacy.

SF will continue to provide force-protection measures through ongoing assessments of both the urban populace and the area's critical structures, and they will continue to provide their expertise on ways of locating and destroying any remaining weapons of mass destruction, or WMD. Employed in the urban role, SF snipers can provide an extraordinary force-protection capability, as they demonstrated in Mogadishu. SF engineers can restore key infrastructure in isolated areas. Finally, SF can play a critical role in the link-up operations between UW forces and conventional forces (in fact, SF are the only forces trained for those operations), and they will

During U.S. operations in Haiti in 1994, a PSYOP speaker team warns residents to evacuate a targeted building. When necessary, SF can assist other SOF in civil-military operations.

A boy watches as Serbian residents of Sarajevo burn their house rather than transition to the control of the Bosnian Federation. SF can provide invaluable assistance during the critical transition phase.



Photo by Andrew McGalliard

play a role during the demobilization of UW forces.

Transition phase. During the transition phase, the objective is to achieve an orderly and rapid turnover of the JUO to other forces, whether they are forces of the formerly deposed host-nation military or designated international peacekeeping forces. The transition phase is the most important phase of urban operations, and SF can play an integral role in establishing the conditions for transition to the support-and-stability operations.

SF soldiers will revert to their FID role in order to train and restore the host nation's paramilitary or military forces. Aided by their cultural and language capabilities and by their long-term, professional foreign military associations formed during regional-engagement activities, SF can be instrumental in integrating foreign forces into peace operations as part of the battle handover from U.S. forces. SF can monitor cease-fire agreements and enforce compliance with peace treaties, as the Special Forces Joint Commission Observers did in Bosnia.

SF can provide support to CA and PSYOP efforts during the transition phase. That support will be strengthened through SF's contacts in the interagency arena and through SF's habitual contacts with NGOs

and PVOs. To alleviate the suffering imposed on noncombatants by the urban operation, SF may have to perform its collateral mission of humanitarian assistance. During personnel-recovery missions, SF can continue to search for combatants who are listed as missing in action.

Finally, during the transition phase, SF can assist in measures to combat terrorism. The final gasp of urban insurgents could still be affecting stability operations. SF can provide antiterrorism and counterterrorism training to security forces to strengthen their capabilities. Should terrorists employ WMD, SF can provide a first-response capability until conventional forces arrive. SF's organic assets, such as chemical-reconnaissance teams, can conduct initial assessments and provide local authorities with immediate secure communications, medical assistance, security and advice.

SOF 2020 emphasizes the need to achieve full-spectrum dominance by conducting prompt and sustained joint special operations. To ensure SF's role as global scouts with a worldwide presence, SF can participate in regional-engagement activities to develop the coalition interoperability and the information databases that will be critical in conducting future joint urban operations. The specific tasks that SF are

capable of conducting during a joint urban operation must be included in the planning phase of the campaign. Joint SOF planners can provide this information through a well-developed SF joint-urban-operations supporting plan. ✂

Colonel Joseph D. Celeski is the deputy commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Colonel Celeski enlisted in the Army in 1974 and served as an armor crewman in the 1st Armored Division. He graduated from Army Officer Candidate School and was commissioned in February 1978 as an armor officer. He served in the Federal Republic of Germany with the 3/64th Armor, 3rd Infantry Division, as leader of an M-60A1 tank platoon, as battalion motor officer, and as commander of an M1 tank company. In 1983, Colonel Celeski completed the SF Qualification Course and was assigned to the 5th SF Group as a detachment commander. His other assignments in the 5th Group include company commander, battalion S3, group S3, and battalion commander. Colonel Celeski has also served as an adviser to the Royal Jordanian 1st Armor Battalion; as the J3 ground operations officer and as the deputy J5 for plans in the Special Operations Command-Central; as G3 and as chief of staff with the U.S. Army SF Command; and as commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in Sarajevo, in support of NATO's Operation Joint Forge. Colonel Celeski is a graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the Marine Amphibious Warfare Course, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Air Force Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Army War College and the Army Force Management Course. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Columbus College and a master's degree in public administration from Shippensburg University.



Notes:

¹ "Special Operations Forces Employment in the Urban Environment." Draft SOF Input to J8 Working Group, JCS Pub 3-06, November 1999, p. 1.

² Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, "Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025," *Parameters* 29 (Summer 1999):78.

³ Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future* (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1999), 70-83.

⁴ Department of the Navy, *Military Operations on Urban Terrain*, MCWP 3-35.3 (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 4-98), 1-12 – 1-20.

⁵ Martin Libicki, "The Mesh and the NET – Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon," Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 28, Chapter 5 (National Defense University, www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair28/m028ch05, 14 September 1999):2-4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁷ Lester Grau, "Urban Warfare Communication: A Contemporary Russian View." Foreign Military Studies Office (Fort Leavenworth, Kan., July 1966):1-8.

⁸ Associated Press. "Chechens Say They Shot Down 2 Russian Jets," *Baltimore Sun*, 24 October 1999; accessed on the Internet, 24 October 1999.

⁹ Retired Lieutenant Colonels Lester W. Grau and Timothy L. Thomas, "Soft Log and Concrete Canyons – Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny," *Marine Corps Gazette* 83 (October 1999):67-74.

¹⁰ Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya – Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 108.

¹¹ Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (February 1995), III-4.

¹² "Draft Operational Concept for Joint Urban Operations." JCS J8 JWG, JP3-06 Draft, 4 October 1999, 6-10.

¹³ Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, "Global Threats and Challenges – The Decades Ahead." Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, March 1999, 15.

The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and Army Special Forces

by Dr. Keith D. Dickson

The adversaries of freedom ... subversives and saboteurs and insurrectionists ... send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. ... [They] conscript talent and manpower for any purpose, and [have] long experience in the techniques of violence and subversion. It is a contest of will and purpose as well as force and violence — a battle for minds and souls as well as lives and territory. And in that contest, we cannot stand aside.

— John F. Kennedy, message to Congress, April 27, 1961

President Kennedy's long-forgotten words take on a new meaning in the aftermath of the events of Sept. 11, 2001. Kennedy was describing unconventional war. Today, the Bush administration is attempting to define a new direction for national security while conducting a global war against terrorism. As our national leaders examine how best to characterize the threat and how the nation will respond, we should remember Kennedy's characterization of what we increasingly refer to today as asymmetric warfare.

The United States must develop a grand strategy that will allow us to pursue our interests and objectives through peace, crisis and war. In developing a grand strategy, we must establish a clear definition of our

national interests, and we must have a thorough understanding of the threats that our nation faces. Before becoming the current national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice published an article in *Foreign Affairs* in which she emphasized the need for "a disciplined and consistent foreign policy" that will focus on pursuing our top priorities for the protection of national interests. Among the priorities she identified was the need to develop a strategy for dealing decisively with "rogue regimes and hostile powers."¹

Rice leans heavily on nuclear deterrence and strategic missile defense as methods of dealing with the threats presented by our potential adversaries. While both of those methods are effective in dealing with classic strength-against-strength confrontations, American power and dominance now force our adversaries to seek new approaches that do not center on strength-on-strength challenges. In the future, an adversary will most likely apply its strengths against U.S. weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Asymmetric warfare

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review first described the danger that a future adversary could "delay or deny U.S. access to critical facilities; disrupt our command, control, communications, and intelligence networks; or inflict higher-than-expected casualties in an attempt to weaken our national resolve."² Strategists have called



DoD photo

The terrorist attack on the Pentagon is an example of asymmetric warfare.

this approach *asymmetric warfare*, a concept that encompasses virtually any kind of attack by an enemy employing a variety of means and methods designed to exploit our weaknesses.

In essence, asymmetric warfare is a way of “acting, organizing, and thinking differently” from one’s opponent.³ Asymmetric warfare demands sophisticated planning; a thorough understanding of the adversary’s strengths and weaknesses; and the ability to attack with a number of techniques, weapons and technologies at several levels at once. The goals of asymmetric warfare are to deny and degrade the enemy’s capabilities; to destroy and disrupt the enemy’s systems; and to dislocate and dislodge the enemy’s political will.⁴ The attacks on the Pentagon and on the World Trade Center certainly reflect these goals.

Joint Vision 2020

How does the U.S. military currently approach the possibility that an adversary could employ asymmetric warfare to negate our capabilities? Our military blueprint for the future, *Joint Vision 2020*, predicts that our armed forces will gain a capability called “full-spectrum domi-

nance.” Full-spectrum dominance is intended to counter and defeat any adversary by employing dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection at any level of warfare.

The military capabilities described in *JV 2020*, however, appear to be similar to conventional war-fighting capabilities — although the forces described in *JV 2020* would be more technologically sophisticated, better-organized, and better-led. Although *JV 2020* recognizes the possibility that an adversary could employ asymmetric threats, it assumes a static enemy capability that largely mirrors our own. *JV 2020* implies that the U.S. military will be able to choose the conditions under which it will fight and will thus be able to apply its full-spectrum dominance to any threat.

These conditions may very well turn out to be true. But while *JV 2020* defines the ends, it does not describe the ways or means, and it leaves unsettling questions: What if our potential adversaries refuse to challenge our ever-growing strengths directly, either now or in the future? What if they neutralize our superiority by identifying and attacking our

vulnerabilities through asymmetric means at times and places not of our choosing? Even if the U.S. military does become the force described in *JV 2020*, engaging an enemy who chooses to fight asymmetrically would most likely bring us only a Pyrrhic victory.⁵ As Steven Metz has noted, strategy documents like *JV 2020* recognize the importance of dealing with an adversary or adversaries who employ asymmetric means, yet American strategic practitioners have not been able to capture asymmetry, either in strategy or in doctrine.⁶

An adversary's asymmetric warfare methods would most likely focus on his-

Although American strategic culture is uncomfortable with the idea of employing the same asymmetric-warfare strategies that our adversaries might adopt, asymmetric warfare can be practiced by the strong as well as by the weak.

toric American vulnerabilities that have rarely been targeted: force-deployment capability, information transfer and popular will. Particularly disturbing for strategists is the potential of asymmetric warfare to negate not only our conventional military strength, but our moral and organizational strength as well — the three pillars upon which rests the status of the U.S. as a superpower. It is galling for Americans to think that an enemy who has relatively limited means, but who has the right access and the right methods, could lay this nation low quickly and cheaply.

Countering the threat

It is this basic idea that has caused some in the Department of Defense and in other agencies to devote much thought and a great deal of ink toward finding methods of countering what appears to be an ever-expanding number of asymmetric threats. The general approach has been to develop ways of mitigating the consequences of a

possible attack. While much of this effort has been productive, it has also been short-sighted. By examining asymmetric warfare in only one dimension — the defensive — the U.S. in effect yields the strategic initiative to the enemy.⁷

Because some rogue states and non-state actors cannot, or will not, face American conventional military power directly, they are more likely to adopt asymmetric means of attack. Although American strategic culture is uncomfortable with the idea of employing the same asymmetric-warfare strategies that our adversaries might adopt, asymmetric warfare can be practiced by the strong as well as by the weak. In fact, asymmetric warfare is attractive to the U.S. for the same reasons that it is attractive to our potential adversaries:

- Our enemies have moral, informational and organizational vulnerabilities that can be exploited asymmetrically.
- Strategic goals can potentially be achieved with far less cost through asymmetric warfare than through conventional warfare.
- Asymmetric warfare can be conducted overtly, clandestinely and covertly.
- Asymmetric warfare can be employed at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.
- Given proper timing and proper selection of objectives, asymmetric warfare attacks can produce effects that far outweigh the cost of the resources employed.

If asymmetric warfare can be advantageous to a great power as a component of its grand strategy, what then are the means that the U.S. could employ to pursue its national interests and objectives asymmetrically? The answers lie in our doctrine for unconventional warfare, or UW, but we need to reinvigorate that UW doctrine and redirect it into the realm of asymmetric warfare.

The current definition of UW, as stated in Joint Pub 1-02, the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, is:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of

*long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.*⁸

SF capability

In the U.S. military, the responsibility for UW resides with Army Special Forces, or SF. Established in the 1950s with the specific mission of waging UW around the world, SF has retained the organizational structure that was intended to facilitate the conduct of guerrilla operations. SF is composed of tactical units whose operations produce strategic effects. SF's low-visibility, low-cost assets are organized into small, rapidly deployable groups of highly skilled, culturally attuned, and independent troops.

But SF soldiers have rarely practiced the art of UW since the early years of the Vietnam War. As a result, SF's role in UW has been steadily de-emphasized for more than a generation in favor of other operations. SF is used to support large-scale conventional operations (in the aftermath of the Gulf War, General Norman Schwarzkopf described SF soldiers as "the eyes and ears of Desert Storm"). They also provide training and assistance called foreign internal defense, or FID, to foreign military organizations. FID is a much-watered-down version of UW's focus on establishing indigenous combat organizations.

The strategic situation in which the U.S. finds itself in the post-Cold War world has created the need for us to recast our UW capabilities to fit the requirements of asymmetric warfare. SF remains best-suited by organization, culture and training to adapt traditional UW concepts into the tools of asymmetric warfare. As practitioners of this new form of UW, SF soldiers could provide a powerful deterrent and a stinging offensive capability against an adversary who employs an

asymmetric strategy.

Formulating a new definition of UW is the first step in adapting SF to the practice of asymmetric warfare. Shown below is a working definition of unconventional operations. The definition is the result of combining various definitions of UW since 1969 and applying them to the conduct of



Photo by Jim Hampshire

An SF soldier gives marksmanship training to a Nigerian soldier. SF soldiers serve worldwide in FID missions.

asymmetric warfare in the 21st century:

Unconventional operations consist of military and paramilitary operations involving political, psychological, or technological actions of a covert, clandestine, or overt nature conducted unilaterally by the United States or in conjunction with small, independent, indigenous, or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, directed, and employed in varying degrees by an

*external source. These actions include subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection activities, propaganda, and offensive information operations.*⁹

When directed by the President or by the Secretary of Defense, SF would conduct this new brand of UW anywhere in the world, with the objectives of putting adversaries on the defensive and forcing them off balance. SF's job would be, in the words of one analyst, "directly or indirectly preventing an enemy from gaining ascendancy over the local population, denying organizations the use of safe areas, dis-

advantage of the global information environment, UW practitioners could manipulate print and broadcast media to weaken the resolve of the opposing leadership and to undermine its public support. The craft and art of propaganda should be the centerpiece of an information-operations campaign conducted in conjunction with computer-network attacks that could paralyze an opponent's systems of public communication, transportation and power. Information operations can also employ countermeasures to limit the effectiveness of an opponent's information-warfare systems.¹¹



DoD photo

SF soldiers work with forces of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. SF can achieve asymmetric objectives by training and assisting an irregular force.

rupting cash-flow and other supplies, negating effective use of the media, exposing corruption, disgracing the leadership, [and] breaking power relationships."¹⁰

SF soldiers could achieve their objectives in any number of ways. They could conduct their operations unilaterally; they could conduct them with an irregular force that they have trained and assisted; or they could conduct them in conjunction with other agencies of either the U.S. government or its allies. Subversion, sabotage, and intelligence collection would be the common components of these operations. Thus, by applying traditional UW skills, SF could achieve asymmetric objectives.

Information operations will become one of the main weapons of the new UW, and public opinion will be the decisive battleground in achieving asymmetric success. By taking

Asymmetric fighters

This new UW mission is not old wine in new bottles. UW would have to become the sole mission of SF — the reason for its existence. Achieving this would require a redirection of doctrinal concepts and a return to the ethos of the warrior as artisan. Versatile and agile, the asymmetric fighter embodied by the SF soldier must be able to employ combat skills (sniping, raids, ambushes and close-quarter battle techniques) and to train irregular forces. But the SF soldier must be equally skilled in the political, psychological, technological and intelligence-collection techniques that are the primary weapons of asymmetric warfare. The SF soldier must have a thorough appreciation of the roles that ethnic and nationalist ideologies play in the area of operations, so that he will be able to exploit or neutralize them. He must be able to work effectively in urban environments, either unilaterally or through surrogates, across the spectrum of conflict.

Applying asymmetric means through a new adaptation of UW would provide the U.S. with a better capability for dealing with asymmetric threats and for maintaining an advantage over our enemies. The asymmetric approach would complement Condoleeza Rice's advocacy of the pursuit of clearly-defined, broad strategic goals that support U.S. interests and objectives, thereby invoking the national will to protect the homeland and American interests around the world.

Two of Rice's observations bear repeating:

(1) The U.S. is the only guarantor of global peace and security. (2) As a great power, the U.S. must employ its power judiciously and effectively.

The new UW, as practiced by SF, could be a realistic and viable means of employing the military and political aspects of national power in pursuit of U.S. strategy. Rice also makes clear the often-overlooked truth about the choices that great powers must make in pursuit of national goals. "If it is worth fighting for," she says, "you had better be prepared to win."¹² If adapted to asymmetric concepts, UW would allow the U.S. to meet and neutralize threats with a variety of methods that demonstrate the American will to win those battles that we decide are worth fighting.

In his inaugural address in 1961, John F. Kennedy summoned America to heed the battle call of a new trumpet that called the nation "to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle." Forty years later, our nation has been reawakened to that struggle in an outrage of blood and death on our own shores. Placing a well-defined UW doctrine, adapted to the principles and techniques of asymmetric warfare, in the hands of properly trained and equipped SF soldiers would give the U.S. a means of meeting the asymmetric challenges that are inevitable. Linking the concepts of UW to those of asymmetric warfare would reshape the mission of SF to provide the nation with a powerful offensive and defensive weapon with which to fight the twilight war that our nation faces. ✂

Dr. Keith D. Dickson is an associate professor of military studies at the Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. He has a Ph.D. in American history from the University of Virginia and has taught at the Virginia Military Institute, where he also served as commandant of cadets. In addition, he has served more than 23 years of active and reserve service as an Army officer. The majority of those years were in special-operations units, where he served as a detachment



commander, company commander, group S5 and PSYOP plans officer. As a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, he is commander of the Joint Reserve Unit, Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command.

Notes:

¹ Condoleeza Rice, *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January/February 2000):46-47.

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, "Section II: The Global Security Environment" (May 1997).

³ Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, "Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts," January 2001 (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute), 5.

⁴ David L. Grange, "Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern," *The Officer* 77 (March 2001):31-32.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Steven Metz, "Strategic Asymmetry," *Military Review* 51 (July-August 2001):24.

⁷ For example, see Robert David Steele, "The Asymmetric Threat: Listening to the Debate," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1998-1999):78-84. On the issue of initiative and asymmetry, it is important to recall that the issue of asymmetry has always been a concern for strategists. "Asymmetry recognizes the reality of limited resources, and stresses the need to pick and choose the manner of one's response. ... It concentrates not so much on a multiplicity of options as on a variety of means, emphasizing the need to act in circumstances, at times, and in ways calculated to apply one's own strengths against adversary weaknesses. It retains, thereby, the initiative." John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 353.

⁸ Joint Pub 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 1998), 469-70.

⁹ Gary M. Jones and Chris Tone, "Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces," *Special Warfare* 12 (Summer 1999):4-15. I have drawn heavily on this article to arrive at this working definition, which reflects many of the ideas that Jones and Tone proposed in their own revised definition of unconventional warfare.

¹⁰ Grange, "Asymmetric Warfare," 32.

¹¹ Jonathan B. Tucker, "Asymmetric Warfare," *Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy* 14 (Summer, 1999):34-38. Vincent J. Goulding Jr., "Back to the Future With Asymmetric Warfare," *Parameters* 30 (Winter 2000-2001):29-30.

¹² Rice, 52.

Urban Warfare: Lessons from the Middle East

by Norvell B. DeAtkine

In a series of outstanding monographs that address the more recent urban warfare in the Middle East, author Ron McLaurin states, “In general, even those armies devoting considerable time to MOUT [military operations on urbanized terrain] training do not address the key area of psychological operations and civil affairs despite the fact the residents of a city are generally its most important resource, and are often the target of the battle.”¹

Throughout the modern post-world-war history of the Middle East, urban warfare

Lebanon functions around Beirut; Egypt around Cairo; and Iraq around Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. For many years, the trend in the Middle East has been for people to migrate from the countryside to the city.²

It has long been recognized that urban warfare requires special techniques, special training and, in some cases, special weapons. Very often, however, doctrine has tended to subsume urban warfare under a number of other topics, giving the impression that with only a little fine tuning, the tactics, techniques and procedures advocated for other forms of warfare can be applied to urban warfare.³ From a review of recent U.S. Army doctrine on urban warfare, it appears that the primary thinking is that it is best either to simply avoid combat in cities or to mount some sort of siege.⁴

Despite the fact that we have, in recent years, experienced combat in Third World cities, much of our doctrine and many of our lessons learned are still based on European models. However, the cities of Europe and America offer little utility in helping our Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, and our Civil Affairs, or CA, personnel understand what they will encounter in the traditional urban areas of the Middle East. These areas, which have their own social environment, their own structure and their own problems, have been built layer upon layer over the course of dozens of civilizations.⁵

The Persian Gulf area, where many

It has long been recognized that urban warfare requires special techniques. ... Very often, however, doctrine has tended to subsume urban warfare under a number of other topics, giving the impression that with only a little fine tuning, the tactics, techniques and procedures advocated for other forms of warfare can be applied to urban warfare.

has become an increasingly important factor, particularly in those Middle Eastern conflicts that fit into the low-intensity-conflict pattern. Many of the Middle Eastern nations are simply pieces of real estate wrapped around cities that are growing astronomically in size and in population.



Photo by Kit Thompson

A U.S. soldier patrols the roof of the Kuwaiti TV and Radio Broadcasting Building in Kuwait City in 1991. The Western appearance of many of the buildings in Middle Eastern cities belies a Middle Eastern social environment.

Americans have acquired experience, tends to be misleading in its newness, since many of its glass-and-steel cities have been built since World War II. (As an American who served with the British Trucial Oman Scouts in 1968, I remember Abu Dhabi as being mostly a collection of *burusti* (palm fronds) huts and traffic circles that led nowhere.)

But even in the Persian Gulf area, the appearance of the new Western-style cities belies a very Middle Eastern social environment. Middle Eastern cities present a unique set of challenges, not only in terms of brick and mortar but, much more importantly, in terms of the culture and the people of those cities.

Those who have been involved in urban warfare know the intense feeling of isolation that an individual experiences during city combat. In a conventional war — conducted in more open terrain — one draws a feeling of security from seeing his fellow soldiers around him. In a Middle Eastern city, with its unfamiliar streets and twisting, narrow alleyways, where there is limited light even at midday, one feels alone and vulnerable.

The feeling of isolation and uncertainty is characteristic among those who have

been involved in recent Middle Eastern urban conflicts. Correspondent David Lamb wrote:

I learned a new kind of fear in Lebanon, the fear of constant vulnerability. Covering the Vietnam War for two years, I understood where the lines were drawn. I knew who was friend and who was foe. A sixth sense told me risks were worth taking. Even on combat missions with the Marines, I felt strangely secure: I was with my people, and my life meant something to them. But in Beirut, there were no lines across which it was safe to trespass, no discernible differences between allies and enemies.⁶

While moving heavy units into a city could give the attacking troops a psychological boost, it could also invite a tactical disaster. One such situation occurred in 1973, when over-confident Israeli armor units attacked Egyptian defenses within Suez City. The attack resulted in heavy Israeli losses.⁷

As a former Army attaché officer who moved around in Amman, Jordan, during the battle for that city in September and October 1970, I offer some observations

and reflections drawn from my personal experience. During that battle, the Jordanian Arab Army, or JAA, drove the Palestinian regulars and the militia of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO, from Amman and ultimately from Jordan. Although the battle had begun as a struggle for power between the government of Jordan and Yasir Arafat's PLO, it quickly degenerated into an intracommunal civil war, with east-bank Jordanians on one side and Palestinians on the other. People were

Although the battle had begun as a struggle for power between the government of Jordan and Yasir Arafat's PLO, it quickly degenerated into an intracommunal civil war. ... It is this type of ethnic, communal strife in which the SOF soldier has been involved and likely will continue to be involved for the foreseeable future, whether he is a peacemaker, a peacekeeper or a combatant.

dragged from their cars and killed merely on the basis of the origin specified on their identity cards. It is this type of ethnic, communal strife in which the SOF soldier has been involved and likely will continue to be involved for the foreseeable future, whether he is a peacemaker, a peacekeeper or a combatant.

Briefly, the genesis of the conflict was the earlier Arab-Israeli wars that had resulted in thousands of Palestinian refugees arriving in Jordan with little more than the clothes on their backs. By 1970, West Bank Palestinians made up about 50 percent of the Jordanian population. Large numbers of them were still being confined in refugee camps, but thousands of others had crowded into makeshift housing in urban areas. A number of the refugee camps eventually blended into the city itself.

While Amman did not have the traditional ethnic quarters found in many Middle Eastern cities, it did have a number of urban areas that were almost entirely Palestinian. Ever since Jordan had acquired the West Bank during the 1948

war, an uneasy relationship had existed between Jordanians and Palestinians, despite the fact that they shared extensive family and economic ties. The more-educated Palestinians tended to view the Jordanian army soldiers as primitive nomads and occupiers. The Jordanian soldiers (of Bedouin or village stock) saw the Palestinians as being somewhat cowardly for having allowed Jewish settlers to drive them from their land.⁸

For the regular Arab armies, the 1948 and 1967 wars were disastrous. The wars also embittered the Arab masses, particularly the Palestinians, who believed that regaining Palestine would never become a priority of the Arab rulers. Following the 1967 war, Palestinian youth flocked to join the various Palestinian guerrilla organizations, most of which were under the control of the PLO. Soon after the March 1968 battle of Karamah in the Jordan valley, during which the Jordanian army severely mauled an Israeli task force, the Arab press turned the battle into a huge Palestinian victory, and the PLO became a powerful entity within the Jordanian state.

Indeed, the PLO became a threat to the existence of the Hashemite kingdom. The Palestinians imposed a nation within a nation (as they would do later in Lebanon), collecting taxes and stopping motorists for identity checks and shakedowns. Emboldened by the lack of Jordanian resistance, the Palestinian groups virtually took over Amman, and the PLO established complete control of the majority of the downtown area. One must remember that these events occurred during an era in which the myth of the "invincible guerrilla" had reached its zenith. Myrmidons of the new left from Europe and from the United States made regular pilgrimages to the refugee camps of Jordan. The conventional wisdom of the time was that the strategies and the philosophies of Regis Debray, Franz Fanon, Che Guevara and Mao Tse Tung were applicable everywhere.

The Palestinian organizations themselves were loosely organized, and they were under very little central control. In many instances, thugs controlled the streets and terrorized the people and the

foreign community. The insolence of the heavily armed Palestinian irregulars toward the Jordanian military infuriated the Jordanian soldiers, from privates to general officers.⁹ There is probably no other country in the world in which the army represents the national pride as much as it does in Jordan. In fact, Jordan has been called a nation wrapped around an army.¹⁰ That description was particularly true in 1970.

It was inevitable that a clash would occur, and despite the reluctance of Jordan's king to initiate an attack on the Palestinian forces, he eventually acquiesced to the demands of the Jordanian military. Early on the morning of Sept. 16, 1970, Jordanian forces attacked Palestinian strongholds in Amman.

Lessons from the conflict that ensued may be useful to special-operations units that might need to deploy to urban areas in the Middle East. I offer the following lessons learned, which are derived from my observations from the American Embassy

(which, perched as it was on the side of Jebel Luweideh, provided a panoramic view of the war, especially of the Palestinian area of Jebel Ashrafiyah), from my forays outside the embassy to find water,¹¹ and from my many subsequent discussions with the East Bank Jordanian officers with whom I had formed friendships.

Lessons

- *The primary focus of CA and PSYOP must be to separate the insurgent from his popular base (i.e., the people from which the insurgent draws his strength).* Achieving this goal will require the tactical integration of CA and PSYOP detachments down to the battalion level or even lower. When the Israelis invaded South Lebanon in 1982, the initial Israeli combat forces were greeted as liberators by the mainly Shia Lebanese. But as the invasion force swept further north and as support units occupied South Lebanon, the goodwill evaporated, and the Shia became the most



A Bosnian woman tries to stop a PSYOP broadcast by striking the loudspeaker. CA and PSYOP forces must work to retain the goodwill of the populace and to separate the insurgent from the people.

Photo by Luis Deya

implacable enemy that the Israelis had ever faced. This turnaround was the result of a massive CA and PSYOP disaster.¹²

In the Jordanian conflict, the war quickly degenerated from a battle between the regular forces of the JAA and the PLO to an internecine and brutal war between Jordanians and West Bank Palestinians. People were drawn into the conflict against their own convictions. Neither side exploited the psychological vulnerabilities of its



Photo by Michelle Leonard

CA and PSYOP units assigned to the tactical front can assist refugees by publicizing refugee escape routes and by administering aid.

enemy. The immense ethnic, religious, tribal and economic fissures extant in Middle Eastern society were not exploited. In fact, the recent history of the Middle East, with few exceptions, offers more lessons in PSYOP failures than in PSYOP successes.¹³ In this case, the fragmented nature of the Palestinian forces was a major weakness, but the massive and sometimes indiscriminate bombardment of Palestinian neighborhoods by the Jordanian army early in the conflict brought the feuding Palestinian factions together. Civilians

from the two communities used the occasion as an excuse to redress old grievances and, in some cases, to simply loot the homes of their neighbors. The urban battle, expected to last a few days, lasted for weeks.

• *The fighting force should be composed of specially trained forces who have an urban background.* In the 1970 war, the Jordanians brought in two infantry divisions from the front that faces Israel. Most of those infantry soldiers were not from an urban background, and many of them were of Palestinian origin. The Palestinian infantrymen were ineffective, and many of them, including a number of officers, defected. Defection is one of the major problems in an ethnic conflict. There was no psychological conditioning of the soldiers who were brought in to fight in the city. The Jordanian soldiers were, in fact, a detriment, because after a few days, when it was evident that the conflict would be a prolonged one, the Palestinians were emboldened by success. I saw a group of five Palestinian fighters hold a Jordanian company at bay all day by moving from house to house. The Jordanians employed Centurion and M-60 tanks in twos and threes, and at close range, the Palestinians' RPGs took a toll on them. As soon as the Jordanians located the source of the incoming fire, the Palestinians moved on.

• *Often in urban and ethnic conflicts, separating the innocents from the combatants becomes a major issue.* Such was the case in 1982, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, when the Israelis cornered a group of die-hard Palestinian fighters in the Ayn-el-Hilwe refugee camp.¹⁴ The Palestinians were holed up with their families inside the camp, posing a problem for the Israeli attackers. In 1970, the Jordanians faced the same problem: How do units of a civilized nation achieve their military objectives without causing excessive civilian casualties? Rulers such as Hafez Al Assad, who reduced whole sections of rebellious cities to rubble in 1980, and Saddam Hussein, who has used genocidal warfare for years, are the only ones who do not consider civilian casualties to be a problem. The Jordanian forces made mistakes

such as not creating a well-advertised escape route for families; not mounting a psychological campaign focused on the safety of families; and not providing CA-type units to administer aid to refugee families who had fled the area in an attempt to avoid the fighting. CA and PSYOP units should be assigned to the tactical front, as well as to the follow-on echelons of troops who will occupy the cleared areas. For example, the Lebanese civilians who initially welcomed the Israeli troops in 1982 turned against the Israelis because of the excesses of support and auxiliary units that followed the attacking units into south Lebanon.¹⁵

• *The control of information, internally and externally, is of critical importance.* In this era, we assume that controlling information is impossible, and certainly that task has become more difficult. In the Jordanian-Palestinian conflict, the press was, from the outset, anti-Hashemite and pro-Palestinian, but the Jordanian regime did little to combat the unfavorable image of the Jordanian army that became common in the Western media. U.S. news magazines carried stories of blood-crazed Bedouin soldiers looting and killing in the refugee camps — creating an image that was never entirely erased, even after the truth was known. In reality, because of the fighting, most of the Western correspondents were confined to one or two hotels, from which they could see very little through the smoke and haze. For news about the battle, the correspondents relied upon hotel service personnel (most of whom were Palestinian) and erratic telephone contacts. More important, there was an empathetic relationship between the Western correspondents and the leadership of the Palestinian movement. Modishly attired, speaking excellent English and often having been educated in the West, many of the Palestinian leaders moved smoothly among the journalists. As a result, the news emanating from Amman was entirely hostile to the regime.¹⁶

The Jordanians could rely on the Jordanian news and, to some extent, on the Israeli news, but the majority of the news was anti-Jordanian, including that of the

premier Arab news service, “Voice of the Arabs,” which was broadcast from Cairo. Even the well-respected BBC was vitriolic in its condemnation of the Jordanian government. The reason was simple: Most of the news personnel were Palestinian and viscerally anti-Hashemite.¹⁷

The lesson here is that information going out, as well as information coming in, must be carefully monitored, and an information task force must be assembled to fight the increasingly important media war. The Jordanians had very little contact with the correspondents, who within their own constricted informational circles, created a kind of “story of the day” atmosphere. Information that went out was recycled and beamed back in. The value and the truthfulness of reports were dependent

The fragmented nature of the Palestinian forces was a major weakness, but the massive and sometimes indiscriminate bombardment of Palestinian neighborhoods by the Jordanian army early in the conflict brought the feuding Palestinian factions together. ... The urban battle, expected to last a few days, lasted for weeks.

upon the correspondents’ objectivity and competence, but with only a few exceptions, neither quality was present. Correspondents who felt obligated to report *something* often filed reports that were little more than street rumors. Those rumors, however, were then presented as factual, with the prestige of the news networks and of the news anchors to give them an air of indisputability. Radio broadcasts from Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo made outside intervention seem imminent, giving added confidence to the beleaguered PLO. For many days, the Palestinians, while being squeezed into ever-smaller enclaves, were convinced that the Iraqis and the Syrians would come to their aid.¹⁸

The Jordanians also made a mistake when they tried to bolster morale by broad-

casting extravagant claims of victory. Radio Amman claimed that, except for small pockets, Amman was in the hands of the government by Sept. 16. In fact, fierce fighting continued until Sept. 27. To the hunkered-down residents of Amman, the claims of victory, which were barely audible over the artillery explosions and the roar of gunfire, did little to promote the government's credibility. Once lost, credibility is very difficult to regain.

- *Perhaps the most significant of the lessons learned from this conflict is the importance of what Ralph Peters calls the "human terrain."*¹⁹ Reviewing the available literature on urban warfare, one is struck by the paucity of material dealing with the human aspect of urban warfare. The preponderance of the literature deals with the technical and tactical aspects; there is very little information on the sociology and character of the people. Knowledge of the people is imperative. In the Middle East, cultural knowledge, so sadly lacking in the

Radio Amman claimed that, except for small pockets, Amman was in the hands of the government by Sept. 16. In fact, fierce fighting continued until Sept. 27. To the hunkered-down residents of Amman, the claims of victory, which were barely audible over the artillery explosions and the roar of gunfire, did little to promote the government's credibility.

U.S. experiences in Beirut and in Somalia, is by far the most critical factor.

In Middle Eastern cities such as Cairo, there is a much more stable and orderly society than anything that we find in our own very mobile culture. In that stable society, everyone belongs somewhere. Citizens carry a card that identifies who they are and where they belong. The society's leadership is informal, but it is enduring, having passed through generations of the same family. The *zuama*, as they are called in some Arab countries, provide a stable leadership, even when the country is in

political chaos. It is essential that we know who those leaders are, who their constituents are, and where they reside.

Increasingly important also are the Muslim *ulama*, or religious leaders. Particularly in the poor districts or in immigrant "squatter" villages inside the city, the mosque is the center of daily life. In these districts, sectarian identification as Christian, Shia, Sunni, etc., has strengthened over the years. For example, the massive influx of Shia villagers from southern Lebanon into Beirut has produced a corresponding increase in Shia identification and militancy.

The SOF soldier must know the many fissures and the fault lines that define Middle Eastern urban society. A class system that resembles a caste system, a pervasive sense of religion, sectarian identification, and an inbred sense of distrust for authority combine to create a psychologically "target rich" environment. However, the Jordanian government did not capitalize on those fissures. The Palestinian community was by no means monolithic.²⁰ Some of its members had tied their fortunes to the Hashimite regime, and the well-known rivalries among Palestinian families and villages carried over into the refugee camps, but the actions of the Jordanian government served to drive together not only the disparate wings of the Palestinian community but also the factions within the PLO. Many of the Palestinian *Fedayeen* organizations were under the control of outside countries: *Saiqa* by Syria, the Arab Liberation Front by Iraq, etc. The Jordanians also failed to capitalize on that situation. Other groups, such as the Circassians and the Chechens, were allied with the Hashemite regime, while the Christians, for the most part, simply tried to stay out of harm's way.

However exploitable those fissures are, they are not amenable to amateur approaches. The subtle nuances of an urban Middle Eastern society are not readily visible to an unpracticed eye, and a little knowledge, poorly applied, may be more damaging than no knowledge at all. Ill-considered actions can generate enduring hostility, as did the actions of U.S. forces in



A Bosnian local interpreter (left) talks to a Bosnian resident who has a complaint about the construction of a road through his farm. In the Middle East, the use of indigenous personnel has many pitfalls.

Photo by Andrew Lockwood

Lebanon, when they allowed themselves to be identified as simply another warring faction in a civil war. Information, as well as psychological themes, must be focused like a narrow beam of light on the groups who are susceptible to the message.

Acknowledging the difficulty of understanding the urban society leads us to the issue of the advisability of using indigenous personnel either to formulate and implement the information and PSYOP programs, or to administer the population during a peacekeeping operation. Here, too, there are many pitfalls. This issue arose at the conclusion of the fighting in Amman, when the International Red Cross, with a large American medical contingent, arrived in Jordan. The difficulty of interfacing with the two mutually hostile populations — Jordanian and Palestinian — surfaced the prevailing custom of *wasta*, or third-party intercession. *Wasta* can be very useful, but only if it is thoroughly understood.

As Americans, we too easily fall prey to the notion that an Arab is an Arab, and we tend to view the Arab world as a monolithic ethnic and social entity. Nothing could be more erroneous.²¹ The Middle East abounds with people who purport to be influential and who will carry your message for a fee. Many of them do more harm

than good. Subtleties of names, dialects and pronunciation quickly identify people of the Middle East in terms of their social class, religion and origin — even to the point of identifying their village. The stereotypes by which Arabs label one another are often grotesque. For instance, the Palestinian cause is nearly sacred, but the individual Palestinian is everywhere suspect. Nor are Arabs particularly at home in Arab countries other than their own.²²

While astute observers of the Arab world in no way denigrate the very real and often passionate feeling of Arab solidarity, they have noted that the people of the Middle East have a multiplicity of identities, and depending upon the current environment, political or otherwise, those identities may change. In short, the indigenous ally who assists you in constructing an information program may not be knowledgeable of the target audience, or, as it often happens, he may have his own agenda, as did the Palestinian BBC newscasters in 1970.

Not only is urban warfare a *unique* form of war, it is by far the most *prevalent* form of war in the Middle East.²³ Going into a Middle Eastern city, hostile or otherwise, requires meticulous preparation and planning. In no other type of deployment will the immediate usefulness of a sound

knowledge of PSYOP and CA be so evident. Middle Eastern cities not only house the majority of their countries' populations, they also serve as the political, economic and military centers of their nations, and they will be the center of gravity in any conflict. As the Israeli, Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese armies found out, even overwhelming force does not guarantee success. Knowing the infrastructure of the city (e.g., the water lines, the power stations and the telephone exchanges) is a necessity, but knowledge of the city's infrastructure alone will not suffice.

Within the study of urban warfare, Middle Eastern style, there must be additional emphasis on studying the people. The SOF soldier must understand the "social map" of the city. He must know the various districts; their sectarian identities; their formal and informal leadership; the way the citizens live their daily lives; their means of supporting their families; their history; and their social, religious and cultural environments. The level of knowledge should be commensurate with that required by John Paul Vann of American district advisers in Vietnam. Vann exhorted the newly arrived U.S. advisers to learn the names of the village chiefs and to become familiar with the chiefs' families and political connections. Advisers also needed to know the local prices of rice, pork, sampans, beer, soft drinks, etc.²⁴

Knowledge of Arabic, or of the language of the region, is imperative. True fluency is a standard that few achieve, but all soldiers must have a working knowledge of the language. The ability to read signs, insignias and slogans; to ask directions; and to recognize ethnic and sectarian identities by name is a life-saving asset. Being able to recognize that the roadblock ahead is manned by the *Shabiya* (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) rather than by the *Fatah* is crucial. In 1970 Amman, that ability could have meant the difference between a Westerner being asked to give money or being dragged out of his vehicle and shot. Today, recognizing the difference between *Amal*, *Hizbollah*, *Hamas* and the Palestinian security police may have the same importance. This is the kind

of knowledge to which there are no shortcuts. There are no easy methods of assessing or quantifying it, and there is no way of programming it into a computer. The "terrain walks" so useful to tactical study have two counterparts in urban warfare: frequent on-the-ground exposure of the SOF soldier to the people of the cities and to their "rhythm of life," and the reinforcement of firsthand observations through a study of the region's literature and culture. Studying should not be confined to books on political science or history. Studying should include watching newscasts, soap operas, and movies such as *A Wedding in Galilee*, *West Beirut*, or the Egyptian docudrama *Nasser*. Reading the stories of Naguib Mahfouz, particularly "Midaq Alley" or "The Thief and the Dogs," can take one into Egyptian urban life in a way that no tract on political science can.

Certainly the lessons of Beirut, Amman, Mogadishu, Sarajevo and, lately, Grozny, should be readily apparent. But it often appears that the American fascination with technology, quick fixes and rapid, quantifiable results works against the time, depth of knowledge and patience that are necessary for educating and training SOF soldiers to the level of competence they must achieve if they are to be effective in a Middle Eastern urban environment. While it is apparent that there has been a recent reawakening of interest in urban warfare, the building of mock urban areas and training in block-to-block, city-fighting techniques is not sufficient for conditioning the force for urban combat. The brick-and-mortar approach to urban warfare, however useful and necessary, cannot substitute for political-military analysis and an understanding of the human terrain. ❌

Norvell B. DeAtkine is director of Middle East studies in the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. A retired Army colonel, he served more than 26 years as a member of the Field Artillery Branch and as a foreign-area offi-



cer. A 1959 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he completed the Army War College in 1981. In addition to his bachelor's degree from West Point, he holds a master's degree in Middle East studies from the American University in Beirut.

Notes:

¹ R.D. McLaurin, "The Battle Of Sidon" (Technical Memorandum 13-89: Aberdeen Proving Grounds Human Engineering Laboratory, 1989), 53. See also Ralph Peters, "The Human Terrain of Urban Warfare," *Parameters* 30 (Spring 2000).

² Daniel Bates and Amal Rassam, *Peoples and Culture of the Middle East* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), 183.

³ Speech by Major General Jack A. Walker to the American Defense Preparedness Association, Adelphi, Md., 9 December 1980.

⁴ Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, "Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025," *Parameters* 29 (Summer 1999):77.

⁵ Based largely on the work of Dr. Paul Jureidini of Armitage Associates, who with R.D. McLaurin (now deceased) was one of two pre-eminent experts in Middle Eastern urban warfare. Dr. Jureidini has studied and researched this aspect of warfare for more than 20 years.

⁶ David Lamb, *The Arabs: Journey Beyond the Mirage* (New York: Random House, 1988), 175.

⁷ R. D. McLaurin and Lewis D. Snider, "Recent Military Operations on Urban Terrain" (Technical Memorandum 12-92) (Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.: Human Engineering Laboratory, 1982), 20.

⁸ The Palestinians often referred to the Jordanian soldiers as the *al-huffa* (barefoot ones). See Abdullah M. Lutfiyya, *Baytin: A Jordanian Village* (London: Mouton, 1966), 87. On the other side, a senior Jordanian officer told me that the West Bank was lost to the Israelis in 1967 because the Jordanian army units that had a high proportion of Palestinians "ran like rabbits." This was a common refrain among East Bank Jordanians.

⁹ I saw many examples of this. This is also mentioned by James Lunt in *Hussein of Jordan* (New York: William Morrow, 1989), 122-23.

¹⁰ P.J. Vatikiotis, in his excellent study of the JAA, *Politics and Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion from 1921-1957* (London: Frank Cass, 1967), 132, wrote that the Legion virtually created the state of Jordan.

¹¹ The U.S. Embassy was surrounded by Palestinian forces for two weeks, and the water tanks on top of the building were riddled by mortar fragments and small-arms fire early, necessitating forays into the surrounding vacated homes to find water. An old lesson relearned was that one can do without food for a considerable time, but not without water.

¹² R.D. McLaurin, "The Battle of Tyre" (Technical Memorandum 15-87) (Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.: Human Engineering Laboratory, 1989), 37-39.

¹³ Philip P. Katz and R.D. McLaurin, "Psychological Operations in Urban Warfare: Lessons from the 1982 Middle East War" (Technical Memorandum 12-87) (Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.: Human Engineering

Laboratory), 4. The fragility of the social structure in both Iran and Iraq was not affected in any significant manner by propaganda from the opposing side. The Iraqi Shia remained loyal to Iraq, and the Iranian Arabs remained loyal to Iran, although as was subsequently seen, neither group was trusted by its government.

¹⁴ McLaurin, "The Battle of Sidon," 30-31.

¹⁵ McLaurin, "The Battle of Tyre," 37-39.

¹⁶ Attending the American University of Beirut, or AUB, from 1967 to 1970, I was struck by the symbiotic relationship between the Palestinians and Westerners attending the school. The university became known only half facetiously as "Guerrilla U." Symbolic of this relationship were the lectures to the university students by the world's only two-time aircraft hijacker, the modishly attired, English-speaking Leila Khaled. She was a former AUB student, as were two other leaders of the militant PFLP, George Habash and Wadie Hadad.

¹⁷ Lunt, 138.

¹⁸ On Sept. 20, the Hittin Brigade of the Palestinian Liberation Army, with elements of the Syrian 5th Mechanized Division (displaying Palestinian insignias) crossed the border, but they were denied air support by the commander of the Syrian air force, Hafez Al Assad, and they retreated three days later. The elements of two Iraqi divisions deployed in Jordan at the onset of the conflict returned to Iraq. Saddam Hussein was instrumental in the decision to recall them, and some believe that Jordan's stance in the 1991 Gulf War was a way of returning the favor.

¹⁹ Ralph Peters, "The Human Terrain."

²⁰ Joel Migdal, *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 118-19.

²¹ For one survey of attitudes, see Ralph R. Sell, "International Affinities in Modern Egypt: Results from a Social Distance Survey of Elite Students," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (February 1990), 71.

²² An Egyptian military psychologist who had accompanied the Egyptian forces into Yemen told me that the Egyptian forces had enormous problems with troop alienation and depression. The very provincial Egyptian soldier was an alien in the unique Yemeni culture. The same point is made in Manfred W. Wener's book, *Modern Yemen: 1918-1966* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 198-223.

²³ Since World War II, the majority of the conflicts have occurred in or around cities. The intense conflict in Jerusalem, in both 1948 and 1967; the Lebanese civil war; the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; the Syrian Sunni urban revolts in 1980 and in 1982; and the various phases of the Palestinian *intifadah* all attest to the primacy of urban warfare in the Middle East. As is the case in the rest of the developing world, the percentage of urbanites in the total population continues to rise dramatically as the high birth rates and continuing migrations to the cities add thousands monthly. Cairo now has nearly 15 million people.

²⁴ Jeffrey J. Clarke, *Advise and Support: The Final Years: The US Army in Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 66.

PSYOP Radio Operations in Bosnia: A Steady, Positive Drumbeat

by Major John Mills

From January 1997 to August 1997, elements of the United States Army Reserve's 11th Psychological Operations Battalion and personnel attached from other USAR PSYOP battalions deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the Psychological Operations Task Force, or POTF, they provided support to Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard.

The POTF's operations were a continuation of the support that USAR PSYOP had been contributing to the Implementation Force/Stabilization Force, or IFOR/SFOR, since late 1995, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, began its intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The deployment of the POTF marked the beginning of a new operational concept for PSYOP in Bosnia — the establishment of

an effective national commercial radio network that would support the IFOR/SFOR information campaign.¹ The network would enable the POTF to counteract virulent statements being broadcast in the national media, particularly on

radio, against the Dayton Peace Accords, or DPA.²

Bosnia situation — 1997

Bosnia-Herzegovina is a former state of the Yugoslavian Republic. Severe ethnic fighting began in Bosnia in 1992, but with the signing of the DPA in 1995, NATO began enforcing the peace there. The DPA established a zone of separation, or ZOS, a restricted area that separates the two major ethnic groups, the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs. A third ethnic group, the Bosnian Croats, live in pockets scattered throughout the areas occupied by the two major groups.

Bosnia is also separated into three multinational divisions, or MNDs: MND-North (headed by the Americans), MND-Southwest (headed by the British) and MND-Southeast (headed by the French). In each of the MNDs, additional NATO and non-NATO forces support IFOR/SFOR operations. During the period covered by this article, MND-North contained a Nordic-Polish brigade (NORDPOL), a Turkish brigade, a Russian brigade and a U.S. brigade.

Information campaign

The POTF received a mission-guidance letter from the headquarters of the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force, or CJICTF, in Sarajevo.³ The letter





This map shows the locations of the various units of the POTF.

listed 11 major tasks, but the following four were considered the most important:

- Enhance the safety and security of SFOR.
- Facilitate orderly peace implementation.
- Establish SFOR as a credible source of information.
- Limit the effectiveness of hostile propaganda, disinformation and political warfare.

Using the letter as a guide, the POTF developed the mission statement for the information campaign of MND-North. The mission statement said in part that PSYOP would “Educate and inform the local target audience of SFOR’s role and objectives in MND(N) and shape the opinions and behaviors of the population.”

It was clear that the operation would become a media war. While the members of the POTF were not media experts, they were experienced

in preparing PSYOP campaign-control plans. That experience enabled them to develop themes and to find methods of communicating those themes to the target audiences.

Disposition of PSYOP elements

The POTF headquarters was located at Eagle Base, an old airfield of the former Yugoslavian air force. Located south of Tuzla, Eagle Base held all the command-and-control resources for MND-North.

The POTF’s subordinate elements were three brigade PSYOP support elements, or BPSEs (now called tactical PSYOP detachments). Each BPSE was composed of 12-16 personnel who were organized into tactical PSYOP teams, or TPTs.

BPSE 10 was based at Camp McGovern, which was located in the ZOS, south of the city of Brcko. BPSE 10 had a satellite camp, Camp Colt, that had one TPT, which was led by an NCO.

BPSE 20 was based at Doboј and supported NORDPOL, which was composed of battalions from different Scandinavian and Baltic countries (some of them former members of the Warsaw Pact). NORDPOL personnel were highly trained, highly motivated and dedicated soldiers who proved to be eager to learn and willing to work with the American PSYOP forces.

BPSE 40 was based at Camp Doboј, a small camp located east of Tuzla. Camp Doboј and its satellite, Camp Demi, were



Photo courtesy John Mills

The commander of BPSE 10 (center) and the TF Eagle public affairs officer (right) lead the media working group in Brcko.



Photo courtesy John Mills

A member of the POTF uses a laptop computer to send e-mail. The low processor speed and the low memory capacity of the POTF's computers made it difficult to send and receive graphics files.

also located in the ZOS. BPSE 40 was later reorganized to provide support to Camp Bedrock, which focused on servicing Muslim areas in and around Tuzla.

Concept and implementation

When the POTF took the hand-off from the outgoing PSYOP task force, there were several issues that helped shape and focus the operational concept for the information campaign in MND-North.

The most pressing issue for the POTF was its lack of credibility with the supported unit, Task Force Eagle. Credibility suffered because it was virtually impossible for the POTF to provide a rapid response with hard-copy products. All of the information campaign's planning staff and production assets were located in Sarajevo, a three- to four-hour drive from Eagle Base. The centralization of production activities without a corresponding capability for quick delivery made the POTF appear to be unresponsive to the needs of tactical commanders.⁴ As a result, some of the leaders of MND-N formed an unfavorable opinion of the POTF. The production delays also meant that the rapidly rebuilt national media system (including broadcast and print journalism) was running circles around the information campaign and, in some cases, making it irrelevant.

Unreliable communications was another issue. Voice communications were accomplished via unsecure voice satellite, or VSAT, and via mobile subscriber equip-

ment, or MSE. Unfortunately, both methods experienced frequent outages because of technical difficulties. With VSAT, the time delay created by the bouncing of communications signals caused many conversations to be confusing. E-mail was sporadic because of technical problems, varying levels of user proficiency, and low processor speeds of the available laptop computers. The process of downloading large attachments was extremely slow. Overall, the reliability rate for internal and external communications efforts was below 50 percent. In June 1997, commercial phone service was introduced. Even though the commercial contractor greatly increased the quality and the reliability of telephone service, the lines were still unsecure.

Information-systems support was also a problem. The laptop computers were sufficient for report-writing, but because of their low processor speed, it was difficult for the POTF to produce graphics and pictures or to send products and reports between the different camps.

The final issue was that the SFOR leadership was afraid of releasing improperly screened material,⁵ and many high-ranking officers and political advisers insisted on reviewing and approving PSYOP products. The requirement not only slowed approvals down but also made it more difficult to get themes approved. As a result, some PSYOP themes that could have had a high impact were watered down, and the themes that received emphasis were "soft" — such as, "Be a courteous driver" and "Bosnians, please stay away from unexpended ordnance."

Brainstorming

We saw that our first challenge was to re-establish credibility. Our next challenge was to become more responsive to the operational and tactical situations in MND-N.

Resources were limited. We had no internal media-production capabilities. Our best turnaround time for a product to be delivered to tactical PSYOP teams was 2-3 weeks — woefully behind the response time of local media. Our primary printed products were the *Herald of Peace* and the *Herald of Progress*. These were good products, but they consumed most of our planning, approval and

production resources in Sarajevo. It was clear that we lacked a rapid-turnaround product. After brainstorming numerous concepts, we hit on the solution — radio.

Our radio-production capability was limited. Radio Mir in Sarajevo was producing various types of music tapes that contained intermittent soft-sell, radio-announcer voice-overs. Sometimes the voice-overs were in English, but most of the time they were in Muslim dialects of Serbo-Croatian. Most of the Bosnian stations played the music tapes, because they had very little of their own music to play.

Bosnia already had a well-developed national radio network whose stations were linked by phone, fax and, sometimes, e-mail. Because of animosities between the ethnic groups, civilian communications across the ZOS were denied by the various groups. In Muslim listening areas, there were normally multiple radio stations. Serb listening areas were usually limited to one station. Many of the Croat pockets also had a radio station. In all areas, unquestioned political allegiance to the dominant political party was required of radio-station management personnel.

We still had to resolve issues of production and distribution, and we had to improve the abilities of our radio announcers.⁶ We received guidance from headquarters regarding specific themes, and we produced our own list of themes for our sector: the decisiveness and effectiveness with which NATO and SFOR enforced the DPA; the benefits of cooperating with SFOR; the penalties for not complying with SFOR directives; economic success stories; and other positive aspects of the successful implementation of the DPA. Our goal was to broadcast a steady, positive drumbeat of open-source information that would, over time, reduce the aggressiveness of the target audience toward other ethnic and social groups.

MND-N urgently wanted more responsive information-campaign support, but the existing information products did not fill the voracious appetite that radio has for news. We decided to use radio to broadcast translations of open-source information from existing international news media (Reuters, the Associated Press and United Press International) to supplement the information products produced by the

headquarters of the CJICTF.

By offering stations translated products, we provided them with alternative news sources and a more balanced view of current events. At the same time, we chose products that matched the themes developed by the MND-N information-operations working group.⁷

Initial operations

The POTF's initial radio operations focused on producing tapes, which seemed to be the best way of packaging a prepared product and providing it to local radio stations for replay. Lacking an organic tape-production capability, we borrowed a professional-quality portable cassette deck that was equipped with a microphone.

Our initial tapes were unacceptable because of background noise. We tried producing tapes in several locations, including the basement of our dormitory building at Eagle Base, but we experienced constant interruptions and noise. We needed a dedicated broadcast booth and professional-quality equip-



Photo courtesy John Mills

ment. The answer was an MSQ-85B shelter.

The MSQ-85B mobile audiovisual shelter was at the time one of the primary systems of the PSYOP community. This HMMWV-mounted shelter was fielded during the 1980s. The shelter provided a complete capability for recording, editing and reproducing audio and video products. Had

A PSYOP specialist of the POTF (left) and one of the POTF's local interpreters work inside the MSQ-85B shelter.

it been equipped with an FM transmitter, it would have been a complete broadcast studio.⁸ The only MSQ-85B shelter in theater was located in Sarajevo, at the headquarters of the CJICTF. The headquarters was initially averse to releasing the system to us, but after several weeks of writing memorandums, negotiating and pleading, we were able to obtain the MSQ-85B.

The MSQ-85B gave the POTF a dedicated place in which to record, edit and reproduce audio tapes, and the quality of our audio tapes greatly improved. In addition to significantly reducing background noise, the shelter allowed us to mix in background theme music and to copy tapes much faster. We were also able to use higher-quality, metal tape rather than vinyl tape, which deteriorates rapidly.

We reproduced between 15 and 35 copies of each tape for dissemination through the three BPSEs. It took 2-3 days to translate, produce and copy a tape. At one point, we were measuring success by whether or not stations were playing our tapes. But several factors made us realize that tapes were not

the ideal solution: (1) Tape production was labor-intensive, requiring three translators and two or three soldiers from the Tuzla information-campaign team. (2) Tape quality still was not optimal, even though we were using higher-quality tapes and had a dedicated sound booth. (3) Our announcers needed to become more polished — the two Bosnian/Serbian announcers were fine, but the American translator spoke with a distinct Croatian/American accent. (4) Stations were still hesitant to play our tapes because they wanted control over the production of the products they were broadcasting. To alleviate the stations' concerns, we began writing and delivering scripts that stations could use in producing their own tapes.

Radio Mir operations

The POTF had one asset that could give us unfiltered access to the population in and around Brcko — the radio station at Camp McGovern. Its range was approximately 30 kilometers. Although the station provided a steady stream of “classic rock” into Brcko, its full capability was not being realized. Housed in a CONEX shipping container, the station was designed for replaying tapes, and it had no live-broadcast capability. We began planning to harness the potential of this radio operation.

In order to encourage the peace process, Ambassador Robert Farrand, the deputy high representative for Brcko, needed to encourage the populace to resettle and to rebuild. Major General Montgomery Meigs, then-commanding general of MND-N and TF Eagle, wanted to give Ambassador Farrand direct access to the population.

As a result, TF Eagle provided the funding we needed to construct a new radio facility. Once completed, the station included a sound booth, a control room, a production room and a reproduction room. With the finishing touches provided by our own personnel, the facility soon became an outstanding field-expedient broadcast facility. We also procured and installed a full suite of professional broadcast equipment. With the support of the TF Eagle division staff, the procurement process had moved along rapidly. What had begun as a brainstorming session in late Feb-



Photo courtesy John Mills

A member of the POTF displays a box of the audio tapes prepared for distribution to Bosnian radio stations.



Photo courtesy John Mills

Members of the POTF show a visitor the newly completed radio broadcast facility at Camp McGovern.

ruary had evolved into a fully operational live-broadcast facility by late May.

Although TF Eagle had provided the money for building the facility, the headquarters of the CJICTF considered the station to be a direct-support asset that should be controlled out of Sarajevo. But in order to proactively advocate Ambassador Farrand's themes and issues, the station would have to greatly improve its operating procedures. Eventually, we made arrangements with the Information Campaign Task Force to give the ambassador and his designated speakers live airtime twice a week.

To operate 18 hours per day, the station would require personnel and labor to fill the airtime. In the end, the additional personnel needed to operate the radio station came from the staff of BPSE 10. However, the resulting shortage of personnel degraded the other BPSE 10 operations and detracted from other important radio-support operations such as polling and surveying. The labor shortage was never fully resolved; as a result, neither the radio operation nor the field activities of the Brcko information campaign could be fully exploited.

Maturity

In late May, the radio operation hit its full stride, producing and distributing 5-10 scripts per week. Our first real opportunity to affect the local situation came in July 1997, when the SFOR captured two Ser-

bians who had been indicted as war criminals. We produced and released 27 scripts that addressed this first direct action by SFOR against indicted war criminals. The Serbian stations, which served the primary audiences we wanted to reach, initially refrained from using our scripts. For several days (in some cases, weeks) after the arrest of the two Serbians, some of the radio-station managers who had been cooperating with BPSE 20 would not even allow BPSE personnel to visit their stations. Their reluctance reflected the anxiety that all of the radio-station managers felt about appearing to be too friendly to SFOR.

Our major objective was to put out a message that would forcefully explain the SFOR's right, under international law and under the DPA, to seize indicted war criminals. We translated press releases from the Coalition Press Information Center, or CPIC, in an attempt to counter the tirade of messages being broadcast in Serbian-controlled areas. Only a handful of Serb stations accepted our translated press releases, but the Muslim stations readily broadcast them. We counted on Serbs listening surreptitiously to Muslim broadcasts in order to get a different point of view on current events.⁹

We also focused our messages on other situations. Dobojo, a predominantly Muslim town before hostilities began, had been seized by Serbian elements. One objective of the DPA

was to encourage Dobož refugees to return to Dobož and to resettle in their former homes. The SFOR mission around Dobož was to monitor the resettlement process and to ensure that it was peaceful. We produced radio scripts addressing resettlement. These were aimed at Serbian elements around Dobož. The message was clear — SFOR had the resolve and the ability to enforce peaceful resettlement. Although fewer than 100 families became involved in the resettlement efforts during the summer of 1997, the fact that they attempted to move back was remarkable.

We also produced eight scripts that addressed the problem of illegal police checkpoints. One of the basic tenets of the DPA was freedom of movement. However, after the withdrawal of SFOR forces from ZOS checkpoints in mid-May 1997, police in the Republic of Srpska, or RS, set up a number of illegal police checkpoints to “shake down” Muslims and Croats and to extort payments from them for having crossed into Srpska. The checkpoints had a distinctly chilling effect on cross-ZOS travel. SFOR took direct measures to disarm and detain the police officers, and by mid-July 1997, RS police had abandoned the illegal practice.

Other radio scripts encouraged the commercial markets that had developed at checkpoints Arizona and Virginia.¹⁰ The markets provided civil and economic interaction between the ethnic entities. Scripts also presented economic success stories, promoted

cross-ZOS trade, informed listeners of employment and aid opportunities in areas that cooperated with the implementation of the DPA, and carried news of decisive actions by SFOR to disrupt and detain elements that opposed the implementation of the DPA.

Other POTF communication projects included planning cooperative efforts with the USAID and Voice of America, or VOA; broadcasting live weekly radio shows over Radio Tuzla; broadcasting scripts of joint press conferences with the U.N. and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE; and establishing the media working group at Camp McGovern.

Our efforts with the USAID and VOA did not bear fruit while we were in country, but they laid the groundwork for future implementation efforts. We proposed to USAID and to VOA that we would provide an on-the-ground “sales force” that would offer grants from the USAID Office of Transition Initiative to key local stations. The grants were to be cash awards and equipment purchases worth up to \$20,000 — an amount that would greatly enhance a local station’s broadcast capability. We also proposed establishing e-mail connectivity between our production facilities and the local stations, and providing a satellite dish for down-linking VOA programming from satellite.

Each week, at Radio Tuzla, we produced and broadcast a 30-minute show that came to be titled “The Week in SFOR.” We used the

A U.S. PSYOP soldier and a DoD translator patrol the Arizona market area of Bosnia during Operation Joint Endeavor.



Photo by William E. Lee



Photo by Henry S. Block

An interpreter working for U.S. PSYOP forces interviews residents of Brcko. While interviews are one of the best ways of measuring the effectiveness of radio broadcasts, they are labor-intensive.

show to broadcast our themes to the Tuzla valley corridor. The show incorporated a segment during which our interpreters interviewed U.S. Army Reserve personnel about their lives, their duties as citizens, and their civilian careers in the U.S. Our goal was to present a model of a functional society.

The CPIC held weekly press conferences with both the U.N. and the OSCE. We took the transcripts of the press conferences, converted them into radio scripts, and distributed the scripts to local stations. Following up a press conference with a translated radio script proved to be an effective package for presenting a message.

We also developed a media working group (at Camp McGovern) to encourage interaction between journalists of the hostile ethnic factions. The public affairs officer for TF Eagle gave information briefings to the journalists on the roles and responsibilities of journalists in a democratic society. Although the journalists did not talk a great deal with their colleagues from the other factions, their willingness to be seen in the same room with them was an indication of success.

Impact and effectiveness

The impact and the effectiveness of our radio broadcasts were difficult to pinpoint. While we cannot say that broadcasts alone

converted Bosnian opponents to the DPA, certainly when we evaluate the combined effects of SFOR activities, including the radio campaign, there is no question that the SFOR was successful in slowly quelling the rebelliousness of the Bosnian Serbs.

One of the best ways of measuring the effectiveness of radio broadcasts is to conduct interviews with samples of the population, but surveys are labor-intensive, and it was difficult for the POTF to shift personnel from production and distribution to conducting surveys. In one survey that we did conduct, we found that among the stations in the Brcko listening area, Radio Mir was one of the top five, having earned a market share of 10 percent.

Short of conducting interviews, one of the most effective ways of determining the success of the POTF's radio campaign would have been to assess the willingness of local radio-station managers to accept our radio products. In the Muslim areas, managers accepted almost all of our products, even those that presented Muslim participation in the DPA in a less-than-positive light. But in the Serb areas, the managers did not hesitate to reject any product they felt was questionable. PSYOP soldiers built relationships with the Serbian station managers in order to give those managers the confidence to accept U.S. products on a regular basis.

After we began offering the station man-

agers scripts instead of tapes, their willingness to accept our products increased. Using our scripts allowed them to have more control over production and presentation than using our tapes did. Because radio-station managers held their positions at the approval of the dominant party, they could be considered key members of the area. Their acceptance of the scripts was a good indication of the area's cooperation.

Lessons learned

We learned a variety of lessons in Bosnia. Some involved areas of information operations and PSYOP that had not been previously addressed.

We learned that producing and disseminating paper products (such as posters, handbills and magazines) was extremely labor-intensive.

Many of the legal, political and military leaders insisted on having input in the development of PSYOP themes and products. This is not the way media organizations are run. We learned that when more than a few people are involved in developing a concept, the administrative burden of staffing destroys timeliness.

The information campaign initially focused on soft themes in hard copy; there was a hesitancy to use radio to compete with existing local radio news media. Part of that hesitancy

stemmed from a lack of appreciation for modern media procedures. PSYOP training should emphasize the media's focus on immediate responses. Without the confidence and the ability to respond rapidly, the PSYOP task force will appear to be lethargic.

Although we increased the number of PSYOP products and shortened the turn-around time,¹¹ the product-approval process from Sarajevo still took at least 10 days — too long to achieve decisiveness, momentum and agility. Compared to the local media, SFOR appeared to be cumbersome. The only approvals that came quickly from CJICTF were those for leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts. Those products are effective when modern media systems have been destroyed by warfare, but by January 1997, Bosnian radio had been re-established.

Training for PSYOP and for information operations should include aspects of commercial sales training. Establishing relationships with radio-station personnel should be considered a long-term campaign of persuasion. Rapport with radio-station personnel can easily be damaged or destroyed by a lack of appreciation for the sensitive nature of the relationship. U.S. Army Reserve personnel who were familiar in their civilian professions with relationship-building excelled at establishing this rapport. However, those who did not have sales backgrounds were easily disappointed

A U.S. PSYOP soldier distributes leaflets to citizens of Brcko, urging them to turn in arms and ammunition. Designing, producing and distributing printed products requires large amounts of time.



Photo by Henry S. Block

by the brusque nature of some radio-station personnel, and they “sold” the radio programs either half-heartedly or not at all.

More emphasis should be placed on integrating and coordinating the information activities of all elements involved in international political-military operations. There was little apparent coordination among the elements of the International Stabilization Force, U.S. government agencies, foreign government agencies and nongovernment entities.

Interpreters were key to the success of the operation in Bosnia. Local nationals were more effective as interpreters than hired Americans who had a Slavic background. The Americans could not compare in speed, expression or overall ability to read or produce a script. The local nationals also assisted us during the process of building relationships with the local radio stations.

Summary

From January to August 1997, the information campaign in Bosnia used local radio to communicate the SFOR message to the formerly warring factions. While it was difficult to precisely measure the program’s effectiveness, the success of the combined efforts of the SFOR was reflected by a lack of active hostilities. The radio program laid the groundwork for establishing long-lasting relationships with the local radio-station managers and personnel — some of the people who controlled what was being communicated in Bosnia. Unless an information operation develops a strategy for building alliances with these personnel, as well as for using the most effective media and production processes, the operation will only be going through the motions of establishing information dominance. ✂

Major John Mills is secretary of the general staff for the 352nd Civil Affairs Command in Riverdale Park, Md. He has served with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 2nd Infantry Division, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, and with several PSYOP and Civil Affairs units.



Major Mills has served overseas assignments in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Korea and Bosnia during peacetime and in combat operations. In civilian life, he is a management and program analyst at the Federal Aviation Administration. Major Mills has a bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington and a master’s degree in business administration from Golden Gate University. He is currently mobilized and assigned to the J-33 Special Operations Division as a CENTCOM action officer to support Operation Enduring Freedom.

Notes:

¹ “Information campaign” was the official title for U.S. military psychological-operations activities in Bosnia during the period covered by this article.

² On July 3, 1997, during a press conference in Sarajevo, David Foley, of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, said, “It is clear that Radovan Karadzic [the leader of the Bosnian Serbs] continues to exercise influence in Pale. ... We believe he exercises a pernicious and destructive influence on the peace process and the Dayton Agreement. ... It is obvious that Republik Srpska authorities will not live up to their commitments under the Dayton Agreement to deliver him to the Hague.” Foley’s quote shows the continuing influence of hostile Bosnian Serbs. Some of that influence was evidenced in vitriolic radio broadcasts from stations in the Republic of Srpska.

³ Mission-guidance letter dated Feb. 1, 1997.

⁴ The best possible turnaround of products occurred during the initial capture of indicted war criminals and during the crisis in the Republic of Srpska. However, even then, the length of time from the initiation of a product to the dissemination of the product to the target audience was 10 days for hard copy and seven days for a radio script. When compared to local media-response times, these times rendered the products irrelevant.

⁵ This concern was constantly relayed by leaders of the Sarajevo information campaign and by others in SFOR leadership positions.

⁶ This was further discussed with personnel from the 4th PSYOP Group during a meeting in Sarajevo in July 1999. Concern over the reliability of radio personalities had been expressed by members of EUCOM staff from the very beginning of information operations in Bosnia.

⁷ The Land Information Warfare Activity, based at Fort Belvoir, Va., maintained a forward presence at Eagle Base to coordinate information operations.

⁸ U.S. Army public-affairs units have similar systems with a broadcast capability.

⁹ Feedback from tactical PSYOP teams supported this “cross-listening.”

¹⁰ The Arizona Market was also known as a hub of legal, semi-legal and illegal trade.

¹¹ A review of the message log of the previous rotation of PSYOP forces showed only a 10-percent approval rate — and the response time for the items that were eventually approved and received was several weeks.

Historical Vignette: Two Combat Glider Landings in One Day

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

In August 1944, the Allies conducted Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France, in an attempt to secure southern French seaports and to relieve German pressure in the Normandy area. Although nearly one-third of Major General Robert T. Frederick's First Airborne Task Force, or FABTF, became casualties during the controversial operation,¹ General Jacob L. Devers, commander of the VI Army Group, and Lieutenant Colonel William P. Yarborough, commander of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, or PIB (which was part of the FABTF), later called Operation Dragoon the most successful Allied airborne assault of World War II.

Technical Sergeant Dane Wolfe, a soldier in the newly activated 512th Airborne Signal Company (the ancestor of today's 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion) had a different view of the operation.

Many of Operation Dragoon's glider-assault casualties were later attributed to the soldiers' "failing to properly absorb instruction."² Official after-action reports detailed extensive pre-mission glider training for the quickly assembled U.S. units of the FABTF. The 512th AB Signal Company, as it was referred to, along with its sister companies (antitank, chemical, aviation and medical), had received glider training

in Italy from the 550th Airborne Infantry Battalion in July and August of 1944. Soldiers learned to load and secure equipment in the CG-4A Waco gliders, and to rapidly exit the gliders and assemble under simulated combat conditions.³

Planners of Operation Dragoon had calculated that the FABTF would require more than 400 American Waco and 50 British Horsa gliders for the assault. But during the hectic weeks before the invasion, they discovered that there were fewer than 100 Wacos in the Mediterranean theater. As the Allies frantically attempted to assemble and flight-test more than 300 new gliders before the mission, very few of the newly designated glidermen got the chance to make practice flights. Drawing on lessons learned in Normandy, the Allies assigned two pilots to each glider, and planned to use Griswold devices (iron tripods) to reinforce the noses of the Waco gliders. The tripods were meant to protect the aircrew and deflect anti-glider obstacles, but because of a shortage of the Griswold devices, none were installed.⁴

When Major William L. James, the FABTF signal officer, asked Wolfe if he would go in without any glider training, Wolfe replied: "Let's get this 'GD' war over with ... but give me that 50 dollars more a month for my wife!" Wolfe said that he was "familiarized" with the glider when the 512th took off for France on the morning of Aug. 15, 1944.⁵



Technical
Sergeant
Dane Wolfe

USASOC archive



112th SOSB archive

Members of the 512th Airborne Signal Company stand alongside a glider prior to Operation Dragoon.

Around 7 a.m., Wolfe's glider was pulled airborne from one of the three departure airfields near Rome. The Waco carried two pilots, Major James, Wolfe and four other signalmen, a Harley-Davidson motorcycle, several reels of W110 telephone wire, a footlocker filled with field phones, and two crates of carrier pigeons. Once their serial of 35 Wacos had cleared the mainland, James instructed Wolfe to send a pigeon back with a message. While watching to make sure that the pigeon flew away unharmed, Wolfe was suddenly pitched forward. The glider had been prematurely released by its C-47 tug. One of the glider pilots said, "Boys, we're going down," and the pilots aligned the craft for a landing in the three-foot waves of the Mediterranean.⁶

A perfect landing kept the glider intact. Wolfe, who had been unable to strap himself in, was the first to scramble out and inflate his Mae West life preserver. An air-rescue plane circling overhead spotted the Waco and dropped three rubber boats nearby. Because the soldiers had not been briefed on emergency-ditching procedures, they continued to wear their boots, clothing and equipment. Wolfe even retained his steel helmet. One soldier, Private Tommy Wright, was injured during the landing. Once Wright had been put into a rubber boat, Major James mentioned that there was a bottle of whiskey in his field pack. James' driver quickly dove to recover the bottle, and by the time

a Royal Air Force rescue boat arrived, the six glidermen and two pilots had taken on more than seawater.⁷

The six glidermen were soon ashore, but their relief that their misfortune had gotten them out of the invasion was short-lived. Soon Major James announced, "We'll be going back in this afternoon," and by 5 p.m., Wolfe was aboard another Waco, bound for Le Muy, France. The six men were spread among 350 gliders assigned to transport the 550th Airborne Infantry Battalion and the 676th Medical Company. Wolfe joined a "bunch of pill-rollers" (medics) and a jeep trailer loaded with medical supplies. Only Wolfe and the two pilots were armed. On this trip, Wolfe made it to France, but his glider lost its left wheel upon landing and spun into a vineyard. Again, Wolfe was the first one to exit the Waco. He was met by two Scots paratroopers from the British 2nd Airlanding Brigade of the FABTF who offered him a drink from a liberated bottle of German schnapps. Thus, Wolfe had survived two combat glider landings — one wet and one dry — in a single day, and he had celebrated each landing with a toast.

Unbeknownst to Wolfe and the rest of the FABTF, the morning and late-afternoon paratroop and glider assaults had been observed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill from the British destroyer *Kimberley* offshore.⁸

Wolfe's relatively safe glider-landing

experiences were the exception to the rule in the Le Muy area on Aug. 15. Morning and afternoon glider landings encountered thick smog produced by aircraft bombing, naval gunfire, and the fires that the bombing and gunfire produced. In the smog, some gliders were released early. Others overflowed their landing areas and circled back, squarely into the path of the follow-on C-47 flights. Scores of gliders were weaving and darting about, trying to avoid mid-air collisions and dangling tow ropes.

As they approached the ground, pilots could see that the landing areas were littered with obstacles known as *Rommelspargel* (Rommel's asparagus) and with



USASOC archive

The landing area at Le Muy was chaos as gliders crashed into trees, poles and ditches.

gliders that had wrecked during earlier landings. The pilots instinctively looked for clear areas, and, inevitably, too many selected the same areas. Glider wings were torn off as the Wacos crashed through orchards, vineyards and fields of *Rommelspargel*. Fuselages burst apart as the gliders slammed into poles and ditches at high speeds.⁹ Waco pilot Lieutenant Ellsworth Dewberry remarked: "You could mush those bastards (Wacos) in at 50 miles an hour real easy with a full load. A lot of guys landed at 60, 70, 80 miles an hour."¹⁰

Landing areas were total chaos. Paratroopers moving to their assembly areas darted about, zigzagging among the trees and vineyards in an attempt to avoid the gliders that were crash-landing all around them. "Glider were coming in all over the place. You were more scared of being hit by a glider than by enemy fire," recalled Technical Sergeant Dave Muñoz, a medic in Company C, 551st PIB. "As one Waco came

down in an orchard between the trees, its wings were shucked off before the glider hit a big tree and disintegrated. The bodies just flew," said Technical Sergeant Ralph Wenthold, S-2 section, 551st PIB. "One glider was going to crash into some tall trees, so the pilot pulled it up on its tail and banked it over to miss them. Then a wing tip caught one of the big anti-glider stakes and (the glider) just cart-wheeled, crashing into the ground. There were quite a few that came sliding in just fine. Then another glider would land from another direction and smash right into them," said Sergeant Doug Dillard, Company A communications, 551st PIB.¹¹ Surveying the carnage around the wrecked gliders, Major Ray "Pappy" Herrington, 551st PIB, muttered to a companion, "I'll stick to parachutes."¹²

Yet in the midst of the chaos, jeep engines rumbled, motorcycles roared and squads of glidermen stumbled from the debris of wrecked Wacos and headed toward their unit assembly areas.¹³ Outside the initial FABTF command post near Le Miton, Wolfe found one of the other signalmen who had crashed into the Mediterranean with him that morning. As the fellow worked to repair French telephone lines so that he could make his switchboard operational, medics were splinting his broken leg.¹⁴

Ironically, one of the missions assigned to the French resistance and the FABTF paratroopers was to cut underground and overhead telephone, telegraph and teletype lines to disrupt German communications. Both groups did outstanding jobs, but as the Germans had already learned, the mountainous plateaus along the coast of southern France created enough interference to make radio communications ineffective.¹⁵

Despite all problems, by early evening on Aug. 15, the FABTF had established communications between all elements, and the orders for the following day had been issued.¹⁶ According to Wolfe, it was a constant effort for the 512th wire teams to keep the switchboards connected, especially as the battalion command posts moved into more rugged mountainous terrain. Theater signal units rehabilitated more than 1,700 miles of French telephone lines;

they had to string less than 150 miles of their own W110 telephone wire to maintain telephone and teletype circuits. Tactical wire was used only to fill gaps in areas still under German artillery fire. Artillery fire caused major command posts to relocate into the Riviera cities. But even while operating out of the Hotel Alhambra in Nice, the FABTF had to establish switchboard relays at the edge of the plateaus above the coast in order to maintain communications with forward-deployed combat units.¹⁷

After the FABTF was dissolved, the 512th Signal Company became the basis of the 112th Airborne Signal Battalion, which supported the 1st Allied Airborne Army headquarters in Maisons Laffitte, near Reims, France. Wolfe's final mission with the 112th was to supervise the VIP and general-officer switchboard during the Potsdam Conference, which was held July 17-Aug. 2, 1945.¹⁸

During the Sept. 7, 2001, reunion of the 112th Signal Battalion, Wolfe, now 82, was awarded a maroon beret with the 112th flash. Although Wolfe is proud of his World War II combat service with the 45th Infantry Division in Sicily and at Cassino and Anzio in Italy, he says that his service with the 512th AB Signal Company tops his war memories. "When I got the call to join the 512th AB, I knew the 'AB' stood for 'Airborne,' and I was thrilled. I was happy. I had worked with the 82nd Airborne guys before, in Sicily and Anzio, and really liked that."¹⁹

Very few World War II glidermen made two combat assaults in a single day. Fewer still were fortunate enough to toast their accomplishments in the Mediterranean Sea and on the French Riviera afterward. ✕

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Notes:

¹ William B. Breuer, *Operation Dragoon: The Allied Invasion of the South of France* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987), 13, 247; Robert H. Adleman and

Colonel George Walton, *The Champagne Campaign* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969), 129.

² Adleman and Walton, 72.

³ U.S. Department of War, *512th Airborne Signal Company: Historical Record – 14 July 1944 to 10 February 1945* (Berlin, Germany, 1945); Michel De Trez, *First Airborne Task Force: Pictorial History of the Allied Paratroopers in the Invasion of Southern France* (Wezembeek-Oppem, Belgium: D-Day Publishing, 1998), 444.

⁴ Milton Dank, *The Glider Gang: An Eyewitness History of World War II Glider Combat* (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott Co., 1977), 157; Breuer, 200.

⁵ Recorded interview with Dane Wolfe by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, at Fort Bragg, N.C., 7 September 2001; Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, *United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: Riviera to the Rhine* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993), 91.

⁶ Wolfe interview.

⁷ Wolfe interview; Dank, 144; Breuer, 150.

⁸ Wolfe interview; Dank, 164-65.

⁹ Breuer, 196.

¹⁰ Dank, 159.

¹¹ Dan Morgan, *The Left Corner of My Heart: The Saga of the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion* (Wauconda, Wash.: Alder Enterprises, 1984), 185, 186, 189, 190.

¹² Breuer, 198.

¹³ De Trez, 448; Wolfe interview.

¹⁴ Wolfe interview.

¹⁵ Clarke and Smith, 80-81, 96; Adleman and Walton, 111.

¹⁶ Adleman and Walton, 111; Breuer, 150.

¹⁷ George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, *United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services: The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-1943 Through 1945)* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966), 129; Clarke and Smith, 212-13; Wolfe interview.

¹⁸ Recorded interview with Myron Berman, former member of the 112th Airborne Signal Battalion, by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, in Raleigh, N.C., 1 May 2001; Wolfe interview.

¹⁹ Wolfe interview.

From OSS to USSOCOM: Lessons Learned

by Colonel James M. Coyne

On Sept. 11, 2001, the continental United States was the victim of terrorist attacks of unprecedented nature and scope. The U.S. military was our first line of defense, and on Oct. 19, 2001, the

U.S. began conducting raids into Afghanistan, using Army Special Forces and Rangers. Today, more than ever, special-operations forces, or SOF, are critical to the national security strategy of the U.S.

Many of today's SOF can trace their origins to World War II and the efforts of William J. Donovan.¹ Donovan, a Wall Street attorney who had earned the Medal of Honor during World War I,

approached President Franklin D. Roosevelt with the proposition of creating a small organization consisting of highly trained and motivated individuals who would be invaluable at the strategic level.

In 1941, in response to Donovan's proposition, Roosevelt established the Office of the Coordinator of Information, or COI.

Later, when it became clear that the COI was to be disbanded, Donovan recommended establishing an organization similar to the British Special Operations Executive, or SOE. SOE was a paramilitary offshoot of the British Secret Intelligence Service. SOE's mission was to harass the German army by building and arming European resistance movements.

In June 1942, the COI was dissolved. In its place, the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, was established. The OSS comprised the Research and Analysis Section, the Secret Intelligence Section and the Special Operations Section. The OSS was the predecessor of both the Central Intelligence Agency and Army Special Forces.

From the beginning, Donovan had to fight for money, not only for hiring the OSS staff, but also for OSS recruiting, training and operations. Although the battle for money persisted throughout the war years, Donovan succeeded in acquiring necessary funds, mainly because of his dominant personality.

OSS charter

The OSS charter included "the planning, development, coordination and execution of the military program for psychological warfare" and "the compilation of such political, psychological, sociological and economic information as may be required by military operations." Throughout the war,



National Archives

Major General William J. Donovan's vision led to the creation of the OSS, the predecessor of both the CIA and today's Army Special Forces.



File photo

The regional focus, language skills and cultural familiarity of today's SOF are critical to operations in politically sensitive areas.

the OSS participated in sabotage, espionage, subversion, unorthodox warfare and propaganda against Germany and Japan. Donovan's idea of unorthodox warfare included destroying the will of enemy forces; collecting information on the enemy's capabilities and intentions; destroying or disrupting the enemy's lines of communication before, during and after the battle; and preparing the way for conventional forces. The job of executing these unorthodox-warfare missions in enemy territory fell to the OSS operational groups, or OGs.

OG missions

The OGs were efficient, mobile, self-sufficient units capable of raising and organizing resistance groups; coordinating the operations of resistance groups with the main forces; gathering intelligence; conducting hit-and-run operations; rescuing prisoners of war; countering enemy guerrilla units; and conducting sabotage and subversive operations. They operated in secret, and they often served as the personal troops of the supreme commander. The OGs demonstrated not only that sabo-

tage could be as effective as aerial bombardment, but also that saboteurs were more accurate, more economical and less likely to suffer casualties than aviators.

The qualifications of the men and women that the OSS recruited were crucial. The OSS sought volunteers who were paratroopers; had language skills; were specialists in demolitions, special weapons and scouting; were wireless operators; and were skilled in fieldcraft.

Those early "special forces" deserve a great deal of credit for today's special operations, which are characterized by small units involved in direct and indirect military activities. Modern SOF perform missions that are generally of an operational or strategic objective. SOF are regionally focused, and they possess the language skills, cultural familiarity and maturity that are crucial for operations in politically sensitive areas. SOF operations are inherently joint, and they differ from conventional operations in the degree of risk that forces encounter. Regardless of the military service involved, SOF's operational techniques, modes of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indige-

nous assets remain common factors.

Although the special-operations community has progressed greatly since the early days of World War II, many of the lessons learned 60 years ago are still being applied today in the areas of recruiting; training; military missions; unity of effort; and legal considerations and restraints.

USSOCOM creation

Two lessons that were slow to be applied were the need for unity of command and the need for an independent budget. In 1986, the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, finally put those lessons into effect. USSOCOM is a unified combatant command under which all the service-component SOF (the Army Special Operations Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command, and the Air Force Special Operations Command) fall.

The existence of a unified command for SOF has provided three distinct advantages. First, as a supporting and supported command, USSOCOM can provide ready and trained SOF to the regional commanders in chief, and when directed by the national command authorities, USSOCOM is capable of conducting selected special operations of a strategic nature under its own command. Second, having a single commander for all SOF has promoted SOF interoperability. Command and control during operations is simplified because of the creation of an in-theater special-operations command and the ability to establish a joint special-operations task force. Third, the establishment of Major Force Program-11 funds has given the commander in chief of USSOCOM his own checkbook for funding special-operations programs and purchasing special-operations equipment.

SOF still have unique requirements for recruiting and training. In fact, those requirements are more critical now than in the past, because SOF missions have expanded since World War II. SOF missions now include direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, combating terrorism, psychological operations, civil affairs, counterproliferation, information opera-

tions and numerous collateral activities.

The four SOF truths are:

- Humans are more important than hardware;
- Quality is better than quantity;
- Special-operations forces cannot be mass-produced;
- Special-operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

The order of the SOF truths is appropriate, for the single most important asset of SOF has always been people. Of the nearly 16,000 men and women who served in the OSS, only 143 lost their lives during World War II; approximately 300 were wounded or captured. These numbers show that it does not necessarily require an outpouring of blood to cause the enemy severe damage. Members of special-operations units are gallant, honorable and valuable soldiers who should not be wasted.

The OSS is the foundation of today's SOF, and the lessons learned by the OSS are reflected in the recruiting, training, capabilities and command and control of USSOCOM. Considering the unsettled nature of the threats to the U.S., the capabilities of both SOF and USSOCOM are critical in supporting the national security strategy of the 21st century. ✂

Colonel James M. Coyne is the staff judge advocate for V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany. He wrote this article while he was a student at the U.S. Army War College in 2001.

Notes:

¹ Anthony Cave Brown, *Wild Bill Donovan – The Last Hero* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984).

Letters

Special Warfare

New UW definitions may affect clarity of doctrine

I read the recent issue of *Special Warfare* [Winter 2001] that was dedicated to the subject of unconventional warfare, or UW, with great interest. I also can say truly that I read it with mixed emotions.

First, I was pleased to see the magazine being largely employed for professional discussion. For too long, the Army's branch magazines have had to see honors in this important area go to the Naval Institute's *Proceedings* and to the *Marine Corps Gazette*.

At the same time, I was concerned about the UW direction that some of the authors advocated. Colonel Kershner's statement, "All other tasks are subsets of this overarching mission [UW]," and Captain Wilson's statement, "Under the new definition, many missions of foreign internal defense, or FID, are better classified as UW. Coalition support and counterinsurgency missions also fall under the UW umbrella," were equally disturbing.

Adopting their collective view would be a mistake that would affect both doctrinal clarity and special-operations unity. Moreover, we would be taking a step 30 years backward.

A bit of history — a look at the "bad old days" — may illuminate my concerns. The services' special-operations forces — Special Forces, SEALs, USAF Air Commando squadrons — were born and grew up in organizational isolation, not only within their parent services

but also (initially) from each other.

At first, there were few joint activities, and there was no joint structure for special-operations, or SO. Many years of evolution resulted in a very austere joint structure. Eventually, each of the regional commands developed a small staff organization for handling what is now called special operations. Each of these organizations was unique in size, structure, authority, function and even title. Only the U.S. European Command, or EUCOM, had even a skeletal standing joint unconventional warfare task force, or JUWTF, which was the doctrinal predecessor of the modern special-operations commands, or SOCs.

Nor did the joint structure have any real charter for promulgating doctrine: With limited exceptions, doctrine was a service matter. The result of these conditions was that each service developed its own doctrine and terms. What the SF operator called "unconventional warfare," the air commando called "special operations." The SEAL, bred in Navy self-sufficiency and independence, used the term "special warfare."

Each service's warriors knew what their own terms meant and encompassed. The SF operators knew that "unconventional warfare" and its major aspect, guerrilla warfare, were the principal activities, followed by the later-added foreign internal defense (usually called counterinsurgency, or COIN), and special operations, the last term roughly equivalent to the modern "direct action." The Air Force operators knew equally

well that "special operations" was the collective term and that unconventional warfare, COIN, etc., were its components. The SEALs knew that the members of the other services were misguided, if not totally bereft of rationality: It was clearly evident that "special warfare" encompassed all the tasks required by the regional CINCs and fleet admirals.

As long as the SO elements were small and had little contact outside their services, the variations among their terms had little impact. Clearly, in order to conduct an intelligent professional conversation, special operators of the different services had to repeatedly define their terms, but this was acceptable.

By the mid-1970s, the situation was about to change. The SO forces had served with distinction (if little recognition) in the long Southeast Asia war; they had survived years of postwar neglect; and they were being increasingly supported by the CINCs, if not (excepting the Navy) by their parent services. The war, common misery under service neglect, and most important, years of activity in joint exercises, had created numerous bonds: personal, professional and intellectual.

A common body of professional terms was a necessity. This requirement was broader than just communications between the *cognoscenti*. Joint staff actions — and most special operations-related actions were joint in nature — if they weren't to be accompanied by a glossary, required accepted terms that adequately and pre-

cisely described the subjects, participants and activities. If such actions were to progress smoothly, they would have to be read and understood by the staff officers and the commanders receiving them, regardless of their parent services. There were enough problems acquiring assets in an always-restrained environment: It was unacceptable to fail merely because some intermediate staff officer had read an action through "service glasses."

In the mid-1970s, an effort to establish a JUWTF, similar to EUCOM's, in each CINC's headquarters was unsuccessful. The need was acknowledged by the joint commands, which was an indication of some progress, but the service assets were not forthcoming. That effort, however, did give birth to an alternative solution. A single JUWTF was established under the title of Joint Special Operations Support Element, or JJOSE, with the duty of supporting all the CINCs' needs for special-operations expertise.

JJOSE was based at MacDill AFB, Fla., and was manned with highly qualified personnel from the three services. The JJOSE personnel supported all the CINCs' exercises that included UW/SO content. This job was extremely demanding, not only because of the number of activities and their often sequential or overlapping schedules, but also because each CINC had his own war plans, his own requirements and goals, and his own unique, small, UW staff organization with which the JJOSE element had to meld. Worse, each theater had its own choice set of special-operations terms.

The variation in terms was a burden on JJOSE personnel, on the national level SO organization, and on the service SO units that in many cases supported more than one theater's war plans. JJOSE, commanded succes-

sively by Army Colonels Bud Skoien and Tim Gannon, and by Air Force Colonel Jon Zacharias, articulated the problem and pressed for its solution. As part of this effort, JJOSE drafted a pamphlet containing a set of proposed UW/SO terms and practices.

The only national-level SO organization then in existence was a small staff division in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J3 SOD. Its members, led primarily by Colonel Linc German, recognized the importance of the terminology problem and endeavored to solve it.

Understandably, each service considered its position to be right (verging on being Holy Writ) and clearly the one that the other services should adopt. Of course, all the CINCs and their SO elements considered their solution to be the only correct one. The efforts, urging, cajolery, discussions and negotiations were extended. Service-based counterarguments were long.

Gradually, the worldwide participants came to recognize the necessity for change and began to work for it. Their work engendered the compromises necessary to produce a single set of terms to which all could adhere. The UW/special operations/special warfare difference was central, and it was not amenable to compromise. Only one of the terms could be the descriptor for the capstone activity. The adoption of one service's term would require that the other services make major revisions in their doctrines.

Eventually, the Air Force's position prevailed, and "special operations" became the capstone title. "Unconventional warfare" became one of SO's component parts. "Special warfare" lives on in the Army and in the Navy, primarily as an honored title rather than as an active term for a specific operational activity. The Pacific Command's title for its UW/SO ele-

ment, "special operations command," became the standard title in all the theaters.

And now, as evidenced by the recent *Special Warfare* issue, the effort is to expand the meaning of UW from its doctrinal definition of "guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion" to encompass numerous broader and heretofore unrelated activities. But this is neither 1952, when the doctrinal page was both blank and unilateral, nor is it the 1960s, when the services could pontificate their own doctrines with little fear of challenge.

The Joint Staff now has a vastly expanded, law-based authority in the field of military doctrine. UW and numerous other SO-related terms have well-established and joint-approved meanings. Redefining a central term, such as UW, is not to be done lightly. The U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, which normally recommends SO-related changes to the JCS, would have to concur with the change. Adoption of the new UW meaning would affect USSOCOM's doctrinal unity and the other services' doctrines. USSOCOM's concurrence is therefore not a foregone conclusion.

Assuming for a moment that USSOCOM would concur and that the Joint Staff would accept a new Army definition of UW, would we not be in the process of re-creating the very conditions that existed before SO forces enjoyed a joint terminology? The loss of that joint terminology would be too high a price to pay in order to please those who would be entranced with conducting UW vs. some less dramatic-sounding activity, or who see the new definition as a return to the era when UW was SF's premier activity.

I would strongly recommend that, for interservice unity and for mutual comprehension, the current term "unconventional warfare" and its accepted meaning be

left undisturbed. If the term is imperfect or lacking in any respect, then supplementary terms (e.g., “surrogate operations” or “irregular operations”) should be developed to meet the perceived need. SOF’s doctrinal clarity was bought at too high a price to be casually cast aside.

I trust my negative comments in this instance will not discourage continued professional discussion in *Special Warfare*.

COL J. H. Crerar
U.S. Army (ret.)
Vienna, Va.

Legal points on human rights merit clarification

I enjoyed very much reading Colonel Rudolph C. Barnes Jr.’s “Human Rights and Legitimacy in the Foreign Training Mission” in the Spring 2001 issue of *Special Warfare*. Colonel Barnes continues his longstanding record of contributions to ARSOF. Two minor points merit clarification for your readership.

On page 3, Colonel Barnes quotes a statement by General Barry R. McCaffrey. [“If a captain, colonel, or general knows of a human-rights violation or war crime and takes no action, then he or she will be held criminally liable. That’s what we teach everyone here at the School of the Americas.”]

While I am not sure of the context in which the statement was made, in the context of Colonel

Barnes’ otherwise excellent article, the statement does not accurately reflect U.S. or international law. A military commander may be held accountable if he or she *ordered, knew or should have known*, under the circumstances ruling at the time, of human-rights or law-of-war violations, and failed to take appropriate actions. ARSOF personnel should understand that one may not turn a “blind eye” when such violations are being committed. As Colonel Barnes indicates later in the article (page 5), ARSOF personnel must report any evidence of gross violations of human rights.

On page 5, Colonel Barnes states, “LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict] is not obligatory in OOTW.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01A (27 August 1999) declares, “The Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized and, unless otherwise directed by competent authorities, will comply with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations.” The intent was to make the application of LOAC seamless across the conflict spectrum. The essence of Colonel Barnes’ article reinforces this policy statement. Deployed ARSOF members seldom are in a position to determine where they are on the conflict spectrum, or whether emphasis is on human rights vs. the law of war. As

Colonel Barnes notes, the overlap between the two addresses the many ARSOF missions.

W. Hays Parks
Special Assistant to the Judge
Advocate General
Rosslyn, Va.



Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With sufficient input from the field, the “Letters” section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Ideally, letters should be approximately 250 words long, but they can be longer, depending upon the subject matter. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-DM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28310.

2001 Index

Special Warfare

Articles

- Army Values: The Epitome — Dick Meadows; Winter, 39.
- “ ‘Devils & Beasts’: Japanese PSYOP Posters from World War II”; Spring, 26-27.
- Adelstein, LTC Dan; “The State of SF, PSYOP and CA Personnel”; Spring, 38-43.
- Arquilla, Dr. John; “The Confederacy Could Have Won — Unconventionally: A Thought Experiment for Special Warriors”; Winter, 10-17.
- Barnes, COL Rudolph C. Jr.; “Human Rights and Legitimacy in the Foreign Training Mission”; Spring, 2-11.
- Boyatt, COL Mark D., U.S. Army (ret.); “Special Forces: Our Core Purpose”; Winter, 8-9.
- Briscoe, Dr. C.H.; “Helicopters in Combat: World War II”; Summer, 32-38.
- Briscoe, Dr. C.H.; “Historical Vignette: Two Combat Glider Landings in One Day”; Fall, 40-43.
- Brown, LTG Bryan D.; “The 160th SOAR: The Quiet Aviation Professionals”; Summer, 2-5.
- Brown, MW4 Carl R., U.S. Army (ret.); “ ‘Green Platoon’: The 160th SOAR’s Training Program”; Summer, 12-13.
- Cahill, MAJ Dennis J.; “Is There a Role for CA in Domestic Support Operations?”; Winter, 32-38.
- Celeski, COL Joseph D.; “Joint Urban Operations: Special Forces in Urban Campaign Planning”; Fall, 2-13.
- Coyne, COL James M.; “From OSS to USSOCOM: Lessons Learned”; Fall, 44-46.
- DeAtkine, Norvell B.; “Urban Warfare: Lessons from the Middle East”; Fall, 20-29.
- Dickson, Dr. Keith D.; “The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and Army Special Forces”; Fall, 14-19.
- Finlayson, Dr. Kenn; “Helicopters in Combat: Korea”; Summer, 39-41.
- Glenn, SSG Amanda; “Advisory Missions: SF-Command Training Supports Human Rights”; Spring, 12-17.
- Gray, MAJ Sidney J. III and CW5 Charles W. Weigandt; “The 160th SOAR: 20 Years of Army Special-Operations Aviation”; Summer, 6-11.
- Halstead, CW2 Brian D.; “Unconventional Warfare: Questions, Concerns and Proposals”; Winter, 28-31.
- Kershner, COL Michael R.; “Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of Military Operations”; Winter, 2-7.
- Marks, MAJ Paul; “Advisers and Advising in the 21st Century”; Spring, 28-37.
- Metzgar, MAJ Greg E.; “Unconventional Warfare: Definitions from 1950 to the Present”; Winter, 18-23.
- Milani, LTC Andy; “Evolution of the 3-160th SOAR Through Desert Storm”; Summer, 14-22.
- Mills, MAJ John; “PSYOP Radio Operations in Bosnia: A Steady, Positive Drumbeat”; Fall, 30-39.
- Rugen, MAJ Walter; “The Impact of Forward-Based Special-Operations Aviation”; Summer, 23-25.
- Stewart, LTC Greg and Thorwald Eide; “20 Years of Army Special-Operations Aviation Modernization”; Summer, 28-31.
- Terzian, SFC John; “SF Advisers in El Salvador: The Attack on El Paraiso”; Spring, 18-25.
- Turner, CPT Holly; “Company E: The 160th SOAR’s Newest Forward-Based Unit”; Summer, 26-27.
- Wilson, CPT Robert Lee; “Unconventional Warfare: SF’s Past, Present and Future”; Winter, 24-27.

Books

- Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholt and America’s Secret Air Wars*; by Warren A. Trest; reviewed by COL J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); Summer, 48-49.
- America and Guerrilla Warfare*; by Anthony James Joes; reviewed by LTC Chris Tone; Spring, 52-53.
- Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*; by H. R. McMaster; reviewed by LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr., U.S. Army (ret.); Spring, 52.

Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Modern Warfare; by John Alexander; reviewed by MAJ Bill Gormley; Winter, 49.

The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon; by Bernard Norling; reviewed by COL J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); Winter, 48-49.

The Principles of War for the Information Age; by Robert R. Leonhard; reviewed by Dr. David Bradford; Fall, 60-61.

War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet; by Eric S. Margolis; reviewed by Dr. Kenn Finlayson; Fall, 60.



Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Soldiers must meet MOS prerequisites

Recently, there has been some confusion about the prerequisites that reserve-component soldiers must satisfy in order to attend training for military occupational specialties 37F (PSYOP) and 38A (Civil Affairs). DA Pam 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, Chapter 10, paragraph 10-122 (for 37F), and paragraph 10-123 (for 38A), identify the prerequisites both for training and for the award of the MOSs. The only exception that can be made involves the prerequisite for a secret clearance. A soldier can begin training without a secret clearance if he or she can furnish evidence that a background investigation has been initiated (a copy of SF Form 86, *Personnel Security Questionnaire*, authenticated by the unit S2). However, before the soldier can be awarded the MOS, he or she must have received a secret clearance or an interim secret clearance issued by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Additionally, AR 140-158, *Enlisted Personnel Classification, Promotion, and Reduction*, Chapter 2, paragraph 2-9d, restricts reclassification into MOSs 37F and 38A to soldiers in the rank of staff sergeant or below. By exception, sergeants first class who have obtained written approval from the Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Proponency Office, or SOPO, may also be awarded the MOSs. Approval will be based on SOPO's determination of the soldier's qualifications. In addition to meeting the requirements of DA Pam 611-21, the soldier must have acquired civilian education or related civilian job skills that complement the MOS to be awarded. Exceptions to either of the above policies must be requested through: Commander, USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-SP (SOPO). Exceptions must be granted before soldiers attend MOS training.

E8 promotion board analyzes CMF 18 records

The 2001 master-sergeant promotion board has provided an analysis of the records that it reviewed. Below are comments regarding CMF 18 records:

Utilization and assignments. Almost all of the SFCs had served 24 months or more on Special Forces operational detachments or in special-mission units. Most of the SFCs had also demonstrated highly successful duty performance as drill sergeants or as recruiters, or in assignments at the Special Warfare Center and School, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, or the Joint Readiness Training Center. Provided that those assignments lasted 36 months or less, they contributed enormously to the board's perception of the NCOs' overall development. Through their job performance on operational detachments, the top CMF 18 SFCs clearly established the CMF's standards.

MOS compatibility within the CMF. The board considered NCOs' duty titles and descriptions, along with descriptions of all 18-series MOSs, to determine what position an NCO was filling. For example, if a soldier's duty description was "assistant operations and intelligence NCO," he was evaluated for that duty position, regardless of whether he held the 18F MOS.

Training and education. With the exception of the static-line jumpmaster course, the board did not weigh any course as a key to success. Instead, the board viewed the entire range of NCO professional education. Many of the soldiers' photos were more than five years old, and many of the photos did not reflect all the awards and badges that the soldiers had earned.

CMF structure and career-progression assessment. The overall quality of CMF 18 is extremely high. However, there are not enough E9 slots within the current force structure to allow CMF 18 soldiers to be promoted to E9 at the Army's average rate. The board carefully reviewed the files of soldiers who are in special-mission units. Overall, the files and the photos of those soldiers were more current and better-prepared than those of the soldiers in other units. For more information, telephone MSG Brian Nulf at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Army selects 85 FA 39 captains for promotion

The 2001 major promotion board considered 101 FA 39 captains who were in the promotion zone and selected 85, giving FA 39 a promotion-zone selection rate of 84 percent, one point higher than the Army's promotion-zone selection rate of 83 percent. During 2001, 29 officers career field designated, or CFD'd, into FA 39: 11 FA 39Bs, 10 FA 39Cs and 8 FA 39Xs (an FA 39X is an officer who has had no FA 39 training or utilization). The officers with FA 39 training who CFD'd into FA 39 must attend the FA 39 Intermediate Level Education Program, or ILE Program, prior to assuming a branch-qualifying major's position. The FA 39Xs must attend the ILE Program and receive an additional 9-11 months of FA 39 training before serving in an FA 39 position. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldman at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

2001 major promotion board selects 151 SF captains

The 2001 major promotion board considered 148 SF captains who were in the promotion zone and selected 137, giving the SF Branch a promotion-zone selection rate of 93 percent, 10 points higher than the Army's promotion-zone selection rate of 83 percent. The board considered 156 SF captains who were below-the-zone and selected 10. It selected four of the SF captains who were above-the-zone. For more information, telephone Major William Bender, SF branch manager in the SWCS Special Operations Propensity Office, at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

Army selects 51 FA 39 majors for promotion to LTC

The 2001 lieutenant-colonel promotion board considered 62 FA 39 majors who were in the promotion zone and selected 49, giving FA 39 a promotion-zone selection rate of 79 percent, which exceeded the Army's promotion-zone selection rate of 75.7 percent. The board selected two FA 39 majors who were below-the-zone.

Warrant officers should attend training as scheduled

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Education System ensures training at every level of progression throughout an SF warrant officer's career. First, the soldier must attend the Warrant Officer Candidate School, or WOCS, at Fort Rucker, Ala. This seven-week course focuses on leadership, academics and stress management. After completion of WOCS, the newly appointed WO1 must attend the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course at Fort Bragg, N.C. This course technically certifies the WO1 in MOS 180A, Special Forces Warrant Officer. The 19-week course focuses on leadership; the military decision-making process; training management; advanced special-operations techniques, or ASOT; force protection; and personnel-recovery operations. Upon selection for promotion to CW3, the SF warrant officer must attend the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or SFWOAC, at Fort Bragg. The advanced course focuses on joint operations and planning, interagency familiarization, regional studies, advanced targeting, ASOT administration, force protection level II, and personnel-recovery operations.

In fiscal year 2001, 45 personnel were selected for promotion and for attendance in the SFWOAC, but 14 were deferred. Commanders and soldiers should minimize deferments if possible. The education system, which prepares the warrant officer for future assignments, is tied to the Army's selection-board processes. When education is delayed, the effects can place the soldier at a disadvantage for promotion. Education funding is allocated for the year in which the soldier is selected to attend a course. If the funds are not used, they are not carried over to the next fiscal year. Warrant officers must have a top-secret clearance in order to attend the SFWOAC. To allow sufficient time for the clearance to be processed, SF warrants should apply for their top-secret clearance as soon as they become CW2s. Once selected for promotion to CW4, the warrant officer must attend the Warrant Officer Staff Course at Fort Rucker. This four-week course focuses on staff procedures. Upon selection for promotion to CW5, the warrant officer must attend the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course at Fort Rucker. This two-week course focuses on how the Army operates. It is critical that warrant officers attend the appropriate courses as scheduled. To apply for any of the education courses, warrant officers should submit a DA Form 4187 to the SF warrant-officer career manager, CW4 Eisentrout, at the Total Army Personnel Command.

**2001 LTC promotion board
selects 49 SF majors**

The 2001 lieutenant colonel promotion board considered 52 SF majors who were in the promotion zone and selected 43, giving the SF Branch a promotion-zone selection rate of 82.7 percent, seven points higher than the Army's promotion-zone selection rate of 75.7 percent. SF's rate exceeded the rates of all other combat-arms branches by an average of five points. Five SF officers were selected from the 54 who were considered below-the-zone, and one officer was selected from the 21 who were considered above-the-zone.

**FA 39 selections for SSC
slightly below Army's average**

FA 39's 2001 senior-service-college selection rate was 6.8 percent, slightly below the Army's average selection rate of 7.7 percent. The 2001 SSC selection board was the last one to be conducted under the old officer-management system. In fiscal year 2002, all officers whose records appear before the SSC board will be rated under the OPMS XXI system, and they will be single-tracked, which should put FA 39's selection rate on par with the Army's average selection rate.

**SF SSC selection rate
on par with Army's average**

The SF Branch's 2001 senior-service-college selection rate was 7.6 percent, which was on par with the Army's average selection rate of 7.7 percent. The rates for other combat-arms branches were as follows: Infantry, 9 percent; Armor, 7.7 percent; and Field Artillery, 8.2 percent.



Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Mexico replaces Federal Judicial Police

Following a series of other actions taken by Mexican President Vicente Fox to reform Mexico's law-enforcement and security establishment, Mexico is replacing the Federal Judicial Police with a new law-enforcement body called the Federal Investigation Agency, or AFI. The AFI will employ the latest scientific means of criminal investigation. It is slated to receive training from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The AFI's strength is projected to be 2,500 agents. Agents will concentrate their efforts in the areas of Mexico that are experiencing the greatest problems with crime and conflict. The replacement of the Federal Judicial Police is being billed as a de-emphasis of the heavily armed federal police elements that based their activities on the application of armed force. In contrast to those elements, the AFI represents a move toward creating a multiskilled, investigative police force.

Danes take new approach to homeland defense

During the Cold War, Denmark was a potential target of the Soviet Union and of other members of the Warsaw Pact. Regular Danish armed forces were trained to defend against attacks by ground, airborne and amphibious forces that might attempt to seize the Danish offshore islands or conduct operations along the Jutland peninsula. Today, with substantial changes in the operational environment and in the external threat, forces of Denmark's regular army, air force, and navy are being reduced in size and are being assigned to international peacekeeping duties. Limited numbers of personnel in the Danish home guard, which consists of about 62,000 volunteers, are also being assigned to international peacekeeping duties. At the same time, Denmark is developing a new approach to homeland defense. During the next 4-6 years, the home guard will form a 3,000-man special force that will be organized into 92 units. Those units will be assigned to guard key infrastructure (e.g., bridges, communications centers and power stations) and other facilities around the country. A number of the units have already been created. The units' training approximates the training given to personnel of the regular Danish armed forces, and the units are under military oversight. In time of war, the guard units would be placed under the control of Denmark's Army Operational Command, and they would be led by the commander of the local defense region.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

USASOC announces NCO, Soldier of the Year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command has announced the winners of its competition for NCO and Soldier of the Year.

The NCO of the Year is Sergeant William J. Haynes of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion. The Soldier of the Year is Specialist Alan S. Kellermann, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

Runners-up were Staff Sergeant Robert L. Garnsay, U.S. Army Special Forces Command; and Specialist Andrew S. Kirfman, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

U. S. Army Special Forces Command changes hands

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert took command of the U. S. Army Special Forces Command from Brigadier General Frank J. Toney during a ceremony held at Fort Bragg's Dick Meadows Field, Sept. 7, 2001.

"Today's Special Forces soldier is better-trained, better-equipped and more capable than ever in history," said Lieutenant General Doug Brown, commander of the U. S. Army Special Operations Command. "These kinds of soldiers deserve the very best in leaders. They just don't come any better than Major General Geoffrey Lambert," said Brown. "He is trained, ready and eager."

Lambert's previous assignments include several positions with the 75th Ranger Regiment; operations officer, 7th SF Group; commander,



Photo by Amanda Glenn
LTG Doug Brown (right) presents the colors of the Army Special Forces Command to MG Geoffrey Lambert.

1st Battalion, 7th SF Group; commander, 10th SF Group; commander, Special Operations Command Europe; commander, Special Operations Command (IFOR); and director of the Center for Operations, Plans and Policy, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. — SSG Amanda C. Glenn, USASOC PAO

SWCS producing ARSOF CSS, NEO, urban-ops manuals

The SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Joint and Army Doctrine Division is working to produce three manuals during fiscal year 2002:

FM 3-05.103 (63-31), *ARSOF Combat Service Support*, is a revision and an expansion of FM 63-24, *Special Operations Support Battalion*, dated 1995. FM 3-

05.103 (63-31) will provide users with a base document for planning and conducting ARSOF CSS operations. The initial draft is scheduled to be staffed to SOF units early in 2002. The project officer is Captain George Northington, DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail, northg@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.106, *ARSOF Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, is a new publication that will provide a basic reference for planning and conducting ARSOF noncombatant-evacuation operations, or NEO. The manual will outline the capabilities and the organization of SF, Ranger, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, and support units in the conduct of NEO in the joint, multinational, and interagency environments. The project officer is Mr. Jim Mong, DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail, mongj@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.109, *ARSOF Urban Operations*, is a new publication that will acquaint ARSOF planners and operational units with the capabilities that SF, Ranger, CA, PSYOP and ARSOF support units offer in conducting urban operations, either unilaterally or in support of joint and multinational task forces. The project officer is Mr. Guy Griffaw, DSN 239-5393; e-mail, griffawg@soc.mil.

PSYOP Division primary review authority for JP 3-53

The PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, SWCS, is the primary review authority, or PRA, for the revision of Joint Pub 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychologi-*

cal Operations.

JP 3-53 addresses the use of military PSYOP assets in support of joint operations across the range of military operations.

As the PRA, the PSYOP Division directed a thorough review and adjudication of critical comments received from field units regarding the manual. Working with the U.S. Special Operations Command's joint-doctrine officer, who is the lead agent for the revision, the PRA organized a two-day meeting, hosted by USSOCOM, that brought together representatives from the Army, Air Force, Navy and Fleet Information Warfare Center. The representatives refined the scope of the revision, developed a detailed chapter outline for the revised manual, refined the publication's audience and established milestones for production.

The participants also discussed the integration of PSYOP and information operations; command and control of PSYOP forces; and PSYOP concerns across the conflict spectrum, including flexible deterrent options, theater-engagement plans and post-conflict operations.

The PRA will continue to coordinate with the doctrine writer, the lead agent and others to ensure the timely development of JP 3-53, which is scheduled for completion in June 2003.

For additional information, contact Ms. Debra A. Weltz, deputy chief of the PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division, at DSN 236-4010 or commercial (910) 396-4010; or send e-mail to weltzd@soc.mil.

5th SF Group receives new commander

Colonel John F. Mulholland assumed command of the 5th Special Forces Group from Colonel Charles Paxton during a ceremony at Fort Campbell, Ky., July 26, 2001.

Mulholland was previously a student at the National War College in Washington, D.C. His other Special Forces assignments include commander, 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group; operations officer and executive officer, 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group; and company and detachment commander, 5th SF Group. He has also served with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and the Special Operations Command-South.

Paxton's new assignment is chief, Agency Support, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

Browski assumes duties as SWCS CSM

CSM Frank Browski succeeded CSM Michael Bishop as the command sergeant major of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School during a change-of-responsibility ceremony Dec. 3, 2001.

Browski was previously the command sergeant major of the 4th PSYOP Group. His other special-operations assignments include instructor duty at the Special Warfare Center and School; and service with the 7th SF Group, 5th SF Group, and 75th Ranger Regiment

SWCS to produce new UW manual

The Special Forces Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine is developing a user-friendly manual to explain the tactics, techniques and procedures of unconventional warfare, or UW, to SF soldiers in the field.

FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (UW) Operations*, will provide guidance for the training, mission-planning, and employment of SF operational detachments A, B and C in a UW environment.

The need to include classified material in the manual led to the development of FM 3-05.201 (ini-

tial draft) in two volumes — unclassified and classified.

The unclassified volume, containing four chapters and appendixes, will cover the various aspects of UW and the seven phases of a U.S.-sponsored insurgency. It will also cover SF-detachment mission-planning and the development of mission-essential task lists; employment of SF detachments in joint special-operations areas; and demobilization. The unclassified manual will also address PSYOP and Civil Affairs support in each phase of UW.

The classified volume will address sabotage, subversion and the UW underground. It is designed to be used in conjunction with the unclassified volume and with FM 3-05.220, *Advanced Special Operations Techniques (ASOT)*.

In December 2001, the initial draft of the unclassified volume was distributed in hard copy and on CD, and it was placed on the ASOCNET. The classified volume will also be distributed in hard copy and on CD.

FM 3-05.201 will help define current and future SF operations. Soldiers in SF field units are encouraged to review the manual; comments from the field are important to the manual's development and usefulness. For more information, telephone Major David Beech, chief of the SF Doctrine Branch, at DSN 239-7690 or commercial (910) 432-7690; or send e-mail to beechd@soc.mil.

Soldiers can apply for admission to USMA

Each year, approximately 150 Regular Army soldiers are offered admission to the United States Military Academy or to the United States Military Academy Preparatory School.

Soldiers who are interested in this opportunity must possess high

moral character and express a sincere desire to become an Army officer. Applicants must be U.S. citizens, unmarried, and have no legal obligation to support dependents. They also cannot have turned 23 before July 1 of the year of entry. For more information, telephone Captain Cliff Hodges, soldier admissions officer, at DSN 688-5780 or commercial (845) 938-5780. His e-mail address is tc2324@usma.edu.

The USMA is also seeking branch-qualified, company-grade officers to serve as instructors; and sergeants first class to serve as company tactical NCOs. NCOs should have drill-sergeant or platoon-sergeant experience and 12-15 years of active federal service.

Applicants should complete a USMA interest form, which can be obtained either by visiting the USMA Web site (www.usma.army.mil/adjutantgeneral/) or by writing to: Management Operations Branch, AG Division, West Point, NY 10996-1926.

USASOC distributes SERE Level-B products

In January 2002, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, in coordination with the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, began distributing training materials for Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Level-B to Army special-operations units.

Department of Defense Directives 1300.7 and 1300.21 require that U.S. armed-forces personnel who are considered a moderate risk for capture and exploitation receive SERE Level-B training. Army personnel who serve in ground combat units, provide security for high-threat targets, or serve in the vicinity of the forward-edge-of-battle area or the forward line of troops are considered a moderate risk.

The Level-B training materials, produced by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, or JPRA, comprise 22 videotapes that teach soldiers how to deal with a variety of captivity situations, including wartime detention, peacetime government detention, and hostage detention. Level-B training is a unit responsibility, and ARSOF units must use the JPRA-produced videotapes to meet the minimum requirements for Level-B qualification.

Because some of the videotapes contain classified information, service members who do not have a secret security clearance will not be allowed to view the classified tapes. The unclassified training meets the requirements for Army SERE Level-B qualification. Service members who have a secret security clearance must view all 22 videotapes.

Units are also encouraged to procure the Special Warfare Center and School's SERE Level-B training-support package, or TSP. The TSP contains field training exercises and practical exercises that will assist units in providing enhancement training in survival and evasion. The TSP will be available for downloading from the Army Training and Doctrine Command's Reimer Digital Library, or RDL, in March 2002.

The Special Warfare Center and School has also been revising two field manuals that support SERE Level-B training. FM 21-78, *Resistance and Escape*, has been revised and has been renumbered FM 3-05.71. The manual, published in January 2002, is classified "confidential" and will not be available on the RDL. FM 21-76, *Survival (5 June 1992)*, is being revised and will be renumbered FM 3-05.70. The revised manual is scheduled to be published in June 2002 and will be available on the RDL.

In May 2001, the commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations

Command authorized the use of the SERE Level-B training program as a temporary substitute for SERE Level-C training until the Special Warfare Center and School can increase its training capacity for the SERE Level-C Course. SERE Level-C training is designed to prepare personnel who are at a high risk for capture.

To procure additional copies of the SERE Level-B training materials, units should telephone the Joint Visual Information Services Distribution Activity, Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pa., at DSN 795-7937. For additional information, telephone CW3 Daniel Wilke, USASOC DCSOPS, at DSN 239-2069 or commercial (910) 432-2069 (e-mail: wilked@soc.mil); or SFC Daniel Baldrige, SWCS Personnel Recovery Cell, at DSN 239-9362 or commercial (910) 396-9362 (e-mail: baldridd@soc.mil).



Book Reviews

Special Warfare


War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet. By Eric S. Margolis. New York: Routledge Press, 2000. ISBN: 0-415-92712-9. 250 pages. \$26.

In some of the most inhospitable terrain on earth, ethnic, religious and political factions clash daily. In the mountainous lands of southwest Asia, long-standing conflicts between nations, tribes and religions has taken on new meaning in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States on Sept. 11, 2001.

Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet are the battlegrounds where the “great game” was played out between Russia and Great Britain in the 1800s. Today, India, China, Pakistan and the newly formed nations of the former Soviet Union continue to vie for dominance in a modern version of the game made more deadly by the added threat of nuclear weapons.

In *War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet*, veteran journalist Eric S. Margolis recounts the history and the current state of affairs in the most volatile region of the world. Whether travelling with the *mujahedin* and observing the struggle to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in the 1980s, or visiting the Panchen Lama at the Potala Palace in Lhasa, Tibet, Margolis explores the roots of conflict in the region.

Margolis looks at the long-standing war between Pakistan and India, fought on the three-mile high glaciers and peaks of



the Karakoram, and at the relationships between the various Afghani tribes that form the background of his story. He also explains the lingering unrest in Tibet and in China’s adjoining Sinkiang Province over China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950. That unrest, as well as India’s rise to regional power, may one day destabilize the Chinese communist government and lead to war in the Himalayas. In his quest to explain the direction that events are taking in the region, Margolis visits all of the areas and groups that he discusses.

Well-written and informative, *War at the Top of the World* is an excellent source for the reader who is seeking to identify the key players and the issues related to the conflict in Southwest Asia. Part political-science primer, part travelogue, the book is a fine com-

pilation of Margolis’ years of experience with the people of this volatile, dangerous region.

Dr. Kenn Finlayson
USAJFKSWCS
Fort Bragg, N.C.

The Principles of War for the Information Age. By Robert R. Leonhard. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1998. ISBN: 0-891441-647-1. 287 pages. \$30.

Is the author of this book Kevin Costner, the prescient farmer who turns his cornfield into a baseball field? Or is the author Thich Nhat Hanh, the Buddhist theologian who asks his followers to always look deeply?

The author could be Costner, because this book plows under a military doctrine that is in full bloom and that has provided the United States military with a bumper crop of successes. The author could also be the monk Hanh, because the book teaches that one must “not be idolatrous about or bound to any doctrine, theory, or ideology ... (nor) think the knowledge one presently possesses is changeless, absolute truth.” In a well-written, logical, and thought-provoking book, Bob Leonhard is both characters: With total sincerity, he plows military doctrine under while chanting Hanh’s mantra.

The Principles of War for the Information Age makes one rethink and reformulate the vaunted nine principles of war that most military professionals have read, studied, used and


taught for more than 125 years. Leonhard's completely new set of principles will be discussed in military organizations for years to come. But know this: Bob Leonhard is probably the best-qualified officer to do what he has done, because he is exactly between the two groups of military officers who are either too set in their ways to change or too young in their careers to bother with the "antiquated nine."

A reader might be inclined to believe that the principles of war must be rewritten because the computer age demands that we eliminate anything that is antiquated or obsolete. This is not the premise of the book. True, Leonhard writes that computer-driven and digitized battle plans provide a commander and his or her staff with precise information, but that is not why he calls for new principles.

Leonhard calls for new principles because "(I)nformation dominance in future warfare is 'not' built only upon the computer. It does not rely solely on communications. It is not based only on sensor technology. It is not merely a training innovation. It is 'all' these things — and much more — welded together by doctrine."

To put it more simply, Leonhard states, "One of the skills of future warfare will be to actively manage what we know and what we don't know." Too bad Leonhard hasn't spent a tour of duty with special-warfare types, for they are already practicing the new principles of war, and they do know how to separate the known from the unknown.

This book could very well serve as a stand-alone doctrinal manual for the U.S. Special Operations Command. It is based on the very principles of war that special-operations forces have been practicing for 30 years, especially what Leonhard calls "precision



warfare."

Precision warfare, writes Leonhard, is based upon these "new" principles: *dislocation* — the art of rendering enemy strength irrelevant; *distribution* — the apportioned combat power used to accomplish specific purposes in the most economical and precise way possible; *activity* — all the friendly actions that advance the commander's plan, other than security; *opportunity* — the freedom to act; *option acceleration* — the delay of the decision concerning the desired end state of a conflict, which then capitalizes on flexibility to achieve a precise and high-payoff end state; and *command* — the practice of seeking unity of effort through authoritative direction.

Leonhard's book could also provide the basis for establishing special operators as a branch of the armed forces, since they are the most experienced in using these principles.

The book is intriguing. There are no footnotes or references. There is a "works cited" page on which Leonhard lists 20 books and provides short critiques of most of them. Obviously, Leonhard has

read and studied them all. He has written two other military-oriented books — *The Art of Maneuver* (Presidio Press, 1991) and *Time and the Art of War* (Praeger Press, 1994) — and this book is a natural conclusion to the trilogy.

My predictions for *The Principles of War for the Information Age* are several years of denunciation, denial, discussion and decision. The old school will pick Leonhard's arguments apart word for word, reference by reference. These actions will parallel the attacks that Robert Asprey suffered when he published *War in the Shadows* in 1975 and denounced the military establishment for using antiquated doctrine and conventional methods to fight a guerrilla war in Vietnam.

But attacking Leonhard's book would be foolish and defeating. Here is a book that, while scholarly in scope, is written in a down-to-earth manner by an infantry officer who is both literate and combat-tested.

Leonhard's work should be taken seriously and studied assiduously. For those who serve in special-warfare units, this book is a clarion call to formalize doctrine and principles of war, already being done to the greatest extent possible, into the special-operations schools. Acquire this book, read it carefully, discuss it openly, and implement it fully.

*Dr. David Bradford
University of Central Florida
Orlando, Fla.*



Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army
JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK – DT – DM
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

Prstd Std
U.S. Postage
PAID
Niagara Falls, NY
Permit No. 28