


Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Keeping It Relevant: Transforming the SF Pipeline



From the Commandant



Special Warfare

Last October, I hosted a week-long conference with the senior officers and NCOs at the Special Warfare Center and School to see what we could do to improve the SF Training “Pipeline.” The Pipeline is doing an excellent job of training SF Soldiers, as is evident from the successes of Special Forces worldwide, so why “fix” something that is working well? Our intent is to modify the training, to make it more adaptable and more relevant to the current and future battlefields.

As trainers, we face several challenges: The Global War on Terrorism demands greater numbers of Special Forces Soldiers at the same time that it demands that they have greater skill. The students coming to the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, these days have a wide range of military experience: Some have been recruited specifically for service in SF, some are junior enlisted, some are officers and senior enlisted Soldiers with several years of service in other branches. We need to be able to adapt training to the strengths and weaknesses of the students, neither rushing those who need more training nor wasting the time of those who are more experienced. Also, training methods and training technology are changing, and we should take advantage of the latest methods. Finally, lessons learned from current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world need to be incorporated quickly into our training.

From the beginning, we made two things clear: There would be no lowering of training standards, and we would do nothing that would damage the successful program already in existence. During the conference, we developed a blueprint for change that comprises modifications in seven areas. These modifications concentrate on core unconventional-warfare skills, place a greater emphasis throughout the Pipeline on language training, and allow us to reduce the average length of the training program.

In March, we will begin the first of the



modifications — grouping SFQC Phase II students into modules of 75 students each. These modules will allow us to group students who have similar training needs and to provide a better instructor-student ratio. Changes in other areas will follow until the “transformation” of the Pipeline is complete. All changes are scheduled to be completed by the end of 2006.

In this issue, Lieutenant Colonel David P. Fitchitt, the SWCS SGS, provides an overview of the Pipeline transformation. Articles in future issues will provide more details as the changes are implemented. Here I will only re-emphasize that the transformation is designed to improve the existing, excellent SF Pipeline program. Our goal is to ensure that when our new SF Soldiers join the Special Forces brotherhood, we will have done everything possible to give them the training and the unconventional-warfare skills they will need to fight, win and survive on an ever more complicated and dangerous battlefield.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, which reads "James W. Parker".

Major General James W. Parker

Commander & Commandant

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Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

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Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

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Raising the Bar: The Transformation of the SF Training Model

by Lieutenant Colonel David P. Fitchitt

Special Forces Soldiers are in the forefront of the Global War on Terrorism, and their successes have only increased the demand for quiet professionals. At the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the agency charged with training Special Forces Soldiers, that increased demand hasn't altered the school's commitment to excellence in training, but it has generated a transformation in the training program — the first in more than a decade.

The vision for the transformation was soon clear: To provide world-class training and education that allows multiple paths to success while maintaining the highest standards and sustaining the operational force.

The transformation began in October 2004, when the SWCS commander, Major General James W. Parker, hosted a conference with the senior officers and noncommissioned officers to develop a vision and lay out a blueprint for transformation. The vision for the transformation was soon clear: To provide world-class training and education that allows multiple paths to success while maintaining the highest standards and sustaining the operational force. From the beginning, Major General

Parker insisted that there could be no lowering of training standards and no harm could be done to the current successful program. The successes of Special Forces Soldiers in recent missions prove that the training is on-target.

The SF training program, also known as the "Pipeline," will be expanded. Instruction will be added to most phases of the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC. The additions are designed to implement the latest training methods available, allow for more efficient use of time and resources and leverage technology to its greatest advantage.

The transformation plan focuses on providing the SFQC student with relevant training that concentrates on enhancing core skills for unconventional warfare, on linking the program of instruction to the battlefield, and on placing greater emphasis on foreign-language training. The transformation is designed to produce an SF warrior who will be better prepared to fight and win on today's battlefield.

Modular program

At the heart of the vision is an updated training methodology and improved quality of instruction. Overall, the military occupational specialty portion of the Pipeline will change from a sequential, linear program to a modular one, in

which each Soldiers' training and experience is taken into account to develop a program in which multiple subjects will be taught concurrently, much like a college curriculum.

For example, a Soldier who is already proficient in a foreign language may bypass the language instruction and graduate up to eight weeks sooner. Modularization of the Pipeline will provide a greater number of the iterations of each major block of training, a better instructor-to-student ratio and less time that the Soldiers will spend waiting for the next training block to begin.

Phase II, small-unit tactics, will be the first major training block to be converted to the modular program. Beginning in March 2005, Phase II will be broken into five modules of 75 students each. A new Phase II module will begin every two weeks.

The core programs of instruction for the SF military occupational specialties, or MOSs, will remain largely intact, but new material will be added to the curriculum. The new material will cover such subjects as intelligence operations, abduction-avoidance and captivity survival, adaptive thinking and learning, and additional training in SF common skills and warrior skills. Even with the additional training, the transformation plan will result in a decrease of two to four months to the time it takes for the average SFQC student to complete the Pipeline.

Linked to the battlefield

To ensure continued relevance, the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD, is linked to the battlefield, conducting critical task review boards to capture recent lessons learned and implement them into the various programs of instruction quickly.

This integration of training subjects will begin in April 2005, when SWCS will phase in a new process that will provide a Soldier with information concerning his Special Forces group assignment, his target language, and his 18-series MOS at the outset of training rather than at the

Blueprint for Change

1. Create a Student Reception Center (all personnel services)
Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB); SF Group, MOS, and foreign language assignment at start of SFQC; security clearance
2. SFAS
Develop "whole man" concept, Identify characteristics and traits of the SF Warrior (Reduce or eliminate training during this Phase)
3. Phase II
Small Unit Tactics (SUT); integrate SERE; PGD/HD*; Language Block I; incorporate Common Leader Training (CLT)
4. Phase III
MOS Training; integrate Instructor Trainer Course; add SF Common tasks; digitized POI; Language Block II; DLPT
5. Phase IV
Language Block III "Blitz"; DLPT; maintain warrior edge, range firing, etc.
6. Phase V
UW culmination exercise "Robin Sage" – the final exam; regional orientation and language segments; intelligence operations
7. Phase VI
Regimental First Formation and Graduation

*Peacetime Governmental Detention/Hostage Detention (PGD/HD)

end. That knowledge will allow trainers to organize cohort student operational detachments for the collective-training phases of the SFQC.

Emphasis on language

The ability to speak a foreign language is a core unconventional-warfare skill for the Special Forces Soldier. Because of the importance of language skills, DOTD is developing a comprehensive language-training program that will introduce students to their foreign language early and make language a more integral part of SFQC training.

Once the language program has been fully implemented, language training will be as common to the SFQC student as physical training is now. From advanced distributed learning that allows students to study language from home to negotiations with a "G-chief" in Arabic during the culmination exercise, foreign-language training will be woven throughout the SFQC.

Higher language-proficiency standards are achievable, and are, in fact, already in place. A score of 1/1/1 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test is now required before a student can graduate from the SFQC. More than 95 percent of SFQC students are currently achieving this standard, and some qualify for language profi-

Reshaping SF Training

Current

- Recruiting company
- 2 weeks to in-process
- Phase II: Small Unit Tactics (SUT)
- Phase III: MOS training
- Phase IV: training and Robin Sage
- Graduation: no tab, 2 courses to go
- Foreign language at end of SFQC
- SERE last training event
- Ave. Soldier in training 63 wks
- No regional orientation
- Linear program, mass production
- Low or no technology

Future

- Recruiting battalion
- Reception center (all services)
- Phase II: SUT; CLT; SERE; PGD/HD; SFPC if req.
- Phase III: MOS; foreign language; SF common and warrior skills training
- UW Culmination Exercise integrates foreign language, regional orientation, and intelligence opns
- Graduation and induction into Regiment at end of all training
- Foreign language training throughout SFQC
- Ave. Soldier in training 48 wks
- Modular program; individualized training plan; multi-task environment
- Interactive video; virtual reality; simulation; and distant learning tools

ciency pay, even in the most difficult languages.

Beginning in May 2005, training in Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE, will be integrated into the initial phase of the SFQC. As early as July 2005, the Peacetime Governmental Detention/Hostage Detention, or PGD/HD, Course

will also be added to the initial phase of the SFQC.

Culmination exercise


The capstone event of the SFQC will remain the Unconventional Warfare Culmination Exercise, or UW CULEX, commonly known as Robin Sage. The CULEX has historically taken place exclusively in the towns and counties surrounding Fort Bragg, N.C., in a mythical country called "Pineland," but that will be changing, as well.

In August 2005, in addition to the Pineland exercise, SWCS plans to send two student operational detachments to the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., to test the feasibility of adding NTC as an alternate location for conducting the UW CULEX, depending upon the Soldiers' SF group assignment. SWCS is also adding regionally oriented scenarios to the UW CULEX to allow students to use their foreign-language and cultural-awareness skills in a real-world environment. During various situational training exercises, students will encounter situations based on



USASOC PAO photo

Soldiers in the SF Pipeline currently participate in Robin Sage, a UW CULEX, in the counties adjacent to Fort Bragg. The transformation plan will test the idea of the addition of a second location for the CULEX at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif.



Soldiers’ recent battlefield experiences.

The graduating class of March 2005 will be the last to wear the Green Beret prior to completing language and SERE training. Beginning with the October 2005 graduating class, Soldiers will be inducted into the 1st Special Forces Regiment and attend their graduation ceremony at the end of all training. Only then will they be awarded the coveted Green Beret, signifying that they are fully prepared to join their brothers on SF operational detachments.

All elements of the transformation plan

are scheduled to be in place by the end of 2006. ✕

Lieutenant Colonel David P. Fitchitt is the secretary of the general staff at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous assignments include duty with the 7th SF Group and Special Operations Command South. Lieutenant Colonel Fitchitt is a graduate of the Command and General Staff Officer Course and holds a master’s degree in administration.

Looking for Letters

Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in *Special Warfare* or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With sufficient input from the field, the “Letters” section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of ARSOF doctrinal issues. Ideally, letters should be approximately 250 words long, but they can be longer, depending upon the subject matter. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor, *Special Warfare*; Attn: AOJK-DTD-DM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28310, or send them by e-mail to steelman@soc.mil.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response

By Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen

Insurgency has existed throughout history, undercutting regional stability, drawing outsiders into direct conflict and spawning humanitarian disasters.

The strategic significance of insurgency ebbs and flows with the world political situation: The lower the chances of direct armed conflict between great powers, the greater the tendency of those powers to sponsor insurgency as a form of surrogate conflict, and the greater insurgency's strategic significance. When war between great powers is likely, insurgency may simmer on, but it becomes strategic background noise.

Today, with sustained, large-scale conventional war between major powers unlikely, at least in the near term, insurgency is again strategically significant and is likely to remain so for at least a decade.

Although counterinsurgency support has been part of American strategy since the 1960s, applying the strategies, doctrine and operational concepts from several decades ago to 21st-century insurgency is a recipe for ineffectiveness or failure. Insurgency is mutating, and the U.S. military, as well as other components of the govern-

ment, must confront insurgency's new variants and distinguish them from its enduring characteristics.

Definition and context

Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups too weak to attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power. It is characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban areas), psychological warfare and political mobilization — all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor.

Insurgents may attempt to seize power and replace the existing government (revolutionary insurgency) or they may have more limited aims such as separation, autonomy or alteration of a particular policy. They avoid conventional battlespaces — where they are weakest — and focus on those in which they can operate on more equal footing, particularly the psychological and the political.

In a broad sense, insurgencies take two forms.¹ In the first form, “national” insurgencies, the primary antagonists are the insurgents

and a national government that has at least some degree of legitimacy and support. The distinctions between the insurgents and the regime are based on economic class, ideology, identity (ethnicity, race, religion) or some other political factor.

National insurgencies are triangular in that they involve not only the two antagonists but also a range of other actors who can shift the relationship between the antagonists by supporting one or the other. The other actors may include external states, organizations and groups, but the most important of these other actors is the populace of the country. The insurgents and counterinsurgents pursue strategies that, in a sense, mirror each other as they attempt to weaken the other party and simultaneously win over neutral actors.

The second form is “liberation” insurgencies. These pit insurgents against a ruling group that is seen as an outside occupier (even though it might not actually be) by virtue of race, ethnicity or culture. The goal of the insurgents is to “liberate” their nation from alien occupation. Examples include the insurgency in Rhodesia, the Palestinian insurgency, Vietnam after

1965, the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet occupation, Chechnya, the current Taliban/al-Qaeda insurgency in Afghanistan and the Iraq insurgency.

The distinction between national and liberation insurgencies is not always clear. An insurgency can contain elements of both, and it can shift from one form to another during its lifespan. The Chinese communist insurgency, for instance, began as a national insurgency, shifted to a combination of liberation and national during the Japanese occupation, and then shifted back to a national one.

Liberation insurgencies are difficult to counter. The approach that usually works against national insurgents — demonstrating that the government can address the root causes of the conflict through reform — does not work nearly as well, because the occupiers are inherently distinct from the insurgents and their supporters. Their outsider status cannot be overcome by even the most skilled information campaign. What motivates the insurgents is not the lack of jobs, schools or the right to vote, but resentment over occupation, interference and rule by outsiders or those perceived as outsiders.² For this reason, skilled insurgents prefer to have their movement seen as a liberation one rather than as a national one, thus making the mobilization of support and internal unity within the insurgency easier.

Insurgencies vary across time and regions, but most follow a common life cycle. During the period of organization and coalescence, insurgent movements tend to be weak and disorganized. Survival is the overwhelming priority. In the earliest stage, there may be diverse, competing insurgent movements within a nation. If so, establishing a reputation — “brand identity” — is important, leading



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Insurgencies can be divided into two types: national and liberation. In Iraq, insurgents are trying to market their actions as a liberation insurgency by showing the U.S. troops to be occupiers. Information campaigns, like that carried out in Baghdad by a Soldier with the 315th Tactical Psychological Operations Company, must counter that idea and should be led by the host government in order to achieve maximum success.

some of the proto-insurgencies to undertake bold, even foolhardy actions.³ Other insurgents may opt for the underground approach and remain hidden as long as possible while organizing, recruiting, training, learning their craft and accumulating resources. Each method of mobilization — by publicity-generating action or by building an underground organization — has proven successful, particularly if the regime fails to recognize the seriousness of the threat at an early stage.

At some point, every insurgency must begin direct operations against the regime in order to succeed. This can take the form of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, assassination of officials, sabotage and other types of irregular or asymmetric violence. At the same time, the insurgents must continue to improve their skills, learn their craft, accumulate resources and mobilize support. They may do this by cultivating external alliances or by engaging in illegal activities such as kidnapping and robbery.

Most — but not all — insurgents

also seek to augment their legitimacy, to mobilize greater public support and, in some cases, to expand their international acceptance. They have a variety of methods for doing this, including propaganda and information warfare designed to popularize the perception that they are seekers of justice forced into violence by the unwillingness of the regime to give them a voice in the political system.

They may also employ actions that demonstrate that they offer a better alternative than the regime, as well as simple boldness and courage — “armed propaganda” — designed to demonstrate the incompetence and brutality of the regime. In any case, insurgents inspire resistance and recruitment by defiance, particularly among young males with the volatile combination of boredom, anger and a lack of purpose. Thus the greater the pool of bored, angry, unoccupied young men in a society, the more fruitful ground there is for insurgent organizers to work.

The job of mobilizing support and acquiring resources is even

easier for insurgents in a liberation conflict, because they can draw on the inherent dislike that people have of domination by “outsiders.” As Khair al-Din Hasib, the “father” of pan-Arab nationalism, stated, “Whenever, wherever there is occupation, there will be resistance.”⁴

An insurgency continues so long as both sides believe either that they will ultimately prevail or that the costs of stopping the conflict will be greater than the costs of persisting. Often insurgencies drag on so long that entire generations emerge that have known nothing but conflict, so their fear of peace — which is an unknown — surpasses their fear of conflict.

An insurgency may end when one side (or, less often, both) decides that no matter how long they continue, they cannot prevail, or that the costs of ending the conflict are less than the costs of continuation. The normal practice is for large segments of the population to throw their support to the side they believe will win. Ultimately the denouement may be a negotiated settlement, or the conflict may simply peter out as the insurgents melt back into the population or go into exile. Less often, insurgencies end with decisive victory, either when the insurgents seize power or attain some other objective, or when the regime eradicates all the insurgents and prevents the recruitment of new ones.

During the past century, most insurgencies failed. The majority were either crushed before they developed a critical mass of skill and support or were simply incapable of attaining such a critical mass. Successful insurgencies were those with effective force-protection and counterintelligence capabilities that were able to prevent the counterinsurgents, whether a regime or outside occupiers, from pushing the conflict to decision in

the military realm until the power balance shifted in their favor. They did this either by making the political and psychological realms decisive or by postponing decisive military encounters until they weakened the government through guerrilla, political and psychological operations.

Conditions

Starting an insurgency is easy: A dozen or so dedicated radicals with access to munitions and explosives can do it. But building an effective insurgency is difficult. History suggests that it requires five specific conditions: frustration, effective strategy, effective ideology, effective leadership and resources. The importance of these is determined, in part, by the effectiveness of the regime. When facing a determined regime that understands counterinsurgency and has the resources to undertake it, the insurgents must meet all of the conditions if they are to have any degree of success. When facing a weak, disorganized, corrupt, divided, repressive or ineffective regime,

the insurgents can overcome the absence of one or even several of the conditions.

Frustration. The most basic condition for insurgency is frustration and the belief that the frustration cannot be changed through the existing political system. This frustration may be widespread among a population or limited to a radical elite that has to convince the more passive population of the need for violent change. A conspiratorial history and culture are also important.

Effective strategy. The strategy of an insurgent movement is built on three simultaneous and interlinked components: (1) force protection (via dispersion, sanctuary, the use of complex terrain, effective counterintelligence, etc.); (2) actions to erode the will, strength and legitimacy of the regime (via violence and political-psychological programs); and, (3) augmentation of resources and support.

Effective ideology. National insurgencies, in particular, depend on ideology to unify and inspire, to explain why the existing system is unjust or illegitimate and to rationalize the use of violence in order



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For an insurgency to be effective, the insurgents must have sanctuary. The formation of a trained security force can help eradicate safe havens for the insurgents, as well as provide a feeling of security for the local populace.

to alter or overthrow the existing system. (Because liberation insurgencies have the “organic” mobilizing factor of an alien occupation, they depend less on artificial mechanisms such as ideology). A coherent ideology explains existing discontent and anger and offers a remedy. It builds on the emotions and culture of the people. An effective insurgent ideology, in other words, must “fit” a given society.

Effective leadership. Insurgent leaders must convince people to undertake extraordinary danger and hardship for extended periods of time with a very small chance of a positive outcome. Successful insurgent leaders are those who can unify diverse groups and organizations and impose their will under situations of high stress. Psychologically, effective insurgent leaders are so dedicated to their cause that they will persevere even though the odds are against them. They become obsessive “true believers” of nearly mythical status, driven by vision, often building a cult of leadership. Similarly, they tend to believe so strongly in their cause that they become completely ruthless, willing to do anything necessary to protect their movement and weaken the counterinsurgents.

Resources. In the broadest terms, insurgents need five types of resources: (1) manpower; (2) funding; (3) equipment/supplies, particularly access to arms, munitions and explosives; (4) sanctuary (internal or internal and external); and (5) intelligence. Some insurgencies, for instance, need mass support; others do not. Some need only public passivity. Insurgent resources can be provided, seized or created. The first can come from outside sponsors, domestic supporters or from the ineptitude of the counterinsurgents. Funding, equipment and supplies are the

resources most often seized, but in some insurgencies, particularly those in Africa, manpower is seized through violence as insurgents undertake forcible recruitment.

20th-century insurgency

21st-century insurgency is clearly a descendent of the “golden age of insurgency” that blossomed during the second half of the 20th century. At that time, many states in Latin America, Asia, Africa and even on the periphery of Europe were ruled by weak, corrupt regimes; unpopular dictators; new, fragile governments; or colonial occupiers. Socialist radicalism and nationalism inspired revolutionaries around the world and provided an ethical justification for political violence. Increases in literacy and improvements in communication helped to mobilize the disenfranchised and the repressed. The Soviet Union, unable to undertake direct expansion, adopted an indirect strategy in which it supported insurgency to weaken the West. Later, China and Cuba followed suit. Toward the end of the 20th century, indirect aggression via state support to insurgency was used in many countries.

The rise of Mao’s theory of the people’s war was key to the growth of insurgents. People’s war began when a highly motivated cadre mobilized a support base among a rural peasantry using nationalism and local grievances such as corruption, excessive taxation and land ownership. It was particularly powerful when it could take the form of a liberation insurgency. The Chinese insurgents, for instance, gained strength when they painted their movement as an anti-Japanese one (even though they did little actual fighting against the Japanese). The same was true of the Viet Minh. What happened in these cases — and may happen in Iraq —

was that the insurgents built their movements on liberation grounds but were able to segue into purely national insurgencies after the occupiers left. People’s War called for a period of underground political organization followed by guerrilla war.⁵

The ultimate objective was to seize power and create a communist state. While the insurgents were prepared for a long struggle involving occasional military setbacks, they sought to launch increasingly larger military operations. In the “pure” form of Maoist people’s war, the final phase was conventional maneuver warfare after the regime was weakened by prolonged guerrilla operations.

Psychological operations and political mobilization paralleled military actions in this warfare. Military actions that had a direct effect on the insurgents often alienated the public and the international community and inspired potential insurgent supporters.

The Algerian National Liberation Front, the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong focused assassinations and terrorism on unpopular local officials and landowners. Often the regimes were blamed when their use of force hurt innocents, while the insurgents often were not — one of the core asymmetries of insurgency is an asymmetry of expectations concerning behavior. Thus, one of the key decisions for counterinsurgents was deciding whether the political cost of armed strikes against the insurgents was worth paying.

The essence of people’s war and the core of its triangularity was that the conflict was an armed and political psychological competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the “undecideds.” Often outside supporters played an important role in people’s war, providing sanctuary, training, equip-

ment, funding and supplies. In fact, 20th-century insurgency was a form of proxy conflict. Because direct confrontation between the West and East risked escalation to the thermonuclear level, proxy conflict was considered a safe option.⁶

By the 1980s, the U.S. — recognizing that insurgency often required “fighting fire with fire” — began promoting insurgency against pro-Soviet regimes in places such as Nicaragua and Angola. Despite its long history with insurgency and other forms of irregular war, the U.S. was organizationally, doctrinally, conceptually and psychologically unprepared for people’s war when it first confronted it in Vietnam. The Army, at least at the senior level, placed little stress on the mundane but vital aspects of counterinsurgency, such as training the South Vietnamese security forces, village pacification, local self-defense and the need to root out insurgent political cadres. Perhaps more importantly, even though a number of experts in the U.S. developed an astute understanding of the Vietnamese communist strategy and organization, Washington never forced the South Vietnamese regime to undergo fundamental reform, and thus the South Vietnamese government never solidified its legitimacy.⁷ Army Chief of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler reflected the thinking of President Lyndon Johnson and his top advisers when he said, “The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military.”⁸

By the time the U.S. did develop an organization for synchronizing the military, political and psychological dimensions of the struggle — the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS, program — it was too late.⁹ The U.S. never supported CORDS to a degree comparable to the major military operations, the

North Vietnamese military was thoroughly entrenched in the south, the South Vietnamese regime was widely perceived as corrupt and illegitimate, and the American public was alienated. Even though the Viet Cong were militarily crushed during the 1968 Tet Offensive and saw their political underground decimated by the Phoenix Program (which came later), the shift of power away from the regime was irreversible and was carried on by the other element of the insurgent alliance — the North Vietnamese Army.¹⁰

When the U.S. again confronted insurgency during the 1980s, it drew on the Vietnam experience to develop a “carrot-and-stick” strategy that simultaneously promoted democratization, economic development, dialogue and defense. Recognizing that counterinsurgency support was a very long-term proposition and that support by the American people and their elected leaders would have to be sustained, the U.S. limited its involvement in counterinsurgency to areas of high national interest, especially Central America and the Caribbean.

In addition, the U.S. preferred indirect means over the large-scale application of American military force. The 1987 *National Security Strategy*, for instance, specified that indirect military power, particularly security assistance, was the primary tool of counterinsurgency. The 1988 *National Security Strategy* was even more explicit, emphasizing that U.S. engagement “must be realistic, often discreet, and founded on a clear relationship between the conflict’s outcome and important U.S. national security interests.”¹¹

This understanding of insurgency was eventually codified with the 1990 release of Army and Air Force doctrine in FM 100-20/AFM

3-20, *Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*. Success in low-intensity conflict, according to the manual, depended upon adherence to five “imperatives”: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy and perseverance.

The pivotal concept was *legitimacy*. This concept assumed that the people of a country will decide to support the government or the insurgents based upon which side offers the “best deal” in terms of goods and services. Following that line of thought, U.S. activity in counterinsurgency was based on the concept of internal defense and development, or IDAD, under which the host government “identifies the genuine grievances of its people and takes political, economic and social actions to redress them.”

But while FM 100-20, like the national-security strategy, noted that the U.S. military role in counterinsurgency would “normally center on security-assistance program administration,” it did not rule out the direct tactical involvement of U.S. forces.

Simultaneously, other governments around the world also came to grips with Maoist-style insurgency and developed effective strategies, doctrine and forces to counter it. Some used the American approach, combining the carrot and the stick. Others, such as the Guatemalans and Peruvians, implemented a “mailed fist” strategy that also proved effective (albeit brutal). By the end of the 20th century, counterinsurgency thinking had caught up with insurgency, and the tide had turned. Insurgency’s golden age was over — at least for a brief period.

Mutating insurgency

While many governments have discovered ways to counter Maoist people’s war, the factors that moti-

vate insurgents — anger, frustration, perceived repression and an inability to change these through legitimate political means — persist.¹² As a result, insurgency is mutating. But there are key changes or discontinuities whose effects are not yet fully understood.

The meaning of sanctuary. Because there are fewer geographically remote areas outside government control in which insurgencies can gestate, the initial stages of development tend to take place “hidden in plain sight” — in cities and other developed areas. The ability of governments, particularly those affiliated with the U.S., to find and destroy targets from a distance has made embedding and dispersal, rather than isolation, the preferred forms of protection for insurgents. While necessary for self-protection, dispersion will make it difficult for insurgent movements to concentrate enough power to seize control of a state. Modern insurgents thus never develop enough military power to undertake conventional operations and will have to rely on terrorism and psychological and political means, which have a lower chance of success.

Diversification of support. While many insurgent movements continue to seek external support, they can no longer rely on it to the extent that Cold War insurgents could, in large part because of the ability of the U.S. to pressure external supporters. Insurgents must therefore devote extensive efforts to fund-raising or to income-generation. Those efforts increasingly lead them to form coalitions with organized crime or to become criminal organizations themselves. While this is, in a sense, a distraction from the insurgents goal, it diminishes the need for external sponsors and for public support. To a much greater extent, contempo-



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During the Vietnam War, the Army did not place enough emphasis on vital aspects of counterinsurgency such as training security forces, village pacification, local self-defense and the need to root out insurgent political cadres.

rary insurgents need public passivity rather than public support.

Extended connections. Information technology and interconnectivity have facilitated the linkage of various insurgent movements and allied organizations, including criminal enterprises, across regions and around the world. Coalitions and partnerships that would have been impossible during the Cold War are becoming the norm. The best example is the transnational Islamist insurgency, which includes a dizzying array of subcomponents.

Asymmetric power projection. Insurgents have developed the capability for strategic power projection (terrorism), strategic intelligence and the building of wide-ranging regional and global linkages without the need for a patron like the Soviet Union or Cuba. Eventually this may allow them to deter states that have a less-than-vital interest from providing counterinsurgency support.

Shifting rallying cries. The content of insurgent ideology has shifted. While there are a few lingering Marxist insurgencies, an

ideology based on transnational, radical Islam is clearly on the ascent. In some ways, this ideology poses greater challenges than Marxism. For instance, clerics play a central role in political mobilization but are considered protected and hence unacceptable targets. Because of its transcendentalism, radical Islam can inspire suicide terrorists — a phenomenon uncommon in secular insurgencies. But radical Islam is also a less forward-looking and less inclusive ideology than Marxism; its appeal outside its historical cultural realm is limited. In the broadest sense, the ideologies that underlie 21st-century insurgencies decry the injustice of globalization. Because the U.S. is seen as the engineer of the existing world order, many insurgent ideologies define the U.S. and its partner regimes as the enemy.

Transparency. Flowing from information technology, globalization and the international movement of people, transparency has changed the nature of psychological warfare, making it easier to transmit information (including rumors and lies) and to build link-

ages, but harder to sustain perceptions or themes that do not closely match existing predispositions. In an environment in which the population has access to multiple and instantaneous sources of information, perceptions can be shaped but not controlled.

The mutation of insurgency is likely to continue and may take several directions. For instance, insurgencies may become increasingly networked, with no centralized command and no common strategy, only a unifying objective. This would make them even less effective in terms of seizing power or attaining other political goals, but more survivable in the face of effective counterinsurgent actions.

Insurgencies also may develop connections, even alliances, with legitimate political organizations that share their resentment of the U.S.-dominated global economic and political system. It is conceivable that insurgent movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America could find political allies or sympathetic affiliates in North America, Western Europe and the Pacific Rim. This would accord them a degree of legitimacy that would greatly complicate the task of counterinsurgency.

Insurgencies may follow the path of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and evolve into purely criminal organizations with only the thinnest veneer of politics. Or, more ominously, they may acquire weapons of mass destruction and thus develop an increased capability for deterrence or coercion.

Current situation

For the U.S., the strategic salience of insurgency is higher than it has been since the height of the Cold War. The interconnectedness and permeability of states, the globalization of economies, the

transparency arising from information technology, and the intermixing of people around the world give every conflict regional and global repercussions. What takes place within states is of intense concern to those outside, particularly to the U.S., in its role as engineer of global and regional order.

Internal conflicts create refugee flows that destabilize neighboring states. They often spawn organized crime as rebels turn to smuggling to raise capital and acquire weaponry. Internal conflicts and the weak states or ungoverned areas they create often also serve as breeding grounds for terrorism, so the con-

Leader development and training must include increased cultural sensitivity and the ability to communicate across cultural boundaries. It must focus on inculcating the Army with the ability to innovate and adapt.

nection between internal conflicts and American security is direct.

Insurgency is challenging for the U.S. because two of insurgency's dominant characteristics — protractedness and ambiguity — mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Rapid decisive operations are seldom, if ever, strategically decisive; long-term involvement, with extensive interagency activity and partner cooperation, is the norm.

Because the military battlespace is not decisive, ultimate success requires that the U.S. military play a supporting role to other govern-

ment agencies and, more importantly, to the partner governments and their security forces. Furthermore, the broader U.S. national-security organization is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. Even when the military is effective at the security component of counterinsurgency, other government agencies are less effective in meeting counterinsurgency's political, economic, psychological and intelligence challenges.

The strategic and doctrinal framework with which the U.S. must face 21st-century insurgencies does provide a foundation, but there are serious gaps. Some key strategic documents overlook insurgency altogether. For instance, the 2004 *National Military Strategy* states, "While the Armed Forces' foremost task is to fight and win wars, the character of conflict has changed, necessitating capabilities to defeat a wide range of adversaries — from state to non-state actors."¹³ While not using the word "insurgency," the publication refers to "illegal armed groups that menace stability and security."¹⁴

But the national military strategy's principles are agility, decisiveness and integration that "support simultaneous operations, the application of overmatching power and the fusion of U.S. military power with other instruments of power."¹⁵ This strategy is not integrated fully with the characteristics that history has shown to be most effective in counterinsurgency: perseverance, restrained use of force, and an emphasis on intelligence, law-enforcement and political action.

Moreover, the section of the strategy that deals with deterring aggression does not mention insurgency sponsorship or support as a form of aggression.¹⁶ The strategy does mention stability operations, but it views them purely as a follow-on to major combat operations. In

aggregate, the 2004 *National Military Strategy* applies the conceptual foundation and methodology developed for conventional combat to irregular warfare rather than developing a new or separate approach.

While joint and service doctrine does deal with insurgency, it tends to overlook the ongoing mutations, treating 20th-century Maoist people's war as a universal model for insurgency. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, for instance, incorporates counterinsurgency under nation assistance, which includes security assistance, foreign internal defense and humanitarian and civil assistance.¹⁷

Foreign internal defense, or FID, is the most salient concept. It is defined as "the total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency." This "has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government."¹⁸ Initially developed from the U.S. experience in Vietnam, FID is designed to "free and protect a nation from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society."¹⁹ Economic, social, informational and political needs are the focus of U.S. effort. However, military assistance is usually necessary for providing security.

FID programs may also address other, interrelated sources of instability, such as drug trafficking, terrorism and ethnic rivalries.²⁰ The military's role in FID can be categorized as indirect support, such as security assistance, combined exercises and exchanges; as direct support, such as civil-military operations, military training to host-nation forces, logistics support, and intelligence and communications

sharing; and as combat operations.

Recent Army doctrine incorporates counterinsurgency into stability operations and support operations. The emphasis tends to be less on the direct interests of the U.S. in countering insurgency than on the indirect adverse effects of such conflict. For instance, Army FM 3-07 states, "Many modern conflicts do not directly affect the interests of the United States. Others, however, affect U.S. humanitarian interests, access to markets and materials, the safety of our citizens, and the stability necessary to sustain democratic government. These threats to U.S. national interests may require stability operations or support operations in response."²¹

Army doctrine is also based on FID. FM 3-07 states:

*Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support. The winner will be the party that better forms the issues, mobilizes groups and forces around them, and develops programs that solve problems of relative deprivation. This requires political, social, and economic development. Security operations by military and police forces, combined with effective and legitimate administration of justice, provide the necessary secure environment in which development can occur.*²²

According to the doctrine, the primary role of the Army in counterinsurgency is managing security-assistance programs.²³ While U.S. forces generally do not engage in combat, they may conduct strike operations if required.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq led the Army's leaders to recognize the need for new counterinsurgency doctrine. An interim field manual was published in October 2004, with other versions intended to follow.²⁴ While this was an ambitious undertaking, it treated 20th-

century insurgency patterned after Maoist people's war as a universal model and did not grapple with new forms of 21st-century insurgency. For instance, the new doctrine defined insurgency as an "organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government," which would exclude the conflict in Iraq prior to national elections, or the post-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.²⁵

Given this perspective, the recommendations for counterinsurgency largely reflect the lessons of Vietnam. Using a national insurgency as the sole model, the doctrine gives no consideration to the special requirements of a liberation insurgency.

Strategic considerations

Until recently, the U.S. became involved in counterinsurgency to support a regime whose overthrow would threaten important or vital U.S. national interests. A range of criteria were used to decide whether intervention was warranted:

- The nature of the regime facing the challenge;
- The nature of the insurgents;
- The economic or geostrategic significance of the state facing an insurgency;
- The traditional relationship of the threatened state with the U.S.;
- The human cost of the insurgency.

Historically, the decision to intervene usually has been made when a pro-American regime faced an active insurgency that it could not handle on its own. In the post-9/11, strategic environment, a second mechanism for American involvement in counterinsurgency has emerged: an insurgency that arises out of a stabilization and transformation operation such as Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom. Because such stabilization and transformation operations are like-

ly to remain an important element of American national-security strategy for the duration of the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. military is likely to be used in counterinsurgency support in the foreseeable future.

When the U.S. supports a beleaguered partner, there are existing political and security structures, but America's leverage may be limited. A regime that faces a serious insurgency threat often has major political, economic and social shortcomings. The fact that an insurgency has been able to coalesce and develop indicates that the regime is unable or unwilling to recognize the shortcomings. The problem for the U.S. is finding an effective way to encourage or, if necessary, to force the partner to undertake needed reforms at the same time that its security capabilities are being improved.

In addition, American assistance makes partner regimes feel more secure and can diminish their perception of the urgency of change. This complicates counterinsurgency support and makes it difficult to retain the backing of other nations and of the American people.

Counterinsurgency support as a follow-on to stabilization and transformation operations can be especially challenging, because security and political structures are weak or nonexistent, and because insurgents can cast their struggle as one of liberation. Once the insurgency is seen as a liberation insurgency, it is difficult to shift it back to a national one. Even when the U.S. helps establish a local government and security forces (as in Vietnam by the early 1970s and Iraq at the present time), the new regime may be perceived as an American proxy. It can be difficult to mobilize backing for counterinsurgency under these conditions, even when the future

offered by the U.S. and its local partners is, in objective terms, significantly more attractive than that proposed by the insurgents.

In countering insurgency, the key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at counterinsurgency.

While this makes perfect sense for a national insurgency, one size does not fit all. A strategy for countering a liberation insurgency must be different in some important ways. This includes:

- Rapid stabilization of the state or area, using the force required. Normally, a larger force is better, because perception and presence are integral components of stabilization. Preferably, the stabilization force should be a multinational, integrated, interagency organization operating with a United Nations mandate. The U.S. contingent should not be the largest if other effective multinational partners are available.
- Achieving a minimal U.S. military presence as rapidly as possible.
- Rapid creation of effective local security and intelligence forces.
- Shifting the perception of the insurgency to one of a national insurgency. This will include augmenting the legitimacy of the local government and security forces by distancing them from the U.S. This process will entail having the local government and military forces take the lead in projects and operations whenever possible.
- Over the long term, adjusting the actions of the local regime by encouraging sustained reform.
- Cauterization — the strengthening of states surrounding the state facing an insurgency. In this way, the strategic damage

can be contained should the insurgency escalate or become uncontrollable.

Some elements of U.S. strategy will be relevant to both national and liberation insurgencies. For instance, sustained capability enhancement is crucial even during those times when the U.S. is not actively engaged in counterinsurgency. This includes leader development, wargaming, concept development, research and analysis, professional education and focused training. This will be particularly difficult to sustain during the gap between counterinsurgency operations, but it is vital.

The tradition within the U.S. military has been to develop an understanding of counterinsurgency and an impressive array of counterinsurgency skills when engaged in such operations, and then let the expertise atrophy afterwards. That pattern forces us into a blank-slate relearning process when the nation is again committed to counterinsurgency support.

Capability enhancement should include increasing the ability and willingness of regional states and other regional security organizations to provide counterinsurgency support. This is easier said than done. Because counterinsurgency tends to be a dirty business, and because the emergence of an active insurgency is seen as a taint on a regime, security organizations in regions where insurgencies occur have tended to shy away from collective responses. They are willing to work on cooperative ventures for peace operations but not for counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency support traditionally has come from outside a region. Breaking down this prejudice and building effective regional counterinsurgency systems would be useful. Along similar lines, synchronization of counterinsurgency thinking among key Ameri-

can partners like the NATO states, Australia and India would augment U.S. capabilities.

Because insurgents have developed a strategic strike capability via terrorism, improved homeland security also must be seen as part of capability enhancement for counterinsurgency support. When assessing the wisdom of engagement in counterinsurgency support, American political leaders must consider the domestic social repercussions and whether the involvement might spawn terrorism aimed at the U.S. This possibility must not deter the U.S. from actions in the national interest, but it is a consideration. It means that the Department of Homeland Security should be consulted and integrated into counterinsurgency strategic planning.

The U.S., along with its global and regional partners, needs better methods for early warning of insurgency, taking preventative actions and creating early-stage support packages. One of the ironies and problems with insurgency is that the regime facing one often does not recognize it or denies it until the insurgency has had time to coalesce and develop. The insurgents, in other words, always begin a conflict with the strategic initiative. If the U.S. could commit resources before a conflict explodes, the payoff would be immense — preventing an insurgency or nipping one in the bud is always easier than turning the tide on one that has taken root.

The issue of when and how to engage in counterinsurgency support will remain an open one in U.S. strategy. Specifically, the question of whether this should be an “all or nothing” proposition is vital. Should there be a counterinsurgency corollary to the “Powell Doctrine” that states that the U.S. will engage in counterinsurgency support only when the interests at

stake are high enough that we are willing to sustain the effort to the end and to use decisive force, even if that requires a longtime commitment of money and personnel? Or is a modest amount of counterinsurgency support to a beleaguered friend better than none at all? In reality, this is probably not an either/or choice. The U.S. has become and will continue to become involved in “major” counterinsurgencies where sustained, high-level engagement is justified, as well as in “minor” ones where it is not. The key is to understand the distinction and not let what should be a minor case segue into a major commitment.

The U.S. must make clear whether its approach to counterinsurgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, tailoring the response and method to the threat. Traditional thinking is that victory, defined as the eradication of the insurgency as a political and military force and the improvement of the factors that allowed it to emerge in the first place, is the appropriate goal. This is captured in joint and Army doctrine. But

given the extent of America’s global commitment and the time and resources that it takes to attain ultimate victory in counterinsurgency, a strategy of containment merits consideration. This would be similar to the contemporary Israeli approach. The Israelis know they cannot win the hearts and minds of the Palestinians. They know they cannot change the root cause of the insurgency, because that is the existence of Israel itself. They therefore have built a strategy designed to keep the insurgents ineffective for as long as it takes.

A strategy of containment might distinguish between different types of insurgents and commit the U.S. to countering only insurgencies likely to support international terrorism or aggression, or those attempting to overthrow truly democratic regimes. Such a strategy would return to a minimum U.S. presence once an acceptable level of stability had been attained. Americans might initially protest that such a strategy of containment is antithetical to the current broader tenets of U.S. national-security strategy, but the strategy



Army News Service

In Afghanistan a Soldier from the 304 Psychological Operations Company puts up posters announcing the opening of new schools. In the past it was thought that “winning hearts and minds” was enough, but the mutating insurgency of the 21st century challenges that concept.

is certainly within our tradition. We have, for instance, chosen to manage the problem of Haiti for the past century, preferring to re-intervene as required rather than engineer the sort of wide-scale social, political and economic transformation that it would take to prevent instability from re-emerging. It is conceivable that in faraway places like Iraq and Afghanistan, we could adopt a strategy of intervention and stabilization when necessary, without attempting to transform the societies or making a commitment to protracted counterinsurgency.

Which strategy makes more sense? As Clausewitz reminds us, “The first, the supreme, and the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make” is to understand “the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” A strategy of victory that seeks a definitive end makes sense when facing a national insurgency in which the partner government has some basis of legitimacy and popular support. In liberation insurgencies, though, a strategy of victory is a very long shot. No matter how much effort, money and blood the U.S. pours in, it will be unable to change the image of an outsider imposing a solution. Even if the U.S. focuses on creating a friendly regime, that regime will be unlikely to attain legitimacy and support (except by turning on the U.S.). In such insurgencies, a strategy of containment is the more logical one.

One additional strategic factor merits consideration: Some strategic thinkers contend that the U.S. is now facing the first insurgency of a global scale — created by the interlinking of multiple national insurgencies and led by a network motivated by radical Islam.²⁶ The

Global War on Terrorism has all of the characteristics of an insurgency. The insurgents are fighting a total war with limited resources; the counterinsurgents are self-restrained by ethics and a desire to control costs. This contention suggests that the appropriate American response is to build a grand strategy modeled on counterinsurgency that recognizes the differences between national and liberation insurgencies.

Operational considerations

One of the core dynamics in insurgency and counterinsurgency is the “learning contest.” Insurgents tend to be highly adaptable and flexible, at least at the tactical and operational levels. To match them, counterinsurgents must also be adaptable and quick to learn. Adaptability can be maximized by giving lower-level leaders as much autonomy as possible; by refining methods for the collection, dissemination and implementation of lessons learned; and by adopting what the U.S. Marine Corps calls a “matrix organization” of functionally organized teams from across the U.S. government and, for military units themselves, a networked structure with central coordination but local autonomy.²⁷

Because insurgents attempt to concentrate operations in the political and psychological battlespaces, the operational design for counterinsurgency must be different than for conventional combat. One useful approach would be to adopt an inter-agency, effects-based method of counterinsurgency planning, focused on the following key activities:

- *Fracturing* the insurgent movement through military, psychological and political means, including direct strikes; dividing one faction against another; offering amnesties; draining the

pool of alienated, disillusioned, angry young males by providing alternatives; and so forth.

- *Delegitimizing* the insurgent movement in the eyes of the local population and any international constituency it might have.
- *Demoralizing* the insurgent movement by creating and sustaining the perception that long-term trends are adverse and by making the lives of insurgents unpleasant and dangerous through military pressure and psychological operations.
- *Delinking* the insurgent movement from its internal and external support by understanding and destroying the political, logistics and financial connections.
- *Deresourcing* the insurgent movement both by curtailing funding streams and by causing it to waste its existing resources.

In combination, the activities would allow counterinsurgent commanders to assess success or failure and make adjustments. Because the essence of insurgency is psychological, psychological metrics, while difficult to develop and to assess, are more accurate than body counts, insurgent operations undertaken, development projects begun (or finished), and similar measures. They might include things such as the percentage of local residents who feel secure enough to go out at night, express a pro government political position, work for the government, or have favorable attitudes toward the government vs. toward the insurgents.

The notion of recognizing and reacting to failure is an important one. As John Nagl points out, one of the things that allowed the British army to innovate, adapt and succeed during its counterinsurgency operations in Malaya during the 1950s was its willingness at all levels to admit failure.²⁸

This requires an independent

strategic assessment organization. Those whose careers are contingent on the success of a campaign can never evaluate it with brutal objectivity. Making an organization or even its higher headquarters responsible for self-evaluation is to risk the kind of fantasy assessments and inflated reporting seen in Vietnam. The auditors should include experienced government officials, military officers, policemen, intelligence officers, strategists and regional experts. The organization should be nonpartisan, interagency and, if possible, multinational.

Another way of thinking about structuring an operation (and one that is compatible with the effects-based approach) is to use *pre-emption/prevention* as a guideline. Certain adverse things can happen during the course of an insurgency: (1) the emergence of a serious insurgency; (2) the development of insurgent military capabilities; (3) the expansion of public support for the insurgents; (4) the creation of linkages between the insurgency and organized crime; (5) the development by the insurgents of the ability to sustain a level of chronic instability; (6) a widespread perception that the insurgents will ultimately prevail; and, (7) the coalescence of a coherent insurgent political organization.

An effective counterinsurgency plan would be one explicitly designed to pre-empt and prevent these adverse trends. Each activity would combine defensive and offensive actions. Each would require a range of resources and actions; each could be evaluated by separate metrics. Counterinsurgent planners should always remember that timing matters. As with health care, a small effort early is more effective than a major one later on. While it is difficult to discern, insurgencies do have a

point of “critical mass,” at which they become much more formidable opponents. If the U.S. is able to help a threatened partner early, it may be able to prevent the insurgents from attaining critical mass. In general, once an insurgency reaches critical mass, U.S. involvement is likely to be ineffective, and the U.S. should pursue disengagement, even given the strategic and political costs.

The military component of a counterinsurgency campaign must seize the initiative as quickly as possible. When an insurgent movement elects to make a stand in the military battlespace and depends on internal sanctuary, conventional sweeps and offensives play an important role.

Often the regimes were blamed when their use of force hurt innocents, while the insurgents often were not — one of the core asymmetries of insurgency is an asymmetry of expectations concerning behavior.

But history suggests that “fighting fire with fire” — emulating insurgent tactics — is also important. The counterinsurgents, for instance, can develop combined guerrilla forces comprising U.S. SF and other outside or host-nation personnel. Creating a second front severely weakens the insurgents’ ability to wage an effective insurgency, because allied guerrillas will be raiding the insurgents’ logistical bases and headquarters, as well as interdicting their lines of communication.

The French in Indochina and the British in Malaya used allied guer-

rillas to great effect. Even though the French program began late in the Indochina war (1953), French guerrillas tied down a number of Viet Minh battalions by raiding bases, striking at headquarters units and interdicting lines of communication.²⁹ In Malaya, the British raised guerrilla units composed of former insurgents. Allied guerrilla operations force the insurgents to devote critical resources and manpower to defensive measures. Given that insurgent capabilities are weak to begin with, such a two-pronged counterinsurgent strategy can quash an insurgency early on.

In a national insurgency, with its triangular configuration, the war of ideas plays a critical role. Hence, information operations, or IO, cannot be conducted in an ad hoc manner. The insurgents always have an initial advantage in this regard, and only a sophisticated IO campaign will wrest the initiative from them. The host-nation government must control the IO process fully; the U.S. will never have a sophisticated enough understanding of key cultural and historical elements to run a program on its own. The American role must be to provide support.

In a liberation insurgency, the U.S. is at a distinct disadvantage in the information campaign. Almost no U.S. actions or information themes are likely to change the perception that Americans are outsiders. This does not mean that the U.S. should abandon the information campaign, but only that American strategists and leaders must be aware of their limitations and not expect to “win” the “war of ideas” on their own.

Organization, force structure

The history of counterinsurgency shows that the full integration of all government agencies under uni-



Army News Service

CA and PSYOP Soldiers play a key role in counterinsurgency, and as the Army transforms, these units will need to be refocused and restructured. At a minimum, a larger portion of these units should be in the active component, with greater autonomy rather than being assigned to a maneuver unit, like this Soldier, who is a member of the 451st Civil Affairs Battalion but is assigned to an archeological dig as part of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team.

fied control is the only way to synchronize the elements of national power effectively. This is considered one of the reasons for British success in Malaya and for the lack of French and American success in Indochina.³⁰ History also suggests that intelligence and counterintelligence are central to success in counterinsurgency. Intelligence must be all-source, focused and disseminated to the various organizations involved in the counterinsurgency effort. The seamless integration of law-enforcement and military action is equally important. Police capability has always been vital for destroying insurgent political undergrounds, but it is becoming even more so as insurgency mutates. Today, effective, preferably multinational law-enforcement support is vital for limiting

insurgent access to resources, whether through direct criminal activity or through ties to global organized crime.

One of the most important elements in counterinsurgency support is the selection of the right person to lead it. In most cases, insurgency warfare necessitates a law-enforcement response, so a security czar, preferably a former police commissioner, should exercise unified command. This appointment accomplishes two objectives: It signifies the primacy of a political solution vs. a parochial military solution, and it appoints a credentialed official who has experience in domestic security issues and is able to integrate all agencies in a unified campaign.

The leader of counterinsurgency support must also be a skilled strategist, able to integrate elements of power and take a long-term perspective. His staff must include police, experts on economic and political development, psychologists, cultural anthropologists and mass-communications specialists.

Because insurgency is an “armed theater” in which the antagonists play to an audience at the same time that they interact with each other, it is sometimes suggested that a specific organization is needed to control information activities. A better idea is to create an organizational culture in which every component of the government is aware of the centrality of information, of the need to tailor images and messages, and of the importance of developing strategies, operations and tactical plans based on desired psychological and political effects.

The composition of the package for U.S. counterinsurgency support will depend on whether the operation entails supporting a threatened partner state or is a component of post-intervention stabilization and transformation. When

backing an existing government, the U.S. would send a force package predominantly designed for training, advice and support. In most cases, the only combat forces would be those needed for force and facility protection. Modularity should increasingly allow the Army to tailor, deploy and sustain such packages. It would be a mistake, though, to think strictly in terms of Army or even military force packages. When the U.S. undertakes counterinsurgency support, it should build an interagency force package from the beginning.

The relationship of the U.S. force and the supported government is always a major consideration. Intelligence sharing is complicated, because the U.S. will often have no way of assessing the supported government’s counterintelligence procedures. In a counterinsurgency, human intelligence is often more important, but an outside military faces tremendous obstacles in building and sustaining the personal relationships that fuel human intelligence. It is more effective to rely on police forces to gather actionable intelligence through investigations, interviews and interrogations with the inhabitants.

While a large U.S. military presence may be needed during the early part of a counterinsurgency campaign following intervention and for the stabilization of a failed state, over the long term, a small military footprint, supporting a larger law-enforcement effort, is an effective solution that crushes the insurgency without giving the insurgency a nationalist rallying cry against an occupying power.

As the Army continues transformation, it is likely that other types of units can be redesigned into counterinsurgency. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, both of which also have high utility in counterinsurgency support, need

refocusing and restructuring. At a minimum, a larger proportion of these units should be in the active component, and both need greater autonomy, rather than being assigned to a maneuver unit.

Counterinsurgency related to stabilization and transformation operations can pose even greater force-development challenges. A stabilization operation can require the significant deployment of forces for extended periods. The challenge, then, is one of sustaining the commitment and developing a rotation base. As U.S. doctrine and strategy indicate, the primary role of the U.S. in counterinsurgency is to strengthen and support partners. U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency combat should always be seen as an emergency expedient, undertaken only when absolutely necessary and for the shortest period of time possible. Given this, it would not be an effective use of resources to create specialized units for counterinsurgency combat. If direct combat is required for some finite period of time, the tactical activities would be close enough to those already resident in the force that the training of existing units could be modified to make them effective.

Leader development, training

Insurgents often deliberately undertake actions that the regime cannot or will not, drawing the counterinsurgents into abuses that can be used as psychological ammunition. Beleaguered governments must often choose between sinking to the ethical level of the insurgents or suffering defeat. Because of this, leader development and training for counterinsurgency must emphasize ethical considerations and force discipline. While these are certainly integral to all forms of leader development and training, in the coun-

terinsurgency context, where insurgents are completely intermixed with noncombatants, intelligence is heavily human, crime and warfare intermingle, and every action has immense psychological and political implications. This not only adds additional stress on Soldiers and leaders, but also confronts them with a different array of challenges.

Leader-development training

Many ideas and concepts central to their understanding of counterinsurgency, such as the notion that victory comes from winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people, are actually specific to national insurgency. One of the key challenges is to distinguish the universal themes and concepts from the context-specific ones, and to jettison those that no longer apply.

must focus on good decision-making, confidence and creativity among lower-ranking leaders, both commissioned and noncommissioned. Leader development and training must include increased cultural sensitivity and the ability to communicate across cultural boundaries. It must focus on inculcating the Army with the ability to innovate and adapt.

Empowering and entrusting

junior leaders to find durable solutions in their unique environments is the only effective way to combat dynamic insurgents. The Army's experience in Iraq during 2003-04 suggests that it does have a significant capability for innovation and adaptation, particularly at the junior levels.³¹

Given the nature of counterinsurgency, professional education and training increasingly must be interagency and multinational. The interagency aspect is particularly important. Unless the Army trains with other agencies, it cannot operate seamlessly in the high pressure, violent, ambiguous world of counterinsurgency. Leaders at all levels must understand and trust the capabilities of other agencies; otherwise, they will never venture from the approved military solution.

The way ahead

Because many of the people in decision-making chain with counterinsurgency expertise and experience understand the Maoist people's war, rather than the evolving counterinsurgency of the 21st century, America's response to the growing threat is problematic. Many ideas and concepts central to their understanding of counterinsurgency, such as the notion that victory comes from winning the "hearts and minds" of the people, are actually specific to national insurgency. One of the key challenges is to distinguish the universal themes and concepts from the context-specific ones, and to jettison those that no longer apply. This process has only begun.

In the realm of strategy, the U.S. must build regional structures for identifying, deterring or preventing incipient insurgencies, and develop regional support systems when insurgencies do break out. The idea that the U.S. will be solely responsi-

ble for counterinsurgency support around the world is not sustainable. Other nations have experience, capability and the incentive to prevent insurgency from destabilizing their regions. The U.S. should inspire them to act on this.

The notion of a grand strategy, modeled on counterinsurgency, to confront the global insurgency also needs further development. As the service most experienced in the analysis of insurgency, the Army should play a leading role in this. But the U.S. military, particularly the Army, was so disillusioned by Vietnam that it has since kept insurgency and counterinsurgency at arm's length. Counterinsurgency was folded into, even hidden, in other concepts such as low-intensity conflict, foreign internal defense and now stability-and-support operations. Given the centrality of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the contemporary strategic environment, the Army must accord these forms of conflict the priority they merit in strategy, operational thinking, doctrine, concept development and force development. Given the importance of the psychological and political battlespaces in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the Army must integrate psychological concepts and analysis in its strategic and operational planning. This kind of integration will require adding trained psychologists and cultural experts at many planning levels (as well as in the professional military education and wargaming systems). The Army also needs better concepts and, eventually, doctrine to understand the links between insurgency and organized crime. This would certainly need to be joint doctrine and may need to be inter-agency doctrine.

To instigate such changes, the Army can be an advocate in the joint and interagency arenas. The

interagency dimension is crucial: The U.S. Army may become the most proficient army in the world at counterinsurgency, but if the rest of the government does not develop equal capabilities, the U.S. will not be effective. And the Army can use its powerful educational, wargaming and concept-development capabilities to generate needed changes within the Army. It will require all of these devices to meet (and transcend) the challenges of the new insurgency era. ✕

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Notes:

¹ These are not mutually exclusive, and an insurgency can take on dimensions of both, or shift from one to the other over its course.

² The British success at quelling the Malayan insurgency of the 1950s and 1960s sometimes is held to offer a model of successful counterinsurgency in a liberation framework, but its applicability is limited. The Malayan insurgency was limited to the Chinese minority of that territory and never spread to the Malay majority. If it had, the British strategy, which was based on precise, limited uses of military force and a stress on police actions and political and economic reforms, would have had less utility. In addition, one of the major factors that made the counterinsurgency campaign successful and prevented the insurgency from spreading to the ethnic Malay population was a promise by Britain that it would withdraw once the situation was stabilized. In other words, the British had to surrender their role as occupier to defeat the insurgents. For discussions of this conflict, see Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); Robert W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1972); Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dog: Malaya 1948-1960* (London: Fontana, 1973); Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960* (London: Cassell, 1966); and John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).

³ The foco strategy developed by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro placed great stress on

this. See Ernesto Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1998).

⁴ Quoted in Ahmed Janabi, "Of Homeland, Identity and Occupation," 9 September 2004, published at <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/239DF360-3640-457C-BA99-5FD497547598.htm>.

⁵ Underground political organization did not stop once armed conflict began but continued through the duration of the campaign in areas controlled by the government.

⁶ Martin van Creveld argued that this tendency for nuclear weapons to obviate large-scale conventional warfare would continue, thus making low-intensity conflict the dominant form around the world. See Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).

⁷ For example, Andrew Molnar, et. al., *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office of the American University, 1965), reprinted (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001), provided an amazingly accurate description of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese strategy. A good description of Dau Tranh can be found at <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-14725.html>.

⁸ Quoted in Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (New York: William Morrow, 1994), 724.

⁹ On CORDS, see Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 118-21. Ambassador Komer was director of the CORDS program.

¹⁰ The classic early work on the organization and strategy of the Viet Cong is Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). Also important is Pike's classic *PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986). On Tet, see Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). On the Phoenix Program, see Douglas Valentine, *The Phoenix Program* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1990); and Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997).

¹¹ *National Security Strategy of the United States*, January 1988, 34.

¹² Probably the only traditional Maoist insurgency that has a chance of outright victory is the one in Nepal. See Thomas A. Marks, *Insurgency in Nepal* (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003).

¹³ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, 2-3.

¹⁴ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, 4.

¹⁵ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, 7.

¹⁶ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, 11.

¹⁷ Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, June 1995, III-9.

¹⁸ Joint Publication 3-07, III-10.

¹⁹ Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, April 2004, I-1.

²⁰ Joint Publication 3-07, III-3.

²¹ Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, February 2003, 1-8.

²² FM 3-07, 3-4.

²³ FM 3-07, 3-6.

²⁴ Keith J. Costa, "Army Crafting Field Manual For Counterinsurgency Operations," *Inside The Pentagon*, 26 August 2004, 1. The interim doctrine is Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, October 2004.

²⁵ FMI 3-07.22, 1-1.

²⁶ Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002), 205-07 and ff.

²⁷ See *Small Wars: 21st Century* (draft) (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2004), 13-14.

²⁸ Nagl, 192.

²⁹ Bernard Fall, *Street Without Joy* (Mechanicsburg, Penn.: Stackpole, 1964), 268-71, 274.

³⁰ See Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, "Policemen versus Soldiers, the Debate Leading to MAAJ Objections and Washington Rejections of the Core of British Counter-Insurgency Advice," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Summer 2001, 51-78.

³¹ Leonard Wong, *Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).

19th SF Group Utilizes MCA Missions to Train Afghan National Army Battalions

by Major Robert W. Redding

During the fall of 2002, Soldiers of the 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, deployed to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, with the primary mission of training the new Afghan National Army, or ANA.

Over the course of six months, the battalion provided an entire range of training, from individual soldier skills to confidence missions. The Soldiers conducted initial training at the Kabul Military Training Center, or KMTC, located about 15 kilometers east of the center of Kabul. They conducted post-graduation unit training in a local joint special-operations area, or JSOA, and at remote firebases.

In accordance with the objectives of Coalition Joint Task Force 180, or CJTF 180, the Soldiers planned and executed military civic-action, or MCA, missions. The MCA missions supported the legitimacy of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, or TISA, and provided ANA soldiers with noncombat leadership opportunities and with training in ways of dealing with the Afghan civilian populace.

The use of ANA troops for MCA operations proved to be an excellent method for increasing the legitimacy of the ANA in the eyes of the Afghan public, for supporting CJTF 180's guidance on the effects of information operations, and for training

the ANA in disaster-relief and humanitarian-assistance operations.

Military civic action

Military civic action is defined in FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, as the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces to perform projects useful to the local population at all levels, in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, etc. By contributing to local economic and social development, the projects also improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

CJTF 180's campaign plan called for ANA forces to be trained and assigned to perform MCA operations in the ANA area of operations supporting coalition operations. The primary goals of ANA MCA operations were to improve the ANA acceptance by the Afghan people, to develop the ANA's capabilities for supporting future disaster-relief and humanitarian-relief efforts, and to provide the ANA troops with an operational mission prior to their deployment to areas that had a high probability of combat.

MCA operations were used not only to increase ANA military skills, but also to increase the ANA's professionalism by instilling in its soldiers the values of respect for fellow citizens, the importance of the democratic process and civilian con-

trol of the military. The tasking of conducting MCA came as implied tasks from several sources, including guidance letters from the commander of CJTF-180.

SF involvement

The primary United States unit involved with training the ANA was the Special Forces Operational Detachment–Alpha, or ODA. At full capacity of the U.S. training at KMTC, six SF ODAs were scheduled to train six ANA battalions per training cycle. Logistics and cultural issues often detracted from the training goals, but the ODAs were able to succeed despite the environment.

Even though MCA operations were identified as an important part of ANA operations, there were inherent barriers to those operations. The military experience of ANA soldiers falls into one of two categories. In the first category are the Afghan leaders, particularly the officers, who gained their military experience in the Soviet-styled Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Army, or DRAA. These soldiers learned a rigid adherence to doctrine and the need for high-level, centralized decision-making.

The other category were the *jihadi* who gained their experience in the ad hoc units of the various guerrilla factions that fought the Soviets and DRAA. Neither category

had any experience in conducting MCA operations. The ODAs determined, however, that ANA battalions did have the capability of performing basic security missions and labor functions. The ODAs also assessed the ANA officers as having the capability, with limited U.S. assistance, of planning and executing MCA operations.

Operational context

During the fall of 2002, major combat operations were being conducted in various regions of Afghanistan, and the deployment plan for the ANA battalions used a “phase-in” concept in order to ease the units into combat. After ANA battalions finished their 10-week period of basic instruction, ODAs took the battalions through a series of increasingly complex and dangerous missions, beginning with missions in the local area, including MCA operations. The plan allowed ODAs to gauge the preparedness of their ANA battalions before subjecting them to more rigorous operations.

Additionally, all of the initial ANA battalions were scheduled to be garrisoned in the Kabul Province, so local-area experience was important, both to ANA success and to the Afghan population’s acceptance of the ANA. Another convenient aspect of



Photo courtesy Robert W. Redding

Military civic-action missions like this medical civic-action project were planned by Soldiers of the 19th SF Group to increase the legitimacy of the Afghan government, but also to provide Afghan troops with noncombat leadership opportunities.



Photo courtesy Robert W. Redding

Forming partnerships with nongovernmental organizations like the Kabul Province Reconstruction Organization, or KRPO, allowed the Soldiers of the 19th SF Group and the ANA to gather “ground truth” from the agencies who had been working in the for several years. The agencies were also instrumental in crowd management during MCA operations.

the plan was that the ANA battalions would be geographically well-positioned to conduct MCA within the Kabul area.

Partnering

Part of the initial MCA concept was to attempt to form a partnership with an international relief organization that was operating in the KMTC vicinity. At the time, security in Kabul was good, and nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and international organizations, or IOs, were performing dozens of relief operations daily in Kabul Province. Although it is a common perception that NGOs and IOs are reluctant to work with U.S. military forces, it was relatively easy to find partners to work with the ANA for an MCA operation.

Planners selected two NGOs as partners: Morningstar Development and the Kabul Province Reconstruction Organization, or KPRO. Morningstar had been working in Afghanistan (even under the Taliban) for more than eight years when the partnership was established. Morningstar’s efforts involved several activities, including developing sustainable economic situations for

underprivileged Afghans and providing short-term relief to internally displaced Afghans. KPRO is an Afghan-run organization that provides development and relief assistance in the vicinity of the ANA’s area of operations. KPRO was instrumental in providing much needed Afghan “ground truth” and crowd-management during MCA operations.

Select MCA missions

Two types of MCA were candidates for the ANA missions: medical civil-action projects, or MEDCAPs, and humanitarian assistance, or HA. Both could be accomplished with the personnel and materiel assets on hand at KMTC. While the ODA was the primary mission planner, the battalion staff developed the contacts and mission parameters in order to minimize the impact on the ODA. Once the ODA had completed the mission analysis and planning, it became clear that the ANA had several pre-mission training requirements that needed to be addressed during mission preparation and mission rehearsals:

- *MCA training.* According to the ODAs’ assessments, none of the ANA soldiers had training or experience in any type of MCA operations (humanitarian distributions, MEDCAPs, etc.).

- *Driver training.* Most ANA soldiers had never driven a vehicle. As a result, ANA units required nonorganic transportation support to perform any of the MCA operations.

- *Crowd-control training.* A significant portion of MCA duties involved maintaining order at MCA mission sites. At any humanitarian-distribution site or mobile medical clinic, crowds quickly become an issue. Crowd-control training also had a significant additional pay-off by building ANA soldier confidence.

Concept of operations

In planning the MCA missions, the SF ODAs had to consider many factors in addition to basic military planning. Other significant factors included:

- *Maintaining ANA unit integrity.* The ODAs planned operations that would keep Afghan units together under their normal

chain of command. This was critical for achieving ANA unity. In the U.S. Army, the importance of unit integrity is understood, but in Afghanistan, where racial and ethnic biases run deep, it was a challenge to create unified ANA battalions out of units that had members of different ethnicity.

- *Operational security.* During the initial stages of its development and deployment, the ANA could not afford a public mission failure. One of the critical aspects of ensuring success was proper operational security, or OPSEC. The SF planners anticipated that subversive, anti-TISA elements would take advantage of any opportunity to disrupt an ANA mission. OPSEC proved challenging to maintain, as MCA missions would lose a significant portion of their value if the press was not present to cover the events. Planners took special pains to ensure media participation without compromising OPSEC. Most of the time, that involved scheduling press coverage of the event without disclosing the location of the mission. Media escorts linked up with the media away from the MCA mission site and escorted them there.

- *Mission-site preparation.* Prior to conducting MCA operations, key U.S. and Afghan leaders coordinated with the mission's selected NGO partner, as well as with local leaders at the mission location. Coordination was conducted to determine the roles of the various participants, the location of the MCA mission sites, and what each participant would need to provide. For example, the village receiving the services often helped with crowd control and movement of people and livestock. On the ANA/U.S. side, medical providers determined what medical conditions would be treated, what equipment and medicines would be needed, and how many health-care providers would be necessary. Based on the coordination, the ODAs could also modify the training plan in order to train the appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures for the mission.

In planning the missions, the ODA used several criteria aimed at ensuring that the mission was worthwhile and had not only the support of the local populace, but also met a need in the area. To ensure that local interactions were appropriate, the ODAs,

ANA leadership and other battalion mission-support elements spent the majority of pre-mission reconnaissance talking with the local leaders near the mission site. During the reconnaissance, they made significant efforts to manage the expectations of the locals, as well as to define the roles of all participants.

Legal considerations

MCA operations proved to be legally complex, particularly in regard to funding, and a legal review proved to be an essential aspect of mission preparation. All in all, legal considerations were minor once the funding rules were identified. The staff judge advocate for JTF 180 found that the ANA could legally participate in U.S.-funded HA projects. There were, however, legal restrictions and constraints for ANA MCA operations, including the following:

- HA goods or services could not be provided directly or indirectly to the ANA.
- Operating funds had to be normal ANA foreign military funding.
- For U.S.-funded MEDCAPs, the ANA could only assist American Soldiers in the execution of the project. This was feasible,



Photo courtesy Robert W. Redding

The Afghan National Army's participation in MCA missions was a visible effort to show the Afghan people that the army had changed, because no Afghan fighting force had ever performed these kinds of missions or sought to aid the populace in this manner. The perceived change added to the legitimacy of the government.



Photo courtesy Robert W. Redding

MCA missions carried out by the ANA under the guidance of the 19th SF Group ranged from medical civic-action projects, or MEDCAPS, to humanitarian assistance. Both types of missions could be accomplished with the personnel and materiel assets on hand at the Kabul Military Training Center, where the primary training was occurring.

as American medical personnel led the medical efforts on the ground.

- During the distribution of donated relief supplies, the NGO partner for the mission had to be in control of the distribution.

- Goods and services could be transferred only to Afghan local government representatives or to their designees (who could not be the ANA).

- When goods and services were provided to Afghan civil government representatives, NGOs and IOs could be involved in the operation of the facilities constructed or in the distribution of the HA, provided that they didn't take ownership.

- U.S. SF could participate with NGOs during the conduct of HA and HCA projects. At a minimum, U.S. forces were required to participate in the initial and final assessment and periodic monitoring of any projects. In fact, ODAs were present throughout the process.

- In the case of HCA projects (projects authorized under Title 10 U.S. Code 401), U.S. forces were used in the actual labor that occurred during the course of the mission. These are usually small-scale projects incidental to other military operations.

These projects could involve NGOs. If the project was an HA project (projects authorized under Title 10 U.S. Code 2561), U.S. forces could take a more supervisory role. The 2561 projects (the bigger projects) normally include NGOs. U.S. forces could, but were not required to, take a more supervisory role in the 2561 projects.

- HCA projects (10 USC 401) were funded with operational and maintenance funds; funds used for those projects were not likely to be reimbursed.

Progress of missions

During the mission-preparation process, the planning team outlined the amount of assistance that U.S. forces would provide, producing the progression of missions through the phases shown below:

- *ANA leadership shadows U.S. forces performing HA or H/CA.* The purpose of this phase was to have U.S. forces run HA and H/CA operations so that Afghan leaders could see an example of mission execution. While the planners thought this phase was pertinent, it turned out not to be possible. ODAs compensated by performing multiple rehearsals, to include role-playing.

- *ANA provides security and labor for U.S. forces that are performing HA or H/CA.* This was the first phase that was executed. For the most part, medical capabilities within the ANA during this period consisted of a few medics and former nurses (doctors had not yet come on board).

- *ANA performs MCA with U.S. embedded trainers.* The ODAs with the 19th SF Group completed this third cycle of training while they were deployed. The teams performed MEDCAPS that had been planned primarily by Afghan leaders, with the medical portions conducted by coalition, Afghan and NGO medical support.

- *ANA performs MCA with U.S. planning assistance; ANA plans and executes MCA as directed by Afghan Ministry of Defense.* These two phases were the final, full-performance mission categories.

Execution, lessons learned

During the 5/19th SF Group's deployment, it executed several MCA missions

with ANA forces. Each mission was unique, but all of them shared common elements:

- Once trained and oriented, ANA leaders and soldiers were fully capable of the proper execution of MCA operations. ANA soldiers understood the impact of these missions, and they took care to act appropriately to help ensure mission success.

- Thorough reconnaissance and planning was necessary for the proper execution of MCA missions. ANA/U.S. teams that actively and earnestly engaged the local population at the mission site prior to mission execution were more successful at controlling events during mission execution than those that did not.

- The ODAs and supporting U.S. elements performed complete personality assessments of the ANA participants and local players at the mission location. During preparation for one mission, it was found that there were significant issues with one of the senior leaders of the ANA battalion being selected to execute a MED-CAP in a particular location. It was found that this officer had operated in the same area as a *jihadi* commander during the Afghan civil war (1992-1996), and had inflicted particularly harsh measures on the local population in the vicinity of the mission site. Based on that information, the ODA changed the site for the mission.

- As can be seen from the previous lesson, mission-site selection was critical to the success of the operation. Missions that were conducted in areas in which the local leadership embraced and participated in the planning and execution of the MCA event were more successful, better-organized events than those in which the leaders did not participate.

Conclusions

ANA participation in MCA was and still is an essential aspect of the Afghan people's acceptance of the ANA. It was a visible effort to show the Afghan people that the army had changed, because before, no Afghan fighting force would have performed that type of mission. ANA MCA operations were also feasible missions that enhanced and sustained the ANA's war-

fighting skills. Not only were the MCA missions good for train-up, they were good sustainment training, too. Finally, with detailed planning and rehearsals, these events were conducted smoothly and successfully, providing a tremendous amount of good local and international press and thereby generating support for the war effort. ><

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Special Forces Warrant Officer Pay Overhauled as Career Field Transforms

by Kathleen Devine

When Special Forces warrant officers discuss why they made the switch from noncommissioned officer to warrant officer, money will rarely be the reason. Instead, Soldiers who have transitioned to warrant officers list job satisfaction and team time as top reasons for making the switch.

One USASOC warrant officer says the challenge for him is the opportunity to develop future commanders, “I would tell you that my goal has been to make a battalion commander out of a good captain when I was on an ODA. I’m seeing those battalion commanders today, and I’ve been a warrant 11 years now.”

Warrant officers have the opportunity to spend five to seven years on a team providing subject-matter expertise, continuity and the ability to influence long-term planning, all key factors in the decision to trade in stripes for bars. In fact, the Special Forces warrant officer (180A) is the only warrant officer in the U.S. Army inventory to serve as a combat leader during split-team operations or in the absence of the detachment commander.

Promotion opportunities for Special Forces warrant officers are another big reason to make the switch. The selection rate from CW2 to CW3 is between 90 and 100 percent; from CW3 to CW4, it’s about 100 percent; and from CW4 to CW5, it’s 66 to 70 percent — a high selection rate compared to SF enlisted promotions. But high

job satisfaction and high promotion rates alone are not sufficient incentives to keep the ranks filled, which is why the commander of the Army Special Operations Command is making SF warrant-officer issues a top priority.

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Directorate of Special Operations Proponency is spearheading an effort to review and transform the Special Forces warrant officer career field. That effort will affect everything from accessions and education to assignments and pay. While there are a number of significant initiatives under way, the addition of 180As to the critical skills accessions bonus, or CSAB, and the critical skills retention bonus, or CSRIB, programs are likely to have the most immediate impact on the SF warrant officer program.

Bonus programs

Under the CSAB program, new 180A candidates are eligible for up to \$60,000 per year; under the CSRIB program, eligible 180As could get between \$8,000 and \$150,000. Another pay initiative that will have a positive impact on the force is assignment incentive pay, or AIP, for 180As who have more than 25 years of service. The 180A must serve in a designated operational billet to be eligible for the extra \$750 per month.

Of key importance to the pay issue is the

Pay Incentive Facts

<u>What</u>	<u>Who</u>	<u>Benefit</u>
Critical Skill Accession Bonus (CSAB)	180A new candidates	Up to \$60K with a 6-yr. ADSO
Critical Skill Retention Bonus (CSRB)	180A w/19-24 AFS	\$150K-8K with a 6-1 yr. ADSO
Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP)	180A w/25-25+ AFS	\$750/month in "operational unit"
180A not considered	180A w/<19 AFS	Remain serving out their ADSO

Note: 180A incentives are in effect from 1 January 2005-December 2007

addition of 180As to the accessions, recruiting and assignment pay incentives. CW5 William McPherson, chief warrant officer for the Special Forces Branch, feels this is a big step in the right direction but that pay issues are something that must be continually reviewed and worked to ensure that the force is filled with the right people at the right time, both now and in the future. Specific details on the 2005 accession and retention pay incentives are being worked through personnel and finance channels and are in effect from January 2005 to December 2007.

Education improvements

There are also major transformation initiatives underway in the area of military education and professional development, based on input from SF warrants worldwide. A new 180A career model will incorporate joint and interagency training and assignments. Special Forces warrant officers are attending advanced schooling at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. There will also be a substantial investment in technology, training and equipment for selected SF warrants in the intelligence fusion, information operations and communications areas. But the most sweeping changes will involve revising the courses for basic, advanced and senior staff warrant officers, based on current wartime lessons learned.

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course has been updated and streamlined to an 11-week course from the 19-week version that had been taught in various forms since 1993. The cadre reduced the number of hours devoted to teaching common subjects, which students should already have

learned in the Warrant Officer Candidate School at Fort Rucker, Ala., or in classes routinely taught at their home unit. The streamlined course provides the student with a more concise curriculum and incorporates lessons learned from instructors who have just returned from supporting the Global War on Terrorism.

There is little doubt that the SF warrant officer is a proven combat leader who is indispensable to the well-being of the force and the team. The transformation of the Special Forces warrant officer career field is ensuring that legacy.

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21st-Century Relevance of Mao's Theory on Popular Support in Guerrilla Warfare

by Major Christian M. Karsner

After more than 70 years, the writings of Mao Zedong on guerrilla warfare are still relevant and worthy of in-depth study by United States Army Special Forces. One has to look no further than the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to realize that insurgency and counterinsurgency are becoming the norm, not the exception, in modern warfare.

Guerrilla warfare is not new; its well-documented history stretches back through time. While large, well-equipped, modern, conventional armies generally look down on guerrilla tactics, military forces have used these techniques when circumstances dictated. Though guerrilla fighters may often resemble a disorganized rabble, the true guerrilla is, in reality, very different.¹

Guerrilla warfare is a technique available to a strategically weaker and less well-armed opponent. Guerrillas have the initiative and can choose the time and place to attack the organized power of a stronger opponent. At the same time, the guerrilla often has the advantage because he has the ability to refuse combat and fade from the battlefield. The guerrilla

fights on a strategic defensive, but as seen in the Middle East, he can conduct tactically offensive war against military or government targets for psychological impact. Guerrilla factions are not capable of defeating or destroying a well-equipped enemy. The fact that the guerrilla selects military and government targets differentiates him from the terrorist, who generally selects noncombatant civilian and nongovernmental targets for a different kind of psychological impact.

Savages, bandits, drug lords and well-trained commandos have all made use of many of the same techniques. However, neither they nor counterinsurgency forces are true guerrillas. The distinction is that the guerrilla is a politically motivated, "armed civilian whose principal weapon is not his rifle or machete, but his relationship to the community, the nation in and for which he fights."²

In 20th-century China, Mao blended political and military activity to develop new concepts of guerrilla warfare.³ Mao's new strategy theorized and practiced a form of military conflict known as the people's protracted war, which

called for "engaging a civilian population, or a significant part of such a population, against the military forces of an established or usurpative governmental authority."⁴

Mao fashioned a doctrine of guerrilla warfare based on a unique combination of politics and war. He recognized that insurgents must consider popular support the primary condition for their success and the central objective of the guerrilla movement. Guerrilla movements lacking a strong foundation in the masses are easily destroyed.⁵ According to Mao, "The moment that this war of resistance disassociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it disassociates itself from hope of ultimate victory."⁶

Author Robert Tabor, in his book *The War of the Flea*, acknowledges that the population "is the key to the entire struggle"; it is, he says, "the population that is doing the struggling."⁷ A supportive civilian populace is a guerrilla's "camouflage, quartermaster, recruiter, communications network and all-seeing intelligence service."⁸ The survival of a guerrilla movement is entirely dependent upon the

support of the populace, who provide combat and support troops, food, shelter, intelligence and medical support.

Mao viewed the guerrilla's ability to communicate effectively with the populace as indispensable for popular support. Accordingly, if the information-warfare battle is lost, then the essential lifeline to the population is severed, and the guerrilla movement will wither and die. In fact, Mao went so far as to say that without the support of the people, a true guerrilla movement couldn't even exist, "Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation."⁹

Mao was against impressing citizens into the guerrilla ranks and believed that only volunteers should be accepted into service as guerrillas; however, all could join and be welcomed if they observed some basic rules of conduct. Mao implemented these guidelines for guerrilla interaction with the populace in order to gain and maintain the support of local civilians, and the guidelines reflected the importance he placed on popular support in victory. Mao's "three rules and eight remarks"¹⁰ are listed below:

Rules

- All actions are subject to command.
- Do not steal from the people.
- Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks

- Replace the door when you leave the house.
- Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
- Be courteous.
- Be honest in your transactions.

- Return what you borrow.
- Replace what you break.
- Do not bathe in the presence of women.
- Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.

Mao realized the importance of strict discipline and the prohibition of human-rights violations if the guerrillas were to keep the popular support that is essential to the cause. He exhorted his followers to dismiss from service "vicious people" and those with a problem

The fact that the guerrilla selects military and government targets differentiates him from the terrorist, who generally selects noncombatant civilian and non-governmental targets for a different kind of psychological impact.

maintaining discipline.¹¹ Mao's oft-quoted citation describes the relationship between the civilian populace and the guerrilla: "The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it."

Furthermore, Mao believed that popular support for the guerrilla movement is inversely related to the alienation of the established governing power from the masses. Therefore, a chief aim of the guerrilla is to cause further isolation that will break the tie between the governing power and the people.¹²

In writing on Mao, retired Marine Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith II implied that Mao believed a revolutionary guerrilla

war resulted once an oppressed people were sufficiently aroused with antigovernment sentiment to organize and begin resistance against a governing power that lacks legitimacy. This lack of government legitimacy would be due to the government's failure to address the needs of the people or its failure to provide fundamental social and economic development that indicates progress toward meeting the people's needs.¹³ It can be argued that in order to ensure legitimacy for the movement and gain or maintain popular support, the guerrilla movement must often concentrate more on out-administering the enemy and relegate fighting the enemy to a supporting role.

Nevertheless, according to Tabor, the guerrilla's basic weapon is his ability to inspire armed resistance against the government. The principle goal "is to militate the population," which will cause the government to crumble.¹⁴ Mao's philosophy was that guerrillas do not fight only to weaken the enemy but also to encourage popular resistance and mobilize the masses against the enemy.¹⁵ The guerrillas' mere existence and survival are a political victory that engenders popular support for the guerrilla movement and encourages popular resistance against a government.

The same necessity for popular support that Mao outlined as a requirement for a successful guerrilla movement is a fundamental aspect of Special Forces doctrine of foreign internal defense, or FID, and unconventional warfare, or UW. To understand the relationship between Mao's theories and current SF doctrine, it is important to understand current definitions and their relation to Mao's terminology.

The joint definition of FID is "the

participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the actions or programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.”¹⁶ Insurgency is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict,” and counterinsurgency, or COIN, is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”¹⁷

The primary SF mission in FID is to organize, train, advise and improve the tactical and technical proficiency of host nation, or HN, forces (focusing on HN cadre) in order to defeat the insurgency without direct U.S. involvement.¹⁸ SF elements execute FID missions principally through military operations with HN forces, providing indirect support to friendly armed forces and paramilitary forces and, in some cases, participating in direct combat operations.¹⁹

Traditionally, SF’s role in FID has focused predominantly on COIN, a subset of FID.²⁰ The COIN model maximizes the integration of intelligence; SF; Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, with particular attention to the impact of military actions on the population and on other HN programs of internal defense and development, or IDAD. SF may also help to preserve a friendly nation’s internal stability through some of its other missions, such as counterdrug operations or combating terrorism.²¹

Of the numerous types of operations in which SF Soldiers may participate while performing their COIN role, consolidation operations may best illustrate the importance of gaining and maintaining

popular support. “Consolidation operations are long-term population security operations conducted in territory generally under HN control. The purpose of these operations is to isolate the insurgents from the populace, protect the populace from insurgent influence and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure.”²²

The civilian self-defense force, or CSDF, program is an example of a consolidation operation that exemplifies the SF doctrinal acknowledgement of the necessity for popular support and participation. The CSDF’s purpose is to engage the population as an active participant in the HN IDAD program and cultivate a commitment to the government. The strategy behind the concept of self-defending communities is to sever the link between the populace and the insurgents in order to isolate the insurgents from civilian support; to identify and neutralize any insurgent activity in the community; and to provide a secure, reprisal-free environment in which the populace can cooperate with, and be assisted by, government administrators. “To be successful, the CSDF program must have popular support.”²³

According to the current FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, UW is a “broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and unconventional assisted recovery, or UAR. UW includes the military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements to organize and mobilize the civil population against a hostile government or occupying power.”²⁴

The overarching mission set of UW covers most SF activities that are conducted indirectly by, with or through indigenous or surrogate forces, in contrast to the other overarching mission set of direct action, which covers most SF activities that are conducted unilaterally (directly) by SF. Thus, most, if not all FID and COIN activities actually fall within the realm of UW and are therefore a natural subset.

JP 1-02 defines a resistance movement as “an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”²⁵ What Army and joint doctrine call resistance, current SF doctrine has elaborated on by further defining a partisan resistance movement as one directed solely against an occupying power.²⁶ That which Mao referred to as a guerrilla movement — the Chinese guerrilla movement against the occupying Japanese invaders — would thus fall under the current definition of partisan resistance.

By defining insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict,”²⁷ current joint and Army doctrine fail to point out that, while it may have external support or sponsorship, insurgency must be primarily an internal conflict. Doctrine also overlooks the fact that the goal of the insurgency may not be to overthrow the government but to secede from it, as in the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, or merely to change it. Regardless of doctrinal shortcomings, it is important to note that the action Mao labeled a guerrilla movement would also be included under our current definition of insurgency, if we are speaking about the Chinese Communist Party’s guerrilla move-

ment against the Chinese Nationalist forces and the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

JP 1-02 defines guerrilla warfare as “military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.”²⁸ SF doctrine further states that guerrilla warfare is used to undermine the legitimacy of an existing government (making it a subset of insurgency) or an occupying power (making it a subset of resistance).²⁹

Just as Mao recognized the need for popular support to his guerrilla movement, Army FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, also contains numerous passages that stress counterinsurgency’s requirement for legitimacy and popular support. One passage even makes clear that success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support.³⁰ Army doctrine further refines Mao’s position on popular support by indicating that legitimacy is the willing popular acceptance of the government’s right to govern, and that legitimacy derives from the perception that governmental authority is genuine, effective and properly used.³¹ The importance of legitimacy is summed up by current Army doctrine: “Legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents.”³²

In cases in which the U.S. supports a resistance movement or an insurgency, SF are best suited to provide that support because of their unique UW training and background.³³ In light of this, it is worth noting the applicability of two of the special-operations imperatives in gaining and maintaining popular support in a UW environment:

- *Consider long-term effects.* This imperative acknowledges the importance of consistency through-

out the long duration of many UW campaigns as well as the negative effect of inconsistency on legitimacy or popular support.

- *Ensure the legitimacy and credibility of special operations.* This imperative addresses the significance of legitimacy and the effect it has on both HN popular support and U.S. domestic support, along with the broader implications of a failure to maintain the required popular support internally or internationally. The implication is that legitimacy is crucial for

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a government to remain in power or for a group to gain power. It is essential that U.S. special-operations forces operate in a manner that reinforces the legitimacy of the supported group or government.

Based on current developments in the world, particularly given the situation and ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq and the Philippines, the likelihood is that the U.S. will continue to find itself increasingly involved in UW

and FID operations. The potential exists for future UW and FID operations against forces hostile to HN governments of strategic importance to the U.S. Our forces might also operate against criminal, rogue or transnational elements (perhaps developing and employing weapons of mass destruction) that are using, without consequence, a portion of a friendly, neutral or hostile country as a sanctuary or base for operations against the U.S. or its allies.

Given the above scenarios and the overwhelming U.S. conventional military capabilities, a hostile nation might have no choice other than to wage guerrilla warfare against U.S. forces. The U.S. would then find itself fighting in a counterinsurgency role against an anti-U.S. resistance movement or supporting a counterinsurgency effort by a U.S.-installed government. Ironically, this closely resembles the situation and the resulting struggle presented to the U.S. in Iraq.

Another scenario could find the U.S. unable, for military or political reasons, to launch a ground invasion against a hostile nation attempting to develop a weapon of mass destruction or threatening the U.S. or U.S. interests with international terrorism. Direct-action missions or air attacks might not be viable, sufficient or effective. Perhaps world and domestic opinion would not allow conventional U.S. military force to be used as the situation would demand. In such a case, UW by means of surrogates or disaffected nationals might be the weapon of choice. Effects would no doubt be limited, however, without the existence of some level of insurgency or of a rival faction.

A third, more flexible military option would be to combine military and informational elements of

power in order to eliminate the leadership of the hostile nation and channel the popular support toward a government more in line with U.S. interests. The U.S. might opt for this more indirect and unconventional approach of toppling a hostile government by exploiting an existing insurgency movement or a rival intranational power and helping to replace the toppled government with one friendlier toward the U.S. and its allies.

As outlined in Army doctrine, on the orders of the president and the secretary of defense, Army special-operations forces support insurgencies that oppose regimes that threaten U.S. interests or regional stability.³⁴ In those circumstances, the U.S. would be involved in a UW campaign. The UW option is the approach that the U.S. successfully applied in Afghanistan to topple the al-Qaeda-backed Taliban.

There is a high probability that U.S. Army SF will continue to be involved in UW and FID operations. That probability, combined with the fact that recent versions of SF FID and UW doctrine are flush with references to the requirement for popular support, leads one to the conclusion that Mao's theories on the necessity for popular support in guerrilla warfare will continue to be relevant. This is true both from the standpoint of building or supporting an insurgency and from the standpoint of better understanding an insurgency in order to fight it.

From a strictly utilitarian point of view, SF doctrine will probably continue to view popular support as a critical requirement in FID and UW, because neither the insurgent nor the government can win without it. In terms of a cost/benefit analysis, popular support, which costs comparatively little, offers the ultimate benefit, victory.

“For economic reasons, popular support is crucial for a modern government to function.”³⁵ Popular support is essential for a government to defeat an insurgency because it brings victory quicker and cheaper in terms of money, people and resources. Similarly, popular support is critical for a guerrilla's survival, as well as vital to a successful insurgency, since it provides critical manpower, intelligence and logistical support.

Struggles for peace, stability and security in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines and Colombia continue to demonstrate that UW and COIN are indispensable capabilities for the U.S. military. Mao's ideas regarding the necessity of popular support continue to be relevant and essential for U.S. special-operations forces in the 21st century.

Major Christian M. Karsner is the S3 of the 1st SF Group. His other SF assignments include S3, 2nd Battalion, 1st SF Group; company commander, 2nd Battalion, 1st SF Group; staff officer, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; small-group instructor in the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School; and detachment commander, assistant S3 and headquarters-service-company commander in the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group. He also served in the 82nd Airborne Division as a scout platoon leader and as executive officer of the long-range surveillance detachment. Before receiving his commission through Officer Candidate School, Major Karsner served more than eight years as an SF NCO.

Notes:

¹ T.N. Green, *The Guerrilla — and How to Fight Him* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), 38, 40.

² Robert Tabor, *The War of the Flea* (New York: The Citadel Press, 1969), 21.

³ Tabor, 27.

⁴ Tabor, 17.

⁵ Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (May 1973), translated Samuel B. Griffith II (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 47-48.

⁶ Mao, 39.

⁷ Tabor, 22.

⁸ Tabor, 22.

⁹ Mao, 44.

¹⁰ Mao, 92.

¹¹ Mao, 87, 90.

¹² Mao, 66-69.

¹³ Samuel B. Griffith II, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 5-8, 20-23, 27.

¹⁴ Tabor, 19.

¹⁵ Mao, 109.

¹⁶ Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2001), 2-11.

¹⁷ FM 3-05.20 (2001), G-5, G-14.

¹⁸ Department of the Army, FM 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1994), 1-16.

¹⁹ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2000), 9-8.

²⁰ FM-31-20-3, 1-16.

²¹ FM-31-20-3, 1-16.

²² FM-31-20-3, 1-16, 1-18.

²³ FM-31-20-3, D-1.

²⁴ FM 3-05.20 (2001), 2-1.

²⁵ FM 3-05.20 (2001), G-23.

²⁶ FM 3-05.20 (2001), 2-5.

²⁷ FM 3-05.20 (2001), G-14.

²⁸ Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2003), 3-4.

²⁹ FM 3-05.20 (2003), 2-7.

³⁰ Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2003), 3-4.

³¹ FM 3-07, 4-19.

³² FM 3-07, D-3.

³³ FM 3-0, 9-10.

³⁴ FM 3-0, 9-10.

³⁵ Tabor, 25.

Joint Base Station to Provide Deployable, Lightweight, Multi-User Communication for ARSOF

With the operations tempo at an all-time high and Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, spread around the globe, enhancing ARSOF communications is of key importance. An equipment system being fielded to ARSOF units is designed to provide the necessary improvement.

The Joint Base Station: TSC-135 (V2)D, Transportable, was introduced to ARSOF at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School in November 2004. The system is a member of the JBS family of communications systems that support special-operations forces, or SOF. The JBS (V2)D gives Soldiers the ability to exchange secure and non-secure voice and data communications with mobile and fixed-site platforms in support of SOF missions and tasks.

But unlike other systems, the JBS (V2)D fulfills the requirement of the United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, for a small, high-data-rate communications system that can be lifted by two men.

The JBS (V2)D consists of 21 to 27 transit cases that can easily be deployed from and within a theater of operations by vehicle

or on a 436L aircraft pallet. The components are installed in pre-wired transit cases. To maximize their portability, the cases are designed to be lifted by two men. The case design also allows the JBS (V2)D to be set up or dismantled quickly. The system is also fully scalable to meet mission requirements.

The JBS (V2)D supports communications in high frequency, or HF; very high frequency /ultra high frequency, or VHF/UHF; demand assignment multiple access, or DAMA; and satellite communications, or SATCOM. The system also includes diesel generators, portable table dollies and spare-parts cases.

The radios that power the JBS (V2)D include AN/PRC-137F HF transceivers and AN/PSC-5 high power multi-band, multi-mission radio sets.

A unique component of the system is its remote-control capability. A virtual intercom, or VICOM, system runs the JBS remote-control application, giving a number of users access to intercom; data, e-mail and radio-control features using one network.

Between January and September 2005, the 3rd, 5th and 10th SF groups will each receive four new base stations, and the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, will receive one. ✂ —
USASOC G8



File photo

The Joint Base Station: TSC-135 (V2)D, Transportable

JSOU Provides New Education Programs, Opportunities for SOF Personnel

by Colonel William W. Mendel, U.S. Army (ret.)

In the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, one of the most critical resources in the United States arsenal is education. The well-educated force will shape transformation, military readiness and the way that the U.S. prosecutes the GWOT. Providing part of that critical education for the U.S. special-operations community is the job of the Joint Special Operations University, or JSOU.

Located at Hurlburt Field, Fla., JSOU exemplifies the SOF Truth that humans are more important than hardware. Its contributions are evidenced by four recent advances at JSOU: the formation of the Strategic Studies Division Center for Research and Strategic Outreach; an extensive program for supporting professional military education with SOF-specific curricula; the staff-readiness education program developed for the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM; and the Enlightened Warrior Program, which provides “anytime, anyplace” college education for SOF personnel of all ranks.

Research fellowship

The JSOU Strategic Studies Division is a small cadre of

researchers and special operators working to address SOF challenges and long-term issues and to support joint SOF education. SSD members were brought on board by the JSOU team for their strong academic backgrounds, proven records of publication and their expertise in national security and SOF.

The division expands SOF interaction and representation into the interagency, business, university and foreign-security arenas. It also works with senior service colleges, their SOF chairs and their students through conferencing, consulting and the exchange of papers. The SSD’s research initiatives are guided by USSOCOM’s operational priorities and JSOU’s annual research plan.

The SSD is a “virtual research organization,” with a core staff of two research analysts providing continuity and support for a larger group of “virtual” adjunct analysts — the six JSOU senior fellows. The senior fellows work from distant locations on a part-time basis. The virtual think-tank concept maximizes their output at a low cost and reduces the administrative footprint on JSOU headquarters.

The senior fellows are called

together for JSOU workshops and can be assigned to research projects separately or with other analysts. They are also tasked to represent JSOU and the SOF community at various symposia and will present papers, lead seminars, contribute to interagency projects and similar activities.

One example of SSD activities is the October 2004 symposium held in partnership with the Royal Military College of Canada. The SSD conducted an international symposium with the theme, “Global Insurgency, Terrorism and Special Operations in the 21st Century.” JSOU’s senior fellows presented their insights on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to an audience composed of U.S. and Canadian professors and students, members of Canada’s JTF-2 special unit, Canadian officials in intelligence and government, and U.S. military officials from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the Joint Staff and USSOCOM.

During the symposium Dr. John B. Alexander, a futurist and a former SF colonel, suggested methods for evaluating SOF counterterrorist capabilities; Dr. Thomas H.

Henriksen, from the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, discussed potential methods for “dividing and conquering” terrorist groups; Dr. Hy Rothstein, senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School, reviewed U.S. strategy in Afghanistan; and Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, U.S. Army (ret.), recounted his experiences as commander of a combined joint special-operations task force in Afghanistan. The presentations provided the basis for discussion and debate, and the accompanying papers will contribute to a forthcoming book on GWOT topics.

In addition to research and strategic outreach, JSOU has been active by providing teaching and curriculum support to joint-professional-military-education institutions and to SOF commands. Prominent have been JSOU’s education-support efforts at Norfolk, Va.; Fort Leavenworth, Kan.; and Maxwell AFB, Ala.

Supporting PME

JSOU has made a significant commitment to the advanced warfighting education programs at the Joint Forces Staff College, or JFSC, and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, or CGSC. Both schools have high-value educational programs for USSOCOM and SOF. The USSOCOM-JSOU investment in the education of these student officers achieves a double benefit.

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School, or JAWS, and the School of Advanced Military Studies, or SAMS, are educating special-operations planners who will go to USSOCOM and the theater special-operations commands as theater-level planners. JSOU is also educating conventional planners who need to understand the integration of special-operations capa-

JSOU Support for Advanced Warfighting Program

JAWS — Lieutenant colonels and majors; 25 students, two seminars (1 AFSOC, 0 SF).

- Approximately equal representation by Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines.
- All students go to theater-level planning staffs or command upon graduation.
- Three-day program of special-ops theory, doctrine, organization and employment.
- 12 contact hours (two days) at JFSC, classroom and practical exercise.
- Synthesis: 4-5 hours at USSOCOM, issue-centric discussions with senior and operational leadership (JSOU-facilitated).
- Five-day COIN curriculum, 20 contact hours.

SAMS — Majors; 84 students, 6 seminars (4 SF this year, 6 SF/1 CA/1 PSYOP/1 SEAL last year).

- Primarily Army, 5-6 USAF, 3-4 USMC, 2-3 USN, 5-6 international students.
- SOF students go to SOCs or to USSOCOM, not to corps or divisions, as conventional students do.
- Four-day program of special-ops theory, doctrine, organization and employment.
- Application: 16 contact hours (four days) at Fort Leavenworth, reading and practical exercise.
- 10-day COIN elective (24 students), 40 contact hours.
- JSOU directs (mentors and approves) student monographs; two in 2004, four in 2003, three in 2002.

SAMS — Lieutenant colonels; 10 students, 1 seminar (1 SF and 1 NSDQ as students [first year], 1 SF, 1 RGR, 1 NSDQ as faculty [second year]).

- Primarily Army, 1 USAF, 1 USMC, 1 German.
- A two-year program: first year as students, second year as faculty for SAMS majors.
- All go to theater planning staffs or to command upon graduation.
- Eight-day program of COIN theory, doctrine and application (32 contact hours).
- Four-days of SOF doctrine, organization and employment (16 contact hours).

Naval War College — 4-5 SOF lieutenant colonels, 10-12 SOF majors.

- JSOU supports six of 10 lessons in the SOF Doctrine, Planning and Employment elective.
- 24 students, mixed SOF and non-SOF in the elective.
- Mixed students — junior and senior classes in the elective.
- JSOU also supports both iterations of the two-week student exercise with mentors.
- First iteration for the junior class, second iteration for the senior class.

Source: Richard D. Newton, JSOU SOED-E, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

bilities as they build campaign and operational plans for the unified commands. In addition to teaching the JSOU curriculum on special-operations integration, organization, doctrine and employment, the

JSOU faculty supports the counterinsurgency and small-wars education programs run by JAWS and SAMS.

JSOU also supports joint professional military education with

programs embedded in the curricula at JFSC. In coordination with the SOF chair/USSOCOM liaison officer at JFSC, JSOU has developed the USSOCOM Focused Study for SOF students and supports it with instructors, educational materials and guest speakers. JSOU has also developed an elective on counterinsurgency at JFSC and CGSC, open to all students, for which JSOU provides most of the instruction.

During 2005, JSOU will also support PME efforts at the Air Command and Staff College by providing eight seminars on joint special operations and serving as an information resource to the Advanced Special Operations Research Elective. In this elective, 14 mid-career SOF officers from the three military departments will enhance their understanding of joint special operations while conducting research on SOF-related subjects of interest to the USSOCOM commander.

CSO readiness education

In addition to advancing SOF education in the schoolhouse, JSOU is developing a new program to enhance the operational readiness of the staff of the USSO-

COM Center for Special Operations, or CSO.

JSOU recently interviewed 20 SOCOM staff members during a site survey in Tampa, Fla., to review educational programs, to determine potential requirements and to suggest courses of action for program development. The interview findings led to recommendations that will be advanced to the JSOU president and then to the CSO leadership for approval.

Current educational opportunities for the CSO staff include Joint Professional Military Education II at the JFSC; the USSOCOM Newcomer's Class (Phases 1 & 2); JSOU's Joint Special Operations Staff Orientation Course; JSOU's Introduction to Special Operations Course; and separate directorate and division training programs. But time-sensitive planning and JTF operations hold priority interests for CSO readiness education.

JSOU is in position to assist with a warfighter's course that will focus on key subject areas: CSO organization and responsibilities; the joint operations planning process; JTF doctrine and SOPs; the GWOT orders-and-plans hierarchy and authorities; and available systems.

The concept of the CSO education program emphasizes long-term efforts to upgrade existing programs and eliminate redundancy and to ensure that CSO staff members have opportunities to participate in readiness education. When fully developed and approved by the CSO, the new JSOU course may have applicability to other special-operations headquarters elements that are increasingly engaged in the GWOT.

Beyond supporting SOF PME and staff-readiness education, JSOU has been developing a program to help SOF personnel achieve their individual development goals. Through the Enlightened Warrior Program, SOF warfighters can attend college — even while on the job.

Enlightened Warrior

To provide a readily available means for SOF personnel to earn a college degree, the USSOCOM commander recently directed JSOU to develop the Enlightened Warrior Program. Designed first for enlisted personnel, the program has evolved to include educational opportunities for officers and warrant officers, as well.

Under the program, four universities have formed partnerships with USSOCOM, agreeing to provide online coursework and to award college credit to SOF personnel commensurate for their training and experience, according to the guidelines of the American Council on Education. The program can thus reduce the length of time required for SOF personnel to obtain a college degree.

The cooperating universities are American InterContinental University, Capella University, Jones International University and Western Governors University. All four schools are regionally accredited



Photo courtesy JSOU

The Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, Fla., is transforming as the force transforms in order to meet the educational needs of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

and accept tuition assistance and education payments from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and various financial-aid programs. The coursework is 100 percent online, thus giving SOF students access at any time and from any place. Full information on the Enlightened Warrior Program's degree offerings, tuition costs and enrollment procedures can be obtained from the program's Web site: <https://www.hurlburt.af.mil/milonly/tenantunits/jsou/index.php>.

Through the Enlightened Warrior Program, SOF personnel can complete an accredited bachelor's degree in business, education, communications, information technology or criminal justice. Additionally, master's-degree programs are also offered in business, education, psychology and information technology, as well as a Ph.D. program in education.

Educate for uncertainty

Joint SOF education is the key to preparing warfighters for the uncertainty that characterizes the modern security environment. To that end, JSOU is providing education support for SOF units and their troops. ✂

Colonel William W. Mendel, U.S. Army (ret.), serves as director of studies in the Strategic Studies Division, Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, Fla., under contract with Science Applications International Corporation.

Challenging Training Critical to ARSOF Missions

By Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School must continue to focus on challenging training that prepares special-operations Soldiers and leaders at every level to fight unconventional warfare and to deploy as a joint, combined-arms team worldwide. The training this center and school provides is crucial for the tough missions ahead. The Warrior Ethos and Soldiers' Creed must remain deeply embedded in our training mission: mis-



CSM Dave M. Bruner

sion first, never accept defeat and never leave behind a fallen comrade. Our cadre and instructors will instill in every special-operations Soldier the will to fight, win and prevail on the battlefield.

Because of rapid advances in technology, weaponry, training aids and training methods, we must continue to make bold changes and incorporate technological solutions. We must apply lessons learned immediately and understand where our Soldiers may be expected to fight and under what conditions. It is imperative our Soldiers understand that every Soldier is a rifleman first; this is the key to defeating our enemies. Always remember, Soldiers fight as their leaders have trained them!

Everyone's ideas are important in overcoming facilities issues. The quality of our facilities is critical to our Soldiers receiving proper and safe training, now and in the future. Facilities upgrades are often overlooked and under-funded because of a lack of leader involvement at every level. We, as leaders, need to work together and look into the future to upgrade our facilities, logistical requirements, storage areas and ranges and to apply transformation at our institution.

Our nation and Army are at war. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is not only a decisive component but the centerpiece of America's national strategy for conducting the Global War on Terrorism. We are the nation's only unconventional-warfare training capability. The special-operations Soldiers that we train will be fierce warriors: well-trained, well-prepared and disciplined professionals who will not fail our nation.

Veritas et Libertas! ✂

Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner is the command sergeant major for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

SOF retention incentive package upgraded

The Department of Defense recently approved a new retention-incentive package for special-operations forces. The initiative uses existing DoD incentive programs, including special duty assignment pay, critical skills retention bonus and assignment incentive pay, to retain individuals who have years of experience, especially as they become retirement-eligible and are at the peak of their value to the armed services. The following retention incentives were approved for U.S. Army Special Forces; Navy SEALs and special-warfare combatant crewmen; and Air Force combat controllers and pararescuemen:

- The ranks of E4 to E9 in identified USSOCOM billets will receive special duty assignment pay in the amount of \$375 per month.
- A critical skills retention bonus will be available to senior enlisted service members (pay grades E6 to E9) and warrant officers. Contract amounts are as follows: \$150,000 for six years, \$75,000 for five years, \$50,000 for four years, \$30,000 for three years, \$18,000 for two years and \$8,000 for one year.
- Enlisted members and warrant officers who have more than 25 years of service will receive assignment incentive pay in the amount of \$750 per month provided they sign an agreement to remain on active duty for at least 12 additional months.

In addition to the new incentives, the military services will continue to offer SOF service members selective re-enlistment bonuses as needed. "Our investment in these professionals is great, and the experience gained through years of service makes them invaluable assets to our nation's defense," said Lieutenant Colonel Alex Findlay of the U.S. Special Operations Command's personnel directorate.

Lower enlisted SF Soldiers gain promotion opportunity

Recently approved changes to Army promotion policy give increased opportunities for Special Forces candidates and SF sergeants serving in operational assignments. According to a memorandum recently released by the United States Army's director of personnel management, Soldiers in the rank of sergeant who hold an SF military occupational specialty, or MOS, are recommended by their commander and meet other basic eligibility requirements for promotion, may be boarded and promoted to staff sergeant without regard to the requirements for time in grade and time in service. Additionally, soldiers in the grade of specialist and sergeant who are enrolled in the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, and carry Special Report Code 18X (a training MOS) are eligible for promotion in MOS 11B if they meet primary-zone eligibility requirements and are recommended for promotion by their commander. The changes are in addition to other changes to Army promotion policy, which apply to SFQC graduates, that were released via MILPER message No. 05-003. One of those changes provides for the automatic promotion of specialists and corporals to sergeant without a board appearance, effective the day they receive their SF MOS. For additional information, telephone Master Sergeant Larry P. Deel at DSN 239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to deell@soc.mil.



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SO/LIC program offers unique instruction

One of the opportunities that SF officers have for advanced civil schooling is the Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Program, taught at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. The SO/LIC Program is an 18-month, thesis-based program designed to provide students with a broad-based course of instruction that focuses on the strategic, operational and tactical employment of special operations; on theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency; and on unconventional warfare. The program confers a master's of science in defense analysis. Officers' utilization tours are linked to their thesis research and require close coordination between the officer's branch and the SO/LIC program. SOLIC now qualifies as intermediate-level education and can take the place of ILE at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Students take the three-month ILE core course either before or after the SOLIC program, giving them 21 months at Monterey.

The target population for the 2006 SO/LIC program is majors in Year Group 1994, but YG 95 and YG 96 officers may apply. The most-qualified selectee from YG 96 will serve a utilization tour as an SF instructor in the Department of Military Instruction at the U.S. Military Academy from June 2005 to June 2007. Application packets must include:

- A DA Form 1618 signed and endorsed by the applicant's battalion commander.
- Certified college transcripts (two copies).
- Current GRE or GMAT scores.
- Current Officer Record Brief.
- Current official photo.

The deadline for applications for the SO/LIC program beginning in January 2006 is May 1, 2005. For more information on application, telephone Major Seth Krummrich, captains' assignment officer at the SF Officer Branch, at (703) 325-3175, or send e-mail to seth.krummrich@hoffman.army.mil.

Eight SF majors selected for SAMS

Eight SF majors have been selected to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies, or SAMS, at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., during the 2005-2006 academic year. This number represents the highest selection rate to date of SF majors for SAMS. The program solicits 46-48 students each academic year to receive in-depth instruction in the doctrine of war-fighting at the tactical and operational levels. SAMS consists of three phases. Phase I is the resident education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Phase II is an additional year at CGSC. Phase III for SF officers is currently a 24- to 36-month tour in an operations or plans position in the headquarters of a theater special-operations command. Selection for the SAMS program is considered to be the mark of a very competent officer, and graduates of the program will be identified for future service at the highest levels of the Army.



Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Iran's Republican Guard considers new threats

The September 2004 exercise, Ashura 5, afforded opportunity for some commentary on the focus of the “new” Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. The IRGC ground-force commander noted ongoing reorganization and adjustments in tactics and training in light of evolving threats. Those adjustments include paying attention to asymmetric warfare and incorporating lessons observed from U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as continuing to apply lessons from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. The commander also noted that the exercise included conventional heavy and light forces and new technologies, including recent innovations in missile systems. Spokesmen noted the importance of the Basij, or volunteer, Resistance Force for popular nationwide defense and indicated the need to “improve the defense capability of Basij for an effective resistance against foreign threats,” to include the formation of Basij special air forces and more professionalized training. Recent Iranian commentary has also pointed to U.S. psychological-warfare approaches used to influence opponents, particularly in what was termed efforts to transform and damage the cultures of other nations. To counter this, according to one spokesman: “Historic experience shows that insistence on one’s national identity and a collective effort to confront a cultural onslaught will, to a large extent, defuse the enemy’s psychological warfare and his cultural destruction.”

Naxalite insurgency draws Indian concerns

Maoist guerrilla groups, collectively termed the Naxalite movement or Naxalite insurgency, are active in at least nine Indian states. Naxalite groups present themselves as champions of tribal groups and of landless peasants. For decades, they have carried out acts of violence against the Indian government, police, military, landlords and others whom they deem as representatives of oppression and roadblocks to the overthrow of the current system and the creation of a classless society. The recent merger of the two largest and best organized groups — the Peoples Guerrilla Army of the People’s War Group, or PWG, and the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army of the Maoist Communist Centre of India, or MCCI — under the Communist Party of India, or Maoist, has created what one source described as “an unparalleled pan-Indian naxal network from South India to the Nepalese border.” Indian authorities are concerned that this merger will engender new levels of violence in states like Andhra Pradesh and attract even more, smaller groups into an increasingly centralized movement. In this context, the truce concluded between the state government of Andhra Pradesh and the PWG has received sharp criticism from some, including spokesmen in the neighboring Maharashtra state. In Maharashtra, the truce has enabled guerrillas from Andhra Pradesh to re-fit, recruit and make common cause with Maoist insurgents in acts of violence against the police and army. Some analysts have commented on the seeming dis-

Singapore forms maritime special-operations unit

connect between India's negotiating with Naxalites at home at the same time that it provides assistance to Nepal in its fight against Maoist fighters there. Maoist insurgents are viewed by these analysts as unremitting in the use of violence to achieve their political goals — which include the destruction of Indian constitutional democracy. From these analysts' perspective, truces or negotiations are appeasement and a dereliction of the Indian government's responsibility to enforce the rule of law.

High levels of piracy worldwide and the intensified threat of maritime terrorism on the high seas, in key shipping channels and in ports, has fostered new levels of cooperation among a number of regional states as well as the implementation of a number of national countermeasures. Despite good results overall — pirate attacks decreased from 445 in 2003 to 325 in 2004 — the number of crewmen killed increased from 21 to 30, and in parts of Asia, such as the Malacca and Singapore straits, the number of attacks increased. A special concern, however, has been the potential for major terrorist incidents, including the interaction of terrorists and pirates. Singapore singled out the latter dimension in the recent past, noting seemingly better-planned pirate attacks, well-armed criminals, and an “almost military precision” on the part of some of the pirate groups. In February 2005, Singapore formed a maritime special-operations unit intended to counter maritime attacks in its territorial waters and ports, which are among the busiest in the world. The new force will provide special capabilities in addition to the Police Coast Guard and Navy. It is a component of the Special Tactics and Rescue Unit, or STAR, a police special-operations unit formed in 1993, which until recently had focused primarily on ground actions like hostage rescue. The new maritime component is trained in a broad range of capabilities, including the forced boarding of vessels, dealing with armed resistance, and combat diving. Officers — apparently drawn from the original STAR — have been trained over the course of four years. Foreign instructors helped prepare the force, and training has reportedly been conducted with Asian and Western counterparts, including Hong Kong. Chinese media noted the formation of the force without comment.

Serbia to form consolidated counterterrorist unit

The Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, or MUP, is planning to form a new police counterterrorist unit that would be manned by personnel from other special-operations and counterterrorist components. The decision was supposedly made at the strong suggestion of the European Union, or EU. EU specialists pointed to a need to consolidate Serbian counterterrorist units and, at the same time, to avoid association between counterterrorist forces and the notorious and murderous Red Berets, which were disbanded last year. The new force will possibly be called the “Knights,” although this is not yet clear. Initial recruiting and vetting for the more highly paid and professionalized force were underway during the fall of 2004.



This feature is produced under the auspices of the Joint Special Operations University, Strategy Division, Strategic Studies Group. Items in this issue were written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., a senior fellow of the JSOU Strategic Studies Group.

Update

Special Warfare

SF Soldier finally comes home from Vietnam

The remains of a Soldier killed in action during the Vietnam War were returned to his family and fellow Soldiers in a ceremony Jan. 15 at First Baptist Church in Fayetteville, N.C.

Sergeant Major Kenneth Hanna, a heavy weapons specialist with the 5th Special Forces Group, was killed at the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp in South Vietnam on Feb. 7, 1968. The camp was about 11 miles from the Laotian border. Hanna was last seen rendering first aid to Charles D. Lindewald of the 12th Mobile Strike Force Company when their position was overrun by North Vietnamese forces. Hanna, wounded in the scalp, left shoulder and arm, radioed that he was badly injured and that enemy forces were overrunning the camp.

Hanna, then a sergeant first class, was listed as missing in action until 1978, but he was regularly promoted by the Department of the Army, up to the rank of sergeant major. He was awarded a Purple Heart and a Silver Star.

His remains were found near Lang Vei and taken to a lab in Hawaii, where they were identified Sept. 8, 2004, through DNA analysis. Lang Vei has been excavated and sifted, and no other missing Soldiers have been found there.

Several family members briefly shared memories of Hanna and expressed gratitude to the Soldiers who accompanied Hanna on his final trip home.

"I have to believe it's God's grace that brought our brother home,"



Photo by Robert Gowen

Special Forces Soldiers pay tribute to Sergeant Major Kenneth Hanna by acting as pallbearers at his funeral on Jan. 15. Hanna, an SF Soldier, was killed in Vietnam on Feb. 7, 1968. His remains were found in Vietnam in 2004.

said a nephew, who recalled spending a summer with Hanna before he deployed.

The service was conducted in part by Special Forces Soldiers, demonstrating the continuity from generation to generation.

Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, offered condolences to the family and spoke well of Hanna. "This was a man of resolute purpose. He was a Special Forces Soldier," he said. — *PFC Chris McCann, Fort Bragg Paraglide*

Fridovich takes command of SOCPAC

Army Brigadier General David P. Fridovich assumed command of the Special Operations Command

Pacific, or SOCPAC, from Air Force Brigadier General Gregory L. Trebon during a change of command ceremony at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, Jan. 6.

Fridovich is the 12th officer to hold the position of commander of SOCPAC. He was previously the deputy director for operations at the U.S. Pacific Command.

His other assignments include serving as commander of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines and as commander of the 1st Special Forces Group, Fort Lewis, Wash.

Fridovich's military education includes the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. In 1999, he completed the British Forces' Royal College of Defence Studies at Seaford House, London.

USASOC Futures Center opens at Fort Bragg

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command activated a provisional organization at Fort Bragg Jan. 1 that command officials say will manage development of future Army special-operations forces.

The USASOC Futures Center anticipates future challenges facing ARSOF by developing concepts for handling problems of tomorrow, today, said Lieutenant General Philip R. Kensinger Jr., USASOC commanding general.

The center combines the Army Special Operations Battle Lab, or ARSOBL, and the USASOC Transformation Office into a formal organization with greater authorities and efficiencies, according to Colonel Glenn Vavra, director of the USASOC Futures Center.

"This organization allows the ability to think about the future force capabilities without being captured by today's force limitations," Vavra said. He added that establishing the center as provisional helps minimize additional costs because it uses USASOC's existing resources.

The concept of developing a futures center for USASOC originated in 1996. At that time, USASOC began working with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, to integrate ARSOF functions and capabilities into activities concentrating on the Army's future.

The establishment of the ARSOBL in 1999 was the initial step in the development of the center. ARSOBL was organized and structured to analyze and solve current problems facing ARSOF, but it didn't provide the same capabilities of a futures center. In addition to the ARSOBL, USASOC established the Transformation Office in December 2002 to provide overall direction oversight on issues affecting ARSOF's ability

to conduct special operations.

Recognizing the need for a single organization to bring key issues to the Army leadership, TRADOC opened the first U.S. Army Futures Center in October 2003 at Fort Monroe, Va. USASOC determined that it needed a similar organization to bring all of its major subordinate units, major subordinate commands and personnel together to plan and manage change. In May 2004, Kensinger approved the establishment of the provisional USASOC Futures Center to accomplish that.

Key functions of the center include identifying the impact of the future environment on ARSOF capabilities, developing concepts for ARSOF in future operations, validating these concepts through experimentation and integrating with joint and Army futures developments. — *Joanna Hawkins, USASOC PAO*

CA team aids in tsunami relief effort

For the Army Civil Affairs Soldiers helping to coordinate tsunami relief and reconstruction missions in support of Operation Unified Assistance, day-long meetings with civilians at the Royal Thai Navy air base at Utapao, Thailand, can be frustrating, but they are an important part of the work.

A dozen Soldiers from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion's Detachment 220 are at work in Thailand, Sri Lanka and Indonesia to assist Combined Support Force 536 with civil affairs and civil-military operations in support of Operation Unified Assistance, said Major Gerry Messmer, officer in charge of the detachment's Civil Affairs Team-B planning and operations element.

The Soldiers serve as the chief liaisons between the military and civilian organizations conducting humanitarian-aid projects in Southeast Asia. Messmer ex-

plained that CA Soldiers help to accomplish such tasks as relief and reconstruction projects largely by identifying needs on the ground in troubled areas and alerting civilian aid organizations.

"We provide continuity between civilian government agencies and (nongovernmental agencies) and the military side to help make them aware of what is available to them from the military and the U.S. government," Messmer said. "It's not our intention to actually do projects, but to help the agencies identify them and to prioritize funding from the U.S. government."

According to Sergeant First Class Bill Gordon, CAT-B team medic, such project identification is done by conducting special, rapid-needs assessments of factors such as the availability of food and water and conditions of the local hospitals and schools. The assessments are often compiled into a database formatted so that can be easily shared with the civilians.

Government and nongovernment aid agencies now operating in Southeast Asia include the United Nations World Food Programme, the World Health Organization, the International Red Cross and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Army CA Soldiers have worked extensively with all four agencies in the past. Frequent cooperation helps the CA Soldiers and the organizations they support stay in step with each other's operations, Messmer said.

By being part of the daily situational briefings, the CAT-B is attempting to establish a credible presence with the civilian agencies in the region. "We don't want to do their job — we want to support them and help them do their job," Messmer said. "They're better at doing medical relief and they're better at building houses; it's very important that we have credibility and make them understand that we're here to support them."

That credibility will be critical to the reconstruction process in the weeks to come, especially after the majority of more than 15,000 U.S. military personnel now operating in the region depart, Gordon said.

The CA Soldiers are expecting to stay in the region after that transition to assist with initial reconstruction efforts.

International efforts to minimize suffering and mitigate loss of life resulting from the effects of the earthquake and tsunami continue as the combined support force of host nations, civilian aid organizations and U.S. Department of Defense work together to provide humanitarian assistance in support of Operation Unified Assistance. — *SGT Kyle Cosner, USASOC PAO*

SF recruiting on target thanks to 'strike teams'

The U.S. Army Special Forces Recruiting Company at Fort Bragg exceeded its recruiting goals during fiscal year 2004 and is on track to surpass its 2005 goals, according to company First Sergeant Chris L. Hochstetler.

"Our enlisted active-duty recruitment goal in 2004 was 1,600

Soldiers," said Hochstetler. "We recruited 1,628. And being three months into fiscal year 2005, we are ahead of schedule. It's all because we got creative."

Hochstetler, an Army recruiter with 13 years of experience, said the creation of three-man recruiting "strike teams" in January 2004 is a main reason for his unit's success. "Because of the Army's operations tempo in 2004, we realized that we needed to work in synchronization with a unit's deployment timeline."

Using unclassified rotation schedules published on military Web sites, SF recruiter strike teams target specific conventional Army units that are in pre-deployment or re-deployment phases, said Hochstetler.

Strike teams will travel to an installation and spend approximately one week talking to conventional Soldiers about the opportunities provided to special-operations Soldiers. "The benefit to this method is that if a Soldier is scheduled to deploy, we can plant a seed in his head," Hochstetler said. "And if the Soldier recently returned from deployment, we can answer his specific questions about special operations."

Hochstetler also noted that Soldiers now are able to complete preliminary paperwork and Special Forces medical exams at operating bases in Afghanistan and Iraq. "This allows the Soldier to facilitate the application process while deployed," he said.

Sergeant First Class Bennie B. Anderson, station commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Recruiting Station at Fort Bragg, leads strike teams on their missions. He believes that the strike teams give Soldiers a chance to ask questions that they normally might not ask of single recruiters.

He noted that because many of the Soldiers have seen special-operations teams in action, their questions tend to deal with such issues as retirement and family care. He added that more Soldiers are "combat educated" and ask more questions about special-operations careers instead of about special-operations courses.

"We will continue to be creative in our recruiting efforts for the rest of the year," said Hochstetler. — *SGT Joe Healy, USASOC PAO*



Photo by K. Kassens

Building up

Just as transformation is occurring within the SF Pipeline, changes are also being made at Camp Mackall, home to many phases of SF training. Specialist Patrick Rollman, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 27th Engineer Battalion, was one of many engineers building new facilities Jan. 13 at Camp Mackall for use during Special Forces Assessment and Selection.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare


Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces.

By Linda Robinson. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. ISBN 1-58648-249-1. 416 pages. \$26.95.

Linda Robinson's *Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces* conveys the story of United States Army Special Forces over the last 20 years, as seen through the eyes of the men who lived it. Robinson, a writer for *U.S. News and World Report*, was granted access to the SF community from the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. She traveled extensively to Fort Bragg, Fort Campbell, MacDill Air Force Base, Colombia, Afghanistan and Iraq to observe operations and interview SF Soldiers. In addition to interviews, Robinson collected information from official documents and archival material. The result is an entertaining book that highly praises the unconventional missions and men of the U.S. Army Special Forces.

Robinson's 12-page introduction summarizes the key points of SF history, from Colonel Aaron Bank and the OSS, through the Kennedy era, to force reduction in the 1970s and expansion in the early 1980s. The first chapter of the book introduces the reader to some 30 SF officers, warrant officers and NCOs, about whom the remainder of the book is centered. The men chosen for the book are mostly senior SF NCOs and officers with extensive experience conducting special operations around the world. After introducing these men, Robinson describes their experiences over the last 20 years.

In the chapter, "Earning the Beret," the author shares the story



of the personal and physical obstacles that each man had to overcome in order to earn the Green Beret. The author then captures the details of SF exploits in Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, the Balkans and Afghanistan.

One chapter includes insight into the CONUS-based training that teams conduct while they are not deployed overseas. This part of the book includes Soldiers' memories of various types of advanced-skills training at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS; home-station training; Joint Task Force-6 missions along the U.S.-Mexico border; and interagency work that SF Soldiers conducted with the FBI after 9/11.

The second half of the book details recent SF operations throughout Iraq, again through the eyes of the men who were there. This part of the book is Robinson's

primary focus, and it provides extensive personal and operational details of unconventional-warfare operations from the outset to the present. The author captures the story of SF teams rescuing POWs, working with local populations, targeting insurgent leaders and developing indigenous intelligence networks. The book also provides a detailed account of Operation Viking Hammer, the attack on Ansar al-Islam's terrorist training camp in northern Iraq.

By sharing the experiences of the SF Soldiers profiled in the book, Robinson provides the reader with a better understanding of what SF does and does not do. There are a few minor inaccuracies in the book, such as the claim that all SF Soldiers are trained in high-altitude/low-opening, or HALO, parachuting, and a description of the SF patch as the Army special-operations patch. However, details such as these are likely to be noticed only by SF personnel and do not detract from the research that the book represents. In the final chapter, "The Future of Special Forces," the author describes current U.S. policies involving SF and explores what the future may hold for the SF community. With input from the senior leadership of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Robinson provides a look at potential changes in roles and organization that are designed to better prepare SF for future unconventional and asymmetric conflicts.

For SF Soldiers, reading *Masters of Chaos* provides useful lessons learned from SF operations over the last 20 years. For readers not inti-

mately familiar with SF, *Masters of Chaos* is recommended as a well-researched look into the missions and day-to-day lives of the men of the Army's Special Forces.

CPT J.C. Lumbaca
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The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957. By General Paul Aussaresses. New York: Enigma Books, 2002. ISBN 1-929631-12-X. 186 pages. \$25.

General Paul Aussaresses' book describing his activities as an intelligence officer in Algeria during the Algerian war for liberation blew the top off the kettle when it was first published in France in 2001 as *Services Speciaux, Algerie 1955-1957*. The surprising aspect is that the furor and resultant legal actions appear to have been aimed less at the author and his revelations than at his publisher and the fact that the story was being published. One wonders if the inclusion of the names of many later prominent political figures such as Bourges-Maunoury, Faure, Mendes-France and Mitterand was not the basis of some of this ire.

Aussaresses, then a captain, was a professional intelligence officer and had been a founder of the national intelligence organization's striking arm, the 11th Shock Battalion. (If this sounds strange, consider the various historical military/paramilitary organizations and actions of the Central Intelligence Agency, sometimes snidely referred to as the Waffen CIA.) His account begins with his transfer to Algeria from Paris following extensive active service in Indochina.

At the time, the Algerian insurgents had commenced a massive effort to drive out the French. This was a second- or third-level insurgency complete with small-unit

attacks on French forces and a concurrent terrorist war, waged with exceptional savagery against both the French settlers and the then largely politically indifferent Muslim population. The rebels were supported by regional Arab nations (some of which were recently independent former French colonies) and by both domestic French and international communists. The rebels portrayed the struggle to the world as an attempt to win liberation from colonialism, a theme that had wide resonance in that period of successive colonial sunsets.


The French viewed Algeria not as a colony, but as a part of metropolitan France that had to be defended from a small minority of terrorists. An American can smile smugly at the French belief that a land not contiguous to France, which had a largely non-French native population with its own languages and cultures, could be considered part of France. But then one might remember Alaska and Hawaii. (Those with a fuller interest in the Algerian war are referred to John Talbot's *The War Without a Name* [Faber, 1980]. For a contentious view of the military lessons of that war, see Colonel Roger Trinquier's *Modern Warfare* [Praeger, 1964].)

Aussaresses' entire account, which is autobiographical, addresses his efforts to gain intelligence and to remove the rebel terrorists and leaders. Although that goal is a bit more proactive than the normal duties of an American intelligence officer, it is not exceptional. What is exceptional, and the basis for the furor over this book, is that his methods routinely included the torture and subsequent execution of prisoners. This he describes as a necessity of the time and place and as producing demonstrated operational results. It is also described without any regrets. Per Aussaresses, it was completely known and concurred with by his military

and political superiors, who included the famous politicians previously mentioned.

If looked at only for military results, the French Army's operations have to be considered successful. They essentially won an insurgent war — an accomplishment no modern western army can claim, with the limited exception of the British in the more restricted environment of Malaya. The French effectively controlled the borders, making rebel attempts at incursion from bordering sanctuaries nearly suicidal. The French, probably uniquely, wrested the control of a major city, Algiers, from an entrenched insurgency. They hunted down and eliminated the major terrorists. Subsequently, political decisions by President de Gaulle negated the results of the army's eight-year struggle.

Even if we disregard the political dénouement, were Aussaresses and his military and political superiors justified in their resort to torture, not to mention summary execution? The legal and moral answer is, of course, "No." In this reviewer's view, the operational answer is also, "No." In reading this book, one wonders how many times



the French torturers got the wrong answer — either because the individual would give any answer that offered surcease or, very rarely, because the victim recognized that he was finished in any event, and that a lie was his last weapon.

There is at least one more argument for the negative answer: the historical view. Such activities do not remain secrets forever, even in totalitarian regimes. In democracies, discovery comes even quicker. (In America “forever” in news security is probably about three hours and 17 minutes.) And when transgressions are eventually discovered, they are not judged by soldiers under the stress of pressing operational requirements but by entire, politically disparate populations who are unthreatened and have unlimited time to consider

the actions’ legality, morality and ramifications.

In democracies, the adherence to the Rule of Law, although always imperfect in application, brooks no prior or post exceptions. Punishment may be delayed or even completely obviated by the passage of time, but wrongful actions are not condoned and, as a minimum, reputations are permanently soiled. In the Algerian case, the practice of torture casts a shadow on the accomplishments of famously gallant units such as the French regular, colonial and Legion parachute battalions, and on the reputations of famous colonial-war fighting commanders such as Massu, Trinquier, Jeanpierre and Bigeard.

The Battle of the Casbah has no maps, but they are not needed. It has an excellent index and a short

annex of useful biographical sketches of the principal military, political and rebel leaders in mid-1950s Algeria. It also has a glossary that is particularly useful if one tends to forget the differences between such military unit abbreviations as “RCP,” “RPC” and “REP” (respectively: regular army, colonial and Foreign Legion parachute regiments.)

The book is recommended for professional reading and contemplation, but not for emulation.

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