


# Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



## Counterinsurgency: Achieving Popular Support

# From the Commandant



## Special Warfare

At the Special Warfare Center and School, we have watched the stellar performance of our Army special-operations Soldiers in the Global War on Terrorism with immense pride. Their cultural knowledge, coupled with their language skills, has been key to successes around the world. It is in this arena that our Army special-operations Soldiers truly lead the way for the rest of our nation's forces.

Over the past year, the transformation of the SF Training Pipeline has been a priority for us at SWCS. Current operations have made us look closely at our cultural and language training to make sure that they enhance our ability to interact with, and ideally influence the beliefs and behavior of, the populace with whom we are engaged. These are key elements of our unconventional warfare skills.

As part of the pipeline transformation, we have implemented higher standards for language training for our Special Forces Soldiers, and we have redesigned SF training to make language training integral to the SFQC, woven throughout its fabric from beginning to end.

Soldiers are now tested and interviewed during Special Forces Assessment and Selection to determine language suitability and then assigned one of 10 core foreign languages when they begin the SFQC. From that point on, students will be grouped into "ODAs" according to their language assignments. Each phase of SF training will have a block of language training, including the final phase, in which students will be required to use their foreign-language skills during the Robin Sage Exercise. This approach will expose the students to the languages over the entire one year average course length to improve the learning model and reinforce the importance of language and cultural understanding in unconventional warfare. At the end of SFQC, students will have to earn a score of 1/1/1 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test before they will be able to graduate and become members of the SF brotherhood.

SWCS is also now responsible to oversee and assist unit command-language programs, so that we can continue to enhance and sustain Soldiers' language skills after they become members of



their units. This will include funding, recommendations based on best-business practices and training-development assistance.

Contingency language training is a concept to provide training assistance for language requirements that groups may have other than the 10 core languages taught as a part of the SFQC. SWCS can provide instructors, resources and course design for language training at the unit location prior to a deployment. The arrival of our LNO from the Defense Language Institute this fall will improve our ability to leverage that institute for assistance, too.

This nation asks a great deal of its special-operations forces. We are fortunate to find Soldiers with the pride, intelligence, stamina and sense of duty required by our missions. While language training is very important to creating the Special Forces Soldier, we must remember that our goal is not to train linguists; we are training Special Forces combat medics, weapons sergeants and so on, who have a working knowledge of a language and the appreciation of a culture that together enhance their ability to work by, with, and through indigenous forces to accomplish their mission.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "James W. Parker".

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# Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling

by Lieutenant Colonel (P) Eric P. Wendt

**A**s the United States continues to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, it must ensure that all of its resources are used in the most effective manner possible. The effective application of these resources can be achieved by linking strongly rooted and strategically sound modeling for counterinsurgency, or COIN, with an effective method for implementation similar to that used by Joint Task Force 510 and the 1st Special Forces Group in the Philippines during the initial evolution of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, or OEF-P.

Prior to 2002, Basilan Island was a safe haven for the Abu Sayaf Group, or ASG, a terrorist group that used kidnapping, rape and murder as a means of controlling the island. In early 2002, U.S. special-operations forces<sup>1</sup> of JTF-510, led by Soldiers from the 1st SF Group, conducted operations through, by and with forces of the government of the Republic of the Philippines, or GRP, which ejected the ASG from the island.

In early 2004, more than a year after all U.S. forces had withdrawn from Basilan Island, the ASG had virtually ceased operations on the

island.<sup>2</sup> After visiting the southern Philippines, noted author Robert Kaplan pointed to the work done by JTF 510 on Basilan Island as a superior example of successful counterinsurgency.<sup>3</sup>

## Strategic COIN modeling

There are many strategic theories related to insurgency and counterinsurgency that, while ac-

***Like the moving bubble on a level, the behavior of the bulk of the populace will shift to assist either the government or the insurgents, depending on the carrots and sticks ... used by each side.***

ademically stimulating cannot be applied effectively. Likewise, there are countless tactical remedies for dealing with insurgent warfare that are not strategically grounded. The tactics must be implemented through strategic COIN modeling in order to avoid squandering

the increase in national-security spending the U.S. has undertaken since 9/11.<sup>4</sup>

During Operation Iraqi Freedom II, or OIF II, Colonel Hector Pagan, the commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula, or CJSOTF-AP, had the insight to use strategic modeling to develop ground-truth awareness of the insurgent situation and to pass COIN recommendations based on these models to his higher headquarters for use in theater.

The Naval Postgraduate School's Department of Defense Analysis, which is home to some of the world's most brilliant minds in unconventional and counterinsurgent warfare, teaches many strategic COIN models. Several of those models were used during OEF-P and OIF II. Understanding those models will allow the U.S. to more effectively apply its assets in order to counter insurgency.<sup>5</sup>

## Area-of-influence model

In order to use the models in concert with each other to achieve a synergistic effect, it is important to understand each model individually. We'll begin with the area-of-

influence model (Figure 1).<sup>6</sup> The key to this model is understanding that, like the moving bubble on a level, the behavior of the bulk of the populace will shift to assist either the government or the insurgents, depending on the carrots and sticks (rewards and punishments) used by each side.<sup>7</sup>


The challenge for the government in COIN is to sufficiently move the bubble, using the correct carrots and sticks, so that the population will identify and expose extreme insurgent members. The behavior of those extreme insurgent members themselves will not be influenced by carrots and sticks; instead, these extreme members (a small minority of the population) must be killed or captured.

An additional implication of the area-of-influence model is that whenever possible, we should co-opt people and organizations in the able-to-influence zone by offering them amnesty in exchange for targetable information about extreme insurgent members. Bringing people into the fold with amnesty prevents them from assisting insurgents or becoming insurgents themselves, and it provides a harvest of actionable intelligence.

### Origin, flow of support

The second model (Figure 2), shows the origins and flow of insurgent support.<sup>8</sup> Derived from the writings of Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., this model is vital for understanding the difference between conventional and unconventional approaches to COIN, as well as for defining where COIN operations should focus the priority of their effort.

Insurgent support (people, guns, money, etc.) flows from outside of the state boundaries of an insurgency (external support), as well as from inside the state boundaries



(internal support). External and internal support flow to a cadre or infrastructure, where they will be refined and translated into output.

Output can range from armed forces patrolling in the jungle or the neighborhood, to the placement of improvised explosive devices, to suicide bombings.

The origin and flow of insurgent support is key to an insurgency. It is important to note that support will likely come from a mixture of external and internal sources. Defining where the majority of insurgent support is coming from allows for the proportionate and correct application of COIN resources.


Conventional forces are best trained, organized and equipped to attack insurgent output and external support, but they are less focused on attacking insurgent infrastructure and internal support. Indirectly attacking insurgent infrastructure by working through the population and internal insurgent supporters, so that the population will reveal and expose members of the insurgent infrastructure, is the realm of unconventional forces, such as SF Soldiers.

How can we define insurgent infrastructure? It is not an ethereal concept. The insurgent infrastructure is composed of the people who live in the village, neighborhood or community and translate insurgent support into output. To phrase it differently, if a villager wants to give support (people, guns or money) to a cause, who, by

name, in the village or neighborhood is the insurgents' point of contact for transferring those resources? That individual is a member of the infrastructure.

To identify members of the insurgent infrastructure, SF Soldiers must live and operate with the population and identify which carrots and sticks will shift the area-of-influence model "bubble" and cause locals to provide information. COIN forces cannot drive through a town and identify members of the insurgent infrastructure. Gaining the detailed local knowledge and implementing the carrots and sticks needed for acquiring actionable intelligence requires long-term presence; language skills; cultural and area familiarization; constant monitoring of the area's population and resource controls, or PRCs; and expertise in advanced special-operations skills, or ASOs. To reiterate, if we are to be able to identify members of the insurgent infrastructure, we must embed forces in a local population for long periods of time and develop local human intelligence by implementing carrots and sticks with the population. In this article, we will call this long-term local presence the constabulary-force mission. One tool perfectly suited for the constabulary-force mission is the U.S. Army's Special Forces.

While it is important to target all four areas shown in Leites' and Wolf's model, it is helpful to liken internal and external support to a well that provides the overall sup-



ply of water. The water flows from the well through the spigot (the infrastructure), which translates it into output (guerrilla patrols, bombings, etc). The output can be equated to water coming out of a faucet. Attacking the output involves engaging trained, organized and equipped insurgents, or their planted bombs, in battle. Such attacks against insurgent output are resource-intensive and often carry a high price in blood.

While attacking the output is a necessary portion of COIN, it must be a supporting effort and not the main effort. Attacking output as the main effort in COIN is equivalent to trying to stop the flow of water by slapping at it as it comes out of the spigot. If we throw ever-increasing resources against the output, we will slap the water even faster, but we are doomed to failure. Attacking output as the main effort in COIN has failed throughout history, and it will fail during the GWOT.

The unconventional approach to COIN must address all areas of the Leites and Wolf model, but the main effort must be to attack the cadre or infrastructure. In conven-

tional war, we can make direct attacks against troops in the field (output), but in COIN, we cannot directly attack the members of the infrastructure, because we cannot easily identify them.

Instead, we must first work indirectly, through, by and with the local internal supporters and population, using the correct carrots and sticks so that the population will identify and expose members of the local insurgent infrastructure for us. Once they have been identified by the local populace, the infrastructure members can be killed or captured. When we work indirectly through the local populace to identify members of the infrastructure, we are correctly stopping the insurgent flow of water by turning off the spigot. Targeting the members of the local infrastructure must be the main effort in COIN.

In sum, in conventional war, output is the main effort, and external support the primary supporting effort. In unconventional warfare (including COIN), the infrastructure is the main effort, and the most effective way of identifying local infrastructure members for

killing or capture is that we live, operate with, and apply carrots and sticks to the local population, so they will identify the infrastructure members for us.

### Equivalent-response model

Figure 3 represents the equivalent-response model.<sup>9</sup> In this model, the qualities of intensity of violence and time apply, as does the need for the insurgency to grow in size and intensity of violent action over time, if it is to succeed.

For example, if two men are dissatisfied with their government, they likely have it within their abilities to conduct a minor terrorist action, but they are unable to overthrow the government unless they grow in size as an organization. While they grow, they will pass through several phases. At first, their organization will be capable of small terrorist actions only. Later, in addition to terrorist actions, they will be capable of covert and overt small-unit guerrilla actions. Finally, if they grow sufficiently, they will finally be capable of conducting an overt war of movement or a conventional war.

Insurgent organizations may grow and achieve victory in what appears to be a sudden snowball effect at the end of an insurgency (e.g., the Cuban insurgency), or they may take long periods of time to grow and finally overthrow the government (e.g., the Maoist insurgency). Quickly or slowly, the requirement is the same: Insurgencies must grow in size if they are to overthrow the government.

The equivalent-response model demonstrates that for insurgencies to achieve their desired and necessary growth, they must keep their actions within a "band of excellence," between the maximum and minimum acceptable thresholds for violence (V-max and V-min).

Once insurgents act, the government must react. For reactions, the band of excellence must be slightly higher in intensity of violence than the initiating action was. This dynamic must be understood: It is critical to success in insurgent warfare. The intensity of actions within the band of excellence must also grow slightly in intensity over time to sustain the growth of the insurgent organization. It is important to note that it is the perception of the local populace that determines the maximum and minimum acceptable thresholds of violence.

To understand this concept, hypothesize that a small insurgent organization is capable of low-end terrorism only. In a low-end action, the terrorists commit a bank robbery. While robbing the bank, they don't kill anyone, but they do beat up the security guard. In the eyes of the local populace, the bank robbery probably falls above the V-min line and below the V-max line, making it an appropriate insurgent event. After the terrorist act, the government responds. Its response is to put up a poster asking the insurgents politely not to rob any more banks. The government's timid reaction falls below the V-min and outside the band of excellence, costing the government a portion of its legitimacy and control with the populace. We can expect the bubble of the area-of-influence model to shift slightly in favor of the insurgents.

With that shift, we can then look to Leites and Wolf's origin-and-flow-of-support model (Figure 2). We can expect a slight increase in insurgent internal support, resulting in greater throughput and culminating in the potential for greater output in the next insurgent venture.

On the other hand, if the government overreacts to the bank robbery, lining people up against walls

and shooting them in the hope of intimidating the insurgent group, the government will undoubtedly exceed the V-max and fall outside the band of excellence. It will realize the same bubble shift as when it fell short of the V-min, decreasing local support for the government and simultaneously increasing support for the insurgent group.

The equivalent-response model is vital to strategic COIN modeling because it demonstrates that insurgent warfare is a thinking man's game in the extreme. To be successful, COIN forces must take the initiative, carefully choose their actions, weigh possible actions against the band of excellence, and anticipate the adversary's reaction. An effective COIN strategy initiates actions that fall within the band of excellence but cause the opponent to react with actions that fall outside that band.<sup>10</sup> When insurgent actions fall outside the band, the bubble of the area-of-influence model will shift, and we can expect corresponding decreases in people, guns and money from the population


and internal insurgent supporters, further diminishing the insurgents' ability to produce output.

## Diamond model

An insightful model for understanding COIN is the diamond model, developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the NPS.<sup>11</sup> Understanding this model will allow planners to optimize COIN resources by addressing all aspects of insurgent conflict simultaneously and holistically rather than in a disjointed finger-in-the-dike fashion.

The diamond in Figure 4 has five legs. In order for a government to successfully counter an insurgency, it must build its legitimacy and control with the population (Leg 1), then lower the insurgent force's legitimacy and control with the population (Leg 2). Building legitimacy and control with the population allows the government to acquire the actionable intelligence needed to be effective in killing or capturing members of the insurgent infrastructure.

While attacking legs 1 and 2, the






Figure 4. Diamond Insurgent / COIN Model

government must determine if the insurgency has external support. If so, the government must build its legitimacy in the eyes of relevant international actors (other governments, nongovernment organizations, private volunteer organizations, etc.), represented by Leg 4 of the diamond. Building external legitimacy will bring increased external support to the government from the international community. The government must also attempt to reduce external support to the insurgents by minimizing or destroying the insurgent group's support and sanctuary from international actors (Leg 5).

The majority of the conventional military is most comfortable with direct action (Leg 3). However, only a flawed COIN approach would attempt to undertake direct action without first taking the necessary steps of COIN's indirect approach. The indirect approach requires living and operating with the population, executing legs 1 and 2 in sequence, so that the local population identifies the members of the insurgent infrastructure. Once they have been identified, direct

action can be executed successfully. The impatient approach to COIN, attacking Leg 3 without gaining actionable intelligence from the other legs first, will inevitably result in destruction of the wrong targets and abundant dry holes.

It is important to note that the chief advantage of the insurgent is that counterinsurgent forces cannot pick him out of a crowd. The populace at the village or neighborhood level can identify the insurgent and the insurgent infrastructure. To correctly use unconventional and conventional forces and succeed in COIN, the counterinsurgents must first invest the effort needed to control the neighborhood or village (often with conventional forces in areas that are simply too "hot" for a small SF team to control by itself) and to develop the carrot-and-stick incentives needed to acquire local intelligence from the populace. To re-emphasize, attempts to bypass legs 1 and 2 and go straight to direct action will yield dry holes and needless collateral damage that will exceed the V-max of the equivalent-response model. Naturally, following Leg 3

actions that follow actions in legs 1 and 2 must still fall within the equivalent-response model's band of excellence. Ideally, these Leg 3 actions will also be designed to prompt enemy reactions that lie outside the band of excellence.

If COIN is to succeed, it must address all five legs of the diamond. All COIN strategies should use McCormick's diamond in their planning and execution phases in order to produce a coherent and holistic COIN effort.

### Desired components

The last model is the author's own creation, based partially on operations during the Malaysian insurgency. This model contains the three desired military components for successful prosecution of COIN.

Figure 2 showed us that the most efficient way of interrupting the conversion of insurgent support into output is to attack the insurgent infrastructure. In order to attack that infrastructure, the government requires a constabulary force, which is the first component and main effort of the author's model.

As previously stated, SF Soldiers are ideal for leading the constabulary force because of their regional and cultural awareness, ASO skills and light-infantry skills that allow the SF detachments to defend themselves for short periods of time.

Using the proper carrots and sticks, dispensing amnesty (for the price of actionable intelligence against the insurgent infrastructure), ASO and appropriate PRCs in legs 1 and 2 of the diamond, the constabulary force will learn who the local insurgent infrastructure members are in each community. One mission of the constabulary is to develop small, local host-nation

nets for human intelligence, or HUMINT, and small, local host-nation SWAT-type teams that can target members of the insurgent infrastructure once they have been identified and exposed (Leg 3).

The constabulary force must monitor PRCs by checking to see, for example, if food supplies suddenly decline in a local market (because the food is going to an insurgent force), or if, after a battle in which insurgents were wounded, local doctors disappear for a day or two (while they give care to the insurgents).<sup>12</sup> Checkpoints, house monitors and many more PRC measures are possible. It is important that PRC measures be proportionate to the level of insurgent support in a local area: Only those areas with the deepest insurgent support will require the most invasive PRC measures. We must consider the long-term effects upon civil liberties, and we must ensure that the PRCs will not exceed the perceived V-max of the locals who can still be influenced.

It is important to emphasize once again that in some areas with the deepest insurgent support, conventional forces (U.S. or host-nation) will be needed to establish local control before and while the constabulary conducts its work. Once the constabulary begins operations, however, all military forces, as well as joint and interagency assets, operating in the constabulary's area of operations, or AO, should fall under the constabulary's operational control for unity of command and unity of effort.

Feeling the heat from the constabulary, the insurgents will undoubtedly try to destroy and eject the constabulary force. For that reason, the constabulary must have light-infantry skills so that it can defend itself for a short period of time. In areas in which a conventional force is not nearby the

constabulary, a second component, the quick-reaction force, or QRF, must be available.

The QRF must be capable of coming to the aid of the constabulary whenever it is attacked and requires outside help. Constant communication, coupled with QRF mobility and day-and-night availability, are essential. The reaction force should be skilled in offensive urban operations: Rangers, Marines, SEALs, Stryker units and SF-led host-nation forces are ideal QRF elements.


The final component of the model is the movement-to-contact, or MTC, force. Ideally, the MTC force operates along the seams of constabulary AOs and along key avenues of enemy external support (country borders, inbound flow from sanctuaries, etc.). Its mission is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy outside the areas in which the constabularies are working. Relentless in nature, the MTC force must move aggressively and continuously, forcing the enemy to either engage or move. Host-state or U.S. conventional infantry, armor and aviation forces


are superb tools for the MTC force.

As the MTC force operates, the engagements or insurgent movements that it causes will eventually compel the insurgent force to return to areas of active or passive support to refuel, rearm and re-equip. As the insurgent force does so, the resident constabulary will detect its presence and the resources it consumes. The insurgents' support infrastructure becomes increasingly vulnerable as the insurgents' need for resources increases. Once detected, the members of the local insurgent infrastructure can be captured or killed by the constabulary SWAT teams. If the insurgent output force is too robust for the constabulary, the QRF can be called in to eject it, and the relentless pursuit by the MTC can continue.<sup>13</sup>

These three components: the constabulary, the QRF and the MTC force, form the required foundation for effective military counterinsurgency action.

In conventional war, the output is the top priority, so the common-sense main effort is to develop MTC forces that address output:





battalions, brigades, etc. However, in COIN, targeting the infrastructure is the top priority. The constabulary element, which specifically targets the infrastructure, must be the main effort. In COIN, the reaction force and MTC forces are supporting efforts. Our resourcing and prioritization in COIN should reflect the constabulary, not the MTC force, as the main effort.

In areas that do not have a strong host-nation police or military in operation at the beginning of U.S. COIN involvement, a sequential approach to COIN AOs will be required. Since there are not enough conventional or unconventional U.S. forces in many areas of the world to simultaneously occupy whole countries, this three-component methodology should be initiated in one area of the country and then slowly built and expanded to geographically linked areas rather than to geographically separate areas. As the three military component missions are phased over to host-nation forces in different towns, villages and provinces, U.S. forces can then move to the

next geographically linked town or neighborhood and begin the process anew.<sup>14</sup>

### Methodology

Our discussion of the strategic models presents the structurally correct method of prosecuting and winning COIN, but the models are insufficient unless they can be applied in the real world. How can these models be tailored, and how can governments locally apply the correct mix of the elements of national power? How can we optimize resources and achieve desired effects and outcomes?

The following methodology was used to implement the strategic models during OEF-P with success. The methodology was used again during OIF II to prepare and present recommendations to the higher chain of command. The methodology works, and it can be used in future U.S. COIN efforts.<sup>15</sup>

The first step of the methodology is to gain a solid understanding of the COIN models. Without this understanding, we will be unable to correctly use the models as we

develop and implement the COIN plan. Worse yet, we will be unable to adapt to changing conditions on the ground. Like a football game or a jujutsu match, insurgency/COIN is dynamic, not a static chalkboard encounter.

### Demographics

One of the points demonstrated by the strategic models is that insurgents must return to areas of active and passive support for people, guns and money so that they can continue to produce insurgent output. An often overlooked rule of thumb in COIN is that for every active insurgent, there are approximately 10 active supporters.<sup>16</sup>

Active insurgents operating as members of the infrastructure normally fall into the category of those whose behavior cannot be influenced with carrots and sticks — they must be killed or captured. However, with the proper carrots and sticks, the vast majority of active and passive supporters of the insurgents can be influenced to change their behavior.

Operations in neutral or pro-government areas should be resourced as economy-of-force efforts. Throughout the history of COIN, it has been an unfortunate reality that governments often commit excessive resources to areas in which they have already won the fight. Such “preaching to the choir” is a certain recipe for decreasing government legitimacy and control in areas of active and passive insurgent support.

The first step in executing the COIN strategy, therefore, is to identify the regions, villages and neighborhoods that provide insurgents with their greatest active and passive support. A study of demographics (with factors such as religious makeup, number of government jobs and services, number and

cost of government projects in various areas, infant-mortality rates, per-capita income, numbers of squatters and local education levels, etc.) is one of the measures we can use to build a map of disappointment. The map can help ascertain where active and passive support is likely to blossom, leading to more detailed assessments of those areas. These will be the areas from which the enemy will likely draw much of his internal support (people, guns and money). Such areas are primary candidates for constabulary team emplacement.

Once areas of active and passive support have been identified, they must be targeted with the appropriate elements of national power. Assessments allow the government to pinpoint where and how best to attack insurgent support and to

begin working through the populace to target the support infrastructure.<sup>17</sup>

### MIDLIFE, assumptions

The next step is to gather a group of subject-matter-expert planners<sup>18</sup> to discuss McCormick's diamond model. Initially, they should list the assumptions necessary for all planners to consider. Four of the assumptions used during OEF-P and OIF II are listed in Figure 6.


With the assumptions listed, planners are ready to start work. Beginning with Leg 1 of the diamond model (increasing legitimacy and control between the government and the people), they should consider the elements of national power — military, informational, diplomatic, law-enforcement, intel-

ligence, financial and economic, or MIDLIFE — one at a time. Beginning with military, what are the military actions (Civil Affairs, humanitarian assistance, etc.) that can feasibly be performed in the areas of active and passive support to build government legitimacy and control? How can U.S. forces market or label these efforts in such a way that the host government — not the U.S. — gets credit, and therefore expands its legitimacy and control?

After an exhaustive discussion that lists all feasible military actions for building host-nation control and legitimacy, the planning group will address all feasible informational actions. How can the message be translated? By radio? By television? Does the population have television sets? Is the popula-

OIF Assessment - Iraq Country Survey				
Question	Indicators	Yes No	Rating 0 - 5	Observations Comments
<b>Question 1:</b> Are ISF/IP/ING culturally sensitive to the areas they operate in?	Military / police / militia receive formal human-relations training? Military / police / militia receive specialized cultural training? (Religious? Ethnic?) Do military / police / militia follow their cultural training? (Respect different Muslim sects, prayer time, etc.) Is the ethnic and religious make-up of the military / police / militia proportionate to the make-up of the local populace?	Yes No No n/a Yes	3	While the police do not receive formal human-rights training, they do partake in cultural training, and the IP in our area are a good reflection of the religious and the cultural make-up of the area (Kurd).  The main need here is more human-rights training — they are too rough when they conduct raids.
<b>Question 2:</b> Do ISF/IP/ING make an effort to limit collateral damage? (People and property)	Do operations take infrastructure into account? Are damages reimbursed by the IG / local government? Is reimbursement perceived to be fair? Is free medical care provided to injured civilians? Is there a survivor benefit given to the survivors of those killed by collateral damage?	Yes Yes Yes No Yes	1	This area needs a great deal of work. The IPs here are losing their legitimacy with the locals because they are just too rough when they raid houses, arrest suspects, etc.  The people feel very threatened by the IPs, not protected.
<b>Question 3:</b> Are there ISF/IP/ING effectively living and operating for long periods of time in troubled urban areas?	How many? What type? How Long? Are they able to defend themselves for a short period of time (until relieved by a reaction force), if attacked by terrorists? Do they have reliable, 24-hour, all-weather communications with reaction force to assist them, if required?	Yes No	2	The police have basic military training and are capable for a short period of time of protecting themselves. But if they are hit with a large AIF force, they will be in trouble. They have no commo capability to call for ISF reinforcement. Because of this, while the police control a few neighborhoods, they will not go into several troubled neighborhoods, and they have lost control of these to the AIF.

Figure 7. Sample of Assessment Tool



tion literate? Can local newspapers be used, or should cartoons be developed that will inform an illiterate population? These questions continue in exhaustive detail until the list of feasible informational actions is developed. Next comes diplomatic actions, and so on, until the entire analysis of MIDLIFE assets for Leg 1 of the diamond is complete.

Next comes Leg 2 of the diamond, severing the relationship between the people and the insurgents. What MIDLIFE assets can be used to reduce or destroy the insurgents' legitimacy and control? How can Psychological Operations, information operations and other assets be leveraged to sever the insurgents' control over the people? Again, planners must take each element of national power in sequence and produce a list of feasible actions.

Leg 3 of the diamond addresses how the best direct-action results can be achieved against the insurgents. Have host-nation constabulary forces, a QRF and an MTC

force been identified and trained? What schooling, training, resources and operations are needed by the U.S. and the host nation to correctly select, train, organize, equip and employ these three components in COIN conflict for an effective combined, joint and interagency effort?

The same methods should be applied to legs 4 and 5 of the diamond. What diplomatic or law-enforcement efforts can be used to seal the borders? How can more international support for the government be gathered? How can the flow of external support into the insurgency be stopped? How can that support be attacked at its origin? How can we best eliminate international enemy sanctuary? Who comprises the infrastructure used to transition this raw support into output? How can we use informational means to target the infrastructure?

The planning is exhaustive, the lists of feasible actions for each element of national power are long, and the planning group must not

take shortcuts. This methodology should be applied for all five legs of the diamond, methodically and sequentially war-gaming every element of MIDLIFE against each leg of the diamond.

Once MIDLIFE actions of each individual diamond leg have been identified, they should be war-gamed to determine the effects that actions taken in one area will have on other legs of the diamond. Once this dynamic phase of war-gaming is complete, we will have a list of untailored but feasible actions that address the MIDLIFE spectrum.

### Local assessment

When the list of feasible MIDLIFE actions has been developed, progress is being made toward the goal of developing an effective COIN campaign. Next, the list of feasible actions must be tailored for local implementation. A cookie-cutter approach that commits resources across broad areas without local tailoring is wasteful, hard to sustain and will likely not yield the desired outcomes.

The best way to tailor resources for local implementation is to conduct a census and an assessment of each area identified as an area of active or passive insurgent support. Broad, national-level census and assessments are not sufficient; local census and assessments must be conducted so that area-specific results can be captured.

When assessments were conducted during the initial evolution of OEF-P on Basilan Island, and throughout Iraq during OIF II, the results demonstrated that there are different issues and needs throughout different insurgent areas of support. For example, it was found that in a barangay, or village,<sup>19</sup> on the eastern side of Basilan Island, education achieved the greatest gains in legitimacy for the

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government. In another barangay a few kilometers away, the people were not concerned with education but instead responded to having a well provided for them. The same variances during assessments were evident in Iraq.

The point is that just as all politics are local, so the MIDLIFE implementation used by the government to gather actionable intelligence from the populace will vary from village to village, barangay to barangay, and neighborhood to neighborhood. Therefore, localized assessments are a must.

### **Accurate assessment**

If U.S. forces rely wholly on the host state to conduct assessments, they may receive a distorted picture. After all, the reason the insurgency is growing or sustaining itself is that the host-state government has lost control and legitimacy in these areas of active and passive support.

For conducting the assessment, teams with language, cultural and regional expertise are invaluable.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, accurate and localized assessments require men who daily live or operate in the area they are assessing. A drive-by view of the needs of a given community will inevitably result in civic-action and humanitarian projects that are not tailored to the most essential needs of each individual community. A drive-by view will not accurately gauge how best to implement the spectrum of feasible MIDLIFE activities, and it will lead to suboptimal effects.

Additional required attributes of the assessment team are expertise in areas as diverse as security, operations and training; and engineering assessments of roads, bridges, wells and other structures. The medical needs of a community, ranging from dentistry, veterinary

medicine, optometry and surgery to food storage and hygiene, must be addressed, as well as the required capabilities for communications, computers and information operations.

In sum, the assessment team must live or operate consistently in the target areas of insurgent active or passive support and be intelligent and skilled enough to answer and recognize assessment-tool indicators across the MIDLIFE spectrum. The importance of information derived from the man on the ground for these assessments,

***In COIN, the reaction force and MTC forces are supporting efforts. Our resourcing and prioritization in COIN should reflect the constabulary, not the MTC force, as the main effort.***

rather than using the “facts” compiled in some headquarters, cannot be overemphasized. The man on the ground with the correct attributes is the only one capable of providing accurate ground truth, and his information must be valued above all others. Failure to obtain and use ground truth will result in the misapplication of resources.

### **Assessment tool**

We have identified the need for localized assessments, as well as the desirable attributes for the teams that will conduct them. With those needs met, planners must develop an assessment tool that will provide the ground truth needed to efficiently apply feasible MIDLIFE actions.

To develop the assessment tool, planners start with the list of untailored but feasible MIDLIFE actions. Then, for each feasible action, they develop a list of questions and further indicators that will show the best way of locally tailoring and applying local MIDLIFE-resource carrots and sticks.

When the assessment tool is complete, it is distributed to the assessment teams throughout the entire insurgent area. Each team will answer the questions in detail and return the assessment. Consolidating and tabulating the data from the teams produces a matrix that compares assessed areas throughout the insurgent battlespace.

Note that while in one category the assessment tool’s evaluation is subjective, it is expressed as a numerical rating so that the various area assessments can be quantified and compared. In this way, the initial assessment tool sets a baseline. As operations, training and projects are implemented, the same assessment tool can be readministered periodically to provide feedback on the effect of applied MIDLIFE resources. Across the MIDLIFE spectrum, resource levels for carrots and sticks can then be adjusted by senior commanders and resourcers, based on sound assessments of local effects from the best possible source — the man on the ground.

The follow-on assessments make MIDLIFE carrot-and-stick resourcing dynamic, which is essential, because the insurgency will grow or contract in each community at a different rate. Using this methodology, the maps of assessment results (Figure 8) will be periodically reviewed by senior MIDLIFE commanders and resourcers, who can then effectively distribute resources to optimize the desired COIN result: local, actionable intelligence against members of the insurgent infrastructure.

It is important to re-emphasize that the purpose of these MIDLIFE actions is not simply to provide unconditional, feel-good projects that achieve positive perceptions among the local populace. Instead, the purpose is to utilize the correct MIDLIFE carrots and sticks in legs 1 and 2 of the diamond model that will yield actionable intelligence that can be used to target and destroy the insurgent infrastructure (Leg 3).

Unconditional civic-action carrots are a superb technique for winning soft entry and acceptance into an insurgent area. However, once entry has been achieved, at the appropriate time, continued carrots must become conditional upon population support and identification of the insurgent infrastructure. We cannot continue to expend MIDLIFE resources without achieving desired COIN effects.

## Summary

Effective COIN requires constabulary forces to live and operate amongst the local populace. Limited hours of contact with the populace will not yield the carrot-and-stick control required to prompt the local population to provide actionable intelligence against the enemy infrastructure. Conventional forces (U.S. and/host-state) will be required to establish and maintain control in the most dangerous areas with the deepest enemy roots (under the operational control of the constabulary) while the constabulary implements the correct locally assessed carrots and sticks for infrastructure targeting. After the infrastructure has been identified and exposed by the local population, its members can be killed or captured.

Once locals in an area are reflexively reporting and exposing outsiders and infrastructure members,

the local COIN effort is well on the way to being won, and U.S. forces can begin a phased handover of the local area to host-nation constabulary, QRF and MTC forces. U.S. forces can then move into a new, geographically connected area, to start the entire process anew.<sup>21</sup>

As the U.S. continues to prosecute the GWOT, these models and methodologies need to become required knowledge for COIN planners and executors. If used properly, they will allow the U.S. to conduct COIN in a structurally sound way, minimizing the investment of resources and maximizing the success of counterinsurgency operations. ✂

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*Since Sept. 11, 2001, Lieutenant Colonel (P) Eric P. Wendt has served as the deputy commander of the Army special-operations task force during the first evolution of OEF-Philippines; as commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, in Okinawa; and in Iraq as the deputy commander of the combined joint special-operations task force during OIF II. He recently completed an Army War College resident fellowship. Lieutenant Colonel (P) Wendt is scheduled to take command of the 1st SF Group in June 2006.*



### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> While all services and SOF elements were represented during OEF-P, the major ground units and their commanders involved were: the Special Operations Command-Pacific's JTF 510, commanded by Brigadier General Donald Wurster; the 1st Special Forces Group, commanded by Colonel David Fridovich; and the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Maxwell.

<sup>2</sup> Not a single ASG murder, rape or kidnapping was reported during this period to the U.S. Embassy, U.S. military forces in the RP or the Armed Forces of the Philippines. It is

possible that an unreported ASG murder, rape or kidnapping occurred, but even so, there was indisputably an extreme drop in ASG effectiveness and activity.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Kaplan visited the southern Philippines in 2003 and noted the exceptional results and methods used by the JTF and the U.S. Army Special Forces in driving the ASG from Basilan Island. His observations and remarks were delivered to the highest levels of the U.S. Department of Defense.

<sup>4</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), 361.

<sup>5</sup> The Naval Postgraduate School's Department of Defense Analysis is commonly known in the SOF community as the special-operations and low-intensity-conflict curriculum, an 18-month, master's degree-producing program.

<sup>6</sup> Dr. Gordon McCormick, lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1994.

<sup>7</sup> James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977.)

<sup>8</sup> Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1970).

<sup>9</sup> Dr. Gordon McCormick, lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1995.

<sup>10</sup> The equivalent-response model is ideal for the human-rights instruction of U.S. and foreign forces. Once U.S. or foreign forces understand this model, they will see that if they overreact and commit human-rights abuses, they will suffer a strategic loss. With this instruction, human-rights issues become fundamental war-fighting tools, vs. a "touchy-feely" subject.

<sup>11</sup> In 1994, Dr. Gordon McCormick created the triangle insurgent/COIN model used with success during OEF-P. Later, adding other facets to the triangle to account for external international actors in insurgent warfare, Dr. McCormick created the diamond model. For a further discussion of this model and its application, see Gordon H. McCormick, "A 'Pocket Model' of Internal War," Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, forthcoming.

<sup>12</sup> PRC monitoring techniques will range from crude to sophisticated, based on host-state technological capabilities. With today's swipe-age technology, PRC monitoring becomes exponentially effective. The first order of business should be for U.S. forces to conduct a census and an assessment. If it is technologically feasible, after the census, swipe ID cards can be issued, biometrics of known and suspected insurgents and their supporters recorded, and a database main-

tained with details of who lives where, who is related to whom, previous police records, political affiliations, etc. If the cards become a requirement for purchases at a market, hospital use, leaving an area, and various other situations, in short order these cards can become a powerful tool for identifying insurgent infrastructure. Always be mindful that PRC measures are a two-edged sword that can have long-term implications after the insurgency is defeated. As such, they must be applied proportionally in relation to the depth and intensity of local insurgent support and activity.

<sup>13</sup> In an urban COIN environment, the reaction force and the MTC force are often the same. The constabulary force, however, is a constant in both urban and rural environments. In a maritime environment, the reaction force can be launched from a sea-based platform, and the MTC force can be either ships afloat or detection devices that will have the desired pursuit effect.

<sup>14</sup> Dr. Gordon McCormick, lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School, 2005.

<sup>15</sup> During OEF-P, four of the models were used. The area-of-influence model was added

during OIF II.

<sup>16</sup> Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>17</sup> We can use similar techniques to identify the sources of external support, and once we have identified them, we can more effectively target our national elements of power against them.

<sup>18</sup> This group of planners should consist of members of a combined, joint and inter-agency team who are true subject-matter experts in military, informational, diplomatic, law-enforcement, intelligence, financial and economics fields. Such a group was not available during OEF-P or OIF II, so with great foresight, the commanders of the JTF (Brigadier General Wurster) and the ARSOTF (Colonel Fridovich) during OEF-P, and the CJSOTF commander during OIF II, made their best efforts to bring those with the greatest possible knowledge and expertise in each of these areas into the production of the planning-and-assessment tool. While such visionary commanders (like the 5th SF

Group commander, Colonel Hector Pagan, during OIF II) gave all the best resources they could muster for these planning groups, insurgent conflict is a serious commitment of national blood and treasure, and forming a planning group with true experts must be supported by the highest levels of government and the military chain of command. The lack of experienced interagency planners highlights the need for formal joint and interagency education at the senior-officer level. This sort of education will be invaluable in the years of GWOT that lay ahead.

<sup>19</sup> "Barangay" is the term for village in the Philippines.

<sup>20</sup> It should be noted that the desired attributes for our assessment team are identical to the desired attributes of the constabulary component.

<sup>21</sup> The methodology of achieving COIN control in one area and then growing into geographically connected areas was presented by Dr. Gordon McCormick in a lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2005.

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Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double spaced, in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edition, for footnote style.

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# Language Transformation Plan to Build Culturally Savvy Soldiers

*by Janice L. Burton*

**A**s the United States continues its war on terror, military leaders are sending a transformation plan forward that will change the way the U.S. fights. At the heart of the transformation is a move from large conventional ground forces to smaller teams of “culturally savvy Soldiers.”<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, the proponent for Special Forces training, has a long history of producing culturally savvy Soldiers who are skilled in languages and can act as warrior-diplomats. But the center is taking that training to the next level, with a move to transform the language program to ensure that Soldiers graduating from the center’s Special Forces training program are ready to meet the demands of the transforming Army.

“We’ve been producing culturally savvy Soldiers for more than 50 years,” said Lieutenant Colonel Angelo Johnson, chief of the SWCS Training Development Division, which is heading up the language transformation. “The conventional Army’s recent exposure to the effectiveness of our SF forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has made them more aware of the need for this kind of training, and it has also made us aware of the need to do it better.”

The language-transformation plan,

under the leadership of Major General James W. Parker, is designed to introduce languages into the training program early on and weave them throughout the course of the training program rather than teaching them at the end of the program. Just as the Soldiers will be taught the basics of their designated language, they will also be given a foundation in the culture of the areas in which they will be operating. The new language program mirrors some of the changes being made at the Department of Defense aimed at making language a fundamental Soldier skill.

“The biggest thing we are doing differently is weaving language training throughout the course and introducing a different method of delivery,” continued Johnson. “Students will receive more hours of training, but it will be spread out over a period of time, and we will introduce digital training.”

In addition to the incorporation of the latest technology and training methods, utilizing advanced distributed learning, or ADL, programs, students will also be involved in immersion programs to improve their fluency. The ultimate intent is to make sure that SF Soldiers are able to communicate in their assigned language within the context of the customs, traditions


and mores of a specific culture or mix of cultures indigenous to their areas of responsibility.

A key to fulfilling that intent is to ensure that the Soldiers have a basic understanding of the culture. The foundation of cultural understanding begins with the Special Operations Language Training, or SOLT, program, according to Lieutenant Colonel William Butcher, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, at SWCS.

Butcher explained that within each lesson of the SOLT program, instructors are mandated to provide 30 to 60 minutes of instruction on the cultures associated with the language they are teaching. By the end of the program, students will be exposed to 25 to 30 hours of cultural awareness. Students also have access to a cultural reading program, which currently has a focus on Islamic cultures, through the SWCS Marquat Memorial Library.

That cultural awareness, Butcher believes, will help students in learning the language. “It is difficult to speak a language if you do not understand the culture,” he said.

The combination of increased language proficiency and cultural understanding led the center to adopt a higher language-proficiency standard based on the Defense Language Profi-



ciency Test, or DLPT. In order to graduate from the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, and earn the coveted Green Beret, students must have a DLPT score of 1/1/1.

The establishment of a group of core languages is the centerpiece of the language-training transformation. The selected languages are: Chinese, Korean, Tagalog, Indonesian, French, Arabic, Persian Farsi, Russian, German and Spanish.

The decision to reduce the number of languages taught came from a decision brief given to the general officers in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which sought to focus on languages that are relevant to the geographic combatant commands, have regional utility and endurance and are the most applicable to the Global War on Terrorism. Consideration was also given to Soldiers' ability to use, improve and sustain the language over the course of their careers. In this respect, selecting languages that are also important to business and academia allows SWCS to leverage commercial language products, Web-based training, university instruction and

other venues for teaching and maintaining language skills.

Reducing the number of languages taught will also provide higher efficiency, provide better entry-level language skills and provide languages that are sustainable through ADL commercial teaching products. The selected languages will be taught at the most effective location, with some language training being conducted at Fort Bragg, N.C.; at Fort Lewis, Wash.; in Germany and at the Defense Language Institute, or DLI, in Washington, D.C. The establishment of the institutional core languages is the first step in a four-step transition.

The second step is to change the way students receive their language assignments. Under the current process, students enrolled in the SFQC are assigned languages at the end of the course. Under the new program, Soldiers receive a language assignment and unit assignment at the end of Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, which is Phase I of the SFQC. The early language assignment leads to the third step, the integration of language training throughout the SFQC.

At the end of Phase I, students will be given an aptitude test before beginning a four-week program of independent instruction that will give them a head start on training in their designated language. Students will be required to log on to a monitored computer system on a regular basis.

According to Johnson, the head-start program will utilize ADL tools and will include SOLT materials, as well as commercial, off-the-shelf products.

"Some of these materials are geared toward survival, while others are geared toward sustainment," said Johnson. "We have 10 different languages, and the materials won't necessarily be geared the same way."

Some of the introductory materials may be geared more toward "tourist-training," Johnson said, teaching simple ideas such as "Where is the airport?" or "What are the area's point of interest?" The survival training will be aimed more at communicating needs, such as "Where is the embassy?" or "I'm hurt, take me to the hospital."

Culture is included in this training, infused into the program through Web-based lessons that indirectly include cultural training, added Butcher. "Soldiers will read through the material, which may discuss the custom of greetings or how the transit system works in a particular country, and will pick up that part of the culture."

At the beginning of Phase II, which is now small-unit tactics, Soldiers will be divided into student SF operational detachments, based on their language assignments. During this phase, students will receive an additional two weeks of language training known as Language Block I.

During Phase III, the military occupational specialty, or MOS, training, Soldiers will complete Language Block II. This training will incorporate an additional 13 Saturdays of training, each of which will consist of six hours of

face-to-face instruction and two hours of ADL. The course will also incorporate a two-week block of language training between the seventh and eighth weeks of training.

Phase IV, dedicated entirely to language training, will incorporate Language Block III. Depending on their language assignment, students will participate in either an eight or 12-week course. Languages are divided into four categories based on the difficulty of the language. Romance languages, such as French and Spanish, are designated categories 1 or 2. Languages utilizing non-Roman alphabets, such as Korean, Chinese Mandarin and Arabic, are categories 3 or 4. Languages assigned to categories 1 or 2 will have an eight-week block, while categories 3 and 4 will be 12 weeks.

During the first week of Phase IV, all students will take a mock DLPT. Those with the highest scores may be chosen to attend an advanced 16-week language course taught by the DLI. Approximately 36 Soldiers will be offered this opportunity annually.

Students who have been assigned to three specific languages — Tagalog, Chinese Mandarin and German — will be assigned to special immersion programs taught at Fort Lewis and in Germany. Other students will not have as intensive an immersion, but they will be given opportunities to experience the culture of their target languages. Students may do something as simple as visiting a French restaurant, where they will learn dining customs and greetings, or they may visit museums showcasing the French culture, said Butcher. However, some students will be given the opportunity to travel in the United States and stay for a week in communities that are composed heavily of a specific culture. Recently 26 language students spent a week in Dearborn, Mich., the largest Arabic community in the United States. “They had the opportunity to eat in Arabic restaurants, talk to the merchants in the stores, visit a mosque



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*Students participating in the SFQC's culmination exercise, Robin Sage, will use their foreign-language skills to negotiate with role players acting as guerrilla chiefs who are native speakers.*

and visit museums with Arabic instructors,” said Butcher.

The school also sends students to Canada to spend time learning the French culture and to Brighton Beach, N.Y., to spend time in a Russian community, just to name a few of the programs. The realistic training in both culture and language will be beneficial when Soldiers enter the final phase of the SFQC — Robin Sage.

To date, students attending Robin Sage have not been asked to put their language skills to the test, but that's changing, as well. Prior to going to Robin Sage, students may have the opportunity to participate in an interactive scenario-driven simulation where their language skills will be put to the test. The simulation, designed and implemented by 3rd

Battalion, utilizes the Engagement Skills Trainer to put Soldiers in situations they may encounter.

The scenario, which is controlled by an instructor, may have a Soldier asking an individual to leave his house in order for a search to be conducted. The interaction will use the target language, with one of the center's native-speaker instructors playing the role of the indigenous personnel. Soldiers are required to use the proper greetings, render the necessary respect, recognize cultural taboos and negotiate with the man to reach a peaceful solution. “Their knowledge of the culture helps to de-escalate the situation,” said Butcher.

This simulation is still in the beginning stages, but when fully implemented, it will help set the stage for the newly redesigned Robin

Sage. The exercise has been infused with scenarios that will require students to negotiate with guerrilla chiefs utilizing their language training. Johnson said native-speaking contractors will be brought in to participate in those scenarios. "Unless you do it, you don't realize how much longer it takes or how much more difficult it is to negotiate in a foreign language," said Johnson.

"That kind of scenario in Robin Sage will orient the students to negotiating in their target language and will acquaint them with some of the courtesies that must be followed in those kinds of negotiations," Johnson said.

The final element in the transition plan is a sustainment-and-enhancement program that will allow SWCS to support unit command-language programs through language labs and ADL products and courseware at the SF-group level. The sustainment of language skills will be incorporated into the career management of Soldiers.

Johnson added that the increased demands of the language-training programs will require students to demonstrate a lot of initiative. "We are asking a lot, but with the caliber of students who come through here, that shouldn't be a problem," he said. "The Soldiers who elect to become SF are self-starters who are searching for knowledge. We believe if we give them this opportunity, they will strive and work to make themselves a more viable asset to their team."

The first SFQC class to participate in the new language program will be class 02/06, which starts in November; however, the first pilot of the revamped Robin Sage was conducted in July.

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*Janice L. Burton is assigned to the staff of Special Warfare.*

<sup>1</sup> Greg Jaffe, "Rumsfeld details big military shift in new document," *Wall Street Journal*, 11 March 2005.

## Serving a Nation at War

*By Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner*

Since the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has remained a nation at war. This war is being waged across the spectrum of warfare and is unlike any other in American history. The adversaries we face today are intent on destroying American power and influence, both abroad and in our homeland. They are intent on bringing fear and terror to the American homeland, using whatever means necessary. This hatred is being fueled in part by a fundamentalist ideology that attacks our personal and religious freedom, our democratic system of government and our American way of life.



*CSM Dave M. Bruner*

Every Soldier swears a solemn and sacred oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America. Our profession demands selfless service, discipline, love of one's country, personal integrity, honor, courage, pride and living the Soldier's Creed every day.

### *The Soldier's Creed*

*I am an American Soldier.  
I am a Warrior and a member of a team.  
I serve the people of the United States  
and live the Army Values.  
I will always place the mission first.  
I will never accept defeat.  
I will never quit.  
I will never leave a fallen comrade.  
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough,  
trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.  
I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.  
I am an expert, and I am professional.  
I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy  
the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.  
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.  
I am an American Soldier.*

Remember, we as American Soldiers have been entrusted with preserving peace and freedom, defending American culture, defending democracy and safeguarding the Constitution of the United States. We cannot and will not fail to do our duty and defend our great country and its people!

*Veritas et Libertas! ✂*

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*Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner is the command sergeant major for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.*

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# Good Cops, Bad Cops, Carrots and Sticks

by Sergeant First Class Jesse P. Pruett

One of literary icon Robert Heinlein's characters, Lazarus Long, adopted a matter-of-fact, if somewhat cynical, viewpoint on the nature of obtaining cooperation from his fellow man: "Never appeal to a man's 'better nature.' He may not have one. Invoking his self-interest gives you more leverage."

In operations on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan, this cautionary wisdom is finding practical application.

Although the approach may not be an acknowledged tactic, or even a conscious effort, it is perhaps worthwhile to look at how variations of it are yielding results and how those local applications may transfer to a larger strategy and multiply its effectiveness.

In three "tours" in the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, the author has been able to see the varying success of a wide spectrum of tactics, employed at various locations, designed to both ensure the "force protection" of the coalition contingent and, more critically, stabilize the operational environment.

Quite often the tactics include the "stick," or the threat of offensive operations directed against those unwilling to cooperate with local leadership operating in concert with the coalition presence. As well, there is the "carrot," consisting of the largess of the coalition in the form, most often, of some sort of infrastructure improvement, be it a school, clinic, bridge, etc., serving as either a reward for a community's good citizenship or an incentive for future positive relations and stability.

Psychological studies have long held fear of loss and promise of reward to be among chief behavioral influences. Citizens of the lands in which we currently conduct our large, overt military operations may be motivated by self-preservation or by potential material gains.



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*A Psychological Operations Soldier distributes information to Iraqi citizens in an attempt to gain their support. By sharing information, rather than kicking in doors, the Soldier is offering a carrot — but the carrot doesn't always work.*

But when the populace flags down the passing coalition convoy to alert them of an IED just ahead, or treks to the nearest forward operating base to report a recent meeting of anti-coalition military personnel, then the approach is working, irrespective of the motivation. This is “force protection” in its most basic incarnation.

To be successful, this approach requires flexibility and an ability to effectively evaluate the situation. When an operational unit rolls into mythical Oaklandistan and is greeted with the cold stares of a people whose daily mantra has been hatred for all things Western, that is not the best environment in which to pull the carrot from the quiver. Rather, we maintain security by brandishing the stick. When the same unit moves to neighboring Diegostan, however, and the faces carry weariness not wrath, then we may put down the stick and offer the carrot. In both cases, the environment has been secured. Eventually, the folks in Oaklandistan see the improvements in the lives of their neighbors in Diegostan, and begin to eschew the stick their actions compelled and seek the carrot they desire.

The author’s first exposure to the success of this dual approach came shortly after 9/11, when the fact that a third of Bosnia’s population was Muslim suddenly took on a new relevance. Although the stick had not been employed for some time in that environment, for many Bosnians the uncertainty of the nature of the American response added a fresh layer of tension.

Our task force flexed its muscle and took a more assertive stance. The increased posture was not lost on the population, and two results were quickly evident: Some folks were moved to silence, others to demonstrate their non-affiliation with the terrorists. As expected, the collection of active intelligence spiked. Less predictable was the number of locals who sought out the carrot holders, in this case the Civil Affairs team, to offer information. A theme recurrent with these individuals was a general



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indifference to the military presence, but they felt obligated to assist those who had assisted them in tangible ways, particularly with the implementation of infrastructure reconstruction. This carrot-induced response revealed the presence of a Wahaabist (a particular form of Saudi Arabian Islam that is often associated with extremism) enclave suspected of smuggling heavy weapons. Even if not by full design, the combination of the overt and aggressive tactics of traditional military operations with the passive, more subtle aspects of the Civil Affairs

*Civil Affairs Soldiers are tasked with winning hearts and minds. When rewards, such as the distribution of heaters to villagers, do not work, Soldiers may have to use force.*

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mission allowed the full picture to be revealed.

The forces on the ground may often be unaware of the other side of the coin, that we are in effect implementing a good cop/bad cop scenario writ large. Maneuver commanders, for example (for ease of illustration, filling the role of bad cop), may be only mildly aware of the presence and nature of operations of a Civil Affairs team (the good cop), yet the population responds as if it were a choreographed routine. We may be able to capitalize on the appearance of divided aims while leveraging the carrot and stick appeal to the disparate self-interests of our opponent. This will both sway the members of the target audience and influence their behavior.

This is true even now in Afghanistan, where provincial reconstruction teams tra-

***Psychological studies have long held fear of loss and promise of reward to be among chief behavioral influences. Citizens of the lands in which we currently conduct our large, overt military operations may be motivated by self-preservation or by potential material gains.***

verse the same ground as Infantry battalions. They travel through the same villages, yet they evoke distinct responses. Epithets are hurled along with rocks as the bad cops rumble through. They mean to intimidate and they do. They set the stage for the good cops. When the good cops approach, smiles are offered freely, along with the ubiquitous “chai” (the local tea). Same uniforms, same weapons, different response.

The bad do not patrol in advance of the good as part of some master plan; it just works out that way. Yet the good could not so readily expect their warm welcome, were it not in the back of the villager’s minds that the options are to accept the offered generosity and the move towards stability or face the consequences of a conflict they cannot hope to win. Either cop acting alone could not achieve the result.

Together, there is a symbiosis that does work. Imagine, then, the benefits were such complementary activities actually coordinated — if this naturally occurring phenomenon were to become part of the plan. If the cops were sufficiently read-in to each other’s strategy that they could consciously use each other — the threat and the reward — as tactics, then the benefit would be manifest.

This marriage can be achieved through education and planning. Current operations can harness the benefit of this appeal by revisiting preparation techniques that have proven successful in the past and by proactively accounting for the flip side of each respective cop’s operational focus.

Currently, the coordination between the two camps is perfunctory, with the nature of the exchange being determined primarily by the personalities of the leadership. There are no joint training exercises to allow for better understanding of the different missions, much less for ways in which they may complement each other. Egos, territorialism, possessiveness and inflexibility minimize the potential of these individual, lower-level alliances to affect the entire scope of the operational area.

In some cases, the leadership recognizes the benefits and the good and bad cops truly do operate in unison, producing positive results such as those described in Bosnia. However, this ideal scenario is far too infrequent. Prior to deployments to Bosnia, there were detailed training events, incorporating role players, mock villages and subject-matter experts with on-the-ground experience. These events brought together the maneuver units and the personnel with whom they would be working. The strangers met and began to plan how their missions could interlink. GWOT has moved into a phase of operations in which these preparatory functions will multiply the effectiveness of the carrot and stick approach already taking place. Creating a laboratory where the good cops and bad cops can rehearse their tactical approach, mentoring by experienced veterans of the theater, will surely

magnify any positive impact that may be achieved.

The carrot and stick approach, implemented through the dual presentation of unabashed strength on one hand and of cooperative assistance on the other, is an appeal to self-interest that is an effective and efficient application of the coalition's presence. With a force-wide emphasis on joint-training opportunities and appropriate cross-education, we may optimize the ability of our forces to achieve our overall objectives.

Many of our current adversaries, often cloaked in the false legitimacy of religion, have embraced violence and greed. With the right stick, our bad cops can usurp their initiative and through vastly superior tactical ability, decisively trump their violence. With the right carrot, our good cops can expose the pervasiveness of their corruption and erode the fanatical foundation of their claims to power. Together, U.S.

and coalition forces can demonstrate their ability to both intimidate and encourage, delivering the message that one way or the other, they will prevail.

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*Sergeant First Class Jesse P. Pruett, a member of the 450th Civil Affairs Battalion, is serving his second U.S. Army tour in Afghanistan. His other tours of duty include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Out of uniform, he most recently served with the Department of Defense as the regional programs coordinator for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, where he oversaw \$300 million in national reconstruction efforts. He is a founding partner of a Web-based consulting firm focusing on issues of single-issue terrorism. He is a distinguished member of the Civil Affairs Association and holds a bachelor's in international relations from United States International University.*



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*Civil Affairs Soldiers patrol in Baghdad. Often the threat of force, rather than the promise of reward, is needed to influence the local populace.*

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# Brown: Trust Transcends the Chaos of War

*by Captain Joseph Coslett*

Citing the need to build coalitions before a crisis occurs, General Doug Brown, commander, United States Special Operations Command, welcomed SOF operators from around the world to the first USSOCOM International Special Operations Forces Week conference June 8 at the Tampa Convention Center.

“We are truly honored to host so many international guests as well as U.S. military and civilian leadership and our industry partners,” he said.

Brown said this extraordinary event was a great opportunity for building new friendships, strengthening acquaintances and learning how individual SOF units, working as a coalition team, can train and partner together to improve security; stabilize societies; improve the quality of life for our citizens; enhance cultural awareness; share tactics, techniques and procedures; and when required – defeat global threats.

Pointing to the need for more culturally aware soldiers, Brown noted that the forces present came from different backgrounds, cultures, religions, politics and experiences, and that while it would not be wise to presume to understand all nuances of each culture, SOF share a common bond.

“But there is a bond we all share in the profession of special operations,” he said. “Our strength is not in numbers, it’s in the innovation of our forces across a spectrum of capabilities, their superior physical and mental fitness, their adaptability, and most of all, their judgment and initiative, which guide them in the most challenging and unexpected circumstances.”

All SOF stand on common ground to defend and secure their nations by rejecting terror and tyranny, which are not associated with any particular culture, said Brown. “Belief in human dignity is not restricted by politics or geography — these are basic human values that as civilized nations we all share — and seek to defend.”

SOF complete high-level training, operate in hostile environments and are tested in the heat of battle. “Honor is our hallmark — the bravery, razor-sharp skills and devotion to duty of SOF are key factors in determining the ultimate outcome of any conflict we may face.

“We’ve trekked alongside each other through thick mountain jungles to build a school or clinic in a remote village. We’ve quietly prowled through murky waters and along far away beaches in a stealthy pursuit of

an unsuspecting foe — and just as we did this past December, many of us have worked side-by-side in nothing less than heroic efforts to help victims of natural disasters.”

Brown lauded the many years of joint training that have built a coalition force capable of operating across the spectrum of operations from pre-crisis to post-crisis. But he added that the force could not be complacent, rather it should instead look to the next level — building a global network of special-operations capabilities.

Brown noted that a key component to taking that next step was for coalition partners to learn more about each other’s capabilities. They need to gain a better understanding of each other’s thoughts and plans in the ongoing operational environment, he said, particularly in regards to global security issues, and to continue to develop mutually beneficial approaches to coalition operations.

Brown also challenged all the force to look beyond its traditional roles and missions and to search for new approaches to the way SOF train and operate together.

“With this incredible group together for the first time in one place we have a unique and powerful opportunity to openly emerge



USSOCOM Public Affairs Office

*General Doug Brown, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, addresses attendees at the first annual International Special Operations Forces Week in June at MacDill Air Force Base.*

on the future's horizon," he said.

Brown also stressed the importance of non-military skills and expertise such as diplomacy, information, economics and finance — noting that interagency partners are a key component of the international team. In addition, he said, industry partners are enabling SOF to network and operate in ways never thought possible. Technology is a key enabler of special operations; however, the challenge is interoperability.

"Our future rests in a globalized system, one that (New York Times reporter) Thomas Friedman characterizes as 'the (unstoppable) integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before,'" said Brown, adding that USSOCOM's operations tempo is expected to remain high for the foreseeable future, which will affect the amount of training conducted with our coalition partners.

"But we will pursue every opportunity we can ... we've learned we can't wait until a crisis occurs to develop effective working relationships. Our relationships must be habitual."

Noting that relationships nurture trust — the cornerstone of the special operations culture — he added, "We train and operate as one joint/coalition team in order to build the trust between operators that can transcend the chaos of war."

Supporting regional training is the responsibility of USSOCOM's theater special-operations commands, or TSOCs. As a sub-unified command, TSOCs act as a conduit, with regionally oriented, culturally trained and language-proficient SOF in their areas of responsibility to facilitate regional objectives of the geographic combatant commands and USSOCOM.

"As a global community, we all have an interest and role in addressing and preventing the circumstances that lead people to make the leap from nonviolent opposition to dissent to violent opposition," Brown said. "If we fail to confront impending dangers, we imperil ourselves. The statesman Edmund Burke aptly warned, 'All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.'" The threat of global terrorism is a threat that requires a long

and determined effort from all of us."

Brown said he believes the key to success in the Global War on Terrorism is joint, coalition, combined and interagency operations. "They have built a network to defeat us, and it will take a network to defeat them."

According to Brown, preventing the emergence of threats to national security is the key to combatting terrorism. He believes that can be done by improving living conditions for citizens, which will take away the terrorists havens. Through diplomatic, informational and economic efforts, interagency partners can negotiate and provide aid to vulnerable regions.

"Our adversaries will try to convince us that our coalitions cannot prevail," he said. "They will try to make us believe that our diversity is a weakness — they are wrong.

"We must always remember that we cannot let the bonds we forge dissolve after the shooting stops or a crisis is over — building coalitions for the long term means for the long term, not just when it is convenient for current operations," he said.

As crises emerge across the globe, SOF are enabling rapid dissemination of information, rapid decision-making, rapid movement and rapid mission-accomplishment. However Brown cautioned, "We must balance our sense of urgency with a sense of patient persistence.

"There is a Chinese proverb that tells us, 'If your vision is for a year, plant wheat ... if your vision is for a decade, plant trees. If your vision is for a lifetime, plant people — we are planting people.'"

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*Captain Joseph Coslett is assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office.*

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# Special-Operations Forces' Interoperability With Coalition Forces

by Lieutenant Colonel Mark C. Arnold

Since Sept. 11, 2001, United States special-operations forces have fought alongside coalition forces on an unprecedented scale. Integration with coalition forces is critical to affirming the legitimacy and credibility of our operations in the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, accomplishing missions that cover vast amounts of terrain.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, this integration has affected operations from the task-force level down to the special-operations Soldiers on the ground who work with coalition forces in adjacent special-operations areas. ARSOF aviators also work directly with coalition units while inserting, resupplying and exfiltrating coalition forces operating deep in enemy territory.

In both operations Enduring Freedom, or OEF, and Iraqi Freedom, or OIF, SF groups were the core of combined joint-special-operations task forces, or CJSOTFs. Forces from seven allied nations were committed to OEF in late 2001 and deployed to Afghanistan in December 2001, where they executed well over 200 special-reconnaissance, direct-action and sensitive-site-exploita-

tion missions over the ensuing 12 months.

Correct command relationships resulted in unity of command and unity of effort. British and Australian forces, under the tactical control of CJSOTF-West during the opening months of OIF, contributed significantly to the strategically critical counter-theatre-

***Long before we begin isolation planning, rehearsals and infiltration of units, we must achieve a thorough integration of coalition SOF into the theater campaign plan.***

ballistic-missile, or CTBM, mission in Iraq's western desert.

Long before we begin isolation planning, rehearsals and infiltration of units, we must achieve a thorough integration of coalition SOF into the theater campaign plan. This integration begins at senior levels of leadership — the theater special-operations com-

mand, or SOC; the CJSOTF; and the combined Army special-operations task force, or ARSOTF — and extends down to the operator level.

An example of this integration occurred in Iraq, as an Australian patrol reached the eastern edge of its assigned area. While an Australian staff sergeant crouched down with his patrol in defilade observing an Iraqi military convoy moving toward his position, he called for support, using airborne warning and control system, or AWACS. The AWACS aircraft on station that night happened to have a British crew, who guided a flight of American F-15s onto the enemy targets within eight minutes of the initial call for close air support, or CAS.

Thorough training made this example one of dozens of successful contacts with the enemy. CAS procedures and new control techniques were rehearsed and developed with U.S. SF, coalition ground units and U.S. and British air forces during three major joint exercises conducted prior to deployment and in theater during the weeks leading up to OIF. SF and U.S. Air Force commanders said these exercises were the



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*U.S. Special Forces and forces of the Albanian Army conduct a joint patrol in Iraq.*

most sophisticated and realistic they have experienced during their careers. SF operational detachments on the ground called in fighters and bombers that dropped live ordnance on targets; SOF air insertion and resupply teams used both ground and airborne control centers. Commanders believe this training made the difference during the opening weeks of the war in Iraq.

The 5th SF Group was the

nucleus of CJSOTF-West during this period of OIF. The group staff integrated British and Australian officers into almost all directorates of the task force as quickly as allied national authorities approved their potential participation in contingency operations involving Iraq. The CJSOTF J3, the CJSOTF deputy commander, J3-western desert and assistant J2 were all allied officers.

A British army officer proved to

be a no-nonsense J3 who quickly organized the CJSOTF staff into a war-ready mix of officers and NCOs from the 5th SF Group, allied forces, and U.S. reserve-component forces. His accent and uniform proved to be the only noticeable differences between him and his U.S. staff; doctrine he had trained to during his career was so similar to U.S. procedures that integration appeared to be seamless to the command. This

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top-down staffing enhanced interoperability immeasurably, and coalition forces were integrated into all phases of operations.

During CTBM operations in OIF, SF was an enabling force for the combined force air component commander, or CFACC. Coalition units demonstrated their capabilities in the use of emerging technologies by directing precision-targeted air-delivered ordnance. These units have continuously improved their interoperability with U.S. SF and U.S. strike aircraft over the years by training to NATO-standard CAS procedures; they used these skills effectively against the Iraqi Army and paramilitary forces.

On several occasions, coalition SOF units were attacked in Iraq's western desert by mounted Iraqi counter-SOF forces. These engagements were often terminated when coalition SOF called immediate CAS strikes onto the enemy. The CAS missions were coordinated through the CJSOTF-West joint-fires element, which had a combined staff of U.S. and U.K. fires-coordination officers. Coalition units also engaged mobile enemy targets in ambushes using a combination of CAS and their organic direct fires.

The days immediately following the insertion of coalition forces into Iraq's western desert were among the most dangerous for CJSOTF West's subordinate units conducting counter-TBM. Infiltration required British and Australian patrols to deconflict their operations with those of U.S. forces and to conduct a passage of lines as they moved through each other's operating areas. All movements were conducted at night, when Iraqi counter-SOF operations were very aggressive, and there was an increased possibility of fratricide. Rehearsals, a com-

mon radio operating frequency and coordination at all levels of command resulted in success during this period.

SF operators were under extreme pressure as they avoided enemy ambushes and destroyed mobile enemy formations. Through thick dust and night-vision goggles, ODAs had to be able to differentiate between enemy vehicles and various models of coalition vehicles — usually within the standoff range of

***Coalition SOF in U.S.-led task forces continuously proved their ability to get the job done at the tactical and operational levels. They also contributed to strategic objectives by affirming the legitimacy and credibility of our efforts in the GWOT.***

friendly and enemy weapons systems. Fortunately, recognition training on vehicles and markings had continued until infiltration began.

SF detachments and coalition-SOF patrols from CJSOTF-West accomplished this CTBM mission without the loss of any coalition soldiers, while inflicting considerable damage and casualties on the enemy.

As part of the CTBM fight, the British isolated the Iraqi garrison at the strategically significant city of Al Qaim, near the Syrian border, from late March until it surrendered in late April. The

British destroyed large numbers of enemy forces, calling dozens of air strikes onto enemy positions and often using CAS to break contact. Near the end of the Scud missile fight in the western desert, an Australian patrol found more than 50 Iraqi fighter jets hidden under camouflage nets and tents at Al Asad air base. The patrol leader called his command, saying, "I think we just located half the bloody Iraqi air force!"

During OIF, the coalition SOF headquarters was located near the CJSOTF-West headquarters, but during the first year of OEF in Afghanistan, the coalition SOF units were separated by hundreds of miles from the CJSOTF-Afghanistan headquarters. Consequently, the CJSOTF-Afghanistan commander established an SF liaison element — a "coalition forward operating base" also known as the coalition coordination cell, manned by Soldiers from the 3rd SF Group — located with the five coalition SOF task groups. The coalition FOB was manned with representation from the J2, J3, J4 and J6. It provided U.S. command-and-control, communications and intelligence links to the coalition SOF headquarters such as: dissemination of U.S. intelligence in support of mission-oriented requests for information; video feeds of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; clearance of fires; redundant radio communications; frequency and crypto management; U.S.-supervised use of classified e-mail; video teleconferencing with the CJSOTF commander; U.S.-provided combat service support; and operational advice.

Coalition SOF were incorporated into the battle throughout Afghanistan. The units conducted special reconnaissance where little was known of the enemy situa-

tion. They operated mounted in the desert and valleys and dismounted in the most severe terrain. Those deep operations often led to follow-on direct-action missions against members of al-Qaeda and resurgent Taliban.

Interoperability was led at the operational level from the headquarters at CJSOTF Afghanistan through its coalition FOB; however, interoperability often began at the tactical level — a U.S. SF battalion. This began in Afghanistan when the 2nd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, established its FOB at Kandahar Airfield in April 2002. Five coalition SOF task groups and CJSOTF-Afghanistan's coalition FOB — the coalition coordination cell — were located adjacent to FOB 32.

FOB 32's commander and staff took advantage of the coalition SOF units' static and mobile special reconnaissance capabilities to conduct operational preparation of the battlefield, or OPB, for his detachments. Through the coalition FOB and Colonel Joe Celeski, who took command of 3rd SF Group and CJSOTF-Afghanistan in May 2002, FOB 32 planned combat missions with the coalition task groups for execution in the Oruzgun, Helmund and Paktika provinces. Initial reconnaissance missions led to successful operations directed at al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership cells. SF detachments unilaterally conducted many of these missions based on OPB conducted by coalition SOF and briefed to FOB 32.

Coalition SOF were particularly successful in mobile-reconnaissance missions that resulted in the capture and destruction of numerous caches of enemy arms. These missions were in direct support of CJSOTF-Afghanistan's campaign plan. Coalition SOF conducted their own unilateral



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*A U.S. officer from the 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion (left) discusses Iraqi fire-fighting capabilities with a representative of the British Ministry of the Interior and a British Royal Marine.*

direct-action missions and were also successful in the capture of Taliban leadership and in facilitating the information-operations mission of striking the enemy when and where they least expected it.

The 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, supported most of these coalition SOF raids. The battalion's staff, flight leads and com-

manders took interoperability to a high level as the Night Stalkers mutually planned mission after mission with coalition SOF ground-force leaders and planners. The 160th noted that this planning was particularly well done by the Danish SOF, who brought two of their U.S.-trained helicopter pilots to Afghanistan for the purpose of conducting air-operations planning with the



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*A training instructor from the 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group, reviews the capabilities of the Valon 3 metal detector with a member of the Lebanese Army Engineering Regiment, during a field training exercise in Hammana, Lebanon.*

### Night Stalkers.

Extraordinary one-wheel “landings” by MH-47 pilots on extreme slopes at high elevations were the norm for the 160th as it inserted coalition SOF reconnaissance teams on dozens of missions in the middle of the night. Chinook and Blackhawk aircrews took enemy fire on several occasions as they approached insertion points for coalition SOF and while providing fire support from miniguns during raids on enemy leadership compounds.

Most successful combat missions are preceded by some degree of deliberate planning and coalition SOF operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan were no exception. Planning and decision-making doctrine used by the coalition forces in both operations proved to be almost identical to U.S. doctrine. Common doctrine and a common format for briefbacks and concept of operations facilitated the interoperability of U.S. SF and coalition SOF.

Coalition SOF in U.S.-led task forces continuously proved their ability to get the job done at the tactical and operational levels. They also contributed to strategic objectives by affirming the legitimacy and credibility of our efforts in the GWOT. Future missions may cover vast expanses of enemy

territory with complex mission sets that can be simultaneously executed with a coalition force as part of a CJSOTF; they will also involve air fires. During those missions, U.S. SOF aviation will probably lift and support allied units into enemy territory again, and U.S. SF will work adjacent to them on the ground while using their training to avoid incidents of fratricide.

Integration of coalition SOF officers and NCOs in senior positions into U.S. SF-led special-operations task forces is key to gaining a unity of effort and maximizing the potential of our coalition partners. Multinational SOF training exercises at the tactical and CJSOTF/CARSOTF levels can improve the interoperability lessons learned and successes achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan by the 5th and 3rd SF groups. These exercises will also maintain the professional relationships between U.S. and coalition SOF that were created immediately prior to OIF and OEF and bonded in combat. ❧

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*Lieutenant Colonel Mark C. Arnold served as an operations officer with CJSOTF-South in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in January and February 2002 and was the director of the coalition SOF FOB in Kandahar from March through October 2002. He served as an operations and liaison officer for CJSOTF-West during Operation Iraqi Freedom.*

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# FBCB2 Gives Soldiers Better Picture of Battlespace

by Dean George

A key element of the Army's success in current and future operations is making the force smarter with better situational awareness and improved command and control capabilities. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, or FBCB2, is designed to put current information in the hands of decision-makers on the ground and in the field.

The FBCB2, an integrated suite of hardware, installation kits, system software and application software that can be installed on both weapons platforms and vehicles, extends the battlespace from the traditional line-of-sight data provided visually or by radio to one that includes broadcast messaging and automatic map posting. The system is designed to improve communications management and battle command, including the execution of missions, through the use of technology.

FBCB2 is a sub-element of the Army Battle Command System, which interfaces with the Army tactical command and control system that is located within a group, regiment, brigade or battalion. The system provides battle-command information from the group, regiment, brigade or battalion headquarters to the Soldiers in the field. Mounted tactical combat, combat-support and combat-service-support commanders, leaders and Soldiers will use the system across all battlefield functional areas.

The FBCB2 technology provides Soldiers timely information by leveraging wireless tactical Internet and GPS technology. With a clear picture of the battlefield, commanders have a tactical advantage because they can make decisions

faster and communicate those decisions to their Soldiers without allowing the enemy time to react.

Units within the United States Army Special Operations Command will receive two configurations of FBCB2 — a vehicle-mounted platform and a Tactical Operations Center, or TOC, system. Fielding of FBCB2 vehicle-mounted and TOC systems will begin during the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2005 and will continue throughout FY 2007. Each group headquarters and each tactical battalion (Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations) will receive one TOC system. The mounted systems will be installed in the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle class of vehicles, and in ground mobility vehicles. The initial distribution of the vehicle-mounted systems is as follows: 3rd and 5th Special Forces groups, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion. To date, 37 systems have been installed and are in use by SOF supporting of Operation Iraqi Freedom. ✕



File photo

*The Tactical Operations Center, or TOC, is one of two variants of the FBCB2.*

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*Dean George is a force modernization officer assigned to USASOC G8, Force Modernization Branch.*

# Warrant Officer Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### DA staffing WO recruiting, retention initiatives

Significant initiatives are being pursued at the Department of Army level to improve recruiting and retention of warrant officers in all military occupational specialties.

*Lower time-in-grade requirement for technical-service promotions.* Warrant officers in the field are gaining experience much faster than they did in a peacetime environment. There is a critical shortage of CW4s and an over-strength of CW3s. The Army is staffing a proposal to lower the time-in-grade requirement for active-component promotion to CW4. If the initiative is approved, an additional promotion board may be held during the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2006 to consider CW3s for promotion to CW4.

*Tenure for active-component CW4s.* Current policy requires that active-component CW4s who are two-time nonselects for CW5 be separated, unless they are selected for continuation, or SELCON. If they are SELCON, they can serve only 24 years of warrant-officer service (or 30 years total service, whichever occurs first). A legislative change proposal has been submitted that would remove the separation and SELCON requirement for CW4s. An additional change has been submitted to remove the 30 years total service limit. Under the proposal, Soldiers would be limited only by their total warrant-officer service, which would still be capped at 24 years of warrant-officer service for CW4s and below. A legislative change package has been submitted to change the law, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) has been asked to suspend the separation policy (which he may do in wartime) until the law is changed.

*Reserve-component warrant-officer critical skills retention bonus.* Reserve-component warrant officers, including those officers in the National Guard, were not included in the CSRB that was authorized by Congress for FY 2005. A legislative change package has been submitted to authorize critical skills retention bonuses for Reserve-component warrants in FY 2006. The military occupational specialties that would receive the bonus will be determined after the legislation is passed.

*Reserve-component affiliation bonus.* This approved initiative provides a \$6,000 affiliation bonus for warrant officers who agree to serve three years in the Selective Reserves.



# Officer Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### Final Reserve Phase II CA Course offered

The final Phase II Civil Affairs course will be held in March 2006 for Army Reserve officers. Reserve officers unable to complete Phase I distance-learning by that date must attend either a mobilization course or a nine-week CA Qualification Course to obtain duty-MOS qualification. As mobilizations for Iraq and Afghanistan continue, a series of 29-day intensive mobilization courses will be taught to officers of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. Mobilization courses will be skill-identifier producing, with additional qualifications awarded following 90 days experience in an operational environment. The final Phase II course will be held in April 2006 for Army Reserve officers. USAR CA or PSYOP officers desiring further attendance in the active-component pipeline courses (Advanced Regional Analysis Course) can attend as space is available. For information regarding course prerequisites, call Major Rick Springett at DSN 239-8102, commercial (910) 432-8102, or send e-mail to: [springer@soc.mil](mailto:springer@soc.mil).

### OPCF captains eligible for ACS programs

The Army Human Resources Command, or HRC, will select 21 senior captains from the Operations Career Field, or OPCF, to participate in a program of Advanced Civil Schooling, or ACS. The program provides OPCF officers the ability to earn a high-quality graduate degree, attend Intermediate Level Education, and return to their basic branch for a follow-on developmental assignment.

The targeted population for this year's ACS program are year groups 1997 and 1998. To be eligible, applicants must have completed command no later than May 1, 2006. Members of earlier and later year groups who meet the requirements may apply, but the primary focus is for YG97 and YG98. The four available graduate-level programs are listed below:

- The University of South Carolina, located in Columbia, S.C., offers a 22-month program leading to a master's in business administration.
- The Naval Postgraduate School, located in Monterey, Calif., offers an 18-month program leading to a master of science in defense analysis.
- Columbia University, based in New York City and West Point, N.Y., offers a 12-month program leading to a master of arts in psychology.
- Hawaii Pacific University in Honolulu, Hawaii, offers an 18-month program leading to a master of arts in diplomacy and military studies.

The application deadline is Sept. 15, and the selection process runs through Oct. 1. The conditional primary and alternate selections will be announced Feb. 1, 2006. Students will report to Columbia University and to Hawaii Pacific University in May 2006. Students will report to the NPS and to USC in June 2006.

For additional information and requirements contact the SF captain's assignment officer or visit the ACS Web page: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/opfamacs/ACS00.htm>.



# Enlisted Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### **SWCS to offer CA NCO Reclassification Course**

The Training Development Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has completed the critical-task selection and development process for the Civil Affairs NCO Reclassification Course, a six-week course designed for reclassifying NCOs into the new enlisted career-management field 38B, Civil Affairs. SWCS will conduct the course at Fort Bragg beginning Sept. 12, 2005, and Jan. 23, 2006. The course will conclude with a capabilities exercises and a field-training exercise that will require students to form Civil Affairs assessment teams with their counterparts in the CA officer reclassification course. For information regarding reclassification to CMF 38B, contact Master Sergeant Robert Crite at DSN 239-5379, commercial (910) 432-5379, or send e-mail to: [ca-psyoprecruiting@soc.mil](mailto:ca-psyoprecruiting@soc.mil). NCOs who desire instructions for reclassification to CMF 38B should contact their enlisted personnel manager at PERS-COM, Sergeant First Class J.A. Cassel, at DSN 221-3899.

### **Enlisted SF Soldiers gain promotion opportunity**

Recently approved changes to Army promotion policy give increased opportunities for Special Forces candidates and SF sergeants serving in operational assignments. According to a memorandum recently released by the United States Army's director of personnel management, Soldiers in the rank of sergeant who hold an SF military occupational specialty, or MOS, are recommended by their commander and meet other basic eligibility requirements for promotion, may be boarded and promoted to staff sergeant without regard to the requirements for time in grade and time in service. Soldiers in the grade of specialist and sergeant who are enrolled in the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, and carry Special Report Code 18X (a training MOS), and are eligible for promotion in MOS 11B if they meet primary-zone eligibility requirements and are recommended for promotion by their commander. The changes are in addition to other changes to Army promotion policy, which apply to SFQC graduates, that were released via MILPER message No. 05-003. One of those changes provides for the automatic promotion of specialists and corporals to sergeant without a board appearance, effective the day they receive their SF MOS. For additional information, telephone Sergeant Major Charles Stevens at DSN 239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to [stevensc@soc.mil](mailto:stevensc@soc.mil).



### Ziegler takes command of 1st SWTG

Calling the students at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, the “nation’s best resource,” Colonel Jack C. Zeigler Jr. accepted command of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group from Colonel Manuel A. Diemer during a change of command ceremony at Fort Bragg, N.C., on June 24.

Zeigler, a native of Florence, S.C., is taking control of the training group at a critical time. The training group, responsible for the training and education of all Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers, is in the midst of a comprehensive transformation designed to make the force relevant on today’s battlefields and the battlefields of the future.

“There is not a more important, meaningful mission in the Army today than to prepare the nation’s best resource — our sons and daughters — to fight, survive and win on the battlefield,” said Zeigler.

In addition to ensuring the forces’ relevance, 1st SWTG has also been tasked with turning out more special-operations Soldiers than ever before to support the Global War on Terrorism. Part of the ongoing transformation is ensuring that training is done not only to standard, but also in the most efficient manner possible.

Zeigler is well-prepared to carry on with the transformation, having served in special operations for the majority of his career. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry in December 1979 fol-



SWCS PAO

*Colonel Jack Zeigler salutes his troops as he takes command of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group.*

lowing graduation from Presbyterian College in Clinton, S.C., and served in a variety of positions in the 5th Special Forces Group, the 3rd Special Forces Group and at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Colonel Diemer is now the USASOC operations officer.

### SWCS CA/CMO Division updates doctrinal products

The Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations Division of the JFK Spe-

cial Warfare Center and School’s Directorate of Training and Doctrine is working on a number of publications that will keep Soldiers up-to-date on current doctrine and procedures of Army Civil Affairs.

Army Field Manual 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, will introduce its users to Civil Affairs and give them more detailed information on CA organizations, CA operations, effects-based operations, and transition considerations for planners of civil-military operations. The manual will also provide formats for the CMO estimate and the CMO annex.

The initial draft of FM 3-05.40 is in production at SWCS. When completed, it will be sent to selected organizations worldwide for review and comment. It will also be posted on the SWCS ARSOF University Web page (<https://arsofu.army.mil>). Once FM 3-05.40 has been reviewed and necessary changes have been made, it is scheduled to be distributed Armywide in March 2006.

For additional information regarding FM 3-05.40, telephone Major Kent Hinchcliff, the chief of the CA/CMO Division’s doctrine branch, at DSN 239-1548, commercial (910) 432-1548, or send e-mail to [hinchclk@soc.mil](mailto:hinchclk@soc.mil).

The CA/CMO Division began work to rewrite FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, in late May 2005. The author’s draft is currently in production and is scheduled to be staffed in October 2005.

The new CA TTP incorporates changes in the organizational structure of Army CA units that are programmed through the Force Design

Update process, as well as emerging doctrine contained in FM 3-05.40. The production timeline for FM 3-05.401 calls for the author's draft by October 2005, the initial draft by January 2006, the final draft by May 2006 and final approval by September 2006.

For additional information on FM 3-05.401, telephone Ron Fiegler at DSN 239-1548, commercial (910) 432-1548, or send e-mail to fieglero@soc.mil.

The CA/CMO Division is also preparing an updated version of GTA 41-01-001, *Planning, Execution and Assessment Guide*. Now titled *Civil Affairs Operations Planning, Execution and Assessment Guide*, the updated graphic training aid gives more in-depth information than the previous version and includes a section on effects-based operations. GTA 41-01-001 is in the editing phase and scheduled to be released in December 2005.

The CA/CMO Division is also updating several CA training references: ARTEP 41-701-10-MTP, *MTP for a Civil Affairs Team* (15 Sep 00); ARTEP 41-701-35-MTP, *CA Battalion, Brigade, and Command* (5 Aug 02); ARTEP 41-701-60, *MTP for Civil Affairs Specialty Teams* (5 Aug 02); STP 41-38A14-SM-TG, *Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide* (31 Oct 03); and STP 41-38II-OFS, *Officer Foundation Standards II* (30 Apr 04). In the future, the MTP and STP manuals will be replaced by the Combined Arms Training Strategy, which will be accessible down to the unit level through the Army's Digital Training Management System.

In addition to working on the publications listed above, the CA/CMO Division will be contributing information to the CA forums on the ARSOF University Web site. The information will be relevant to products and issues related to the development of doctrine and training, including general information, doctrinal reviews, collective and individual training, emerging issues, and

after-action reports and observations. The forums will not only provide links to all current CA doctrinal products; they will be used to solicit input from the field for the maintenance and revision of CA manuals.

#### 4th POG changes command

Colonel Kenneth A. Turner assumed command of the 4th Psychological Operations Group from Colonel Jack N. Summe during a change of command ceremony held July 19 at Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Plaza.



USASOC PAO

Colonel Kenneth A. Turner (left) accepts command of the 4th PSYOP Group.

Turner's most recent assignment was director of plans and programs for the Joint PSYOP Support Element, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Turner previously served as commander of the 3rd PSYOP Battalion, 4th POG, from 1999 to 2002.

#### 7th SF Group welcomes new commander

Colonel Edward M. Reeder Jr. took command of the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Field Aug. 4.

Reeder assumed command from

Colonel Jeffrey D. Waddell, who had commanded the group since July 2003.

Reeder's previous assignments include detachment commander, company commander, battalion S3, group S3, group XO and deputy commander in the 7th SF Group. He has also served as an adviser in El Salvador, as an operations officer in the Joint Special Operations Command, and as chief of J3 plans in the Joint Interagency Task Force-South.

#### USASOC names Soldier/NCO of the year

One Soldier and one noncommissioned officer stood above all others this year when they were named the 2005 U.S. Army Special Operations Command's Soldier and NCO of the Year after a week-long competition.

Sergeant Kyle Vreeman, a Special Forces weapons sergeant assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, was named the NCO of the Year.

Specialist Christopher Shanahan, an infantryman assigned to the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, was the Soldier of the Year.

Both Vreeman and Shanahan were honored during a special ceremony at Fort Bragg July 22. They will represent the command during the Army-level competition later this year.

#### Army approves badges for special-ops divers

Two new diving badges have recently replaced the Army diving badges for Soldiers in Army special-operations forces.

The Special Operations Diver Badge and the Special Operations Diving Supervisor's Badge were approved July 20 for special-ops Soldiers in the active and reserve components.

"The process to get the badge changed began with a proposal from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School," said Captain Rebecca L.

Eggers, chief of the Action Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. "The request was then submitted to the Human Resource Command, where the award was approved."

After the award was approved, the badges went to the Army Institute of Heraldry for the design and the creation of dies that can be used to manufacture the badges, Eggers explained.

The Special Operations Diver Badge is now awarded to graduates of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Combat Diver Qualification Course, taught by Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, located in Key West, Fla., Eggers said. The award is also given to Soldiers who have completed any other combat diver qualification course approved by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The Special Operations Diving Supervisor's Badge is awarded to individuals who have graduated

from the SWCS Combat Diving Supervisor Course, or from any other USASOC-approved combat diving supervisor's course. "From here on out, all Soldiers who attend the courses in Key West will automatically get the new badges," Eggers said. Both badges may be awarded retroactively to members of any service who completed the courses on or following Oct. 1, 1964. — *Cassie Chance, USASOC PAO*

### USAREC activates special-ops recruiting battalion

The U.S. Army Recruiting Command activated the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion at Fort Bragg, N.C., on July 21.

The new battalion, formerly a 38-person company, will consolidate the recruiting functions of all Army special-operations forces.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Roddenberry, the battalion will synchronize ARSOF recruiting efforts, capitalizing on its access to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command.

### Tovo takes command of 10th SF Group

Hundreds of Green Berets and support Soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group assembled in formation at Fort Carson, Colo.'s Manhart Field July 22 for the group's change of command ceremony.

Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo, a multiple-tour veteran of the 10th SF Group — most recently as commander of the 3rd Battalion — accepted command of the group from Colonel Michael S. Repass.

Tovo's previous assignments include detachment, company and battalion commands in the 10th SF Group, as well as stints as a plans and operations officer at the U.S. Special Operations Command and at NATO's Joint Headquarters Cen-




USASOC Public Affairs Office

Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo (left) assumes command of the 10th SF Group at Fort Carson, Colo.

ter. He is a veteran of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, non-combatant-evacuation operations in Sierra Leone, Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Repass had commanded the group since 2003 and led it through two combat tours in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. His next assignment will be with U.S. Army Europe, based in Germany.



Institute of Heraldry

The Special Operations Diver Badge (top) and the Special Operations Diving Supervisor's Badge.

# Book Reviews

## Special Warfare


**You're Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger.** By Roger Hall. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004. ISBN: 0-8117-0024-0. 219 pages. \$22.95.

*You're Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger* is a highly entertaining and engaging account of one man's uncommon experiences in the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, during World War II. It is a tale of courage, danger and wit, with a clever turn of phrase on nearly every page. The book appeals to the patriot, the thrill-seeker and the rebel, easily capturing the imagination of the inner spy within each of us.

The author, Roger Hall, writes about his experiences as a young Army lieutenant recruited into the OSS. Hall, the son of a Navy captain and raised in Annapolis among his father's peers, had little awe for authority, so the excitement offered by the OSS seemed to be a perfect fit for him. Hall is quite the storyteller, and his personality, verbal agility and quick wit endear him to the reader.

Not fully understanding the scope of the assignment for which he volunteered, Hall reported for OSS duties almost as an exercise in intestinal fortitude. Greeted by a colonel who regarded him with a mix of awe and pity, he was mournfully told that none of the young OSS officers who processed through the office were married, nor had they ever returned. With a sense of impending doom, Hall began to question his decision to volunteer.

Seeking the thrill and adventure he associates with the OSS, Hall was disappointed when, after his



initial training, he was saddled with instructor duty. The duty was designed to fill his time while he waited for the unlikely arrival of 28 Danes who were to complete the formation of his Danish operational group. After four months and the realization that a Danish operational group was not feasible, Hall was “volunteered” for parachute school at Fort Benning.

Parachute school was followed by an assessment phase in which Hall began the “cloak” portion of his cloak-and-dagger training. He recounts the students' attempts to create and maintain cover stories that backed up their phony identities, as well as the cadre's often-successful attempts to crack their cover stories and break them down mentally. Hall later obtained orders to the “spy school,” which was designed to provide operational training in undercover activities. From the

spy school, students were sent out to performing, “espionage missions” in Philadelphia. Each student was given the task of infiltrating various factories or other places of interest. Hall elected to present himself as a wounded war veteran in search of a job. After catching the eye of a secretary, who happened to be the boss' daughter, Hall was invited to a war-bond rally in the company's cafeteria, where he made an impassioned plea for support. He performed so well that his impromptu speech appeared the next day in the local newspaper.

Having effectively demonstrated his ability to maintain cover and to improvise, Hall shipped out to London, but instead of hitting the battlefield, he received a literal five-day crash course at the British parachute school. Upon completion of the course, he learned that his first assignment was to perform a high-risk, nighttime parachute drop behind enemy lines to join the French *maquis* groups. After nerve-racking preparation for the jump, Hall landed safely, only to discover that the lines had shifted and that he had landed behind American lines.

Hall's following assignments got better. On his next assignment, he was chosen to accompany seven German officers through parachute school before dropping them back behind German lines as spies. His job — to determine which one was really a double agent.

Fearing he would never see action, Hall finally found himself

in an operational role toward the end of the war, when he was assigned to head a Norwegian operational group and to oversee the surrender of seven German battalions.

*You're Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger* is an excellent book. Because Hall writes so well, the book reads like a popular spy novel, and the reader sometimes forgets that this is a true account rather than an exciting work of fiction. Hall's sense of humor and irreverence keep the mood light without detracting from the danger and importance of his experiences. Instead, they highlight the humility and unassuming courage with which these unsung heroes fought the war. The only disappointment is the book's length — it is entirely too short, leaving the reader yearning for more.

*Lt. Michelle Mui, U.S. Navy  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, Calif.*

**Behind the Lines: The Oral History of Special Operations in World War II.** By Russell Miller. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. ISBN: 0415121112X (paper) 304 pages. \$15.

*Behind Enemy Lines* is composed almost entirely of debriefings, letters and reports written during or immediately after the conduct of World War II special operations. The operations included were conducted predominantly in Central Europe by personnel from the Special Operations Executive, or SOE, and the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS. The missions ran the gamut from individual-agent operations prior to the June 1944 Normandy invasion to guerrilla operations in support of the Normandy and Mediterranean landings.

The sources of the material and its operational intimacy at the

time that it was written provide a reality and humanity that is lacking in later, fuller and more considered accounts. Miller did a good job in selecting materials that stand on their own without significant supporting information. He has organized them in a roughly chronological order, and the World War II history buff will find little or no need to refer to other sources to establish the operational environment referenced in the reports.

While the well-informed reader might garner snippets of operational techniques or intelligence tradecraft, there are no real special-operations lessons stated, implied or readily extracted from this work. This does not mean that it does not have professional value, only that its values lie elsewhere. One of these values is the repeated demonstration of the criticality of selecting the right people: people who can operate independently under pressure, in ambiguous situations and with no immediate availability of external support. (These characteristics would almost define the difference between the special operator and the line Soldier.)

The reader cannot help but admire the courage of the person-


nel involved, most particularly the agents and their radio operators who went into occupied France years before the invasion. They volunteered to enter a continent occupied and ever more tightly controlled by a totalitarian regime. Their enemies were not only the German military and state police forces (Gestapo) but also the German-controlled French police and in particular, the Germans' subordinate gendarmerie force, the French *milice*.

Against these massive forces, the agents' only defenses were their individual cover identities, their language skills, their instincts and, above all, their wits. Even with the best of these defenses, they could be caught by faults in their documentation, radio direction-finding, a notoriously feeble encryption system, willing or unwilling betrayal by their local contacts, or simple bad luck.

One of the book's more charming accounts is the effort of two OSS operatives from a linked-up Jedburgh team to provide the senior ground-force commander with the details of a German-held harbor. To meet the commander's requirements, reconnaissance had to be done overnight. The operatives pulled it off with a combination of intelligence, courage verging on bravado and quick wits. In exercising the last, they not only avoided capture but also convinced the Germans to give them a ride to their destination.

This book is recommended for background or just enjoyable special-operations reading.

*COL J. H. Crerar  
U.S. Army (ret.)  
Vienna, Va.*



# Special Warfare

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