

# Special Warfare

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Toys  
for  
Kids

## TRAINING PSYOP FOR THE BATTLEFIELD

## ARTICLES

### 8 The Virtual Battlefield

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Digital Training Center is charged with preparing Special Forces commanders and staffs at various levels for deployment by providing challenging battle-staff exercises for unit training and for self-evaluation.

### 10 PSYOP Transformed *COVER STORY*

The transformation of the Psychological Operations training pipeline affects all levels of training, from advanced individual training to the PSYOP Officer Qualification Course.

### 14 Understanding Unconventional Warfare and U.S. Army Special Forces

A better understanding of unconventional warfare as a special operation can lead to increased acceptance of UW as part of the spectrum of capabilities.

### 25 Branch Out

New branches recognize importance of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations.

### 26 Hard as Nail

During his tenure at the SERE school, Richmond Nail, a retired sergeant major, has taught countless Soldiers to survive captivity.



## DEPARTMENTS

### 4 From the Commandant

### 5 Update

### 28 Sergeant Major Sound-off

### 28 Career Notes

### 30 Book Reviews

**ON THE COVER >**  
A PSYOP Soldier distributes school supplies to children in Iraq.



# Special Warfare

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10

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As the importance of the populace increases on the modern battlefield, Psychological Operations play an ever more crucial role in conventional and special operations. PSYOP forces are a valuable asset for communicating with civilians and winning their support, and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review calls for a 33-percent increase in the number of PSYOP Soldiers in the active and reserve components.


As Janice Burton's article in this issue points out, we are transforming the training pipeline for PSYOP Soldiers just as we have done for Special Forces and Civil Affairs. PSYOP Soldiers have always needed to understand the language and culture of the target audience so that they can produce messages that will be well-received. Not only is it necessary to increase the number of PSYOP Soldiers; we must also adapt their training to the lessons learned from the war on terrorism.

The increased importance of PSYOP and CA will be recognized in October when they become the Army's newest active-duty branches. Although CA has been a branch in the Army Reserve since August 1955, PSYOP has been an active-duty and reserve-component functional area, and its recognition as a branch will be a true milestone in its long history. Both CA and PSYOP have been heavily involved in operations over the last 20 years, and the new branches are evidence of the Army's recognition that the skills of both branches deserve to be preserved and developed through formal training and repetitive assignments.

Another aspect of Army special operations that is receiving increasing recognition is unconventional warfare. As special operators, we should be subject-matter experts in our own doctrine. We need to study it, discuss it, argue about it ... care about it. In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic, a Special Forces officer, examines the history and doctrinal definition of UW to increase readers' understanding of what UW is and how it can be applied to a variety of situations.

The Soldiers and civilians of the special-operations brotherhood can be justly proud of the contributions they are making to our nation's military forces. There has never been a more challenging time to be in the Army nor a better time to serve in Army special operations.



  
Major General James W. Parker

## USASOC NAMES TOP SOLDIER, NCO

*USASOC Public Affairs Office*

Two United States Army Special Operations Command Soldiers earned bragging rights by being named NCO and Soldier of the Year July 20, after competing in a demanding four-day challenge of intellectual and physical events at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Staff Sergeant Douglas W. Norman, of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Ga., was named the NCO of the Year. Specialist Edward A. Hull of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield, was named Soldier of the Year.

The USASOC NCO and Soldier of the Year Competition was a face-off among Soldiers from the various subordinate commands and units. They were tested in categories ranging from Army physical fitness, weapons proficiency and land navigation to common-task testing and general Army subjects.

The runners-up in the USASOC NCO and Soldier of the Year Competition were Sergeant John M. Doyle of Co. B, 3rd Bn., 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky.; and Specialist Nicholas A. Huge of HHC, 1st Bn., 75th Ranger Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield.

Other Soldiers who participated in this year's competition were Staff Sergeant Estefan Nastvogel, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 160th SOAR, Fort Campbell, Ky.; Sergeant Cristian A. Banu, HHC, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th CA Brigade, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Private First Class Charles A. Fernandez, HHC, 96th CAB (A), 95th BDE; Sergeant Mark Hunter of Company C, 3rd Psychological Operations Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Specialist Kevin Weiss of C Co., 3rd PSYOP Battalion; Sergeant First Class Jean-Claude J. Leblanc of the NCO Academy, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Private First Class Daniel Saenz Jr., HHC, SWCS;



▲ **BEST OF THE BEST** USASOC Command Sergeant Major Michael T. Hall (left) congratulates SGT John Doyle, runner-up in the NCO of the Year competition. SSG Douglas Norman, the USASOC NCO of the Year, stands to Doyle's right. *Photo by Gillian M. Albro, USASOC PAO.*

Specialist Joshua A. Bean, HSC, 2nd Bn., 3rd SF Group, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Sergeant Lisa Hurtad, Co. C, 112th Signal Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Specialist John W. Hammes of C. Co., 112th Signal Battalion.

The USASOC NCO and Soldier of the Year will represent all quiet professionals at the Army-level competition in September.

## Csrnko takes helm of Special Forces Command



▲ **TAKING THE HELM** Major General Thomas R. Csrnko (left) accepts the colors of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command from Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner at Meadows Parade Field at Fort Bragg, N.C. *Photo by Paul Prince, USASOC PAO.*

*USASOC Public Affairs Office*

In a ceremony at Meadows Memorial Parade Field at Fort Bragg July 17, Brigadier General John F. Mulholland relinquished command of the United States Army Special Forces Command to Major General Thomas R. Csrnko.

Csrnko, a native of Bethlehem, Pa., is the former commander of Special Operations Command–Europe and has held numerous other positions within the special-operations community. This is Csrnko's fifth assignment with Special Forces at Fort Bragg.

"The power of the bench cannot be clearer than the selection of Major General Tom Csrnko to command Special Forces Command. You know him well," said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

"On behalf of everyone here at the command and everyone here, thank you (General Mulholland) and Miriam for taking care of our Soldiers at home and in combat, as if they were your own sons and daughters," said Wagner. "We wish you in every measure continued success as you serve our nation and our Soldiers. We are very proud of you."

Mulholland is slated to become the deputy commanding general of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command.

"I've been humbly honored and privileged beyond words to have served as commanding general of the finest fighting men on the planet, the men of the Green Beret," said Mulholland. "To leave that is not easy and is only offset by knowing that the regiment is now in the hands of a man far more capable than I am, Major General Tom Csrnko."

## HAAS TAKES COMMAND OF 3RD SPECIAL FORCES GROUP



**^ IN COMMAND** Colonel Christopher K. Haas (left) receives the 3rd SF Group colors from Brigadier General John F. Mullholland at Meadows Parade Field at Fort Bragg, N.C. *U.S. Army photo*

Soldiers of the 3rd Special Forces Group welcomed a new commander June 14 as Colonel Christopher K. Haas assumed command from Colonel Patrick Higgins.

Haas, a native of Germany, was commissioned in the Infantry following his graduation from Duquesne University in 1985. His initial assignment was with the 3rd Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Armored Division, in Garlstedt, Germany, where he served as an Infantry platoon leader, company executive officer and battalion maintenance officer. Following his graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course in 1990, Haas served with the 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, as a detachment commander, battalion operations officer and commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company. From 1994 to 1996, he served as an observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, La. Following his graduation from the Army Command and General Staff College in 1997,

Haas returned to the 5th SF Group, where he served as the commander of Company A and battalion S3. From 1999 to June 2001, Haas was assigned to the Special Operations Division, Operations Directorate, on the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C. From June 2001 to July 2004, he served as the commander, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group, and as the deputy group commander. Following his graduation from the U.S. Army War College, he assumed duties as the director of operations for the Special Operations Command, United States Central Command.

His awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Presidential Unit Citation and the Combat Infantryman's Badge.

He is married to the former Elvira Santos from Houston, Texas, and they have four children — Renee, Joshua, Marshall and Christine.

## 1st Special Forces Group Welcomes New Commander

Colonel Eric P. Wendt took command of the 1st Special Forces Group July 12 at Fort Lewis, Wash.

Wendt, a native of Berkeley, Calif., assumed command from Colonel Richard G. Thomas Jr. Thomas' next assignment will be as chief of staff, Special Operations Command-Pacific.

Wendt's previous assignments include detachment commander and company commander in the 1st Special Forces Group. After graduation from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, he returned to the 1st SF Group, where he served as battalion operations officer and the battalion executive officer for the 2nd Battalion. He also served as the group operations officer. Wendt served in the Special Operations Command-Pacific, or SOCPAC, as the chief of counterdrug and humanitarian demining operations and as chief of international training. During his SOCPAC tour, he deployed twice to Indonesia as the team chief for the PACOM commander's Pacific Situation Assessment Team, and he served as the deputy commanding officer for the Army Special Operations Task Force during the first evolution of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines.

After departing SOCPAC, Wendt served as the commander of the 1st Battalion, 1 SF Group in Okinawa. In his next duty assignment, Wendt deployed to Iraq, where he served as the deputy commanding officer of the CJSOTF-AP. Following his tour in Iraq, he attended the Army War College and then served as the chief of staff of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

His awards include the Humanitarian Service Medal, the



**^ IN CONTROL** Colonel Eric P. Wendt (left) receives the 1st SF Group colors from Brigadier General John F. Mulholland, commander of the United States Army Special Forces Command, during the ceremony at Fort Lewis, Wash. *U.S. Army photo*

Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Armed Forces Service Medal and the Bronze Star Medal. He is a recipient of the Air Assault Badge, the Master Parachutist Badge, the Ranger Tab, the Special Forces Tab, the Expert Infantryman Badge and the Combat Infantryman Badge.

Wendt is married to the former Katie Laurie of San Jose, Calif. They have two children: a son, Alden, and a daughter, Emma.

## SWCS to publish revised SF manuals

The United States Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, will be publishing revised editions of several Special Forces manuals during fiscal year 2007. The SWCS SF Training and Doctrine Division has revised the manuals, updating and expanding doctrine where necessary through the incorporation of lessons learned from the field and use of the latest media technology.

The revised manuals will better prepare SF Soldiers for operations in the 21st century by addressing the changing mission requirements for SF. They will also familiarize non-SOF personnel with SF capabilities and requirements, contributing to interoperability and integration with other SOF, conventional forces, other U.S. agencies and allied or coalition forces.

Each manual has been renumbered to conform to the numbering system for joint publications. Once published, the manuals will be available through SWCS and through the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Reimer Digital Library. The manuals incorporate changes in presentation and formatting, as well as less obvious changes that expand the manual's utility to users, such as the incorporation of embedded hyperlinks in the electronic versions of several of the manuals. The hyperlinks take users to recent video footage of SOF in action, animated short takes, color graphics and virtual simulations.

The revised publications are FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*; FM 3-05.214, *Special Forces Vehicle-Mounted Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*; FM 3-05.204, *Special Reconnaissance Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*; and FM 3-05.221, *Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat*. Some manuals have been reclassified and will be limited in their distribution or accessibility.

FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, formerly FM 31-20, *Special Forces Operations*, now classified as confidential, is scheduled for release during FY 2007. The manual remains a guide for SF Soldiers conducting special operations either in training or combat situations. The new FM 3-05.20 reflects the changing mission requirements for the SF primary missions of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism and counter-proliferation. For additional information, telephone R.J. Wagner at DSN 236-6072 or commercial (910) 907-3913, or send e-mail to: wagnerr@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.204, *Special Reconnaissance Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, previously known as FM 31-20-5, *Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Operations*, remains the premier guide for personnel conducting special-reconnaissance operations. Now classified as confidential, FM 3-05.204 is scheduled to be released during the first quarter of FY 2007.

For more information, telephone Danny Averitt at DSN 239-8286/7690 or commercial (910) 432-8286/7690, or send e-mail to: averitt@d@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.221, *Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat*, the principle guide for SF personnel conducting advanced urban-combat operations, continues to be classified as confidential. The manual was designed to incorporate the latest tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs, and lessons learned from the Global War on Terrorism. The manual highlights several new TTPs for entering rooms and moving through stairwells. It is the first SOF manual to contain imbedded hyperlinks. FM 3-05.221 is scheduled to be released during the first quarter of FY 2007. For more information, telephone Danny Averitt at DSN 239-8286/7690 or commercial (910) 432-8286/7690, or send e-mail to: averitt@d@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.214, *Special Forces Vehicle-Mounted Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, formerly FM 31-23, *Special Forces Mounted Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, encompasses TTPs and lessons learned by SF at Fort Bliss, Fort Campbell, Fort Bragg and overseas. Unlike FM 31-23, it is classified as confidential. The revised manual accounts for equipment updates, such as the new ground-mobility vehicle, and the use of global-positioning-system devices. It also incorporates data extracted from recent operations, including Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Restore Hope, Provide Democracy, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. FM 3-05.214's primary purpose is to serve as a reference for training and employing mounted SF detachments and other military units operating in desert terrain during long-term, unassisted operations. FM 3-05.214 is scheduled to be released during the first quarter of FY 2007. For additional information, telephone CWO4 Randall Wurstr at DSN 239-5952/3043 or commercial (910) 432-5952/3043, or send e-mail to: wurstr@soc.mil.

The SF Doctrine Division has already revised and published another SF publication, GTA 31-01-003, *Detachment Mission Planning Guide*. A revision of the 2003 edition, the latest version is less a GTA and more a handbook. It is a comprehensive reference covering the SF detachment's deliberate planning process. Although the GTA retains the 3x5-inch hand-out format, it has grown from 36 to 96 pages. The additional pages allow the GTA to provide greater coverage of the military decision-making process; overviews of isolation-facility staff and liaison procedures; more in-depth descriptions of the duties and responsibilities of SF detachment members during planning; and sample formats for briefbacks, operations orders and annexes. GTA-31-01-003 remains unclassified to ensure the widest distribution.

## Special Operations Language Training

AVAILABLE THROUGH ARSOFU

Students in the Army special-operations-forces training pipelines will soon be able to supplement their training in the Army's Special Operations Language Training, or SOLT, using a new feature of the Web portal for the Army Special Operations Forces University, or ARSOFU.

Using the learning management system, or LMS, language students will be able to access textbooks, workbooks, quizzes and audio files. They will also be able to take tests through secure online connections. Instructors will be able to track student progress and test results, which will be stored electronically in the LMS instead of in paper-based records.

The Army Special Operations Forces Language Office of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine is converting the SOLT core-language programs so that students and instructors will be able to access them through ARSOFU. The SOLT core languages are Russian, Arabic, Spanish, Korean, French, German, Indonesian and Persian Farsi. In October, German will be replaced by Thai. By December, SOLT will also include Chinese Mandarin and Tagalog.

Users gain access to ARSOFU via their Army Knowledge Online account. Once the LMS is in place, a "Language" link on the ARSOFU main page will take users to the SOLT language listing, where they can choose the appropriate language. Language students will be issued a password for accessing SOLT through the LMS. The ARSOF Language Office's goal is to have the SOLT languages available through the LMS by December.

For additional information, telephone Elizabeth Lampkin, ARSOF Language/Advanced Distributed Learning Branch, Training Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, at DSN 236-4400, commercial (910) 432-4400, or send e-mail to lampkine@soc.mil.

# THE VIRTUAL

## Training Today to Meet Tomorrow's Requirements By Bob Seals

"Attention in the TOC, attention in the TOC: we have troops in contact, Bobcat 15 reports an engagement with an estimated five or six anticoalition militia armed with automatic weapons, vicinity southeast of the village," the battle captain of the special-operations task force announces over the background clatter of various staff sections engaged with current and future operations.

All eyes quickly focus on the current operating picture on the command-and-control personnel computer display, as the system operator brings the Special Forces detachment's location into the center of the projection screen. The battle captain rapidly assesses the lethal assets that are available to support Bobcat 15 and begins the staff's immediate-action battle drill for a unit in contact.

Even though the staff jumped into action, this isn't a real engagement — it's an exercise for the Battle Command Exercise Division, or BCED, at the U.S. Army Special Operations Digital Training Center, or ARSODTC, located at Fort Bragg, N.C. The center is one of the "best kept secrets on Bragg," according to Special Forces group commanders who have used the facility. The digital training center is charged with preparing Special Forces commanders and staffs at various levels — Army special-operations task force, SF forward operational base and SF advanced operational base — for deployment by providing challenging battle-staff exercises for unit training and self-evaluation.

The BCED, which has been in operation since 2004, not only gives commanders battle-command training capability but also provides staff assistance in a current, state-of-the-art, command-and-control digital environment, either at the Fort Bragg

ARSODTC or at home stations for off-site units. During the past year, the 3rd, 7th and 20th SF groups have completed exercises both on and off Fort Bragg.

A valuable pre-mission training resource, the BCED does not provide units with formal or informal evaluations or certifications, but it provides a pre-deployment "warm start" opportunity for commanders to hone skills with numerous training objectives and vignettes that best support the unit's upcoming missions. It should be noted that the participating commander normally conducts a "hot wash" at the end of each day's training, focused upon self-assessment, evaluation and correction by the battle staff. At the conclusion of an exercise, the BCED provides a written exercise report to the commander for continued unit development.<sup>1</sup>

In order to use the facility, commanders must make a formal request through the United States Special Forces Command. That request is forwarded to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. If the request is approved, the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the proponent of the ARSODTC, will be given a pre-mission tasking for subsequent scheduling and execution. At that point, the unit commander and staff will meet with the staff of the BCED to develop a list of training objectives. Training exercises typically include such tasks as exercising crisis management; "bottom up" intelligence flow; the targeting cycle; information operations; current and future operations; staff familiarization with the area of responsibility, or AOR; lethal-fires procedures; and mission execution.

Armed with the objectives, the BCED team begins scripting exercise scenarios and vignettes us-

ing planned locations, terrain and weather data, U.S. and coalition-force dispositions and relevant threat data. All exercise information is the most current available "real world" data, giving the participating unit an added degree of familiarity with its AOR prior to deployment.

Finally, the ARSOF commander and the commanding general of SWCS sign a formal mutual-support agreement that spells out exact duties and responsibilities during the upcoming exercise. The BCED also gives units assistance with the exercise "ramp up" process by providing detailed "road to war" and "operations and intelligence overview" briefings before hostilities commence.<sup>2</sup>

The structure and background of the BCED team allows for the rapid translation of training objectives into a realistic battle-staff exercise. The team's contractors, all retired senior military officers and NCOs with extensive SF or SOF experience, offer literally hundreds of years of experience in SF operations and missions. That experience allows them to script the various components of the asymmetrical battlefield and portray a realistic operational environment. After a recent exercise, one SF group commander commented, "With 215 master-scenario-event-list injects, it really stressed our battle-staff procedures and drastically improved our ability to plan and execute special operations on a noncontiguous battlefield."<sup>3</sup>

Exercises include the play of conventional task forces, local nationals, security forces and governments, coalition troops, nongovernment organizations, other governmental organizations, media, narcotrafficking and civilians on the battlefield. The list of these players in modern asymmetrical warfare

# BATTLEFIELD

becomes quite extensive.

An illustrative vignette from a recent exercise included an SF detachment receiving intelligence from a local source referencing the whereabouts of a medium-value target. The detachment, armed with that information, prepared and submitted a detailed operational concept of the operation for a time-sensitive, direct-action “take down” of the target. The FOB exercised standing policies and procedures for subsequent approval and execution of the mission.

In addition to major vignettes, “noise injects,” or lesser events, are submitted throughout the exercise to add value and realism. Noise injects also pose problems to solve, provide events to track, and force decisions or actions by the participating unit. Noise injects can include challenges such as improvised explosive devices, medical evacuations, rocket attacks, resupply requests, medical issues, requests for humanitarian aid or assistance, cross-border events, refugees, public affairs, persons under control and Law of Land Warfare issues.

The BCED team endeavors to provide all unit staff sections with an appropriate “workout” during the conduct of an exercise. As one commander recently commented, “The scenario created was thorough and exercised all sections of the staff, not just the OPCEN.”<sup>4</sup>

During the battle-staff exercise, digital connectivity is provided by a robust, state-of-the-art communications architecture that mirrors the range of software and equipment found in the theater. For a Fort Bragg-based unit, exercise facilities, such as workstations, servers, offices and staff centers in the ARSODTC, are configured to units’ specific needs, allowing operations-center, support-center and signal-center areas to be appropriately manned and exercised. A unit is limited only by its concept of the operation or its



▲ **MISSION CONTROL** The staff of the Battle Command Exercise Division provides realistic training for Special Forces commanders and staff prior to deployment through challenging battle-staff exercises. *U.S. Army photo.*

imagination, and subordinate units can participate from field or satellite CONUS locations.

Command and control for the exercise is maintained by a BCED “white cell” that injects events and manages the ebb and flow of the digital battlefield. Participating commanders have the flexibility to stop, start or redo training events, as desired. A participating unit’s commander is also briefed by the BCED team leader on each day’s upcoming events, enabling him to completely command and control events that support the training objectives. The unit commander remains the exercise director, having “carte blanche” for the conduct of the battle-staff exercise.

Today’s operational ARSOF units have more pre-mission training requirements than ever before. Commanders and their staffs are challenged to accomplish all needed training in the limited time allotted before deployments in support of the ongoing war on terror. The ARSOF battle staff, at all levels, should be part of pre-mission training so that its members can provide timely and accurate recommendations to the commander and

function as a single, cohesive team. The BCED at SWCS can be a worthwhile and important part of a deploying unit’s battle-staff train-up program. **SW**

## Notes:

<sup>1</sup> SWCS ARSODTC Battle Command Exercise Division Information Brief, PowerPoint slides, Matthew Dansbury, Fort Bragg, N.C., 14 July 2005, hereafter cited as Dansbury brief.

<sup>2</sup> Dansbury brief.

<sup>3</sup> E-mail to the author, Subject: FW: Army Special Operations Digital Training Center (ARSODTC), 28 November 2005.

<sup>4</sup> 20th Special Forces Group Memorandum for Commander, USAJFKSWCS, SUBJECT: Summary of ARSODTC BCED Support to 20th SFGA STAFFEX, 01-03 August 2005.

*Bob Seals is employed by General Dynamics as an analyst in the Battle Command Exercise Division of the Army Special Operations Digital Training Center. A retired Special Forces officer, he served with the 1st and 3rd SF groups, the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, the Security Assistance Training Management Office, and Special Operations Command-Korea.*



## Training transformation prepares PSYOP Soldiers for prominence on asymmetric battlespace

The transformation of the Psychological Operations training pipeline comes at a critical time in the evolution of the PSYOP force. The Quadrennial Defense Review calls for the PSYOP force to be increased by one-third. The active-duty force will increase by 1,132 billets, which will provide an additional five active-component PSYOP companies to the active PSYOP group, the 4th Psychological Operations Group. The reserve component will increase by 1,228 billets in order to add seven tactical PSYOP companies to each of the two reserve-component PSYOP groups.

The growth of the force is predicated on the pivotal role PSYOP Soldiers have played and continue to play in the Global War on Terrorism. In an interview in *Special Operations Technology* magazine, the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, General Bryan Brown, spoke of the critical role of PSYOP Soldiers in the ongoing conflict.

“Through its mission, ubiquitous presence and access to critical regions around the world, PSYOP uniquely supports USSOCOM’s leadership role in the GWOT,” said Brown. “PSYOP embodies the SOF characteristics of a mature, highly-trained, rapidly-deployable, linguistically-capable, culturally-attuned, regionally-oriented, and technologically-equipped force.

“These forces are playing a prominent role in supporting other SOF in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and the GWOT,” concluded Brown.

Recognizing not only the need to increase the number of PSYOP Soldiers in the field but also, and more importantly, the need to ensure that the Soldiers entering the field have the technical and warrior skills needed to navigate today’s asymmetric battlespace, the Soldiers of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, launched a comprehensive transformation of the PSYOP training pipeline. The changes in training went into effect in the fall of 2005, and they affected virtually every aspect of PSYOP training from advanced individual training, or AIT, to the PSYOP Officer Qualification Course.

### ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Sergeant First Class Michael Anderson, the former NCO in charge of the PSYOP AIT program during the transformation, believes two key changes to the program at Fort Bragg, N.C., make the program more realistic and relevant to ongoing operations around the world: the addition of survivability lanes and a convoy live-fire exercise.

“The transformation of the PSYOP training program has occurred over the past two years,” explained Anderson. “The additional training gives the students a taste — the flavor of combat that was lacking in the previous training.”

Anderson pointed out that the majority of students cycling through AIT are between the ages of 18 and 20, and that 60 to 70 percent of those Soldiers will be deployed downrange within six months of their graduation.

The survivability lanes focus more on mounted land navigation over long distances; reacting to ambushes, both blocked and unblocked, while mounted; and most important, reacting to improvised explosive devices, or IEDs.

“We are constantly trying to improve our training by implementing lessons-learned from the Global War on Terrorism,” said Anderson. “The addition of these lanes gives the students a more realistic perspective, because they are being called to move farther distances out instead of staying in the box at Camp Mackall.”


The addition of the lessons-learned is facilitated by the fact that the majority of the instructors have served multiple deployments in the GWOT. “Two of them had their loudspeakers shot off while they were broadcasting, and three or four of them found themselves under fire in very bad situations,” he added.

The new program expands the training range, forcing students to travel through high-traffic areas that are considered high-danger areas, leaving them open to possible ambush or IED attack. “This move out of the training area takes the students out of their comfort zone,” said Anderson. “It just adds a more realistic feel to the training.”

The PSYOP AIT program is the first AIT in the Army to successfully run a convoy live-fire exercise. “With this training we use the crawl, walk, run methodology,” Anderson explained. “We do four iterations of the training — the first is a walk-through, the second is dry-fire, then a blank-fire and finally a live-fire.”


He said that with each iteration, the students learn a little more and become more comfortable with firing from a moving vehicle. “It will help give them the mindset of the danger they will be facing when they deploy,” he noted.

Once students graduate from AIT, they are assigned either to a tactical PSYOP battalion or company or to a regional PSYOP battalion or company in the 4th Psychological Operations Group. Anderson said the time spent in the group allows Soldiers to build experience in all areas of PSYOP.



# PSYOP TRANSFORMED

Story by Janice Burton



That experience will prove beneficial as the Soldiers move through the PSYOP ranks. Because of a shortage of PSYOP officers, higher enlisted NCOs are frequently called on to fill roles usually reserved for captains and majors. “We are sending E7s when they ask for a captain or a major,” said Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Goldsmith, who spearheaded the PSYOP training transformation.

“They are serving at embassies and three-star joint headquarters. Those NCOs are being required to observe what the officers do and pick up and do it, because they know they won’t always have officers with them — they are going to have to do it themselves.”

That need for highly trained, seasoned PSYOP NCOs led to the creation of the Army’s first reclassification AIT. Also taught at Fort Bragg, the reclass AIT drew Soldiers of various backgrounds and skill sets. The first class, offered in September 2005, had 12 students; only 10 of them graduated. “In the past, if someone came to AIT as a reclass, they passed,” said Anderson. “But we are now holding these students to higher standards.”

Anderson said the standard for graduating from the program isn’t based solely on what a Soldier knows but also on how he reacts to situations and people. “That really helps define the true character of an individual,”

## PSYOP OFFICER QUALIFICATION COURSE

The PSYOP Officer Qualification Course, or POQC, much like the Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course, also received a complete overhaul. In the past, there were two courses for PSYOP officers. The reserve-component course consisted of a distance-learning phase and a two-week resident phase at Fort Bragg. Active-duty officers attended a five-week resident course. With the transformation, both active-duty and reserve-component officers attend a nine-week course.

A critical-task analysis led to the changes in the POQC. “The analysis determined that the course was insufficient in terms of providing the skills and knowledge that both active- and reserve-component officers now need to do their jobs as PSYOP officers in support of conventional and ARSOF units,” said Goldsmith. “The new nine-week course addresses these shortcomings.”

The changes in the qualification course were based on the development of 99 core tasks for PSYOP officers. Training developers used those tasks to build the new program of instruction.

“TRADOC (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command)

**“PSYOP embodies the SOF characteristics of a mature, highly-trained, rapidly-deployable, linguistically-capable, culturally-attuned, regionally-oriented, and technologically-equipped force.”**

he said. “Say for instance you put someone in a position of leadership and he decided to let the team carry him, or failed to make decisions — always defaulting to the team — that guy wouldn’t make it through the course.”

Much like the Special Forces Qualification Course and its culmination exercise, Robin Sage, the 11-week program incorporates a field-training exercise that requires the potential PSYOP NCOs to utilize all of the PSYOP tools and skill sets they have learned during the training. It is also set in the notional country of Pineland. The exercise is the first time the NCOs will have an opportunity to work side by side with the new PSYOP officers in a tactical and operational PSYOP exercise.

“Some of the Soldiers will be working with Civil Affairs teams to do surveys. This will give us an opportunity to see how they interact not only with their fellow Soldiers but with the residents of Pineland as well,” said Anderson. “Others will be given a PSYOP project that they will need to brainstorm, build overnight and deliver to a tactical PSYOP team the next morning. Some will have to brief an ambassador or a general. All of these scenarios are based on situations we have found ourselves in.”

Goldsmith explained that the Soldiers who are selected as PSYOP NCOs must be well-rounded and articulate, as well as having the ability to think for themselves. “It all goes back to personal qualities — the Soldiers we are looking for are adaptable, flexible and mature,” he added.

requires you to run a pilot program three times,” explained Goldsmith. “After each iteration, some tweaks are made to the POI (program of instruction). After our first course, we thought we were at about 90 percent. After the next course, we were pretty close, about 95 percent. Now, our training is on target.”

The new POQC is geared to meet the needs of the expanding PSYOP force and the expansion of the groups. “We are being tasked to provide PSYOP officers at the division and corps level in support of maneuver commanders,” said Goldsmith. “Those PSYOP officers must be able to show the combatant commanders and supported commanders at the tactical and operational levels that they can embrace the concept of effects-based operations as part of the military decision-making process. PSYOP is inherently effects-based, since the ultimate goal of any PSYOP activity is to change the behavior of the selected foreign target audience.”

The nine-week course is divided into key segments, with weeks 3, 4 and 5 allotted for core and general tasks — or the bread and butter of the PSYOP officer. These three weeks focus on key issues such as the legal aspects of PSYOP, the roles and functions of ambassadors and the need for projects to have measures of effectiveness.

When it comes to the legal aspects of PSYOP, all PSYOP Soldiers enrolled in training receive blocks of instruction. “We all know there are things that are out of bounds,” said Goldsmith. “We do not operate in a black hole where we

can do whatever we want. This training ensures that everyone stays in their lane.”

Goldsmith added that another key task is teaching of-ficers how to build quantifiable measures of effectiveness into PSYOP programs for the supported commander.

“This sounds hard, but conceptually, it’s not that difficult. This means that when officers or NCOs use the seven-step PSYOP process to develop PSYOP activities to change behavior they develop the PSYOP objectives and PSYOP supporting objectives with emphasis on being able to report back to the commander on the effects that our PSYOP program is having on the behavior of the target audiences selected,” said Goldsmith.

As an example, if the PSYOP objective is to increase the average person’s involvement in their government, and the supporting PSYOP objective is to increase the percentage of the voting-eligible population who votes in an upcoming election, then a well-crafted measure of effectiveness would be to count the number of people who vote and compare the number to voter turnout from previous elections.

The number of people who voted in an election is a measurable result that can be attributed, in part — but never wholly — to an active PSYOP program targeting people of voting age. These are the kinds of effects-based measures of effectiveness that are measurable, understandable and point to positive or negative trends in behavior modification. Furthermore, the optimal level of PSYOP support not only influences behavior in positive ways that support the government’s policies and objectives in a region — it also critically comments, from a psychological perspective, on all

activities that a supported commander is engaged in.

“If kicking someone’s door down to check for weapons is alienating the general populace, there may be a way to conduct the same search effectively without making new enemies or driving the populace into the enemy’s camp. The only truly effective way to isolate the enemy force is to isolate that force from all active and passive support,” continued Goldsmith. “Ultimately, this means that the sum total of the supported commander’s operations has a more positive psychological effect on the general populace than the enemy’s operations. If we are doing this right, at a minimum, no one wants to join or support the enemy. In the best-case scenario, the general populace actively participates in locating and destroying the enemy. As an

expert at looking at the problem from the target audience’s perspective, the PSYOP officer or NCO is obligated to advise the supported commander and his staff on the psychological effects of all operations because, ultimately, every activity has a psychological impact of some kind on a target audience somewhere.”

Basic PSYOP skills, such as product development and dissemination, are also taught during this block of instruction. During this time, the students will visit television and radio stations to view the development, production and marketing of media products.

Week 2 of the POQC focuses on leadership and negotiation skills. The officers study a range of subjects, from asymmetric warfare to terrorism to the art of persuasion. It is in this module that officers going through the POQC

take the ARSOF-unique Adaptive Thinking and Leadership training. ATL includes in-depth psychological assessments, classroom instruction, small-group practical exercises and virtual, computer-simulation exercises. The class is designed to build in each PSYOP officer an enhanced self-awareness, awareness of others, increased adaptability and negotiation and persuasion skills. This training is later tested in the Soldiers Urban Reaction Facility, or SURF, during the course’s FTX. The SURF, located at Camp Mackall, puts the officers in various scenarios that force them to react not only in a culturally appropriate manner but also in a manner that



*PSYOP products must be developed in a manner that allows the team to build quantifiable means of effectiveness. These products, distributed in Iraq, meet that goal.*

will build relationships with people in the village.

The culmination exercise is a key aspect of the training. As with the NCOs, it is during this exercise that the officers’ skills and knowledge are put to the test. The officers are placed in one stressful scenario after another and are forced to use the skills they have developed over the preceding weeks in adaptive thinking, negotiations and product development. Each officer is tested on all of the PSYOP tasks and is rated on a go/no-go basis for each task. If the officer does not meet the standard, he is dropped from the course.

The overhauled PSYOP training pipeline incorporates rigorous, realistic training as a means of ensuring that PSYOP Soldiers arrive on the battlefield with the technical and warrior skills they need to complete their mission, making them a force multiplier for the commanders on the ground. **SW**



**UNDERSTANDING  
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND  
U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES**



## By Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic

Unconventional warfare has been an integral part of the United States' national-security strategy in the post-World War II era, yet the topic remains shrouded in myth and misunderstanding. For more than 50 years, this valuable operational capability has remained hampered by unclear doctrine, a lack of common understanding and education, and interservice and interagency rivalry and bias.

The U.S. Army, and more specifically, Army Special Forces, uses the term "unconventional warfare," or UW, to denote a type of special operation — specifically, support to indigenous irregular forces, such as resistance forces or insurgents — in the conduct of operations against an occupying force or hostile government. The Army's most recent UW field manual states:

*"The intent of U.S. Unconventional Warfare operations is to exploit a hostile power's political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic goals."<sup>1</sup>*

Although the doctrine has reflected this same meaning since the 1950s, the topic has received little acknowledgment in conventional Army doctrine or formal military education.<sup>2</sup> Despite the remarkable contributions of UW operations to the opening phases of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army's newest operations field manual makes little mention of UW operations. It's not hard to understand why senior Army leaders might show a reluctance or an unwillingness to authorize or even entertain the concept of UW operations, with which they are completely unfamiliar.

The issue is further confused by the fact that the military and the civilian academic community often use the same term to convey two very different meanings. The civilian academic community commonly uses the term "unconventional warfare" to describe conflicts considered to be outside the realm of conventional or "maneuver" warfare, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. For that reason, the civilian academic community often uses UW synonymously with irregular warfare and asymmetric warfare.

A blending of the civilian and military versions has led to UW being unofficially defined as an operational environment or as a technique — "working with indigenous or foreign personnel." Cloaking UW in generalities only conceals the specific knowledge and skills required to effectively support insurgencies and resistance forces. Generalizations provide little assistance to military decision-makers: Operations are not developed and conducted because of a need to work in a given environment or to employ a specific technique — they are designed to achieve a desired effect.

Lastly, interservice and interagency rivalry has worked in direct opposition to the achievement of a common understanding. The CIA and Department of Defense have had a murky relationship over this topic for the last 50 years. While there have been several periods of intelligent debate, these normally ended in deadlock, with no achievement of clarity. The issues were usually resolved by reaching compromise solutions with ambiguous terminology that resolved nothing and put the issue off for future resolution.

This article is intended to provide military leaders and planners with a degree of clarity regarding UW as a special operation and to explain the requirements for UW's successful application. Ideally, this discussion will lead to an increased understanding and acceptance of UW as part of a spectrum of operational capabilities.

### Evolution of UW Capability and Doctrine

Despite the tremendous effectiveness of operations conducted to support resistance organizations during World War II, the U.S. disbanded the only organization with that capability, the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, soon after the war's end in 1945. Many OSS veterans, military and civilian, argued that this was premature in light of the emerging Cold War. In 1947, the CIA was created with a charter similar to that of the OSS. Individuals within DoD argued that in order to achieve the appropriate coordinated effect, support to guerrillas should be under the control of the military and not a civilian organization. A lack of general understanding of UW caused other portions of the military to question the utility of expending valuable resources on unconventional operations.

While the debate continued, the CIA was already conducting operations, supporting resistance movements in Latvia, Albania, Guatemala, Indonesia and Tibet. During these early operations, the CIA had significant difficulty adjusting the operational techniques applied successfully by the OSS in wartime to operations in communist countries during peacetime. Operations against sovereign governments, as compared to occupying armies, required new covert and clandestine techniques to conceal

direct U.S. involvement.<sup>3</sup> This requirement for concealment prohibited infiltration, exfiltration and resupply from military platforms and led to the development of "paramilitary" or "military like" capabilities organic to the CIA.

Hostile indigenous governments that have had the benefit of years of intimidation and indoctrination have a much greater degree of control over a population than do occupying armies. Assessments of resistance potential have to be based not only on the population's will to resist but also on the government's level of control over the population. Without some exploitable vulnerability in the government's control over the population, successful UW operations are highly unlikely. This proved to be the case with CIA attempts to establish agent networks in Latvia and Albania.<sup>4</sup>

Army and CIA efforts to support partisans during the Korean conflict produced mixed results, but they demonstrated the value of such operations, as well as the need for highly trained professionals with unique skills.<sup>5</sup> Many of the personnel assigned to the operations in Korea were chosen based on their instructor experience, which was a far cry from the selection of OSS operatives. DoD realized that UW operations were more complex than merely training and arming guerrillas and would require training in unique skill sets. In 1952, the Army formally established its first Special Forces unit, the 10th Special Forces Group.<sup>6</sup>

In a paper written in 1961, OSS veteran Franklin Lindsay stressed the critical need for advisers to resistance organizations being thoroughly trained in techniques for underground operations and guerrilla warfare.<sup>7</sup> His paper highlights the fundamental point that resistances or insurgencies: achieve their desired effects by applying

a combination of the tactics of armed conflict (guerrilla operations) and subversion (underground operations) appropriate to the specific conflict and environment.<sup>8</sup> A new term was needed to encompass the whole of the resistance movement's activities.

In 1961 the term "unconventional warfare" was officially introduced as part of U.S. military doctrine. The definition of the new term stated that UW consisted of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare,



**Rural Insurgencies**

**Urban Insurgencies**

The Symbiotic Relationship of Guerrilla Warfare and Subversion that makes the Strategy of Insurgency work in Specific Environments



**SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS** Despite the success of UW operations during Operation Enduring Freedom and the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some senior Army leaders remain reluctant to entertain the idea of UW because they are unfamiliar with it. *All photos courtesy Mark Grdovic.*

subversion, and escape and evasion.<sup>9</sup> Guerrilla warfare was the main activity of the guerrilla element, while subversion, sabotage and intelligence collection were the main activities of the underground. Auxiliary members would provide a variety of support functions.<sup>10</sup> DoD would use the term unconventional warfare, and the CIA would continue to use the term paramilitary activities to convey the same meaning while still delineating responsibility.<sup>11</sup>

The Army's interest in UW in 1961 was short-lived. Covert operations in Cuba by the CIA, commonly known as the Bay of Pigs incident, served to validate many Army leaders' opinions that UW operations did not deserve serious consideration or effort by the military. By 1962, the Cuba Study Group, which had been established to determine the cause of the failed operation, had transitioned to the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). The growing threat posed by the Soviet Union's pledge to support "just wars of liberation"<sup>12</sup> changed the priority within DoD from supporting allied insurgencies that were countering communist regimes to supporting allied nations that were countering insurgencies.

While this change propelled UW further into the shadows and further from the mainstream of the military, it simultaneously placed Army Special Forces at the forefront of President John F. Kennedy's plan to counter communist insurgencies worldwide. Counterinsurgency (which

later became foreign internal defense, or FID), was quickly added as a new mission for Special Forces, in addition to its primary mission of UW. The addition was based on the notion that the skills required for UW made SF Soldiers ideal counterinsurgent or counter guerrilla advisers. Training and advisory teams were sent to work with Third World forces in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and South America.

This change of doctrine and operational focus apparently caused a degree of confusion within the SF community. The first article in the first journal published by the newly formed Special Warfare Training Center at Fort Bragg, titled "Use the Right Word," made a point of distinguishing UW and COIN as two distinctly different operations. Similarly, the 1965 *Special Forces Operations* field manual attempted to resolve any confusion by making the following opening statement:

*"Broad Unconventional Warfare doctrine does not apply to counter insurgency situations. In unconventional warfare operations, the U.S.-sponsored guerrillas operate deep within enemy or enemy dominated territory and are the insurgents themselves. Their efforts are directed towards the delay and harassment of the enemy military force and are facilitated by inducing the local civilians to support the guerrilla effort. In counter insurgency operations, U.S.-sponsored forces are operating in a less restrictive operational environ-*



**HIGHLY DEVELOPED** UW efforts by the U.S. with the Northern Alliance and the Kurdish Peshmerga were successful in part because they inherited highly developed resistance organizations under favorable conditions.

*ment with their efforts directed toward prevention or countering the insurgents movements by winning the support of the population, thus denying the insurgents their support and by combat actions against the insurgent force. However selected UW tactics and techniques such as establishing intelligence nets and methods to gain the support of the population, and combat techniques such as raids and ambushes, may apply to counter insurgency.”<sup>13</sup>*

While personnel trained in UW have traditionally made excellent counterinsurgency advisers, it is important to understand that host-nation forces and insurgents employ different tactics, and that providing support to either group requires specific knowledge and skills. While those skills are highly complementary, it is an oversimplification to say that understanding the requirements and skills for supporting an insurgency automatically constitutes an understanding of the requirements and skills for countering an insurgency.

During the 1960s, SF personnel continued to gain valuable experiences in UW and counterinsurgency. SF personnel supported CIA operations to enable Laotian Hmong tribesmen to disrupt North Vietnam’s encroachment into northern Laos. This effort was highly classified and executed under the cover of other operations, known as project White Star, conducted to support the Laotian Army. At its height, the operation coordinated the efforts of 40,000 tribesmen to disrupt North Vietnamese efforts. Significant operational restrictions came as a result of Laos’s declaration of neutrality in 1962. Under the Geneva protocol, signed in 1962, Laos and North Vietnam agreed to remove foreign troops from Laos. While the U.S. removed almost all of the White Star advisers, it is estimated that only 40 of

the 10,000 North Vietnamese left Laos.<sup>14</sup>

In 1964, the Army created a joint SF organization under the cover Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, or MACV-SOG, to take control of CIA covert operations directed against North Vietnam. Previous efforts to establish agent networks had been unsuccessful, and the U.S. determined that the potential for developing resistance infrastructure was not present. The operational focus eventually changed to reconnaissance and interdiction operations along the Ho Chi Minh trail inside Laos and Cambodia, to coastal raids along the North Vietnamese coast and to propaganda and deception efforts within North Vietnam.<sup>15</sup>

The majority of other SF operations in Vietnam were advisory efforts with the South Vietnamese Army or the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, or CIDG. While these efforts were hugely successful, they did not constitute UW but rather sound counterinsurgency practices. Eventually, SF developed indigenous strike forces called mobile guerrilla forces. These unique elements were composed of ethnic Asian irregulars or mercenaries led by Americans. While they fought like guerrillas, by definition they were not guerrillas but rather an irregular strike force:

*“In truth, the mobile guerrilla forces can be more likened to World War II long range penetration units such as Merrill’s Marauders or Wingate’s Chindits. This is not to say that the mobile guerrilla forces did not perform useful or heroic missions. They did, but not as guerrillas.”<sup>16</sup>*

The historical example of the Mike Forces and the CIDG forces demonstrates an important distinction between FID and UW. FID consists of operations conducted in support of the allied government. This can include advisory assistance to regular military and police or irregular para-military and militia forces. It is a misconception to think of operations as UW or FID based on whether the force receiving the support is an irregular or regular force. Developing and employing irregular forces, like those of the CIDG forces of Vietnam, is a common technique in FID especially in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

It is equally inappropriate to distinguish FID and UW based on whether the operations are in support of host nation or US objectives. One of the fundamental criteria for US support to host nation forces during the conduct of FID is that the operational capability developed from the support achieves US objectives.<sup>17</sup> By definition FID and UW operations must both support US objectives.

Following the withdrawal from Vietnam, the Army quickly became uninterested in UW and counterinsurgency. It was not until the Reagan presidency that UW was revitalized as part of U.S. military and political strategy for countering communist regimes around the world. The

covert campaigns in Nicaragua and Afghanistan during the 1980s remain two of the largest covert efforts ever conducted by the U.S. They continue to be regarded as small oddities in U.S. military history, even though they were the most significant engagements in each of their theaters. Both campaigns offer significant lessons for the employment of UW that have gone relatively undocumented by the U.S. military.

Perhaps the most significant lesson of the support to the Contras was that a resistance movement cannot be manufactured if the potential does not already exist.

*“The Resistance’s lack of authenticity as an indigenous insurgency and the Contras’ extreme dependence on US support were deprecated even by participants who otherwise generally favored active US support to anti-communist insurgencies. The resistance has always been structured (inappropriately) as a force with short-term, purely military objectives.”<sup>18</sup>*

Trying to pass off artificially raised mercenaries as freedom fighters in an area in which they do not have favor

possible opportunity for supporting the Kuwaiti resistance. For a variety of reasons, some of which remain classified, the U.S. decided not to conduct operations to support the resistance. The decision may have been due in part to the belief that the coalition invasion would ultimately succeed without the need to accept the risk associated with supporting a UW operation or that conditions (time, terrain and force potential) did not indicate the feasibility of UW operations.

During the decade following the Gulf War, conflicts such as Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo contributed to a marginalization of the Army’s UW doctrine because of a prevailing belief that the U.S. would not face a peer competitor in the future. During this period of great military uncertainty, all things “strange” became synonymous with “unconventional,” leading to demining training and liaison duties with coalition partners being incorrectly portrayed as “contemporary UW.”

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, what had previously been considered by some within the DoD as archaic

**“It’s not hard to understand why senior Army leaders might show a reluctance or an unwillingness to authorize or even entertain the concept of UW operations, with which they are completely unfamiliar.”**

with the locals will ultimately fail. Reminiscent of previous efforts, it was also noted that advisers lacked a fundamental understanding of the strategy of insurgency and the appropriate tactics required by their counterparts. According to a 1990 RAND study commissioned by the Pentagon:

*“The U.S. effort to assist the Contras in Nicaragua was obviously handicapped by a lack of expertise on how to effectively organize and prosecute an insurgency. The United States erred particularly in structuring the Contras as a conventional raiding force that depended heavily on outside resupply.”<sup>19</sup>*

At relatively the same time as the operations to support the Contras in Nicaragua, the U.S. engaged in a covert operation to support various resistance groups in Afghanistan. While the covert Afghanistan campaign achieved significant success in terms of damage to the Soviet Union, it also assisted in creating a generation of trained Islamic fundamentalist militants. The effort serves as an example of the dangers associated with focusing on short-term objectives without considering long-term implications<sup>20</sup> and of not remaining engaged during the transition to normalcy after arming thousands of fighters.

In 1990, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq presented a

and irrelevant capabilities for modern conflicts suddenly became the most viable military option. This opportunity did not arise as a result of a common understanding of the capabilities of SF and a comparison with other options — all other options had simply proven insufficient.

The UW efforts during the opening stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and of Operation Iraqi Freedom were unprecedented in U.S. military history. The efforts with the Northern Alliance and Kurdish Peshmerga were overwhelmingly successful; however, the U.S. was fortunate to inherit highly developed resistance organizations under relatively favorable conditions. This allowed the time normally required to develop an operational capability to be significantly compressed from months to weeks. The operational requirements and the achievements of these UW efforts remain relatively unknown to most military leaders.

Unfortunately for many Army leaders, their only exposure to UW has been with the controversial injection of Northern Alliance forces as conventional infantry into Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002 or the unsuccessful efforts to support the Shia resistance or Free Iraq Forces in southern Iraq in 2003. Regrettably, there has been little or no analysis that would outline the factors that

produced the less-than-optimal performance.

As the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have transitioned from attacks against foreign nations to operations in support of newly established allied nations, the U.S. finds itself in a situation reminiscent of the one it faced in 1961, as the imminent need to relearn counterinsurgency operations overshadows the need to understand how to conduct UW.<sup>21</sup> DoD, in particular the U.S. Special Operations Command, is faced with an opportunity for addressing and clarifying UW and improving the overall capability within the force. This will require professional military education, deliberate exchange and dialogue regarding the Army and UW, and distribution of the analysis of recent efforts in order to teach lessons and improve capabilities.

**Understanding UW as a special operation**

The following is intended to provide an introduction for professionals interested in understanding UW as a special operation. UW is a broad spectrum of activities conducted by the U.S. government to support insurgencies conducting operations to disrupt or defeat a hostile government or an occupying power in accordance with U.S. strategic goals (author’s definition). This definition of UW specifically equates to developing and advising guerrilla units and developing and coordinating undergrounds.

The U.S. may conduct UW operations in two ways:

The first way is to support a resistance movement or insurgency during a major theater war or regional contingency that will eventually involve U.S. military forces directly. The purpose of this type of UW is normally to facilitate the eventual introduction of conventional invasion forces or to divert enemy resources from other areas of the battlefield.

In this case, operations focus more on the short-term, military aspects of the conflict. UW operations will normally be conducted to achieve a general effect against enemy forces, such as disruption, but they will be coordinated for a specific time in relation to the conventional invasion forces. Because of the operational security associated with the invasion plans, the specific time for the commencement of overt resistance operations is normally kept compartmentalized. Planning efforts are synchronized in relation to a common key event, with time to be specified at a later date, such as “D-day, H hour.”

Synchronizing operations to achieve a specific effect, at an unspecified time to be identified later, presents a tremendous challenge. It is critical that U.S. forces maintain reasonable compartmentalization of information in planning while receiving clear guidance of what effects need to be achieved. It is equally critical that operational units be afforded enough time in country to develop a working relationship with their indigenous counterparts; to develop

**The U.S. may conduct UW in two ways**

**As support to a resistance movement or insurgency during a major theater war or regional contingency that will eventually directly involve U.S. military forces.**

**Examples of this type of UW by the U.S. include:**

- The Office of Strategic Services in the European and Pacific theaters (1942-45)
- The Philippines (1941-1944)
- North Korea (1951-53)
- Cold-War contingency plans for Eastern Europe and Scandinavia (1952-1989)
- Afghanistan/OEF (2001-2002)
- Northern and Southern Iraq/OIF (2002-2003)

**As support to an insurgency or resistance movement in which direct involvement by U.S. conventional units is not anticipated.**

**Examples of this type of UW by the U.S. include:**

- Guatemala (1950)
- Albania (1950)
- The Baltic States (1950-1951)
- Tibet (1950-1958)
- Indonesia (1958-59)
- Cuba (1960-61)
- Laos (1960-1975)
- North Vietnam (1961-64)
- Angola (1970)
- Afghanistan (1980-1988)
- Nicaragua (1980-1989)
- Iraq (1991-1996)

supporting infrastructure and guerrilla-force capabilities; and to determine which targets are appropriate for achieving the desired effects.

These operations may include uprisings or coordinated attacks across a broad area that focus on disrupting command and control; on seizing key checkpoints, such as bridges or portions of urban areas; on harassing and disrupting lines of communication; on supporting deception; and on providing vital intelligence to advancing conventional forces. Without careful consideration and close coordination, seemingly successful aggressive guerrilla operations could inadvertently draw enemy combat forces toward a future axis of allied advance or raise the enemy alert posture prior to a conventional invasion, causing an overall loss of surprise.

The amount of time required to mobilize and launch resistance forces and the amount of advance notification acceptable to the conventional-force headquarters needs to be understood during planning. This will significantly affect the way the resistance capability is developed. Resistance forces need to communicate through signals and code-words and across compartmentalized networks. Guerrillas need to assemble forces, recover caches and move to target areas. If resistance forces rise up too early, they are likely to be destroyed by enemy forces, and if they rise up too late, they are likely to be of little value.<sup>22</sup> Once notification

### **Typical critical information/assumption during an initial feasibility assessment**

- Are there groups who could be developed into a viable force?
- Are we in contact with or can we make contact with individuals representing the resistance potential in an area?
- Are there capable leaders, with goals compatible with the U.S. goals, who are willing to cooperate with the U.S.?
- Can the leaders be influenced to remain compliant with U.S. goals?
- Are their tactics and battlefield conduct acceptable by the Law of Land Warfare and acceptable to the U.S. population?
- Will the environment (geography and demographics) support resistance operations?
- Does the enemy have effective control over the population?
- Is the potential gain worth the potential risk? Is this group's participation politically acceptable to other regional allies?

to execute offensive operations has been given, resistance forces can assume a greater degree of risk, as compared to a protracted insurgency, based on the expectation of link-up with allied conventional forces.

The second way of conducting UW is to support an insurgency or resistance movement in which direct involvement by U.S. conventional units is not anticipated. The purpose of this type of operation is usually to apply pressure against a regional adversary of the U.S.

These operations take place in the absence of overt hostilities between the adversary and the U.S. They take on a long-term, strategic aspect, with an emphasis on combined political and military objectives. Operational headquarters should anticipate close scrutiny from the highest levels of the U.S. government to ensure that the UW effort remains within the parameters of the campaign objectives and operating directives.<sup>23</sup>

Offensive actions of this type of UW are executed in a slightly different manner from those associated with operations in support of an invasion. Operations need to be sustained over a prolonged period rather than during a short, intense campaign. Greater consideration must be given to ensuring long-term survivability of the resistance infrastructure. The resistance force needs to operate within its environment and its local supporting infrastructure. If the resistance conducts operations beyond the boundaries of the environment, it will allow the enemy to conduct decisive counterinsurgency or counter-underground operations.

Special efforts may also be applied to conceal or reduce the U.S. signature associated with the support. Direct involvement by U.S. personnel will likely be strictly limited in order to maintain deniability and to mitigate the risks of escalation to an international incident. Initial training efforts may focus on developing an indigenous cadre, possibly trained within the U.S. or in a neighboring country. Indigenous operational personnel would then be reinserted into the area of interest to execute further training of individuals and to develop resistance infrastructure.<sup>24</sup>

### **Prerequisite conditions for success**

Planners need to be aware of the prerequisite conditions for developing the UW potential. Planning must remain limited until certain assumptions have been confirmed as valid. If operations proceed without a proper assessment of feasibility, the likelihood of unintended consequences is high.

Operational personnel must have clear campaign objectives, a desired end state and knowledge of exactly what level of support is available and acceptable. Without these specifics, feasibility assessments and negotiations with potential resistance forces are futile. Historically, a com-

mon shortcoming in UW planning has been the failure to address the desired end state for the environment, including the post-conflict disposition of allied resistance or insurgent forces.

During assessment, if conditions prove to be unfavorable, planners should determine whether there are measures that could make the situation favorable. For example, can a potential resistance group be persuaded to cease unacceptable tactics or behavior? Can a coalition ally be persuaded to accept a specific resistance group's participation under certain conditions? Can the enemy's control over the population be degraded? Can the population's will to resist be bolstered?

The last question planners need to ask is: What can actually be achieved, given the constraint of time? Operational detachments need time to organize with their new counterparts, to develop a working relationship in terms of trust and credibility, and to build up the guerrilla capability and supporting infrastructure while remaining relatively undetected by the enemy. These objectives take considerable time to achieve in friendly territory, operating with U.S. units. For forces working within enemy territory, dealing with unfamiliar units and coordinating operations across a wide, decentralized front, the time requirement is much greater.

Planners and commanders need to appreciate the relationship between risk and capability. The resistance capability developed is in some ways directly proportional to the amount of time available to operational detachments on the ground. If the risk associated with inserting operational detachments is considered to be unacceptable until the night prior to an invasion, the desired operational capabilities will likely not be in place for several months. This was a common problem among OSS teams dropped into Belgium and Holland during World War II. Many were dropped simultaneously with the conventional paratroopers and subsequently provided very little assistance. In 2003, the Special Forces efforts to support the Shiites in Southern Iraq faced similar problems.

## Resistance forces

Special Forces can enable resistance forces in many ways. They can provide training and logistics, help organize guerrilla elements or undergrounds and give operational advice. If Special Forces personnel are able to develop a favorable working relationship, and thereby a degree of influence with their counterparts, this offers the best chance for synchronized operations, unity of effort and long-term stability after the conflict ends. For this reason, the importance of developing relationships and accurately assessing resistance group's intentions

and capabilities cannot be overstated.

Conventional commanders should not think of resistance forces in terms of numbers but rather in terms of capability. A 300-man guerrilla band does not equate to a battalion. It could mean 20 separate 15-man elements attacking 20 targets across a 200-mile area. Guerrillas overcome most of their shortcomings through familiarity with the region, the advantage of favorable terrain and the support or protection from the local population. If guerrillas are removed from the area where these advantages reside, the logical results are to be expected. Utilization of Northern Alliance guerrillas in support of conventional operations in Southern Afghanistan has received much criticism for this exact reason.<sup>25</sup>

The support provided by Special Forces will undoubtedly change the balance of power in a region. It is critical that U.S. support, in terms of equipment and advisers, finds its way to the right groups and is not distributed lightly. During OIF, in addition to supplies provided directly to the guerrillas, Special Forces personnel employed numerous pieces of specialized equipment that created a considerable advantage, such as man-portable unmanned aerial vehicles, antitank weapons, sniper systems, ground-to-air missiles, mortars, man-portable minefield-breaching equipment, radios and close air support.

U.S. close air support is such a disproportionate advantage that it allows most guerrilla units to achieve a degree of parity with their enemies. It can be tempting to see them as substitute infantry that can replace U.S. forces or to relegate them to providing security for U.S. close-air-support teams. Either would negate a tremendous amount of the inherent capability of the guerrillas and the underground. Close air support is available only during a narrow portion of unconventional warfare. For the times when close air support is not available, guerrilla warfare remains a critical skill. The psychological impact of guerrilla forces, particularly against conscripts, cannot be overstated.

## The way ahead

Some might argue that the author's perspective of UW is too narrow and reflects the traditional view. While a more narrow definition might appear to make UW unsuitable to many of the operational needs of the current war against terror, it should be noted that UW is only one of the missions with which Special Forces is chartered — the others include foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, direct action and special reconnaissance — in order to provide a full spectrum of special-operations capabilities. A more accurate definition of UW would be specific and unambiguous.<sup>26</sup>

In 1983, then-Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh



**RESISTANCE FORCES** Guerrilla forces overcome their shortcomings through their familiarity with the region, the advantage of favorable terrain and the support or protection of the local population.

stated, “*Doctrine is the cornerstone upon which a special operations capability can be erected ... our failure ... to develop doctrine has prevented special operations in the Army from gaining permanence and acceptability within the ranks of the military.*”<sup>27</sup> Without a clear doctrine and commonly accepted understanding of what constitutes UW as it refers to special operations, the chances for successful future UW operations remain significantly degraded, and the likelihood of missed opportunities or inappropriate employment will remain high. By clearly defining Special Forces’ “operations” by what they can achieve rather than by the techniques they would employ; we would ensure that skill sets and capabilities within the force adapt as needed to remain relevant to the task at hand and that military leaders would have a common understanding enabling conceptual planning and decision-making that would achieve better operational employment. **SW**

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Army, FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, 2003, Para 1-1, 1-1.

<sup>2</sup> A review of the 1951, 1958, 1961, 1965, 1974 and 1977 Army Special Forces field

manuals (classified and unclassified) articulates a single operation or activity — operations to enable a resistance movement or insurgency in support of U.S. objectives.

<sup>3</sup> The terms covert and clandestine should not be confused with meaning secret. Operations can be secret without being covert or clandestine. Those terms refer more to concealment and deniability: Covert to the concealment of the sponsor of an act, and clandestine to the concealment of the act itself, even after it has occurred.

<sup>4</sup> John Prados, *Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1986).

<sup>5</sup> The skills required were different from those associated with normal infantry skills. Operational personnel would need knowledge of communications in austere environments, foreign weapons, medical skills, demolitions (to include improvised munitions), language and cultural skills, infiltration and exfiltration techniques, environmental skills for jungle, desert or mountain terrain, intelligence-collection and analysis skills, and planning (or operations) techniques. Personnel would also need to operate effectively in the absence of a proximity to the chain of command ... simply put, to operate in a decentralized manner based on guidance and intent rather than on regimented and detailed plans.

<sup>6</sup> Although the 10th Special Forces Group did deploy personnel to Korea, its Soldiers were not utilized as operational detachments, as conceptually intended, but rather as individual replacements.

<sup>7</sup> Franklin Lindsay, *Basic Doctrine for the Conduct of Unconventional Warfare*, JFK Library, Boston Mass., April 4, 1961. Similar sentiments were

expressed by Colonel Aaron Bank, an OSS veteran and the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group in his book *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986).

<sup>8</sup> Conducting underground operations should not be confused with developing intelligence networks. While undergrounds do develop and operate intelligence networks, the development of an intelligence network does not constitute underground operations or unconventional warfare. Underground operations are conducted against the constituted power. Developing a network is a technique applicable to numerous types of special operations.

<sup>9</sup> Escape and evasion referred to developing networks for assisting or recovering downed airmen, a task normally carried out by the underground and auxiliaries but sometimes by guerrilla forces. While this was a skill set that was a high priority to the Air Force, it is merely a task rather than a separate component of UW. While still a viable requirement, it is not nearly as important on the modern battlefield as it was during World War II, when thousands of aircrew personnel or escaped prisoners of war were recovered.

<sup>10</sup> It is worth noting that DoD's definition of insurgency mirrors this concept of UW by stating that an insurgency is as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The term resistance should be taken to portray relatively the same meaning as insurgency. The term resistance is more traditionally used to describe groups rising up against occupying armies, whereas insurgency is more commonly used to denote elements rising up against a hostile government.

<sup>11</sup> Memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the Army on the Delineation of Responsibilities. JFK Library, Boston, April 11, 1961.

<sup>12</sup> Nikita Khrushchev, January, 1961.

<sup>13</sup> FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, 1965, 180.

<sup>14</sup> Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years, A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), 91.

<sup>15</sup> Author's note: It was the North Vietnamese response to a covert coastal raid at the Gulf of Tonkin that served as the catalyst for expansion of the war effort under the guise of North Vietnamese aggression.

<sup>16</sup> Alfred H. Paddock Jr., *US Army Special Warfare. Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982), 159.

<sup>17</sup> JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, outlines three criteria for a host nation to receive U.S. support: that providing support is in the U.S. national security interest; that the host nation can make effective use of the support; and that the host nation requests the support.

<sup>18</sup> David Ronfelt and Brian Jenkins, *The Nicaraguan Resistance and U.S. Policy*. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1987), 8.

<sup>19</sup> Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Army's Role in Counter Insurgency and Insurgency*, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1989), 36.

<sup>20</sup> At the onset of the Afghan operations there was debate whether extremist religious groups should receive support along with purely ethnic anti-communist groups, such as the predominantly Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance. In Afghanistan, seven different groups received varying degrees of support from the U.S. as well as several other countries.

<sup>21</sup> This overshadowing is evident as emerging doctrine attempts to include UW as part of the new topic of irregular warfare, which includes all counterinsurgency operations, information operations, peacekeeping and stability operations but predominately focuses on counterinsurgency operations.

<sup>22</sup> In Northern Iraq, Special Forces detachments were expecting 24-48 hours notice of the start of the ground assault in order to implement supporting plans; however, this was negated by the surprise "shock and awe" start of the ground assault. Several pockets of Kurdish resistance misinterpreted this, as well as the toppling of the Saddam statue in Baghdad, as the signal to launch uprisings and seize key targets. Iraq Army elements wiped out many of these forces long before allied forces could arrive.

<sup>23</sup> If the executing task force does not have direct contact with the highest level of decision-making authority, the effort is likely to become unresponsive to operational requirements and subordinate units. It will also be highly reactive to constant changes in guidance as political landscapes shift and guidance is translated and interpreted and subsequently retranslated through various levels of command. These were key factors that hampered planning and operations in the case of the anti-Castro operations during the 1960s and support to the Contras during the 1980s.

<sup>24</sup> In 1958, Tibetan guerrillas were trained at Fort Carson and Camp Hale, Colo., before being returned by parachute insertion into Tibet.

<sup>25</sup> Similar criticism can be made regarding the Free Iraq Forces in the final days of the invasion into Iraq in 2003. The FIF was a manufactured force for public appearances to present an Iraqi, rather than a Kurdish, face on the resistance. The 500 FIF soldiers, who contributed almost no operational value to the campaign to remove Saddam Hussein, received more acknowledgment from the U.S. Central Command than the 60,000 Kurdish peshmerga who held the northern front.

<sup>26</sup> Theoretically, the development of any irregular capability for operational purposes within an allied or neutral nation (potentially without the host nation's knowledge) in order to achieve unilateral U.S. objectives (as a surrogate of the U.S.) would more accurately be categorized as covert direct action or counterterrorism rather than as unconventional warfare. An example of this type of operation was the covert raids planned by the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center in 1998, using Afghans as surrogates to capture Osama bin Laden, as detailed in the *9/11 Commission Report or Ghost Wars*, written by Steve Coll in 2004.

<sup>27</sup> Thomas K. Adams, *U. S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 13.

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# Branch Out

## New Branches Recognize Importance of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations

By Majors Sean Donnelly and Kent Hinchcliff

The Department of the Army has directed the creation of branches for Civil Affairs, or CA, and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP. Both branches are scheduled to stand up Oct. 16, 2006. The new branches will eliminate the CA and PSYOP functional areas in the active Army and the PSYOP functional area in the Army Reserve.

The demands of the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, continue to increase the demand for CA- and PSYOP-unique skills. The new branches will give the Army a better way of managing those critical skills and give CA and PSYOP officers better career potential, more rewarding assignments and greater recognition for their expertise.

The formation of the CA and PSYOP branches recognizes the importance of the two career fields, particularly as they support national objectives in the "long war." Soldiers in both fields have made historic contributions to countless military operations, and their presence and performance can be seen in current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Their operations and their skills are integral components of U.S. efforts to eliminate instability through military operations in the GWOT.

An extensive review and transformation of the training for CA and PSYOP officers in the active and reserve components was a key element of the implementation of the new branches. Career-development plans for the officers in both branches reflect changing requirements in CA and PSYOP operations and in support to other military units. The expansion of the roles of

CA and PSYOP officers underlines the importance of having specific branches that will train and develop their technical proficiency, regional expertise, language abilities, negotiation and mediation skills, and talents in analysis and assessment.

The Army conducted a thorough analysis to ensure the relevance of the two new branches and to identify their needs for the future. Two areas that received great scrutiny were training qualification and force structure. To meet the objectives of transformation, it is imperative that the CA and PSYOP forces have a comprehensive force structure that is operationally relevant. The credibility and legitimacy of both branches will depend heavily upon their having a corps of officers and enlisted Soldiers who have the knowledge, competency and skill necessary to satisfy operational requirements and to deliver their expertise anywhere and any time.

Career development for the CA and PSYOP branches will be similar to that of other maneuver-fires-and-effects branches. Initial training will be extensive, and all active-Army CA and PSYOP officers will be required to remain airborne-qualified throughout their careers. Like the Special Forces Branch, the CA and PSYOP branches will not offer their own Captains Career Course, or CCC. Every CA and PSYOP officer will attend another branch's CCC upon selection by a consolidated ARSOF board. After they complete CCC, CA and PSYOP officers will attend either the Civil Affairs Qualification Course or Psychological Operations Qualification Course and serve an operational assignment.

The CA and PSYOP training pipelines have been revitalized to ensure that officers acquire the skills and levels of competency they will need for promotion, successful job performance and adherence to the standards of their grade. Skills previously trained only in the active-Army CA and PSYOP training pipelines will now be taught to Army Reserve Soldiers, as well.

The transformation from functional areas to the pyramid structures of viable branches will take into account the Army's requirements for modularity by including CA and PSYOP presence in the organization and structures of conventional task forces. Developers of the new branches have coordinated with force developers in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command during recent force-design updates. Inevitably, establishment of the branches will allow the CA and PSYOP communities to provide a critical capability to Army, joint and combined forces operating in the future. The parity of training and education between active and reserve components will ensure nearly identical capabilities in both, making possible seamless transitions between forces, promoting professionalism in the two career fields, and helping the Army to meet its manpower requirements for the long war. **SW**

*The authors wish to acknowledge their use of information from then-Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Boyd's article, "CA and PSYOP: Major Changes in Personnel, Training Upcoming for Officers, NCOs," published in the July 2005 issue of Special Warfare.*

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# HARD AS NAIL



## Retired Sergeant Major Richmond Nail's SERE career spans three decades

Story by Janice Burton

Richmond Nail may have a hard time figuring out how not to be in the Army. Nail, an Arkansas native, joined the Army when he was 18. In June, Nail, now 71 years old, retired as an instructor at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE, school after more than 53 years in service to the United States.

"Anyone who has spent time in the SERE course, on the SERE committee or at Camp Mackall knows a Richmond Nail story," said Major Brian Hankinson, the former SERE commander, now the S3 of 5th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Hankinson is the first to admit that some of the stories have grown because of embellishment over the years, but they are rooted in fact and reflect the exploits of a man Hankinson calls a "true American hero."

Nail doesn't use words like that to describe himself. Instead, he prefers to talk about others, or as was the case during a recent visit to the Green Beret Club, let others talk for him. "He's a legend," said one of his retired Special Forces friends. "Everybody knows Richmond. He helped start the SERE school."

And that is a fact. In 1982, Nail was one of a handful of people selected by Lieutenant Colonel Nick Rowe to help stand up the SERE school. The decision by Rowe was only logical: Nail had spent seven years at the Special Warfare Center as the Phase I

instructor of the Special Forces Basic Enlisted Division, where he personally wrote every lesson plan, set up a jungle-training lane and wrote the RECONDO course.

In 1982, when Rowe was preparing to start the school, Nail was a team sergeant with the 5th Special Forces Group. "I got a call from Rowe, and he said, 'I want you to come to work for me.' I only had 18 months left, but I went to work for him, and I made sergeant major," said Nail.

During that time, Nail took the lesson plans from his first SWCS job and tailored them for the new school Rowe was creating. Nail honed in on the survival aspect of the SERE training, creating lesson plans that zeroed in on poisonous plants, ropes and knots, infiltration and extraction techniques. He also set up some landmark obstacles at Camp Mackall and helped implement some of the hallmarks of the course — barriers, wires, a slide for life and the implementation of an aggressor force.

As his time in the Army came to a close in 1984, Nail prepared his family for a move to Houston, Texas — but that didn't happen. He dropped by Camp Mackall to say his farewells to friends and encountered Rowe. "At that time, I had basically been an instructor at SERE for about five years," he recalled. "I had a job waiting for me in Houston, but while I was visiting out at Camp Mackall, I went by to see Colonel Rowe, and he said, 'Why don't you come work for me (as a civilian)?' I

thought about it and I did it, and now, 22 years later, I'm retiring."

After having spent almost what most people consider a career at SERE, Nail still loves it. "I'm going to miss seeing these young students who come straight off the streets into SF," he said. "They are really doing a super job. I've always encouraged the guys to try and do a good job. I try to encourage them to have a sense of urgency and maturity — that will get you a long way. I tell them they have got to be motivated."

And while Nail only taught those things at SERE school, he lived them during his own Army career. He received his first Bronze Star Medal with a V device when he was 31; the second when he was 54 for actions that had occurred more than a decade earlier.

In 1966, Nail was serving in the 101st Airborne Division's Artillery. The division was conducting combat operations in Vietnam, and Nail was the acting artillery NCO. When his battery came under heavy fire, Nail exercised the maturity and urgency that he strove to instill in his students. Nail's battery was attacked by an overwhelming Viet Cong force. According to his award citation, "Nail fearlessly exposed himself to heavy enemy fire and grenades in order to place direct howitzer fire on the enemy. He acted with calm courage when he personally dove on an enemy grenade which had landed between two of his men and threw it from the parapet before it could explode."

If that wasn't enough, Nail, realizing his men were running low on ammunition, braved enemy fire again to reach the ammunition bunker to resupply his troops, killing three Viet Cong soldiers along the way. Nail doesn't necessarily see his actions as heroic; instead, he sees them as simply getting the job done.

Ask him about heroes, and he'll tell you about the men he served with in the 82nd Airborne Division when he was a young private. "After World War II, that's where you would find a bunch of heroes," he said. "The 82nd is where you would find all the guys who fought in combat in the war."

It was there he met the man who became his mentor. "Sergeant Major Frank Creed was just a corporal in the 82nd then," he said. "But he was my squad leader, and he encouraged me a lot."

That encouragement is what drove Nail to join the ranks of the elite Soldiers in Special Forces. "I worked with Special Forces a lot in Germany and in Vietnam," he said, and following his year in combat in Vietnam, he went through the SF training in 1967, knowing that would ensure a ticket back to Vietnam.

After completing SF training, Nail returned to Vietnam in 1969. He was a member of MIKE Force Team B55. On March 17, 1969, Nail's team was working with 200 Montagnard tribesmen in the hills of central Vietnam when they came under fire. Realizing the team needed help, Nail, then a sergeant first class, volunteered to go for help, even though the odds were against him. "Ignoring the danger, he immediately began moving through the hail of machine-gun and sniper fire until he was seriously wounded and unable to move further. Despite being in severe pain, he continued to encourage his comrades until they eventually were able to reach safety," reads the second citation for the Bronze Star Medal, which was presented to Nail 20 years after the fact.

Nail's wounds were, according to the U.S. Army, enough to take him out of the game. But he wasn't prepared to go. After a lengthy recovery at Walter Reed Army Hospital, Nail was told that he was going to receive a medical discharge, something he fought — even though he had lost an eye and a kidney. "They gave me a PT

test, and I passed it," he recalled. "So they sent me out to Camp Mackall because they needed instructors. There were a lot of people coming through because of the war, and a lot of the people running the camp were wounded in Vietnam."

He stayed on as an instructor until 1975, when he went to 5th Group as a team sergeant. "We went everywhere and did everything from skiing to mountain climbing to water training," he recalled. "That's where I first met Colonel Rowe. He was a lieutenant in the group."


Nail speaks fondly of Rowe and his drive to start the school. "He went to the Department of the Army and convinced them they needed the SERE school," he said. "It was initially supposed to be run by A-teams, but they wouldn't buy it. So the first classes were taught by instructors from the 82nd Airborne Division. But Rowe was determined, and he went around hiring instructors. The first person he hired was Sergeant Major Howard Allen — I was the second or third guy he hired, and we put SERE together."

Nail said that from the first iteration, the course has only gotten better. "If Colonel Rowe were alive, he would be super proud of the SERE school today."

Nail is just as proud of the school and his legacy there. "I'm going to miss the students and teaching them," he said. "It's something I've always loved doing — but it was time to go."

For the cadre left behind at the SERE school, Nail's presence is going to be missed. "Up until the late '90s, students in the SERE school frequently saw Richmond negotiating the treacherous barriers, egging the timid students around, over, under and through the obstacles," said Hankinson. "He was leading and intimidating them on to mission accomplishment, and he was in his 60s. The warrior spirit has not faded over the years." **SW**

*All photos courtesy Richmond Nail.*



The mission of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, is to recruit, train and educate U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers, and to provide training in advanced skills as required. SWCS supports Army special-operations forces' ability to conduct operations worldwide, across the U.S. Special Operation Command's core functions, by providing superior training, relevant doctrine, effective career- management policy and the highest quality Soldiers to man the Army's premier special-operations fighting forces.

The way we assess, select and train our Soldiers is key to our success in meeting our mission statement. The NCO is key in this process. NCOs are the most important asset we have at SWCS; they are professional, dedicated and capable — more important than hardware. It is important to note that 98 percent of our NCOs have recent combat experience, most with multiple tours. Generally speaking, our NCOs are assigned here for three years. Some leave sooner, as they are promoted and move to operational assignments, but only for truly exceptional reasons do they stay longer. The enemy is always adopting different and new tactics, and as the enemy changes, so will our training. SWCS is committed to continually updating tasks and

reviewing lessons learned that are critical in helping our Soldiers survive and win in a combat situation. Having a healthy rotation of top-quality NCOs is necessary for the school to stay relevant in the current fight.

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy stated, "There is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by roding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. ... (it) requires a new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of training." NCOs assigned to SWCS understand this message. They are dedicated to achieving the highest standards in training. Our NCOs are leading transformation and building the operational force for the battlefields of today and of the future. Our training continues to provide our Soldiers with the confidence and the broad range of capabilities needed to win the "long war."

As the command sergeant major of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, I am very privileged and honored to serve in a command that trains approximately 7,500 students per year in more than 46 different courses. Every Soldier we graduate is well prepared for the rigors, challenges



**CSM David Bruner**

and uncertainty of war and is a highly adaptive leader. I am proud of the accomplishments of our staff. Always remember our duty is to do what is right for our Soldiers, their families and our country. In closing, I would like to share this quote from Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth O. Preston.

"[The] Warrior Ethos has been the common thread that ties us as Soldiers together for the last 229 years. From Valley Forge, to the battlefields of Gettysburg, to the Argonne Forest, to the shores of Normandy, to the mountains of Afghanistan, (to) the streets of Baghdad — that Warrior Ethos is the fiber of which we as Soldiers live by, and enduring value for all of us that wear the uniform."

*Veritas et Libertas*

## Enlisted

### 2006 SGM board offers review and analysis for SF NCOs

The Fiscal Year 2006 Sergeant Major Promotion Selection Board chose 48 SF master sergeants for promotion. The following comments were extracted from the board's review and analysis:

- The key assignment for an SF master sergeant is the SF detachment team sergeant. Demonstrated competence in leadership at the team-sergeant position was critical for promotion. It sets the foundation for success at the sergeant major/command sergeant major levels.

- Master sergeants with language capabilities of 2/2 were viewed favorably, as were those with continual Army Physical Fitness Test scores of 300 or higher.
- The board viewed back-to-back TDA assignments unfavorably.
- A number of NCOs had either outdated photos or inaccurate Enlisted Record Briefs, or they had failed to validate their ERBs. This reduced the likelihood of their being selected for promotion.
- Many duty descriptions in the ratings of master sergeants serving

above the SF-group level were not clearly articulated.

- Raters need to ensure that their bulleted comments match what the rated NCO accomplished. Vague comments about performance and potential leave too much room for interpretation by the board.
- Senior raters can improve an NCO's chances for promotion by quantifying where he stands in comparison to his peers.

For additional information, telephone Sergeant Major Charles Stevens at DSN 239-7594, commer-

## Enlisted Career Notes continued

cial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to: [stevensc@soc.mil](mailto:stevensc@soc.mil).

### Reclassification to 37F

The pilot program for the 37F MOS-T reclassification training ran three classes during Fiscal Year 2006. During FY 2007, there will be four classes, each with 30 seats. The classes are designed to fill the ranks of the 37F (PSYOP) community. Soldiers in the rank of specialist thru staff sergeant can apply for 37 MOS-T. Interested Soldiers can contact the Special Operation Recruiting Battalion at 910-432-1818/5083 for more information. Soldiers must be airborne-qualified or willing to complete airborne school prior to training. They must

also have a Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 85+, PULHES: 111221, normal color vision and a secret security clearance. Training consists of nine weeks of MOS training followed by up to six months of language training for Soldiers not already language-qualified.

CMF 37 now offers Soldiers fully-funded four- and two-year degree programs in marketing with South New Hampshire University. For more information go to [GoArmyEd.com](http://GoArmyEd.com) or visit your installation education center.

With the beginning of the new fiscal year, PSYOP senior NCOs need to start reviewing their records in preparation for this year's promotion boards. NCOs should review

their enlisted record brief, official military personnel folder and DA photo. They should contact their battalion S1 for updates to their records and watch for the MILPER message for their respective boards. They should pay special attention to updating their civilian education.

### SWCS to run 38B BNCOC

Congratulations to all of the 38B MOS-T graduates from FY06. Almost all class seats for FY 2007 are already filled, and SWCS continues to receive application packets from the field. The 38B Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course has been established and will conduct the first class from Oct. 23 to Dec. 19, at the SWCS NCO Academy. The

## Warrant Officer

### Transformation reduces time for SF WO acquisition

During the last year, Special Forces warrant officers have witnessed a significant transformation of their acquisition process. From concept to measurable success, the transformation has been one of the most rapid initiatives ever undertaken by MOS 180A.

On Sept. 22, 2006, some of the most obvious measures of success, 29 new SF warrant officers, stood in front of the stage in Bank Hall during the second SF Warrant Officer Appointment Ceremony. During the ceremony, the new warrant officers were conditionally appointed as warrant officers as part of the newly revised Special Forces Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course. The new warrant officers included 27 representatives from all seven SF operational groups and two representatives from the 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Most of the officers had been selected during the U.S. Army Recruiting Command's March and May 2006 selection boards. Some National Guard applicants had predetermined and selected-in during a one-month period. All the new SF warrant officers who complete the program will graduate with MOS 180A during the same calendar year in which they were selected for training.

The reduction in the acquisition process represents a key factor in the 180A WOES transformation. With the expectation of significant growth in Special Forces, the opportunities for SF warrant officers are greater now than at any time in recent history. Special Forces seeking warrant-officer candidates.

### SF warrant officers needed

Special Forces is looking for SF NCOs in the active and reserve components who want to become SF warrant officers. Upon completion of the SF Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification and the awarding of MOS 180A, SF Warrant Officer, active-duty Soldiers are eligible for a Critical Skills Accession Bonus of \$20,000. National Guard Soldiers are eligible for an accession bonus of \$10,000. To apply for SF warrant-officer training, Soldiers must meet the following prerequisites:

1. Be a U.S. citizen (non-waivable).
2. Have a General Technical score of 110 or higher (non-waivable).
3. Be a high-school graduate or have earned a GED (non-waivable).
4. Possess a secret security clearance (non-waivable).
5. Pass the three-event Army Physical Fitness Test with a minimum of 80 percent in each event.
6. Have at least 12 months remain-

ing on the current enlistment contract.

7. Hold the grade of staff sergeant (E6) or higher.

8. Be a member of a CMF 18-series MOS.

9. Be not older than 46 and have at least three years of experience on an SF operational detachment.

10. Attain a Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 85 or hold a DA Form 330 with at least 1/1 language proficiency.

11. Be medically fit for SF duty and pass a commissioning physical.

12. Have letters of recommendation from current company commander, battalion commander and group commander, and from the unit's senior SF warrant officer.

Applicants may request waivers for some of the prerequisites. The commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is the final authority for waiver requests. Requests for waivers should be addressed to: Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-SP; Fort Bragg, NC 28310.

For additional information, Soldiers should go to [www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant](http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant); <http://www.1800goguard.com/warrantofficer/warrant.html>; contact the senior SF warrant officers in their unit; or telephone DSN 239-1879/7597/7596 or commercial (910) 432-1879/7597/7596.

# Officer

## Army designates newest branches

Effective Oct. 1, 2006, the U.S. Army Human Resources Command redesignated all Functional Area 39 officers as members of either the Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations branches. Activating these branches will help the Army fight and win the Global War on Terrorism and support Department of Defense stability operations.

Officers interested in volunteering for service in PSYOP or CA should prepare a packet for the Army Special Operations Forces Board that will convene in April 2007 to select the best candidates. The Special Operations Recruiting Battalion at Fort Bragg, N.C., is accepting applications for officers in Year Group 2004 for CA and PSYOP detachment command. Male and female officers of all branches are encouraged to apply. For more information visit [www.bragg.army.mil/CAPSYOP/](http://www.bragg.army.mil/CAPSYOP/)

## HRC updates files of CA officers

The U.S. Army Human Resources Command is updating officer records to reflect the activation of the CA Branch. Officers should review their officer record brief to make sure that changes have been recorded.

The next promotion-selection board for lieutenant colonel is scheduled for the second quarter of FY 2007; for major: the third quarter of FY 2007. Eligible officers should review and update their records now.

The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is forming, with Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry as its first commander. The 97th Civil Affairs Battalion is also forming. Both units will have an official effective date of March 2007.

## CAQC for company-grade officers

The Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course is designed to qualify captains and first lieutenants for assignment into the Civil Affairs Branch. It is not designed to train field-grade officers for CA. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is revising the course administrative data to limit attendance to first lieutenants and captains who meet the other prerequisites. Majors may submit requests for grade waivers to the SWCS commanding general. Address waiver requests to Commanding General, USAJFK-SWCS; ATTN: AOJK-SP; Fort Bragg, NC 28310.

The Army is revising DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*. Major changes to the pamphlet include listing Civil Affairs as an active-component branch vs. a functional area.

The Advanced Regional Analysis Course is mandatory for all Civil Affairs officers. Active-component officers will attend the course as captains. Reserve officers must attend the course to be eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel.

## FA 39Xs to become 37Xs

When the U.S. Army Human Resources Command re-designates all Functional Area 39B officers to the PSYOP Branch, all PSYOP officers designated 39X (PSYOP designated – untrained) will be branch-transferred to the PSYOP branch with an area of concentration of 37X. The PSYOP Branch will be documented in unit MTOES and TDAs with effective dates of Oct. 16, 2006, and later. Officers should review their officer record briefs to ensure that they have been updated to reflect the PSYOP Branch. Also, although officers have up to two years to update their DA photo, they should do so as soon as possible.

PSYOP Branch officers will be authorized to wear the PSYOP Branch insignia. The new PSYOP Branch is aligned under the Maneuver, Fires and Effects Functional Category (SOF subcategory) for career management, development and promotions under the new Officer Personnel Management System, or OPMS. For questions regarding PSYOP basic-branch designation for colonels, contact the colonels assignment officer, Senior Leader Development Office Major Ron Tuczak, DSN 426-4958, or commercial (703) 696-4958, or send e-mail to [ronald.tuczak@hqda.army.mil](mailto:ronald.tuczak@hqda.army.mil). For questions regarding PSYOP basic-branch designations, contact the PSYOP assignment officer, Major John Morgan, DSN 221-5790, or commercial (703) 325-5790 or send e-mail to [john.p.morgan@us.army.mil](mailto:john.p.morgan@us.army.mil).

## SF captains and majors inventory

The Army has reduced the time-in-service requirement for promotion to major so that captains now enter primary-zone consideration after nine years of service instead of 10. With the change, officers in year groups 1996 and 1997 were eligible for promotion in

Fiscal Year 2006.

The change has had two other consequences that are important to Special Forces: The number of year groups in the inventory of SF captains has been reduced by one, and the number of year groups in the inventory of SF majors has been increased by one. Manning for SF captains now stands at 73 percent. Manning for SF majors stands at 192 percent.

The imbalance is temporary and is expected to correct itself some time in 2009. In the meantime, SF promotable captains and recently promoted majors will continue to serve in SF captain positions. According to Chapter 1, DA Pam 600-3 (28 Dec 05), officers' promotions do not automatically alter their positions, and there is nothing inherently wrong with a position being filled by an officer whose grade exceeds the authorized grade because of a recent promotion. Boards will not view such assignments negatively when determining the officer's potential for future.

## USAR accession bonus

The U.S. Army Reserve is offering a \$10,000 accession incentive for officers and enlisted Soldiers from the IRR or coming off active duty who join a CA or PSYOP reserve unit. Soldiers must be branch-qualified to get the bonus. The SWCS is approving requests for grade waivers from Army Reserve sergeants first class who want to attend reclassification training. For officers, the Captains Career Course has been waived as a prerequisite for CAQC or POQC until Oct. 1, 2008. The waiver provides flexibility to the prospective PSYOP or CA officer in achieving branch qualification. Officers cannot be branch-qualified until they have completed CCC, completed either the POQC or CAQC and have met all other prerequisites. Soldiers must request waivers or for branch qualification or transfer by sending a request from the first battalion commander in their chain of command, to the director of Special Operations Proponency via e-mail ([carlisja@soc.mil](mailto:carlisja@soc.mil)), the request must include the name, social security number and contact information for the Soldier requesting the waiver or branch qualification or branch transfer. The Directorate of Special Operations Proponency will determine eligibility and provide a response to the request within 10 working days.

## LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A KNIFE: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Why can't the U.S. Army figure out Iraq? Why are Special Forces detachments advising and employing Afghan National Army forces to conduct battalion- and brigade-sized cordon-and-search operations with less-than-actionable intelligence? Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl's book, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, answers these questions. Nagl, the current military assistant to the deputy secretary of defense, analyzes two similar counterinsurgencies: the Malayan Emergency (1948-1957) and the U.S. Army's efforts in South Vietnam (1950-1972). He shows how the British Army, faced with adversity during the Malayan Emergency, changed its strategy and won, while the U.S. Army, faced with similar difficulties in Vietnam, failed to evolve and lost.

Originally published in 2002, the book was republished after Nagl's return from a year in Iraq, where he faced the challenge of executing his thesis in a real-world situation. As the operations officer for an armor task force, Nagl had to change the culture of his battalion, which had trained for tank battles in a conventional fight, to enable it to execute counterinsurgency operations against the insurgents. As evidence of the book's potential long-term influence, General Peter Schoomaker, the Army's chief of staff, penned the foreword for this edition.


Nagl's preface discusses the differences between his original scholarly work and what he experienced operating in Iraq. Nagl develops his thesis by describing how different armies learn and change. He provides a useful and easy-to-understand depiction of the intricacies of insurgencies. Nagl discusses how the British and American armies differ at the fundamental cultural level: The British Army evolved conducting colonial police actions, while the U.S. Army mastered conventional maneuver warfare.

The British began their counterinsurgency in Malaya making

classic counterinsurgent mistakes, such as executing battalion maneuvers to clear suspected insurgent areas. After 1952, the British changed their strategy to synchronize their political, economic and military elements. They placed emphasis on intelligence-collection and on advising Malayan local-security forces to provide protection to the populace. The British charged a single leader, either military or political, with coordinating all efforts at local levels. Nagl credits the efforts of General Sir Gerald Templer in overcoming bureaucratic resistance and forcing positive and effective change.

The U.S. began its counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam, using advisers to assist the South Vietnamese. Unfortunately, the conventionally trained advisers attempted to build the South Vietnamese army to mirror the U.S. Army, thus preventing the South Vietnamese army's ability to effectively answer the Viet Cong. In 1965, the U.S. increased its presence in Vietnam and deployed conventional forces to attempt to destroy the Viet Cong insurgency. Nagl explains several effective techniques that the U.S. used, such as the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program and the Marines' use of combined-action platoons. Both those programs provided the political and decentralized characteristics necessary for defeating an insurgency, but Nagl shows how the deep-rooted, conventional culture of the U.S. Army resisted those moves away from large-scale maneuver warfare.

Nagl closes by examining how the British were able to change in the middle of an unconventional war to defeat an insurgency, and how the U.S. could not. Nagl predicts that the U.S. Army will not change until it becomes aware that it needs to change. He says that upon achieving that self-awareness, the U.S. Army leaders must take advice from their subordinates about what really works



### DETAILS

**By John A. Nagl**

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**Reviewed by:**

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Monterey, Calif.

or fails to work on the ground and then lead the organizational change into reality.

Nagl presents his thesis succinctly, clearly depicting the steps necessary for effecting change in the Army organization. Along the way, he provides excellent instruction on insurgencies and useful strategies for defeating them. The book's only weakness is that Nagl stops just short of challenging senior Army leaders to begin effecting real change in our counterinsurgency efforts.

*Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife* gives SOF operators insight into the challenges of counterinsurgency and the best strategies for conducting it. Nagl's book provides senior SOF leaders with lessons that can assist in implementing the SOF organizational changes needed to fight and win the "long war." **SW**



Photo by Janice Burton

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