

Special Warfare



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ROCKY ROAD TO STABILITY**

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
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Special Warfare

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
The role of Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, on the battlefield has never been more important. Today's battles require adaptable, culturally savvy Soldiers and leaders who can focus their planning and intelligence-collection not on large militaries but on those more vague elements of the "human terrain," such as social networks. The article beginning on page 22, titled "Intelligent Design," was written by some of our ILE students at Fort Leavenworth and provides a great overview of intelligence in the COIN fight. This is just one role in which ARSOF excel. The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review recognizes the important role SOF plays in the Global War on Terrorism, and the Program Decision Memorandum, or PDM, has directed increased authorizations for special operators within the Army.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is on path to fill Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces units and will continue to meet the training requirements resulting from the PDM-directed increase in ARSOF. There has been some discussion as to our ability to meet this growth, and the article on page 32 of this issue addresses that question in depth. We are already producing the numbers of SF Soldiers needed as a result of significant changes we have made in the ways that we recruit, assess, train and sustain SF Soldiers. Beginning this June, we increased the number of yearly classes of the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, from four to eight. Additionally, the SFQC is now more relevant to today's operational environment, focused on enhancing core unconventional-warfare skills; linking the program of instruction to the battlefield, and placing greater emphasis on training in foreign languages and cultures. These changes in training methodology have resulted in our ability to train more Soldiers in less time while maintaining high standards, and in some cases raising them.

Significant changes have also been made in the way both CA and PSYOP Soldiers are trained. We established one pipeline for each specialty, training active and Army Reserve Soldiers to the same standard in order to enhance their interoperability and capability. We also built a field training site at Camp Mackall to support the culmination exercise for the CA and PSYOP pipelines, Operation Certain Trust. In addition to improving existing courses, we have implemented two new courses: one for CA NCOs and one for PSYOP NCOs.

To find the right Soldiers needed to attend these new training pipelines, SWCS, in partnership with the Army Recruiting Command, activated the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, or SORB, last year. The success of the SORB has allowed us to recruit the best qualified candidates for Special Forces Assessment and Selection, as well as for PSYOP and CA training. Finally, SWCS is actively managing the health of ARSOF to achieve higher retention of SF, CA and PSYOP Soldiers through effective career programs and policies.

The bottom line is that we are well postured to fill our ARSOF units with fully trained ARSOF Soldiers, and we will stay on path as these forces grow. In addition to managing the health of the force, we are producing ARSOF Soldiers who are better prepared than ever before to meet the challenges of current and future battlefields.

Major General James W. Parker

Special Forces Soldiers Earn MacArthur Leadership Award

Two Special Forces Soldiers were chosen to receive the General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award for dedication to duty, honor and country.

Warrant Officer Jason W. Latteri, the commander of Operational Detachment – Alpha 533, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, was selected as the only active-duty warrant officer candidate to receive the award.

Captain Robert C. Eldridge, commander, Headquarters and Support Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, was one of the officers selected to receive the award.

Each year, 27 company-grade officers are chosen to receive the award. Six commissioned officers and one warrant officer are selected from the National Guard and Army Reserve, respectively, and 12 commissioned officers and one warrant officer are selected from the active Army.

Latteri began his Army career at Fort Campbell in 1991 when he joined Company B, 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), where he served as a machine gunner and rifle team leader. His next assignment was with Company C, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, Camp Greeves, Korea, before return-

ing to the 327th and serving as a rifle team leader, rifle squad leader, weapons squad leader and rifle platoon sergeant.

Latteri attended Special Forces Assessment and Selection in 1997, followed by on-the-job-training on ODA 521, 5th SF Group. He graduated from the Special Forces Weapons Sergeant Qualification Course in early 1998 and was reassigned to ODA 526 as the senior weapons sergeant.

Eldridge enlisted in December 1986, into the now-deactivated 11th SF Group, an Army Reserve group, as an SF medic. He spent nearly 11 years as an enlisted serviceman, during that time acquiring his bachelor's degree from Virginia Tech. After attending Officer Candidate School, he was commissioned in 1997.

He served with the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), as a platoon leader before he decided to rejoin the ranks of SF Soldiers.

Eldridge was assigned directly to ODA 734, a military freefall team. During his two years as the team leader, Eldridge participated in an unconventional-warfare rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, La., a deployment to Colombia and a deployment to Afghanistan.

FORT LEWIS RANGER THE 'BEST'



A Ranger team crosses the finish line at the conclusion of the Best Ranger Competition. Photo by Paul Prince.

A Ranger team from Fort Benning, Ga., took bragging rights in the 2005 U.S. Army David E. Grange Jr. Best Ranger Competition April 21-24.

Specialist Mikhail Venikov and Sergeant First Class John Sheaffer, both of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, won the title after three days of intense competition. Only 30 of the 52 competitors who began the competition survived the 60 hours of grueling events to cross the finish line.

The event concluded with a formal awards ceremony during which General Richard A. Cody, vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, recognized each of the competitors.

The event included a series of physical-fitness challenges, including an obstacle course, chin-ups, pull-ups and combatives; a parachute competition; marksmanship; and an all-night road march that included weapons assembly and night fire. A highlight of the event was the Ranger Day Stakes, a day-long event designed to test the Rangers' skills in archery, knot tying, grenade proficiency, rappelling and marksmanship.

The three-day Best Ranger Competition was established in 1982 and has been compared to the Ironman and Eco-Challenge competitions. The competition challenges two-man Ranger teams in events that test their physical conditioning, Ranger skills and team strategies. The events are purposely scheduled back-to-back and around the clock for 60 hours, allowing little time for rest and meals.

The competition is conducted on a "come as you are" basis, with no tasks or events announced prior to the competition. All events are timed, and competitors score points for each completed event. Both team members must complete each task.

LANGUAGE CORNER

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School hosted the semiannual Command Language Program Manager's Conference April 18-19. Those attending the conference discussed specific language products and emerging technologies that could be useful for training Soldiers. For example, several language-program managers have had excellent results using language products that Soldiers can listen to in their cars. SWCS is researching these and other language products that can meet the needs for Army special-operations forces. Attendees also provided input on ways of improving contract procedures for language programs. Recommendations included ensuring that contracting is decentralized, so that the activity responsible for writing contracts for language training will also be responsible for evaluating the training. Conference attendees stressed the importance of SWCS and the language-program managers working together to move the program into the future.

Rosetta Stone recently released language-training products for Tagalog and Farsi (level 2), and the Army immediately made the products available on its e-learning Web site. Training is now available online for all 10 of the languages designated by SWCS as ARSOF core languages.

For additional information, telephone Major Kevin Price, Training Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, at DSN 239-2942, commercial (910) 907-2942, or send e-mail to pricek@soc.mil.

Afghanistan's Rocky Road to Stability

3rd SF Group Utilizes the Threat Pyramid to Develop an Adaptive Counterinsurgency Strategy

By Captain Paul Toolan

Along a dirt road, nothing more than a narrow passageway between 10-foot mud walls, a white Toyota Corolla hatchback crawls its way toward the center of town. Inside the car, the passengers are crammed into every inch of space — their faces peering out of dirty windows spider-webbed with cracks, held together only by garish bright advertising stickers of questionable nationalistic origins.

As the car rounds a blind corner, a roadblock comes into sight. The man-made obstacle is a confusing array of pickup trucks and men in civilian clothes armed with AK-47 automatic rifles. In the back of one truck, a man lazily mans a PKM machine gun.

As the car skids to a halt, the driver recognizes one of the men manning the roadblock as his neighbor, a member of a tribe at odds with his own. He senses almost immediately a confrontation with his life-long enemy. Along the inside of the driver's door, he reaches for his own AK-47. He keeps it in the car to defend against the rampant banditry that plagues the road from his village to the center of town. He quickly exits the vehicle, and with awkward purpose draws his weapon ...

In the melee that ensues, several of the men manning the road block, Afghan National Police, are killed. Several passengers from the vehicle are killed as well, while others flee for cover or to seek reinforcements from brother tribesmen. Hours later, coalition forces with the Afghan National Army will ar-

rive to reinforce the police. Ultimately the event will be characterized as an action against the forces of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, or IROA, by anti-coalition militia, or ACM. The police who recognized the occupants of the vehicle will report that they are Taliban, and an operation to cordon and search "Taliban" compounds will result in nothing more than a day of rooting through the meager possessions of the average Afghan family, bringing the IROA no closer to stability than it was the day before.

This anecdote is typical of the complexities of the situation now faced by United States forces in Afghanistan. Centuries-old tribal and family feuds, corruption at virtually every level of civic government, an emerging narco-state and a healthy and well-organized insurgency continue to muddle the operational environment and preclude an economical formula for success in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Over the last four years, virtually every branch within the Army, as well as other services, has offered its perspective on modern counterinsurgency strategy. Many of the Army's counterinsurgency manuals, which have remained largely unchanged for the last three to four decades, have been the benefactors of accelerated efforts to update and modernize the principles and tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine. Countless articles have appeared, books have been written, and the Army's professional journals have



▲ NATION BUILDING U.S. and Afghan troops work to

been inundated with perspectives on counterinsurgency. For its part, Special Forces has contributed similar volumes of work and dedicated equal amounts of careful study to finding the ideal modern counterinsurgency model, and the ideal model for fighting the preponderance of threats that face the Army and the nation today.

While Special Forces has cornered the market on counterinsurgency for nearly a half century, there are intelligent, experienced people without Special Forces training who are making important contributions to the Army's ability to deal with an insurgent



quell disorder in an Afghan village. Stability is key in overcoming the insurgency. All photos courtesy of Paul Toolan.

threat. However, a common trend has emerged with regard to these important works — ambiguity. In attempting to find a workable solution to the various insurgencies we now face, most of the proposed models and theories have tried to remain fairly broad and generic, in an attempt to find a one-size-fits-all counterinsurgency model.

Counterinsurgency by its very nature will never be one-size-fits-all. Separate and distinct models, predicated on core principles, must be developed for each area of the world in which an insurgency has taken hold. Afghanistan is one of the areas where this kind

of tailored approach is required.

Any consideration of a counterinsurgency model for Afghanistan and the requisite strategy for dealing with it must begin with an agreement about the state of the Afghan insurgency. That state is best described within the context of the insurgency continuum, and in the fall of 2005, the Afghan insurgency rested decisively between Phase I (latent and incipient) and Phase II (open guerrilla warfare). The Afghan insurgent strategy has become one of survival in the hopes of conserving resources and manpower and waiting out coalition presence so that they

may face a weak and easily defeated Afghan National Security Force when the U.S. and its allies significantly reduce forces in the region.

At this stage of Operation Enduring Freedom, the above assessment is not always well-received, but the evidence to support it is overwhelming. Over the last three years, the ACM has re-energized the Taliban movement into an effective clandestine organization. It has developed its leadership, promoted its ideology and consolidated and rebuilt forces and resources. It has expertly used the Afghan culture to its advantage and effectively employed propa-

ganda and violence. Enemy activities frequently occur in an organized pattern, but no major attacks on fixed installations have yet occurred. The ACM has recruited, organized and trained a cadre and has established networks for cellular intelligence, operations and support.

Throughout the summer, fall and winter of 2005, Special Forces and conventional forces in southern Afghanistan experienced a more resolute, better-organized enemy who demonstrated the ability to mass forces and react quickly to exploitable situations. In the span of six months, the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, under the banner of Task Force 31, encountered the enemy on 90 separate occasions. As a result, 516 enemy were killed, 290 enemy were captured and more than 65 were accepted for long-term detention. Leaders in every subsystem of the insurgency (guerrilla, underground and auxiliary) were captured or killed. Two noncommissioned officers from TF-31 and one from the 173rd Infantry were killed, and another 22 men were wounded in action.

In its fourth rotation to OEF, TF-31 could look at the enemy from a historical perspective and attest to the fact that the enemy has changed, that the insurgency has matured and that the ACM has demonstrated a growing capacity for conflict. The uncharacteristic way the enemy engaged both Afghan National Security and coalition forces pointed to an adapting enemy who had become savvier about his own tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as about the coalition's. A detailed analysis of the engagements has created a picture of an enemy growing in readiness, flexibility and resolve.

Intermittent indicators of open guerrilla warfare support the notion that the Afghan insurgency has passed Phase I and is

inching its way toward Phase II. Evidence of a shadow government lends additional credence to the argument. While continuing to grow and operate a shadow government from sanctuary areas in Pakistan, the ACM concurrently exploited the recent elections of the National Assembly and Provincial Council. They were able to get individuals sympathetic to their way of life and their proposed system of government into legitimate seats of power.

In the Bahmian province, the former Taliban governor, who was responsible for the destruction of the ancient Buddha statues in Bahmian and was subsequently ousted, was re-elected to office. Throughout southern Afghanistan, 13 candidates with ACM or Taliban affiliations and sympathies were also elected. Their success prepared a system that would be ready to assume power in the event that the ACM is able to topple the IROA.

Threat pyramid

Acknowledging that the insurgency is still in its nascent stages is the starting point for the formulation of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan detailed in this article. Proceeding from that point, we have developed an applicable and relevant threat model. The Afghan Threat Pyramid is a multidimensional model designed to explain an incredibly complex issue in a graphic form.

Each of the pyramid's three tiers represents an element of the threat to Afghanistan. Each element has been further developed to provide the depth needed to explain the dimensions of who, what, why, how and where within each element. The model thus defines the threat, the protagonists, their methodologies and their motivations. The model was designed within the context of southern Afghanistan, and is caveated by the fact that Afghanistan cannot be painted with one color; each province and region should be taken into account separately.


Furthermore, the elements and the dimensions within each element are not mutually exclusive. There is cross-over and interaction between elements and dimensions, and no element can be addressed without consideration of the others. Therefore, despite the fact that the model is neatly delineated on paper, it is much more blurred in reality.

Defining the threats

The model's tiers address the three major threats to Afghanistan: threats to reconstruction; threats to governance and justice; and threats to a safe, secure and stable environment. Threats to reconstruction range from the tangible (mining the Tarin Kowt road project) to the intangible (cultural resistance to education).

Threats to governance and justice include all of the things that are prejudicial to the establishment of a rule of law and a system based on due process and individual and states rights. Threats to a

stable, safe and secure environment address direct threats to the full spectrum of security mechanisms that are in place or are being developed to provide the Afghan people with the freedom to live a life



The Afghan Threat Pyramid



▲ WARRIOR DIPLOMATS SF medics treat Afghan villagers as a way of developing rapport with the people and gaining their support.

of relative prosperity and independence within the context of moderate Islam.

Protagonists

The base of the threat pyramid is formed by the threat to security and stability posed by the groups typically categorized as ACM — the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hig and other, less visible paramilitary groups. In 2005, these groups were adequately populated and showed few signs of a waning appeal to the disenfranchised masses. The most concrete indicator of their strength is the increase in hostile activity against government forces and the abundance of anti-IROA propaganda being routinely distributed throughout southern Afghanistan.

The groups most responsible for the threats to the development of governance and justice are those involved in the drug trade and or-

ganized crime (smugglers and warlords conducting illegal checkpoints, hijacking, etc.). These groups do not include “routine” criminals, such as murderers, rapists, robbers and kidnapers. Although TF-31 was not tasked with a counter-drug mandate, it confiscated (and subsequently turned over to Afghan authorities) more than 270 pounds of opium tar (raw heroin) during the period following the poppy harvest — a clear indicator of the scope of the criminal problem.

The threat to reconstruction comes mostly from the rampant “green on green” violence that exists between various tribes, families, ethnic groups and races in Afghanistan. One does not need to look farther than the Special Forces firebase medical clinics to understand that violence between families is a daily occurrence. Green-on-green violence

is the rule and not the exception in Afghanistan.

Methodology

The model can be helpful in demonstrating the way that the various groups pose different threats, and it can even show how the tools of one group may be identical to those of another.

Ethnic and tribal disputes pose threats to reconstruction by using the tool of factionalism. Of all the threats in Afghanistan, factionalism is the least deliberate but most pervasive. Factionalism creates subcultures of self-reliance, in which one group believes that its existence is dependent upon the homogeneity of the group. By keeping themselves isolated as tribes or as families, and by fighting all neighboring tribes and families, groups create an environment that precludes the participation of organizations whose mission is to develop infrastructure

and encourage economic reform. For example, in the Deh Rawood district, violence and instability has kept international assistance organizations at bay for the last five years. Work on the Taliban bridge, a key construction project that would span the Teri Rod river, has been started and stopped so many times that nomadic Kuchi tribes use its half-completed pylons for temporary shelter during the “traveling months.” The violence that has deterred assistance is not due to the ACM or Taliban per se, but rather to an ancient conflict between Popalzai, Bobalzai and Noorzai tribes (all subfactions of Pashtun) that frequently boils over.

The criminal elements that threaten the maturation of the legitimate government and its requisite legal system use coercion, exploitation, violence and all other methods normally associated with organized crime. In Afghanistan, the threat is most damaging when and where the criminal element strongly influences the existing government, or where criminals and government are one and the same.

Finally, the ACM, whose members threaten the overall security of the country, promotes the insurgency to achieve its objectives. Quite simply, this group, focused on overthrowing the IROA, is responsible for the majority of the acts of violence and mayhem against the forces charged with providing Afghanistan with a safe, stable and secure environment.

Motivations

Having determined what the threats are, who is responsible for them and how the groups attempt to achieve their objectives, we need to look at their motivations, the “why” of the threat pyramid.

The tribes and ethnic groups embracing the factionalism that directly threatens reconstruction are motivated strictly by survival. Statistically, Afghanistan remains one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world, and southern Afghanistan is perhaps the worst. Accustomed to decades of scraping their existence out of the dirt, these groups rarely look beyond the present. They remain focused on dominating the family or tribe in the next



▲ LOCAL CUSTOMS Members of an SF detachment dine Afghan-style while meeting with local villagers.

compound for a precious share of basic necessities, and they cannot grasp the concept that if they would only allow each other to live in relative peace, then the organizations that can change this condition would come to their aid.

The criminal element of the second tier is motivated by greed and self-interest. It has no lofty ideology or basic need to survive, only a desire to keep what it has gained through its illegal activities.

The ACM is motivated mainly by religious ideology and fundamentalism. There are members motivated by money, but they are simply rank-and-file who, given other alternatives, would be just as likely to lay down a weapon for money as to pick one up. The motiva-

tions that the pyramid seeks to define are those of the core of the ACM movement, the fundamentalists who seek to establish the Islamic Caliphate, a utopian state idealized as a return to the state of affairs as they existed in the time of the prophet Mohammad.

Virtually every scrap of propaganda or written communication recovered during operations in TF-31's fourth rotation extolled the virtues of radical Islam and the tenets of the Talib or expressed anti-Western sentiment. Recovered documents and other evidence detailed payment schemes for insurgent action that tended to be pragmatic: That is to say, the ACM did not use monetary



gain as a defining principle but rather as a means to an end.

Locations

Determining areas of the country in which the threats are concentrated is the most important element of applying the model, as well as the most difficult. The difficulty is due to the amount of analysis that is required to template the dimensions of each element as it exists throughout Afghanistan.

In theory, the “where” of the threat pyramid should identify the majority threat in any one area. Naturally there will be crossover and shared threats on any portion of the map, but only the majority threat should be

addressed geographically, to ensure that the appropriate resources, in the appropriate quantities, are applied to fight the threat in that area. Once a majority threat has been defeated, the minority threats can be addressed with greater emphasis.

Deconstructing the pyramid

Once we have established the elements of the threat and the methods and motives of each element of the threat, it becomes easier to develop a comprehensive, long-term Afghan counterinsurgency strategy that can become a cornerstone of continuity to be passed from one unit to the next.

Developing this strategy, which essentially forms the framework for actions designed to establish a safe, stable and secure Afghanistan, begins with determining the priorities. This step is the impetus behind representing the model as a pyramid: The pyramid demonstrates the building-block principle that contributes to the most efficient and practical counterinsurgency approach.

For example, if countering factionalism were the highest priority, the top tier of the pyramid would be affected, but the other two levels would remain relatively unchanged. As there is crossover between the elements, so too, will there be crossover of effects: By attacking factionalism, we would cause some effects to be felt among the criminal element and possibly even within the insurgency. But the result of reducing factionalism would be a decrease in the amount of green-on-green violence, which would result in some increase of reconstruction efforts but would fail to significantly affect the problems in either of the other two tiers.

Eliminating crime and graft would reduce the lawlessness that threatens the legitimacy of the government. It would make the country safer in regard to the violence and victimization associated with criminal activity, but it would not affect the destabilizing violence associated with the insurgents. As a result of the enforcement of a rule of law, the factionalism created by the pervasive green-on-green conflict would be reduced because a more reliable government would be more

responsive to the needs of the people.

Defeating the insurgency would cause the other tiers of the threat pyramid to collapse. Removing the insurgency would reduce the most destabilizing element in the Afghan society, which in turn would allow the government to mature and to focus on “routine” justice. It would create an environment hospitable to economic growth and the development of infrastructure, thereby creating an environment in which the hierarchy of needs is being met and precluding the survival mentality that promotes factionalism.

Methodology

Having set the priorities, we must develop a methodology for combating each element of the threat. Although the lines between the threat elements sometimes tend to blur, each element is unique and must be attacked with a method specific to the problem.

To attack factionalism, we must make a campaign of nation-building the main effort. All nation-building efforts will help to defeat factionalism. Tangible efforts, such as the development of roads, will allow resources to move freely around the country, bringing food, for example, to an area in which it would not be uncommon for one Afghan to kill another over a sack of wheat. Intangible efforts, such as the development of education, will begin to weaken the barriers between tribes and ethnic groups by providing a common framework of association within the next generation of Afghans. The starting point of these kinds of initiatives is critical. While provincial reconstruction efforts are well-established, a gap exists at the tribal and village level that must be bridged. The results of this kind of village-centric effort were manifested in the ANA “flag campaign,” an initiative to distribute Afghan flags throughout southern Afghanistan immediately before and after the elections for the National Assembly and Provincial Council. Though a small measure in terms of complexity, the initiative made a difference that was obvious as more and more Afghans displayed national flags. When contrasted with areas where the white Taliban flag had once been the norm,

the impact of simple nation-building initiatives became evident.

To attack the insurgency, the military-based counterinsurgency campaign must continue. The centerpiece of TF-31's fourth rotation was a search, attack, assist and train strategy that was developed and prosecuted to counter the threat as it was defined by the pyramid model.

Hand-in-hand with the military counterinsurgency campaign is the inclusion and development of a viable police organization; however, this development should not be misconstrued as an anti-crime effort. A police force that deals with the insurgency will, of course, have secondary effects on crime, but it cannot be focused on crime until the insurgency has been defeated. In Afghanistan, the development of the Afghan National Police is one of the most problematic ongoing initiatives. In an effort to mirror the relative success of the ANA, the ANP was hastily created by legitimizing existing police forces, regardless of the ethnic or tribal make-up of the force. In many areas, age-old tribal disputes were inadvertently elevated from simple feuds to "anti-government" conflicts by virtue of the fact that one of the protagonists in the battle had been given the mantle of the ANP. In a counterinsurgency, this type of police-force development will ultimately prove counterproductive and will create more pockets of disenfranchised peoples who will be easily co-opted by the insurgents.

Overall, a counterinsurgency strategy can and should have elements of nation-building and the development of good government, but it must be focused primarily on targeting the subsystems of the underground, the guerrillas and the auxiliary.

As we implement the instruments of nation-building and synchronize a counterinsurgency strategy throughout Afghanistan, a fusion of efforts should occur that will have a simultaneous effect on crime and corruption (the middle layer of the pyramid). As the bridging element of the pyramid, the crime-and-corruption layer has the most interdependency with the other two layers. Drug traffickers, for example, can manipulate the survival

mentality by exploiting the poverty and privation that persevere as a result of factionalism. Toward the bottom of the pyramid, drug traffickers use insurgent infiltration and exfiltration routes and benefit from the fact that police must focus on the insurgency instead of on counter-drug operations.

Focusing the effort

If our counterinsurgency efforts are to have a clear focus, each methodology will need to target the center of gravity of the element it is designed to reach. Addressing factionalism, for instance, needs to start with the people. Once they have a high level of confidence in the ability of the government to provide for their basic needs, they will be less likely to fight among themselves for survival. But that confidence cannot be achieved without the growth of the institutions that will provide the mechanisms vital for survival (health care, economic stability, subsidies for infrastructure and underdeveloped areas).

The government also needs to instill a national identity based on national values. Without some form of nationalism, efforts to develop institutions might serve only to further the perception that factions need to compete with each other. In the eyes of many Afghans, the ANA represents the promise of a new nation of Afghanistan: a nationalistic ideal vs. a tribal one. In areas in which the ANA was well-established, the nationalistic ideal had a fighting chance of taking hold. The heterogeneity of a typical ANA unit serves as a model for people who have never witnessed Pashtuns and Tajiks living and working side by side.

The target groups in the crime-and-graft element are the heads of the drug syndicates and corrupt government officials. In Afghanistan, these two groups are the most collusive, and they are often represented by one individual.

Within the insurgency, the centers of gravity are the leadership, the insurgents' safe havens and the ideology that fuels the core insurgent group. An argument can be made that money is a center of gravity, but a monetary strategy would address only the rank-and-file insurgents, not those motivated by

religious ideology. A suicide bomber rarely does it for the money.

Avoiding timelines

In order to properly gauge the effects the methodology has on the centers of gravity, we must consider the external factors and weigh them appropriately.

In order to develop a national identity and a set of national values, the government must instill the idea of nationalism through education. The implication of this is that the most rudimentary Afghan national identity is two or even three generations away.

In order to affect the second tier, corruption and crime, we must consider the importance of timing. For example, a solution for countering the threat of a corrupt official would be simply to replace that official, but without a thorough consideration of the timing, the cost of this action could outweigh the benefits. During a post-insurgency period, a corrupt governor who has associations with the drug trade and extorts money from a portion of the population may be the first one deposed. But during the height of an insurgency, he may be exactly the right man for the job, because he is closely tied to people who can provide anti-insurgent intelligence (at a price) and because he has a paramilitary organization at his disposal for fighting insurgent groups. In any event, the timing of the governor's replacement could determine failure or success.

Finally, although timing is a factor with regard to the crime layer, it cannot be a factor for the insurgency layer. Counterinsurgency must be event-driven: It is only through the identification of events, and not by attempting to adhere to a specific timeline, that we can prosecute counterinsurgency. This is due in large part to the fact that the insurgents, not the counterinsurgents, determine when they will attempt to move from one phase of the insurgency to another. For example, when an insurgent leader is caught or killed, it could be argued that the insurgent leadership has been destroyed. But it would be impossible to say that the leader will be captured or killed by a specific date. In a more concrete example, when TF-31 arrived in



▲ **BRIDGE BUILDING** An SF detachment uses a ferry to cross an Afghan river. Insurgent activity disrupts construction projects such as bridge building, leading to more instability.

Afghanistan for its fourth rotation, speculation abounded about the possible desired end state for the ANA. Initially, it was decided that the goal should be a capacity for company-level operations. After only a month, it became clear that the ANA (specifically the 205th Corps) had gone beyond that level of proficiency and was able to conduct limited battalion-level operations. One battalion-level operation was completed by the 205th Corps (advised by TF-71) in the winter and spring of 2005, and five battalion-level operations were conducted by the 205th Corps (again advised by TF-31) in the summer, fall and winter of 2005. Thus it was events, not a timeline, that determined the direction that TF-31's strategy took during the rotation.

Partnerships for success

If we hope to develop a successful strategy that affects all elements of the threat, we must consider our partners, who must have a buy-in. Most, if not

all of these contributing entities will be beyond the scope of a tactical organization. But they must be identified, acknowledged and considered as influential elements in order for the strategy to be comprehensive.

The U.S. currently provides the lion's share of the security mechanisms in Afghanistan. However, the establishment of a safe, stable and secure Afghanistan cannot occur without the participation of the Afghan National Army, our coalition partners and neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan. If we do not include these partners, we are planning in a vacuum, and our plan will fail to set the conditions needed for long-term success.

In the same way, although current instances of good governance appear to be a result of significant U.S. oversight, to achieve the ultimate goal of self-governance, Afghan law-enforcement agencies will have to become the instruments of order and law.

To build infrastructure through reconstruction under the umbrella of nationalism, the provincial reconstruction teams will have to be slowly replaced by nongovernment agencies and the coordinating and facilitating efforts of the U.S. Department of State.

Overall, we must capitalize and expand upon the mandate of the United Nations to promote national reconciliation and to fulfill its responsibilities under the Bonn Agreement to assist in the recovery, relief, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan within the context of human rights and the rule of law.

If we correctly apply partnership principles, the threat pyramid will become inverted. The greatest threat to Afghanistan will become the relatively manageable threat to reconstruction facing every developing nation: the lack of resources, manpower and qualified personnel. The second-level threat will still be crime and corruption, but at a level that will not threaten stability. Finally, the insurgency will be reduced to an ideological struggle, much like the arguments of other disenfranchised or discontented groups within an established nation. As a result, the external partnerships will change into systems that will contribute to Afghanistan's long-term development.

Conquering the threat

In Afghanistan, particularly in southern Afghanistan, the development of an effective strategy for defeating the threat defined by the pyramid begins with proper force structure. The placement of SOF forces should be predicated on the notion that we must operate from secure bases virtually in the enemy's backyard, preferably where they traditionally feel most secure. Once properly placed, the array of special-operations forces throughout the battlespace must be able to achieve four overarching objectives: overlapping areas of intelligence collection; interlocking and mutually supporting spheres of combat power; the capability of an organic quick reaction force, or QRF; and the establishment of an operational footprint that can easily and successfully be assumed by the Afghan National Army.

Overlapping areas of intelligence

collection are defined by SOF-unique indigenous relationships; inorganic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets in direct support; and the ability of SOF to conduct surrogate intelligence-collection through the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Intelligence capabilities should be specifically arrayed to overlap at the physical barriers that divide the geographic terrain but not the human terrain.

Interlocking and mutually supporting spheres of combat power are defined by organic combat capabilities, the ability to leverage close-air-support assets, and cooperation with conventional coalition forces and partnerships with the ANA and ANP. In Regional Command South, the area of operations in which TF-31 operated, this principle was validated on numerous occasions and evidenced by the more than 90 contacts with the enemy in remote sanctuary areas that previously had remained relatively quiet.

The bulk of the QRF should come from the elements in closest proximity to aviation assets. Most important will be the manner in which the QRF is employed. In Afghanistan, because of the low density of aviation and conventional combat-arms units, the combined joint task force's QRF was typically released only during in-extremis situations. As a result, TF-31 maintained its organic QRF from Kandahar (firebase Ghecko) in order to have a force that could be brought to bear in emerging combat situations and to exploit perceived insurgent weaknesses.

In Syachow, a small village in the Deh Rawood district of the Oruzgan province, a combat reconnaissance patrol that stirred up a hornet's nest of hard-line Taliban was ultimately supported by more than 250 coalition forces. The battle lasted 24 hours, claimed one U.S. and two ANA lives and the lives of more than 60 enemy combatants. But in the important first few hours of the battle, only TF-31's organic QRF was brought in. It played a critical role in exploiting the situation and in gaining and maintaining momentum, and highlighted the danger of allowing operational constraints that could give the enemy an unnecessary advantage.



▲ LISTEN UP An SF detachment commander on patrol with Afghan troops makes commo with his forward operating base.

The Afghan National Security Forces are the key to controlling the insurgency, and a small operational footprint would offer the ANA a number of advantages:

- The ability to project combat power throughout the sanctuary areas of southern Afghanistan.
- A structure that the ANA could resupply through a vehicle network, with no reliance on aviation resupply. TF-31 proposed the firebase in Spin Boldak as a pilot program to validate this concept. A short drive from Kandahar, it represented an ideal location for the ANA to “gain its sea legs,” logistically as well as operationally. Though not brought to fruition during the last rotation, the idea was applauded by Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the CFC-A commanding general, as “the way of the future” for ANA partnership, and it will be a high priority goal for TF-31's next rotation.
- An established network of easily defensible bases that would provide force-protection in remote areas.
- A tangible symbol of the Afghan government. By presenting a growing island of nationalism in a sea of tribalism, the ANA could win a psychological victory for the IROA.

Achieving the four objectives creates an effects-based array of forces that brings maximum effects to bear on the enemy. The force structure should not be created in a vacuum, nor can such a structure succeed. The counterinsurgency strategy should represent a layering of SOF, conventional and Afghan forces to ensure that the strategy is nested with and complementary to the regional commander's strategy and makes maximum use of available aviation support.

Second only to force structure in its importance to conquering the threat is the operational strategy that SOF adopt. The counterinsurgency strategy embraced by TF-31 — search, attack, assist and train — is a cyclic model that combines kinetic and nonkinetic activities to achieve the desired effects on the enemy throughout the battlespace.

The kinetic elements were characterized by aggressive combat reconnaissance patrols, movements to contact, deliberate ground and air assaults, and frequent cordon-and-search operations. Designed to fix and finish the enemy, the search-and-attack dimension of the strategy was manifested in more than 619 combat patrols, covering some 120,000 square kilometers, in a six-month period.

The effectiveness of this approach was best articulated by the exiled Supreme Taliban Commander Mullah Omar, who was quoted as saying, “What are the Americans doing? Why are they mad? ... They are killing our brothers faster than we can replace them.”

The nonkinetic elements were characterized by civil-military operations (more than 332 missions), robust human-intelligence activities, creative PSYOP, and a tireless medical-assistance program that treated more than 20,000 Afghan patients. These non-kinetic activities negated the enemy’s ideological support and had a direct impact on the quantity and quality of the intelligence gathered, as well as an impact on the number of improvised explosive devices turned in and the number of caches reported. The ability to counter the enemy’s ideological support also increased the effectiveness of advanced special-operations activities, which in turn contributed to the ability to effect ACM leadership. On three occasions, ACM leaders were left virtually at the gate of an SF firebase as a result of the relationships that had grown out of the nonkinetic operations.

The entire counterinsurgency strategy was based on partnership with the Afghan National Army. Owing in large part to the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group’s long and storied history with the ANA and with Afghanistan in general, TF-31 can say that there has been significant progress. Slow progress to be certain,

but progress nevertheless. There is also a promise of exponentially greater progress if we can nest a strategy for foreign internal defense, or FID, within the counterinsurgency strategy for southern Afghanistan in the years ahead.

The FID strategy must be part of a true ANA partnership, and every effort must be made to transform from a theory of operations that have an “Afghan face” to the practice of operations that are “Afghan led.” The effort has to extend to breaking down current barriers to partnership. The absence of the IROA from the roster of the Global Counterterrorism Force and the lack of an intelligence-sharing agreement with the IROA suggests that the road ahead is fraught with challenges that may ultimately bring progress to a standstill. Until the time that such obstacles can be overcome, the FID strategy must incorporate creative solutions for maintaining the momentum of growth.

TF-31 incorporated ANA liaison officers into the forward operating base headquarters as a means of “going the extra mile” in building the ANA’s capacity for greater self-reliance and partnership. The effectiveness of the tactic was felt during the many ANA battalion-level operations conducted during the summer and fall of 2005.

Conclusion

The situation in Afghanistan is at a critical crossroads. We must recognize that the enemy’s center of

gravity is their ideology, and that they will continue to influence the people and government as they execute their strategy of wait, conserve and survive. If we do not adopt a comprehensive model to address the complexity of the situation and acknowledge that the counterinsurgency is still in its infancy, we may succumb to the complexity in such a way as to raise the cost of success to an exorbitant level. It is a foregone conclusion that the enduring threat to Afghanistan is not an overland invasion from one of its neighbors, and that Afghanistan will not fall back into bedlam (international momentum simply will not allow that to happen). But the question of the price of success remains.

The formula for success in Afghanistan has to be a strong counterinsurgency strategy, based on a tailor-made threat model for Afghanistan that seeks to prepare the Afghan national security forces to assume responsibility for their own destiny. This strategy will have to be coupled with a reconstruction effort that has a conventional-force security blanket to create a safe and stable environment in which good governance and economic reconstruction efforts can thrive. Without the strategy, we must be prepared to accept the inflated bill in time, resources and lives that may be the result of too many well-intentioned but disjointed blueprints for victory in Afghanistan. **SW**

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Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bolduc and Major Richard Reese contributed to this article. Bolduc is the commander of the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, the “Desert Eagles.” He has deployed to Afghanistan twice. During his first rotation, he fought side by side with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and participated in the liberation of Kandahar. Reese is the operations officer for the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group. He has deployed to Afghanistan three times and has twice been awarded the Bronze Star for his service in support of OEF.

DIVER ON

PREPARING SOLDIERS FOR CDQC: A TEAM SERGEANT'S REPORT

By Master Sergeant J.T. Reed

Although Special Forces groups no longer conduct preliminary training for SF combat divers, SF detachment team sergeants can still prepare their Soldiers for the demanding course at the SF Underwater Operations School.

Since the early 1980s, the SF groups conducted their own training to prepare SF Soldiers for the Combat Diver Qualification Course, or CDQC. Last year, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, whose 1st Special Warfare Training Group runs the SF Underwater Operations School at Key West, Fla., incorporated the pre-CDQC instruction into the CDQC to take the burden of training off the groups. With the change, many SF team sergeants have been left wondering how best to prepare Soldiers for the CDQC.

Recently, that concern sent me to the school looking for answers. At the time, I was preparing four of my Soldiers for CDQC. Their backgrounds were as varied as their capabilities: One had attended pre-CDQC almost a year before and been recommended to attend CDQC. One was an 18X who had deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom and had almost a year of team time. One was a young Soldier who had spent only a short time in the Army before coming to SF. The fourth was an 18X who had less than two months of team time. With nothing to base their training routine on other than the current "strong swimmer program," I adopted many of the tasks that had always been included in the pre-CDQC, leaving out only that program's intense stress.

But with one-third of my detachment

scheduled to attend the CDQC, I was still concerned about whether I was doing what I should. I contacted the 1st Special Warfare Training Group's 2nd Battalion, which teaches the course, about visiting the SF Underwater Operations School. I eventually received permission to observe the two weeks of pool training that prepare students to meet the demands of open-ocean training.

While I would like to give a detailed daily training schedule, it is in the best interests of future attendees that I don't. Rather, I will sum up the pool training and show what team sergeants can do to prepare their Soldiers.

The first week of CDQC consists of many of the events typically associated with any school: the PT test, medical-records review and in-processing. During this week, the instructors also begin molding the students into combat divers. They conduct the chamber pressure test to ensure that the students can equalize pressure in their ears. They also begin classes that will assist students in the near future. The SF Underwater Operations School dedicates nine hours of instruction and practical exercises to finning techniques alone.

The second week, Pool Week, gives the students a shock to their systems, pushing them to hard but realistic limits. The students conduct tasks designed to increase their breath-holding capacity and their confidence in their ability to operate in the waterborne environment. The first day of the Pool Week that I attended, several students quit, but that must be expected: Many of them had never had a mask that filled with water or done an

underwater swim.

My second day of Pool Week confirmed that the school cadre had indeed made pre-CDQC obsolete. Students achieved progressively greater lengths on the underwater swim (which eventually culminates with 50 meters). They then began the same progression in the duration of Navy drownproofing, which requires that students remain afloat despite being bound hand and foot. After exiting the pool, donning their equipment and receiving their dive-supervisor inspection, the students re-entered the water to practice equipment-recovery drills, which transitioned into the weight-belt swim.

The students were given a realistic set of standards: Use the techniques you were taught; do not prematurely end the event by grabbing the wall or losing faith in yourself and quitting. Students also did underwater sprints and tank-treading exercises to increase their breath-holding capabilities and to develop the leg and hip-flexor muscles. That night saw the beginning of remedial training: Students were paired with an instructor who talked them through the variety of techniques that can be applied to complete any event.

During day three of Pool Week, the class seemed to start coming together as a team. With few exceptions, the Soldiers who had left the course up to then had not been comfortable in the waterborne environment. The remaining students were young men, in good physical condition, who had the desire to succeed. By day three, the students are spending more time on compressed air and less time

DECK





Photo by April Blumer

“My second day of Pool Week confirmed that the school cadre had indeed made pre-CDQC obsolete.”

on the precursor events. They are beginning to feel that they can truly become combat divers. To advance to the finer points of operating in the waterborne environment, the students are tested on some of the events they have been training for: the weight-belt swim, the 50-meter underwater swim and equipment recovery. During this testing, the success of the previous day's remedial training became evident. All the students passed equipment recovery; 90 percent passed the 50-meter underwater swim.

Day four gave further evidence of the students' transition into combat divers. They finished quickly with their breath-holding exercises and the 50-meter underwater swim test (raising their success rate on the underwater swim from 90 to 97 percent). Then they made the transition to compressed air. The cadre members began shifting their focus from training the students to be comfortable holding their breath underwater to training them to be comfortable operating on compressed air.

Day five began with continued evaluation and re-evaluation of the students' abilities to conduct underwater swims, followed by Navy drownproofing. Afterward, the cadre had the students perform underwater sprints. By this day, the students were beginning to show patterns of strengths and weaknesses, and the cadre evaluates those trends to determine whether a student has the potential to become a combat diver. Basing the evaluation on trends rather than on a snapshot gives the school a better determination of a student's abilities and motivations.

During Pool Week, the tasks that students accomplished during the first week were revisited to assist students' continued development, but they spent less time on those events each day. The second week emphasizes the adage, "It pays to be a winner": When students perform the tasks successfully, they are told to slide out of the pool while the remaining students receive additional training. The focus then shifts to the next set of tasks: one- and two-man confidence exams and the free-ascent swimming tower. These will be the last tasks the students perform before

leaving the relative safety of the pool to begin training in the open ocean. The events of week two are therefore the last ones that a team sergeant can prepare his men for.

In preparing Soldiers for CDQC, one of the most important things a team sergeant can do is to discard the old thinking about subjecting students to high stress right away. The Underwater Operations School no longer tests students immediately on their ability to complete events like Navy drownproofing, equipment recovery, 50-meter swim, etc. The school has adopted a methodology that gives a student the instruction and the time to learn these tasks. Even after the students begin learning the tasks, the School embraces the concept of the total Soldier. The Soldier's progress, as a whole, is more important than his performance in any one task.

Prepare your Soldiers so that they will show up for CDQC in good cardio-respiratory shape, able to do 52 pushups, perform 62 sit-ups, run two miles in 14:54, and do seven pull-ups. These should be the minimum standards; they do not, in themselves, guarantee success. Conduct the recommended strong-swimmer training to ensure that Soldiers can at least swim. However, the critical factor throughout all of the tasks that will be given to the students is that they not show panic but continue to attempt the assigned task. Of the four Soldiers I prepared for CDQC, three completed the training; the fourth withdrew voluntarily from training because of a family problem.

The following is a recommended program for preparing students for CDQC. It is not all-inclusive, and it is by no means an attempt to tell other team sergeants how to train their teams. It is meant only as the observations of a diver and team sergeant.

- Good cardio conditioning is paramount. The ability to recover from strenuous PT can be achieved only through continued physical and mental conditioning.
- Incorporate pool work into your PT regimen. It is imperative that the Soldiers get their face in the water and get some water up their noses. If a Soldier



▲ **HEAVY BREATHING** Soldiers enrolled in the Combat Diver Qualification Course practice breathing during pool week. *Photo by April Blumer*

demonstrates signs of panic while doing flutter kicks with a mask full of water or refuses to swim under the water for the prerequisite 25 meters, he may need to delay attending CDQC until he can overcome that. Include events like water polo or underwater football (i.e., competitive sports that incorporate dynamic breath-holding and elevated heart rates).

- If possible, expose the Soldier to surface swims using a mask and fins. This is not mandatory, but it will increase the Soldiers' overall confidence level. If the student does not have the opportunity to conduct surface swims, then flutter kick, flutter kick, flutter kick.
- Practice breath-holding. It doesn't have to be underwater — it can be done in the team room, watching TV, etc.

- Ensure that the Soldier can achieve the mandated strong-swimmer prerequisites: swim 25 meters underwater; swim 500 meters in uniform and swim booties; pass the PT test (52 pushups, 62 sit-ups, two miles in 14:54 and seven pull-ups).
- If a detachment has the luxury of time, train the Soldier on the old pre-CDQC tasks, because they will be trained in CDQC. However, these tasks should not be considered as a factor in a Soldier's ability to succeed in CDQC, because the SF Underwater Operations School will make great efforts to teach Soldiers to perform the tasks. Tasks include the weight-belt swim, Navy drownproofing, equipment recovery, knot tying, 50-meter underwater swim, bobbing with tanks, underwater sprints, proper

hand and arm signals, conducting safe ascent procedures, and proper surface dive techniques.

In summary, if I could stress one thing to my fellow team sergeants, it would be that the old pre-CDQC training is neither necessary nor a valid indicator of success in the CDQC. Conduct good physical training at the SF-detachment level that incorporates swimming and breath-holding. Let the Soldiers get some water in their faces. If they can handle a good PT run and then go to the pool and not panic when they get a face full of water, the Underwater Operations School will give them every chance to become a combat diver. **SW**

Master Sergeant J.T. Reed is the operations sergeant for SF Operational Detachment 555, 5th SF Group.

Bound by Honor

Story, photo by Janice Burton

“To really live, you must almost die. To those who fight for it, life has a meaning that the protected will never know.”

That quote has great meaning to Gary Beikirch. Beikirch, a Medal of Honor recipient and former Special Forces medic, had his brush with death in Vietnam on April 1, 1970, and it forever changed his outlook on life. He recently returned to Fort Bragg, N.C., the post where he trained prior to deploying to Vietnam, to take part in a ceremony to honor the 40th anniversary of the John F. Kennedy Chapel.

“When I came through the gates of Fort Bragg, a flood of memories came back to me,” said Beikirch. “It wasn’t initiated by what I saw, because everything is different, except the chapel. It was the feeling I got when I talked to the guys. Whether it’s here on Fort Bragg or on a street somewhere else, there’s a real brotherhood between Special Forces Soldiers. I haven’t had this kind of experience in quite a while.”

Beikirch spent two days visiting the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. What he saw impressed him.

“I told the guys that when I went through the SF training we didn’t have anything comparable to what they have now. The day I got my beret, there were about 30 of us standing in a street, but today, watching the Regimental First Formation, I know how they felt when they said, ‘Don the beret,’” he said.

During his visit, Beikirch spent time at Camp Mackall, Bank Hall and the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center.

“For me, the medical training center was the highlight,” he said. “The medical training facilities are just tremendous. At the language school, I saw the guys

working in small teams training together. I saw them go through a lot of training experiences we didn’t get until after we went to our group. The dedication, investment and commitment these guys have makes me believe that we are in good hands.”

Coming from Beikirch, that is high praise. Beikirch is one of only 113 still-living Medal of Honor recipients. He is the chaplain of the Medal of Honor Society and served in the 3rd, 5th and 10th Special Forces groups. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during an enemy encounter at Camp Dak Seang, Republic of Vietnam. According to his Medal of Honor citation, during the battle, Beikirch “with complete disregard for his personal safety, moved unhesitatingly through the withering enemy fire to his fallen comrades, applied first aid to their wounds and assisted them to the medical aid station.”

It is in that paragraph that Beikirch says the first of two mistakes occurs in his citation. “That word ‘unhesitatingly’ is a mistake,” said Beikirch. “There was some hesitation, but when you are in that position your training kicks in, and it becomes automatic. I knew my job was to help the Soldiers who were down, so that’s what I did.”

The first time Beikirch was wounded, he was working on a Vietnamese soldier. “I heard a 122 shell coming in, and I threw myself on top of the soldier. The blast hit me and I could see myself flying head over heels until I slammed into the medical bunker. I felt immediate pain. I tried to move, but I couldn’t.”

That’s where the second error in Beikirch’s citation comes into play. The citation says Beikirch ran through enemy fire several more times, when in fact, he couldn’t walk. “A Montagnard medic had been assisting me before I was injured,” he recalled. “He came to me at the medic bunker and tried to get me downstairs, but I told him we had to stay up there. Our job was there where the wounded were. So he carried me around to the wounded so I could treat them. When he was wounded, another Montagnard medic helped him carry me. I was literally draped over their shoulders.”

Beikirch was wounded two more times, with the last injury resulting in the death of one of his medics. “When the rounds came in, he threw himself on top of me to protect me,” he said. Another medic ran to replace him, and Beikirch and his medics carried on until he collapsed. “I couldn’t have done anything without those medics,” he said. “I tell guys that I don’t think I deserve this medal. I just did what I was trained to do. When you are in that situation, you just go until you can’t go anymore.”

Beikirch remembers waking up in a hospital bed in a world of hurt. “I kept battling unconsciousness, and during that time I realized there was nothing I could do to keep myself from passing out,” he said. “I watched the guy beside me die and knew I couldn’t stop it. It was really scary. I wasn’t ready to die. I woke up again, and a chaplain was there. He asked me if I wanted to pray, and

I told him I didn't know how. He said, 'God knows how to listen.'"

For Beikirch, that was a turning point in his life. Before going to Vietnam, Beikirch had believed in very little but himself. "I didn't really acknowledge that there was a higher power," he said. "I really thought that I was all I needed, but there were a couple of times when I looked somewhere else."

The first was in 1968, when Beikirch sought the solace of the JFK Chapel following the death of a friend. "I heard my friend had been killed, and I just walked across the street to the chapel," he said. "I didn't really have an awareness of anything higher than me or my need for anything more than me. But I knew that it was a place to sit and think. It was always quiet. It was always peaceful."

In 1969 he again found himself heading to the chapel, before he shipped out to Vietnam. "I probably went there for the same reason — for the quiet — but I know now that's when I was rubbing shoulders with God. There was such openness at the chapel. Going there got me thinking about the existence of a higher power. I realized that I might need that power when I went into battle," he said.

The peace that Beikirch found in the chapel, and again when he prayed with the chaplain in the hospital, would be tried in the years that followed.

Upon his release from the Army, Beikirch returned to the states and enrolled in college. What he found in 1971 was a college campus that was opposed to the war and its warriors. "I got spit on on campus, and I said, 'I'm out of here,'" he recalled. Unlike the others of that time who dropped out of society, Beikirch didn't turn to drugs, he turned to nature. He went to New Hampshire, and in the woods surrounding Mount Adams, he found a cave and moved in. In the fall of 1973, he enrolled in a nearby seminary. In October of that year, he received a letter in his post office box asking him to be at a local inn at a specified time for an important phone call. Beikirch did what was asked and received a phone call from Washington, D.C., notifying him that he was being awarded the Medal of Honor. "When they told me, I was silent," he said. "I didn't know what to say. They asked me if I wanted to come to Washington for the presentation, and I said yes."


Before going to Washington, Beikirch had to make some changes. His hair was below his shoulders, and his escort officers told him he could not wear his uniform unless he cut his hair. He cut it and was presented the medal by President Richard Nixon. With the ceremonies over, Beikirch returned to New Hampshire, and his cave, and he put the medal in his duffel bag with his other awards and kind of forgot about it. He completed seminary, met and married his wife, whom he affectionately calls Lolly, and became an assistant pastor. With Lolly, he moved out of the cave and into a shack in Maine.

"We were living way out in the woods. We had no running water or electricity," she recalled. "Gary was dealing

with some issues, and I didn't understand all of them, but we got through it."

Over time, Beikirch was able to put that time into perspective and to recognize the honor of the medal he had received. "It's only been over the last few years that either of us has gotten to a comfort level of what this means," he said. "It's been a real experience wearing and holding the Medal of Honor for what it means. I think all of the Medal of Honor recipients would say, 'It's not about me — it's about all of the men and women who have served.'"

"When I wear this medal, I know how important it is to other people. I had friends who are vets who told me to quit being so selfish. They told me, 'You aren't wearing it for you — you're wearing it for us,'" he continued. "I realized that it represents sacrifice and believing in something more than myself. Now, I wear it for His glory. I realize that it is only by God's grace that I survived. I wear it for His honor and for the honor of all the men and women who have served, because we are all the same." **SW**



INTELLIGENT DESIGN

COIN Operations Require Soldiers to Put a New Emphasis on Intelligence Collection and Analysis

One of the greatest challenges for the current generation of American military professionals is relearning the principles of counterinsurgency, or COIN. This includes intelligence professionals who must not only tailor the intelligence preparation of the battlespace, or IPB, process to the requirements of COIN but also learn the intricacies of foreign cultures and people. Analysts have to shift their focus from military capabilities to social networks, culture and people. The level of understanding required to conduct COIN operations at the tactical and operational levels presents challenges.

At the beginning of a COIN campaign, before patterns in the enemy's method of operating have emerged, the intelligence analyst is more dependent on military art than science. In such a situation, to generate actionable intelligence, friendly forces must frequently begin by executing an action.¹ In that type of operation, the role of intelligence shifts from one that supports maneuver to a more central role.

Perhaps the biggest intelligence challenges presented by COIN arise from the difficulties friendly forces face in identifying insurgents and in understanding complex cultural environments. Examples can be seen in the chart on p. 27. Before discussing COIN, we must review IPB against more conventional threats to appreciate the changes in collection, analysis and support to targeting.

Traditional threats

For more than 40 years, the United States prepared for a conventional war

against the Soviet Union and its allies. The Cold War affected every facet of Army operations, from weapons procurement, to the development of tactics, to training at the combat training centers.

Cold War planning also affected the various parts of the intelligence cycle: direct, collect, process and disseminate. In developing the IPB process, the intelligence community utilized doctrinal templates that became the basis for the development of enemy courses of action, or COA. The availability of Soviet doctrine, combined with their rigid adherence to it and the minimal amounts of initiative they afforded junior leaders, made the doctrinal templates a useful and accurate tool. Over time, IPB became a scientific process.

Collection

Collection of intelligence against enemy targets focused on the threat's large networks, including command, control and communications, or C³; air defense; and sustainment. Intelligence assets at all levels utilized a balance of the various intel disciplines — human, or HUMINT, signals, or SIGINT, imagery, or IMINT, and measurement and signatures intelligence, or MASINT — to find the enemy for targeting. Tactical and operational military intelligence, or MI, units used their organic systems as well as tactical exploitation of national capabilities,

or TENCAP, feeds to find concentrations of Soviet forces.

Analysis

Define the battlefield environment and describe the battlefield effects. In this part of IPB, the intelligence section focused on the effects of weather and the physical terrain on friendly and enemy operations. It focused on the military aspects of terrain, mobility and the impact of terrain on the range of the weapons systems.

Evaluate the threat and determine threat courses of action. Determining the effects of weather and terrain allowed an intelligence section to predict an enemy force's scheme of maneuver in a situational template. Further adjustments were made by taking into account range fans, doctrinal rates of movement and the space and time between echelons. Units that trained in exercises against this threat believed that the IPB process did a good job of depicting its operations. The reality, however, is that we may never know, since we never faced the Soviet Army in battle.

Targeting

Tactical targeting in conventional operations had a kinetic focus. Friendly forces targeted high-payoff targets that would weaken the enemy at a decisive point. These target sets traditionally included reconnaissance units, armor, engineer equipment, long-range artillery, rockets and attack-aviation assets. At the operation-



▲ MAKING FRIENDS A Special Forces Soldier gives a young Afghan girl some food after taking part in a search of her village in the Zabol Province. The SF Soldiers and members of the Afghan National Army were looking for Taliban fighters. If Soldiers are to be able to collect intelligence, they must make sure that the villagers see them not as the enemy, but rather as friends. *U.S. Army photo.*

al level, the targeting effort focused on key enablers such as petroleum storage facilities, supply warehouses and ammunition supply points. Additionally, using information operations, or IO, and psychological operations, or PSYOP, friendly forces tried to demoralize enemy forces and dissuade them from fighting and to influence other forces. During a conventional fight, intelligence supported most parts of the targeting process: decide, detect, deliver and assess.

Intelligence support to COIN

Supporting COIN operations with intelligence requires the analyst to know the indigenous people in a way not required by conventional operations. This human-intelligence dimension involves examining the role

that culture, demographics, political support, religion and ethnicity play. It also necessitates learning about patterns of social networking. The intelligence cycle begins with directing requirements to different intelligence assets and then conducting collection operations.

Collection

In the COIN environment, identifying the enemy is a significant obstacle and an important part of the collection process. Potential adversaries have the advantage of blending in with the population. Identifying insurgents must occur in order to separate the insurgents from their bases of support through population control.

The focus of collection efforts in COIN differs greatly from that of

conventional combat operations. Because human factors are extremely important, standoff collection assets have less value. In COIN, useful intelligence is most often obtained through personal contact with the population. This puts a disproportionate level of importance on HUMINT and requires a different understanding of it. In conventional operations, HUMINT is the domain of interrogators and counter-intelligence agents; that has changed.

In COIN, the preponderance of HUMINT comes from the units who have the most familiarity and contact with the population. Special Forces teams, Civil Affairs personnel, the unit chaplain, the commander, engineers, the SAW gunner in the 1st squad and everybody else who has daily contact with the population notice changing



▲ **MEETING NEEDS** U.S. Army special-operations medical personnel unload medical supplies during a U.S./Iraqi medical civil-military operation in Iraq. In COIN, useful intelligence is most often collected through personal contact with the population, such as these medical clinics. *U.S. Army photo.*

conditions in their areas before anybody else. Some of the changes might match indicators and warnings from the intelligence section that precede an insurgent action. Input from first-contact units gives the commander the ability to see first, understand first and act first. The increase in situational awareness helps friendly forces gain and maintain the initiative, which is critical in COIN.²

While COIN demands that we break our reliance on technical collection and put renewed emphasis on HUMINT, the other intelligence disciplines — SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT — still have value. Friendly forces can take advantage of national collection assets using organic TENCAP systems to confirm or deny HUMINT reporting. As Colonel Rick Allenbaugh notes, “(In a

COIN targeting cycle,) the key is (still) cross-cueing and synchronization.”³ Open-source intelligence, or OSINT, also gains a measure of importance that it does not have against a conventional threat. The intelligence analyst has much to gain from what people say on the radio and write in newspapers. Just gauging the number of pro- and anti-government newspapers printed in a certain area is telling.

The sources of intelligence and the collection assets that an intelligence professional has access to in a COIN environment are much different from those of a conventional combat operation. In a conventional operation, the intelligence section accesses organic assets with limited or no access to interagency, international or national

sources of information, especially at lower echelons. In COIN, intelligence operations strive to fuse intelligence from nonorganic collection sources into a seamless picture of the insurgency networks and to provide corroborating intelligence for targeting.

As noted by Retired Major General James Marks, maneuver commanders are also conducting operations to gain intelligence: “Commanders at all levels must develop intelligence to develop their missions. Higher headquarters often will not and cannot provide sufficient clarity of task or purpose to drive operations at the lower levels.”⁴ As a result, intelligence operations are now considered operational missions. For example, operational elements may plan to increase patrols and establish roadblocks surrounding a

neighborhood suspected of harboring al-Qaeda senior leadership. Door-to-door checks through residences may trigger movement of a target that may be detected by unmanned aerial vehicles or by cordon-and-search forces when the targets attempt to escape the area. Another example of the relational changes is the integration of intelligence professionals into information operations and the nonkinetic targeting processes.

Operators are now trained and accustomed to collecting forensic evidence during search operations. During site exploitation, residences suspected of providing safe-havens to insurgents are now treated much like crime scenes. Operators search for and collect items that may provide leads for future operations. As Allenbaugh notes, "Forensics are new and not fully accepted or understood."⁵ Building a forensic case has two major benefits: It allows host-nation, or HN, security forces to build legal cases against insurgents and their supporters; and it provides information that interrogators can use to confront suspects and gain more intelligence on their network and operational plans.

The COIN environment requires joint, interagency, international and HN collaboration for collection operations and target development. National intelligence support teams, when deployed to an operational command, provide access to national-level collection assets from other government agencies, or OGAs. Joint interagency task forces, or JIATFs, composed of military and government intelligence analysts and collectors, offer another way of accessing national intelligence and analysis.⁶ Military analysts fuse that intelligence with organic collection to gain the best possible understanding of the insurgent network, high-value targets and the populace.

Centralized and synchronized intelligence collection between all elements deployed in a theater is important for providing a more complete picture of terrorist networking through more thorough intelligence fusion. In current operations, a target tracked by the JIATF in Afghanistan or Pakistan may carry operational plans between the al-Qaeda senior leadership and Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi and turn up in another command's sector in Iraq. This makes mutual support between commands a necessity. The insurgent network is linked; we should be, too.

Mutual support between the various units, agencies and countries often meets parochial and cultural roadblocks. Intelligence professionals must work cooperatively but forcefully to cut through bureaucratic red tape and to keep everybody focused on the end state: actionable intelligence. The synergy of intelligence collaboration is too valuable to sacrifice it to petty concerns.

Analysis

Define the battlefield environment and describe the battlefield effects. One of the requirements in the first IPB step is to establish an area of interest, or AI.⁷ Although U.S. forces face adversaries who conduct transnational operations and aspire to lead a global insurgency, the AI, as a practical matter, cannot be the entire world. Intelligence analysts work to incorporate local nodes that the insurgents use to connect with other parts of their network into the AI. Doing this creates an AI that encompasses a manageable area for analysis. These AIs may include avenues of approach that cross an international boundary and lines of communication, including known or likely courier routes, SIGINT networks and local Internet service providers.

Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, in his article "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," offers some valuable advice about studying the terrain: "Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district."⁸

Depending on the operational environment, a myriad of other demographic considerations may also become relevant in COIN. These considerations include social class structure, race, ethnicity, tribe, political party, gender, age, physical ability, nationality, language, region, professional or occupational status and employment levels. Additionally, key personnel and groups have become the new key terrain. These may comprise religious clerics, financially powerful families, influential members of the opposition or anyone with influence over a large or important constituency. Insurgents may target, agitate or subvert any of these groups to further their aims.

Key terrain also encompasses the neutral pockets of the population, the "fence sitters" who represent the operational center of gravity.⁹ Intelligence sections should graphically depict the geographic areas of these various groups in population status overlays and continuously develop the relationship of social networks using link diagrams. Population analysis enables military forces to identify key formal and informal leaders as well as groups of people who require intelligence and operational focus. This socio-cultural analysis bolsters the power of full-spectrum military operations by providing a starting point for winning "hearts and minds."

An evaluation of the battlefield's

effects begins with an analysis of the environment and its effect on friendly and enemy operations. The analyst also considers political topography and the factors that relate to it. These may include infrastructure and enemy capabilities that previously were not evaluated. In the COIN environment, one must consider the importance of infrastructure and not merely its location and effect. Opening an office of a government ministry in a certain neighborhood could have second- and third-order effects that the commander must weigh when he considers COAs.

Owing to technology and the asymmetrical nature of the threat, the bat-

tional patience and allow enough time for insurgent patterns of operation to emerge. Interrogations of detained insurgents and the exploitation of captured manuals, equipment and information will also help to confirm suspected patterns of operation and tactics, techniques and procedures.

In assessing threat capabilities, the intelligence section will try to link personnel with events using an activities matrix. A series of incidents, along with information from captured personnel and equipment, may help reveal key personnel within the network. Examples may include bomb makers, financiers and arms dealers. Their relative power within the network is

makes people tick, what their structure is, where authority lies, what is different about their values, and their way of doing business.”¹³

Targeting

Owing to the demands of the “three block war,”¹⁴ in which U.S. forces could find themselves providing humanitarian assistance, conducting peace operations and fighting a mid-intensity battle simultaneously, targeting has become more complex. It also demands much more from the intelligence community. With the full-spectrum operations required by COIN, U.S. forces do two types of targeting:

“We know that lethal targeting does not itself provide a solution in COIN.”

blespace now heavily favors the use of information operations. Using cyberspace and the media, the insurgents seek to influence their target audience, expand their numbers and exploit their acts. Outlets that allow the insurgents to spread their message must be incorporated into the analysis of the environment. COIN forces should pay attention to Internet pages, in particular, as they provide an effective means of reaching a large audience from an electronic sanctuary.

Evaluate the threat and determine threat courses of action. The requirements of Steps 3 and 4 of IPB, as outlined in FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, show that the process is adaptable to COIN although COIN presents additional challenges. Step 3 consists of converting patterns of operations to graphics,¹⁰ describing, in words, the threat’s tactics and options, identifying high-value targets, or HVTs, and defining the threat capabilities.¹¹

COIN forces must exercise opera-

high because multiple operational teams rely on the support that they provide.¹² Individual teams or cells, on the other hand, have less connection to the network. This makes finding them a more formidable task. The section has a number of analytical tools, such as the association matrix for mapping the network and finding its key nodes (who may become HVTs).

One of the greatest challenges in COIN is to identify those pockets of the population that indirectly or secretly provide support to the insurgency. Winning over the population denies the insurgents their base of support. To do this, U.S. forces must obtain sufficient cultural intelligence to gain rapport, trust and credibility as an ally of the HN. Cultural missteps impair our relationship with the HN and the people. The people have to believe that the government can fulfill their needs and personal interests. “We never do a good job of cultural intelligence: of understanding what

- Lethal — targeting of key leaders and nodes (“kill/capture,” raid)
- Nonlethal — gaining support from the population (“heart and minds”)

The obvious difference in the two comes in the “deliver” phase. One type of targeting uses combat operations (maneuver and firepower) to destroy, while the other uses nonlethal fires (IO and PSYOP) and CA to persuade. The “detect” phase, however, is also different. The first target is threat-based, but the second considers the neutral population as the target audience. The first type requires the tracking of certain key leaders, while the second type requires an understanding of the environment and the people. The first poses technical challenges; the latter is conceptually difficult.

In order to maintain contact with key leaders or other HVTs, the targeting process in COIN more closely follows “decide, detect, track, deliver and assess,” instead of the Cold War “decide, detect, deliver and assess.” The

CONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS - VS - COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)

	Conventional Ops	COIN
IPB-Battlespace	Physical terrain	Human factors - demographics, culture, tribes, clans, class, ethnicity, key individuals/groups/families
IPB-Effects	Politics not primarily considered	Politics are central and integral for every action
	Linear	Asymmetric (computer, media-IO, population)
	Effects of physical terrain and weather	Effects of infrastructure, gov't services, jobs and media
IPB-Threat	Order of battle	Networks (cellular structure)
	Doctrinal templates	Enemy TTPs
	Military focus (uniformed combatants, identifiable threat with large signature)	Irregular-warfare threat requires distinguishing between insurgents, active/tacit supporters and general population
IPB-COA	Event templates (movement times/doctrine)	Pattern, link analysis, social networking (objectives/goals)
	Centralized C2	Decentralized cellular operations
TARGETING	Equipment focus	Focus on insurgent (enemy/social networking) and population (environment)
	Critical capabilities determined through order of battle	Critical capabilities determined through pattern, incident and network analysis
	Targeting boards-FSCoord run, emphasis on kinetic fires	Targeting boards-effects cell run, emphasis on nonkinetic
COLLECTION	Collectors scheduled by blocks of time for D3A [decide, detect, deliver and assess (BDA)]	High demand for the "unblinking eye" for D2TDA [decide, detect, track, deliver, assess (1st to 3rd-order effects)]
	Collectors employed at a stand-off range	Collectors much closer to the area (personal contact)
	Heavy use of overhead (SIGINT/IMINT)	HUMINT-intensive
	Military communications	Personal communication systems (mobile phones, pagers, Internet)
	Ops executed with intel	Ops conducted to create intel
	Organic, TENCAP (tactical exploitation of national capabilities), coalition assets	Organic, TENCAP, coalition interagency/international/national leverage
	EPW searches, captured enemy equipment (military exploitation)	Detainee searches, sensitive site exploitation, forensics (similar to criminal investigation)

change places greater demands on intelligence assets to provide an "unblinking eye," or continuous surveillance, either fixed or moving targets.

We know that lethal targeting does not itself provide a solution in COIN.¹⁵

We have to target the people's support, which is the center of grav-

ity for both the HN government and the insurgents. Understanding how factors like culture, religion and tribal structure cause different behaviors



▲ **A TIME TO TALK** U.S. Army special-operations Soldiers, along with their Iraqi counterparts, talk with Iraqi citizens about their needs, but also about insurgent activity on the ground. These one-on-one encounters are a primary means of gathering intelligence. *U.S. Army photo.*

and perceptions is difficult; it requires education and experience. Intelligence sections should seek out a HN military counterpart (English-speaking or not), other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, immigrants within the ranks, or others who have area expertise.¹⁶

Having contributed to the “detect” phase of targeting, the intelligence analyst is still not finished — the “assess” phase is critical in COIN. Instead of merely doing a battle-damage assessment, the analyst must anticipate the reaction of key groups and second- and third-order effects. A UAV camera will not pick up the most important effects. Intelligence analysts must be the

commander’s experts on culture and be able to predict the consequences of servicing targets.

A critical aspect of targeting the insurgents and the population is that both groups form part of a larger social network. Killing or capturing a key leader could generate ripple effects throughout that network and outside it. Targeting certain groups through nonkinetic means will also affect members of other groups that because of fear, insult or jealousy, develop a connection to the event.¹⁷ Using link analysis, the analyst should try to anticipate these unintended consequences so the commander can more accurately assess his operational risk. With proper intelligence support, targeting

allows us to assist the HN government to secure popular support, which, once accomplished, is decisive.

Conclusion

Almost overnight it seems, MI analysts have gone from templating Soviet motorized rifle divisions to assessing the capabilities of clans, tribes, gangs and militias. The practice of intelligence has evolved from a military science in conventional operations to a military art in COIN. With that change came the challenge of learning about different peoples and their environments.

In COIN, the environment is as important as the enemy, because the neutral majority, the center of gravity,

resides there. COIN requires an appreciation of cultures, religions, tribes, classes, ethnicities and languages, so that the people will view U.S. forces and their own government positively and work against the insurgents. Knowledge of the population, social networks and the insurgency helps us to highlight the importance of human factors in fighting an insurgency. Consequently, most intelligence in COIN is collected by HUMINT, including information from Soldier debriefings and reporting. The other intelligence disciplines work in support to confirm or deny HUMINT reporting.

To effectively target the population, intelligence professionals use all-source intelligence gained from HN, joint service, interagency and multinational partners. Tearing down the walls between these groups and fusing intelligence enables effective targeting. Targeting the enemy and the population, through lethal and nonlethal means, results in a weakened insurgency that has been denied its base of support. Intelligence and operations, working closely together and with the HN, bring about this end state. **SW**

Notes:

1 In "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency" (Unpublished paper, 2006), the author, David Kilcullen, notes, "Intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not as a product prepared and served up by higher headquarters." A number of active-duty general officers in intelligence and Special Forces concur with that assessment.

2 These may range from newly hung posters of a particular leader of coalition concern or population movements into or away from the town.

3 E-mail to the authors, 9 April 2006. Cross-cueing refers to tasking more than one collector to confirm or deny information coming from another.

4 E-mail to the authors, 20 April 2006.

5 E-mail to the authors, 19 April 2006.

6 The JIATFs in Afghanistan and Iraq work together through working

groups, targeting meetings, operations and intelligence planning. JIATF responsibilities include collection, targeting and development of actionable intelligence.

7 "Area of interest - the geographical area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning or successful conduct of the commander's operation. The AI is usually larger than the command's AO and battle space; it includes any threat forces or characteristics of the battlefield environment that will significantly influence accomplishment of the mission." Department of the Army, FM 34-130: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), G-4.

8 David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," 2.

9 For a discussion on this in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom, see Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, "The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," Military Review (July-August 2005), 3.

10 Intelligence sections use patterns of operation, or tactics, techniques and procedures, in lieu of threat doctrine. Once portrayed graphically, the product becomes a doctrinal template.

11 Department of the Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), 2-1-2-2.

12 In social-network theory, such a node would score a high Eigenvector centrality, a number that measures the node's importance within the network.

13 Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, quoted in Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates, "My Clan Against the World: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia" (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 49.

14 This term was coined by retired Marine General Charles Krulak to describe a construct of post Cold War conflicts that demanded full-spectrum operations simultaneously. "In one moment in time, our service members will be

feeding and clothing displaced refugees — providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart — conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war." (Charles C. Krulak, "The Three Block War: Fighting In Urban Areas," presented at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 10 October 1997, Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December 1997, 139.)

15 As the early 20th-century author and theorist General Sir Charles Gwynn notes, the use of military force must be kept to an absolute minimum because "the military object is to re-establish the control of civil power and secure its acceptance without an aftermath of bitterness." (Sir Charles W. Gwynn, Imperial Policing [London: MacMillan and Company, 1934], 13.) New York Times columnist Tom Friedman observed the practice and consequence of making lethal targeting the primary focus at the operational level: "Have you noticed how often Israel kills a Hamas activist and the victim is described by Israelis as a 'senior Hamas official' or a 'key operative'?... By now Israel should have killed off the entire Hamas leadership twice ... [The result is] something I call Palestinian math: Israel kills one Hamas operative and three others volunteer to take his place, in which case what Israel is doing is actually self-destructive." (New York Times, June 15, 2003)

16 If limited area knowledge exists at home station, analysts should make maximum use of written periodicals and products, area-studies departments at universities, immigrant groups and Peace Corps volunteers.

17 Examples of this could include a supportive tribe's anger at numerous government projects and funds for building infrastructure going to a competing tribe that does not support the coalition.

This article was written and reviewed by a team of officers in Class 2006-01 of the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Contributors included (in alphabetical order) Majors Laura Geldhof, Maureen Green, Remi Hajjar, Chris Litwhiler, Christine Locke, James Myers and David Perrine; Lieutenant Commander David Smith; Christine Watson; and Majors Cameron Weathers and Dan Zeytoonian, who is the primary author. Major Zeytoonian is a Military Intelligence officer who has served in various command and staff positions within the XVIII Airborne Corps and was deployed to Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy. All the authors have worked for or with conventional military forces, special-operation forces and intelligence agencies at various levels. Their collective operational deployments include Afghanistan, Africa, Bosnia, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Korea and Kosovo. The authors wish to thank Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, retired Major General James Marks and retired Colonel Rick Allenbaugh for their input to this article.

IN FIGHTING FORM

The CA and PSYOP Training Pipeline Transformation Prepares Soldiers for an Asymmetric Battlefield

Story, photos by Janice Burton

In a move to ensure that Soldiers have all the skills they need to survive on an asymmetric battleground, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, has undergone a sweeping transformation of its Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations training programs. All phases of training from the advanced individual training, or AIT, to the officer qualification courses have been affected by the transformation.

“The world has changed dramatically since we last looked at our training,” said Lieutenant Colonel William Butcher, commander, 3rd Battalion. “The majority of our POIs (programs of instruction) were about a decade old. During that time, our world has changed through an increase of complex emergency operations and the Global War on Terrorism. We now operate more readily on an asymmetric battlefield, and our CA and PSYOP Soldiers are important contributors to stabilization and operations on that battlefield. It’s our duty to make sure they are prepared properly for the environments that they will face in the modern world.”

Butcher explained that the last sweeping modifications occurred to the course in 1996. At that time, SWCS, the proponent for CA and PSYOP training, was responsible for ensuring that Soldiers were trained in their individual skill sets — Soldiers were not trained for an impending combat environment. “It was expected that Soldiers would get that training at their unit,” said Butcher. “That’s just not our reality



▲ **CAN YOU HEAR ME NOW** PSYOP AIT students broadcast messages while on patrol during the AIT FTX.

anymore. So many of our Soldiers leave the schoolhouse, get to their unit and are quickly deployed. It is imperative that the institution ensures that they are prepared for deployment. We have to verify that every critical task they need to be successful — to embody the warrior ethos — has been both learned and exercised.”

To that end, the 3rd Battalion began its training transformation. Butcher said the staff was aware that the transformation was something that had to be accomplished, and that they took the transformation seriously, looking at every aspect of training and making changes in every program offered.

“The training I went through 10 years ago was insufficient for today’s world,” he added. “We believed that we could do better, and we changed our focus across the board in coordination with our training and doctrine development team.”

Course developers took a systems approach to the training process, extending some courses, shortening others and deleting some, focusing on the training the students needed to be successful.

“In the 20 months we’ve been working on this, we looked at every single one of the POIs and completely overhauled each and every one of those courses. We took three weeks away from the former 16-week Regional Studies course — changing its focus to providing analytical understanding of an operational area which will enhance the abilities of CA and PSYOP officers to provide accurate and timely effects-based feedback to the commanders they are assigned to,” he said. “We added time to the CAQC and POQC (Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations qualification courses), and we incorporated TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) mandated warrior tasks and drills into the AIT courses.”

The battalion also added another training program designed for Soldiers who are transitioning into the Civil Affairs, or 38B, military occupational specialty. The six-week (soon to be nine-week) course qualifies noncommissioned officers in Civil Affairs, while simultaneously incorporating certain aspects of their training with the officers’ course for the first time in the school’s history.

Butcher said the AIT courses were



▲ **MEETING OF THE MINDS** Students in the CAQC and POQC interact with the inhabitants of Freedom Village. The Iraqi role players fled Iraq during Saddam Hussein's reign and now help these ARSOF Soldiers.

the least affected by the transformation. “We do a great job through our AIT at teaching and reinforcing the skills they need to survive,” he said. “Our changes reflected the fact that it is important that they function as teams,” he continued. “In many cases, they will deploy in small teams and will sometimes be on their own — expected to respond and react to their duty, but also to protect the team member to their right and left.”

Simple changes, like the addition of cultural interaction and live-fire convoy training, are designed to build the team's warrior skills.

The CAQC and the POQC may have undergone the most dramatic changes. “In the past, the company conducted both an active-duty and Army Reserve qualification course for CA and PSYOP,” said Major David Converse, commander, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st SWTG.

For the reserve force, there was a nonresident course broken into two distinct phases. Phase I was a correspondence course, affectionately known as the “box of books.” Officers enrolled in the course had up to two years to complete the course. Once

they passed an exam on Phase I, they were eligible to attend Phase II, a two-week resident course. Active-duty officers were required to attend a four-week CA or PSYOP course, a regional-studies course and language training. Under the new training pipeline, both active and reserve officers attend a nine-week course that Converse describes as having “significant improvements” over the previous training.

“We validated the critical tasks our CA and PSYOP officers need to perform on the battlefield,” said Butcher. “The only way to validate them is if everybody is trained to the same standard. The days of doing work through the box of books are over and should be over. Why should one Soldier receive 25 percent of the instruction, while another receives 100 percent, if they are both expected to perform the same mission?”

Key to the success of the transformation is the implementation of a hard-core field-training exercise, known as Operation Certain Trust, that puts both the NCOs and the officers in the field together. The teams must face difficult dilemmas in the Soldiers' Urban Reaction Facility,

or SURF, and in a “real-world” village known as Freedom Village. Just as the conventional Army has found success through the implementation of cultural role players in training scenarios, SWCS has also embraced the idea for the CA and PSYOP training pipeline. Freedom Village is peopled by Iraqis who fled Saddam Hussein's Iraq. They engage Soldiers in language and cultural scenarios, forcing them to react and to form relationships. “Operation Certain Trust is the key to this training,” said Butcher. “I can't imagine doing this exercise without the role players. We had a real need to get language and culture involved in these exercises.”

While Butcher believes the training transformation is close to complete, he watches each iteration much like an expectant father. “The most challenging aspect (of the transformation) has been the validation process itself — waiting to see if we got it right is a lot like waiting for a baby,” he said. “We are always tweaking the training — that's the beauty of this organization — everybody is about getting it right. If it needs adjustment, we make it.” **SW**

ON TARGET

SWCS Poised to Meet Special Forces Growth

Story, photo by Janice Burton

For more than a year, the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School has been in the midst of a transformation that will position it to meet the growing demand for Special Forces Soldiers. In June, that transformation will be complete as the school begins the first of eight annual starts of the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, rather than the traditional four. The transformation of the training pipeline is one of the most sweeping in the school's history, affecting not only how students are recruited, assessed and trained, but also how SF Soldiers are sustained.

The transformation stands SWCS in good stead to meet the requirements of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the subsequent Program Decision Memorandum, or PDM, that calls for an increase in active-duty Special Forces battalions by one third beginning in Fiscal Year 2007. Prior to 2002, SWCS graduated approximately 350 SF active-duty

Forces Soldier. "Soldiers are putting more rounds down range than ever before," said Zeigler. "Soldiers are getting the warrior tasks at the front of the pipeline that they'll need as they progress through training. The SF Soldiers we are producing are highly trained warriors."

Zeigler said the grouping of students into cohorts at the beginning of the training, all linked through their language and group assignments, also helps build the team mentality needed to function on an operational detachment. "The students are grouped in language-oriented detachments up front," he explained. "They go through the SFQC together, and we will maintain that team integrity to the maximum extent possible."

He also added that moving the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape training to Phase II of the Q-Course gives students added skills to help them throughout the remainder of the course.

Zeigler said the move to a modularized training pipeline is the key to the transformation's success. Instead of running four iterations of the SFQC each year, SWCS will run eight iterations. The eight iterations allow students who are recycled to re-enter the training pipeline in a timely manner. "If a student needs to be recycled in his MOS (military occupational specialty) training, we can recycle him a lot quicker because the course is modularized," explained Zei-

"Now the students are in a perpetual state of training. Modularization allows us to constantly train and to consistently graduate."

enlisted Soldiers each year. Since that time, SWCS has conducted a methodical phased increase in the capacity of the SF training program, which has resulted in a goal of graduating 750 students in FY 2007.

"We have achieved our goals for each of the past two years and are on track to repeat this year. Our goals were established before the PDM came out," said Colonel Jack Zeigler, the commander of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group. "Our position is that if we continue to graduate 750 students we will meet the PDM at a steady state."

One of the SOF truths is, "You can't mass produce SOF." Some have argued that the increased number of graduates will result in a lowering of standards. Zeigler maintains that is far from true. "I would invite anyone with questions concerning our standards and how we are training to come and visit," he said. "I would like them to take a look at our transformation and how we are training our Soldiers."

He added that standards in many areas have actually been raised as a result of the transformation. Language training, which is a key component of the transformation and a warfighting skill, is one of the more obvious places where standards have been raised. Students now must earn a 1/1/1 rating on the Defense Language Proficiency Test in order to graduate from the course, rather than the 0+/0+ rating previously required.

Another area where the bar is being raised is during Phase II, where Soldiers learn patrolling skills, small-unit tactics and hone the common skills required to be a Special

gler. "In the past a guy wouldn't make it and would have to wait several months until the next class. During that time he would lose interest. Now the students are in a perpetual state of training. Modularization allows us to constantly train and to consistently graduate."

Another key to the success of the pipeline transformation is the quality of instructors who are involved in the program. "Most of the cadre are combat veterans, and their mission now is to teach, coach, train, and mentor the next generation of Special Forces Soldiers," said Zeigler. "They are not gatekeepers — they are teachers, trainers, coaches and mentors. They bring the students up to standard so that they can achieve the level of competence required to be a Special Forces Soldier. Not all students will make it, but we assess and select Soldiers during Special Forces Assessment and Selection, then train Soldiers from Phase II through Phase V."

In order to ensure that the Soldiers who enter the training pipeline have the right qualities to succeed, the center has adopted a "whole man" concept in its Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS. The premise of the concept is a holistic look at each individual that evaluates him on six primary attributes — intelligence, trainability, judgment, influence, physical fitness and motivation. If a Soldier demonstrates the capacity and motivation to learn during the stressful SFAS, then he is more likely to be successful in the SFQC.

The addition of language modules throughout the course is designed to produce culturally savvy Soldiers.



▲ **FIRST FORMATION** A constant state of training leads to consistent graduation of SF Soldiers from the training pipeline.

Zeigler said the new process of assigning languages based on a student's capacity to learn a certain language has improved the process. "I tell every Soldier that language is a warfighting skill and one of the toughest modules they'll have to pass," he said. "We now test students at the end of SFAS and assign their language based on their abilities. We provide the tools to begin language training immediately after SFAS, the students are getting more language training throughout the SFQC than ever before, and we're targeting that training to meet their inherent skills."

Zeigler said the proof of the training's success can be seen in the success of the troops on the front lines. "You can't argue with that," he said, adding, "Soldiers working alongside these SF Soldiers see their skills and they want to become SF. It really helps out in our recruiting."

Recruiting is playing a major role in SWCS' ability to meet the increasing demand for SF Soldiers. In 2005, through a SWCS initiative, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Army's Recruiting Command, or USAREC, activated the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, or SORB, a move up from the former company-sized unit. SWCS is working closely with the USAREC to accept more candidates from in-service recruits, with those candidates totaling two-thirds of the total annual recruit population.

Lieutenant Colonel David Roddenberry Jr., the commander of the SORB, agrees with Zeigler's assessment. "There is a percentage of Soldiers who come in the Army and spend a few years and decide it is not for them," said Roddenberry. "But there is a significant number who come in and like what they are doing and plan to make a career of it."

It is those Soldiers that the SORB is reaching out to. "They are deployed and they come back from having served with Special Forces Soldiers — seeing their role and missions — and because they like being in the Army, they decide to take the next step. They want the challenge that Special Forces offers."

He added that the high visibility of Special Forces in the Global War on Terrorism is a key to his unit's success.

"Before the Global War on Terrorism, Special Forces Soldiers were doing their normal deployment routines — quite often by themselves," he said. "They were not necessarily that visible to the rest of the Army. In the Global War on Terrorism, in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, SF interoperates with the Army on a daily basis. Those (conventional) Soldiers are exposed to what SF is all about, which is a big boost to our recruiting program, because Soldiers see what we do first-hand."

While others argue that the recruiting numbers needed for Special Forces to meet the demands of the PDM are too high, Roddenberry sees just the opposite. "In this case, the proof is in the production," he said.

The SORB is on-target to meet its 2006 recruiting goal of 1,800 Soldiers. "At this point, we are ahead of our goal and are on track to meet or exceed it," Roddenberry said. "And all indications point to the fact that we can do so."

A key to that success is the creation of recruiting stations at key military posts. The SORB will have 12 stations across the world. The goal is to have a recruiting stations at every post where there are at least three brigade combat teams. In addition to putting people on the ground, the SORB is also utilizing technology and advertising to get its mission across. "We are still in a building stage, but as we progress and build our staff, we will be able to take on a more aggressive and sophisticated advertising campaigns. Our goal is to build the capability that will allow us to focus our recruiting by providing more and better information to Soldiers so they can make more informed decisions about a career in special operations."

Another recruiting tool was the implementation of the Initial Accession Program by SWCS in 2002. The program allows civilians to enlist in the Army specifically to enter the Special Forces training program. The Initial Accession Program initially allowed recruits to enter the program at the age of 18. In 2005, the age limit was raised to 20. While the SORB's mission is designed to target in-service recruits, they do assist the USAREC in this endeavor by providing briefings and information products to potential civilian recruits. **SW**



▲ **Establishing Rapport** Sergeant First Class Keith Gates, an instructor at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School NCO Academy and the Training and Doctrine Command Instructor of the Year, meets with local villagers in the Kantiwa Valley in Afghanistan. *Photo courtesy Keith Gates.*

THE LISTENER

TRADOC Instructor of the Year Believes Listening is the Most Important Part of Teaching Story by Janice Burton

Sergeant First Class Keith Gates, an instructor at the United States Army Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy, is a strong believer in the idea that the biggest part of teaching is listening. Gates, who was recently named the Training and Doctrine Command's Instructor of the Year, puts that belief in action by listening to his students to tailor his classes to meet their needs.

"I always ask my students what they need to succeed," explained Gates, an SF medic. "They tell me they need an information clearinghouse of sorts with answers to common questions like where they can find a policy letter on medical purchasing overseas or things like that. And that just didn't exist."

So Gates started investigating a way to compile relevant information for Special Forces medics. He found the SWCS ARSOF University, or ARSOFU, Web portal to be an innovative method for sharing information. "When I first visited ARSOFU, I found that a lot of the information was generic, but realized that it could become a one-stop shop of information, so I became the moderator for the 18D Web page," he said.

Gates' vision for the ARSOFU page is in line with that of the creators of the site — for ARSOFU to become a single-source portal for the sharing of information between Army special-operations forces. "I want this to be a site that 18Ds, wherever they are in the world, can go to to look up

information," he continued.

But more than that, he wants it to be a place where people can share information. "We have started a forum for the sharing of lessons learned. Medics can come to the site and read the posts and then add their own take on things," he explained. "I started the forum with some lessons learned from the information my students shared with me, things about types of patients and injuries they are seeing while deployed. We want to use that information to tailor training in order to keep it relevant."

The biggest battle that Gates is facing in keeping the site relevant is letting other 18Ds know that it is out there. "I need Deltas to know it's out there, and they need to know that their input is what will make the site successful. I want to get them logged in and sharing their viewpoints and knowledge," Gates said.

While he believes the information he is compiling concerning policies and procedures is important, he

knows that the lessons learned from the battlefield are what will drive the site. "The information that we can share with each other from our own experiences is the most important information on the site," he said.

Prior to making his initial posts, Gates gathered a group of subject-matter experts together to determine whether or not the information he had compiled was relevant. "They gave me a go, and since it's been up and running, we have seen a lot of excitement," he said.

ARSOFU is single-source sign-on that uses AKO addresses; however, the 18D site is restricted, and Soldiers must be granted access to it by Gates. He said the procedure is simple and only requires Soldiers who are in the medical field to ask for access. SF medics, as well as other special-operations medics, will be given access. "We can learn from what other medics do," said Gates. "The Ranger medics do things a little differently. They tailor their medical plans to their missions and units, and what they see in the field is different than what we see, but we can still learn from it."

Gates' drive to educate and share information was key to his success in the TRADOC Instructor of the Year Competition. "I'm the first to say that I'm not the best instructor in this academy, but I am dedicated," he said. "Winning the competition meant that I had represented the academy, SWCS and our special-operations community well. My main mission in the competition was not to let my peers down."

That same desire to serve his peers is what keeps him excited about the ARSOFU site. He hopes that other special-operations Soldiers will share that goal because while the 18D site is rapidly expanding, other military occupation specialty, or MOS, sites are not. Gates would like to see someone with a passion for each MOS to step up and take on the role of moderator for the site. "When that happens, ARSOFU will start being a big asset for Special Forces," he said. **SW**

GoArmyEd: New Program Revolutionizes Civilian Education for Soldiers

By Sergeant Major Jack R. Stanford

These are exciting times in regard to changes in civilian education for Soldiers. On April 1, the Army launched the GoArmyEd.com Web site, essentially bringing under one umbrella all the Army's civilian-education initiatives.

Now traditional classroom instruction and distributive-learning education processes are managed under one system. The system is Soldier-centric, both in terms of the selection of schools and degrees as well as in the application of tuition assistance.

It is no longer necessary for Soldiers to work through the local education center: All education processes are available online wherever Soldiers have Internet connectivity. Soldiers can now adapt a degree plan to their particular deployment schedule and lifestyle, so the days of using deployments as an excuse for not attending college are over.

Future Army initiatives will combine a Soldier's civilian and military education goals into a lifelong-learning model. That model will guide initial-entry Soldiers in achieving their goals for higher education and will eventually tie higher education to military advancement.

GoArmyEd

Soldiers in some military occupational specialties, or MOSs, can already accomplish their education goals through an Army career-degree plan, established by their MOS in conjunction with select institutions of higher learning. These plans are based on the school's core requirements and the recommendations of the American Council of Education, or ACE. Most degrees conferred are associate's degrees that a Soldier starts work on early in his or her career.

Under the plan for GoArmyEd, by the time Soldiers complete their advanced individual training, they should be educated in the process of using the Web site and enrolled in the program.

The Special Warfare Center and School's Department of Education, in conjunction with officials of the ACE and GoArmyEd.com, has the lead in establishing an education pathway for NCOs in Career Management Field 18, Special Forces. Initially, the CMF 18 path will lead to an associate's degree. The plan will be geared to the entry-level NCO, but it will be open to all SF NCOs.

The intent of this initial step is not to supplant or override the education goals of individual Soldiers, but to offer a map for the Soldier just getting on the road to higher education. For Soldiers already on that road, GoArmyEd offers convenience and adaptability. Eventually, the program's framework for lifelong learning will be the "way ahead" for all Special Forces NCOs. **SW**

Sergeant Major Jack R. Stanford is chief of the Basic NCO Course Branch of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy.

SWCS instructor honored at Department of Defense observance

Throughout his military career, Staff Sergeant Jamal Bowers, an instructor assigned to Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, has held himself and his peers to a high standard. He admits that he has received scrutiny for his rigid stance in living up to the NCO Creed. But that's something he is proud of and something others have found worth honoring.

In February, Bowers, along with 11 other African-American service members, was honored at the Department of Defense's African-American History Observance in Austin, Texas. Bowers was the Department of the Army's active-duty representative to the observance. The event, sponsored by the DoD's Equal Opportunity Office, is designed to recognize individuals of African-American descent whose actions in conflict have been heroic and serve as a role model to the African-American community at large.

Bowers was humbled by the recognition. "When I found out that I had been selected, at first it overwhelmed me," he said. "There are many individuals who have accomplished much greater things than I have. There are many who have given the greatest sacrifice, so this award at one level humbled me. It is much greater than anything I could ever set out to accomplish, and I am very thankful that what I have accomplished was recognized."

Bowers' actions while assigned to a tactical psychological operations team, or TPT, during the opening days of Operation Iraqi Freedom earned him the honor. Assigned to the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion, Bowers and his team supported the 2nd Marine Division during its operations into Al Fallujah, Iraq, from Sept. 11, 2004, to April 18, 2005. Working with the Marines was a little like going home for Bowers. Prior to enlisting in the Army, Bowers served four years in the Marines as a combat engineer. He also served in the Army Reserve for a year, prior to enlisting in the active Army. During his tenure with the Marines, he deployed to Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. "It was really great experience deploying again with the Marines," said Bowers, talking about his recent deployment to Iraq. "It was an easy transition for me because I understood their internal workings,

which enabled me to better support the commander's intent."

The push into Al Fallujah required a lot of Bowers and his team. Their first foray into the city was to evacuate more than 400 civilians from an apartment complex. The team broadcast many hours of civilian noninterference



▲ RUBBING ELBOWS Staff Sergeant Jamal Bowers meets with Command Sergeant Major Stephen Flood of the Army Test and Evaluation Command at the DoD African American History Observance. *U.S. Army photo.*

loudspeaker messages that proved to be critical in limiting civilian casualties and proved essential to ensuring that the Marines maintained the initiative during the assault. Once that portion of the mission had been accomplished, Bowers and his team initiated direct-action missions with the Marines. It was on one of these missions that Bowers proved his mettle under fire. On Nov. 10, while under enemy fire, Bowers led a mission to evacuate three wounded Marines. Later that day, facing a barrage of gunfire from nine insurgents, Bowers selflessly went into action to extract a fallen Marine from a courtyard. And again in December, while exposed to a hail of enemy fire, he fought his way to three Marines killed in action while clearing a house in Al Fallujah.

"In a situation where real bad things are going on, your training kicks in, and you do what you are trained to do," said Bowers. "The Marines had sustained some casualties, and instead of our TPT sitting back in a support role, we realized that our greatest effort was on the battlefield in a forward role. We wanted to assure them that we were an asset and not a liability."

For his efforts, Bowers was awarded a Bronze Star Medal, the Navy Achievement Medal with a "V" device and an Army Commendation Medal. His team was recognized by the 2nd Marine Division for its outstanding conduct of missions. Bowers was honored by the receipt of the awards, but he doesn't see that he did anything more than his job. "To me, everything that we did in Iraq was a matter of doing the same thing that any other Soldier, Sailor or Marine would do. When you are in those situations, I say your muscle memory kicks in. You don't second guess what you are doing, and you don't really think about it. You just conduct yourself in a manner that the training that has been instilled in you leads you."

And while training stands him in good stead on the battlefield, a moral discipline keeps him there. He believes that the precedence in which he lives his life has enabled him to come to this point in his life. "I give first glory to God and his son, Jesus Christ," he said. "I work very hard to live a clean life and establish a line of professionalism that I am not willing to compromise."

That was apparent during his time in Al Fallujah. According to the narrative written for Bowers' nomination for the DoD recognition, "His courage under fire and superior leadership capabilities directly enabled his team to conduct more than 50 hours of surrender appeals and 100 hours of harassment loudspeaker broadcasts. He greatly assisted in their development and led his team in the dissemination of these broadcasts that effectively targeted the enemy forces, limiting their ability to rest, keeping them off balance, and crushing their will to resist. His heroic efforts directly resulted in the surrender of more than 150 of the enemy."

From December 2004 to April 2005, Staff Sergeant Bowers constantly volunteered to lead missions in and around the city of Fallujah, despite the ever-present danger of improvised explosive devices and enemy ambushes. His boundless energy, bravery in the face of danger, and unsurpassed dedication to duty allowed him to directly engage enemy forces on numerous occasions while leading his team to complete more missions than any other Tactical PSYOP Team in the Al Anbar province during his unit's deployment." **SW**

2006 board selects 188 SF SSGs for promotion

The fiscal year 2006 Sergeant First Class Promotion Selection Board considered 360 Special Forces staff sergeants and selected 188 for promotion. The resultant selection rate for SF was 52.2 percent, which greatly exceeded the Infantry selection rate of 19.8 percent and the Army overall rate of 26.7 percent. Board results show that the average SF NCO selected for promotion was 29 years old, had eight to nine years time in service and three to four years time in grade.

Listed below are excerpts from the board's review and analysis of the records of the SF NCOs whom it considered:

- **Performance and potential.** Duty descriptions on the NCO Evaluation Report, or NCOER, must accurately reflect the scope of a Soldier's duties and responsibilities to ensure that he receives appropriate credit. For example, the duty description of a staff sergeant serving as the senior communications sergeant should reflect that it is a skill-level-40 position, and the narrative should indicate "senior communications sergeant." Raters, senior raters and reviewers are responsible for being consistent in assessing potential. Senior-rater comments on potential — e.g., "Promote now," "Promote ahead of peers," and "Promote with peers" — should be consistent with the numerical rating given.
- **Training and education.** Additional skill identifiers and skill-qualification identifiers are important for SF Soldiers. There were only a few Soldiers who possessed more than one ASI or SQI.
- **Physical fitness.** On the average, SF Soldiers were incredibly fit. When the extended scale for the Army Physical Fitness Test is applicable, it is to the Soldier's benefit to reflect that fact in the NCOER.
- **Overall career management.** Every SF Soldier should have a current DA photo on file. Of the SF NCOs not selected for promotion to E7, 48 percent did not have current DA photos. The Army requirement of having a new photo taken every five years should allow for the difficulty caused by multiple deployments and over-scheduled photo facilities.
- **Competence.** On its own, civilian schooling (college) does not justify an excellence rating in competence unless the civilian schooling is directly related to the Soldier's MOS. While college credit was viewed favorably, Army ASI- and SQI-pro-

ducing schools were considered to be much more important.

- **Assistant operations sergeant.** Raters should reflect in bullet comments that Soldiers have been selected as assistant operations sergeant.
- **Excellence ratings.** Ratings of excellence should be supported by specific and quantifiable examples. The results should indicate that the Soldier is clearly a better performer than most of his peers.
- **Combat experience.** No duty demands more of our Soldiers than deployment to a combat zone. Bullet comments of war-time experience are quantifiable and should be included in the NCOER.

For additional information, telephone Sergeant Major Charles F. Stevens, Special Operations Proponency, at DSN 239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to: stevensc@soc.mil.

2006 PSYOP, CA SFC promotions far exceed Army average

The fiscal year 2006 Sergeant First Class Promotion Selection Board released its results March 21, and enlisted Soldiers in Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs fared well. The board considered 44 PSYOP Soldiers and selected 35, yielding a selection rate of 79.5 percent. The board considered 40 Civil Affairs Soldiers and selected 34, yielding a selection rate of 85 percent. The overall selection rate for the Army was 26.7 percent. From a review and analysis of the records it considered, the board made the following observations:

- **Assignments and opportunities.** The majority of the Soldiers whose records were reviewed had the correct assignments.
- **Training and education.** Soldiers who have earned college credits were looked upon more favorably by the board.
- **Physical fitness.** The board was concerned that a number of the NCOs exceeded the screening-table weight by a substantial amount.
- **Overall career management.** A number of the files reviewed were missing photos or had photos that were not current.
- **Performance and potential.** The NCO Evaluation Report remains the most critical document in the board's review and selection process. The board evaluated Soldiers using the "total person" concept; Soldiers need to keep that concept in mind as they prepare their records to be competitive for the board.

Warrant Officer

Army National Guard changes MOS 180A application procedures

In early fiscal year 2005, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Special Operations Proponency streamlined the Special Forces warrant-officer application process by making it possible for an applicant and his chain of command to download, complete and submit an application using the Army Knowledge Online Web site and AKO knowledge centers. While the active component quickly embraced the process and expedited its applications, nondigital administrative processing requirements at the state level and in the National Guard Bureau, or NGB, slowed the process for SF Soldiers in the Army National Guard, or ARNG.

Now, because of procedural changes instituted by the NGB in April, ARNG SF Soldiers submit and process their warrant-officer application

packets through AKO in the same manner as the active component.

There are three key parts to the change. First, the military occupational specialty, or MOS, prerequisite predetermination package is now submitted from the state command chief warrant officer, or CCWO, directly to the MOS proponent. Once the proponent determines that the applicant meets the MOS prerequisites, it sends an endorsement to the state in which the federal recognition board is conducted. Once selected and approved by the federal recognition board, an applicant will be scheduled to attend the Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course. NGB receives a courtesy copy of the predetermination actions for administrative tracking purposes only. NGB and the Army G1 receive

the results of the federal recognition board.

Second, and possibly more important, the state CCWO must personally endorse the application packet before sending it to the MOS proponent. This provides personal oversight and involvement within the process and will allow the proponent to leverage SF warrant-officer initiatives to a greater degree, including recommending recruiting missions.

Finally, the entire process has been digitized to mirror active-duty procedures. The ability to electronically submit and process a warrant-officer application will reduce processing time by an estimated 50 percent. For additional information, telephone CW05 Douglas Frank at DSN 239-1879, commercial (910) 432-1879, or send e-mail to: frankd@soc.mil.

Officer

Board selects YG 2003 officers for ARSOF training

In April 2006, the Army Human Resources Command held the first consolidated ARSOF officer selection board to select Year Group 2003 officers for attendance in Special Forces Assessment and Selection, the Psychological Operations Officer Qualification Course, or POQC, and the Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course, or CAQC.

The board also considered officers in YGs 1997 to 2002 for PSYOP and CA, as more than 200 positions will be opening in special operations between the fall of 2006 and 2008.

Once the board results have been announced, PSYOP- and CA-designated officers are encouraged to contact their assignments officer to schedule training. Officers will attend the Captains Career Course and the Basic Airborne Course (as necessary), the POQC or the CAQC, the Advanced Regional Analysis Course and Special Operations Language Training. Officers who complete all the training will then be assigned within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, either to the 4th PSYOP Group or to the 95th CA Brigade.

For additional information on PSYOP officer assignments, telephone Major J.P. Morgan at DSN 221-5790 or commercial (703) 325-5790. For additional information on CA officer assignments, telephone Major Scot Storey at DSN 221-3115 or commercial (703) 321-3115.

Special Forces

SF officers selected for FY 2007 colonel command

Four SF officers have been selected for the FY 2007 colonel command list:

COL Kent R. Bolster	Combat Arms Institutional
COL Mark S. Lowe	Training and Support – SF
LTC (P) Darsie D. Rogers Jr.	Tactical – SF
LTC (P) Timothy S. Slemp	Tactical – SF

SF officers selected for senior service college

Fourteen SF officers have been selected to attend senior service college:

Officer	School
COL Randolph Binford	Marine Corps War College
COL Andrew Yee	Defer
LTC (P) Kevin A. Christie	Air War College
LTC (P) John Fenzel III	National War College
LTC (P) Wesley Rehorn	Army War College
LTC (P) Darsie Rogers	Air War College
LTC (P) Timothy Slemp	Army War College
LTC (P) Robert Warburg	Joint Army Warfighter School
LTC Gus Benton II	Army War College
LTC Paul Burton	Defer
LTC Kevin I. Davis	Army War College
LTC Kenneth Hurst	Defer
LTC Wilfred Rowlett	Industrial College of the AF
LTC David Witty	Naval War College

SF officers selected for battalion command

Twenty-six SF officers were selected by the FY 2007 Battalion Level Command

Selection Board:

Officer	Category
LTC Edward Amato	Institutional – Generalist
LTC Gary Bloomberg	Institutional – Garrison
LTC Bryan Blue	Institutional – Recruiting
LTC Dale Buckner	Tactical – Special Troops Bn
LTC Kevin Colyer	Institutional – Garrison
LTC Darin Conkright	Institutional – Generalist
LTC Brandt Deck	Training and Support – SF
LTC Edwin Deedrick	Tactical – SF
LTC David Dellinger	Tactical – Special Troops Bn
LTC Heinz Dinter	Tactical – SF
LTC Mark Grdovic	Tactical – SF
LTC David Grosso	Training and Support – SF
LTC James Higgins	Tactical – SF
LTC Matthew Karres	Tactical – Special Troops Bn
LTC Chris Karsner	Tactical – SF
LTC James Miller	Tactical – SF
LTC Mark Miller	Tactical – SF
LTC Doug Raddatz	Training and Support – SF
LTC Richard Rhyne	Tactical – Bde Special Troops Bn
LTC Patrick Roberson	Tactical – SF
LTC Gary Rosenberg	Institutional – Generalist
LTC Nestor Saddler	Training and Support – SF
LTC John Stack	Institutional – Generalist
LTC Adam Such	Tactical – SF
LTC Bruce Swatek	Institutional – Recruiting
LTC Daniel Whitney	Institutional – Garrison

Villages of the Moon:

Psychological Operations in Southern Afghanistan

Few writings exist regarding contemporary psychological operations, or PSYOP, and virtually none cover tactical PSYOP, until now. *Villages of the Moon: Psychological Operations in Southern Afghanistan* presents a firsthand account of tactical PSYOP and its employment in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2002.

The author, Sergeant First Class M.E. Roberts, draws upon an extensive knowledge of PSYOP history and interaction with foreign cultures to provide his understanding of the challenges faced by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the role PSYOP plays at the tactical level. This book highlights the importance of PSYOP in civil and military operations and its usefulness in combating the cultural barriers and mistrust that exist between U.S. forces and foreign populations.

Most of the book is written as journal entries composed during Roberts' deployment to Afghanistan. Regional maps, photos and samples of PSYOP products are displayed at the end of each chapter, but they are clearly subservient to the author's descriptive portrayal of PSYOP missions.


The work is also supplemented with an initial chapter titled "Fighting Terrorist and Tyrants: Thoughts on the Grand Strategy," which showcases Roberts' knowledge of insurgency, counterinsurgency and the role that PSYOP plays in supporting combat operations. This chapter provides both

an historical background of PSYOP and an outline of the essentials for effective personnel and teams. Roberts further discusses the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of PSYOP, providing context useful in understanding his journal entries.

Roberts deployed to Afghanistan as part of a PSYOP team and encountered a society that is distrustful, and in many cases, ignorant of U.S. culture. His journey through southern Afghanistan while supporting numerous civil and military operations shows the utility of PSYOP teams in a variety of situations, including calming potentially hostile crowds, preventing misunderstandings between U.S. troops and the Afghan population, and ensuring that the U.S. message reaches the people and is not lost to enemy propaganda.

Roberts' accounts are intelligently written with insight into the challenges faced in integrating a tactical PSYOP team with multiple U.S. units, developing trust among the population, and reaching out to the most isolated areas of Afghanistan — the "villages of the moon."

Villages of the Moon: Psychological Operations in Southern Afghanistan is an excellent book and a smooth read. It provides much-needed context for understanding the role PSYOP plays in supporting military operations. Roberts effectively portrays the challenges of a PSYOP team deployed in a region



DETAILS

By M.E. Roberts

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that has mixed feelings and often deep misgivings regarding the presence of U.S. forces. The variety of missions and skill sets required of PSYOP teams is seen throughout this work in the daily accounts of Roberts' journal.

The book gives an appreciation of the complexity and thoroughness of PSYOP teams during the execution of their missions, which are often overlooked, misunderstood and underappreciated by elements outside PSYOP. Roberts' book is strongly recommended for members of the PSYOP community and those outside it who wish to better understand PSYOP. **SW**



Photo by Janice Burton

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