


Special Warfare



MARCH-APRIL 2007
VOLUME 20 ISSUE 2



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
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A Special Forces Soldier mans a checkpoint with his Iraqi counterparts.
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Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th Edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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Headquarters, Department of the Army

Compared to performing the many missions of Army special-operations forces, discussing the subtleties of doctrinal definitions may sound academic. The truth is that it is difficult to understand the mission and explain it to others unless you understand the doctrine — subtleties included — that defines the mission and determines the training required.

During this time of transformation and changing threats, some of our doctrinal concepts and terms are by necessity changing, in some cases outrunning our written doctrine. One example is the term “irregular warfare.” Many define the current operational environment as being one of irregular warfare, and the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* has a strong IW theme. Yet the concept of IW is only now being formally addressed in joint and service doctrine.


In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeff Hasler does an exceptional job of analyzing current concepts and working definitions of IW to explain how the IW concept relates to established ARSOF doctrine. As part of the analysis, he reviews other doctrinal and nondoctrinal terms currently used and misused in military and civilian circles alike. As a primer on IW, his article is a valuable resource for ARSOF Soldiers who want to fully understand their role in 21st-century operations. In fact, I intend to make it “required reading” for our 18A students.

One of the foremost characteristics of counterinsurgency is the importance of understanding culture. Major Ed Croot makes use of his experiences in Afghanistan to show that learning facts about a culture is only the beginning — Soldiers must assimilate that knowledge and incorporate it into their dealings with the populace if they are to develop a working relationship and win popular support.

The development of effective training and doctrine is a complex process that is not the province of the schoolhouse alone. We actively seek and appreciate the input and advice of field units through their comments and reviews of draft manuals, and our training is continually updated based on lessons learned during operations. If ARSOF are to remain dynamic and relevant, our training and doctrine must flow from a collaborative process in which all ARSOF Soldiers are participants.

As Special Forces celebrates the 20th anniversary of the establishment of SF as a basic branch of the Army on April 9, 1987, it gives me great pleasure to report that the health of the SF Branch has never been better. Our NCOs are currently over 100 percent strength as a whole, and 18Ds are at 94-percent strength. Both of these achievements are historical firsts. The goal is for SF to be at 100-percent strength or better in every MOS as we move into the growth years. As we celebrate our birthday, we should not only remember how far Special Forces has come but also think about the future and the role SF must be prepared to perform. We must not fail; we must continue to provide the best unconventional warriors in the world.




Major General James W. Parker

7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP SOLDIERS RECEIVE VALOR AWARDS

Thirty-nine Special Forces Soldiers were honored in an awards ceremony at Fort Bragg's Ritz-Epps Fitness Center Feb. 21 for valorous actions during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, commanding general of the United States Army Special Operations Command, presented two Silver Star Medals, one Soldier's Medal, 11 Bronze Star Medals for Valor, 19 Purple Hearts, 22 Army Commendation Medals for Valor, and a Meritorious Unit Commendation to members of the 7th Special Forces Group.

"This valor award ceremony is not only about recognizing the great accomplishments of the Soldiers before you, but it's also to pass on to a new generation of Special Forces Soldiers and young Americans a knowledge of the sacrifices and bravery displayed by the generation that preceded them," said Colonel Edward M. Reeder Jr., commander of the 7th SF Group. "The young children here today will not understand now, but one day they

will realize that their brave fathers believed that America as a nation and an ideal is worth fighting for and, at times, dying for."

In Afghanistan, Soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, were integrated into Task Force 73. TF-73 had an extensive list of accomplishments during 2006, including training 2,500 Afghan soldiers, conducting more than 2,300 combat missions and neutralizing 1,178 enemy fighters.

"(They) have proven time and time again that (they) will not allow insurgent leadership to regain control of Afghanistan," Reeder said. "(They) were responsible for not only giving Afghans a better tomorrow but also keeping terror off of our soil, and for that we owe a debt of gratitude."

Soldiers from Company C, 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The company conducted 186 direct-action operations to capture and kill high-value targets. Their actions resulted in 200 personnel captured and more than 50 enemy personnel killed.

"The Soldiers awarded today certainly could not have foreseen the life-changing events that were about to happen as they prepared for combat operations," said Reeder. "It was their training, professionalism and dedication to each other that enabled them to perform their duties under the most extraordinary circumstances."

Two of the Soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Angel DeJesus and Staff Sergeant Erasmo Espino, were awarded the Silver Star in recognition of their actions during an ambush on May 19, 2006. When their detachment was attacked by 150 to 200 enemy fighters, they orchestrated a fighting escape, saving many lives.

"I think that this medal goes to my whole team," DeJesus said. "They are my family; without them, it would never have happened. I just did something for my brothers that they would have done for me."

DeJesus said that he was proud that his wife and daughter could see him receive the award but felt that he didn't deserve such an honor because he was only doing what had to be done.

"The most important part of the ceremony is the recognition of valor," said Wagner. "The history of our nation rides on the backs of valorous heroes like the ones we are recognizing today, and there's no way we could ever repay these people for what they do." (USASOC PAO)

Green Beret awarded Silver Star for actions in Iraq

A Special Forces Soldier, formerly of the 5th Special Forces Group, based at Fort Campbell, Ky., was recognized for valorous actions in Iraq during a ceremony at the Heritage Auditorium, Fort Bragg, N.C., Jan. 19.

Sergeant 1st Class Frederick Allen, a native of Ann Arbor, Mich., was awarded the Silver Star for his actions Aug. 12, 2004, in An Najaf, Iraq.

Allen, his SF team, and 51 Iraqi National Guardsmen engaged approximately 15 to 20 Mahdi Militiamen who were hiding in a local school.

The detachment, with the Iraqi National Guard in the lead, advanced toward its objective and came under immediate and intense enemy fire from inside the school. Allen, the gunner in the detachment's second vehicle, ordered his vehicle forward, placing himself in the direct line of fire to allow the Iraqi National Guard elements to regroup and reorganize after sustaining several casualties. Allen selflessly stayed in the line of fire battling the enemy so that others could make it back to cover.

Allen said he feels that the award symbolizes the heroism of his team and the Iraqi National Guard.

"This medal honors those who paid the ultimate sacrifice and also serves as a tribute



▲ SILVER STAR Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, commanding general USASOC, presents Sgt. 1st Class Frederick Allen the Silver Star for his actions in Iraq. U.S. Army photo.

to Soldiers who serve today and will serve tomorrow," Allen said.

After the fight, Allen's valorous actions continued as he secured his fallen commander and rendered aid to the remaining 14 members of the Iraqi National Guard.

"At least 10 different times, Sergeant Allen made a conscious decision for valor," said Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. "He chose to expose himself to risk ... he is a wonderful example of what it means to be an American patriot." (USASOC PAO)

LIST OF AWARDEES:

Silver Star

CW2 Angel DeJesus
SSG Erasmo Espino

Soldier's Medal

SSG Gary Wedemann

Bronze Star Medal for Valor

SFC Michael A. Bergstrom
SSG Elisha R. Bremmer
WO1 Luis Chamorro
SSG Jose A. Guitierrez
SFC Carl F. Harris
SSG Mark R. Hawver
SSG Craig G. Kubala II
SFC Antonio D. Pastor
SSG Brandon B. Pechette
SSG James H. Sanchez
SFC Joseph A. Serna

Meritorious Unit Commendation

Group Support Company,
7th Special Forces Group

7TH GROUP MEDIC NAMED SOCOM TOP DOC

A Fort Bragg Special Forces Soldier was recognized as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's Medic of the Year at the Special Operations Medical Conference in Tampa Bay, Fla., Dec. 1.

Master Sergeant Brendan O'Connor, a medic assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group, received the honor for his battlefield performance on June 24.

According to a memorandum recommending O'Connor for the award, the 7th Group medic was leading a quick-reaction force to link up with a pair of "wounded and isolated Soldiers ... pinned down by enemy fire."

O'Connor repeatedly exposed himself to heavy fire, even low-crawling 80 meters over an open field to reach the wounded Soldiers. He did it without body armor, a decision O'Connor made in order to keep as low to the ground as possible and carry as many medical supplies as possible.

"You don't leave people out there — end of story," O'Connor said.

"With rounds coming within inches," O'Connor navigated the open field, climbed over a wall and picked his way through vineyard rows undetected by an enemy element moving ahead of him, according to the report.

O'Connor reached the hemmed-in Soldiers and began treating their wounds. Several times he alternated between using medical supplies and using his weapon, as Taliban fighters threatened to overrun their position.

"The Taliban ... had gotten close enough to verbally taunt them with threats of capture," stated the memorandum. "The Taliban fought relentlessly and continued to reinforce the element, attempting to kill or capture the small group of Coalition fighters."

The small group held off the Taliban advance long enough to evacuate the casualties to better cover, where O'Connor continued

to treat them.

"That was a tough day," O'Connor said. "We were in a fight."

Captain Sheffield Ford, who was O'Connor's team leader in Afghanistan, wrote the memorandum detailing his senior medic's life-saving efforts during the 17½-hour gun battle.

"There are so many words to describe it," Ford said of O'Connor's behavior in the firefight. "He was going to do anything and everything he could do to save them. He's a true hero."

O'Connor, a 24-year veteran of Special Forces, said he was uneasy about receiving any individual honor for his actions that day, which ultimately saved the life of one of his team members.

"Anyone would have done the same thing in my position," O'Connor said. "It was a team effort."

That "team" included Master Sergeant Thomas Maholic, O'Connor's team sergeant, and Staff Sergeant Joseph F. Fuerst III, a Florida National Guard infantryman attached to the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha to train the Afghan army. Both were killed in the firefight.

As a tribute to Maholic, and on his behalf, O'Connor accepted the award. "Thom was a medic, too," he said about Maholic's occupational specialty before becoming team sergeant. "He held the back door open for all of us. He was killed holding the back door open."

The "door," a lane running between fields and mud compounds, was the team's only way back to their patrol base, and Maholic was killed defending it.

Retired Colonel Al Moloff, SOMA president, and Master Sergeant Samuel Rodriguez, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's senior enlisted medic, presented the award to O'Connor who, along with his wife, Margaret, escorted Maholic's widow, Wendy,



▲ **TOP DOC** Master Sergeant Brendan O'Connor was named the U.S. Special Operations Command Medic of the Year at the Special Operations Medical Conference in December. *U.S. Army photo.*

to the SOMA conference.

"He wanted to do it to keep Sergeant Maholic's memory alive. That's a credit to him, the type of person he is," Moloff and Rodriguez wrote.

The award and the manner in which O'Connor accepted it "speaks very well for his character," said Sergeant Major William Zaiser, a close friend of O'Connor and his comrade in 7th Group.

"His views on military service are very heartfelt," Zaiser said. "He's probably the most patriotic man I've ever met. And he was the finest medic of any ODA that I had ever been on, and not just because of his medical skills."

"The little things he did had a

huge impact (on the team). Almost every free minute he had, he would spend trying to improve the quality of life of the team members," Zaiser said. "(O'Connor) was absolutely tireless in his efforts to not only be the best medic, but ODA team member."

The award recognizes Army special-operations medics "willing to do anything to save their comrades, their friends," Rodriguez said. "It doesn't have to be an act of heroism. Guys have also earned the award for cumulative service."

"The reason why we do this is to pay tribute to the dedication and sacrifices that our guys are making for each other. (O'Connor) is an example of that." (*USASOC PAO*)

SOAR PA honored for contributions to Army Aviation Medicine

Captain Scott M. Gilpatrick, a certified aeromedical physician assistant, was awarded the 2006 Army Aviation Association of America Medicine Award for his contributions to Army Aviation while serving in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

The award recognizes outstanding achievements in Army aviation. The AAAA Medicine Award is presented to the flight surgeon or aeromedical physician assistant who best exemplifies the contribution to Army aviation during the award's period.

Major Shawn F. Kane, the 160th senior regiment flight surgeon, submitted the award nomination because he felt Gilpatrick was truly deserving. "His contributions to our mission and (the ground forces we support) are immeasurable," Kane said.

According to the nomination, Gilpatrick made significant contributions in aviation medicine; special-operations aviation medicine tactics, techniques and procedures; and training special-operations-aviation medical personnel over the past year.

According to the nomination, these contributions were instrumental in saving the lives of countless

special-operations forces personnel and the successful completion of numerous missions in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

For Gilpatrick, the award is a reflection on all of the medical professionals in the 160th.

"It says, as a section, we go above and beyond what's expected of any other team of aviation health care providers," Gilpatrick said.

"We not only provide great care to our aviators and crew, we provide the (ground forces) we support with world-class casualty-evacuation coverage."

Recognition of Gilpatrick's and the unit's medical accomplishments through this award has the potential to expand support for similar programs and capabilities in conventional units.

"Hopefully this award will show the aviation-medicine community that aeromedical physician assistants are valuable members of a unit's aviation medicine program," said Gilpatrick.

"I also hope it shows that an aviation unit's medical section can provide CASEVAC (casualty evacuation)



coverage to the ground force units they support, beyond the conventional medical evacuation unit's mission."

Gilpatrick's contributions to aviation medicine are based on core principles he believes in and passes along to his fellow medics.

"Every Soldier you take care of should be looked at as a family member. Take care of them like you would your brother or sister," he said. (USASOC PAO)

USASOC to release new ARSOF language regulation

Army special-operations forces will soon have a new regulation that describes policies and procedures for executing command- and unit-level language programs.

The regulation, entitled "USASOC ARSOF Language Program," will apply to all units that report directly to the United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC. The regulation will be of special interest to commanders and managers of command language programs at all levels. It contains specific information and definitions regarding roles and responsibilities, contracting training, budgeting and resources, quarterly reporting requirements and the SOF-language database.

The regulation, still in pre-release form, is scheduled to be released by USASOC in late March. It will be numbered in the 350 series.

The ARSOF Command Language Program consists of

three components: institutional training that forms part of the qualification courses for Special Forces and active-component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations; unit programs for language sustainment and enhancement; and contingency language programs designed to respond to emerging requirements of ARSOF personnel operating in their primary geographic region. The command language program is designed to provide ARSOF warfighters with a substantive language capability that will allow them to accomplish their missions.

For additional information, telephone Rusty Restituyo, ARSOF contingency program manager, ARSOF Language Office, Training Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School, at DSN 337-2941 or commercial (910) 907-2941, or send e-mail to: restituf@soc.mil.



Oil Spill

Spreading security to counter insurgency

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Ward, U.S. Army (ret.)

From the dawn of recorded history, counterinsurgency operations have been the most frustrating form of warfare in which a powerful military force can engage.

Current counterinsurgency, or COIN, operations by the United States in Iraq are no exception. One reason for the current frustration, however, may be that our COIN strategy is designed not so much to defeat the insurgency as it is merely to turn the problem over to the Iraqis.

But if the United States, with its incredible combat and intelligence resources, cannot defeat the Sunni-based insurgency, how can we expect a divided Iraqi government to do so? Certainly, training effective Iraqi security services is an important element of a successful strategy, but it does not, by itself, constitute a strategy — other than for withdrawal.

Unfortunately, history shows that insurgencies based on nationalism or ideology — and the insurgency in Iraq is motivated by both — cannot be wiped out merely by killing the insurgent leadership or even large numbers of their supporters.

Admittedly, had we killed or captured Osama bin Laden 10 years ago, we would likely not be facing the prospect of a global, extremist Islamic insurgency today, but that is hindsight. Killing Zarqawi's successor and his key lieutenants will not, in itself, defeat the Iraqi insurgency we face today. Such operations are tactically defensive measures that are designed to impair the insurgency; they will not defeat it.

One senior U.S. military officer has compared our strategy in Iraq to the game "Whack-a-Mole," because as soon as we capture or kill insurgent leaders, others pop up in their place. Similarly, soon after we "clear" a city of insurgents, they re-emerge, and the process is repeated.

In executing countless raids on in-

surgent strongholds and safe houses, the U.S. military leadership appears to believe that these operations are on the strategic offensive when in fact, while they are tactically offensive, they are strategically *defensive*.

When we look to the past for successful counterinsurgency strategies, the record is not encouraging. Even the greatest military commanders of all time have been taxed to the limit in attempting to defeat popular insurgencies.

Alexander the Great, after crushing the powerful Persian Empire in a series of pitched battles, encountered his greatest challenge in fighting a two-year counterguerrilla campaign to subdue the mountainous Persian provinces of Bactria and Sogdiana (roughly northern Afghanistan and southern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). Kublai Kahn invaded northern Vietnam three times in the mid-to-late 13th century but was defeated each time by protracted guerrilla operations when the Vietnamese abandoned their cities and fled to the hills.

When no organized military force in Europe could stand against Napoleon Bonaparte, guerrillas played a major role in ending his domination. Professional military officers and military historians still study Bonaparte's lightning campaigns of 1805 and 1806 in great detail, but they pay little attention to his attempts to cure "the Spanish ulcer" that bled the French army white between 1808 and 1814 and thus set the stage for Napoleon's final defeat.

What Napoleon first derided as a "war of peasants and monks" eventually required him to maintain an average of 250,000 French troops in Spain for six years — years in which those soldiers were sorely needed elsewhere. Later, mainly irregular Russian forces, employing a strategy that Czar Alexander admitted was inspired by the success of the Spanish guerrillas,

harassed Napoleon's army from the Vistula to Moscow, contributing in no small measure to the staggering attrition of the French force.

Napoleon's proud 600,000-man army that invaded Russia dwindled to a mere 30,000 by the end of the campaign. It was ragged bands of guerrillas, Cossacks and militias that brought Napoleon to his knees, not huge armies led by resplendent generals. Those merely administered the coup de grace.

Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini served with the French army in Spain and treated what he called "national wars" in some detail in *The Art of War*. He considered such wars "the most formidable of all," observing in words that sound prophetic today, "every step is disputed, the army holds only its camp-ground, ... and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured."

"Each armed inhabitant," Jomini continued, "finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the commanders know the country, and, learning immediately of the slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects; while the latter ... is like a blind man." Surely this situation is familiar to anyone who reads today's headlines from Iraq. Carl Von Clausewitz, who served with the Russian Army during Napoleon's campaign in Russia, also dedicated a full chapter of his classic *On War* to insurgency.

Finally, whether we admit it or not, the United States was defeated in Vietnam by an army employing guerrilla strategy and largely guerrilla tactics with which we never learned to cope. In short, guerrilla warfare has regularly proven to be successful for forces inferior in numbers or armament. In a guerrilla war, the enemy is everywhere, and he is nowhere. He rarely has a physical center of gravity, the occupation of which will ensure

his defeat. He almost invariably possesses the initiative and, perhaps most importantly, the advantages a guerrilla enjoys tend to neutralize the greatest advantages that large military organizations possess.

Conventional generals are trained to maneuver large forces in major ground and air operations and therefore seek to employ their forces in ways that do what large conventional forces do best: They seek large-scale operations designed to find, fix and destroy enemy forces.

Unfortunately, guerrillas generally have the operational agility not to allow themselves either to be found or fixed in significant numbers unless they want to be. Grudgingly, conventional generals eventually abandon large maneuver operations in favor of patrols and raids by small units, but these operations, while more effective tactically, do not produce the desired result unless they are part of an effective counterinsurgency strategy.

A principle of war not taught in our war colleges is that military forces generally act in accordance with their national cultures, and it is an American cultural tendency to develop technological responses to any problem. In Vietnam, we sprayed defoliating agents to expose the Ho Chi Minh Trail and employed unattended sensors and air-sampling devices in attempts to detect troop concentrations in the dense vegetation. In Iraq, our military places similar reliance on state-of-the-art information technology and the use of high-tech, unmanned drones equipped with an amazing array of sophisticated sensors and computer programs to detect enemy movements and improvised explosive devices.

U.S. Soldiers and Marines cannot defeat an insurgency using essentially the same strategy we employed un-

successfully in Vietnam — conducting operations to find, fix and destroy groups of insurgents hiding among a generally passive, if not supportive, population. “Clearing” areas of insurgents, only to have them return in a few weeks or months, accomplishes nothing other than preventing them from becoming too deeply entrenched in a particular area. When clearing operations occur too frequently, it confirms to the local populace that the government is incapable of providing long-term security, which can affect their willingness to support the government.

What lessons can history teach us about defeating a popular insurgency? There are many historical examples of successful counterinsurgency campaigns, but most entailed brutal measures unacceptable to modern American values. The Romans, for example, frequently killed the entire adult male population of rebellious tribes and sold the women and children into slavery. This approach served both as a solution to the immediate problem and as a warning to other populations not to challenge Roman rule.

But the most effective long-term Roman strategy for pacifying conquered peoples was not a military, but a political-economic one. True, rebellions against Roman rule by newly conquered peoples were common and were often put down with great brutality, but as the quality of life improved with the arrival of Roman laws, trade opportunities, roads, technologies and other improvements, such revolts were infrequent. Despite the fact that it took Rome more than 100 years to subdue what is now Spain, once that had been accomplished, Rome did not have to station a single legion in either Spain or Gaul (other than the garrisons guarding

the German frontier) in order to maintain control. Those provinces were content with the peace and prosperity that came with Roman rule.

Unfortunately, the United States does not have 100 years in which to defeat an insurgency, but history does provide an example of a successful counterinsurgency strategy that is applicable to the current situation. That strategy, known as the *tache d’huile*, or oil-spot strategy, was developed and refined by the French colonial officers Joseph-Simon Gallieni and Louis-Hubert Lyautey. The premise of the strategy is that the government must establish secure base areas, normally in population centers, and slowly expand its area of control from those bases, just as oil spreads across water. Supported by an aggressive system of population- and resource-control measures, the oil-spot strategy may provide a guide for conducting future counterinsurgency operations.

In counterinsurgency operations, a base area is a geographic region from which one side or the other draws its strength. In its base area, the controlling side enjoys the support of the populace, and that area naturally serves as a source of military recruits as well as of logistical and financial support.

Ideally, one’s base area would be safe from enemy attack, but any expectation of total security is generally unreasonable in war. But even though one’s base area may be subject to isolated attacks, it should never be vulnerable to occupation by the enemy, even for brief periods. Nor should it be vulnerable to harassing attacks to the degree that those attacks threaten to disrupt the base area’s core function of providing troops, funding and supplies, and of providing a safe area in which government



▲ **HEADS UP** A Special Forces Soldier watches as Iraqi National Guard Soldiers perform a search of a house and a gas station. *Photo by Steve Hebert.*

security forces can rest and refit.

In an insurgency, the government generally has sufficient combat power to intrude into any geographic area. Likewise, the insurgents usually have the capability of staging at least isolated, sometimes even spectacular, attacks in government-controlled areas. The key point is whether such operations are able to disrupt either side's use of a geographic area as a strategic base.

In insurgencies, base areas are centers of gravity. Other centers of gravity, such as support for the central government, are often political, economic or ideological. Military forces are of little use in attacking enemy political or ideological centers of gravity, but they can play a major supporting role in defending friendly base areas and attacking those of the

enemy. Base areas are usually the most vulnerable centers of gravity to military operations and are thus the most proper focus of military operations. Friendly base areas have the added virtue of providing safe environments in which the government can demonstrate to the populace the advantages that would accrue to them were the insurgency to be defeated.

In counterinsurgency warfare, only those military operations that expand government base areas while reducing insurgent base areas or contested areas may be considered to be strategically offensive. All other military operations, even those that are operationally offensive, such as major operations to clear insurgents out of a major city, are strategically defensive. The exception would be operations that are part of a system-

atic plan to incorporate cleared areas into the government's strategic base. Certainly, any operation that targets an enemy strategic center of gravity is strategically offensive, especially if it is part of a campaign to dominate that center of gravity and not just a raid to temporarily disrupt it.

In theory, therefore, the oil-spot strategy has some merit. Regrettably, having a good strategy is not the same as knowing how to employ it. "Buying low and selling high" is a good strategy for getting rich in the stock market, but flawed execution can defeat even the best plan. As Napoleon said, "The art of war is a simple art; everything is in the performance." So how does one execute the oil-spot strategy in an environment such as Iraq?

First, we must understand that



▲ **ON POINT** A Special Forces soldier patrols a bazaar in Paktia Province, Afghanistan. For the oil-spot concept to work, the main interaction with the populace should be performed by local police or host-nation military forces. *Photo by Steve Hebert.*

there are three basic types of military counterinsurgency operations: clearing and consolidation, or C&C; disruption; and border control. C&C operations clear an area of insurgents and consolidate it into the government's expanding base area. Disruption operations are economy-of-force operations to keep the enemy from establishing his own base areas or from becoming so strong that he poses a major threat to a friendly base area. Border-control operations are intended to cut off the insurgents from external support.

In planning and conducting counterinsurgency operations, the guiding principle should always be to isolate the insurgent from the populace,

both physically and psychologically. The government must do both, or it cannot win. C&C operations, which include information operations, isolate the insurgents from the populace, while border-control operations isolate the insurgents from any foreign support bases. Disruption operations demonstrate the insurgent's inability to seize and hold ground and thus help to create doubt in the mind of the people regarding the insurgency's long-term viability.

Layeutu described insurgency, which he called banditry, as a plant that can survive only in a particular type of soil — the soil of poverty and discontent. He believed that the government, by good governance, could

make that soil uncongenial to the insurgent. This is an apt description of the psychological isolation the government must impose on the insurgents. Mao's famous comparison of the guerrilla to a fish and the populace to the water in which the fish lives is an accurate description of the physical relationship. Keeping the principle of isolation in mind, C&C operations are the heart of any counterinsurgency campaign, because they alone are designed to clear the insurgents from an area and consolidate government control over that area.

In 1972, when the author attended the Army Infantry Officer Basic Course, students had the "Vietnam Village" as one of their principal

training scenarios. They learned how to cordon off a village, to control the populace and to search it. The Iraqi coalition needs to adopt similar techniques, ranging in scale from villages to cities. Keep in mind, however, that the idea is to clear insurgents from an area, not to kill them.

For a number of reasons, it is often better to take control of a city without having to engage in highly destructive urban combat. Not only does this approach conserve friendly forces and preserve the city's infrastructure, it also spares the local populace the trauma of house-to-house fighting and makes consolidation efforts more likely to succeed. In some cases, when avoiding destruction is a major

the squad level. While this intelligence preparation of the battlefield will rely heavily on human intelligence, or HUMINT, it will also have a major signals-intelligence component.

As in the old Vietnam Village scenarios, clearing operations begin with a tight cordon around the target area. If the intelligence collection has been successful and the tactical situation permits, every effort should be made to detain all black-list personnel during the initial hours of the clearing operation. This may require special-operations forces to conduct nearly simultaneous raids on the suspected locations of the most important insurgent leaders. In urban areas too large to seize in one operation, it may be

and room-by-room.

Consolidation operations should begin simultaneously with the clearing operations. U.S. and host-country HUMINT teams should accompany units trained to clear buildings. HUMINT teams will question everyone, at least briefly, and naturally should have females trained to question the women and children. Because non-host-nation forces will initially constitute a large percentage of the military force, each team should have at least one interpreter, preferably two — one male and one female.

In addition to debriefing everyone, the teams will compile a book on the people in each family, each building and each block. This book

“Certainly, training effective security services is an important element of a successful strategy, but it does not, by itself, constitute a strategy — other than for withdrawal.”

concern, it may not be a bad idea to announce that an operation will be undertaken to clear City X. That will give most of the insurgents a chance to clear out, and they will eventually run out of places to hide.

Clearing operations should be preceded by an intense intelligence-gathering campaign in the target city or area. The campaign will identify insurgents, insurgent sympathizers and government supporters. Intelligence gatherers will compile black, gray and white lists to identify known insurgents and insurgent sympathizers, suspected insurgents and sympathizers, and confirmed government supporters, respectively. Black lists, in particular, should be exhaustively researched, compiled and disseminated to intelligence officers and commanders at every echelon, down to

necessary to divide the city into sectors and conduct C&C operations in a phased approach. Cordoning off part of an urban area is extremely difficult, but it can be done, even if it means clearing a “no man’s land” and erecting barriers between sectors.

Loudspeakers, radio and other means of communication should be employed to announce the operation to the populace and to declare martial law and a 24-hour curfew. Anyone on the street or rooftops during the curfew should be considered hostile and engaged with lethal force. Overwhelming air and ground power should saturate the area with patrols enforcing the curfew. Once the curfew has been imposed, specially trained units should begin exhaustive systematic search-and-clear operations, block-by-block, building-by-building

will contain, at a minimum, names, photographs and biographical data for every family member (date and place of birth, distinguishing physical characteristics, education, current and former employment, address and phone numbers, and record of foreign travel and military service).

Ideally, it would also include biometric data such as fingerprints, but this may not be feasible during the initial sweep. The book should also describe the level of cooperation each family member afforded the search team, an inventory by serial number of any authorized weapons found and a detailed inventory, with photographs, of any contraband discovered. It should also include each family member’s tribal affiliation, ethnic and religious affiliation, and names of close family members not living

with the family. Businesses dealing with sensitive items, such as vehicles or pharmaceuticals, should also be inventoried.

These family books should be consolidated into books for every building, such as apartment buildings, and for each block in the city. These books have many uses, not the least of which is to confirm who belongs in the area during surprise checks that will be conducted periodically in the future. If a future spot check reveals the presence of someone who is not a family member or neighbor, or the presence of different weapons than those originally found, further investigation will be conducted.

As each part of the city has been cleared, the commander may decide to relax the curfew somewhat, perhaps initially allowing people in certain areas to leave their houses for two or three hours a day to take care of shopping and other business. These curfews can be relaxed even more as the security situation improves, and they can be re-imposed in response to security violations. Restrictions on vehicle movement may be kept in place longer than those on foot movement. If possible, the government may establish or expand bus service in the affected area while vehicle curfews are in place. If the curfew is in place for an extended period, a ration system for feeding the populace may be required. Food would be issued based on the number of family members listed in the family books.

The host-nation element of the C&C force must conduct an aggressive information-operations campaign to tell the populace how the operation is designed to improve their security and quality of life; to request their tolerance of this temporary, yet necessary, inconvenience;

and to solicit their active support in reporting suspected insurgents so that the situation can return to normal as quickly as possible.

Rank-and-file police and security officials must be trained to impart these messages face-to-face, and the leaders of the security forces who will be enforcing the martial law should bring together the local political, tribal and religious leaders to solicit their support. Police corruption must be dealt with severely. For cities undergoing consolidation, the government must control, or at least censor, the television and radio stations and the newspapers for the duration of the consolidation effort. Freedom of the press will return after martial law has ended.

Once an area has been cleared of known insurgents, aggressive population- and resource-control measures are essential to establishing and maintaining control. Every resident must be issued a special identification card with his or her photo. These should be made very difficult to forge. Women who for religious reasons decline to have their pictures taken might not be required to have their photos on the ID, but they must give their thumbprint, and they may be required to travel with a relative, with the same family name, who has a valid photo ID. Female security officials should confirm that the person in question is female and not a male insurgent posing as a female.

Internal passports and travel passes should be used to control the movement of personnel within the area of the C&C operation, as well as into and out of that area. People found outside the area in which they reside or work can be subject to detention. Claims of visiting relatives can be checked against rosters of residents compiled from the family,

building and block books. Personnel entering the area must be sponsored by a registered resident, signed in and signed out of the city before nightfall, or they can be registered to remain for a set period and issued a temporary pass.

Strict control of food, fuel, medicine and other critical items must be instituted and ration cards issued. Medicines normally dispensed "over the counter" that would be of use to sick or wounded insurgents, such as antibiotics, should be issued by the government and only with a doctor's prescription. Police officers should monitor compliance with rationing. If necessary, the storage and issue of food and medicine should be controlled by the government until the local consolidation phase is complete.

Periodic random roadblocks should be established to check IDs, and house-by-house sweeps should be conducted through areas of the city to identify outsiders. Such sweeps must be conducted with the utmost respect, but visitors who do not show up on the family or building books must be detained until their identities can be established. All persons detained must be treated with respect, but severe fines or other punishment must be instituted for the violation of curfew or of the rules regarding the possession of ID cards.

The periodic sweeps should include brief interviews with every resident to solicit their support in identifying insurgents. Teams conducting the sweeps should have a good representation of female police officers, and these officers must be well-trained, not only in basic intelligence and police skills such as debriefing but also in the information-operations themes and ways of communicating them. These officers



▲ **ON THE BEAT** For the oil spot to work, security forces must become part of the community they patrol. Its citizens must come to know and trust them. *U.S. Army photo.*

must take pains to explain to each member of a household why the measures are necessary and how the government wants to get everyone's life back to normal as soon as possible. Giving nominal gifts, such as tea or coffee, to compensate for the inconvenience of the search helps minimize negative reactions.

A comprehensive system of wardens must also be established to identify future likely insurgent activity. As intelligence officers or specially trained police officers accompanying the search teams identify cooperative individuals, they should recruit at least one person on each floor of every apartment building as an agent for the government (a warden) to monitor and report suspicious activities. Whenever possible, such reporting

should be done by phoning a hotline separate from those provided for the public. When that is not possible, other, less technical means can be employed. For example, a source can hang a certain color rag from a specific window to advise police that they have information, and a sweep can be organized for that building during which every resident is interviewed, so that the source's identity will be protected. A more overt neighborhood watch-type program would preferably supplement the warden system.

As soon as the security situation allows, perhaps within days, the government, with coalition support, would undertake an effort to improve the quality of life for the residents of the city. City and tribal leaders would be consulted and infrastructure

improvement projects identified and prioritized. Power, sewers, schools, mosque renovation and clinics are some projects that can be undertaken. Maximizing the use of local labor creates jobs, and the timely initiation of such projects clearly demonstrates the advantages of supporting continued government control.

As soon as the security situation permits, non-host-nation military forces should be withdrawn from high-profile operations and replaced by host-nation security forces, preferably police rather than military. Police patrolling on foot and in vehicles should saturate the area and get to know local residents. Use of "beat cops" should be maximized so they can get to know specific areas thoroughly. These officers should soon



▲ **WATCH DOG** A Special Forces Soldier patrols a neighborhood in Iraq. Soldiers must not only drive the insurgents from the neighborhoods but refuse to allow them to return. *Photo by Steve Hebert.*

know residents by name and eventually should recognize instinctively when something is unusual in the neighborhood. Friendly relationships between the rank-and-file police and the people living and working on their beat will soon produce actionable intelligence.

Courts must be re-established as soon as possible, to include special military antiterrorism courts to deal with violations of martial law. Special courts will eventually be abolished as the security situation improves, but special police elements, similar to

the Special Branch of British Police, should be trained to conduct counterinsurgent intelligence operations for the duration of the crisis. Local elections should be held and civil government established as soon as the security situation permits.

The end state of successful consolidation operations is an area in which the government is in total control and enjoys the full and active support of the populace. Population- and resource-control measures should be relaxed as government control is established, but they should

never be eliminated until the entire country is pacified. Strict enforcement of these measures, including controls regarding the movement of people into the area, is essential to prevent re-infiltration by insurgents. Timely identification by an active population of insurgent attempts at infiltration will sustain government control and give the people confidence in the government's ability to protect them.

Once an area is secure enough for the police to take over, supported by host-nation military reaction forces —

both small SWAT-type teams and larger, heavily armed elements that are prepared to assume security responsibilities — the coalition forces can move on to conduct C&C operations in an adjacent area, slowly expanding the government’s strategic base. During the advanced stages of the consolidation effort in one city, the coalition shifts its intelligence-collection focus to the next target area, preferably the suburbs of the current target or a neighboring city, compiling black, gray and white lists in preparation for conducting clearing operations there.

Because C&C operations are resource-intensive, the government must limit the number undertaken at any one time, and often the hardest decision the overall military commander must make is which cities to defer clearing.

Because of the resources required for C&C operations, there is also a danger that the insurgents will increase their operations in areas with reduced government presence in order to establish control there or to divert coalition forces from effective C&C operations. That is why the government must conduct aggressive operations to disrupt insurgent presence in areas not targeted by C&C operations. Disruption operations are aggressive sweeps, raids and intelligence operations to capture or kill insurgent leaders, etc. Despite their offensive tactical or operational nature, however, these are strategically defensive, economy-of-force operations. If successful, they disrupt the enemy and cause him temporary setbacks, but they do not deal with the root causes of the insurgency, nor do they serve to systematically deny the enemy supplies, funding or recruits the way erosion of his base areas does. Nor do they strengthen the government’s base. They are a version of Vietnam’s search-and-destroy missions.

Unfortunately for the government, insurgents have the added advantage that contested areas, which serve as a secure base for neither side, often provide substantial support for the insurgents but not for the government. Because insurgent recruiting and fund-raising are essentially clandestine activities in contested areas, while government recruiting, fund-raising and logistical operations are fundamentally overt, the latter are vulnerable, while the former generally are not.

Because the government cannot guarantee the safety of the populace from insurgent attack in contested areas, the people, even if they are sympathetic to the government, tend to remain neutral, and neutrality favors the insurgency. We must remember that, in insurgencies, silence is a weapon, and an insurgency can succeed even if only 10 percent of the population is actively involved, so long as most of the remaining population is not actively supporting the government.

Border-control operations deny or limit the insurgents’ logistical support and reinforcement from foreign sources. They require a combination of intelligence operations, patrols and numerous mobile checkpoints, as well as curfews and other movement restrictions. Border-control operations may extend into off-limits areas and may even involve the establishment of “free fire” zone, in which movement is prohibited in certain areas or at certain times, and in which violators may be engaged without warning. Border-control intelligence operations give increased play to overhead and ground-emplaced sensors.

Oil-spot operations, employed with pervasive and aggressive information operations to win the active support of the people, and increased

assumption of security duties by police and security forces, offer our best chance for defeating an insurgency, regardless of whether the enemy is motivated by misplaced patriotism or religious fanaticism. The bad news is that it won’t happen quickly.

There is always the danger that if the number of completed consolidation operations becomes the metric by which we determine success against the insurgency, pressure will build to increase the numbers by moving on to the next city before consolidation is truly complete. The real measure of success in a consolidation operation is whether neighborhood watches and hotlines begin regularly reporting suspicious activity and whether the local police, not the military, are in charge of the city’s security.

The reader will notice the lack of discussion of the root causes of insurgency. That is almost always something with which the host country has to deal. Admittedly, the foreign military presence in a country motivates many to fight against the perceived occupation; that cannot be helped, but it can be mitigated by an aggressive information-operations campaign. The best the U.S.-led coalition can do is to assist in establishing a climate of security in which a true government can develop and, yes, win the hearts and minds of its own people. **SW**

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Defining War: New doctrinal definitions of irregular, conventional and unconventional warfare

by Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey L. Hasler

In April 2006, the Pentagon drafted the execution roadmap for irregular warfare, or IW, as a means of combating the growing threat from actions beyond conventional state-to-state military conflict.

With military leaders' attention focused on IW, it is important for Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, to understand the emerging concept of IW and the place of traditional and maturing unconventional warfare, or UW, within it.

It is also important for ARSOF to understand other terms that are of enduring or renewed importance, such as "insurgency," "counterinsurgency" and "conventional warfare." Furthermore, it is necessary to be familiar with other nondoctrinal terms that continue to influence policy-makers, commanders and doctrine developers, such as "asymmetric warfare," "fourth-generation warfare" and "unrestricted warfare."

The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States highlighted the increased danger of warfare conducted by other-than-state enemies. Recognizing that such irregular threats by nonstate actors would be a likely and even dominant pattern throughout the 21st century, national policy-makers dictated that such irregular threats must be analyzed and prepared for. On April 17, 2006, the deputy secretary of defense approved a working definition of irregular warfare as a basis for planning and doctrine analysis:

A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or the legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric advantages, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will.¹

The ideas in this definition were heavily influenced by the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, in which IW was a significant theme.

Having identified the importance of the strategic theme and the process of analyzing and characterizing IW, the execution roadmap distinguished it clearly from current doctrine. The roadmap tasked the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, or MCCDC, to jointly develop the *IW Joint Operating Concept*, or JOC, for delivery by Dec. 15, 2006. Its purpose was to describe broadly how future joint force commanders would conduct protracted IW in support of unified action on a regional or global scale in the 2014-2026 time frame.

Although the JOC is not yet established doctrine, it provides the best descriptions and discussions of irregular warfare available to date. IW doctrine will continue to emerge. Therefore, it is important that ARSOF understand the meaning and implications of IW. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD, has assembled an informal working group, of which the author is a member, to study the implications of the JOC to ARSOF doctrine. This article represents the working group's opinions of what the JOC's concept of IW means in relation to established doctrinal concepts and terminology.

As an emerging concept, IW and many of its related ideas are not yet defined in either Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, or JP 1-02; or FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*. To date, discussions regarding IW and attempts to integrate it into doctrine have resulted in inconsistencies of interpretation. For example, whereas the JOC consistently suggests that IW is a new kind of challenge, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Revision Final Coordination, or JP-1 RFC, states that IW is not a new or independent type of warfare per se. FM 3-0 (doctrinal review and approval

group, or Drag version), *Full Spectrum Operations*, describes IW as merely one operational theme within the spectrum of conflict. The U.S. Joint Forces Command *IW Special Study*, conducted by the Joint Warfighting Center in August 2006, was not only critical of the developing JOC — highlighting the often vague description of methods and approaches — but it also went so far as to recommend that IW not be incorporated into joint doctrine.

The DOTD working group's analysis of the IW JOC has identified both problematic and useful IW conceptual elements that are directly pertinent to ARSOF. For example, the IW JOC has established a revised definition for IW: "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population."² This latest definition is clearer and more succinct. It is also in line with JP-1 and includes an appropriate and understandable objective. However, the adjective "violent" may not be appropriate, because the various activities that IW comprises are not exclusively violent.

The IW JOC also states that the definition takes on different meanings at each level of war (strategic, operational and tactical). To be clear, doctrinal terms — whether "irregular" or not — should not have different meanings at different levels. What makes IW different is the focus of its operations — a relevant population — and its strategic purpose of gaining or maintaining control or influence over and supporting that population through political, psychological and economic methods. Both the approved working definition and the proposed definition already contain the essential meaning of IW — the struggle for legitimacy or influence amongst a given population — and this meaning unifies all levels of warfare.

Much of what the IW concept offers, however, does align with traditional ARSOF doctrine, practice and conceptualization. Practitioners of UW

have long understood, for example, that a campaign’s logical lines of operation, or LLO, could include not only combat operations but also information, intelligence and developing capability. JP-1 RFC states that IW is marked by a struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population; that it primarily involves an indirect approach to erode power, influence and will; and that it is determined by the characteristics of the adversary and is not, per se, a new or independent type of warfare. These are all familiar insights for ARSOF.

Moreover, the JOC lists the constituent activities of IW as follows:

1. Insurgency.
2. Counterinsurgency (COIN).
3. Unconventional Warfare (UW).
4. Terrorism.
5. Counterterrorism (CT).
6. Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
7. Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.
8. Strategic Communications.
9. Psychological Operations (PSYOP).
10. Civil-Military Operations (CMO).
11. Information Operations (IO).
12. Intelligence and Counterintelli-

gence Activities.

13. Transnational Criminal Activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing and illegal financial transactions that support or sustain IW.
14. Law-enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries.³

This is an appropriate list of activities for IW. Note that UW (including support for insurgencies), CT, FID, PSYOP and CA are all core ARSOF tasks. Regardless of their scale, traditional ARSOF activities are central to the emerging IW concept.

The working group’s analysis of Army IW doctrine identified some of the same problems and benefits for ARSOF as did its analysis of the IW JOC. For example, whereas the IW JOC connotes IW as a holistic approach to warfare that spans the entire range of military operations, the Army describes IW as an “operational theme” within (and narrower than) the spectrum of conflict. This difference of perspective is clearly incongruent. Nevertheless — and consistent with both joint and Army conceptualizations — FM 3-0 (DRAG) identifies

irregular forces, insurgency and UW as the predominant features of an IW conflict. The Army correctly identifies that although conventional forces may be heavily involved in IW, or that ARSOF may be the only Army forces involved, in either case, SOF are the lead forces in the majority of IW operations. As mentioned previously then, both the IW JOC and the Army observe that the ARSOF role in IW includes UW, CT, FID, PSYOP and CMO, as well as ARSOF support to many of the other constituent missions of IW.

Developing the concept of IW as an approach to warfare is of national importance in the era of the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT. If IW is widely appreciated to be something other than the conventional business-as-usual, and if IW draws so heavily from traditional ARSOF concepts, it is imperative that ARSOF revisit the central doctrinal definitions and currently-influential (non-doctrinal) terms that fuel the debate of what IW is and is not.

It is apparent from the above discussion (and the emphasis placed on the entire IW conceptual effort) that previous understanding of the terms “conventional,” “traditional” or “regular” warfare are inadequate to the challenges the U.S. and its allies face in the 21st century. The identified need for an IW doctrine suggests the inadequacy of relying solely on a regular or conventional-warfare doctrine. Amazingly, conventional warfare is not defined in either JP 1-02 or FM 1-02. The IW JOC appropriately and necessarily identifies the following working definition for conventional or traditional warfare:

A form of warfare between states that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. The focus of conventional military operations is normally an adversary’s armed forces with the objective of influencing the adversary’s government. It generally assumes that the people indigenous to the operational area are non-belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate or negotiate. A fundamental military objective in conventional military operations is to

PRINCIPAL TENETS OF MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (MCO)	
Joint Doctrine: (MCO JOC v 2.0, July 2006)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focused on seizing the initiative and dominating the adversary. • Inherently military actions taken directly or indirectly to defeat an adversary’s military (however, it can be directed against other hostile forces presenting any one — or a combination — of the four challenges described in the National Military Strategy).
Army: (FM 3-0 DRAG, November 2006)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An operational theme that describes general characteristics of the major operation. • Takes place in circumstances usually characterized as war. • Full-spectrum dominance over an organized and capable adversary. • High tempo, high resource consumption, high casualty rates. • Significant national or coalition interests are threatened. • Often waged between uniformed armed forces of nation-states. • Seek to defeat enemy’s armed forces and seize terrain. • Offensive and defensive operations predominate. • Doctrine and principles of war originally derived from MCO.
Comments:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MCO are not defined in JP 1-02 or in FM 1-02. • The characterization listed above is an appropriate description of MCO (however, the Army’s characteristics do not include purpose or end state, unlike the definition of IW proposed in the IW JOC).

*minimize civilian interference in those operations.(working definition.)*⁴

This working definition provides an appropriate starting point from which to contrast IW. It acknowledges that conventional, regular and traditional warfare are synonymous. It properly identifies the direct military confrontation between nation-states, in which the desired effect is to influence an adversary's government through the defeat of the adversary's military, and it further recognizes that such conventional warfare attempts to isolate the population from conflict and to minimize civilian interference. The definition agrees with the JP-1 RFC discussion of traditional warfare as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states. It also agrees with the Army's understanding of major combat operations, or MCO, within the spectrum of conflict and that MCO are distinct from IW.

If IW borrows heavily from traditional ARSOF concepts, and if many ARSOF core and supported missions are constituent parts of IW, it is important to review some of these core and supported missions to ensure clarity and unity throughout ARSOF.

Unconventional Warfare

The definition of UW has evolved over time. The initial doctrinal concept for the U.S. to conduct UW originates with the creation of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. In that classic context, UW was generally defined in terms of guerrilla and covert operations in enemy-held or -influenced territory. The first official Army definition that touched upon aspects of UW appeared in 1950 as "partisan warfare." In 1951, the Army's UW assets were consolidated under the Office of Psychological Warfare, and the Army published the first two field manuals for the conduct of special operations (with an emphasis on UW).

By 1955, the first manual that specifically linked Army Special Forces to UW (FM 31-20, *Special Forces Group*) declared, "UW consists of the three inter-related fields of guerrilla warfare (GW), escape and evasion, and subversion against hostile states." In the subsequent Cold War decades, the definition expanded and contracted, verbiage changed and missions conceived as a part of this unconventional



▲ **THE TEACHER** Carrying out foreign-internal-defense missions, Special Forces Soldiers instruct the armies of foreign governments to bolster their security. U.S. Army photo.

enterprise were added or subtracted.

The common conceptual core has nevertheless remained as working by, with and through irregular surrogates in a clandestine and/or covert manner against opposing actors. The most recent published version of a doctrinally approved UW definition comes from FM3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*:

A broad range of military and/or

*paramilitary operations and activities, normally of long duration, conducted through, with, or by indigenous or other surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and otherwise directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW operations can be conducted across the range of conflict against regular and irregular forces. These forces may or may not be State-sponsored.*⁵

This lengthy definition manages to capture some of the fundamental tenets of the traditional ARSOF understanding of UW, and yet it remains both verbose and inadequate. It correctly includes the notion that UW is an operation conducted “through, with or by” others. However, much of the language is incorrect or unnecessary. For example, “a broad range” or “normally of long duration” add nothing; not all surrogates are indigenous; regular and irregular forces are “all forces”; and organization, training, equipping and directing are all types of support. Unfortunately, the essential historical role of UW in supporting insurgency, resistance and conventional military operations is not included.

In the context of the emerging IW effort, it is equally important to highlight what UW is not. It is not simply a catch-all phrase for anything that is not conventional, regular or traditional. It is synonymous neither with the emerging term irregular warfare, nor with the currently influential (but non-doctrinal) terms “asymmetric warfare,” “unrestricted warfare,” or “fourth-generation warfare” (although there are conceptual similarities). Moreover, and despite widespread confusion outside of ARSOF, UW is not synonymous with either special operations or guerrilla warfare. All UW operations are special operations, but not all special operations are UW. Although GW is a classic inherent component of UW and is featured in many historical definitions, UW is an operation; GW is a technique.

It is common for definitions to evolve, and ARSOF have recently refined the FM 3-05 definition above to highlight the essentials of UW and eliminate everything that is non-essential. In this era of definitional and conceptual change, ARSOF must be unified with a clear and concise understanding of the UW core task. In January 2007, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command approved the following definition:

Unconventional warfare is operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations.

Over many weeks, the DOTD



▲ **UNCONVENTIONAL** The insertion of Special Forces into Afghanistan to work with the Northern Freedom was a prime example of unconventional warfare. U.S. Army photo.

working group used a definition-development methodology that examined doctrinal and popular conceptions of UW dating back to World War II. All past definitions were dissected, as were newly proposed definitions solicited from the SF community, for their common essentials as tested against historical UW operations.

This process resulted in three essential criteria: UW must be conducted by, with, or through surrogates; such surrogates must be irregular forces; and UW must be conducted through clandestine or covert means.

Moreover, any new definition had to be consistent with the historical reasons for conducting UW. UW had been conducted in support of both an insurgency — such as the Contras in 1980s Nicaragua — and resistance movements to defeat an occupying power — such as the *mujahideen* in 1980s Afghanistan. UW had also been conducted in support of pending or ongoing MCO; for example, OSS/Jedburgh activities in France and OSS/Detachment 101 activities in

the Pacific in World War II, and more recently, SF operations in OEF/Afghanistan in 2001 and OIF/Iraq in 2003. Finally, and in keeping with the clandestine and/or covert nature of historical UW operations, another reason for UW was to conduct classified (but unspecified) surrogate operations.

The definition had to establish a litmus test for clearly differentiating UW from other activities and clearly establish the purpose for conducting UW. Including the idea of “by, with or through surrogates” eliminates any confusion with unilateral DA, SR or CT missions. Identifying the historically demonstrated use of irregular forces as surrogates in the definition eliminates any confusion with FID or coalition activities using regular forces. The clearly-stated purpose of UW to support insurgencies, resistance movements and conventional military operations not only eliminates the possibility of incorrectly characterizing UW as solely an IW activity but also articulates UW’s relevance to the rest of the Army and the joint com-



Alliance in the opening days of Operation Enduring

munity by specifying support to other operations.

A new definition, however, could not simply be a list of essential criteria and rationales connected end-to-end. The commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School wanted the most concise definition possible that allowed for the essential UW criteria and rationales and explicitly or implicitly answered the “who, what, when, where, and why” questions of a military definition.

For example, working by, with or through is having one act on the behalf of another, so “surrogate” was thought to be redundant. Moreover, the one on whose behalf action is taken implies the “who” and was likewise considered unnecessary. The “what and why” questions are explicitly answered by UW’s purpose as stated above, and the “when and where” are implicit in the times and spaces in which the purpose is being pursued.

Omitting from the definition a statement of the clandestine and/or covert nature common to UW was

initially thought to be more problematic. There are, however, good reasons to have done so. Clandestine and/or covert *means* are common to all UW, but the *ways* and *ends* are not. For example, UW conducted by SF in Afghanistan in 2001 concealed the locations of teams, movements, partnerships and activities throughout the majority of the conflict — and in some cases, in perpetuity.

That the U.S. was conducting UW as one *way* of assisting the Northern Alliance and supporting conventional military operations for the *end* of defeating the Taliban were not clandestine or covert. Moreover, detailed explanations of clandestine and/or covert activities in support of classified surrogate operations could not be adequately addressed in an unclassified definition. Such activities are therefore omitted from the definition and discussed in the appropriate classified manuals.

COIN vs. FID

The IW effort is, in part, driven by the challenges the U.S. faces in the GWOT. A parallel effort is the updating of Army and Marine Corps doctrine on counterinsurgency. Because COIN is frequently confused with another core ARSOF mission — FID — it is necessary to review these terms. FM 3-24/Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, begins with the JP 1-02 definition of insurgency as: “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” It then slightly restates this definition as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”⁶

FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24 defines counterinsurgency as: “those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.”⁷ COIN is necessarily focused on “actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.” Like IW doctrine, COIN doctrine describes the opponent. As in the IW concept, insurgents do not typically seek a decisive victory on the battlefield. Rather, they

seek primarily to set the conditions for political solutions. The military’s role in COIN is not necessarily decisive victory in the conventional or traditional sense of the term. Rather, the military focuses on making the environment “secure enough” for the other elements of national power to take effect. Therefore, other elements of national power are more significant than the military element.

COIN is not an ARSOF core task, but SOF may play a critical role. COIN is not an effort that can be successfully concluded by military power alone (it requires the coordination of all the instruments of national power and interagency and allied cooperation). Nor is COIN an effort that can be successfully concluded by U.S. power alone (it requires the willing and successful participation of a legitimate host-nation government to secure and manage its own country, as well as the cooperation of a significant portion of the host-nation population), and COIN will not typically be a short-duration effort.

To avoid confusion, COIN must be contrasted with FID, which is defined as: “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency”⁸

As the doctrine states, “actions taken by another government or designated organization” are key to FID. By definition, FID can be conducted in support of nonstate actors and against nonstate actors. Nothing in the definition limits it to a peacetime operation. FID can support other, larger military operations or civilian-assistance efforts. Direct military force can be used in FID, but such use is the exception to the rule.

FID is similar to but distinct from COIN. Whereas COIN is conducted to counter insurgency, the definition of FID is broader: It is all efforts to assist a host nation to defeat insurgency, lawlessness and subversion. Therefore, the terms are not synonymous; one can conduct FID without conducting COIN. Both FID and COIN are constituent parts of IW. Although FID is a core ARSOF task, other non-SOF can and do conduct FID.

Definitions

Conventional or traditional warfare is a form of warfare between states that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies. The focus of conventional military operations is normally an adversary's armed forces, with the objective of influencing the adversary's government. It generally assumes that the people indigenous to the operational area are non-belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate or negotiate. A fundamental military objective in conventional military operations is to minimize civilian interference in those operations.

(IW JOC Version 1.0, JAN 07)

Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.

(IW JOC Version 1.0, JAN 07)

Unconventional warfare is operations conducted by, with or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency or conventional military operations.

(CG, USASOC, JAN 07)

Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.

(JP1-02, AUG 06/FM3-05.202, JAN 07)

Counterinsurgency is those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.

(JP1-02, AUG 06/FM3-24, DEC 06)

Imprecise Terms

Further complicating the goal of establishing up-to-date, authoritative and clearly articulated doctrine are other, currently influential, non-doctrinal terms. Incorrect usage of doctrinal terms sows confusion and hinders mission accomplishment; incorrect usage of unapproved terms does so exponentially. These terms are so widely (and often incorrectly) used throughout government, academia and the press that they demand a brief summary.

One such imprecise term related to the definitions in this article is "asymmetric warfare." Despite the frequent usage of the term, JP 1-02 has no approved definition for it. "Symmetric warfare" assumes the legacy concept of two roughly equal nation-states who fight each other directly, using standing, uniformed armies, navies and air forces. Think of World War II combat and the countries involved.

Asymmetric warfare is generally understood to be a conflict in which the strengths and sizes of the opponents do not mirror each other. The side with the conventional disadvantage is probably incapable of winning through direct, conventional warfare. It must seek victory through other methods that exploit weaknesses in the superior conventional power's capacity to prevail. Think of the Maoist Peoples' War against the Imperial Japanese Army, the Vietnamese *dau trahn* strategy in the First and Second Indochina Wars and al-Qaeda's tactics in the GWOT. In these cases, political organization, proselytizing and psychological operations are fundamental to their effectiveness.

Although symmetric warfare is the loose conceptual equivalent of conventional warfare, it is not an approved doctrinal definition. The discussion of asymmetry, however, is obviously useful to the characterization of IW, UW, COIN, etc. The IW JOC definition does include the concept of seeking asymmetric advantages. It also seeks to explain the IW concept by using terms such as asymmetric applications of tactics, techniques and procedures and by drawing attention to asymmetric activities. The IW JOC also recommends research into joint asymmetric warfare, for which there also is no approved doctrine. ARSOF must therefore understand and use the unapproved term

asymmetric warfare with care.

Another term often used in discussions of IW, UW, COIN, etc., is so-called "fourth-generation warfare," or 4GW. This term is posited by a school of thought led and most closely identified with the writer and pundit William Lind. The school's most currently popular proponent is U.S. Marine Corps Colonel T.X. Hammes, through his book *The Sling and the Stone*. Proponents of 4GW maintain that the world is in a new era, or generation, of warfare. The first generation was characterized by massed manpower, the second by firepower and the third by maneuver. 4GW proponents claim that the new generation is characterized by the use of all instruments of power — not just the military — to defeat the will of enemy decision-makers. 4GW has its detractors. Dr. Antulio Echevarria of the Army War College dismisses 4GW as a myth. He states that the theory is "fundamentally and hopelessly flawed, and creates more confusion than it eliminates. ... It is based on poor history and only obscures what other historians, theorists, and analysts already have worked long and hard to clarify"⁹

To the extent that the 4GW debate contributes insight to ARSOF's understanding of IW, UW, COIN, etc., it can be useful. However — and despite the current popularity of *The Sling and the Stone* — it is not accepted Department of Defense doctrine or terminology. Moreover, careful students of Mao, Giap or Molnar would recognize that 4GW theory has rediscovered the obvious.

The final term that ARSOF will eventually be exposed to is "unrestricted warfare." This refers to the title of a monograph written by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, two army colonels from the Peoples' Republic of China. They advocate "a multitude of means, both military and particularly non-military, to strike at the United States during times of conflict. Hacking into Web sites, targeting financial institutions, terrorism, using the media and conducting urban warfare are among the methods proposed. The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden. Strong countries would not use the same approach against weak countries because 'strong countries make the rules, while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes.'"¹⁰



▲ **BROADCAST NEWS** An Afghan man shares coalition messages with Afghan farmers, aided by a Psychological Operations Soldier. U.S. Army photo.

The similarity of these ideas to those in the previous terms is unmistakable. Whether or not the authors break any new ground or establish a new theory is debatable. Their monograph has generated interest in the West, primarily for what it may signify in PRC strategic thinking — such ideas could not be published without some official sanction in the often inscrutable Chinese government. ARSOF Soldiers should be aware of unrestricted warfare, but they must understand that the term is not synonymous with the aforementioned terms, is not approved doctrine and has a very specific international context and usage.

Words matter. Common understanding and correct usage of approved doctrinal terms and concepts, and the ability to articulate the distinctions between important doctrinal and influ-

ential nondoctrinal terms, have serious ramifications for ARSOF. This article has provided the ARSOF community with an articulation of both traditional and emerging concepts important to providing a unified ARSOF voice in the GWOT era. **SW**

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Notes:

¹ Working definition approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 17 April 2006.

² OSD/Joint Staff definition as of 1 December 2006.

³ *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC)* Version 1.0, January 2007.

⁴ *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC)* Version 1.0, January 2007.

⁵ FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*, September 2006.

⁶ JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* August 2006; FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006.

⁷ JP 1-02, August 2006; FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24, December 2006.

⁸ JP 1-02, August 2006; FM 3-05.202, January 2007.

⁹ Antulio Echevarria, *Fourth Generation War and Other Myths* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2005), 2.

¹⁰ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), 2.



▲ **TEAMWORK** A Special Forces Soldier congratulates an Afghan soldier on a weapons find. Understanding the culture of their fellow soldiers allows Special Forces Soldiers to build strong relationships. *Photo by Steve Hebert.*

DIGGING DEEPER

Cultural understanding requires ARSOF to go beyond surface understanding

by Major Edward C. Croot

For Soldiers going through the Special Forces Qualification Course, and for Soldiers already in the field, one of the most critical lessons to be learned and taken to heart is the importance of understanding and embracing the culture of the area where they will be operating. In understanding the cultural implications of special operations, Soldiers hone their ability to work by, with and through the indigenous forces of many countries.

A 12-man SF team really does not bring a lot of combat power to the battlefield without the 500 or so indigenous fighters it is either training or fighting alongside. Soldiers who stand a line together must build a bond, and the only way to form a bond with indigenous forces is to

study their culture, understand it and never violate it. Members of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, took this lesson to heart during a six-month deployment to southern Afghanistan in 2003. During the deployment, the members of an SF operational detachment learned three crucial lessons in cultural leadership in dealing with Afghans.

The first cultural-leadership lesson concerned the treatment of the dead according to the Muslim religion. While SF Soldiers learned this important cultural lesson during their training, conventional Soldiers do not. The SF team's awareness of the tenets of the Muslim religion significantly improved its relationship with its counterparts in the Afghan National Army, or ANA, leading to an outstanding working relationship. The team

members were assigned to combat-advise an ANA battalion operating in the Helmand Province. The team, operating out of a firebase on the outskirts of the town of Gershik, had as its collective mission the maintenance of security within the province.

In preparing for its deployment to Afghanistan, the team had conducted several training events designed to build cultural awareness. One theme of the training was the importance of Islam in Afghan culture. Of key importance were the reality that Muslims base a majority of their daily decisions on the teachings of Islam, and the manner in which Muslims treat the dead. Islam requires that the eyes of the deceased be gently closed, that the entire body be covered with a white shroud and that the body be buried before the next sundown.¹ Muslims

also believe that after death, the body still feels pain.

Early during the team's deployment, a U.S. convoy passing through Gereshk was ambushed by members of the anti-coalition militia, or ACM, with small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades. A lengthy firefight ensued. The team, along with its ANA battalion, responded to the firefight after the ACM ambush had been repelled. Three ACM had been killed in the fight. While the ANA battalion was shoring up security around the ambush site, a disagreement occurred between the ANA battalion commander and the commander of the American convoy. The major in charge of the convoy had ordered that the bodies of the fallen militia members be loaded on his vehicle and taken to headquarters for identification. The bodies were not covered and were stacked on top each other. The ANA battalion commander demanded that he be allowed to take control of the ACM bodies.

The SF detachment commander took both parties aside to try to broker a compromise. The SF team offered to take pictures and record the biometric stats of the deceased and send the information via satellite communication to the American unit that night. That allowed the ANA battalion commander to take custody of the bodies and afford them the proper burial rites. The compromise was agreed upon by both the ANA and the U.S. contingent, and the dispute was settled.

The ANA battalion commander and his men then drove into a dangerous area within the Helmand Province to return the bodies to the families of the deceased. Although the ACM were the enemy on earth, they were still brothers in Islam, and the culture demanded that they be treated as such. The ANA's cultural beliefs outweighed the reality of the situation.

The U.S. commander's disregard for the sanctity of the ACM corpses, because of his lack of cultural knowledge, greatly offended the ANA. The SF detachment's awareness of the importance of the dead in Islamic culture was critical in defusing the situation, and it enhanced the team's working relationship with the ANA

battalion for several months after the incident. The ANA battalion commander appreciated the fact that SF were aware of and understood his religious beliefs. He later told the detachment commander that it was at that moment that he first believed that the Americans were in Afghanistan to help his people, and that the Americans valued Afghan beliefs. The incident led to the ANA letting down their cultural defenses and resulted in the group becoming a better team.

A key aspect of Afghan daily life is the people's adherence to *Pashtunwali*, the ancient tribal code of honor by which many Afghans live their lives. Prior to deployment, the detachment studied the code and acquired a basic understanding of its influence on Afghans and of its four major components:²

Melmastia (hospitality) — Showing hospitality to all visitors, regardless of whom they are or of their ethnic, religious or national background, without hope of remuneration or favor.

Badal (justice/revenge) — Seeking justice over time or space, in order to avenge a wrong. Badal applies to injustices committed yesterday or 1,000 years ago, if the wrongdoer still exists.

Nanawatay (settlement) — Deriving its name from the verb meaning to go in, nanawatay is the willingness of a vanquished party to go into the house of the victor and ask forgiveness.

Nang (honor) — The various points that a tribesman must observe in order to ensure that his honor and that of his family are upheld.

Southern Afghanistan, where the SF Soldiers were based, is composed largely of Pashtuns. The Soldiers felt comfortable that their knowledge of *Pashtunwali* would stand them in good stead while they were operating in the area. They soon learned, however, that book knowledge is not enough.

Another SF detachment and its assigned ANA battalion were located at a firebase near the town of Gereshk. Inside Gereshk, an Afghan warlord operated a compound that housed a force of more than 1,000 Pashtun fighters from the area. The warlord's force was instrumental in the overthrow of the Taliban in early 2002.

His force remained in Gereshk and operated as a part of the Afghan Militia Force, or AMF. The warlord and his force were not necessarily anti-coalition, but they caused problems for the fledgling Afghan government and its police and security forces.

The warlord saw himself as the provider of security for the people of Gereshk. The problem was that he funded his large force by shaking down the people at checkpoints and during patrols in the bazaar. It became unclear who was really in charge of Gereshk, the government or the warlord.

As the warlord's influence grew, the SF detachment received orders to confront him and re-establish government control of Gereshk. The team requested a meeting at his compound. Concerned that the meeting would become confrontational, the team nevertheless hoped that the *Pashtunwali* tenet of *melmastia* would force the warlord to show hospitality. At the appointed time, the detachment arrived at the compound. As the inside walls of the compound were lined with more than 200 of the warlord's armed fighters, it was clear that the warlord's intent was to intimidate the team. Most of the detachment remained with the vehicles as the leaders were led into the warlord's chamber. The interpreter assured the team that they were truly safe, because the warlord would adhere to *Pashtunwali*.

In keeping with local customs, the team sat in a circle with the warlord and his followers and drank tea before beginning discussions. After about 15 minutes, the warlord appeared to become agitated. He seemed receptive to the team's message of collaboration, but something was wrong. The interpreter alerted the Soldiers that they were not abiding by the principles of *Pashtunwali*. He explained that because the team had been invited into the compound, its safety was guaranteed. However, because the team retained its body armor and Kevlar helmets, it was unknowingly insulting the warlord. The team quickly removed its gear, learning an important lesson — although it was familiar with the principle of *melmastia*, the team had not reciprocated it by showing

proper respect to the warlord and his ability to defend his guests.

The team lost no time in trying to repair the damage, explaining that while they were aware of *Pashtunwali*, they clearly were ignorant of all its intricacies. The commander explained that the team meant no disrespect and only hoped to work with the warlord, within his culture, to provide security to the men, women and children of Gereshk. The warlord responded with a laugh, saying that he was nervous because the Soldiers were dressed to do battle, not to hold discussions. The exchange lightened the mood tremendously. As the meeting went on, the warlord thanked the team for helping his people and for being sensitive to their culture. As a result of the meeting, the warlord turned his checkpoints over to Afghan

the rotations of several SF detachments. The AMF were locals, knew the ground and the people, had been well-trained by previous detachments and had an outstanding reputation. Their presence allowed the detachments and the ANA to concentrate on security in the Helmand Province without the distraction of providing 24-hour security for the firebase. The service the AMF provided was mission-essential, and they performed it in an outstanding manner.

Three months into the team's deployment, the AMF security leader came to the detachment leaders with news. His men had captured a member of the ACM emplacing improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, along the entrance road to the firebase and at the homes of several AMF security personnel. The AMF leader gave the team

ation, ordered that the body remain at the firebase. The SF team was also told to keep the AMF security detail at the firebase until an investigative team could arrive. The team consisted of the FOB's lawyer, its surgeon and a member of the Criminal Investigation Division. It was important for the commander to determine whether there had been any violations by U.S. troops.

The investigation team arrived at the firebase, conducted its investigation and departed with the body. An autopsy determined that the cause of death was a blood clot, possibly from the bruised buttocks. Within a few days, the detachment had been cleared of any wrongdoing, but what was to be done about the AMF?

One of them had clearly beaten the prisoner. However, they were not

“He explained that because the team had been invited into the compound, its safety was guaranteed. However, because the team retained its body armor and Kevlar helmets, it was unknowingly insulting the warlord.”

forces and worked with them to provide security in Gereshk.

Perhaps one of the most difficult cultural lessons the team learned was the extent of brutality within Afghan society and the problems that causes for a modern army. Again, while ramping up for deployment, the team had learned about barbaric behavior carried out by the *mujahadeen* against the Russians, by Afghans against Afghans during their civil war, and by the Taliban. These actions were justified by the *Pashtunwali* tenet of *badal*, which calls on a Pashtun to seek justice or revenge to repay a wrong. The detachment recognized the fact and was prepared to face it during deployment.

When the detachment assumed control of the Gereshk firebase, security for the firebase was provided by a local AMF unit of about 100 fighters. Again, the AMF is a nongovernment militia that assisted coalition forces in the defeat of the Taliban. The AMF security force had secured the firebase for more than a year, through

a tape of the AMF's interrogation of the prisoner. He had given not only the details of his emplacement of IEDs but also details about who constructed the explosives and where the laboratory was. The information was immediately turned over to the ANA battalion commander for action. The AMF commander was instructed to turn the prisoner over to the detachment so that he could be sent to the coalition detention center at Kandahar Air Base.

A few hours later, the detachment medic came to the command with news of the prisoner. The AMF security had captured the prisoner approximately three days before the leader had informed the team. To make matters worse, during his medical examination of the prisoner, the medic discovered severe black-and-blue marks on his buttocks. The medic was worried about the prisoner's condition. The team immediately called for a MEDEVAC, but the prisoner died prior to its arrival. The forward-operating-base commander, recognizing the severity of the situ-

part of the Afghan government and were not required to abide by the Geneva Convention. They were not part of the U.S. Army and therefore not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. There had been no violation of Afghan law. In fact, according to *badal*, they were justified in seeking revenge because the ACM had targeted them with IEDs. Finally, if the team ended the AMF's service to the firebase, it would take months to recruit and train a replacement force of 100 fighters. That would force the ANA and the team to provide security for the firebase, severely limiting their disruption operations throughout the province and allowing the ACM to grow stronger.

The team commander called the AMF leader into his tent and explained the problem. First, he requested that the Afghan leader inform the Afghan security chief of the Helmand Province of the incident and identify the man who had beaten the prisoner. Second, the commander requested that the AMF leader recog-



^ **HOSPITALITY** Soldiers must learn that accepting hospitality, or *melmastia*, also includes adhering to the deeper meaning of the word in the Afghan culture, which includes protection by their host. *Photo by Steve Hebert.*

nize that although the action might be accepted by his culture, it was wrong in the eyes of the international community. If the AMF leader failed to recognize that, it would be impossible to continue the working relationship. Finally, the team commander requested that the detachment be allowed to train the AMF unit on human-rights violations and the proper conduct of a fighting force.

At first, the AMF leader simply did not understand. The ACM had attempted to kill his men and the SF team. He could not conceive why the Americans were concerned about the man, because in his eyes — and in the eyes of his fellow Afghans — the man deserved his fate for threatening their lives. The AMF's conduct was expected in Afghani culture: According to *badal*, any Pashtun acting out revenge is justified. After several hours, the AMF leader agreed to the team's three requests. He identified one of his fighters, turned him over to the security chief, acknowledged that the beating was wrong, and allowed the

team to conduct several human-rights training classes. At the time, the SF team felt that it had done everything it could to ensure that nothing similar would happen again.

Several weeks after the incident, the ex-AMF fighter was seen working in town. At the team's request, the team's interpreter made inquiries to find out what sort of punishment the man had received. He had been released the same night he was turned over to the security chief, because the security chief saw nothing wrong with his actions. While the AMF personnel attended the SF team's human-rights training, they did not relate to it. The Afghan culture, specifically their adherence to *Pushtunwali*, will not be changed. We cannot expect people from other cultures to act as we act or believe what we believe, as they have clearly been influenced by a different culture and way of life.

Our SF team went into Afghanistan with a working knowledge of the Afghan culture — but it was knowledge learned from books. Soldiers

must dig deeper and look at the intricacies of the culture instead of taking what we learn at face value. To work by, with and through indigent forces, we must understand their culture, never violate it, and recognize that we cannot force our ways on them. **SW**

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Notes:

¹ About: Islam, "Islamic Funeral Rites." Retrieved Nov. 18, 2006, from <http://islam.about.com/cs/elderly/a/funerals.htm>.

² Wikipedia, "Pashtunwali." Retrieved Nov. 16, 2006, from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pashtunwali>.

ARAC

Transforming the Way Soldiers Think

by Major Rick N. Myskey

In January, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School implemented a new course designed to teach Soldiers improved methods for analyzing political-military conditions that shape the operations of Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces.

The Advanced Regional Analysis Course, or ARAC, takes the place of the previous Regional Studies Course, or RSC, as part of the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officer-qualification strategy. ARAC is designed to teach future CA and PSYOP officers effective ways of conducting political and military analysis of a given region and of communicating information from the analysis orally and in writing.

Taught by the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, ARAC

ing its seven political-military systems:

- Physical environment system.
- Social (culture) system.
- Political system.
- National-security system.
- Economic system.
- Information system.
- Infrastructure and technology system.

To improve their analysis of the seven political-military systems, ARAC students learn to use the Asymmetrical Software Kit, or ASK. ASK is a collection of state-of-the-art commer-

relationship information within the seven political-military systems.

- Graphically representing geospatial and systems analyses using open-source data.
- Assisting in the decision-making process of supported commanders by presenting analysis and delineating means of achieving specified effects on key civilian nodes.
- Distributing information to other military units and to joint and interagency organizations for unified action.

“Units that receive ARAC graduates will benefit from the skills of officers who have improved capabilities and are ready to execute missions worldwide.”

retains the RSC’s division of the world into five regions (Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America). Unlike the RSC, the 13-week ARAC focuses on teaching students to understand political-military issues at the operational level. Also, and perhaps more importantly, ARAC provides advanced analytical tools for examining a given environment in ways that will generate actionable information.

ARAC students develop an in-depth knowledge of a given region by analyz-

ing its seven political-military systems: tactical data collection, data mining, data management and dissemination of geospatial intelligence. The use of the ASK system offers several advantages to the missions of CA and PSYOP officers:


- Rapidly acquiring vast amounts of information on an assigned region.
- Collecting and organizing information on political and military systems.
- Analyzing geospatial and entity-

ARAC students learn to use ASK in the academic environment to prepare them for the jobs they will need to perform when they arrive in a CA or PSYOP operational unit. They spend two weeks of the course learning the fundamentals of ASK. Later in the course, they spend two weeks on their individual project, using ASK to perform an operational assessment and presenting an analysis briefing to a group of senior cadre members for evaluation.

ARAC also spends one week

ADVANCED REGIONAL ANALYSIS COURSE

13 Weeks



educating CA and PSYOP officers on their operational environment through instruction in the nonlethal targeting process, effects-based planning and the system-of-systems approach, which includes all elements of national power, i.e., diplomatic, informational, military and economic. The training also introduces officers to net-centric warfare, civil-information management and “interagency awareness” and training for the implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, and DoD Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*.

The course allocates one week of instruction to each of the seven political-military systems. Instruction includes research and discussion led by seminar directors who have regional experience and appropriate academic credentials. They develop topics that will give students a per-

spective on relevant issues and methodologies.

ARAC instruction also sheds light on the ways that new intelligence emerges from the relationships between systems and the way those relationships can create conflicts, compatibilities and opportunities that affect mission success. Students will review and discuss the way each system explains events, affects other systems, accounts for uncertainty and predicts outcomes. The course also provides regional perspectives corresponding to the areas of responsibility of the regional military commands. During the final week of ARAC, students take part in an exercise designed to give them experience as members of an operational planning team.

The goal of the course is threefold: to develop officers who have an analytical understanding of regional political-military factors that are pertinent to CA and PSYOP operations; to broaden

the students’ scope of understanding of the operational environment; and to enhance their ability to use multisystem data for operational applications. The course sets the stage for CA and PSYOP officers to analyze their area of assignment; to use ASK to analyze the operational environment; and to plan and execute unified action with joint, interagency and multinational partners at the operational and tactical levels.

Units that receive ARAC graduates will benefit from the skills of officers who have improved capabilities and are ready to execute missions worldwide.

For additional information, telephone DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406. **SW**

Major Rick N. Myseky is the former ARAC detachment commander in the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Warrant Officer

Policy changes provide incentives to SF warrant officers

Over the past 18 months, a number of factors have affected the population of SF warrant officers. Beginning with the fiscal year 2006 promotion boards, time-in-grade requirements for consideration for promotion to CWO 3 and CWO 4 were reduced by one year. The Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA07, included provisions for targeted pay raises for warrant officers and extended the time-in-service pay scales for CWO 4s and CWO 5s. Those provisions will be implemented April 1. Formulas for the computation of retirement benefits have been effectively extended to provide an incentive for eligible Soldiers to remain on active duty for as much as 40 years of active service. In January, a policy to allow all regular Army warrant officers to serve 30 years of warrant-officer service was also implemented as a result of NDAA07. The collective effects of these changes will provide significant additional opportunities and incentives for current and prospective warrant officers.

In order to meet the needs of the growing warrant-officer force, leaders in the SF community need to ensure that SF NCOs are aware of these changes and that the opportunity to serve as an SF warrant officer, MOS 180A, has never been greater. Current 180As need to incorporate these changes into their own career-planning decisions and advise prospective 180A applicants.

WE WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU...

The Special Warfare staff needs your help to make this the best publication it can be. Drop us a line and let us know your ideas and opinions about the new concept and design of the magazine.

- What do you like or dislike?
- Do you have any comments about the articles?
- What would you like to see in future issues?
- Do you like the magazine redesign?
- Are there any issues you want to discuss that may not require a magazine article?
- Just tell us what's on your mind.

SEND LETTERS TO:

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JFK Special Warfare
Center and School
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

E-MAIL:

steelman@soc.mil

Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Articles dealing with a specific operation should be reviewed for security through the author's chain of command.

Enlisted

Soldiers are the best CA, PSYOP recruiters

Recruiting for the CA and PSYOP branches is important. Soldiers can continue to help build the two newest branches of the Army by encouraging junior officers and NCOs to join the new career fields. A review of officer volunteer packets indicates that officers serving in CA and PSYOP units are some of ARSOF's best recruiters. Keep up the good work and continue to encourage candidates to contact the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion.

First CA, PSYOP NCO selection board to convene

The first NCO selection board will convene in May to select the best-qualified candidates to serve in career-management fields 38B (CA) and 37F (PSYOP). Interested Soldiers should review the prerequisites listed in DA PAM 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, and submit their application packet to the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion. For additional information, telephone (910) 432-9697.

38B volunteers may receive enlistment bonus

Enlisted Soldiers in the rank of sergeant who are interested in becoming Civil Affairs NCOs (MOS 38B) may be eligible for a selective re-enlistment bonus of up to \$15,000. Staff sergeants may receive up to \$10,000. For more information, Soldiers should contact their local career counselor.

Next CA BNCOC to begin in April

The schedule for the next class of the 38B (Civil Affairs) Basic NCO Course is as follows: Phase 1: April 23 – May 8. Phase 2: May 9 – June 8. The 38B Advanced NCO Course is being developed. Soldiers should contact their chain of command or schools NCO for additional information.

Officer

Major promotion board to convene in April

A promotion-selection board will convene in April to consider eligible active-duty captains for promotion to major. According to MILPER Message Number 07-016, officers eligible for consideration have the following active-duty dates of rank, or ADOR:

AZ—Captains with an ADOR of 31 March 2001 and earlier

PZ—Captains with an ADOR of 01 April 2001 thru 31 March 2002

BZ—Captains with an ADOR of 01 April 2002 thru 28 February 2003

All eligible captains should ensure that their files are complete and accurate by screening for the following: DA photo up-to-date, awards on uniform match those listed on the officer record brief and official military personnel folder, duty titles correct, overseas deployments and combat

tours listed, no gaps in officer efficiency reports, and a physical within the last five years. Eligible personnel should also continue to monitor MILPER messages for further changes and updates, and they should maintain contact with their assignments officer at the Army Human Resources Command.

CA, PSYOP officers to gain regimental affiliation

Army officers in Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations will soon notice a change to their officer record briefs. In addition to seeing CA or PSYOP listed as their basic and control branches, those officers will now be regimentally affiliated with the Army Civil Affairs Corps or PSYOP Regiment, depending on their branch. Previously, officers remained affiliated with their basic-branch regiments. The activation of the Civil Affairs Branch and the PSYOP Branch now

allows officers to regimentally affiliate with the Civil Affairs Regiment and the PSYOP Regiment.

ARSOF board to consider YG 2004 officers

In April, the Army Human Resources Command will hold the second consolidated ARSOF board to choose officers in year group 2004 for Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations selection and training. Officers selected for CA or PSYOP will attend the Captains Career Course and the Basic Airborne Course (as necessary), the Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations qualification course, the Advanced Regional Analysis Course and special-operations language training. Those who complete all of the training will then be assigned within the United States Army Special Operations Command to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade or to the 4th Psychological Operations Group.

For information on CA and PSYOP accessions, telephone Captain Kurt Sisk at DSN 221-1075 or commercial (703) 325-1075.

For information on CA officer assignments telephone Lieutenant Colonel Scot Storey at DSN 221-3115 or commercial (703) 321-3115.

For information on PSYOP officer assignments telephone Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Morgan at DSN 221-5790 or commercial (703) 325-5790.

HRC reviewing files for upcoming boards

The Army Human Resources Command is reviewing the files of officers to ensure that all eligible officers are notified about the following upcoming boards: Senior Service College (April 2007) and Major Promotion Selection (April 2007). For additional information in these boards, visit the HRC homepage.

SF promotion stats beat Army average

Special Forces officers continue to be selected for promotion at a higher rate than the Army average rate. Rates for SF officers are shown by the following table:

Rank	2004	2005	2006
SF Colonel	52.60%	71.40%	71.30%
Army Colonel	52.60%	59.70%	61.40%
SF Lieutenant Colonel	87.30%	92.20%	93.40%
Army Lieutenant Colonel	79.30%	88.70%	92.00%
SF Major	100.00%	100.00%	98.80%
Army Major	96.70%	97.70%	97.50%

The higher promotion rates can be attributed to the high quality of officers being accessed into Special Forces, well-written officer evaluation reports, and the attention to detail being exercised by Soldiers as they update their files for promotion boards.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN IRAQ

The situation in Iraq is convoluted, confusing and ambiguous. The myriad of insurgent groups, political parties and religious organizations have the potential to overwhelm even the best analysts and academics. *The book, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*, by Dr. Ahmed S. Hashim, attempts to lift the veil of confusion and provide the reader with a detailed analysis of the factors contributing to the conflict.

Hashim is an associate professor of strategic studies in the Strategic Research Department at the United States Naval War College, where he specializes in the security policies of the Middle East and central and south Asia. He has written extensively on security and strategic issues and has published several books, including *Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment*, and *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond*. Hashim has also served as a member of the U.S. Central Command Commander's Advisory Group in Iraq, where he gathered much of the information for this book.

Hashim organizes his thesis into three sections. The first is a historical review of the insurgency. The second summarizes the various organizations, both insurgent and political, that are competing for control. The third is an assessment of the coalition's counterinsurgency campaign, with some predictions for the future. Hashim draws upon an exceptional variety of sources for the book, including interviews, Internet publications, magazine articles, news reports, official documents and his personal experiences during multiple trips to Iraq.


In analyzing the historical context of the insurgency, Hashim covers the history of the Iraqi Army

and its formerly prominent role in Iraqi society. He then covers recent events in Iraq, beginning with the invasion in 2003 and finishing in April 2005. He points to the failings of the coalition's political and military planners, during the time leading up to the invasion and in the first few months of the conflict, as reasons for the development of the insurgency. Specifically, Hashim asserts that the decision to disband the Iraqi Army and other security forces created a security vacuum that allowed the insurgency to organize and gain strength. His supporting information goes a long way toward supporting this assertion.

In the second section, Hashim provides a comprehensive and in-depth look at the predominant insurgency groups, which are composed of former military and regime elements and tribal and religious groups. His summary includes information on the general organization and operational methods of the insurgent groups. For some readers, the section on operational methods may be the weakest part of the book, since most of the information is drawn from other published sources, such as news reports.

Hashim discusses in detail the issues of Kurdish and Shi'a separatism and the way they affect coalition plans for Iraq. He draws upon his multiple trips to Iraq to supplement information drawn from published sources. The Kurd and Shi'a elements, simply by pressing for the creation of separate states, can destroy Iraq, even if the insurgents do not.

The book contains two contextual weaknesses. In the first, Hashim provides conflicting information: He first states that the Shi'a are not



DETAILS

By Ahmed S. Hashim

Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press, 2005.

ISBN: 0-8014-4452-7.

482 pages. \$29.95.

Reviewed by:

Major Tommy E. Stoner

U.S. Army

Naval Post Graduate School

involved in the insurgency, then in subsequent chapters, he talks about the various Shi'a groups and how they have clashed with coalition and Iraqi government forces and are actively working to subvert the government. The second weakness deals with Hashim's assessment of the Iraqi Army. The information that he provides on the status of the Iraqi Army was old at the time he submitted his manuscript (mid-2005), and the situation has changed considerably since then. Hashim attempts to update the information in the book's epilogue, but the information he provides focuses mainly on his experiences in Tal Afar in the north.

Overall, Hashim has produced a well-documented study of the insurgency in Iraq. He has combined

continued on next page

THE NEW FACE OF WAR

How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century

The title of *The New Face of War* may be misleading if the reader thinks that the book will be about changes to the way future wars will be fought at the operator level. Nevertheless, the book does provide a well-written introduction for operators and planners on the nuances of information warfare. It gives historical accounts of the use of information technology and the ways it can be incorporated in strategic planning as information warfare.

Bruce Berkowitz, who works as an analyst on defense and intelligence subjects at the RAND Corporation, gives the reader the basic understanding on the way information technology can be implemented into a campaign strategy when preparing for war against a known adversary. He shows the evolution of information technology, or IT, and provides examples of the use of IT in previous conflicts. Berkowitz's examples range from the Civil War to the present-day application of precision-guided munitions. He keeps technical jargon to a minimum and explains technical Department of Defense information-technology programs in terms that can easily be understood.

Berkowitz also profiles some of the pioneers in information technology, such as United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd. Boyd examined his technique for shooting down enemy MiG fighters and showed that the pilot who could process incoming information the fastest would

win in a dogfight, regardless of which aircraft was considered to be superior. He developed the concept of a decision cycle of observation, orientation, decision and action, or OODA. The concept of the OODA Loop is now commonly used, not only in the military but in science and business, as well.


One interesting chapter in *The New Face of War* is devoted to the idea of using precision-guided munitions for assassination. This is the only area of the book in which Berkowitz goes into dangerous territory. These weapons have progressed to the point that they are so accurate, thanks to the Global Positioning System, that they could be used to target individuals. The failure to kill either Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein with Tomahawk cruise missiles shows how the United States opts for the high-tech, low-risk course of action, failing to remember that Tomahawks do not hit a targeted individual — they hit a map coordinate where the targeted individual is thought to be.

Using a strategic weapon in a tactical role (to interdict individuals) has strategic as well as tactical implications when the Tomahawk doesn't hit the intended target. After introducing the concept of assassination through precision weapons, Berkowitz examines the moral and political aspects of assassination. He concludes that it rarely achieves the intended political results and that it should be used only to ensure a mili-

continued from previous page
general knowledge of the region, published information and his personal experience to provide the reader with an excellent overview of the conflict. He makes no claim to know what needs to happen in Iraq.

Instead, he provides the information one needs to better understand the situation and why it developed, and he allows readers to come to their own conclusions about what needs to be done.

This book is recommended to



DETAILS

By Bruce Berkowitz

New York:
The Free Press, 2003.
ISBN: 0-7432-1249-5.
221 pages. \$26.

Reviewed by:

CWO 4 Thomas Newell
U.S. Special Operations Command

tary success, not a political one.

Overall, *The New Face of War* is a very good book for giving the tactical operator insight into the ways the strategic aspects of information technology will be incorporated into tactical planning. As military planners begin to add the information-warfare annex to the operations order, information warfare can enhance the effectiveness of a military campaign strategy without actually replacing it. **SW**

officers and NCOs at the company level and higher who will be, or may be, deploying to Iraq. The information in the book will provide a foundation of understanding that the reader can build on with further study and research. **SW**



Photo by Steve Hebert

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