


Special Warfare

MAY-JUNE 2007
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
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
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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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The Special Forces Branch was created in April 1987. What began as a more efficient way to manage the Army's Special Forces-trained officers has improved the professionalism of the entire Special Forces career field, including enlisted Soldiers and warrant officers.

Twenty years later, the health of the branch has never been better. Our NCO specialties stand at or near 100-percent fill in every MOS, and we are well-postured for our future growth. We have completely transformed our SF training pipeline to provide relevant training for the full range of SF skills, including language and intercultural communications. We are now training larger numbers of Soldiers, and to higher standards, than at any time in our history. The magnificent performance of SF Soldiers in numerous military operations during recent years, coupled with the unique and relevant skills they bring to any problem set, has resulted in an increased recognition of their value. United States and coalition military commanders, as well as government and interagency partners around the world, seek to incorporate the capabilities of SF into their operational planning.

In fact, there has never been a greater need for the capabilities that SF provides. The environment that we face now and in the foreseeable future is being referred to as irregular warfare, and by definition, IW favors indirect approaches. SF is therefore uniquely suited to many of the missions most appropriate in IW. Whether working by, with and through surrogate forces or advising and assisting partner-nation forces in foreign internal defense, SF Soldiers are specialists in indirect approaches. The article in this issue by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Duffy, "UW support to Irregular Warfare and the Global War on Terrorism," provides an excellent introduction to operations in this environment.

Improvements in SF assessment, selection and training are paying dividends to Army special operations and to our nation. Our SF Soldiers continue to distinguish themselves in a variety of assignments worldwide. They are adept at working in isolation, in joint operations or as part of a coalition. Whether they are performing foreign-internal-defense missions with militaries in Africa, working with indigenous forces in Afghanistan, training soldiers in Iraq or advising partner-nation forces in Colombia, their language skills, cultural awareness and skills in their military specialties allow them to earn the respect and the trust of the population and of their counterparts. SF Soldiers' application of their warfighting skills is tempered by their sensitivity and knowledge of culture and the political situation. Partly through their training and partly through the selection process, SF Soldiers have the right qualities for performing missions that require flexibility and adaptability to the local situation.

Despite the dangers and demands of frequent deployments, the SF Branch at 20 is a dynamic brotherhood whose members can be proud of their heritage and their accomplishments. We have never received better support from our nation or our Army. There has never been a better time to serve in Special Forces.



James W. Parker
Major General James W. Parker

Special Forces NCOs earn Soldier's Medal

Three Special Forces NCOs were recently honored for heroic efforts to save the lives of others while deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Soldier's Medal, the Army's highest award for heroic action not involving direct conflict with an armed enemy, was awarded to Staff Sergeant Jason Smith, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Master Sergeant Michael Manley and Staff Sergeant Heshimu Woods, both of the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky.

Smith, a medic, received the Soldier's Medal April 17 for saving the lives of two International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, soldiers in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Smith rendered aid to ISAF soldiers after their vehicle was hit by an improvised explosive device, or IED. While traveling through the city of Kabul on Nov. 14, 2005, Smith observed an explosion. The scene was chaotic and the enemy was hidden.

"After an IED explodes, we expect that the enemy is watching and waiting for coalition forces to respond so they can detonate a larger explosion," said Sergeant First Class Tate Reis, the detachment's weapons sergeant. "Jason reacted without any regard to his personal safety. His focus was solely on saving the lives of the ISAF soldiers."

Smith rendered aid to the first wounded soldier, stopping the bleeding, stabilizing the soldier and instructing his teammate about further treatment before continuing his sweep.

"He received word that another soldier was severely wounded but would not make it," said Reis, "but ignored the assessment and sprinted about 200 meters to the aid of the second wounded soldier."

The second soldier was suffering from a life-threatening amputation of one of his legs. Smith applied a tourniquet and treated the other wounds before again handing the wounded soldier off to other team members so he could complete the area sweep.

After ensuring there were no more casualties requiring assistance in the area, Smith coordinated the medical evacuation and directed arriving ISAF



▲ **BRAVEHEART** Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, presents Staff Sergeant Jason R. Smith with the Soldier's Medal during a ceremony at the 3rd Special Forces Group on April 17. *Photo by Corey Dennis.*

soldiers to provide additional security and medical assistance.

Major General Thomas Csrnko, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, hosted the ceremony and quoted Admiral Bull Halsey: "There are no great men, just great challenges which ordinary men, out of necessity, are forced by circumstance to meet." He challenged Halsey's remark, however, saying, "Jason Smith clearly is a great man."

Csrnko added that Smith did exactly what he was trained to do but did it in a manner that was truly heroic.

Manley and Woods received the award for saving two men from a burning Humvee near Rabiah, Iraq, in August 2005.

A Humvee collided with another vehicle, began sliding and flipped several times. Manley and Woods were in the vehicle behind the wrecked vehicle. When it came to rest, three Soldiers were trapped inside.

"It was one of the most violent, quick, devastating things I've ever seen in my life," Manley said. He first tried to help the gunner, who had been ejected from the vehicle, but he found no pulse. Then the vehicle caught fire, and one of the men trapped inside began screaming.

"As soon as I heard the ... screaming, I said, 'There's no way I'm going to stand here and listen to my guys burn to death — there's no way,'" Manley said. Together, he and Woods tried to extinguish the fire, but the flames were spreading too quickly.

They had to get the Humvee back on its wheels to free the men. Woods hooked a tow cable to the vehicle's frame, burning his hands in the process. The cable didn't work.

"So I said, 'I don't care what we do ... I don't care if we have to ram it to kick it over. Even if we have to injure these guys, we're going to get them out of there before they burn alive,'" Manley said.

They rammed the vehicle, which rocked and fell back over, and they were able to pull the men from the vehicle. Two minutes later, the burning Humvee exploded. Manley reached a medical-evacuation team on the radio, but when it arrived, it was too late for two of the injured Soldiers.

There is no drill or protocol for what Manley and Woods did.

"If your friends are inside of a vehicle like that, you're going to do whatever it takes," Manley said. "And that's all we did — nothing special, nothing heroic." — *USASOC PAO*

JSOU curriculum focuses on joint SOF education

A curriculum soon to be offered by the Joint Special Operations University is designed to prepare members of special-operations forces for assignments in joint special-operations duty positions.

The Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate program will be an intensive SOF-focused program, meeting joint special-operations education requirements not traditionally provided at service schools or in military-occupational-specialty training.

According to Dr. Joseph A. Stuart, the JSOU dean of academics, "Developing a joint SOF staff knowledge base is frequently cited by SOF leaders as a pressing need. . . . However, there is little in professional development for SOF personnel that emphasizes joint experience or includes content aimed at the operational level and above."

The JSOWC curriculum is divided into three two-week modules: Module 1, Strategic Thinking for SOF Planners; Module 2, Irregular Warfare; and Module 3, Joint Special Operations Collaborative Planning. Class size will be limited to 30 students in order to use a seminar format.

While the modules are mutually supporting, each is independent, and the modules may be taken in any sequence, based on the student's availability. Completing all three modules will qualify the student for the Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate. JSOU ran a pilot course for JSOWC Module 1 in February; pilot courses for the other modules are scheduled for June and August, with full implementation in 2008.

JSOWC will be open to SOF officers, O2-O4; warrant officers, WO1-CWO4; and senior NCOs, E6-E9, who are preparing for, en route to or serving in joint special-operations assignments. To register, applicants can visit the JSOU Web page (<https://www.hurlburt.af.mil/jsou/>). For additional information, telephone Lieutenant Colonel John Prairie at DSN 579-4328 or commercial (850) 884-4328.



▲ MEMORIAL Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner (far left), commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and Colonel Kenneth A. Turner, commander of the 4th PSYOP Group, help Helen Merkel (far right) and Terri Goodrich, the mother and daughter of 1st Lieutenant Michal A. Merkel, unveil the sign at the media-operations complex named in Merkel's honor. Merkel, who died from wounds during combat in Vietnam, was honored in a ceremony held at Fort Bragg, N.C., April 9. Photo by Gillian Albro.

4TH POG HONORS FALLEN VIETNAM-ERA SOLDIER

The Special Operations Forces Media Operations Complex was dedicated to 1st Lieutenant Michal Alvin Merkel during a ceremony April 9 at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Merkel served as the executive officer in the 7th Psychological Operations Detachment and was killed in the Pleiku region of Vietnam in March 1968.

"Today is a very special day because we looked back to history to find a very special Soldier and a hero," said Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Merkel, like Wagner, was a graduate of Purdue University, West Lafayette, Ind. Attendees at the ceremony included other Purdue alumni.

"It's great to be here with a group of my fellow Boilermakers on this great day to honor 1st Lieutenant Merkel by allowing his memory to continue through the dedication of this facility," said Wagner.

"It is a celebration to have had warriors like 1st Lieutenant Merkel, and this building is in honor of the many sacrifices that he made," said Colonel Kenneth A. Turner, 4th Psychological Operations Group commander. "This

is the hub of our reach-back capabilities and the center of our activity."

Robb Powell, a family friend and guest speaker at the ceremony, talked about the days when he and Merkel worked in the Purdue University dining facilities and noted that Merkel was an intelligent, reliable and hard-working person.

"The dedication of this facility in Merkel's name is a heartfelt honor for his friends and family," Powell said. "Michal was always pleasant and had a 'we'll get the job done' attitude."

Merkel's mother, Helen, and his daughter, Terri Goodrich, unveiled the plaque and sign in front of the media complex bearing Merkel's name.

Construction of the 51,000-square-foot media operations complex was completed in 2003. It centrally houses equipment and personnel and enhances PSYOP support to the regional and tactical PSYOP battalions.

The facility provides workspace for more than 300 military and civilian personnel and consolidates five functions under one roof, enabling PSYOP units to produce large quantities of multicolor products from four direct-image digital presses and other state-of-the-art equipment.

New regulation details ARSOF Language Program

A new regulation published by the United States Army Special Operations Command will promote unit readiness by establishing policies and standards for language training.

USASOC Regulation 350-11, *Management of Individual Training Requirements and Resources for Army Special Operations Forces*, provides regulatory guidance for USASOC's Army Special Operations Forces Language Program.

Language capability is a key component of many of the missions of ARSOF and requires the same training focus as ARSOF combat skills. The new regulation addresses all three components of the ARSOF Language Program: institutional training that forms part of the qualification courses for Special Forces and active-component Soldiers in Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations; command and unit language programs designed to sustain and enhance language proficiency; and contingency language programs designed to respond to emerging requirements of ARSOF personnel operating in their primary geographic region.

The regulation, which applies to all units that report directly to USASOC, includes policies and procedures for executing command- and unit-level language programs. It establishes goals, objectives and procedures for the ARSOF Language Program and provides guidance on identifying and validating required ARSOF language capabilities.

The new regulation also explains procedures for re-sourcing, training and maintaining language capabilities and for measuring and reporting those capabilities. In addition, it contains definitions and information regarding roles and responsibilities, budgeting and resources, reporting requirements and contracting procedures.

The regulation, which was effective March 30, can be read and downloaded from the USASOC Web page: https://asociweb.soc.mil/hqs-asoc/ciog6/pubs/asocpubs/REGS/r350_11.pdf. For additional information, telephone Rusty Restituyo at DSN 337-2941, commercial (910) 907-2941, or send e-mail to: restituf@soc.mil.

95TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE ACTIVATED

The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade was formally activated March 16 in a ceremony at Fort Bragg, N.C.

During the ceremony, Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry II, the brigade commander, uncased new brigade colors. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is the Army's only active-duty Civil Affairs Brigade.

Irizarry said the 95th CA Brigade is a critical addition to the United States Army Special Operations Command. "Our Civil Affairs specialists can quickly and systemically identify the needs of local citizens in war-torn countries and allocate civil resources to support them," he said.

"In the year since I have been in command of the brigade, we have witnessed a shift in responsibility. The brigade and battalion staffs literally built the units while simultaneously balancing the requirements of deploying, deployed and re-deploying Soldiers ... Our job in working with the local populace and gaining their support of the U.S.-government objectives requires great skill and expertise of the Civil Affairs teams, and I am confident that the fine Sol-

diers and civilians of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade are up to meeting the challenge," Irizarry said.

Two of the brigade's units, the 97th CA Battalion and the 98th CA Battalion, also uncased new colors and were formally activated during



the program. Both units are based at Fort Bragg with the brigade.

In addition to activating the three CA units, the ceremony also served as formal recognition of a new Civil Affairs Branch.

"The creation of the active-com-

ponent Civil Affairs Branch and Military Operational Specialty 38 provides USSOCOM and DoD with 'SOF for life' Soldiers. Their ability to seamlessly transition between SOF and conventional assignments will strengthen the ability of this nation to provide assistance globally," Irizarry said.

Army Civil Affairs teams deploy worldwide to provide support for ongoing missions. The brigade currently has Soldiers operating on five continents supporting a wide spectrum of operational deployments.

The 95th's lineage dates back to 1945, when it was created at the Presidio of Monterey, Calif., as the 95th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Government Group. Over the next 29 years, the unit went through several changes, including being reorganized, inactivated and redesignated several times until it was inactivated from the Army in 1974 at Fort Bragg. The unit was redesignated into the active Army as Headquarters and Service Company, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, on March 14, 2006.



▲ **HEALING HANDS** 3rd Special Forces Group medical professionals treat Afghan nationals at a forward firebase. The firebases, located in remote hostile areas, are used to secure the area and enable the SF teams to assess and begin community projects. *Photo courtesy Sean Keenan.*

The Doctor is In

Task Force 31 uses host-nation medical care to support its COIN efforts

by Major Sean Keenan

Task Force 31, composed of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, has implemented a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan during two rotations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. One prong of the plan that is often overlooked is the use of host-nation, or HN, medical care as a strategy for supporting the counterinsurgency plan in the Afghanistan theater of operations.

The plan, which consists of providing routine and basic preventive medical (sick-call type) HN care, is in direct contrast to the rules of eligibility in force throughout the theater. Current rules of eligibility essentially allow troops to provide only emergency care to local nationals. The rules are used by United States conventional forces and applied through medical agreements with other members of the International Security and Assistance Forces, or ISAF, the NATO organization in-country.

Task Forces 31's medical "rules of engagement" often clash with the conventional methods of approaching medical care of Afghan nationals, and this article seeks to explain why the strategy is valid in the area of operations, or AO, of Regional Command South and Regional Command West. Of key importance to understanding the strategy is to realize that TF-31's goals are different from those of the ISAF. This article does not seek to present a global strategy for the application of health care but rather to provide an explanation of the use of medical care in the overall strategy of fighting the insurgency.

With the exception of some key cities, southern Afghanistan is a collection of underdeveloped towns. Hospitals are located only in the larger cities (Kandahar, Lashkar Ghar, Qalat, Farah, Herat), and many of those are under-staffed and under-resourced. The lines

of communication throughout the region are primitive at best, with paved roads connecting only the larger towns and district centers. The anti-coalition militia, or ACM, the catch-all phrase for the insurgents, denies free passage on many of the main roads connecting towns and provinces throughout the region. Health care provided in many of the small towns and villages consists of a small clinic or pharmacy with a “provider” who is more interested in selling medications than actually diagnosing and treating medical conditions.

Nongovernmental organizations, who in other underdeveloped countries contribute significantly to the reconstruction of medical organizations and clinics, do not venture into the area because of the volatile security situation. The overriding goal of the Afghan Ministry of Health is to have a clinic within a three-hour walking distance of every citizen; however, this isn’t always the case. The clinics are not always staffed with qualified providers, and they are not always supplied with the basic items needed to provide care, meaning that the people living in the region have little or no basic medical care.

With the lack of primary care, it seems obvious that the Afghan people living in these remote areas have no access to surgical or preventive medical care, which plays a large part in the infant mortality rate being 160.23 per 1,000 live births (the third highest in the world) and the average life expectancy being only 43.16 years.¹

Counterinsurgency strategy

Task Force 31 is involved in a counterinsurgency operation aimed at bolstering the fledgling Afghan government against the force of insurgents who are seeking to destroy it. The resurgent Taliban, fighting against the newly formed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is the insurgent force.

In order to bolster and support the new government, Task Force 31 relies on lethal and nonlethal operations. Lethal operations are the typical use of a military force to close with and destroy the insurgent forces in order to physically separate them and their influence from the local populace. Nonlethal operations include bolstering the local governmental agencies and services, and in many cases, providing much-needed or absent services to the people in the hopes of “winning the hearts and minds” of the local populace and undermining ideological support for the insurgency, while gaining support for the legitimate Afghan government.

Special Forces teams are uniquely qualified to establish self-sustaining base camps, or firebases, in remote or hostile areas. These are established with the intent of securing the local area but also of assessing and begin-

ning community projects and restructuring. With embedded specialists in Civil Affairs, or CA, and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, the teams at these bases conduct lethal and nonlethal operations. Though there are specific provincial reconstruction teams for this mission, they sometimes lack the necessary security and familiarity with some of the more hostile or remote areas.

SF medicine as a counterinsurgency tool

SF medics, unlike most other special-operations medical providers, are trained specifically to operate autonomously in remote locations. Though they have a defined scope of practice, their training comprises a wide range of medical, dental, veterinary and preventive-medicine topics. They are trauma specialists, but they are also trained in the medical care of children, adults and geriatric patients. At many of our firebases, because of the solid background of training and acquired experience, many of our medics are the highest trained medical providers in the community. The mature provider, aware of both his scope of practice and his limitations, has the potential for enormous effects in these communities. The clear definitions of scope of practice of our American subspecialties of medicine are much less clear in these situations. This is not a license for medics to do whatever they think they can but a realization that any care is an improvement, and in many cases it may prove to be lifesaving, when no other care is available. This point should not be lost on the reader, and the potential for long-lasting benefit to the host-nation community is great.

Though ultimately our forces and those of ISAF seek to establish a secure and self-sustaining nation, there are major security issues in our AO. Medical care provided by the regular military assets of our NATO partners is specifically resourced to care for the sick and wounded of the coalition forces and for patients who are wounded by our forces, whether enemy combatants or civilians. Because of the limited nature of the planning and resourcing of medical assets, there is a need to limit the care provided to local nationals. As a result, the regular military medical assets have established various medical rules of eligibility, or MROE, for caring for local nationals.

In general, local-national patients cannot be cared for in coalition medical facilities except for emergency care — defined as a condition that is life, limb or eyesight-threatening — and when there is bed space available at the major Level-3 facilities (as a measure of preserving the limited resources available). There is technically no leeway for individual case consideration when applying this MROE; however, area Level-1 and -2 facilities and forward surgical teams have been known to provide



▲ **WRAP IT UP** Trauma and wound care are daily practice in the firebase clinics. SF medics gain an unparalleled level of experience and training at these clinics. *Photo courtesy Sean Keenan.*

limited care and surgeries on a case-by-case basis for technically nonemergent conditions. Some examples of these cases are: amputation revisions, appendectomies, skin grafting for third-degree burns and external fixation of fractures.


In regard to dedicated local-national care, traveling teams of medical civic-action programs, or MEDCAPs, have been developed by the larger conventional medical-support structure to provide additional benefits to host-nation personnel. The experienced provider, however, will have to participate in only a few MEDCAPs — no matter how large the package and how specialized the providers — to appreciate the relative futility of showing up in town one time and providing care. A much more effective strategy is to identify areas that are truly underserved and provide basic services there on a more regular basis, as we do at our firebase clinics.

Many times, our medical-care strategies clash with conventional MROEs because of the operational constraints placed on each medical unit. Guidance to conventional medical units specifically prohibits those

units from seeing local nationals except when they present in extremis, literally dying at their front gate.

There are also some prohibitions against using medical supplies to treat locals, although there are funds available through the Commander's Emergency Relief Program that can be allocated to locally purchase medications to be used on local nationals. The use of local-national medical supplies is not only cost-effective: It also bolsters the local economy, gives patients confidence and educates them in host-nation medicines. Admittedly, these local-national medications may not look as legitimate as such things as decongestant capsules (used to treat the symptoms of the common cold), which are a highly sought-after commodity in community trading circles because of their multi-colored appearance.

The nonlethal operations of our task force are not intended to supplant or undermine local providers and medical operations but rather to build confidence and support for the elected government and legitimate government operations. Additionally, with judicious use of medical care and application of basic comprehensive care, the local population will



▲ **LOST IN TRANSLATION** To avoid confusing their patients, providers work closely with interpreters. Their assistance is invaluable, both for assistance and for technical communication. *Photo courtesy Sean Keenan.*

begin to feel a true investment in their community. As a by-product of these operations, security will be enhanced as the locals build a partnership with the Special Forces teams and their attached Afghan National Army units.

Another benefit of running the clinics is the unparalleled level of experience and training our medics receive. The breadth of exposure to trauma and infectious diseases alone is unlike anything they see in clinics in the United States. Many of the children who present to our clinics have never received medical evaluations or care in their lives. Malnutrition, childhood illnesses and genetic abnormalities are seen in their raw forms. Our medics get

training in pain control and procedural sedation skills, and many become more adept in the use of ketamine, opiates and benzodiazepines for procedural sedation, without which many of our procedures would not be possible. Cases of severe burns, abscesses and blunt trauma are commonplace, while exposure to pediatric patients is universal. A couple of our clinics even rival the experience of big-city hospitals that deal with the injuries of “knife and gun clubs” in America.

With the rotation of our medical officers (battalion surgeon, battalion physician’s assistant and augmentee providers), SF medics take advantage of an experience comparable to medical-proficiency-training rotations in the U.S. Considering the limitations of peacetime training, the daily experiences in these clinics are unmatched. Properly regulated, duty in these clinics gives the medic a superb learning experience that will build on an already solid background of medical education. The training experience benefits the SF medics as much as it does the patient themselves.

Conclusion

Although it is not a blueprint for conventional forces’ application of medical assets in the Global War on Terrorism, the use of SF medical assets is vital to the overall counterinsurgency strategy of Task Force 31. The operational relevance of our seemingly permissive rules of eligibility, with regard to the provision of local-national health care in this austere and hostile environment, cannot be overlooked. Over two rotations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, and at 14 firebase clinics, we have evaluated close to 50,000 patients, a significant portion of the population in southern Afghanistan in these remote villages. **SW**

Author’s note: *I wish to acknowledge the multiple discussions I have had with my physician colleagues in this theater of operations and especially the Special Forces medical sergeants of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, for teaching me more about the application of host-nation medical care than they probably realize.*

References

¹ <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html>

Major Sean Keenan received his commission in 1991 from the U.S. Military Academy. He graduated from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, in Bethesda, Md., in 1995. He served as the battalion surgeon for the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group in Okinawa from 1996-1999. After completion of his emergency-medicine residency at Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, he served as staff emergency physician, Womack Army Medical Center, Fort Bragg, for two years. He then was assigned to his present position as the battalion surgeon of the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group. He recently completed his fourth wartime deployment in support of special-operations forces and his second consecutive tour as the Task Force 31 surgeon in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

UW Support to Irregular Warfare and the Global War on Terrorism



By Lieutenant Colonel Dave Duffy

With the signing of the Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, execution roadmap for irregular warfare on April 26, 2006, the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, has been given specific tasks to execute in the Global War on Terrorism through irregular warfare.

The roadmap's final definition of irregular warfare is:

Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.¹

As USSOCOM conducts its mission analysis, it should view IW as it is conceptually defined — as a form of warfare. It should not develop IW as an additional core task for the command. As conceived, IW uses the full range of

military capabilities to achieve its strategic objectives. It therefore becomes an additional operational environment that requires a capability-based analysis for each of the current USSOCOM core tasks, particularly unconventional warfare, or UW, to ensure that tactics, techniques and procedures for each are adequate for conducting operations in IW. Instead of determining IW interrelations with UW, USSOCOM should focus on how it will conduct UW within IW strategic environments.

Unconventional warfare can be conducted across the spectrum of conflict and in support of the four operating threats defined by the QDR: irregular, traditional, disruptive and catastrophic. As a special operation that can be conducted either as part of a geographic combatant commander's theater campaign or as an independent, subordinate campaign, UW is unique.² It represents an indirect approach to combat — focusing on development



Photo copyright Steve Hebert

of the irregular force and making political-military and psychological objectives paramount. Using UW, the U.S. government is able to extend its influence into otherwise denied areas by working with third-party forces to counter mutual threats.

The UW approach to the war on terror demands that we take the long-term view. The UW campaign strategy attempts to anticipate requirements and then direct the development of surrogate capability as appropriate. Special Forces is uniquely suited for this, as SF is the only Department of Defense entity that specifically selects, trains and equips its operators for the UW mission. Because of its access to many countries, based on its small footprint of 12-man teams, SF, coupled with Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces, can provide persistent engagement in numerous countries around the world while building surrogate-force capability and capacity during peacetime,

thus shaping future operational environments and establishing additional engagement options if U.S. interests are endangered. This is a proactive yet indirect methodology that prescribes developing surrogate capability in regions around the world where potential targeted nodes and nets will exist, thus extending U.S. operational reach and multiplying forces available.

Traditionally, UW has been seen as U.S. sponsorship of an indigenous resistance movement, with the intent of destabilizing or overthrowing a government or occupying power. However, UW can also be conducted against non-state elements or actors that are not limited by geographic boundaries or legitimate governmental constraints. These elements may or may not receive overt or covert support from other states. Generally, UW conducted against nonstate elements is by, with or through irregular forces controlled by U.S. forces either directly (in permissive to

uncertain environments) or indirectly (in hostile or politically sensitive regions). These irregular forces are enlisted to conduct operations in support of U.S. aims and objectives, thus multiplying forces available for operations. These forces are not constrained by geographic boundaries or subject to the direction of a foreign nation.

What UW is not

UW is not foreign internal defense, or FID; counterinsurgency; or stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations, nor is it exclusively limited to IW. With the QDR development of IW to describe an aspect of the spectrum of war, there has been a tendency among doctrine and policy writers to equate IW with UW, since they are similar in using irregular forces and in countering irregular forces. However, UW does not describe a spectrum of war; it is conducted across the spectrum of conflict, from peace to war and back to peace, much like other USSOCOM core tasks, including direct action and special reconnaissance.

FID is defined as:

*The participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.*³

The main difference between UW and FID is that UW is conducted with irregular forces, while FID is exclusive to

3rd SF Group began doing that during the fall of 2005.

In most cases, a nonstate actor is neither openly associated with any state sponsor nor constrained by state or regional boundaries. Organizations or networks that operate outside government control, such as regional insurgent networks or transnational terrorist networks, would also meet the criteria for being nonstate actors.

The al-Qaeda network, or AQN, and its associated movement is a loosely organized entity based on a common ideology, with the goal of creating an environment in which radical Islam can assert itself. The AQN effort revolves around a regionally based insurgency designed to destabilize and topple various regimes. This regional insurgency defies legitimate geographic boundaries and instead seeks to carve out a new territory under the radical Islamic banner. Denied, ungoverned or under-governed areas or countries provide potential sanctuary for this movement. These areas are typically difficult for U.S. military forces to infiltrate for the purposes of reconnaissance and target development. Surrogates can provide vital support to U.S. military operations in such areas by providing target information and personnel-recovery support.

The challenge to the U.S. in dealing with this type of insurgency is that the U.S. government is restricted by the international community and the UN to recognize and respect the sovereign lands of fellow countries. The degree of the government's engagement is limited by the willingness

“Combining UW with other actions such as FID and counterinsurgency creates a legitimate IW utilization for the GWOT.”

the regular military and paramilitary forces of the involved nation. In FID, the host nation requests and is provided U.S. assistance as needed to protect its society. The U.S. chooses to participate in these programs for access and placement, for shaping operations or for diplomatic reasons, but always at the request of the host nation.

Nonstate actors

The conduct of UW operations against nonstate actors is not without precedent. Well before the fall of the Taliban, UW was being conducted, with the Northern Alliance as the U.S.-sponsored resistance force. However, after the regime change in Afghanistan, U.S. Special Forces teams continued to enlist the aid of irregular paramilitary forces, under the direction of local warlords, to conduct operations against remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In March 2002, the commander of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, was the ground commander for the UW area of operations based out of Khowst. He was able to use the forces of two rival warlords to maintain a viable irregular force for combat operations. U.S. military operations were not conducted against a government or occupying power but toward operations against nonstate actors. As in any UW campaign, these forces need to be successfully demobilized or integrated into existing police or military forces once they are no longer needed in a surrogate capacity, and the

and the capability of potential partner nations to support regional counterinsurgency objectives. Current U.S. government engagement in the GWOT is a prime example. The U.S. methodology of engagement is far different in Iraq and Afghanistan than it is in other countries of the world where we are not “at war.” Any unilateral engagement against transnational terrorists in those other countries could be viewed by the host nation as a forced-entry operation and interpreted as an act of war. However, by conducting UW, the U.S. government could circumvent that obstacle.

Utilization

Initial UW applications within an IW global approach involve conducting a global assessment of current and future threat areas and ascertaining potential development of surrogate capabilities. Within targeted regions, we should also determine the counterterrorism capability of our partner nations, followed by the engagement of SOF mobile training teams, or MTTs, and the introduction of combat advisers to train these regular forces for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Once recruited and trained, indigenous or surrogate personnel can conduct operations in areas denied to U.S. personnel. Assigned tasks may extend from information-collection for mission planning to providing support for infiltration, exfiltration or personnel recovery.



▲ **BEARING ARMS** An SF Soldier walks Iraqi soldiers through a weapons drill. *Photo by Steve Hebert.*

Measures of success

The characteristic of IW that makes military planners and decision-makers uncomfortable is that it's not a "hard science" that deals with combat power. The heart of UW is building human relations, which makes its outcomes much more difficult to predict. When asked how one could tell if the U.S. was being successful in Afghanistan, an SF company commander replied that if the indigenous force hadn't killed them yet, then his forces were doing all right.

Engagement in UW carries a relatively low cost, when compared to a unilateral invasion. While there is no guarantee of success with UW, when a UW pre-emptive strategy has not been pursued, it leaves the U.S. government with no other option than a direct, conventional engagement. The most recent example of this is the period between the Gulf Wars. For 10 years, U.S. forces controlled two safe havens, through the enforcement of the no-fly zones, which had potential indigenous forces, the Kurds and Shi'ia, that could have been developed as resistance elements. In the north, we maintained a relationship with the Kurds, resulting in their successful use during Operation Iraqi Freedom as a partisan element in support of conventional ground operations. However, the decision was made not to pursue UW options in the south. If a more aggressive UW campaign had been authorized after Operation Desert Storm, U.S. involvement in Iraq might have been limited to aiding the new government after Saddam's regime had been overthrown by domestic insurgents and foreign surrogates.

Summary

Unconventional warfare enables a proactive, long-term approach to IW in the GWOT. By using surrogates, UW can extend the U.S. operational reach into denied areas and multiply forces available. UW attempts to anticipate requirements, then develops surrogate capability. SF operators create conditions in foreign cultures that make potential surrogates receptive to U.S. requirements. Combining UW with other actions such as FID and counterinsurgency creates a legitimate IW utilization for the GWOT. Yet if the U.S. government does not pursue IW options, then the only military option available may be a conventional campaign. While there is no certainty that the U.S. will succeed in creating an indigenous or surrogate capability in potential areas of operation, there is a certainty that if we fail to attempt to develop a global network, there will be no option other than direct military action. Conducting IW remains a viable, long-term, indirect engagement option that is cost-effective and has low visibility. **SW**

Notes:

¹ Final definition approved by the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, Feb. 6, 2007.

² Joint Pub 3-05, 17 December 2003.

³ Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001.


Lieutenant Colonel Dave Duffy is chief of special activities, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

An aerial photograph of a lush, green valley with a winding river. The river flows from the upper right towards the bottom center, curving through the landscape. The valley is surrounded by rolling hills and mountains in the distance, partially obscured by a hazy atmosphere. The sky is filled with dramatic, grey clouds, with some light breaking through near the horizon.

Guerrillas in the Midst

**U.S. Planning, Advisory and Training Team
Helps Colombian Army Build Skills**

by Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Christian

An aerial photograph of a lush green valley. A wide, light-colored river winds through the center of the valley, forming several meanders. In the background, a small town or village is visible, nestled in a valley. The sky is filled with large, white, fluffy clouds, with some light breaking through near the horizon. The overall scene is a dramatic landscape.

Tuesday, Aug. 22, 2006

Municipality of Villagarzon, Department of Putumayo, southern Colombia — Villagers report frantically to the commander of the “Domingo Rico” infantry battalion, based outside Villagarzon, that armed insurgents from the 32nd Front of the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, or FARC, are kidnapping everyone passing along the main road leading south from Villagarzon to Puerto Asis. The guerrillas are taking the travelers hostage and confiscating their cars and possessions, and the police, outmanned and outgunned, have requested military assistance ...

The battalion commander dispatches a reinforced platoon under the command of Second Lieutenant Gomez German-Alonso to break up the attack by the guerrillas on the populace. As the platoon approaches the site of the reported attacks, a sniper shot strikes German-Alonso in the chest, killing him. The attack was bait for an ambush to take out the leader of the patrol and dampen the enthusiasm of other officers' aggressive attacks against the FARC.

Wednesday, Aug. 23, 2006

Municipality of Mocoa, Department of Putumayo, southern Colombia — acting upon information from villagers, soldiers from the reaction platoon of the Colombian army's 27th Brigade, 6th Division, engage an element of the 32nd Front. In a fierce firefight, the Colombian soldiers' marksmanship

right. Two other members of the team are badly wounded. During this week of continuing confrontation with FARC guerrillas, the division commander and key members of his staff (including members of a U.S. military advisory team) move from base to base via a combination of Blackhawk, MI-17 and Bell Ranger helicopters to coordinate the responses of the brigades as they continue the fight.

Welcome to the mission of the U.S. planning, advisory and training team, or PATT, to the Republic of Colombia, and the personnel who man this decentralized operation on behalf of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Security Assistance Training Management Organization, based at Fort Bragg, N.C.

As the Colombian army faces off against the 43-year-old FARC, it receives targeted assistance from a

more diverse set of skills and abilities, meshing them into a comprehensive advisory element. The ARSOF leader must also be able to teach his team to work in cross-cultural operating environments and lead them to success without pushing U.S. military doctrine or organization onto a foreign host.

The Colombian military is waging its counterinsurgency primarily against the FARC, which is now considered to be the largest criminal organization in the world and is responsible for the production and transportation of the majority of the world's cocaine. Most of the senior leaders of the FARC are under indictment by both the Colombian and the U.S. justice departments. Under Plan Colombia, the United States has committed its resources to helping Uribe stabilize the country economically and socially while eliminating the FARC as

“The ARSOF leader must also be able to teach his team to work in cross-cultural operating environments and lead them to success without pushing U.S. military doctrine or organization onto a foreign host.”

and movement techniques win out, resulting in six enemy dead, with no friendly casualties. As the unit polices up the bodies of the FARC soldiers, they find significant amounts of ammunition and explosives, leading them to believe that the intercepted FARC unit was on a mission to sabotage critical infrastructure near the department capital of Mocoa.

Thursday, Aug. 24, 2006

Municipality of La Hormiga, Department of Putumayo, southern Colombia — a patrol of Colombian soldiers from the 13th Mobile Brigade approaches the site of an insurgent guerrilla position of the 48th Front reported to them by a resident of one of the nearby villages. As the soldiers move closer, one of the insurgents detonates an improvised explosive device buried underground. The explosion kills the corporal in charge of the lead fire team as well as the soldier to his

growing type of consultancy — the military advisory team. The six embedded advisory teams serve as the tip of the spear in the U.S. country team's effort to support Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's drive to eliminate the threat to his struggling democracy from one of the longest-running insurgencies in modern history.

In Colombia, as in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines and other locations across the globe, small teams of imbedded U.S. military officers and NCOs provide key advisory, training and planning assistance to divisions and brigades.

This type of mission is most often led by personnel from the U.S. Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, but it is a growing practice to include joint and interagency personnel who have a wide variety of training and experiences. ARSOF leaders of the future must be able to expand their concept of advisory teams to include a

a threat to national sovereignty.

U.S. military advisory teams, which make up the PATTs, usually consist of several officers and NCOs from various branches of the U.S. military. Successful teams operate in a semi-autonomous environment, performing an essentially consultant operation in support of a division and its brigades in combat. Each team operates a small PATT station, which is often a house set up with an operations center, signal center, arms room and sleeping quarters. Several of the teams have forward locations to which they frequently deploy in support of their host-nation partner — the command and staff of the division or brigade to which they are assigned.

Perhaps one of the most important lessons for these teams is that success occurs only when they resist trying to change the structure or standard operating procedures of their hosts and instead begin acting as a



▲ IN DEFENSE A Colombian soldier sets up a mortar in defense of the firebase. *All photos provided by Patrick J. Christian.*

type of military consultant or adviser. As military consultants, their job is to help identify critical business elements and focus their time and energy to meet their own goals and objectives.

Conventional military advisory teams begin their service with the idea that they must reshape the force into a model similar to that of the U.S. Army — primarily because that model is the only one they know. Imagine however, a business consultant who tries to push an IBM model of business onto Google or Microsoft. These companies have different business models based upon their particular cultural base of employees and customers, and they know that one type is not the solution for all.

The military advisory team that the author leads in southern Colombia consists of Army and Marine NCOs and Army and Air Force officers. Hailing from three different branches of service, the team members have

unique backgrounds and skill sets. The success of the team lies in identifying the unique skills and meshing them into a continuously evolving plan of military advisory assistance. Variances in rotations of the various team members cause continuous personnel changes, but our hosts are surprisingly accepting of the adjustments to our advisory plan that those changes necessitate.

Key to the success of our plan is our ability to help the Colombians to identify weaknesses in the FARC's critical infrastructure and to develop capabilities for disrupting, disabling or destroying it. We learned that our hosts are more concerned that the plans we bring to the table are effective than they are about whether we have the skills to cover every operational area.

When the team receives personnel who specialize in various aspects of maneuver operations, intelligence or SOF operations, we work to ensure

that their skills and abilities are best aligned with identified weaknesses in our host's military structure. We try to make sure that cooperation, communication and coordination occur at the lowest possible level, with all credit for successes going to the host unit. Only by performing a realistic assessment of our host-unit's capabilities, compared to the FARC threat they face rather than to a U.S. standard, could we understand their actual weaknesses and place available assets against them.

For this type of military consulting to work, the advisory team must build a great deal of trust with its hosts. The bulk of this trust-building has to do with realistic advisement of the individual and group capabilities of host-nation forces in the areas for which the team has training or experience. The advisory team's claim to a certain type of knowledge or skill must be backed up by an ability to explain where and how it was obtained, as



LOCKED AND LOADED A Colombian soldier stands guard over a petroleum well head at the military base of Teteye. *All photos provided by Patrick J. Christian.*



our hosts have been fighting the same enemy for more than three decades.

Success for the advisory mission is predicated upon two (at times conflicting) principles: bringing knowledge, skills and experience to the table, and demonstrating a willingness to modify the way that that information is presented in order to bridge gaps between cultural operating environments.

Balancing these two objectives often means the difference between success and failure. More often than not, advisory teams find themselves helping the hosts sort through what they had already tried and the objectives they were trying to obtain.

The advisory team is finding that the key to the success is its ability to leverage the previous training and experience of its members for the benefit of its hosts. One example of this type of approach to military advising was the Colombians' ongoing struggle with the financial and logistical hub of the FARC's Southern Bloc.

As our host unit had responsibility for the departments that harbored this logistical network, they received continuous pressure to reduce or stop the flow of goods, services and finance moving through this network. Pressure is often exerted at the highest levels by military and political leaders trying to implement other aspects of Plan Colombia and to extend government influence into the outlying reaches of the country.

As we listened to the host unit's problems and challenges, we were able to teach them about critical infrastructure and the way its elements support each other. While the concept of critical infrastructure and effects-based actions are old news to advanced industrial countries at risk from terrorism, these concepts are not always used in understanding and targeting an insurgency. By showing the Colombians that the way to combat their assigned targets was to see them as a set of infrastructure competencies and target them with lethal and nonlethal effects-based fires, we were able to give them valuable support and gain their confidence.

Gaining the confidence and trust of

our counterparts opened many doors previously closed to our advisory mission. After helping identify the target, we worked on developing strategies for tracking it, exploiting its weaknesses and identifying capabilities that might be required to interdict or disrupt its critical infrastructure. This analysis led to interagency cooperation and the development of a new unit.

Members of two advisory teams pooled their resources to create a new SOF strike unit capable of operating deep inside FARC territory, using intelligence obtained from regional interagency partners — another valuable contribution by various members of the military consultancy team.

Our advisory teams organized the new SOF strike unit out of existing units familiar with the planned operational area — southern Colombia — and vetted for human rights by the U.S. State Department. The training program developed was seven weeks long, preceded by a week-long leader-development session in which the PATT officers and NCOs taught Colombians to develop a comprehensive training plan, lay out resources and organize instruction modules, emphasizing decentralized execution and individual skill-building as the basis for collective training.

This leader-development process resulted in a training plan in which the Colombians possessed a vested interest (because they developed it). This process was no easy task. Before these future SOF leaders could begin developing their training program, they had to demonstrate an understanding of their mission and the essential tasks for accomplishing each designated capability.

Showing them how to develop a mission-essential task list, or METL, became an interagency tug-of-war, as the owning division wanted tasks different from those of the supporting regional intelligence center, which was to supply the bulk of the actionable intelligence. Finally, using the newly established interagency plans and operations group process, the units ironed out the METL, approved training schedules, laid on resources



▲ **ROADBLOCK** An explosion on a bus caused by insurgents damages the road and inhibits travel. All photos provided by Patrick J. Christian.

and commenced the new unit-training process.

At each step of the way, however, the members of the PATT had to sidestep efforts to take responsibility for the training away from the Colombian chain of command. We used the Socratic method of teaching — asking questions to ensure that we did not step out of our adviser/consultant role. The quality of the training was very important, but more so was the ownership of the process and product.

While much of the instruction was based upon standard U.S. training doctrine, the authority for determining how and why we trained a certain way stayed with the Colombians, using their years of experience in fighting the FARC insurgency. Those experiences that had worked were adopted, and those that had failed were not.

The reason for using this method was, again, simply to keep the responsibility for training, planning and operations squarely upon the shoulders

of Colombian officers and NCOs and to keep them focused on meeting goals and objectives. Most importantly, such a method develops the planning-and-analysis skills of the host nation's junior military leaders.

Teaching them to base their military operations on actionable intelligence and to plan each combat operation as an intelligence-gathering operation was more difficult than we anticipated. Often this was due to their reverse-engineering of U.S. military processes, which gave them an understanding of what to do without the requisite knowledge of why they were doing it.

Also, many of the processes they had been exposed to in their careers were based upon high-intensity-conflict environments rather than on culturally adaptive low-intensity conflict involving protracted political violence. By encouraging them to develop their own operational and support templates, based upon their own identified requirements and operational

environments, we helped them acquire skills for effective planning.

In summary, working as an adviser to a foreign military force involves a change in the way we view success criteria and in our expectations of how quickly success can be achieved. Operating in a cross-cultural environment means that we actively avoid making clones of the U.S. military and instead work to help our clients develop and achieve measurable goals and objectives while retaining their cultural methodology of field operations. Advisory teams must be sufficiently trained and experienced in order to move beyond offering culturally-dependent templates and begin training their host counterparts to develop their own templates consistent with their operational cultural environment. **SW**

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Christian is a Special Forces officer who serves as a field advisory team leader in southern Colombia. He has served in similar capacities in Ecuador, Sudan



▲ **THE APPOINTED** SF warrant-officer candidates participate in an appointment ceremony at Aaron Bank Hall at Fort Bragg, N.C. U.S. Army photo.

THE RIGHT STUFF

Proposed SF warrant-officer-education changes offer the right education at the right time

by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Steven G. Tuttle

In today's operating environment, it is imperative that Special Forces warrant officers understand how to implement the unconventional skills of the SF operational detachment-alpha, or ODA, at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.

That understanding is gained through a combination of training, education and experience. SF warrant officers come to the field with an average of 10 years at the tactical level, where they have received tactical training and real-world experience. However, experience alone will not suffice in SF warrant-officer professional development. A well-designed education program that specifically targets the SF WO's needs is vital for professional development. The key factor is targeting his development with the right education at the right time in his career.

Training, education, experience

The professional development of SF warrant officers rests on a foundation of three components: training, education and experience. The Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, defines training as the instruction given to each Soldier for the performance of a given task, such as shooting a rifle. The task can be simplified into a step-by-step process for any Soldier to perform. Education is defined as instruction with increased knowledge, skill or experience as the desired outcome, such as

lessons from a professor who imparts cultural knowledge. Students take that knowledge and apply it during their individual experiences.

Military leaders and Army doctrine make a clear distinction between training and education. General Peter J. Schoomaker captured that distinction in the Army Posture Statement of 2004: "We must train for certainty but educate for uncertainty ... how to think, not what to think."

Experience, the third component, comes with the execution of training and the implementation of ideas, theories and knowledge gained through time. The combination of training, education and experience is the backbone of the SF WO's wisdom, confidence and comprehension of his operational environment.

Current 180A educational construct

Four courses compose the current 180A education track: the Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course, or WOTTC; the Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or WOAC; the Warrant Officer Staff Course, or WOSC; and the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course, or WOSSC.

The first two courses, taught at Fort Bragg's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, are designed specifically for the 180A career field. All Army warrant officers, regardless of their specialty, attend the

last two courses, taught by TRADOC at the Warrant Officer Career Center, or WOCC, located at Fort Rucker, Ala.

New concept

The Army has recently implemented a series of changes for all Army officers. The changes affect a number of areas, including education. In the past, the career paths of warrant officers and officers were separate. With the publication of the December 2005 version of DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, both career paths now fall under one officer system.

In November 2006, the WOCC, in conjunction with the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., hosted a working group on the redesign of the Army Warrant Officer Education System. The discussion centered on how best to educate Army warrant officers. The consensus was that warrant officers and officers have essentially different functions within the military: Officers are generalists, and warrant officers are specialists. That specialization calls for different levels of education within the warrant-officer force.

Each warrant-officer branch is responsible for the technical and advanced training of its personnel, and the WOCC is responsible for training decision-making, analytical problem-solving and staff skills. The skills taught by each branch focus on training rather than on education.

“A well-designed education program that specifically targets the

This works fine for the majority of warrant-officer career fields, which require instructions for the performance of given tasks and the operation of technical systems that are vital to the Army. However, there are several fields, SF being one of them, in which instruction alone will not suffice.

Proposal

The time for transformation of the SF warrant-officer education system is now. Today’s SF warrant-officer education needs to be refocused on the fight of tomorrow. Significant changes are already occurring. The WOTTC entry-level training and education established for the SF WO1 now focuses on producing an assistant detachment commander who can operate effectively at the tactical level. The redesign of the WOAC, the second level of 180A education, is near completion and will be ready for implementation later this year. The redesigned WOAC will focus on advancing students’ unconventional-warfare knowledge and on developing operational planners.

An analysis of 180A positions and roles and the maturity of the force reveals that it is time to develop a series of

higher educational courses beyond the WOAC. In their current configurations, the WOSC and WOSSC cannot provide the 180A with focused education designed specifically for the unique positions he will hold.

Stage I, tactical-level training

In 2005, the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD, analyzed what the force had identified as a need for the redesign of the SF warrant-officer education system. The WOTTC was stage one of the redesign. DOTD reviewed the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course, or SFWOBC, in the spring of 2005. The review focused on the critical tasks that SF warrant officers need to perform as assistant detachment commanders. During this same time, the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, or DSOP, put forth a recommendation to the vice chief of staff of the Army, General Richard A. Cody, to consolidate all training for 180A candidates within the SFWOBC. Cody approved the concept, which was implemented in November 2006.

Before the initiative was implemented, SF NCOs seeking accession into 180A would submit an application packet through DSOP, which forwarded the packet to the Army Human Resources Command for review and selection. If selected, the SF NCO would attend a seven-week WO training course at Fort Rucker, Ala., and would be appointed to

WO1 upon graduation. Following the seven-week course, all warrant officers then took an additional basic course for their branch in order to receive the branch MOS. For SF warrants, the average time between selection and graduation from SFWOBC was 18 months.

The 2006 initiative allows the SF WO to receive credit for his operational experience. By thorough research, DSOP, along with DOTD and the WOBC cadre, analyzed the SF WO education requirements and developed the WOTTC. The education and training that WO1s now receive focuses on tactical planning and leadership and on fusing intelligence into executable plans. This redesigned training compresses the SF WO’s initial training time from 18 months to approximately 19 weeks.

Stage II, WOAC Phase I

In the past, SF warrant officers viewed the SFWOAC with some trepidation, and feedback from course attendees was not always positive. Many factors contributed to the course’s reputation: the lack of maturity of the MOS, the lack of proper funding, ambiguous design and the course’s

focus on training rather than education.

Recently, the Army de-linked warrant-officer education from promotion, allowing SF WOs to attend the WOAC immediately upon their promotion to CWO2. The redesigned WOAC will take that de-linking into account. The current WOAC redesign proposal, although not officially adopted at this time, calls for the WOAC to be separated into two phases. Phase I is a nonresident, Web-based educational course that an SF WO could begin upon promotion to CWO2. The focus of the first phase would be on professional writing, which trains planners to convey their message; on unconventional warfare; and on an introduction to national policy, which is necessary for understanding joint and interagency operations. The first phase of WOAC is scheduled to be developed by the end of 2007 and implemented during 2008.

Stage III, WOAC Phase II

Phase II of WOAC is envisioned as a nine-week resident course available to CWO2s who have completed the non-resident phase. It would capitalize on lessons from the first phase and facilitate student development in critical thinking and analytical skills.

Resident instruction would be separated into five blocks. Block I would focus on warrant-officer roles, staff training, operational art, critical reasoning and analytical

focus on expanding his knowledge and aligning it with the education a major receives during Intermediate Level Education, or ILE, at the Combined Arms Center, or CAC.

Stage IV, common-core military education

The WOSC and WOSSC, currently controlled by the WOCC, would best be served if they were realigned with the CAC and ILE curriculum. That would allow a sharing of resources and form a bond between the generalist officer and the specialist warrant officer who commonly work at the same planning and execution level.

The WOSC would focus on the training of Army core tasks to warrant officers, in much the same way that all Army majors receive ILE before they continue their branch education. The intent would not be to integrate training but simply to use the same resources to yield a common educational experience. All Army warrant officers would benefit from this experience, and it would align all officers along one standard education system.

Stage V, SF WO Senior Course

At this time, there is no course that satisfies the technical requirement for SOF strategic-level planning for CWO3s and CWO4s. Such a course is only conceptual; there are no plans for its design. However, DSOP is forwarding an

SF warrant officer's needs is vital for professional development."

skills and SF doctrine. Block II would focus on national policies as they relate to special-operations forces and plans for the Global War on Terrorism. Block III would encompass full-spectrum operations, systems analysis, targeting, information operations, special-activities planning and coordination.

Block IV would focus on joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations, on their coordination and command and control, on the operations of a joint special-operations task force and on joint planning. Block V would concentrate on tactical studies, examining the operations of SF battalions and companies and tying their operational functions back to the lessons of the previous blocks.

The goal of the two-phase WOAC will be to produce an operational-level planner who understands the intricacies of UW and its application to the contemporary operational environment and to the ODA, and who can deal with complex problems and render sound advice to commanders.

The next logical stage of education for the 180A should

analysis to TRADOC that lays out an SF Warrant Officer Senior Course, or SFWOSC, which would focus on strategic-level special-operations planning.


Education is forward-thinking and prepares individuals for the next step in their careers. The traditional Army warrant-officer program does not address the SOF-related issues for which the 180A is responsible. Every SF group has warrant officers who provide the group's institutional knowledge and work as key planners. It is imperative that they be educated for those positions.

Stage VI, WO Senior Staff Course

As stated earlier, the WOSSC could be taught at CAC, using a senior-service education model. Again, aligning the education of the CWO4/CWO5 within an already established education system provided for all Army officers would benefit the Army and only makes sense.

Stage VII, Senior Seminar Series

The last stage of education would be the Senior SF Warrant Officer Seminar Series, the final educational venue



during a 180A's career. The seminar series would not focus solely on education — it would act as an annual event to bring senior warrant officers together for seminars focused on force structure and policy updates for the SF community. The seminars would also provide a means of cross-pollination and idea-generation that would improve the health of the SF WO career field.

During the seminar, guest lecturers would speak on key issues relevant to unconventional warfare. Suggestions for topics for the next seminar series could be elicited from senior leaders. Throughout an SF warrant officer's career, this annual event could be used to continue his education and enhance his vision of the operating environment.

Conclusion

The SF warrant-officer education system of yesterday will not suffice for developing the SF WO of tomorrow. A well-designed education program that focuses on career-long education is vital for a professional SF warrant-officer corps. The redesigned WOTTC and WOAC should not mark the end of 180A-specific education. A core task of the 180A is to understand unconventional warfare in all its permutations and

to plan successful UW operations. The time has come for a 180A education system that provides the right education at the right time in an SF warrant officer's career. **SW**

Notes:

- ¹ Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Education*.
- ² Army Regulation 350-1.
- ³ The Honorable R.L. Brownlee, General Peter J. Schoomaker. *2004 Army Posture Statement*, 8.
- ⁴ U.S. Army Warrant Officer Career Center, <http://usawocc.army.mil/woes/wosc.htm>.
- ⁵ CW05 Douglas Frank, Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, Warrant Officer Training Analysis, 2006.
- ⁶ CW03 Michael G. Rogan, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Warrant Officer Education Analysis, 2007.

CW03 Steven G. Tuttle, an SF warrant officer, is the analyst officer for warrant-officer education in Branch 2 of the Training Development Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine. He is a recent graduate of the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course, and he designed this education model for a class project.

Officer

New initiatives affect ARSOF officer assignments

One of the major ongoing changes at the Army Human Resources Command is that the Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations branches have combined to form the Army Special Operations Forces Group.

Two key initiatives are shaping up at the ARSOF Group that will affect assignments in the near future. The first is that the group will immediately start filling slots at each of the theater special-operations commands for liaison officers to the Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC. The total requirement is for eight majors: two each to Special Operations Command-Europe, Special Operations Command-Pacific, Special Operations Command-South and Special Operations Command-Central. As the program develops, the group will also look at placing JSOC liaison officers

in the U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. Northern Command.

The second initiative, which should take shape this summer and fall, is the assignment of majors and lieutenant colonels to joint special-operations task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan for one-year tours. These assignments will be necessary to fill the requirements of joint manning documents, or JMD. The group is considering approximately 25 positions for SF, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers. This is a significant change to the way ARSOF have been doing business, but it will provide stability and continuity to the JSOTFs as units rotate in and out of theater. ARSOF Group will fill these JMD requirements before filling any other billets outside of ARSOF.

If you haven't deployed in the past 36-48 months, this would be a good opportunity to step up and support the

JSOTFs in their ongoing war efforts. Officers interested in volunteering for one of the JMD positions should contact their assignment officer. ARSOF Group will work with you regarding your desired follow-on assignment.

Officers own best file managers

Assignment officers in the ARSOF Group continue to ensure that ARSOF files are the best that go before the boards, but officers are still their own best file managers. Stay on top of your file, submit awards as you receive them, and have a new DA photo taken at least every 24 months. ARSOF Group has nominative positions to fill almost every day, but officers must have a current photo to be considered for one of those positions. Please go to the Web page to see the latest on officer assignments (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/opsf/SF-PagewithRecruiting.htm>).

Warrant Officer

WO advisory council seeks solutions to WO issues

The Army Senior Warrant Officer Advisory Council, or SWOAC, serves as an advisory council that is directly subordinate to the vice chief of staff of the Army. The council reports directly to the VCSA through its chairman, who is the warrant-officer leader-development officer of the Center for Army Leadership.

The SWOAC meets at least semiannually, usually in March and September. It serves as a continuing body to introduce, review and address potential issues concerning Army systems, policies and programs designed to produce ready and relevant warrant officers capable of supporting the Army mission in their role as Soldiers, officers, leaders and technicians.

The council provides a leadership forum for addressing policies and issues as they pertain to all warrant offi-

cers, regardless of MOS. The SWOAC is not intended to replace any activity within the Army. Voting members of the SWOAC are composed of the chief warrant officer of the branch or the branch proponent representative.

Special Forces warrant officers who have ideas, concerns or issues to bring to the advisory council should forward them through the senior warrant officer of their unit or organization to the chief warrant officer of the SF Branch, Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Change emphasizes importance of PME

The 2007/2008 update to DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, includes a change that requires active-component warrant officers to complete the Warrant Officer Ad-

vanced Course, or WOAC, before promotion to CWO4 and the Warrant Officer Staff Course, or WOSC, before promotion to CWO5. Previously the Army recommended that active-component warrant officers complete WOAC within one year of promotion to CWO3 and WOSC within one year of promotion to CWO4.

The change emphasizes the importance of professional military education, or PME, as a cornerstone of warrant-officer development. PME requirements remain unchanged for warrant officers in the National Guard: A warrant officer must complete WOAC prior to promotion to CWO3 and WOSC prior to promotion to CWO4. All warrant officers who are eligible to attend the WOAC or WOSC should request attendance in the courses as soon as possible by submitting a request to their career manager.

Enlisted

ARSOF SFC Selectees top Army average, board gives guidance

During the fiscal year 2007 Sergeant First Class Promotion-Selection Board, ARSOF Soldiers were successful at a rate that greatly exceeded the Army average.

	Eligible	Selected	Percentage
SF	468	316	68
CA	46	24	52
PSYOP	58	54	93
Army	30,402	8,418	28

Following are excerpts from the selection board's review and analysis of the records it considered:

- Performance and potential.** The NCO Evaluation Report, or NCOER; DA photo; schools; awards and honors weighed heavily in the selection process. The panel gave all benefit of any conflicting information regarding time in position, awards received, etc., to the Soldier. The panel put a significant amount of weight on the past three years of successful performance, duty descriptions and time in key positions, levels of responsibility and overall performance. In situations in which the Soldier held a key leadership position prior to 2004, the panel went back as far as necessary to review the record. The key indicators to the panel from the NCOER were the Soldier's competence, leadership, training and senior-rater input.
- Utilization and assignments.** Some Soldiers had been working in different or higher-level positions, according to their Enlisted Record Brief, for more than 90 days but did not have a complete-the-record NCOER submitted for the promotion board. As a result, panel members had to look closely at the bullet comments and the information on the ERB to award due credit. A CTR evaluation would have eliminated any guesswork by panel members. On the other hand, some Soldiers who had CTR evaluations did not have updated DA photos or validated ERBs. Some records did not have DA

photos. If raters are going to take the time to submit the evaluation, Soldiers need to take the time to submit or update their DA photo.

- Credit for accomplishments.** In some cases, areas of special emphasis and appointed duties did not show what the Soldier had done during the rating period, but bullets on the back of the NCOER identified the particulars. For example, participation in Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom was not listed on the front of the NCOER, but it was mentioned throughout the bullet comments in Part IV, b-f.
- Training and education.** Several Soldiers had completed their advanced NCO course, while almost 70 percent had some college credit. The board gave favorable consideration to military and civilian education.

Prior to each promotion board, eligible NCOs should read the promotion-board announcement message. It specifies the eligibility criteria and zones of consideration, and it provides information on such topics as CTR evaluations, electronic review of the ERB, and procedures for communicating with the board, updating the official military personnel folder and updating the DA photo.

ARSOF MSGs should prepare for SGM/CSM board

All ARSOF master sergeants who are in the zone of consideration for the 2007 Sergeant Major/Command Sergeant Major Promotion-Selection Board should ensure that their records are current and up-to-date. For additional information, they should refer to MILPER Message 07-047.

Eligible NCOs should also read the promotion-board documents from the previous year. Those include the promotion-board announcement message, the memorandum of instruction to board members and the board guidance, which explains how board members should determine the best-qualified candidates for promotion. These documents can be located at <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/select/Enlisted.htm>. For additional information,

telephone SGM Jeff Bare at DSN 239-7594 or commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to: barej@soc.mil.

PSYOP CSRB pending review by DA

The proposal to offer a critical skills retention bonus for PSYOP master sergeants is pending review by the Army G1. If the proposal is approved, PSYOP Soldiers in the grade of E8 who have at least 19.5 years of service would be eligible for a four-year, \$50,000 retention bonus. For more information, telephone Sergeant First Class Jason Sutton or Staff Sergeant Phillip Spauth at the Special Operations Recruitment Battalion, (910) 396-6533.

Update records for CA reclassification packet

Soldiers who have submitted a reclassification packet for Civil Affairs and would like to update their record should contact MSG Stefano Rizzotto at (910) 907-4171. It is highly recommended that Soldiers update their ERB to reflect their accomplishments.

Some CA NCOs eligible for re-enlistment bonus

Civil Affairs Soldiers in the rank of sergeant are eligible for a selective re-enlistment bonus of as much as \$15,000. CA staff sergeants are eligible for as much as \$10,000. The proposal for a critical skills re-enlistment bonus for CA sergeants first class and master sergeants is still being reviewed by the Army G1. For additional information, Soldiers should contact their career counselor.

CA Advanced NCO Course being developed

The CA Advanced NCO Course is being developed, and class dates will be announced as soon as they are available. Soldiers who want to schedule attendance in the Civil Affairs Basic NCO Course should contact their schools NCO. Soldiers who would like more information about CA or CA recruitment should telephone SFC Robert Herring or SFC Dennis Pease at the Special Operations Recruitment Battalion, (910) 432-9697.

THE DYNAMICS OF MILITARY REVOLUTION, 1300 - 2050

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, edited by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, is a necessary read for any student of revolutions in military affairs, or RMAs. The compilation of essays shows the reader the difference between military revolutions and RMAs, examining both phenomena within the context of the past 700 years of military history. The result is an introduction to the true nature of RMAs that explains their principal sources and places current notions of RMAs in perspective.

The first and last chapters, written by Knox and Murray, provide the conceptual framework for understanding the history of the two phenomena in military culture. Military history shows five military revolutions since 1300 that have been far-reaching in consequence and fundamentally changed the framework of war. Within those revolutions were less all-embracing clusters of changes, the RMAs.

The eight historical essays begin with Clifford J. Rogers' examination of 14th-century England. Rogers examines Edward III's RMA for its improvements in weapons, organization and strategies. England's combination of tactics, well-crafted strategy and paid longbowmen was successful in affecting an RMA only after Edward's military leaders made their personal contributions. Thus begins a series of lessons derived from the essays: No one element can bring about a revolutionary change.


John A. Lynn's chapter addresses 17th-century France's transformation, and MacGregor Knox complements Lynn's essay with one addressing the French Revolution. The transformation in all of Europe during the 17th century was so fundamental that it is called a military revolution. The changes in tactics, institutional hierarchies and technologies gave many armies characteristics that we now recognize as modern. Knox's essay addresses French refinement and innovation of earlier Dutch and Swedish military advances and the cultural changes that followed the French Revolution. The theme of these chapters is another important lesson: Dramatic

change came not from technology but from new concepts and institutions.

Later RMAs are examined in Dennis Showalter's essay, "The Prusso-German RMA, 1840-1871" and Holger Herwig's, "The battlefleet revolution, 1885-1914." The importance of these essays is found in their explanation of the coupling of technological change with changes in strategy. As it is defined by American analysts, an RMA embraces three distinct but interrelated areas that produce technological and organizational asymmetries between combatants: the improvement in the ability to destroy the opponent; the information edge brought about through improvements in collecting, processing and distributing information; and changes in force structure and doctrine made to optimize the potential of new material.

Both essays highlight the fact that the 19th century saw Germany making radical asymmetric gains on land and at sea. Despite their victories arising from those RMAs, however, their asymmetric gains were short-lived. The Prusso-German advantage lasted a quarter of a century, and the battlefleet advantages faded incrementally from one decade to the next. As with the other essays, these present lessons: in this case, a warning about overreliance on technology and an affirmation that politics and strategy were the heart of the revolutions.

The last two chapters focus on the military revolutions of World War I and World War II. Jonathan Bailey's essay on World War I is an excellent examination of the combination of industrial warfare and ideology that created the modern style of warfare. The conceptual model laid out in 1917-18 is used as a foundation for explaining the incremental and complementary improvements examined in Williamson Murray's essay on the contingency and fragility of the German RMA in 1940. The critical lesson from these examinations of the two great wars is that the RMA the German army pursued was firmly grounded in historical experience. The changes were slow, steady and systemic, and they became a revolution in military affairs only after vic-



DETAILS

Edited by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray

New York:

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tory had been achieved.

The concluding chapter brings the historical discussions into perspective with regard to military revolutions and RMAs as they are defined early in the book. The importance of *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050* lies in its critical examination of the meaning of RMAs throughout 700 years of war. Current American military analysts view past RMAs with a focus on technological advances and the responses to them. That view appears simplistic when seen in relation to the full breadth of military history.

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 is not a light read, but it is a thought-provoking examination of critical military history. It provides prerequisite knowledge for understanding the true nature of RMAs and possible pitfalls for the future U.S. military. **SW**

THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In *The Sling and the Stone*, retired Marine Colonel T.X. Hammes argues that the world is experiencing a fundamentally new era (or generation) of warfare. The first generation was characterized by massed manpower to destroy the enemy's close force, the second by firepower for the same purpose, and the third by maneuver to disrupt the enemy's command and control and logistical ability to sustain the fight. As a member of the school of thought that espouses so-called Fourth Generation Warfare, or 4GW, Hammes claims that the new generation is characterized by using all instruments of power — not just the military — to defeat the will of enemy decision-makers.

In Chapter One, he asserts:

4GW uses all available networks — political, economic, social, and military — to convince the enemy's political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision-makers to destroy the enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy — measured in decades rather than months or years.

Hammes maintains that war gradually evolves in concert with broader technological and societal changes. In chapters two and three, he outlines the 4GW school's assertion of the way that previous generations of warfare evolved, and Chapter Four is a survey of the rapid social and technical developments of the last century.


The author claims that 4GW was fathered by Mao Tse Tung during the Chinese communist revolu-

tion. In Chapters Five through Eight, Hammes outlines the way the Chinese, Vietnamese, Sandinistas and Palestinians contributed to the continuing evolution of 4GW. In Chapter Nine, he discusses the way that Israeli efforts to reverse Palestinian 4GW successes suggest a method for an established power to prevail.

Having established a pattern of antecedent 4GW successes, Hammes reflects, in Chapters 10-12, on the 4GW qualities exhibited by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and in Iraq. In Chapter 13, he critiques the current DoD mindset. His recommendations include a warning not to see technological development as a panacea; in fact, Hammes observes that the information-age technology in which the United States puts so much faith can be exploited by the very 4GW opponents it hopes to overcome.

Hammes bemoans the DoD "transformation" efforts that result in merely enhancing the abilities and mindsets of "third-generation warfare" and that increasingly lead to bureaucratic centralization. In Chapter 14, he outlines what he sees as the characteristics of 4GW: its strategic-, operational- and tactical-level imperatives; and its timelines, organizations and objectives.

In Chapter 15, Hammes builds on his historical argument and present-day assessment to fashion prescriptions for the future. He asserts, "DoD transformation envisions only one segment of the spectrum of conflict — high-technology, conventional war." Moreover, such a fixation is "about winning battles, not winning wars." He observes that the response "to 4GW enemies overseas requires a genuine, effective, interagency process," and maintains that we have "to stop emphasizing technology and start focusing on people" by reforming U.S.-government personnel systems, reducing the size of the defense bureaucracy, and lengthening opera-



DETAILS

By Colonel Thomas X. Hammes

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Joint and Army Doctrine Division

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JFK Special Warfare Center and

School

tions-force tours while shortening headquarters assignments.

In Chapter 16, the author evaluates future threats. His main effort is to debunk the emphasis on preparing for large-scale conventional war and to oppose those who champion such views out of ignorance, inertia or vested interest. Instead, Hammes identifies two types of 4GW threats: the insurgent actor using 4GW to seize territory and the established nation-state opponent who uses 4GW "to neutralize the power of the United States."

Finally, in Chapter 17, Hammes finishes his prescriptions for ways the U.S. must adapt to the 4GW threat. "Once we have fixed our personnel system, then analyzed the enemies we face and organized our forces to deal with them, the third

pillar of DoD's reorientation to 4GW must be flexibility."

4GW theory in general, and *The Sling and the Stone* in particular, are insightful and provocative but flawed. Although the author may focus the otherwise uninformed reader on the importance of maintaining a holistic view of opponents' efforts, the appreciation of a holistic approach is not unique to the 4GW school. The February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, or NSCT, stated:

The struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in our history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might. We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national power — diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes — some seen, some unseen.

What the NSCT did not assert, however, is that war itself had changed. To his credit, Hammes acknowledges that Mao went beyond Clausewitz in asserting, "Political mobilization is the most fundamental condition for winning the war." Hammes is also correct that Western nations have routinely preferred to interpret Clausewitz too blithely by seeing war as primarily a contest between regular forces and national economies.

It does not follow from these correct observations, however, that war's very nature has changed. In the Chinese case, the fundamental strategy of mass political mobilization still required revolutionaries to resort to assassination, ambush and eventually mobile warfare. Mao and the communists had a genius for political organization — political "warfare" — in the context of agrarian China, but war, properly speaking, remained as Clausewitz had defined it: an act of violence intended to compel the opponent to do one's will.

Hammes laments the focus on winning battles to the exclusion of concentrating on winning a war — a regret shared by this reviewer. As Sun Tzu pronounced 2,500 years ago, "The acme of skill is not to win

100 victories in 100 battles, but to defeat the enemy without fighting." Neither Sun Tzu nor Mao suggested, however, that battles are no longer necessary or important. Their central message stresses that the superior and more circumspect strategy and the superior ability to foresee and manipulate the effects produced by all choices — battle or other efforts — yields the greatest chance for victory.

The implication of this understanding exposes fatal flaws in the contrived 4GW formulation. The 4GW school's assertion that war has evolved is mistaken for at least three reasons. First, the 4GW school claims that war has evolved from eras characterized first by line-and-column, then by firepower, then by maneuver, to socially-holistic and politically-dominant 4GW. Another way to state their assertion is that war is evolving from an era characterized by melee tactics, through firepower-enhanced tactics, through operational agility, to the socially-holistic and politically-dominant strategy of 4GW. By the 4GW school's formulation, war itself hasn't evolved so much as their analytical focus has shifted among the levels of war. In at least two of the first three "generations," 4GW theory blends "war" with "battle."

Second, 4GW discusses the evolution of war but wishes to begin the discussion with modern war, only briefly prefacing its fixation for the era of nation-states (circa Napoleon and beyond) with dismissive references to the relatively small scale of the previous wars of nobility. It is ironic that a theory that purports to explain a universal theory of warfare evolution should engage in creating — *deus ex machina* — an assertion that one need only consider the phenomenon of war from the arbitrary starting point prescribed by the dogmatists of the 4GW school. To suggest that the evolution of war is a simplistic progression from the decisiveness of tactics through operations to strategy is historically unsupportable.

Third, when Hammes defines 4GW in the first chapter, he states within the same paragraph both that 4GW "uses all available networks ... to convince the enemy's political decision-makers that their

strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit," and that "it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision-makers to destroy the enemy's political will." With regard to the former assertion, temporarily forget 4GW altogether and ask yourself if that assertion is nothing more than a truism of politico-military statecraft universally applicable since the dawn of organized armed conflict.

With regard to the latter assertion, even 4GW's supposed fundamental example, Mao's revolution, does not support it. Despite Mao's political genius at organizing, his opponents were not defeated by "directly attacking [their] minds." In defeat, Tojo and Chiang Kai-Shek were no less intransigent. Moreover, regardless of the success with which the communists bled the Imperial Japanese forces, Japan withdrew from China because it was decisively defeated by American conventional and atomic power. The communists won the Chinese civil war through masterful organization of a disgruntled vast majority against an unrepresentative, oppressive and ineffective minority who misunderstood their opponents' strategy.

This reviewer is not alone in sensing that 4GW is, overall, a fraud. In *Fourth-Generation Warfare and Other Myths*, Dr. Antulio Echevarria of the Strategic Studies Institute has written that the theory is "fundamentally and hopelessly flawed, and creates more confusion than it eliminates. ... It is based on poor history and only obscures what other historians, theorists, and analysts already have worked long and hard to clarify."

To the extent that the 4GW debate brings understanding of insurgency to the modern American Soldier or analyst, it can be provocative and insightful. Moreover, Hammes offers some useful critiques about bureaucratic defense assumptions, the nature of transformation, and the imperative to remember that war is not solely a military undertaking. In aligning with the overblown 4GW school, however, *The Sling and the Stone* overreaches. Careful students of Mao, Giap, Molnar — or indeed of history — will recognize that 4GW theory has both missed and rediscovered the obvious. **SW**



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