

Special Warfare



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

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A special-operations forces Soldier, assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan, fires on a Taliban fighting position during an afternoon battle.

Photo by Daniel K. Love

Special Warfare

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Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th Edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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Recently I had the opportunity of visiting some of our special-operations forces Soldiers in Afghanistan and meeting members of the Afghan Army whom they have trained. I was impressed by the skills of the Afghani soldiers and proud of the performance of our Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs forces working with them.


Visiting the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan gave us a chance to view current operations and better evaluate the effectiveness of our training. The JFK Center and School is committed to ensuring that our training incorporates lessons learned from current operations. One of the things we learned is that some Soldiers and commanders are not fully aware of the assistance available to them for pre-deployment language training. As a result, in this issue of *Special Warfare*, we have included information on the resources available to units that need to conduct pre-deployment language training.

It is hard to overemphasize the importance of language and cultural training to current operations. The successful tactics in Afghanistan discussed in Major Christopher Wells' article in this issue depend heavily on an SF Soldier's ability to communicate with the populace and earn the people's trust.

Working by, with and through indigenous forces and the people who inhabit our operational areas has always been the hallmark of Special Forces. In this issue, Major Patrick O'Hara points out that during the 1950s in the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay helped to defeat the Huks by ensuring that the people saw Philippine military forces as protectors, not as aggressors. Lieutenant General William Yarborough's 1972 article on the psychological impact of Special Forces states that the greatest guarantee of cooperation from irregular forces comes from close personal rapport. Yarborough stresses, "The acceptability of Special Forces personnel in the country where they are to operate is of overriding importance."

Thirty-five years after General Yarborough wrote those words, the ability of our SF Soldiers to achieve rapport with partner-nation forces is still important, and its value will only increase in future operations.




Major General James W. Parker

OLSON TAKES COMMAND OF USSOCOM

TAMPA, Fla. — Admiral Eric T. Olson became the first Navy SEAL to command the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, during a July 9 ceremony at the Tampa Convention Center.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates presided as Olson assumed command from Army General Bryan “Doug” Brown. Brown had led the command since September 2003. Two of the more conspicuous accomplishments during that time were assuming new missions in the war on terror and assimilating Marine forces into the command.

Gates said the command works seamlessly among the services, but that this was not always the case. The command grew phoenix-like from the ashes of a failed attempt in 1980 to rescue American hostages being held in Iran, he said. Eight airmen and Marines were killed in the ill-fated mission, and the lessons learned from it led directly to the establishment of USSOCOM in 1987.

“Joint capabilities would eventually eclipse parochial service interests,” Gates said. “And this year we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the establishment of a command that is at the forefront of the fight to preserve our freedom and our way of life.”

Gates recognized Brown for his leadership of the command. “He came to this post four years ago determined to improve the way special operators fight,” Gates said. “He has done just that.”

Brown also improved the way the command works, the secretary said. He reorganized the command’s Center for Special Operations. The changes allowed different special-operations specialties to build on each other rather than compete. He praised the intelligence community for working side by side with special operators, “fusing their expertise and planning to greatly improve results.”

Brown thanked the coalition allies



▲ **PIPING ABOARD** Admiral Eric T. Olson, flanked by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and General Bryan “Doug” Brown, assumed command of the United States Special Operations Command on July 9 during a ceremony at the Tampa Convention Center, Tampa, Fla. *U.S. Army photo.*

and interagency partners for their help. “This is an international coalition at its best, supporting each other,” he said.

Gates also thanked Brown for the way he has worked with other nations in the fight against terror. The general has emphasized the need for Americans to develop language proficiency and cultural understanding to build trust and bonds with foreign militaries. “And his emphasis on indirect operations aimed to prevent minor problems from growing into much bigger crises,” Gates said.

Gates called Olson “a true warrior” and a legend in the special operations community. In 1993, Olson — then a Navy commander — fought street by street through Mogadishu, Somalia, leading a ground convoy to fellow special operators surrounded by thousands of enemy combatants.

Olson is the first Navy SEAL to wear three stars, and now four stars. “There is no mistaking his combination of courage, experience and leadership,” Gates said.

The secretary encouraged Olson to “continue your custom of giving honest opinions and recommendations — with the bark off and straight from the shoulder,” he said.

For his part, Olson said he will build on the base that Brown has left him. Olson, who served as the command’s deputy commander, said he is in awe of special-operations forces’ skill, intellect and courage.

“I intend to reinforce our enduring priorities: to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist threats; develop and support our people and take care of their families; and modernize our force.”

The admiral said he will work with combatant commanders to meet their needs and will work with service chiefs “in order to ensure that our respective roles and missions are well-defined.”

Finally, the admiral vowed to ensure that U.S. special-operations forces remain the best-trained, best-equipped, best-led, boldest, bravest, most aware, innovative, responsive and spirited force in the world.”

Green Berets earn Silver Star

A pair of Special Forces Soldiers received the Silver Star during a Fort Bragg ceremony July 2.

Captain Kenneth M. Dwyer and Staff Sergeant Rodney Scalise, both of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, were recognized with the military's third highest valor award for their gallantry under enemy fire during a battle on Aug. 19, 2006, in Afghanistan.

"When we hear the words, 'gallantry and valor,' we see it in everything that they did that day. This does not happen frequently," said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

According to the award citations, Scalise and Dwyer were conducting a combined patrol with the Afghan National Army in the Oruzgan Province when they were ambushed by a numerically superior anticoalition militia force.

With their patrol pinned down in a "U"-shaped ambush, Dwyer moved his vehicle through small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire to draw enemy fire and establish a support-by-fire position. He then charged from his position to draw the attention of enemy fire to free the pinned-down forces. He continued to engage the enemy forces until friendly forces were able to maneuver.

He then assisted the commander of another SF detachment in coordinating indirect fires. He used various individual and vehicle-mounted weapons systems to fire into the enemy's positions until he was critically injured by an air-burst rocket-propelled grenade.

Scalise, a Special Forces medic, also jumped into action upon contact and manned a 240B machine gun until he became aware of casualties. At that time, he dismounted his armored vehicle, moved more than 100 meters through heavy enemy fire, and began triage of three casualties, one of whom had already expired from his injuries.

To protect the remaining casualties, he supervised their movement to a more secure location. Fighting his way through a three-kilometer rolling am-



HEROIC EFFORT Captain Kenneth M. Dwyer and Staff Sergeant Rodney Scalise, both of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, were awarded the Silver Star Medal on July 2 in the Heritage Auditorium, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. *U.S. Army photo.*

bush back to the team's base camp, he continued to care for his two charges.

Scalise acknowledged the significance of his Silver Star, but he said he feels that the award symbolizes the heroism of his team during its battle with enemy forces. "To me this is all not necessary. I wasn't the only one there that was doing the right thing — I just happened to be the medic," he said. — *USASOC PAO*

WITH VALOR Lieutenant Colonel Clayton M. Hutmacher, commander, 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, attaches the Iraq campaign streamer to the unit's colors, held by Command Sergeant Major David L. Leamon of the 1st Battalion. Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (second from left), presented the 1st Battalion with the Afghanistan and Iraq campaign streamers, as well as the Valorous Unit Award during a ceremony at Fort Campbell, Ky., May 22. In addition to the unit awards, eight Night Stalkers were presented with valorous combat awards, including four Distinguished Flying Crosses, the Bronze Star Medal for Valor and three Air Medals for Valor. Wagner praised the unit for its ongoing contributions to the Global War on Terrorism. "You have earned a place of honor in the history of the Night Stalkers," he said. *U.S. Army photo by Ruth Farwell, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.*



LOWE TAKES HELM OF TRAINING GROUP

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School welcomed Colonel Mark S. Lowe as the new commander of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group in a ceremony held at Meadows Field June 28. Lowe is replacing Colonel Jack Zeigler, who has been named the SWCS chief of staff.

Major General James W. Parker commended Zeigler for his achievements while in command.

“Jack has done a terrific job leading this organization. I can tell you, his challenges were significant,” Parker said. “Jack took command during a time of immense change. You could say that transformation and change have been the watchwords for the training group through the last two years.”

These weren’t small changes to the organization, according to Parker. They were fundamental transformations in the way training is conducted to help meet the needs of a growing Special Forces community.

“Two years ago, our training pipeline had just been redesigned, but it was not yet fully operational. We were essentially running two Special Forces training pipelines: an old one, which we referred to as the ‘legacy,’ and a new one. Some referred to it as running two trains on parallel tracks. We had to get them on one track,” Parker said.

The Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations training was also going through transformation, as the Army created branches for CA and PSYOP career Soldiers, Parker added. In addition to all of this, Camp Mackall was going through its largest construction project since World War II.

Parker said he brought Zeigler into his office and told him to fix the way things had been running. “That’s exactly what he did. Mission accomplished, Jack.”

Though Parker’s comments toward Zeigler’s time in command were kind and suggested the changes were complete, Zeigler himself disagreed.

“Well sir, I respectfully disagree on the mission accomplishment statement. There’s still plenty of work that needs to be done, and I’d like to welcome Mark Lowe. I think he’s the right guy to continue this challenge,” Zeigler said.

No stranger to the SWCS, Lowe expressed his great excitement for the next two years of command.

“Since I’ve been here, many people have asked me why I smile so much,” Lowe said. “It’s because I knew my future. It’s been five years since I left the Special Warfare Training Group, but the Special Warfare Training Group has not left me.”

While preparing to take command, Lowe spent a week observing training within the group. He praised the dedication and professionalism of the instructors. He also thanked Zeigler for making it easy for him to take command.

“I’d like to thank Jack Zeigler for making this transition an easy one,” Lowe said. “You have truly set me up for success, and I wish you best of luck in your new job as the chief of staff.”

Lowe served as a rifle platoon leader and heavy weapons platoon leader in the 6th Battalion, 327th Infantry, 172nd Light Infantry Brigade at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, before attending the Special Forces Officer Qualification Course in October 1985. Lowe has held numerous positions in the 5th Special Forces Group, from detachment com-



▲ IN COMMAND Colonel Mark S. Lowe (second from left) takes the guidon from Major General James W. Parker at a change of command ceremony for the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, during a ceremony at Meadows Field, Fort Bragg, N.C., June 28. *U.S. Army photo.*

mander to company commander. He also served as the aide-de-camp for the commanding general, U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

His other assignments include the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia; the Operations Group Alpha, Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the Special Forces plans and operations officer; and commander of the Special Operations and Control Element at Camp Doha, Kuwait, where he participated in both Operations Southern Watch and Desert Thunder. At SWCS, Lowe has served as the secretary to the general staff; as the executive officer for the 1st SWTG; and as commander of the 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG. Lowe served as the executive officer for the commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, as well as the deputy chief of staff, Multi-National Force – Iraq in Baghdad, Iraq.

He later served as the C-3 director of maneuver, Multinational Force-I during the conduct of the Iraqi national elections and the transition of the interim Iraqi government. Before assuming command, Lowe served as the chief of staff, Alaskan Command, at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska.

He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the Infantry Officer basic and advanced courses.

BOYD TAKES COMMAND OF 4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP

Colonel Curtis S. Boyd assumed command of the 4th Psychological Operations Group July 13 at Meadows Memorial Field, Fort Bragg, N.C. The 4th POG is the only active-duty PSYOP unit in the U.S. Army. Boyd is replacing Colonel Kenneth A. Turner.

Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, praised the work of the 4th POG, as well as Turner's leadership.

"We talk about forces that are high-demand and low-density," said Wagner. "Your services are in such high demand, we can't create more of you fast enough."

On average, more than 500 Soldiers from the unit are deployed at any given time, with missions in more than 20 countries. Wagner said the unit had a critical role in that it "removes a combatant's will to fight."

"You bring nation-building from the national level down to the local level," said Wagner.

Turner, who will move to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command staff, had high praise for the men and women of the unit. "Commanders come and go, but the unit goes on," he said. "The unit is what this is all about. It is the only group like it in the world. I am proud to have served with these Soldiers ... When done right, words conquer."

Boyd is no stranger to the 4th POG, having served there as a detachment commander, group operations officer and battalion executive officer. He expressed his pride in the unit and his opportunity to command it.

Boyd was commissioned from Norwich University as an Infantry officer in 1984. From 1985 to 1992, he held numerous assignments in Germany with the 36th Infantry and at Fort Bragg with the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment. In 1992, Boyd left the 82nd Airborne Division to begin a two-year Psychological Operations officer training program at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Following language school at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Calif., he began a series of assignments in the 4th POG. From 1999 to 2002, Boyd was assigned as an information-operations officer to the Joint Special Operations Command. He then returned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, where he commanded a training battalion from 2002 to 2004. After that command, Boyd was assigned as the deputy director for Special Operations Proponency. Boyd's most recent assignment was the assistant chief of staff, G3, at the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.



▲ COMMANDING MOMENT Colonel Curtis S. Boyd (second from left) takes the guidon from Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner at the 4th PSYOP Group's change-of-command ceremony at Meadows Field, Fort Bragg, N.C., July 13. *U.S. Army photo.*

CAMBRIA TAKES HELM AT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND-PACIFIC

Brigadier General (Promotable) Salvatore F. Cambria assumed command of Special Operations Command-Pacific, or SOCPAC, July 5 during a ceremony at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

Cambria, a Special Forces officer, replaced Major General (Promotable) David P. Fridovich. Fridovich commanded SOCPAC for two and a half years.

Cambria said he's looking forward to joining SOCPAC's talented team of quiet professionals.

"I am deeply aware of SOCPAC's proud history and the many significant accomplishments under General Fridovich's leadership," said Cambria. "I look forward to joining this very talented team of quiet professionals."

Cambria added that it was an honor and privilege to follow Fridovich, and that he looks forward to continuing the great work Fridovich has started in the command.

"God bless this beautiful area of the world and all the cultural and national diversity," Cambria said.

As SOCPAC commander, Cambria exercises operational control of special-operations forces within the Pacific region. SOCPAC forces play the dominant role in U.S. Pacific Command's war on terror operations.

SOCPAC troops are the core of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines. Through their advice and assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, the AFP have improved its ability to coordinate and sustain counterterrorism operations.

SOCPAC forces are also involved in humanitarian-assistance projects in the southern Philippines, such as medical, dental and veterinarian clinics; and in engineering projects, such as water, road and classroom improvements.

Cambria is a 31-year Army veteran who has served in multiple special-operations assignments. In addition to SOCPAC, he has held command positions as commander, 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, N.C.; and commander,



CAMBRIA

Special Operations Command-South, Homestead Air Reserve Base, Fla. Cambria's most recent assignment was as director of operations, U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Fla.

SOF COMMUNITY MOURNS THE LOSS OF THE 'FATHER OF MODERN RANGERS'



▲ **21-GUN SALUTE** Soldiers of the 75th Ranger Regiment bid farewell to General Wayne Downing during funeral services held in Downing's hometown of Peoria, Ill. Downing was known as the 'Father of Modern Rangers.' *U.S. Army photo.*

Special-operations warriors paid tribute to a leader of the special-operations community during a memorial service, July 21 in Peoria, Ill. Retired U.S. Army General Wayne Allan Downing died of a sudden illness in his hometown July 18.

"I think each generation is given only a handful of extraordinary people," said the commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, during the closing eulogy. "From the White House to Congress, the State Department to the media, in homes across the nation and globe, with moments of tears in our eyes in disbelief and sadness, we are here today to honor and salute a uniquely special and extraordinary man of our generation."

Downing served as the commander of both the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command.

"Again, again and again during Vietnam, he was exactly what a military leader should be," said long-time friend H. Ross Perot. "He would never leave his men behind; he would personally go out and rescue the wounded. And he was always held in the highest regard by those who served with him."

Throughout his career, Downing maintained a close relationship to his subordinates and continued to mentor them, even after moving on

to the next assignment, said Lieutenant General Francis H. Kearney, deputy commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

"He was, and is, and always will be, a personal and professional compass for leaders, Soldiers and units, pointing the right way to go," said Wagner. "Legends will be told of Wayne Downing, but future generations will have a hard time of truly sensing the full depth of the person we know, love, honor and respect. No one personified the word 'Ranger' or the Ranger creed better than Wayne A. Downing, father of the modern-day Rangers. His life (was) filled with incredible accomplishments."

"We worked together on many, many projects; we traveled together extensively," said Jim Kimsey, founding chief executive officer of AOL and a founding AOL CEO and Downing's West Point classmate. "We went to places like China, Iraq and, just a few weeks ago, we were in Israel together. And, on all of these trips, Wayne dispensed his advice to our various constituencies in a way I've heard no one else do. And I will say, to sum it all up ... He was a true anomaly. Here was a man who was commander-in-chief of the most lethal fighting force on Earth; yet, he is one of the most compassionate, giving, caring, loving persons I've ever met."

Gamble Takes Command of Brigade

Colonel Duane A. Gamble assumed command of the Special Operations Sustainment Brigade from Colonel Edward F. Dorman during a Fort Bragg, N.C., ceremony July 20.

Gamble, a 1985 graduate of the ROTC program at Western Maryland College, was commissioned as an Ordnance officer, with a bachelor's in economics and business. He later earned a master's degree in logistics from the Florida Institute of Technology and a master's in national resource strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Gamble has held a variety of logistics positions within the 82nd Airborne Division. His most recent assignment was as the corps logistics officer for the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey. He has earned numerous military awards, including two Bronze Star Medals.

Gamble expressed his confidence in assuming the challenges of command as he vowed to focus first on USASOC units and Soldiers. "I'll always keep my mission of supporting USASOC units and Soldiers first, and I'll always accomplish the mission," said Gamble.

Dorman's next assignment is with the XVIII Airborne Corps on Fort Bragg.



▲ **ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY** Colonel Duane A. Gamble (left) takes the guidon from Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner at the Special Operations Sustainment Brigade change-of-command ceremony at Meadows Field, Fort Bragg, N.C., July 20. *U.S. Army photo.*

SPEAKING THE

ARSOFLO supports unit-level language training for contingency operations

When Army special-operations forces units need to conduct or obtain contingency foreign-language training or training for emergent language requirements, they may not be aware of the full range of available assistance.

Units at the group level or its equivalent have a full-time command language-program manager who provides language support to the unit. These units include the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 10th, 19th and 20th SF groups, the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, the 4th Psychological Operations Group, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, the 75th Ranger Regiment and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

In addition to the command language-program manager, however, there is another language-training resource: the Army Special Operations Forces Language Office, or ARSOFLO, which is the functional proponent for language training in the United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC. One of ARSOFLO's primary missions is to assist the language program managers of USASOC units in acquiring and providing quality contingency language training.

ARSOFLO can provide units a variety of contingency language-training materials in more than 45 languages. Materials available for pre-deployment training include language survival kits created by the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, or DLIFLC; 200-hour language-familiarization courses developed by the I Corps Language Center at Fort Lewis, Wash.; and commercial training products, such as Transparent Language's Critical Languages-150 Technology Matrix.

During the past year, the ARSOFLO has provided ARSOF units with a variety of language materials to support combat operations, including training in more than 15 languages using the Critical Languages-150 Technology Matrix; DLIFLC language survival kits in Iraqi, Dari, Pashto, Uzbeki and Tadjik; the July 2007 version of DLIFLC Iraqi Headstart; and aids such as Iraqi

vocabulary flash cards and non-language-specific graphic cards.

ARSOFLO works with ARSOF units to identify their language needs in advance and to provide access to resources necessary to facilitate just-in-time language training. ARSOFLO also coordinates with other training organizations to provide ARSOF Soldiers with the most up-to-date language materials available. Those organizations include DLIFLC's Field Support Office and Emerging Languages School; the U.S. Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Language Office; sister-service language-training components; and leading language-training universities, such as Brigham Young University and Indiana University.

ARSOFLO also hosts semiannual working groups that bring together ARSOF unit and command language-program managers, ARSOF subject-matter experts, resource managers and other USASOC personnel who are concerned with initial, sustainment and contingency foreign-language training. ARSOFLO provides outreach assistance to USASOC units to ensure that units are able to identify, resource, train and manage their foreign-language training and funding requirements.

The ARSOFLO contingency program manager visits units periodically to assess the state of foreign-language training; to determine whether they need additional funding, materials or assistance; and to discuss contingency-operations and identify contingency-language-training needs.

If units need support for language sustainment or contingency training, the first stop should be the battalion-level manager of the unit command language program. For more information, contact the ARSOFLO sustainment program manager, Terry Schnurr, at DSN 239-6699, commercial (910) 432-6699, e-mail: schnurr@soc.mil; or the ARSOFLO contingency program manager, Rusty Restituyo, at (910) 907-2941, e-mail: restituf@soc.mil.

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES LANGUAGE OFFICE 'OPEN FOR BUSINESS'

On Aug. 8, 2006, the United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, designated the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Army Special Operations Forces Language Office, or ARSOFLO, as the functional proponent for ARSOF language.

As the proponent, ARSOFLO has responsibilities not only in initial-acquisition foreign-language training for personnel in the Special Forces and Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations pipelines but also in language sustainment and contingency training for all USASOC direct-reporting units, or DRUs. ARSOFLO serves as the central point of contact for the USASOC DRUs for policy questions, language-training technology, the validation of required capabilities,

resource programming and assistance.

A SWCS unit, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, is responsible for conducting initial-acquisition training in 10 core languages: Arabic (modern standard), Korean, Chinese-Mandarin, Thai, Russian, Persian-Farsi, Tagalog, Indonesian, French and Spanish. Initial-acquisition training in Tagalog and Chinese-Mandarin is conducted at the I Corps language-training facility at Fort Lewis, Wash.

Initial-acquisition language training at SWCS is designed to ensure that students master 33 critical tasks and develop cultural and socio-linguistic competency at the 1/1/1 level (reading, listening, speaking) as scored by the Defense Language Proficiency Test and in ac-

cordance with the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable. The curriculum content covers five areas: military and security; politics and economics; geography; science and technology; and socio-cultural factors. The critical-task list is reviewed periodically and modified as needed to maintain relevance for ARSOF.

It is imperative to ensure that SOF personnel receive the best training to meet the foreign-language requirements of ARSOF's global operations. ARSOFLO coordinates with the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, or DLIFLC, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and other training institutions to update training content and identify essential resources.

LANGUAGE

Foal Eagle puts Green Berets' language skills to the test

The 1st Special Forces Group recently used the annual Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise Foal Eagle as an opportunity to further educate and evaluate its Soldiers in practical language and cultural skills.

Foal Eagle is one of three training exercises conducted annually in Korea by the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command, or CFC. Focused on the ability of the ROK to defend itself assisted by U.S. forces, Foal Eagle trains all aspects of the CFC's mission: rear-battle-area protection; reception, staging, onward movement and integration; conventional multiservice force-on-force; and special operations.

Training exercises like Foal Eagle test an aspect of language skills that written and listening tests cannot: effective intercultural communication. "The commanders and language-program administrators receive the true measure of their Soldiers' abilities through

as interpreters between SF teams. They were literally forced to use their language skills rather than perform their regular duties. Even though the scope of their job changed, the goals remained the same: build rapport, collect intelligence and complete the mission.

Amis said it's important to remember that when Soldiers enter a village, they aren't dressed as the local populace but rather as warriors. Their appearance can be frightening, and it is important that Soldiers immediately express their intent to villagers and break down communication barriers through language skills and cultural understanding.

On one team, a Chinese Mandarin speaker, Sergeant First Class Matt Carey, used his language skills to build rapport by explaining medical procedures to villagers during a medical civic-action program. His ability to communicate, form relationships and impart knowledge earned the trust of

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these exercises. And the Soldiers' confidence is bolstered through their abilities to communicate and improve on their speaking skills," said Sergeant First Class Todd Amis, coordinator of the 1st SF Group language program.

During the exercise, SF Soldiers were sent into villages in which volunteer or contract linguists played roles as Korean and Chinese speakers. The "villagers" spoke only in their assigned language, without breaking character by using English. The SF Soldiers were unaware of the extent to which their foreign-language skills would be tested, and the complete language immersion came as a surprise to many of the younger SF Soldiers.

In some instances, Soldiers used voice-response translators to convert English to Korean or Chinese; however, technology cannot substitute for a person on the ground, speaking the language and understanding cultural complexities. Soldiers who were most proficient in Korean and Chinese were used

the villagers, who reciprocated by providing intelligence on enemy whereabouts, manpower and weapons.

Through the exercise, the Soldiers enhanced their abilities to communicate and impart knowledge in realistic situations. They reaffirmed their strengths, improved on their weaknesses and learned what actions or language might be offensive or misunderstood in their target country.

Exercises like Foal Eagle not only test the capabilities of SF Soldiers but also emphasize the importance of language and cultural interaction to modern warfare.

"Rapport speeds success," said Colonel Eric P. Wendt, commander of the 1st Special Forces Group. "The rapport we develop with language capability and cultural understanding helps us as we enhance the legitimacy of the host government with the local populace. Language and cultural capabilities are vital tools."

LANGUAGE-TRAINING program changes result in greater Soldier proficiency

The 1st Special Forces Group language lab offers language sustainment and enhancement training to help its Soldiers maintain a basic understanding of language and communicate effectively.

During the summer of 2006, the 1st Group developed a plan for creating a 160-hour training course in language and cultural education for SF Soldiers assigned to the 1st Group. The language lab provides training in 10 languages, including Korean, Chinese Mandarin, Tagalog, Thai and Indonesian. Training consists of small teams of about five to 10 Soldiers in a class with an instructor. Soldiers are also encouraged to make use of the fully functional computer lab to supplement classroom instruction with the use of interactive software to improve their vocabulary and with interactive classes online. The language lab also gives them access to self-study materials and a small reference library.

To date, 230 Soldiers have been trained, according to Sergeant First Class Todd Amis, coordinator for the 1st Group language program. The training has resulted in the Soldiers receiving higher scores on the Defense Language Proficiency Test, or DLPT, which measures scores in listening, reading and speaking. Of the 230 Soldiers trained, 67 percent improved to pass the standard of 1/1 (listening/reading) on the DLPT, while 23 percent scored the 2/2 needed to qualify for language proficiency pay. Nearly all of the Soldiers who have taken part in the training achieved a 33-percent increase in their measured language capability.

Soldiers training in Chinese Mandarin and Tagalog also participate in a week-long, language-immersion isolation. The most recent graduates of the Chinese language program showed enormous improvement, Amis said. Out of 18 graduates, all achieved the 1/1 standard. Fifty percent achieved a 2/2 or better and now receive language pay. Twenty-two percent of the Chinese-language students have achieved at least a 3 (general professional proficiency level) in either listening or reading. In speaking, their scores ranged from 1+ to 2+.



A historical view of

By Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough

Special Forces are often in a position to observe developments that may have important ramifications on the attitudes of target areas, as well as the actual audience attitudes.

The Special Forces of the United States Army were designed for employment in several types of environments, each having pronounced psychological overtones. In their primary role, that of unconventional warfare, Special Forces will be in contact with friendly guerrilla forces and will provide a positive link between the irregulars and the conventional commands. The nature of the unconventional-warfare structure, which produces the guerrillas with which Special Forces work, must be understood in order to appreciate the importance of the psychological component of the Green Beret's makeup.

Guerrillas are an action element of the total unconventional-warfare system, but they do not comprise it entirely. Moreover, guerrillas will not appear as the first manifestation of a well-conceived and -organized resistance movement.

A guerrilla-warfare capability of any significance is normally based on a broad clandestine and covert sup-

port structure. The latter is rooted in the civilian population and usually numbers many times the strength of the guerrilla units it serves. The underground which makes guerrilla operations feasible does not develop automatically nor spontaneously. A great deal of careful, sophisticated, patient and time-consuming work on the part of highly motivated resistance architects goes into its design.

Members of a resistance underground live and work surrounded by great danger to themselves and to their families. It is evident, therefore, that the stakes for which they are willing to risk everything must be high. These are usually political. Sacrifice in serving in an underground organization that is hounded by special police and by counterintelligence agents can be justified in the minds of those who feel most deeply that their future and the future of their country can be made better through their efforts. Guerrilla forces which grow from the underground recruiting processes must have the same convictions — many with a firm political base. The mechanics of keeping guerrilla and underground forces' zeal at the required level must involve inspirational approaches which are simple, powerful, consistent and persistent.

It is necessary for the outside forces who work with guerrillas to understand the vital part that belief in the cause plays in the making of an irregular soldier. Granted, there are classical pressures which are used to force an individual into guerrilla ranks against his will. Frequently a combination of inspiration and terror is used

Editor's note: This article was written in 1972 and was published in DA Pamphlet 525-7-2, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application Volume 2 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976), 587-90. Yarborough, who died in December of 2005, is credited as being one of the founders of Special Forces. This historical look at SF's role shows the timelessness of the SF mission and skills.



the psychological role of Special Forces

to move a “volunteer” from his village to a guerrilla camp in the jungle. In any case, both the guerrilla and the vast infrastructure which supports him are dependent upon psychological considerations more than any other.

The history of resistance movements shows conclusively that guerrilla leadership must be indigenous — not imported from outside. This being the case, U.S. Special Forces would be ill-advised to seek command of guerrilla forces with which they have been placed in contact. Nevertheless, the interests of the United States, which in the first place led to the introduction of the Special Forces teams, must be appropriately served. It follows that the Special Forces Soldier must have a clear understanding of what his country’s interests are, and he must seek, with judgment, finesse, firmness and diplomacy, to serve them in dealing with the guerrilla leaders. He can, of course, attempt to guide the indigenous guerrilla leader toward desired tactical objectives by regulating the flow of supplies and resources from U.S. stockpiles. This kind of persuasion, powerful as it is, may not always work.

The greatest guarantee of cooperation from irregular forces can come from the close personal rapport which a mature, carefully selected and trained Special Forces team leader can develop with the guerrilla leader. Even when the relationship is close and there is a mutual respect and confidence, the nature of the guerrilla’s commitment to his political cause and future may preclude his acceding in every respect to the United States’ requirements voiced through the Special Forces commander. The latter must be the type of individual who can understand the nuances and intangibles that make his role in the irregular-warfare scheme so different from that of a liaison officer with foreign conventional forces. Historical accounts of problems stemming from personality clashes between Draza Mihailovic and Colonel Bailey, the British liaison officer to the Yugoslav partisan headquarters dur-

ing World War II, point up the extraordinary impact that human emotions can have on official negotiations.¹

U.S. Special Forces introduced into a conflict arena to work with guerrillas could find themselves enmeshed in several kinds of situations, none of them simple. The guerrillas may be fighting for their own government under siege by an invading enemy. In this case, the motivational propaganda which sustains them would come from that government. The latter would of necessity be compatible enough with U.S. aims to have warranted introduction of U.S. Special Forces in its support.

In such an environment, U.S. Special Forces would be expected to do nothing which would interfere with the mental conditioning of the indigenous resistance mechanism. Here the requirement for intensive indoctrination and meticulous selection of the Americans is apparent.

In recognition of the difficulties surrounding psychological operations carried out by resistance forces, U.S. Special Forces should provide appropriate assistance, beginning with materiel and instruction in its use. Guerrilla forces should be taught field expedients for leaflet production and distribution. The value of simple slogans painted on walls and of face-to-face persuasion should be stressed. Finished intelligence, received through the U.S. link with the Special Forces operations base and which can assist in psychological targeting, can be provided by the Special Forces to the guerrilla leaders.

Generally, the propaganda content of guerrilla psychological-operations activities should not come from U.S. Special Forces. Rather it should come from the guerrillas’ own government through the established communications system of the friendly underground. Thus the Special Forces contribution would consist largely of advice in planning, training in simple techniques, and provision of certain supplies and equipment from U.S. resources.

Another type of unconventional-warfare situation



in which Special Forces might be used could be that in which guerrilla forces supported by an underground resistance movement were challenging a government that for various reasons was unacceptable to the people of the country. In such a case, the introduction of Special Forces would be preceded by the most exhaustive analysis of the situation to determine whether U.S. interests actually demanded involvement in what might seem to be another country's internal affairs.

Lessons of current history seem to place this kind of projection of Special Forces' use fairly low on the probability scale. In the event, however, that Special Forces were used, their psychological role would probably not be limited to the provision of training and materials to the forces of the resistance. Certain aspects of the United

States' own psychological campaign against the enemy government could be reflected through Special Forces to the friendly guerrillas and their supporting infrastructure.

Intelligence is the lifeblood of effective psychological operations. Special Forces deployed in contact with guerrilla forces are in a position to gather the kind of intelligence that bears most intimately upon the attitudes of the people at the grass-roots level. Propaganda programs which are shaped in the absence of extensive knowledge of feelings and persuasions of human target groups are likely to succeed only through rare luck and in defiance of the laws of probability.

In his classic work, *Psychological Warfare*, Paul M.A. Linebarger points out that some of the worst blunders of history have arisen from miscalculations of the enemy state of mind. He indicates that psychologists can set up techniques for determining how people really feel about certain conditions and situations. Special Forces, in carrying out the psychological aspects of their unconventional-warfare missions, need to be trained in or at least familiar with such techniques so that the products of their intelligence-collection can be usable for something other than order-of-battle refinement.

The opportunities for intelligence-collection concerning popular attitudes are widely available to Special Forces assigned to missions bearing upon internal defense and stability of an ailing foreign country. The activity, which was once termed "counterinsurgency" by the U.S. Army and which involves everything from civic action to counter-guerrilla warfare, is still carried as a valid type of employment for Green Berets.

Students of counterinsurgency will recognize immediately the pitfalls inherent in the application of the accepted doctrine which has developed during the last decade. Nonetheless, certain aspects of what is held as valid and is taught in internal-defense-and-stability instruction are being implemented quietly and with success. In every case, the acceptability of the Special Forces personnel in the country where they are to operate is of overriding importance. **SW**

Notes:

¹ C.N.M. Blair, *Guerrilla Warfare* (London: Ministry of Defense, 1957).

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SF AND THE ART OF INFLUENCE

By Captain David P. Coughran Jr.

Special Forces soldiers are highly regarded for their ability to interact with people of different cultures and backgrounds. To date, they are the only branch of the modern military whose explicit purpose is to achieve U.S. objectives by operating through and with indigenous forces. Throughout their missions, there is a recurrent theme of Green Berets influencing the people around them. FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, puts it succinctly: “SF soldiers use their interpersonal skills to get the desired action from a foreign counterpart.”¹

With so much emphasis on this ability to influence others, it is worth the time to consider the factors that increase or decrease the power of this influence. How can I approach a person, shape his perceived environment, and direct the conversation to increase the likelihood that he will behave in the manner I want?

This is exactly the question posed

by social psychologist Dr. Robert B. Cialdini, the leading expert in a field of study that many have named influence psychology. The term influence refers to a type of response whereby one person or a group of people will acquiesce to the requests of another. Cialdini and other researchers have identified certain deep-seated characteristics in human nature that directly affect our ability to say “yes” or “no.” These characteristics, in turn, have led to techniques that others can utilize to shape our behavior. A good metaphor is to imagine our brain and personalities as a lock; a competent locksmith can approach us with his tools, position the tumblers in just the appropriate way and open us up to comply the way he wants.

In some way, all of us have been locksmiths before. Anyone in a marriage can relate to attempting to influence their spouse: “I’ll remind my wife how I loaded the dishwasher so

that she’ll have to empty it.” In other situations we’re the lock, and we feel the pressures from outside locksmiths: “This car dealer is trying to make me believe this piece of junk is a bargain.” Influence techniques are used in daily social interactions with our friends, professional colleagues and families. Television and radio advertisements bombard us with them. With the exception of marketers and salesmen, not everyone has the benefit of reviewing an actual list of specified techniques. Even fewer have considered why those techniques can be so effective.

The remainder of this article will be devoted to describing the most widely used influence techniques identified by Cialdini.² To begin with, it is necessary to analyze the deep-seated characteristics of human nature that lend themselves to influence. Then, after describing the technique, we must review the variables and strategies that can make them more persuasive.



▲ **NATION-BUILDING** By applying the principle of scarcity, villagers can be won over to a certain viewpoint by offering certain perks, such as schools and wells. If the village decides not to cooperate, then the construction projects will be moved to another village where cooperation is ensured. *U.S. Army photo.*

RECIPROCATION

Reciprocation is the most easily recognized influence technique. In simplest terms, it's the familiar concept of tit-for-tat: I give to you, so now you must give to me. In general, people always seek to repay favors that have been provided to them. This driving force stems from our social evolution into networked societies. The hunter who ate from the pot without having contributed that day did so fully understanding that he would share his future kill. Before currency, this allowed early man to give something away without really losing it, and it remains wired into our brains today. No one wants to be labeled a freeloader or a mooch. This mental predisposition to want to pay our debts lends reciprocation its influencing power in many ways.

First of all, reciprocation can be invoked from an unwanted object. The Hare Krishna society uses a unique tactic that some of us have experienced in airports. The Krishna solicitors first give away a free book or flower. Only after the traveler accepts the gift, usually

in an effort to hurry on with his business, does the Krishna member ask for a small donation in return. More often than not, the traveler pays up.

The concept this example emphasizes is that a crafty trader can capitalize on another's innate desire to repay debts, even if the initial "gift" is uninvited. Mankind adapted this principle into his behavior so that anyone could initiate a reciprocating relationship without the fear of loss. This helped connect the less productive contributors of early society to the social network and increased their chance of survival. So givers or receivers beware, because on a subconscious level, "no strings attached" isn't entirely accurate.³

Second, just as goods and services are reciprocated, so are concessions. Humans have a psychological urge not only to repay another's favors but also their compromises, too. This phenomenon is observed in virtually every culture of the world: Our psychological urge to agree to a request greatly increases if the person with whom we are bargaining is willing to cooperate and compromise. Therefore, in all ne-

gotiations, the importance of flexibility cannot be understated. A successful bargainer is patient and always willing to adjust his terms.

The door-in-the-face technique, or DITF, is the most basic version of the reciprocating technique. While the name may be unfamiliar, virtually every person has used it. The strategy involves making two separate requests. The first request is large and demanding. The second request is smaller by comparison and is the actual goal of the influencer.

When the first request is rejected by the subject, it induces psychological guilt. The subject senses that he or she is responsible for some form of damage or disadvantage to the influencer. The influencer now offers a concession in the form of a more meager request. For reasons discussed earlier, the target reciprocates the concession by accepting the offer.

Social psychologists have identified three critical variables that affect the outcome of DITF. First, time interval effects guilt. Guilt is a self-induced emotion, and it will dissipate over

time. Therefore, the influencer should display his disappointment when the first request is rejected but not wait too long before offering the next, smaller, request.

Second, the guilt is associated with the identity of the influencer. The second request will have the greatest statistical chance of success if the same person makes both the large and small request. Finally, pro-social requests are more likely to succeed than for-profit requests. In other words, the influencer's request that is a benefit to everyone has a better chance of acceptance than a request that benefits only the influencer.⁴

OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY

In 1963, Dr. Stanley Milgram published the findings of an experiment that is still one of the most controversial in modern psychology. His goal was to better understand atrocities such as the death camps at Auschwitz and Dachau. Was it an individual's inherent personality or social forces that could lead to such depraved acts?

conflicted with their private feelings. Some would wring their hands, bite their lip or beg through their own tears for the researcher to stop, all while continuing to give the shocks. External influence, in the form of an authority figure, can easily twist someone into a decision they would not choose on their own.

The origin of this human quality is easy to surmise. As mankind started to cooperate in social groups, he was also learning the benefit of having one member of the group in charge. This brought order, organization and synchronization to their efforts when everyone complied. The trend continues today when we teach our children to obey the teacher or to listen to the crosswalk guard. Professions each mark their own area of authority in society, from courtroom law to waging wars.

These authorities make many of our decisions for us when we're faced with unfamiliar or excessive amounts of information. For example, in the midst of a traffic accident, you'll follow the hand signals of the police officer

responsive to an authority-influence technique than an ordinary civilian would be.

SF soldiers are trained to identify the host-nation individuals who have the greatest authority on the local population. These people may derive their power along tribal, political or religious lines. By focusing efforts on a key few, a small detachment can have a much wider impact than it could achieve by itself.⁸

COMMITMENT, CONSISTENCY

There are few examples of indoctrination that match the scope of the Chinese communist re-education camps of the 1950s and 1960s. Loosely outlined in party manuals, these programs were used against criminals, civil dissidents and even American POWs during the Korean War.⁹ The camps went beyond mere behavior influence; the goal was for the subject to completely espouse the ideology of the communist regime. The camps took a very subtle tack: In the beginning, they might ask the subject only to sign a politically charged

“In all negotiations, the importance of flexibility cannot be understated. A successful bargainer is patient and always willing to adjust his terms.”

The experiment was simple: The test subject was misinformed to make him believe that the researcher was studying the effects of punishment on learning. In actuality, the real experiment focused on how much electricity the subject was willing to administer to an imaginary learner when he answered questions wrong. A speaker would play sounds of screaming and anguished protests as the voltmeter increased and the imaginary learner continued to make mistakes. In 65 percent of more than 100 separate experiments, the test subject followed the orders of the researcher and administered shocks past the lethal level of 400 volts.⁵

These results have been reproduced in virtually every similar experiment to date. The presence of the researcher, attired in his professional lab coat and politely urging the shocks to continue, was the key variable of compliance. Test subjects obeyed the lab coat even when the experiment

without questioning.

Authority is easily adapted as an influence technique during a negotiation. The probability that a request will be accepted increases greatly if either: (a) the requester bears some sort of authority regarding the subject matter; or (b) the requester is making his request at the recommendation or behest of an authority figure.⁶ Authority can be carried by someone with a title or special job position. In other cases, simply having privileged information can lend the influencer authority.

Research further suggests that certain people are more prone to obey authority than others. A 2002 study conducted among four major university psychology departments reported: “Career interests and world view ... moderate estimates of self and other obedience.”⁷ A government official or military figure, long indoctrinated on the importance of following orders and a chain of command, is therefore more

document — a seemingly harmless contrivance — for a bowl of rice. More involved writing assignments would then follow, lulling the subject into a sense of routine. “Recopy this party manifesto for us.” “Memorize this.” “Recite this in front of the other prisoners.” Slowly, and over time, the constant pressure could twist a subject's self-image until he was actually cooperating. The results are shocking. American POWs who were repatriated in 1953 recounted the intelligence and propaganda opportunities they had inadvertently provided enemy forces. This prompted the military to adopt the Code of Conduct and conduct more training in resisting interrogation.¹⁰

The commitment and consistency technique is based on personal and interpersonal pressure to behave in accordance with our previous decisions. Every culture in the world appreciates a man or woman who is steadfast in their beliefs and follows

through with their word. Examples of this surround us. Business employers seek this quality when they hire. Matchmaking consumers rate “dependability” as one of the top three characteristics of a potential partner.

Many analysts believe presidential candidate John Kerry committed political suicide with the statement, “I actually voted for the [bill] before I voted against it.”¹¹ On a psychological level, human beings need consistency to conserve their mental energy. After a person makes a decision, even as simple as “I dislike broccoli,” it is easier to behave in accordance with that decision than to constantly re-evaluate the information every time one is faced with the same choice.

To bring the full force of commitment and consistency to bear in a negotiation, start small and build. The influencer gets the subject to commit to *A*, then to *A + B*. It’s then a small jump to *A + B + C = D*, which is the influencer’s real goal. Then the influencer will make every effort to publicize that agreement as widely as possible. By sharing the subject’s decision with his peers or colleagues, it brings that interpersonal pressure on him to comply, because he wants to appear to be consistent with his decision. That is why diet and health counselors encourage clients to share their goals with their friends and families. If only the influencer and the subject know of the commitment, it is much easier for the subject to change his mind.¹²

LIKEABILITY

An influencer’s likeability with the subject greatly affects the probability of compliance. It should not surprise anyone that sales associates in virtually every business are trained to be as affable, polite and pleasant as possible. The best performers in this field have a customer believing that the sales rep is their new best friend, and he will leave the store grateful that he could buy the item from such a nice person. When a girl scout is selling her cookies, the first places she’ll go are to the houses of her parents’ friends and neighbors.

Psychologists have identified many variables of how much a person is “liked.” Physical attractiveness is a large contributor in the first moments after the introduction. The amount of influencer-subject contact and the influencer’s professional background are factors, too. While these variables are difficult to control, there is a tremendous potential in one likeability variable if the influencer can only approach it properly: similarity.

The majority of the earth’s population is satisfied with its sense of self; humans tend to like themselves and their personal qualities. Others who share the same qualities are liked, too. The association principle in psychology stipulates that if a person sees a similarity between two things, he assumes that the two are alike in other ways.¹³ Therefore, if the influencer and the subject share even a few characteristics, the subject will tend to believe that they are alike in other ways. This feedback builds on itself and can help lead the subject to look positively on the influencer.

So as the influencer and subject sit down and converse in their first face-to-face meeting, it serves the influencer well to direct the conversation into topics that will reveal the similarities between the two. Easy places to start are families: wives, children, brothers, sisters, etc. One layer deeper would lie the similarities of their goals. What was the common ground that brought everyone together? What does everyone gain from a successful negotiation? These conversations, coupled with patience, cultural respect and a smile, go far toward reaching an agreement with which everyone will be pleased.

SCARCITY

There’s an adage with a thousand different translations: “You always want what you can’t have.” Making something *scarce* is the easiest and most complete technique for increasing its desirability. Where there is a limited supply, there is a breadth of demand. If something is in high demand, then it must have great value, and if it’s valuable, we want it.

Psychological reactance is the term behavior professionals use to explain this phenomenon. Along with every living species’ evolutionary drive to compete for limited resources, human beings exhibit a tendency to preserve their prerogatives. The ability to make a choice is a freedom. Take away that choice, as when someone else takes the last of anything, and an individual loses personal control of his environment. The need to retain this control can lead us to desire a scarce object.

As an influence technique, scarcity is used when you put a time limit on an offer or explain how other people seek the asset you are bartering: “Please, sir, if you can’t agree to this

now, the deal won’t be available in the morning,” or “Well, if you won’t agree, the other tribe I was in contact with earlier was interested.” Sometimes a touch of scarcity can produce the small lean you need to complete the negotiation. Use this technique gently, as the subject may not appreciate the pressure and may simply walk away.

PLANNING

As stated before, none of these compliance techniques are new or revolutionary. The fact that a well-liked person has a better chance of influencing other people is not shocking. However, the benefit of discussing these techniques, naming them and compiling them into a list makes it substantially easier to plan with them.¹⁴ No military operation in the U.S. Army is performed without some level of planning. Why should interactions with people encountered during a mission be any different? It is surprising to learn that in the intelligence industry, introverts sometimes make the best operatives.¹⁵ While extroverts are adept at carrying on conversations and are comfortable around people, the introvert seeks design and order in everything he does. Conversations and negotiations can be anticipated and modeled. True litigators spend hours contemplating the logic their opponent will use and find methods for refuting it.

The final compliance technique involves approaching negotiations in the same manner as in intelligence preparation of the battlefield: Identify the subject of your influence. Consider his environment and what he may seek in an interaction. Use information regarding his culture, religion, tribe, past experiences and previous occupations to glean an indication of the best way to approach him. Finally, develop a course of action. What will you talk about first, second and third? If he mentions a sensitive subject, how will you return the conversation to your agenda? How can you leverage or resource some of his requests? What conditions do you set before the conversation is over? When will you meet again?¹⁶ **SW**

NOTES:

¹ Field Manual 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, 1-7.

² Robert B. Cialdini, *Compliance: The Psychology of Persuasion Revised Edition* (Quill, 1984), 1-19.



▲ **RECIPROCATION** The principle of reciprocation shows that people are naturally inclined to repay services and favors provided to them. In exchange for the construction of a new building, for example, villagers might be more willing to provide information regarding suspicious activities in the area. *U.S. Army photo.*

Cialdini's research provided the base of reference of this article. After understanding the basic concepts, it was possible to review other research articles and seek information from other sources. Cialdini also recognizes other compliance techniques that are not specified in this essay.

³ John Mariotti, "Understanding Influence and Persuasion," *Industry Week*, 5 April 1999, Vol. 248; 126.

⁴ Daniel J. O'Keefe and Marianne Figge, "A Guilt Based Explanation of Door in the Face Strategy," *Human Communication Research*, September 1997, Vol. 24; 64, 18.

⁵ Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1974), 155.

⁶ Cialdini, 230-33.

⁷ Glen Heber, Kathleen P. Bauman, Sara Elizabeth Kay Hubbard and Jared Richard Legate, "Self and Other Obedience Estimates: Biases and Moderators," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, December 2002, Vol. 142; 688.

⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Paul Burton, interview with author, Fort A.P. Hill, Va., 30 January 2007; and Fort Bragg, N.C., 12 March 2007. Burton frequently used this approach during operations in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Afghanistan. He reports that as a commander of a special-operations task force in Afghanistan, his greatest success in influencing the population to cooperate with coalition forces was convincing their key leadership. Leveraging humanitar-

ian support and other control mechanisms ensured that the leaders continued to facilitate cooperation and did not renege on their commitments.

⁹ Larry Zellers, *In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1991), 43, 168. Zellers was a civilian prisoner during the Korean War. A portion of his book traces interrogation techniques that originated in China and spread as far as Vietnam in the 1970s. He discusses specific measures and procedures that his captors used against him.

¹⁰ Don Oldenburg, "Tending to the Psychic Wounds of POWs; Military 'Decompression' Eases Transition," *The Washington Post*, 15 April 2003, C 01.

¹¹ Damian Cave, "Flip Flopper," *The New York Times*, 26 December 2004, 4.

¹² Master Sergeant Martin, interview with author, Fort Bragg, N.C., 3 March 2007.

¹³ Cialdini, 194.

¹⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Mark Baggett, interview with the author, Fort Bragg, N.C., 14 March 2007. Baggett's suggestions greatly contributed to this portion of the article.

¹⁵ John Nolan, *Confidential Business Secrets Getting Theirs, Keeping Yours* (Yardly Chambers, 1999), 23. Nolan had a 20-year career as a government intelligence official. He worked with the CIA, the military and other government agencies. He is known in the mainstream business industry for his seminars in

counterindustrial espionage.

¹⁶ Nolan, 25.

Captain David P. Coughran Jr.

is a student in the Special Forces Qualification Course. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 2002 with a degree in mechanical engineering and was commissioned as an Engineer officer. His assignments include platoon leader, 73rd Engineer Company; and task force engineer, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment (Stryker Brigade Combat Team). He has served in Operation Iraqi Freedom III with the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT); with the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group; and as a liaison officer to the 2nd Infantry Battalion, Iraqi National Guard.

Breaking the Afghan Insurgency

By Major Christopher B. Wells





On a cloudless, still morning, dawn breaks on a small village in the Oruzgan province of Afghanistan. As the sun rises, it casts shadows along the crumbling dirt walls of the dozen or so dwellings that make up the village. Despite the stillness of the coming day, an ominous dust storm appears to grow from the valley floor to the south of the village. The inhabitants of the village stare in confusion at the mysterious storm forming in the valley. The Taliban mixed among the residents look not in confusion but in horror, as they recognize not only the cause of the storm but the power behind it.

Above the din of the dusty tempest, aircraft fly, and within its whirlwind, a virtual armada of coalition and Afghan National Security Force vehicles and men bear down on the village. The noise of some 300-plus soldiers, amplified by the benefits of modern technology, are the harbingers of destruction to the vastly outnumbered and relatively surprised Taliban who have taken over the village. They immediately launch into a well-practiced drill of escape, evasion and concealment among the villagers. Within hours, the Taliban has been routed from the village, either through successful escape or through unsuccessful confrontation with the massive coalition force, and relative order and security have been re-established for the villagers who have suffered under the tyranny of their “guests” for the last few weeks.

In the days that follow the engagement, the ability of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to maintain order and provide a safe way of life is demonstrated to the populace. Vehicle checkpoints are established on the few roads leading into the village. A shura meeting is held to discuss civic improvements and to assuage the fears of the village elders of possible Taliban reprisal if they cooperate with the government forces. Promises are made for better wells, more food, improved roads and relief from tribal conflict.

Within 72 hours of the initial assault that drove the Taliban from the village, the coalition forces, unable to maintain a presence because of a similar situation that requires their attention elsewhere, depart the small village. Despite every intention to the contrary, they leave the village much the same way they found it three days earlier.

On another cloudless, still morning, dawn breaks on the same small village in the Oruzgan province of Afghanistan. As the sun rises, it reflects off the clean white turbans of the first group of Taliban to return to the village. In the dawn of the fifth day since they were driven from this oasis of possibility in the remote province, they return with a simple, insidious purpose. The sounds of the violence they bring back to the village quickly drown out the memory of the awful noise of the coalition force a mere 96 hours ago.

Time and again, this scenario plays out throughout Afghanistan. Short-sighted combat operations, conducted simply for the sake of clearing out pockets of enemy forces, do little to establish the kind of long-term security required to create a stable environment safe enough to allow for the improvement of Afghan society.

Only operations that incorporate aspects of clearance, security and development within the context of a comprehensive counterinsurgency framework will have the lasting effect required to save Afghanistan. Only truly integrated task forces that possess elements of military, diplomatic

and political entities can properly execute those types of operations.

Understanding the environment and the organization of the insurgent force is the key to fighting effectively and efficiently in a counterinsurgency, or COIN, environment. Developing a flexible COIN strategy that is adopted by all forces and determining the command-and-control relationships between the civil government, military and police are key in implementing a successful counterinsurgency strategy.

Another priority is the development of a task-force structure that integrates the capability and capacity of the police, military, interagency, civil

government and the populace. It is imperative to understand the effectiveness and efficiency of the host-nation military, the level of corruption, economic growth and infrastructure development, state of the insurgency, and the support to the insurgency. Finally, it is imperative to organize the COIN force to conduct lethal and nonlethal intelligence-driven, decentralized, full-spectrum operations that establish and maintain the security, stability and safety needed to control the insurgency and provide development and support to the populace.

Understanding the insurgency is key in developing an effective COIN

strategy — how it is organized, how it sustains itself and how it conducts operations. This knowledge is critical to the eventual defeat of the insurgent movement. Special Forces Soldiers, from their early stages of training, are taught how to establish guerilla forces composed of indigenous personnel to fight, subvert, discredit and eventually unseat an established government. Nowhere has that been demonstrated better than in Afghanistan, where just a few SF teams entered the country, and through their ability to organize and employ the indigenous personnel, defeated the Taliban regime.

However, six years later, U.S. Special Forces, the Afghan National Army and the multinational coalition are running into problems with a resurgence of the Taliban. The insurgency is pushing hard to reclaim large portions of territory from which it was driven. While the SF Soldiers have been lauded as experts in unconventional warfare and masters of employing indigenous forces to overthrow lawless governments, they have encountered difficulty dealing with the insurgent forces in Afghanistan. Those forces attempt to thwart

coalition efforts to establish enduring security forces, economic stability, government institutions and a functional justice system.

The Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Force Group, or Task Force-31, have deployed to Afghanistan on five combat tours in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF. The Desert Eagles, as they are called, have been honing their counterinsurgency strategy to address issues that historically plague counterinsurgency forces.

TF-31's strategy recognizes that the civilian population is the center of gravity and that the fight needs to be focused on winning the support of the passive/neutral populace, since a passive populace generally favors the enemy.

"We have found that the enemy can easily intimidate locals into providing them support, a help-us-or-else kind of attitude. The fence-sitters are usually just trying to survive. It isn't until we can prove to the people that an enduring security situation exists, that we can expect to see a shift in the populace's psyche — from passive to actively supporting us. After that, they start telling us where the IEDs and

weapons caches are and begin reporting on Taliban activity throughout the area. Whereas before, they would report on our movements to the Taliban," said Major Chris Hensley, the TF-31 operations officer.

TF-31's strategy follows four basic lines of thought: search, assist, attack and train. The Desert Eagles search for the enemy and for ways to help the populace or the government. They assist the populace through security development, humanitarian assistance, or HA, and civil-military operations, or CMO. They attack the insurgency, both lethally and nonlethally, to separate the enemy from the primary population centers. Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Bolduc, the former TF-31 commander, explains, "This is a political, diplomatic and military process. These elements must be integrated, coordinated, synchronized and deconflicted. One of the problems we face is that units that deploy to Afghanistan conduct operations based on rotational cycles vs. operations based on a unified counterinsurgency-campaign plan. Additionally, many of the national task forces get sidetracked by focusing on their respective provinces and

SOTF-31 STRATEGY NESTED WITH ISAF/NATO & RC-SOUTH ADZ

1. Security
2. Good Governance & Justice
3. Infrastructure & Economic Growth

SEARCH

- HUMINT INTEL
- ANA/ANP/NDS INTEL
- Interagency INTEL
- PRT/DOS INTEL
- Develop NAIs
- Build Afghan and Coalition Relations
- Nested Strategy
- Redevelop AOR Familiarization
- Combat RECON Patrols (CRP)
- IO Campaign
- Interaction With Populace
- Eagle Search
- Eagle Sweep

ASSIST

- Village - Province
- Promote Nationalism Over Tribalism
- MEDCAP/VETCAP
- CAT-A (CERP/Cash for Work)
- Shura Meetings
- IO-Peace Papers
- Flyers, etc.
- Radios/Stations
- HA Supplies
- A-Camp Clinics
- Civil-Military Ops
- USAID/NGO Ops
- Mobile Mullah

ATTACK

- HUMINT Network
- ANP INTEL Network
- Cordon & Search
- Sweep and Clear
- Deliberate Ops & CRP - Chance
Contact: Pressure, Pursue, Punish
- Movement to Contact: Air & Ground
- QRF to Other Units
- IO Targeting
- Eagle Attack/Nest

TRAIN

- Individual Tasks
- Collective Tasks
- Shoot, Move, C2
- TLPs to CO Leadership
- Govt. and Institution Development
- MDMP for ANA Staff
- Unit COIN Training
- Doctrine-Driven SOF - UW/COIN
- Train the Trainer
- ANA Green-Amber-Red Cycle
- IO Training for ANA
- Decentralized FID Training

AFGHAN FACE, AFGHAN LED

then follow their own agendas rather than an integrated strategy. Our mantra (pressure, pursue, punish) loosely mirrors the four tenets of our strategy, and I believe it provides ... the proper default needed to work through problems encountered in this complex environment.”

The U.S. Special Forces must train the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF, and officials of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, or IROA, to further build up government infrastructure and capabilities, all of which set conditions for bringing in developmental organizations. They conduct sustainment training with the Afghan National Army, or ANA, conduct basic counterinsurgency training with the Afghan National Police, or ANP, and they mentor government officials from the village to the provincial level in order to establish systems that promote good governance and justice.

The Desert Eagles’ strategy is facilitated through several operations that are revised prior to every TF-31 deployment to Afghanistan. These operations are designed to provide the operational detachments and staff with a common vision to guide tactical missions.

The operations are: *Eagle Search*, designed for incoming detachments to regain operational awareness of their respective areas of responsibility and to conduct extended reconnaissance patrols to identify enemy locations for future lethal operations; *Eagle Sweep*, designed to target and clear enemy forces from key population centers identified during *Eagle Search*; *Eagle Attack*, designed to target enemy forces that have been made to operate in their safe haven and contested areas identified during *Eagle Search* and *Eagle Sweep*; and *Eagle Nest*, an enduring operation designed to seamlessly continue infrastructure development, further develop IROA government capacity and to provide oversight regarding the establishment of enduring security in key population centers and on primary lines of communication through COIN consolidation operations.



▲ **OUCH** A Special Forces medic, assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force- Afghanistan, provides medical treatment to a Soldier who received shrapnel wounds from an RPG explosion while battling Taliban fighters in the Sangin District area of the Helmand Province. *U.S. Army photo.*

Counterinsurgency consolidation operations are one of the pillars of Eagle Strategy and are critical to winning the counterinsurgency fight. Bolduc puts it best, “COIN is graduate-level warfare, a thinking man’s game. It simply isn’t enough to strike the enemy or focus on insurgent leadership. We must affect all levels of the insurgent infrastructure. This is a cyclic process that requires intelligence-driven, decentralized, full-spectrum operations that must focus on establishing security, stability and safety for the Afghan people.” (See graphic on Page 25.)

During the battalion’s most recent deployment, the battalion staff conducted a review of SF doctrine in order to conduct an internal assessment and identify any breaks or flaws in TF-31’s strategy. The review revealed some noteworthy results — many validated the strategy, while others exposed areas that required further focus or revision.


The review began with an examination of the common mistakes made in

COIN operations. Historically, there are 18 pitfalls that disrupt efforts in dealing with an active insurgent group. The battalion determined that, collectively, from the individual-unit level to the coalition-command level, nine of the 18 mistakes were being made, three of which will be covered in detail in this article.

The most relevant mistake being made is that the coalition is operating under “multiple divergent lines of command and control, all following separate agendas.” The Desert Eagles must coordinate all their efforts through the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, or CJSOTF-A, which in turn answers to Combined Joint Task Force-76, or CJTF-76.

Additionally, the battalion falls within the battlespace of Regional Command-South, or RC-South, which is composed of several national commands under the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF. RC-South is separated into smaller task forces that are given control over specific political provinces. While TF-

The Counterinsurgency Strategy Pyramid



31 doesn't officially fall into the RC-South command structure, it must coordinate all its efforts through every level of command. The battalion does not seek approval but it does attempt to gain support in order to avoid coalition infighting.

Concurrently, TF-31 is required to coordinate and seek approval through its formal chain of command. At the RC-South level, each represented NATO nation generally tries to support the designated RC-South commander, a position that rotates from each represented nation every four to six months.

Each task force is under the operational control of the RC-South commander; however, the commander's position is weakened by contributing country's national caveats that limit the commander's ability to exert his command authority. This problem is commonly referred to as "NOCON," since most operations are agreed upon and negotiated to gain desired effects. Generally the effect is limited at best.

Additionally, all ANA and ANP fall under the Combined Security Training Command-Afghanistan, or CSTC-A, and the Afghan Ministry of Interior. While CSTC-A efforts are focused on solving problems that hamper the ANSF, they make decisions that are often at odds with those of maneuver commanders and with tactical ground truth. CSTC-A's centralized control doesn't afford the commander the visibility to make informed decisions that effect the tactical level.

The second mistake commonly made during COIN operations is "Failure to establish an effective strategic, operational and tactical information operations (IO) campaign to counter insurgent IO efforts." Time and again, the Taliban and other insurgent forces have released messages with video that were broadcast on major media outlets around the world before coalition forces had time to determine what happened.

Additionally, the enemy has become adept at developing low-budget propaganda videos that are sold in

bazaars, posted on the Internet or released to the mainstream media. Many insurgent commanders regularly speak directly to reporters or are regularly contacted by representatives of the media who are undoubtedly granted exclusive direct access to those leaders.

In most cases, media interactions are not coordinated; they are actions taken by motivated individuals unhampered by approval processes. Overall, the assessment indicates that the Taliban is well ahead of coalition efforts in that arena. The current national and international public opinion of U.S. efforts in dealing with the insurgency indicates that the insurgency has been successful at peddling its messages to what appears to be apparently liberal media only too happy to broadcast the messages under the guise of legitimate news.

At the tactical level, the battalion has made significant strides in its efforts to counter the enemy's propaganda machine. Two years ago, the battalion began fielding its "radio in

a box” concept, placing small broadcast radio systems next to most of its firebases. These radio systems have greatly enhanced SF’s ability to reach the populace with news, music, open-mike interviews with local leaders and time-sensitive information broadcast across a province.

However, the centralized approval process for broadcast messages is retained at higher levels. Many messages are not approved for release until well after the time when they have relevance to unfolding events. A possible solution to this problem is to first have a strategic IO plan that delegates authority to tactical commanders to broadcast messages relevant to their level of operations. Secondly, a system of approved criteria should be developed that would provide lower-level commanders guidelines and give them freedom to release time-sensitive messages that would counter Tal-

iban information operations. is “Conducting combat operations for the sake of conducting combat operations; Conducting large sweep-and-clear operations for short-term effects, instead of conducting sweep, clear, hold, secure and develop operations for long-term effects on the enemy and the populace.” This is probably the most recurrent and harmful type of operation that occurs. Usually, conventional forces lapse into this type of operational tempo, but on occasion, some Special Forces units make this mistake as well, usually when they concentrate only on conducting direct-action missions and focus on targeting the insurgent leadership.

Conventional forces, on the other hand, suffer from organizational architectures that restrict their ability to operate in a COIN environment. Conventional forces are simply not agile enough to adapt to the ever-

support the insurgency. Bolduc, the TF-31 commander, stated, “The key is an organization driven by a COIN strategy that is flexible, adaptable and focuses on achieving effects against the enemy and gaining the support of the people.”

There have been several examples of conventional units that proved to be successful at realigning their forces in order to deal with COIN issues and reorganized their forces to better avoid common pitfalls. Ideally, a conventional force should decentralize its forces, partner with host-nation forces, conduct security for the provincial reconstruction teams, disrupt enemy safe havens and protect population centers and key facilities. One unit deployed its subordinate units across the volatile Zabul Province in small, decentralized elements that were successful in gaining effects against the insurgency.

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iban information operations.

TF-31 developed a comprehensive IO campaign plan designed to influence the insurgents and populace through lethal and nonlethal means. The strategy spans the tactical, operational and strategic levels by coordinating print, radio, Internet and television messaging. Each week, the staff holds its IO working group meeting to discuss CMO projects, successes against enemy forces, ANA/SF/coalition cooperative efforts and ways of countering radical Islamic propaganda. The battalion also executes an IO battle drill order to publish or broadcast time-sensitive messages that will counter enemy messaging and defuse crisis situations that could harm U.S. or IROa political and military objectives. Again, this is all closely nested with the RC-South’s IO efforts to identify gaps and realign IO assets as required.

The last mistake to be reviewed

changing insurgent template. Their centralized command-and-control structure is not suited to COIN operations. This fact breeds frustration that drives commanders to conduct large sweep-and-clear operations to “defeat the insurgency once and for all.”

The large conventional footprint usually telegraphs units’ intentions to the enemy, and the insurgent force simply departs the area until the operation has concluded. Again, these large operations usually produce few or no measurable effects, further frustrating commanders. Additionally, these operations are generally repeated, and over time, the populace becomes weary of the constant disruption and regular invasions into their homes during mass searches.

Units that operate in this fashion find that the populace begins to view coalition forces as unwelcome guests and in some cases, begins to actively

The commander nested his operations with the capabilities and capacities of Task Force-31 and adopted a COIN strategy that was tailored for his infantrymen. They began aggressively patrolling their area of responsibilities in small groups that were able to interact effectively with the populace, disrupt Taliban freedom of movement and facilitate reconstruction efforts. The commander empowered his subordinates to become as agile as the enemy and entrusted them with the freedom to make timely tactical decisions, thereby greatly enhancing his battalion’s COIN capability. He also maintained a standing quick-reaction force, or QRF, that could move to support infantry troops and Special Forces teams that required additional assistance. Furthermore, the QRF element not “on-call” would directly support the provincial reconstruction team as it moved through the districts work-



▲ **UP IN SMOKE** Special Forces Soldiers and members of the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, search for enemy fighters after Air Force munitions strike a target in the Sangin District of Afghanistan. *U.S. Army photo.*

ing on development projects.

In January 2007, the 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, deployed to RC-South in support of ISAF's mission under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Brian Mennes. Mennes, realizing the need to become as agile as the enemy, decided to partner with TF-31 to glean tactics, techniques and procedures from the Desert Eagles. He wanted to empower his subordinate commanders to conduct decentralized small-unit missions that focused on broad-spec-

trum COIN operations. Furthermore, he wanted to expand his capability to collect human intelligence, or HUMINT, and position his leaders to better interact with the populace, thereby increasing his ability to influence the enemy.

While the unit has just begun its deployment, its commander's actions demonstrate that he understands and is willing to address capability issues in order to adapt to a counterinsurgency environment — an environment that is inherently unconventionally based. Furthermore, the cooperation

built between the two commands has helped to fill SF's inherent shortcomings. Bolduc said, "The infantry bring mass and assets I just don't have. Yes, we have mass in the ANA, but at times they have faltered or have reached the end of their skill sets. In those instances, we, SF, need to be able to rely on a force that can move quickly to exploit success."

These balanced lethal and nonlethal approaches are effective templates that conventional commanders should consider adopting when operating in the Afghan theater of operations. Normally, conventional and special-operations forces clash in their approaches dealing with the Afghan insurgency, but when egos are set aside and commanders focus on a common goal or vision, great strides can occur in defeating the insurgent movement.

Task Force-31's strategy continues to evolve as the ISAF begins to take on more responsibility in southern Afghanistan. With that comes a myriad of challenges that define coalition warfare. The Desert Eagles have resolved many of those issues by nesting their operations with the RC-South headquarters. Through this parallel coordination, both commands have been able to sustain complementary effects across the region.

Additionally, TF-31 recognized the need for close cooperation with sister coalition SOF under ISAF control. TF-31 began by incorporating SOF liaison officers into its headquarters staff and by offering each element its own working space. Currently, there are representatives from Dutch, Canadian, Polish and Romanian SOF; Australian Special Air Service; and the British Special Boat Squadron. All have signed on as members of the combined special-operations cell, a coordination and deconfliction working group that was conceived of by TF-31 during its latest OEF rotation.

The resulting level of cooperation has proven to be critical to unity of effort and to creating focused operations in RC-South. Initially, the Desert Eagles encountered resistance



▲ **TALKING POINTS** Assadullah Khalid, the governor of Kandahar, and Major General Ton Van Loon, the RC-South commander, meet with local elders in Panjwayi at a shura arranged by Special Forces Soldiers. *U.S. Army photo.*

from many of their European partners. Many coalition members simply didn't understand the capacity and capabilities of SF. Through focused and deliberate leader engagements, the battalion commander set out to inform his counterparts about the full capabilities of Green Berets. He did that by proving the validity of the strategy as it was applied in the Oruzgan Province, the birthplace of the Taliban.

The strategy was further validated through the battalion's participation in two of the largest NATO combat operations in history, Medusa and Baaz Tsuka. Medusa drove an entrenched Taliban force of 1,400 from the contested district of Panjwayi, the foothold the Taliban required to seize Kandahar City. It is the same area that the Russians could not take from the Mujahideen in the 1980s, and the Soviets eventually lost Kan-

dahar. Task Force 31 pushed just four SF A-teams with their partnered ANA and a B-team into Panjwayi to dislodge the enemy force. Later, to exploit success, an infantry company from the 10th Mountain Division was placed under SF command to assist with detailed clearing operations. After a month of heavy fighting, the Desert Eagles emerged victorious. The Taliban sustained losses not seen since the early stages of the war, with 562 confirmed enemy dead, validated through AC-130 Specter/UAV Predator footage and firsthand accounts.

Bolduc reflected on the similarities between this battle and ones he endured during the initial invasion of Afghanistan. "On Sept. 11, 2006, as I assessed the battlefield, I wondered, 'Why are we fighting the enemy in the same manner as we did in November 2001?' Then I thought, well, the enemy has a vote, too, and the Taliban

probably thought they could achieve a strategic victory against the unproven ISAF/ NATO forces."

After the area had been cleared, TF-31 recommended to the RC-South commander that in order to prevent the Taliban from returning, a series of checkpoints needed to be established to properly consolidate this key population center. This was never done, and the Taliban returned and began rebuilding their numbers. Recognizing the resurgence of new fighters in Panjwayi, RC-South, now under the command of Dutch Major General Ton Van Loon, asked the Desert Eagles to participate in a second clearing operation in the contested area. TF-31 agreed, under the condition that SF be given a free hand to build the required permanent security apparatuses through the construction of nearly 20 police checkpoints.



▲ **JOINT PATROL** Special Forces Soldiers on patrol with British soldiers in the Helmand Province stop to regroup before continuing on their patrol. U.S. Army photo.

The commander agreed, and Operation Baaz Tsuka was born. Similar to Operation Medusa, Baaz Tsuka proved to be yet another defeat for the Taliban, but now, with the newly constructed checkpoints, the insurgent fighters were denied freedom of movement. With the return of the local families, who could see that the new security system was working, Afghans began to report locations of IEDs, caches and remnant groups of Taliban fighters, as predicted. In fact, there were instances in which locals were emboldened to kill Taliban fighters who were attempting to emplace IEDs intended for coalition forces.

SF, Canadian engineers, British SOF and Dutch infantry all assisted the Afghan National Army with the nonlethal activities that followed the operation. Humanitarian supplies were rushed in, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, in

conjunction with U.S. Civil Affairs, began cash-for-work projects to facilitate reconstruction of battle-damaged property. Furthermore, the Kandahar governor, with an entourage of international media, came to Panjwayi to tout the success of Baaz Tsuka and to conduct a series of shura meetings with the district leadership and village elders. The meetings focused on coordination of reconstruction efforts and the recruitment of young men to join the new Afghan National Auxiliary Police. Concurrently, IO efforts were employed to exploit the success in Panjwayi.

As a result of TF-31's shared success, many of the coalition partners began to accept the strategy as a proven method that should be replicated in other units and adopted at higher levels. Van Loon, who once viewed Special Forces methods with skepticism, now publicly touts the

Desert Eagles as the consummate experts of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. He made the following statement at a NATO awards ceremony: "I need more units like TF-31: They are my most effective task force in Southern Afghanistan." **SW**

Major Christopher B. Wells has conducted four combat tours as a Special Forces detachment commander, commanding ODAs 321 and 324 and serving as the Task Force-31 future operations officer. In that capacity, he led the planning effort in support of operations Medusa and Baaz Tsuka. He has been awarded the Silver Star Medal and four Bronze Star Medals for his contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom. Wells has also received the Valorous Unit Award and the Army Superior Unit Award for service in Afghanistan with Task Force-31.

The Carrot and the Stick: Can it still work?

By Major Patrick M. O'Hara

The United States is conducting major counter-insurgency, or COIN, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the success of these ongoing operations has been limited at best. The current U.S. strategy seems to focus on combatting the insurgents conventionally, with only limited resources dedicated to addressing the issues that initially ignited and continue to fuel the insurgencies.

The U.S. Army must learn from historical successes and attempt to adapt and adjust the strategies used in the past into viable courses of action for today. One of the most successful COIN operations conducted during the last 50 years has been the defeat of the Hukbalahap insurrection by President Ramon Magsaysay and the Filipino government in the early 1950s. Combined with reform in the government and the military, Magsaysay's use of "the carrot and the stick" defeated the insurgents on the battlefield and also in the heartlands.

The Huk insurrection

Following the occupation of the Philippines by Japan in 1941 and the decimation of the Philippine army, bands of Filipino guerrillas organized in rural areas to fight a protracted campaign against the Japanese. These guerrillas were called "Hukbalahap" (Huks for short), which meant "people's anti-Japanese army."¹

Following the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese in 1945, many Huks were reluctant to demobilize. When General Douglas MacArthur jailed Huk leaders Luis Taruc and Castro Alejandro, the Huks fled to the mountains but continued to support the National Peasant Union, or NPU, from hiding. In 1946, Manuel Roxas was elected the Philippine president in what was considered a corrupt election.² Landlord-vs.-peasant violence increased, and after the murder of NPU leader Juan Feleo, the Huks rebelled in central Luzon.³

By 1948, military attempts to quell the Huks had failed. President Roxas pardoned Japanese collaborators and declared the Huks to be an illegal and subversive

organization.⁴ Fighting between the Huks and the landlords' private armies continued. In April of that year, Roxas died, and his vice-president, Elpidio Quirino, was named his successor. In 1949, Quirino was formally elected president, but that election was seen as corrupt. Huk activities and recruitment increased, as did the human- and civil-rights violations by government forces.⁵

In the summer of 1950, Roberto Kangleon, the Philippine secretary of national defense, resigned over a dispute with Quirino over the reorganization of the military. Quirino asked Ramon Magsaysay, the chairman of the house of representatives' committee on national defense, to fill the post. Magsaysay said he would, but on the condition that he be given a free hand. Quirino reluctantly agreed.⁶

Causes of the insurrection

The causes of the insurgency at first centered on landlord-tenant disputes and corruption in the national government. The tenants who worked the land felt that they had little representation in the government, while their oppressive landlords had much. When the tenants did gain seats in the government, as in 1946, their elected candidates were not allowed to be installed.⁷ Additionally, the Huks felt betrayed and minimized when they were forced to demobilize and were later declared illegal.

As the government and landlords tried to suppress the insurgency under the Roxas "iron-fist policy," violence and injustices committed by the government forces against the tenant peasants increased.⁸ This caused the peasants and Huks to become more aggressive, which pushed the government forces to be even more violent. The iron-fist policy only caused the insurgency to grow and gain support. The Huk insurgency reached its peak during the period 1949 through 1951. During that time, Filipino intelligence estimated that the Huk forces numbered between 11,000 and 15,000,⁹ with some 250,000 supporters.¹⁰ The Huks also controlled the central Luzon region and had committees established in the southern



▲ **EAGLE EYE** Colonel Abudul Majeed, commander, 1st Kandak, 209th Afghan National Army Corps (left), combat-advised by a U.S. Army Special Forces company commander, assigned to the Combined Joint Special Forces Task Force-Afghanistan, assesses a location for a new governor's headquarters in the Sangin District of Afghanistan. Building government offices to better serve the people is one example of a carrot that can be offered. *U.S. Army photo.*

Tagalog region, the northern Luzon region, the Visayan Islands and Mindanao.

The carrot and the stick

After becoming secretary of national defense, Magsaysay implemented radical changes in the way the military conducted its COIN operations. His intent was to fight the Huks in their own territory, combining the use of small-unit tactics with psychological warfare to maintain constant pressure on the insurgents. Magsaysay wanted to create dissension within the Huks and influence the people to give their support to the government.¹¹

Magsaysay improved the image of the military and the government. He insisted on high levels of professionalism and was quick to punish soldiers who committed injustices upon the people. He also deployed the military

during the 1951 elections to ensure safety and honesty in the election.¹²

In 1953, Magsaysay became president of the Philippines. In that capacity, he reformed the government to address several of the issues that had ignited the insurgency. He reduced corruption in the government, implemented land reform, passed education legislation and took other actions to improve the lives of the people.¹³

Magsaysay also developed a “carrot and the stick” COIN strategy toward the Huks. This strategy was meant to hamper the Huks’ recruitment efforts, reduce insurgent support among the population and efficiently defeat ongoing insurgent operations. The carrot consisted of three main features: (1) Magsaysay opened virgin tracks of land for cultivation; (2) he offered amnesty, land, cash, housing, work animals and training to all Huks who came in (it

was never called surrender); and (3) he reintegrated former rebels into society and the government.¹⁴

Magsaysay’s stick was his insistence that the Huks were not rebels but mere felons wanted for rape, murder, etc. He offered rewards for Huk leaders, sometimes offering higher rewards for lower-ranking leaders to further create dissension.¹⁵ He used tactics designed specifically to transfer popular support from the Huks to the government.¹⁶ Because of Magsaysay’s philosophy and reforms, the U.S. began providing more economic and military aid.

By addressing the core grievances that initiated the insurgency (land reform, government corruption, and legal elections) and transforming the military from an oppressor into a protector of the people, Magsaysay was able to effectively defeat the Huk insurgency. By 1954, more than 9,000 insurgents had come in, and the Huks numbered fewer than 2,000 active guerrillas.¹⁷ By 1955, the popular-support base of the Huks, which had been as high as 250,000 in 1949, was reduced to fewer than 30,000.¹⁸ The Huks were no longer a serious threat.

Insurgency as a system


In their analytical essay on insurgencies, *Rebellion and Authority*, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr. propose that insurgencies can be modeled as a system that has three components: inputs, conversion mechanisms and outputs.¹⁹ Their model illustrates not only the effects of Magsaysay’s COIN strategy on the Huks but also its potential for use in Afghanistan and Iraq.

According to the Leites and Wolf model, inputs are both internal (endogenous) and external (exogenous). Internal inputs include recruits, intelligence, food and shelter. External inputs include financing, equipment, training cadre and publicity.²⁰ These inputs are the raw materials of the insurgency.

Conversion mechanisms are those functions through which inputs become outputs. These functions include training, equipping, supplying and leading the rebellion. The degree of organization within the rebellion often dictates the efficiency levels of these functions.²¹ The conversion mechanisms turn the insurgency’s raw materials into operations against the government.

Outputs are the actual insurgents and their activities. Insurgent activities can be both combative and noncombative. Combative activities include sabotage, assassination, terrorism and military attacks (usually starting with guerrilla fighting and leading to more conventional operations). Noncombative activities include aid projects, education and nonmilitary training to the people.²² These outputs are the more visible signs of an insurgency, but they are only a part of the entire insurgent system.

This insurgent system is cyclical, with the success of insurgent outputs affecting future inputs. As the insur-



The Leites and Wolf Insurgency Model

gents’ outputs become more numerous and successful, inputs, particularly internal ones, increase. After processing through the conversion mechanisms of the insurgent system, these increased inputs produce more outputs, further feeding inputs, and so on.

Magsaysay’s COIN strategy

Magsaysay’s carrot-and-stick COIN strategy can be integrated into the Leites and Wolf model of insurgencies. Magsaysay’s carrot (social reforms that directly addressed the grievances of the people who supported the rebel actions) effectively removed the Filipino populace as a source of internal inputs. Because the Huks had no significant sources of external input, their insurgent system suffered from a lack of raw materials when they lost their support among the populace.

Magsaysay’s stick (focusing military action on small-unit tactics, ending large-scale operations and their inevitable large-scale collateral damage) defeated the conversion mechanisms and the outputs of the Huk insurgent system. With most of the fighting occurring in the rebels’ own backyard, the smaller-unit operations kept the fight focused on



▲ CARRYING A BIG STICK A Special Forces Soldier engages insurgents attempting to disrupt a medical civic-action program. To effectively implement a carrot-and-stick COIN strategy, military action must become focused on small-unit tactics, with an end to large-scale operations and their inevitable large-scale collateral damage. *U.S. Army photo.*

the rebels (and the rebels only) as much as possible. The COIN operations were successful in improving local security and government control. As a result, the Huks conducted increasingly fewer effective insurgent operations, interrupting the cyclical nature of the insurgent system. The focused, small-unit COIN operations also limited collateral damage and its tendency to spur popular support for the insurgents, further limiting the Huks' sources of internal inputs.

With the carrot limiting inputs and the stick reducing outputs, the Huk rebellion was defeated on two fronts. The defeat led to the surrender of the Huk leader, Luis Taruc, on May 17, 1954, and a severe reduction of the Huks' resistance against the government.

Current applications

Although the Magsaysay carrot-and-the-stick" strategy worked in the Philippines of the early 1950s, could it work today in Afghanistan and Iraq? The answer is "yes."

Magsaysay's carrot and stick have applications at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of modern COIN strategy. Because strategic and operational strategies are

beyond the scope of this article, this section will focus on the tactical applications of Magsaysay's COIN approach.

In order for a company-grade tactical commander (detachment commander, company commander or platoon leader) to understand which issues are most important to the local population — the basis for the carrot — within his particular area of operation, or AO, that commander must incorporate rapport-building into every operation his unit conducts. Through rapport, the tactical commander can determine what the population needs. By addressing those needs, the tactical commander can reduce and eventually eradicate any local support for the insurgents in the tactical AO. Local support for the government can be passive (apathetic citizens begin to support the government) or active (citizens who once supported the insurgents switch their allegiances to the government).

The tactical commander will typically build rapport with local leaders while the rest of the unit establishes rapport with the various subsets of the populace. Rapport-building operations can be stand-alone missions (attendance at a local council meeting) or part of a larger operation (while conducting a patrol, the unit makes note of needed area-



▲ **MAKING A POINT** A Special Forces Soldier speaks with a village elder in Afghanistan about improvements to the village. By bringing improvements to the village, such as better schools and medical care, Soldiers can win the loyalty of the villagers from the Taliban. *U.S. Army photo.*

improvement projects). Once established, rapport must continually be reinforced in order to build on past successes and to expand the tactical commander's influence throughout his AO.

While rapport-building operations can use positive reinforcements (incentives), negative reinforcement (sanctions) or a combination of both, the use of positive reinforcements — meeting the basic needs of the people (food, water, shelter, security, etc.) — is usually the most effective course of action. Other than security, these needs might seem to lie outside the capability of a company-grade tactical unit, but they do not. Additional foodstuffs for the populace can be brought in during scheduled resupply operations. Detachment or company engineers can assist in rebuilding projects. Medical personnel can help out in the local hospital. These are only a few examples of what the tactical unit can do to help the local populace within their AO (outside of combatting insurgents and providing a secure environment). The tactical commander can forward any local need that is beyond his unit's capability to his higher command for action.

A tactical commander might ask how rapport-building

can improve his mission success on combat operations — his “stick.” The answer is that it can lead to improved sources of indigenous intelligence. Typically, the government and the U.S. suffer from a lack of local intelligence assets, while the insurgents enjoy a huge advantage in that area. By building rapport and gaining support, the tactical commander gains access to those local assets, giving him and his unit a better intelligence picture for future combat operations. As his “sight” into the local situation improves, the insurgents become blinder, and his success turns the tables in the battle for local intelligence.

While working on his carrot, the tactical commander must simultaneously work on his stick — direct combat operations against the insurgents — to maintain pressure on the insurgents and secure the populace. The tactics used by the commander and his unit need to be designed for the smallest possible element that can still ensure the success of the mission and the safety of the Soldiers. As much as possible, operations need to be conducted on insurgent ground. That can be extremely difficult, because in Afghanistan and Iraq, the insurgents are either in remote locations or intermingled within the population. This

is where the intelligence gained through rapport-building greatly aids the unit in finding exactly where the insurgents are located.

Multiple small-unit operations at various locations (vs. one massive attack) will allow the tactical unit to secure the populace and maintain constant pressure on the insurgents but will also lessen the amount of collateral damage. The reduction of collateral damage will minimize the effects of COIN operations on the people and increase popular support for those actions.

These tactical carrot-and-stick operations can form the base of the operational- and strategic-level COIN strategies (the “big picture”) developed for the region, country or theater. Leaders at those higher levels can build on the tactical successes of ground units and gain valuable insights into local situations in order to accomplish COIN on a national and international level. They can begin large-scale rebuilding operations (i.e., power grids, irrigation systems and oil pipelines), target insurgent strongholds, start the flow of international aid, and begin transferring responsibility for national security to indigenous governmental forces.

Summary

Ramon Magsaysay recognized the need to attack the Huk rebellion in a different way. He understood that whoever had the support of the Filipino people would eventually win. Magsaysay developed a carrot-and-stick approach to COIN that would reprioritize government efforts (focusing on building popular support for the government over the insurgents) in order to defeat the Huk insurgent system at multiple levels. The Magsaysay carrot reduced the Huks’ inputs by addressing the needs of the populace. The Magsaysay stick reduced the Huks’ outputs by attacking their conversion mechanisms and defeating their outputs with small-unit operations focused on the rebels themselves. Magsaysay’s approach effectively removed the Huks as a threat to the Filipino government within four years.

Modern COIN strategists can learn from Magsaysay. At all levels of command, COIN strategists need to refocus their efforts and dedicate as much, if not more, of COIN resources to addressing the problems of the people as to

direct combat with the insurgents. Tactical commanders play a key role in this through their development of rapport with the local population and their conduct of combat operations against local insurgents within their tactical AO. These tactical COIN efforts will become the building blocks of the COIN strategies of higher-level commanders.

The people are the roots of the insurgent weed. If one can take the roots away, the weed will wither, die, and not grow back.

Notes:

¹ L. Grant Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During The Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign.” *IO Sphere*, Spring 2006 [journal online]; available from http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_spring06_bridgewater.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 July 2006, 37.

² Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1977, 150.

³ Kerkvliet, 154.

⁴ Kerkvliet, 199.

⁵ Kerkvliet, 210.

⁶ Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955* [book online] (Washington, D.C.: Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987); available from <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/coldwar/huk/huk-fm.html>; Internet; cited 28 July 2006, 82.

⁷ Kerkvliet, 150.

⁸ Kerkvliet, 188.

⁹ Kerkvliet, 210.

¹⁰ Bridgewater, 38.

¹¹ Greenberg, 116.

¹² Greenberg, 132.

¹³ Kerkvliet, 237.

¹⁴ Kerkvliet, 239.

¹⁵ Greenberg, 121.

¹⁶ Bridgewater, 39.

¹⁷ Greenberg, 140.

¹⁸ Greenberg, 141.

¹⁹ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., *Rebellion and Authority* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 32.

²⁰ Leites and Wolf, 32-33.

²¹ Leites and Wolf, 33.

²² Leites and Wolf, 34.

Major Patrick M. O’Hara is a candidate for a master’s of science in defense analysis (irregular warfare) at the Naval Postgraduate School. Major O’Hara enlisted in the Army as an Infantry rifleman in 1992. In 1995, he completed Officer Candidate School and was commissioned into the Infantry. He served as a rifle platoon leader, company executive officer and battalion air-operations officer in the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y. His SF assignments include commander, SF detachments 586 and 584 (military free-fall) and assistant battalion operations officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group. He commanded a detachment in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and on his second tour in Iraq, he was on the battalion staff. Major O’Hara was also the Headquarters and Headquarters Company commander for the Support Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Major O’Hara holds a bachelor of science degree in finance from Auburn University, a master’s in business administration from the University of Alabama at Birmingham, and an associate in arts in Russian from the DLIFLC, Monterey, Calif.

Enlisted

E8 promotion board slated

All SF sergeants first class who are in the zone for consideration for the 2008 Master Sergeant Promotion-Selection Board should ensure that their records are current. The board will convene Oct. 3-26. For additional information, refer to MILPER Message #07-155.

2008 enlisted board schedule

The 2008 schedule for Army enlisted promotion and school boards is listed below:

Board	Convene date
Sergeant First Class	29 January 2008
Command Sergeant Major, Sergeant Major and Sergeants Major Course	3 June 2008
Master Sergeant	02 October 2008

Soldiers should work with their career manager at the Army Human Resources Command to ensure that their records and microfiche are up-to-date and they have a DA photo on file that is less than a year old.

ARSOF accession board to convene in 2008

The Special Operations Recruiting Battalion is accepting application packets for the next accession board, which is scheduled for the second quarter of FY 2008. Interested Soldiers should contact SFC Herring or SFC Pease at (910) 907-9697. The CA accessions board looks for Soldiers who are best-qualified and meet all the prerequisites listed in DA PAM 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, which can be accessed at: <https://perscomnd04.army.mil/MOSMARTBK.nsf/>

Bonus approved for CA NCOs

CA Soldiers in the rank of sergeant are eligible for a selective re-enlistment bonus of as much as \$15,000; staff sergeants are eligible for as much as \$10,000. The critical-skills-retention bonus for sergeants first class and master sergeants is pending approval by the Office of Secretary of Defense.

CA E7 positions available

The following CA positions are available for immediate assign-

ment: two sergeant-first-class positions at each of three posts — Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Carson, Colo.; and Fort Richardson, Alaska. Interested Soldiers should contact Master Sergeant Butler at HRC, DSN 221-8399 or (703) 325-8399.

CMF 18 poised for growth

CMF 18 is experiencing unprecedented growth, and through efforts at all levels, the force is well-manned to meet the growth requirements. The force stands at 110 percent overall, and it has recently experienced all-time highs for manning in occupational specialties that have been traditionally understrength: 18D strength is 101 percent, 18F is 103 percent, and 18E is 116 percent.

The strength increases are the result of focused efforts by SWCS and by the force as a whole to maintain some of the highest re-enlistment rates in the Army. Recruiting is on track in both quantity and quality of recruits. The increased exposure of other Army units to SF NCOs deployed in theater has been a key part of SF's ability to attract recruits.

Warrant Officer

SWCS transfers SF WO PME responsibility

On June 27, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School transferred the responsibility for SF warrant-officer professional military education within the 1st Special Warfare Training Group from Company A, 2nd Battalion, to Company A, 4th Battalion, which is responsible for the training of SF officers. The transfer will provide warrant-officer education within an officer-centric organization.

The transfer of command and control is part of the SWCS transformation of warrant-offi-

cer education and one more step toward meeting the recommendations of the warrant-officer study done by the Army Chief of Staff's Army Training and Leader Development Panel, or ATLDP. In the past, SWCS has supported and completed the ATLDP's recommendations, including integrating warrant officers into the Army officer corps and incorporating the requirements of warrant-officer career and professional development into DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*.

The transfer also meets the

ATLDP's recommendation of developing and implementing an integrated education system for all Army officers that will teach common leader skills and actions required by the Army vision and will prepare officers for full-spectrum operations in the contemporary operational environment. The SF warrant-officer education system meets the Army's training and leader-development requirements for officers by branch, grade, position, specialty, functional area and assignment, and it ensures their technical competence throughout their career.

Officer

Army releases FY 2008 officer board schedule

Listed below is the fiscal year 2008 schedule of Army boards for command, promotions and schools:

In light of the high operational tempo, all officers should work proactively with the Army Human Resources Command, Special Operations Division, to ensure that their records and microfiche are up-to-date and that their file contains a DA photo that is less than a year old.

Board	Convene Date
LTC command (maneuvers, fires and effects [MFE])	18 Sep 07
COL command (MFE)	8 Jan 08
CWO 3/4/5 promotion	29 Jan 08
LTC Army/MAJ selective continuation	26 Feb 08
Senior Service College	1 Apr 08
MAJ Army/CPT SELCON	8 Apr 08
COL Army/LTC SELCON	15 Jul 08
ROTC (Professor of Military Science)	18 Aug 08
LTC command (MFE)	23 Sep 08

SWCS, HRC work to expand ILE opportunities

In an effort to provide officers in Army special-operations forces with broader experience in their intermediate level education, or ILE, experience and to increase the number of officers attending ILE, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is working with the Army Human Resources Command to increase the number of ARSOF allocations for study at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, foreign and sister-service schools and Army scholar and fellowship programs. These ILE opportunities should begin to expand during FY 2008.

PDM growth will expand SF officer authorizations

Fiscal year 2008 will see the addition of a fourth battalion to the 5th Special Forces Group as part of the growth authorized under Program Decision Memorandum III. The 5th Group is scheduled to activate the 4th Battalion Aug. 16, 2008. The new battalion will add 30 officers to the force. Combined with an additional offi-

cer position in the 5th Group's S3 section, the growth will add 31 SF officer authorizations, as shown below:

For lieutenant colonels: one authorization for a battalion commander was included in the new authorization.

For majors, five authorizations were approved: one for battalion executive officer, one for the battalion S3 and three for company commanders.

For captains, 25 authorizations were approved: 18 for SF ODA commanders; three for company XOs; one for the headquarters-support-company commander; one for the battalion S3 plans officer; and one for the SF Group S3 plans officer.

The 25 new captain positions will cause a temporary drop in the overall strength of the FY 2008 captain population. Subsequent years will see the captain inventory increase as larger year groups are accessed into Special Forces. According to the guidance of the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, on the priorities for filling SF officer vacancies, vacant SF operational slots will continue to receive the majority of

available captains. Lower priority positions will remain vacant until a sufficient number of officers is available to man those billets.

The commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command has approved upgrading commanders of SF headquarters-support companies and headquarters-and-headquarters companies from captain to major. The action is now being processed for approval at the Army G1. If approved, the action will create 30 additional majors' positions during the growth timeline of PDM III. The new positions will offer greater opportunities for filling field-grade billets in SF operational units.

CA force structure growing

The Civil Affairs force structure continues to grow. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is scheduled to stand up the 98th CA Battalion in March 2008. In May, the Army released the results of the latest ARSOF selection board: 59 officers were selected to branch-transfer to CA. One of the main reasons these officers gave for their desire to become part of the CA branch was their observation of CA officers and NCOs in the field.

CONTRA CROSS:

Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989

While the United States and Soviet Union were engaged in a Cold War between capitalism and communism, the same ideological struggle played out in violent fashion in a series of “hot wars” in Central America during the 1980s. *Contra Cross*, by William R. Meara, is a ground-level account of the author’s experiences in the conflicts in Central America from 1979 to 1989.

Written as a personal memoir, the events detailed by Meara reveal that this was truly a bloody and tumultuous front, as well as one of the final stands between Soviet-sponsored communism and Western democracy. The difficulties faced by our diplomatic corps and our conventionally focused military in assisting insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in this region offer many parallels to today’s challenges abroad in the Global War on Terrorism.

Because of the diverse range of capacities in which he served, Meara offers unique insights into this era. He first went to the region as a volunteer English teacher working at a Catholic school in Guatemala. As an Army Special Forces officer, Meara served in Honduras, Panama and El Salvador as one of the “55” U.S. military advisers. He also served as a U.S. Foreign Service officer who worked as a liaison to the Nicaraguan Contras in their struggle against the Sandinistas.


Perhaps most noteworthy is the rare perspective that Meara gained as an insider working on both sides of an insurgency: the COIN effort to

defeat the communist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN, in El Salvador and the Nicaraguan insurgency that he worked to keep alive.

Meara’s unusual vantage points allowed him to draw several conclusions that run contrary to conventional wisdom. First, language, regional expertise and experience are critical to effectiveness in a foreign land, and insurgencies are serious business — amateurs should not be allowed to dabble in them. Second, there are institutional biases and shortcomings that make it difficult for us to deal with foreign insurgencies, particularly our conventionally oriented military machine (i.e., using big bucks and a high-tech approach to support). Also, the Army’s idea that “any good officer” can work on insurgency is ill-conceived.

Finally, when we decide to get involved in foreign insurgencies, we should remember to conduct ourselves in a manner consistent with our national values. We were once helped by foreigners when we were farmers fighting for our independence, so we should not be careless in our dealings with the lives of others who are struggling abroad.

Another of Meara’s points worth mentioning is that the insurgency against the communists was not simply a “proxy war” that was somehow manufactured for the benefit of the U.S. in the fight against Soviet domination. The Contras were a genuine, homegrown resistance that stood against a communist ideology, and they would have done so with



DETAILS

By William R. Meara
Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2006.
ISBN: 1-59114-518-X.
168 pages. \$26.95.

Reviewed by:
Major Kirk Windmueller
JFK Special Warfare Center and School

or without our assistance. According to Meara, this fact was lost on many in Washington who were on the wrong side of the Cold War and used the war for their own political agendas.

Contra Cross is well-delivered in a pragmatic and modest style. Meara exposes the reader to the difficulties of dealing with insurgencies on foreign land and shows the direct impact and implications of U.S. policy on the ground.

This book is recommended to anyone who is looking for a military or political perspective on the events in the region during the 1980s, or to anyone seeking information on serving in an advisory or training role in a foreign-internal-defense or unconventional-warfare mission. **SW**

WINNING THE PEACE:

An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Winning the Peace is a compilation of essays contributed by seven authors who have expertise in the varied areas of post-conflict reconstruction. Seven of these essays were written by the editor, Robert C. Orr, either alone or in conjunction with other authors.

The compilation is a continuation of a joint project by the Association of the United States Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies to study strategies for post-conflict reconstruction. In particular, the book builds upon a brief joint publication created in 2002 and dubbed the “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework.” All the book’s essays emphasize at least one of the four “pillars of reconstruction”: security; justice and reconciliation; social and economic well-being; and governance and participation.

The book’s relevance is conveyed by Orr’s emphasis that the United States has a vested, yet internationally disproportionate, interest in promoting international stability and in reconstructing weak states that may provide safe havens to terrorist networks. Furthermore, the authors emphasize, “There is a lack of a coherent, overarching strategy among U.S. policy-makers on how to promote economic and social well-being in post-conflict countries.”

The book is formed around a core of four essays previously published in the *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2002) and that also corresponded to the four pillars of reconstruction. These essays have been updated to include references to Iraq and Afghanistan. Their main arguments remain the same, however, as do the authors’ recommended policy prescriptions for enhancing U.S. capabilities to conduct post-


conflict reconstruction.

To further develop the policy prescriptions, the authors contributed four additional essays to provide specifics on improving U.S. capabilities for deployment and conducting post-conflict reconstruction. These essays focus on interagency strategies and coordination, training and education, civilian rapid response and funding.

Finally, the book is balanced by the inclusion of six case studies. These describe various post-conflict reconstruction cases, ranging from post-World War II Japan to contemporary Iraq, that involved U.S. support. Orr argues that the United States has participated in five nation-building eras. From that analysis, he focuses on interventions that he calls nonterritorial — those not undertaken primarily to obtain Cold War geographical-positioning advantages and that followed in the wake of a war.

Orr terms his resultant categories “generations of post-conflict reconstruction.” First-generation efforts include the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan; second-generation post-conflict reconstruction involves post-Cold War humanitarian interventions; and third-generation operations are those ushered in by the aftermath of 9/11, as well as global interventions predicated upon countering both international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Winning the Peace clearly highlights the importance of addressing, in a synchronized manner, the myriad of tasks necessary in stabilizing a post-conflict society or region. Furthermore, the authors make it clear that each attempt at post-conflict reconstruction is unique, and



DETAILS

Edited by Robert C. Orr

Washington, D.C.:
Center for Strategic & International Studies,
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ISBN: 0-89206-444-7.
360 pages. \$24.95.

Reviewed by:

Major Jeremy S. Mushtare
5th Psychological Operations Battalion

therefore a “one-size-fits-all” approach cannot be entertained.

This book is an essential read for PSYOP officers and NCOs deploying as part of military information support teams. The book’s true applicability, from a PSYOP perspective, is that it allows PSYOP planners to analyze a post-conflict or democratizing country based upon the task framework and then systematically develop programs that bolster institution-building and address the root causes of insurgency and terrorism.

While every country is different, *Winning the Peace* provides a comprehensive baseline from which conclusions may be drawn regarding institutional shortfalls and those areas that military support to public diplomacy may target with best effects. **SW**



U.S. Army photo

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