

Special Warfare



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**CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT
TO THE SURGE**

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
Our enemies are increasingly using lawsuits to tie up U.S. resources and sway world opinion. While lawfare presents unique challenges, this article proposes tactics and lessons learned that can help tactical commanders adapt to the threat.

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A member of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion shares photos of his family with Iraqi children. The 96th CA Battalion was in Iraq to support "the Surge." *U.S. Army photo*



Special Warfare

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America is fighting an enemy that is tenacious and adaptable. As we take the fight to them, they alter the way they operate. We know that the special-operations Soldiers we train are just as tenacious and adaptable as our nation's enemies. It's our job to make them even more so — a job taken seriously by the military and civilian team at the Special Warfare Center and School. Feedback from commanders and Soldiers in the field, often showcased in this professional journal, allows us to look at the operating environment and adapt our training and doctrine to keep our forces the most effective unconventional warriors in the world.

Over the past three years, we have updated record amounts of Army special-operations forces doctrine and put every aspect of training at the school house under a microscope. We've examined not only the content of our training but also the method in which we deliver it. It is our goal to provide the very best training in the world to the Soldiers we know we are sending into harm's way.


In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Captain Peter Dungan explains how insurgent and terrorist forces around the world attempt to use the U.S. legal system against our forces as a means of diverting resources, tying up commanders' time and swaying world opinion against U.S. actions. The emerging asymmetric tactic, "lawfare," poses problems for commanders at all levels. The lesson learned is that it is essential that commanders include the JAG in planning, consider the legal aspects and ramifications of their operations, and maintain the support of the local populace.

Another lesson reiterated time and again from the field is that Civil Affairs cannot be conceived and executed only upon the completion of combat operations. CA forces must be included in the planning process for combat operations and beyond. In his article, Major Ross Lightsey discusses how 95th Civil Affairs Brigade plans and operations were a key component in successful conventional-force operations in Iraq during 2007. The 95th's capabilities to provide nonlethal options helped their supported units achieve mission success and win/maintain popular trust and support.

As the operational environment has changed, so have many of the skills required of special-operations forces' warriors. As mentioned above, the center and school continues to update old courses and develop new curricula to meet this need. The Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations qualification courses have all been transformed during the last two years and are producing entry-level ARSOF Soldiers in the numbers and quality required by the force. As these battle-proven troops return from the fight, it is essential that we consider and develop their "graduate-level skills." This issue of *Special Warfare* contains a helpful guide that explains available courses and the prerequisites for Soldiers to attend. Many of these courses have been redesigned in response to battlefield lessons learned. Soldiers and commanders who want to improve their professional capabilities and those of their unit should find the enclosed primer to be a helpful summary for preparation and attendance.

At no time has ARSOF been called upon to shoulder a heavier load. Your ability to adapt and succeed has become your hallmark. At the center and school, we are working hard to match your creativity, meet your training requirements and bolster your success on the battlefield.




Major General James W. Parker



▲ **TAKING COMMAND** Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo relinquishes command to Colonel Darsie D. Rogers during a Nov. 29 ceremony at Butts Army Airfield, Fort Carson, Colo. *U.S. Army photo.*

ROGERS TAKES COMMAND OF 10TH SF GROUP

Colonel Darsie D. Rogers Jr. accepted command of the 10th Special Forces Group from Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo during a ceremony at Butts Army Airfield, Fort Carson, Colo., Nov. 29.

Tovo had commanded the group since 2005 and through two combat tours in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as the commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula.

During the traditional change-of-command ceremony, Tovo passed the group colors and the responsibility of the unit's Soldiers to Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, commander of the United States Army Special Forces Command. After a few words of congratulations, Csrnko passed the colors to Rogers, who returned them to group Command Sergeant Major Charles Sekelsky.

"You are in charge of taking care of this great organization, the Soldiers and their families," Csrnko said to Rogers during his remarks. "Be prepared to deploy into combat and succeed."

Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner,

commander of United States Army Special Operations Command, and former 10th SF Group commanders Brigadier General Charles Cleveland, commander of Special Operations Command-South, and Brigadier General Michael Repass, commander of Special Operations Command-Europe were also in attendance.

"I could think of no better officer that I could have passed the colors to today," said Tovo, who praised the work of the 10th SF Group.

"The Soldiers in this group have made a strategic difference in the war on terrorism in Iraq, Africa and Afghanistan," Tovo said. "Regardless of the location, 10th Special Forces Group warriors have fought heroically, risking their lives to protect our way of life. It has been my honor to serve beside each of you in the 10th Special Forces Group, and it would be my privilege to fight alongside any of you in the future."

"As we continue to fight around the globe, I challenge you to carry on the 10th Special Forces Group tradition of high standards,

discipline and courage," he said, "and live and die our motto 'De Oppresso Liber.'"

Rogers' previous assignments include detachment commander, company commander, battalion operations officer, battalion commander and executive officer with the 10th SF Group; as well as SOF observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La.; staff officer for the deputy director of Special Operations, the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.; and executive officer to the commanding general of United States Army Special Operations Command. He is a veteran of Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, Operation Provide Comfort, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Rogers has master's degrees from Louisiana State University and the Air War College and is a graduate of the Joint and Combined Warfighting Course and the Army Command and General Staff College.

Tovo's next assignment will be with the United States Army Special Operations Command, based at Fort Bragg, N.C.

MULLHOLLAND TAKES HELM OF 7TH SF GROUP

Colonel Sean P. Mulholland accepted command of the 7th Special Forces Group from Colonel Edward M. Reeder Jr. during a ceremony at Fort Bragg's, Meadows Field Dec. 7.

As the commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, Reeder led the group through two combat tours in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Also, during his tenure as commander, hundreds of the group's Soldiers were deployed throughout Latin America and Iraq.

"Welcome back to the 7th Special Forces Group," Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, commander of the United States Army Special Forces Command, who officiated at the ceremony, said to Mulholland during his remarks. "You are the right commander to lead this unit. We know that you will not only prepare this unit but also successfully deploy them in combat. Welcome home."

During his remarks, Reeder praised the group's Soldiers for the work they have done around the world. "Look around the battlefield," Reeder said to the Soldiers who stood before him. "Nobody does what you do, nobody can do what you do, and nobody does it better than you."

"I'm extremely proud to have been your commander, and I'm honored to stand amongst your ranks," Reeder said. "You are the greatest fighting force on the face of the earth, and being a member of the 7th Special Forces Group will always be the height of my career."

Mulholland expressed enthusiasm for his new position. "As a team leader 17 years ago, I could only faintly hope to ever become the 7th Special Forces Group commander, but by the grace of God, here I am," he said. "I feel blessed, honored, humbled, to be in command of such a superior Special Forces unit. In a few months, we will go back into the breach. You will be asked again to do the impossible without reservation or hesitation. We will get through this as a unit. I look forward to working with all of you."

Mulholland has extensive experience with the 7th SF Group, having moved between several 7th SF Group positions and many other assignments. He has served extensively in South and Central America with the 7th SF Group and with other units, most recently as the commander of Special Operations Command-South (Forward.)

Mulholland has a bachelor's in biology from the Catholic University



▲ IN COMMAND Colonel Sean Mulholland accepts the colors of the 7th Group from Major General Thomas Crnko. Photo by USASOC PAO.

of America in Washington D.C., and a master's degree from the Naval War College in national security and strategic studies.

Reeder's next assignment will be with the United States Special Operations Command, based at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. — USASOC PAO

Language Institute announces updates to DLPT V test

The Defense Language Institute, or DLI, has announced release dates for new or revised tests for four of the languages included in the Defense Language Proficiency Test V, the test used by the Department of Defense to test the language skills of its Soldiers and civilians.

DLPT has long been used by DoD to measure language proficiency and assign ratings on a scale that indicates a person's level of fluency in reading, speaking and understanding. DLPT V, which DoD began using in 2006, is a computer-based test that uses content from a variety of subject areas to measure the reading and listening skills of its users.

Release dates for the new and revised

tests are as follows:

Modern Standard Arabic. In September 2007, the Defense Language Institute pulled the Modern Standard Arabic DLPT V as the test of record, pending an external review. As of Dec. 3, 2007, the external review has been completed, and DLI has implemented the changes recommended during the review. Validation of the new DLPT V for Arabic is scheduled to be complete by early spring, and the test will be re-implemented not later than May 2008.

Persian Farsi. Pending an external review, the DLPT V for Persian Farsi is scheduled to be released not later than September 2008.

French. The DLPT V for French is scheduled to be released before the end of June 2009.

Korean. The Korean DLPT V is scheduled to be released by early summer 2009.

In the future, all DLPT V tests will receive an external review before they are implemented as the DoD test of record.

Soldiers can get more information on the DLPT V by visiting the DLI Web page: <http://www.dlifc.edu/> or by visiting their command-language-program training facility. Information is also available from Terry Schnurr, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's sustainment program manager, at schnurr@soc.mil or Rusty Restituyo, USASOC contingency program manager, at restituf@soc.mil.

BAER TAKES RESPONSIBILITY FOR USASOC ENLISTED SOLDIERS

The United States Army Special Operations Command welcomed a new senior enlisted Soldier Dec. 11 during a change of responsibility ceremony at Meadows Field.

Command Sergeant Major Parry L. Baer assumed responsibility of USA-SOC from Command Sergeant Major Michael T. Hall during the ceremony.

“Thanks to all of you for allowing me to be the sergeant major I think the command needed,” Hall said. “I was thrilled when Command Sergeant Major Baer was selected for the Special Forces Command. (He was) the right man then, and now I can think of no other man I would want to hand my responsibilities over to than Parry.”

Baer, a native of Crosswell, Mich., comes to USASOC after serving as the command sergeant major of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) since April 2006.

He has served in Special Forces for the last 27 years, 20 of which were with the 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky. Baer has participated in several combat operations throughout his career, ranging from Operation Desert Storm to the current Global War



▲ **TAKING RESPONSIBILITY** Command Sergeant Major Parry L. Baer, incoming USASOC command sergeant major, shakes hands with Command Sergeant Major Michael T. Hall, outgoing command sergeant major during a Dec. 10 ceremony at Meadows Field. Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commander of USASOC, looks on. Photos by Private First Class Anthony Hawkins, Jr., USASOC PAO.

on Terrorism.

“I can say without reservation that you’ve (Hall) done more for special operations over the past six years than any single predecessor,” Baer said. “You always pushed to get the capabilities that we needed out there in the field and took those issues to

the forefront. I want to thank you on behalf of all the Soldiers in USASOC for your tireless effort as the USASOC sergeant major.”

Hall, the command sergeant major of USASOC since November 2001, is scheduled to retire after 31 years of military service.

20TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP SOLDIER EARNS SILVER STAR



▲ **VALIANT SERVICE** Major General William E. Ingram Jr., the Adjutant General of the N.C. National Guard, pins the Silver Star Medal on Chief Warrant Officer James B. Herring of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group, while his wife Michelle watches. The ceremony was held at Halifax Community College in Weldon, N.C. Herring received the prestigious award for combating insurgents and leading his patrol of Green Berets and Iraqi soldiers out of a complex ambush near Baquba, Iraq, on Dec. 23, 2006. This is the second Silver Star Medal earned by a N.C. Army National Guard Soldier in the Global War on Terrorism. U.S. Army photo.

DON'T GO TO WAR WITH OUTDATED DOCTRINE

Recent changes in doctrine have resulted in a series of updated manuals. To ensure that you are keeping with the approved doctrine, please compare your current manuals with the following list.

The following is a list of the Army special-operations forces' field manuals and other doctrinal

products most recently released by the doctrinal and training divisions of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

Many of these versions are available through the Reimer Digital Library (<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/>), Army Knowledge Online, the

U.S. Army Publishing Directorate (<http://www.usapa.army.mil/>), the ARSOF Training and Doctrine Library (<https://portal.soc.mil/C1/C18/ARSOF%20Doctrine%20Library/default.aspx>) and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's ARSOFU Web portal (<https://arsofu.army.mil/>).

Doctrinal Products Update

Joint and Army Doctrine Division

FM 3-05	Army Special Operations Forces	September 2006
FM 3-05.60	ARSOF Aviation Operations	October 2007
FM 3-05.120 (S/NF)	ARSOF Intelligence	July 2007
FM 3-05.132	ARSOF Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Ops	August 2007
FMI 3-05.140	ARSOF Logistics	February 2007
FM 3-05.160	ARSOF Communications Support	July 2006

SF Doctrine Division:

FM 3-05.20 (C)	SF Operations (U)	October 2006
FM 3-05.701 (C)	SF R & E (U)	March 2007
FM 3-05.201 (S/NF)	SF UW (U)	September 2007
FM 3-05.202 (U)	SF FID (U)	February 2007
TC 31-16 (S/NF)	SF Guide to PE (U)	June 2007
FM 3-05.221 (C)	SFAUC (U)	July 2006
FM 3-05.204 (C)	SF SR TTP (U)	October 2006
FM 3-05.214 (C)	SF Vehicle Mounted OPS (U)	October 2006

CA Doctrine Division:

FM 3-05.40	CA Operations	September 2006
FM 3-05.401	CA TTP	July 2007
GTA 41-01-001	CA Planning and Execution Guide	January 2008
GTA 41-01-002	CA Arts, Monuments and Archives	February 2007
GTA 41-01-003	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	March 2005
GTA 41-01-004	Joint CA Planning Guide	September 2007
GTA 41-01-005	Religious Factors Analysis	January 2008
GTA 41-01-006	Working with OFDA	October 2007
	CA Reference CD	January 2008
STP 41-38A-14	CA Specialist Soldiers Manual and Trainers Guide	January 2008
	Collective Task Exportable Package	December 2007

PSYOP Doctrine Division

FM 3-05.301	PSYOP Process TTPs	August 2007
ST 3-05.303	MTP for the PSYOP Product Development Co.	October 2007
ST 3-05.302	MTP for the Tactical PSYOP Co.	October 2007
STP 33-371I-OFS	Officer Foundation Standards II,	July 2007
ARTEP 33-712-MTP	MTP for HHC of the PSYOP Group and Battalion	April 2006
GTA 33-01-001	PSYOP Leaders Planning Guide	November 2005



FIGHTING LAWFARE

AT THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE LEVEL

by Captain C. Peter Dungan

While it is not a new concept, “lawfare” has become an especially important method of warfare used by our enemies in the war on terrorism. A popular definition of lawfare is the one developed by the United States Council on Foreign Relations: “A strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve military objectives.”¹

The enemy uses lawfare as an asymmetric means of abusing our complex legal system to tie up resources, shift momentum and, most importantly, sway world opinion to his cause. Examples of lawfare include habeas corpus lawsuits by terrorist detainees and complaints to international organizations regarding violations of the Law of Armed Conflict, or LOAC.

Some legal engagements, such as the Supreme Court detainee cases, actually seek to change the rules that govern how our forces fight on the battlefield. Most instances of lawfare, such as the more than 400 habeas corpus lawsuits filed by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,² simply seek to harass and burden our legal mechanisms. Like a computer virus or a hacker’s denial-of-service attack on a network, meritless suits seek to grind the wheels of justice to a halt.

Lawfare in its most visible form engages U.S. forces on the strategic level of warfare. Supreme Court battles and complaints through organizations like Human Rights Watch seek long-term effects on a global scale. Insurgents also use lawfare at the operational level of war to seek medium-term effects against a theater or regional command. For instance, insurgents often use puppet local leaders to complain officially about a particular tactic or procedure used by a brigade combat team or regional command. This may serve to change an operational-level commander’s decision-making calculus or to turn local opinion in a particular theater against a command.

Recently, insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have been waging a legal battle against tactical-level forces to extend the lines of operation of their leaders’ lawfare efforts and to attempt to blunt America’s tip of the spear. For instance, detainees may make claims of abuse at the point of capture by indigenous forces, claim abuse again when transferred to an American detachment or team, and then claim abuse once again when they reach the detention facility of the special-operations task force, or SOTF. Knowing that U.S. forces are duty-bound to investigate all claims of detainee abuse, insurgents can effectively burden leaders at three different levels of tactical command with detailed investigations.

While U.S. doctrine and “lessons learned” publications are addressing the problem of lawfare at the strategic and operational levels of war, our tactical-level units are only beginning to learn how to counter this asymmetric threat. This article proposes tactics and techniques for combating

lawfare, encapsulating lessons learned by the command and staff of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, while organized as a SOTF headquarters in southern and western Afghanistan from August 2006 to April 2007. By adapting to the asymmetric threat of lawfare, SOTF-31 was able to counter it effectively and keep the insurgency from placing the command in legal paralysis. That allowed SF detachments to concentrate on their core competency: advising and assisting indigenous forces to defeat the insurgency.

Identifying the threat

As stated previously, lawfare at the tactical level may not be as visible as those aspects of legal warfare that make the news. Indeed, the commander of a detachment; advanced operating base, or AOB; or SOTF may be engaged on the legal battlefield without even realizing it. For example, during SOTF-31’s tour in southern Afghanistan, a detachment commander detained someone who seemed to be a relatively unimportant individual carrying contraband. Within an hour of transporting the detainee to the detachment firebase, the detachment commander received a phone call from the local police chief demanding the detainee’s release.

The seemingly unimportant detainee turned out to be an unofficial local leader who was well-liked (or feared) by the town but previously unknown to the detachment. The police chief threatened that unless the detainee was released, he would tell organizations like the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, or AIHRC, that the Americans were abusing the detainee. The chief also threatened to have a “rabid” crowd of townspeople massing at the firebase gate decrying the Americans’ abuses. Although the detachment commander thought he was simply detaining a small-time gun-runner, he was unwittingly being thrust into the lawfare arena.

At the tactical level, lawfare engagements by the enemy tend to fall into a few basic patterns. The most common charge leveled against American forces at the tactical level is detainee abuse. Intercepted Taliban communications, captured documents and interviews with jailhouse informants at theater-level facilities confirm that it has become Taliban standard operating procedure to claim abuse every time a detainee moves from one facility to the next. Usually, the claim is leveled during initial inprocessing into the field detention site or SOTF detention facility, either during the initial medical examination or during the first interrogation. Intelligence indicates that Taliban leaders know Americans must fully investigate claims of abuse leveled by detainees, and that those leaders also know or suspect the potential burden those inquiries place on a command’s time and resources.



▲ **THINK TANK** Proper task organization is essential countering the insurgency's lawfare efforts at the tactical level, which means have the right people in the right place, at the right time. *U.S. Army photo.*

As American units have learned to deal with allegations of detainee abuse, the enemy has adapted his tactics, techniques and procedures to maintain a relevant and credible lawfare threat. For example, Afghan enemy combatants have virtually stopped claiming abuse by American Soldiers and instead are charging Afghan forces accompanying Special Forces with beatings and physical torture.

Taliban detainees know that claims of abuse by Afghan soldiers are more credible because of the perceived relative lack of respect for human rights by the Afghan military. The enemy also knows that SF Soldiers are required to investigate claims of abuse by the forces they advise and assist. The ever-present duty to investigate, coupled with the perceived increased credibility of the allegation, directly increases the amount of time an investigator will likely have to spend validating or discounting charges of abuse.

While most allegations of detainee abuse are leveled by the detainees themselves, some charges of beatings or torture come from international organizations or the indigenous government. The fact that the international media have greatly sensationalized some of the perceived abuses and rights violations at Guantanamo Bay and the actual abuses at Abu Ghraib means that the enemy can use these organizations to lend credibility to allegations that would normally be too implausible to forward. For instance, during SOTF-31's recent deployment, the task-force commander received a complaint forwarded by higher headquarters from UNAMA. It alleged that an SF team rappelled from a fleet of unmarked black helicopters onto a

rooftop, broke through the roof into the house of a member of the AIHRC, blindfolded that individual's entire family, tied their hands together with detonation cord, placed a time fuse on the "det-cord," threatened the family that they would activate the fuse if anybody tried to move, and then quickly left the house, leaving thousands of dollars of property damage in their wake.

Notwithstanding the fact that multiple higher and adjacent headquarters had full visibility on our operations and knew that we had no forces in the area in which the complaint alleged the abuse had taken place, and the fact that the complaint, on its face, looked like it had been taken out of a Tom Clancy novel, the burden fell on SOTF-31 to "answer the mail." Properly responding to the allegation diverted two days of time and resources away from the command group, operations center and legal section that could have been better spent supporting combat operations.

Countering the threat

According to the Army's new counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, tailoring the design of the counterinsurgency task force "may very well be the most important aspect of countering an insurgency."³ Proper task organization is essential to countering the insurgency's lawfare efforts at the tactical level. Having the right people in the right place, performing the right task, is essential to getting ahead of false allegations and media mistruths. SOTF-31's efforts in task organization involved actions on several levels, including staff embed-

ding, firebase combined operations, coalition involvement and engagement, and direct involvement by the task-force commander. The commander's leadership in crafting and modifying the task force's organization is often the most important aspect of the process.

At the staff level, the legal section is tasked with managing the task force's day-to-day efforts to combat lawfare. The SOTF judge advocate and paralegal NCO are integral members of the SOTF staff and advise the command on all legal aspects of current and future operations. Although historically referred to as a special staff member, the SOTF judge advocate has increasingly taken on operations-staff functions to provide added value and integrate himself into the task force. In Afghanistan for instance, the SOTF judge advocates serve as officers in charge of detainee operations, actually managing detainee operations instead of simply advising other staff members on their legal implications. SOTF judge advocates write operations reports, make routine decisions on the movement of detainees, and manage the establishment and maintenance of detainee facilities.

The location of the SOTF judge advocate is critical. Traditionally, a unit judge advocate maintains his office in the unit administrative area. However, this arrangement is inadequate for responding quickly to lawfare offensives, such as public allegations of LOAC violations. Hours count;

“The enemy uses lawfare as an asymmetric means of abusing our complex legal system to tie up resources, shift momentum and, most importantly, sway world opinion to his cause.”

often the first side to reach the mainstream media wins the ability to publish its version of the truth. A judge advocate cannot respond adequately if he is buried in a cubicle reviewing reports. SOTF-31 made it a practice during its first tour in Afghanistan to place the judge advocate in the operations center, or OPCEN, so that he could provide instant guidance for current operations. That location proved invaluable during SOTF-31's most recent deployment.

For example, one night, a detachment commander called the OPCEN by satellite phone seeking authorization to bomb a compound suspected of holding a large contingent of armed Taliban fighters. Sitting next to the battle captain, the author talked to the commander and advised him to request additional imagery assets and further develop the situation before engagement. The commander followed this advice, and after several hours of developing the situation, he became reasonably certain of the occupants' hostile status and the low probability of collateral damage. Ordnance was dropped and the target was destroyed.

The enemy quickly ramped up his lawfare efforts and made various allegations of LOAC violations. Although

Afghan officials originally validated the claims, they, the coalition partners and the mainstream media sources eventually agreed that the allegations were false. One of the key factors cited by the various investigating was the fact that the detachment commander talked to the SOTF judge advocate via telephone before dropping ordnance. That opportunity would have been missed had the author not been in the right place at the right time, performing the right task.

Properly resourcing the legal section is key to success in the lawfare arena. This applies to personnel and equipment. Traditionally, judge advocates have been permanently assigned only to the group headquarters.⁴ If a forward operating base, or FOB, was geographically detached from the group headquarters, an Army Reserve judge advocate was given the assignment. The 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, was the first SF battalion to field a full-time, active-duty judge advocate. The experiment proved successful, and today all SF battalions field active-duty judge advocates.

Having an experienced paralegal NCO has also proved invaluable. For instance, although SOTF-31's judge advocate was new to the unit and to Afghanistan, the paralegal had been in the unit for three years and was on his third deployment. The paralegal was able to provide the judge

advocate and the rest of the staff with invaluable institutional memory and operational experience.

Resourcing the legal section with adequate equipment is essential to the unit's counter-lawfare efforts. In the OPCEN, the judge advocate must be able to monitor classified message traffic, intelligence reports and open-source news reports to stay ahead of the enemy's lawfare operations. This requires access to dedicated secure and nonsecure computer workstations inside the OPCEN. On two occasions, the author was able to monitor news reports on the Internet about an LOAC violation or an abuse allegation before the operational detachments themselves were aware of them.

He was then able to communicate with the detachments instantly via a secure network to advise them and begin working on a plan to counter the allegations. These detachments were able to engage Afghan leaders and persuade them to agree publicly that the allegations were false, eliminating the need for the unit to conduct lengthy, resource-intensive investigations.

In addition to the OPCEN duties, the judge advocate has

traditional duties, such as legal assistance and administrative law review, that require an office outside the OPCEN. Indeed, many state bars might consider a judge advocate guilty of malpractice if he counseled Soldiers within earshot of others or maintained legal-assistance files outside of a lockable office.

While the judge advocate maintains primary responsibility for day-to-day counter-lawfare operations, other staff sections also play a key role. Some staff sections, like the S3, are traditionally located in the OPCEN and can therefore integrate seamlessly with the judge advocate. During SOTF-31's most recent deployment, it was common for the judge advocate to meet with the S3/OPCEN director 10 times or more during a single day regarding separate issues.

Other staff sections have a less traditional but equally important role. For example, SOTF-31 established a position for a liaison officer, or LNO, from the PSYOP task force of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan so that their PSYOP messages and operations could be synchronized with SOTF-31's operations. Such a position was not authorized, but the command recognized the need and filled the position "out of hide." The arrangement proved invaluable: The PSYOP officer was able to draft messages and have the Afghan media release them instantly after every major operation. Other key staff members included coalition LNOs from all countries conducting special operations in the area, as well as LNOs from federal agencies. Coalition LNOs were able to verify the falsehood of Taliban abuse allegations instantly and communicate it to their home countries. LNOs from federal agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, were able to provide the task force with key contacts and ground truth essential in countering charges of LOAC violations.

The central driving force behind the design and constant re-design of the task force is the commander. No task force ever has enough people or equipment. It requires command vision and involvement to prioritize positions and energize higher and adjacent headquarters to fill them. For example, SOTF-31 was not authorized any LNOs from coalition partners, federal agencies, or PSYOP and CA units sharing our battlespace. It required constant commander-to-commander engagement to ensure that the right personnel manned the OPCEN not only during major operations but also during the day-to-day operations, when abuse allegations by the Taliban were most likely to pop up.

The commander also energizes the staff and subordinate units to respond properly when the enemy conducts lawfare against the task force. When allegations of detainee abuse or violations of the rules of engagement, or ROE, enter the OPCEN, the reputation and combat effectiveness of the task force are on the line. By being personally involved in the response efforts and placing the "finger in the chest"

of the right staff officers and subordinate commanders, the task force commander can ensure that the unit properly and truthfully responds to lawfare engagements in minutes instead of hours or days.

Documenting the truth

Military units rely on honesty and integrity as a bedrock on which to base the exchange of communication. A subordinate commander's word is assumed to be the truth unless proved otherwise. Units rely on verbal reports to satisfy a variety of information requirements. Unfortunately, in the legal arena, a person's word is often useless unless backed up by sufficient evidence. A unit cannot simply tell higher headquarters that it did not raid a particular site or did not abuse a specific prisoner; it must be able to prove it, as well. Indeed, Army Regulation 15-6 requires investigating officers to base findings of fact on sufficient evidence.⁵ This means that in order to discount abuse allegations, an investigating officer must be able to support that finding with either documentary exhibits or corroborating sworn statements.

Documenting operations, especially at the lowest level, highlights a key difference between special-operations forces and conventional forces. Because of the high level of training, maturity and operational experience of special operators, they are usually less likely to lose discipline and commit ROE violations or detainee abuse than conventional Soldiers. However, because special operators are used to "thinking outside the box" and departing from a checklist mentality, SOF Soldiers are sometimes less likely to document the fact that they are in compliance with all policies and procedures.

Further compounding this is an unfortunate perception by some conventional-force commanders that special operators, because of the fact that they are not strictly regimented, somehow lack the discipline to remain in compliance with various ROE or LOAC requirements. Thus, some commanders are inclined to agree to launch time-consuming, resource-intensive investigations that rob SOF units of their operational momentum.

To combat that institutional inclination to investigate, the SOTF must be able to produce documentation within minutes of an allegation to essentially make any investigation moot. SOTF-31 was able to produce a professional, above-board and comprehensive investigation into detainee abuse within 12-24 hours of receiving an allegation, many times having the investigation complete before staff officers at higher headquarters were able to brief their commanders that an allegation even existed.

Developing that capability requires proper equipment and strict adherence to documentary requirements. Every detachment at every firebase must have access to a scanner, digital camera, and secure-network connection to the OPCEN. The detachment cannot wait to send a detainee's paperwork out on

the next flight to the FOB; waiting even 48 hours can mean the enemy will win the lawfare battle regarding a particular allegation. The detachment must use these tools to properly document its actions.

For instance, every operational detachment was required to photograph detainees and perform a documented medical examination and immediately send the files via secure network to the judge advocate. Later, if the detainee claimed abuse by our task force, we were able to instantly e-mail the documents and refute the allegation.

Other skills are essential to properly documenting that operations are conducted in accordance with policies and procedures. All operators must be proficient in executing sworn statements. The sworn statement, usually produced on a DA Form 2823, provides the best method of providing a legitimate and legally binding document of eyewitness testimony.

Unfortunately, Afghan and Iraqi authorities are likely to dismiss sworn statements by anyone who is not a Muslim. Therefore, units should also make it standard procedure to secure statements from indigenous soldiers accompanying the U.S. force. Additionally, OPCEN personnel should keep a ready electronic archive of operational products, such as past concepts

nately, his team discovered three dead civilians under a tent that had been hidden from the view of multiple imagery assets airborne at the time of engagement. The team immediately reported the fact to the OPCEN.

Within hours, the Taliban lawfare machinery ramped up its operations. That afternoon, a leader of the local parliament told the press that SF had killed more than 100 unarmed civilians that night. The erroneous reports made network newscasts as main stories before SOTF-31 and higher headquarters had a chance to respond. More than four investigations arose from those news reports; investigations by higher headquarters, coalition forces and the Afghan government. All of them concluded that the bombing was justified, that the casualty count was much lower than initially reported, and that the bombing, while resulting in unfortunate casualties, was a classic case of a balanced and measured response that took every effort to minimize collateral damage.

Within a couple of weeks, media organizations printed small retractions, but the damage was done. Whatever the facts were, the local populace and the world were left with the impression that SF were indiscriminately bombing civilians. More importantly at the tactical level, SOTF-31 was undergoing the most

“ In order to retain the high ground, the tactical-level unit must be able to market its story effectively to the populace and the international media. When a higher headquarters takes 48 hours to issue an approved press release, that is 47 hours too long. Aggressive information operations conducted using the SOTF’s organic and attached assets are key to maintaining the momentum in the lawfare fight.”

of operation, situation reports, operations reports, and force arrays, ready to allow higher headquarters and, when appropriate, coalition partners and outside agencies, to rapidly respond to bogus charges of abuse.

Getting the truth out

Simply packaging products for higher headquarters is not sufficient to fight the lawfare battle effectively. In order to retain the high ground, the tactical-level unit must be able to market its story effectively to the populace and the international media. When a higher headquarters takes 48 hours to issue an approved press release, that is 47 hours too long. Aggressive information operations conducted using the SOTF’s organic and attached assets are key to maintaining the momentum in the lawfare fight.

The following example highlights the IO lawfare challenges that SOTF-31 faced during its deployment and the procedures it developed to combat them. The detachment commander cited above dropping ordnance on a confirmed Taliban compound conducted a sensitive-site exploitation the next day. Unfortu-

intense of its 10 investigations in its first two months in theater.

Recognizing that the enemy’s lawfare efforts were severely burdening the resources of the command group and staff, the SOTF-31 commander decided that the unit needed to seize the initiative in information operations, or IO. He placed the S3/OPCEN director in charge of spearheading an IO crisis-management group that would meet during any lethal event. The working group consisted of the S3, plans officer, current operations officer, judge advocate, PSYOP LNO, Civil Affairs LNO, S2 and the AOB commander from the province in which the operation took place.

This group executed a rehearsed battle drill that included the following tasks: First, the group met to craft a message, deciding which facts were key to emphasize. Often, because of his experience in dealing with the media and local Afghan leaders, the SOTF commander crafted all or a portion of the message, with the advice of the working group.

Second, the message was then pushed back down to the commanders of the AOB and the detachments. The AOB commander would meet with the governor of the affected province

to tell his side of the story before that leader was engaged by the Taliban. Simultaneously, the operational detachment would, as soon as the tactical situation permitted, hold a shura with village elders to discuss what had happened and come to an agreement on the facts.

During these events, the judge advocate and current-operations officer were gathering documentary evidence to feed to higher headquarters and preparing unclassified versions for coalition partners and the media. The judge advocate also prepared for any investigations that might develop despite the IO battle drill. The plans officer and the PSYOP LNO further refined the message and immediately released it to the Afghan media for dissemination to the populace. Because of regulatory and timeline restrictions, using the Afghan media instead of organic assets like our own PSYOP teams that had to follow “approved” messages was the most efficient way of disseminating messages.

The CA LNO would then plan follow-on humanitarian assistance for the area affected by the strike. Throughout this process, the S3 and SOTF commander conducted high-level talks with Afghan government leaders and senior leaders of the coalition and U.S. forces. As a result of the new IO strategy, during the SOTF’s remaining time in country, it did not have to conduct a single investigation that resulted from a bogus allegation by the Taliban. Any time a reporter would approach an Afghan leader to confirm an allegation fed by the Taliban, that leader would respond that SF acted appropriately, and the story lost momentum before it was ever printed.

Indigenous capacity

The most important element of fighting an insurgency is developing the indigenous armed force’s ability to fight and win. After all, this ability is the “ticket home” for U.S. and coalition forces. SOTF-31’s efforts to develop that indigenous capability focused on providing training and assistance to partnered units at the brigade-staff level. The judge advocate was key in the process.

Early during its deployment, SOTF-31 recognized a marked decrease in the ability of its partnered units to plan and conduct battalion- and brigade-level operations, as compared to that observed during previous deployments. This included the inability of the Afghan National Army to respond effectively to allegations of abuse or LOAC violations.

A major cause of this was staff officers who were not properly trained in the military decision-making process and other key staff tasks. SOTF-31 also assessed that while embedded training teams, or ETTs, were making headway in training company-level troops, ETT staff-officer mentors did not have the time available to properly mentor staff officers, including the Afghan legal adviser, at the brigade level.

SOTF-31 established a staff-assistance program that partnered staff officers, including the judge advocate, with counterparts in the ANA brigade. The judge advocate was able to meet weekly with the ANA brigade-legal adviser to supplement the

monthly training meetings conducted by the ETT judge advocate. Thus, SOTF-31 was able to extend the lines of operation of the ETT and provide tactical-level experience to the ANA legal staff. With ANA legal advisers better able to respond to lawfare engagements by the Taliban, SOTF-31 noticed a marked decrease in the number of abuse allegations. The task force attributed the decrease to an increased capability of the indigenous force to quash the allegations before they gained visibility of U.S. forces.

Conclusion

The lawfare fight is one of many important lines of operation that the SOTF must consider in developing and executing its campaign plan. Units that properly prepare to combat the enemy’s lawfare efforts experience increased freedom of maneuver and increased leader resources to spend on the core mission of assisting the indigenous military in taking the fight to the insurgency.

Units that ignore the lawfare battle see their time and resources consumed by unfounded investigations. During its recent deployment, SOTF-31 applied lessons learned to effectively neutralize the tactical lawfare threat in its area of operations. By organizing properly to fight the lawfare battle, documenting its actions carefully, winning the IO battle through swift message dissemination and training up an indigenous counter-lawfare capability, a tactical-level unit can stop investigations before they start.

Notes:

¹ Council on Foreign Relations, “Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries,” Transcript of Proceedings, March 18, 2003, on <http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id+5772> (last visited Feb. 2, 2008, on file with author.)

² Warren Richey, “New Lawsuits Challenge Congress’s Detainee Act,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 6, 2006.

³ Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, para. 4-28 (Dec. 2006).

⁴ Field Manual 3-05.230, *Special Forces Base Camp Operations*, appendix D (July 2003).

⁵ Army Regulation 15-6, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, para. 3-10b (Oct. 2006).

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CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO



THE SURGE

In the spring of 2007, the United States Army Special Operations Command was called upon to support the surge in Iraq with Civil Affairs forces. It employed the newly-formed 95th CA Brigade to support conventional brigade combat teams, or BCTs, in Iraq. The CA missions there in support of civil-military operations, or CMO, were crucial, and national attention would be directed at their successes and failures. In the end, the 95th's support to CMO achieved the commander's intent and demonstrated CA's capability, strategic utility and flexibility as a member of Army special-operations forces and yielded valuable lessons regarding CMO.

Combating insurgents in Iraq is complicated and continues to evolve. Defining the role of the 95th CA Brigade and its Civil Affairs teams, or CATs, in an area of such turmoil is complex, primarily because of the difficulty in conducting CMO, whose requirements vary from province to province. When direct-combat counterinsurgency operations are ongoing, the planning and execution of Civil Affairs missions may appear to be questionable: Why should we start a road-paving project when insurgents destroy the roads? Why open a police station when potentially corrupt authorities may well use it for their personal gain? Why conduct a cooperative medical exercise when the doctors may very well be ambushed or threatened?

Those questions are representative of the challenges to CMO in combat areas. Despite the difficulties of accomplishing CMO in a nonpermissive setting, they are a valuable resource that can help quell the violence and insurgent activity in Iraq.

Background

The vast majority of U.S. CA forces are found in the U.S. Army Reserve, in units assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. The small percentage of CA forces on active duty, assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, provides a rapid-deployment capability; highly trained, tactically skilled ARSOF Soldiers; and a history of achieving success in working with combined, joint special-operations task forces, or CJSOTFs.

Because of increased CMO requirements in the GWOT, the Army activated two new active-duty CA battalions in March 2007. Prior to that, the Army's only active-duty CA battalion was the 96th. At the same time the 97th and the 98th were activated, the 95th CA Brigade was activated as a headquarters for the three existing battalions. A fourth battalion, the 91st CA Battalion, is scheduled for activation later this year. All four active-duty CA battalions will be regionally oriented, and all are scheduled to be fully operational by the end of fiscal year 2008. There are also plans to activate a fifth CA battalion with the activation of the U.S. Africa Command.

In Iraq, the 95th CA Brigade supported the surge by operating with conventional Army units. The 96th CA Battalion supported units from the 2nd Infantry Division, the

3rd Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division. Most of the 96th's companies deployed to the Baghdad area, attaching their teams to units at the BCT and battalion levels.

The author's team supported the 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division; a Fort Lewis, Wash.-based reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition squadron. Our area of operations, or AO, was near Baqubah in the Diyala Province. The commander of the 2-1 Cavalry Regiment knew both the importance of CMO and CA's capabilities, and we worked to meet his intent.

Tactical strategy

Using CA capabilities to a strategic advantage required creativity. Our strategy was to provide the "ground truth" of the civil situation to the commander of the 2-1 Cav and advise him of his civic responsibilities. By interacting with leaders and key players in each town — the spheres of influence, or SOIs, CA Soldiers could assess the human terrain and furnish the commanders of battalions and BCTs with the information they needed to make their operational decisions.

For example, we were able to provide ground truth on the attitudes of local nationals toward coalition forces by conducting civil reconnaissance immediately after cordon-and-search missions. During a cordon-and-search operation, it is critical that coalition forces maintain a balance between civility and aggression. CA teams help to ensure that balance, and by conducting daily SOI engagements, they can gain the people's respect and help maintain their trust.

It became standard operating procedure for the CA teams to conduct dialogues with the populace following cordon-and-search operations and to provide commanders with immediate information. Frank discussion is critical to gaining truthful and time-sensitive information. For the most part, the Iraqi people are eager to engage in discussions regarding their town's infrastructure, their security concerns, the U.S. presence, etc.

Experienced and dedicated CATs can greatly enhance rapport between the ground forces and the Iraqi citizens. During the summer of 2007, there was a major offensive campaign, Operation Arrowhead Ripper, focused on pushing al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI, out of Baqubah, the provincial capital of Diyala province. During the operation, the 96th's CA Soldiers supported conventional forces by:

- Providing face-to-face interaction with local leaders and the populace.
- Making themselves approachable to the public by building rapport.
- Coordinating immediate cash pay-outs for damages.
- Negotiating temporary rental agreements for coalition-forces occupation.
- Gaining influential and popular support by providing immediate medical care.



▲ **WINNING RESPECT** A medic attached to the unit provides medical care for an Iraqi child. *U.S. Army photo.*

- Providing quick-impact projects to jump-start local economies.
- Providing limited humanitarian assistance to Iraqi citizens in need.

Once cavalry and infantry forces had searched and occupied populated areas, CATs began conducting SOI engagements to gain rapport with the local villagers. Over the past few years, conventional forces have become good at gaining feedback from the populace. However, when commanders are conducting “chai sit-downs,” it takes them out of the fight. Today’s commanders know the importance of dealing with the populace, but they also have a unit to manage. CA can help commanders focus on security, tactics and maneuvers by conducting the interactions and providing daily briefings to the commanders on the civil situation.

Lethal vs. nonlethal operations. Conventional forces have learned CA’s versatility, particularly in averting combat operations. In one instance, the 96th helped avert a potentially large-scale lethal operation on a suspected stronghold. The CAT conducted civil reconnaissance in a town that was planned for a forced occupation. The CA team discov-

ered the town was productive, cooperative and receptive to coalition forces. At first, the locals were leery of the team’s presence — it was their first interaction with the U.S. Army. During the team’s second visit, the locals warmed up to the team’s presence and engaged in positive dialogue. CA planned and conducted humanitarian aid missions — delivering meals and much-needed water. We elevated the position of the mokhtar (mayor) by having him assist in food distribution to his people. The gesture gained the people’s trust in our peaceful intent, and they became even more friendly and receptive to coalition forces.

We used our CA medics on a daily basis to treat U.S. soldiers during combat operations and to provide aid to influential leaders and the public. CA medics are typically trained in the Special Operations Medical Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Their skills allow CATs to deploy and operate independently without a significant medical infrastructure. These highly trained and seasoned NCOs give CA much more flexibility and local impact than standard Army medics. For example, our CA medic advised several local-national doctors on ways of improving their



▲ **GROUND TRUTH** A Civil Affairs Soldier talks with village youth while on patrol. The team is able to gain ground truth by their interaction with the villagers. U.S. Army photo.

clinics and hospitals.

When combat units become heavily engaged and committed to the fight, it is easy to forgo CMO and focus on lethal operations. In those cases, CMO plays a secondary role, but if CMO falls completely by the wayside, commanders could lose their connection with the Iraqi people, who might reject U.S. and Iraqi government interests in favor of the insurgents. Thus, it is imperative that a maneuver commander dedicate a platoon to accompany a CAT on daily SOI engagements, CMO and other related CA tasks designed to separate the populace from the insurgency.

If coalition forces neglect to build upon their newly founded relationship with the people, then AQI will step in and build its own relationship. Power in Iraq moves through interpersonal relationships, and AQI knows the importance of maintaining interpersonal connections with the populace. During Operation Arrowhead Ripper, AQI activities included its own version of meeting the needs of the people.

There is a proverb that says, “Bread bears no name.” If AQI provides bread to the people of Iraq, and we do not, then to the people, AQI appears to be relevant and benevolent. We know of AQI’s atrocities and its hidden agenda, but do the people?

Movement around the battlefield. Movement on the bat-

tlefield was by far the biggest problem for us to overcome. Traditional CMO tasks — infrastructure improvement, civil management, humanitarian actions and key-leader engagement — require freedom of maneuver. In some cases, CATs blended into combat operations and proved beneficial; however, it is extremely difficult to carry out CMO tasks when IEDs, small-arms fire and ambushes are ever-present.

The 96th’s CA teams were used to operating in the company of a small SF detachments. That makes the CA mission set of conducting civil reconnaissance fairly easy, because members of the populace are more prone to accept members of a small contingent. But they are less likely to accept CA teams who are travelling in convoy with the larger contingents of conventional units, especially when those units are in the business of clearing homes rather than sitting down and talking. To lessen the intimidation, the CA team leader would usually greet leaders with smiles, handshakes, waves and a welcoming posture. The team sergeant would behave similarly, but he was more involved with internal security, internal communications, contingency management and maintaining overall situational awareness.

Power vs. force. The platoons that support civil reconnaissance usually perform outer-security duties — walking



▲ **ON CALL** A medic from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion checks the health of an Iraqi child. By meeting the physical needs of the populace, Civil Affairs Soldiers are able to earn popular support. *U.S. Army photo.*

around the houses, up and down streets and displaying power rather than force. Displaying power vs. force can be as simple as having all security measures in place but also conducting low-key interaction with curious locals. The security platoons avoid distraction by continually moving around the secured area, which prevents their being swarmed by children or crowds that can lower their guard against insurgent attacks.

DIME principle

Commanders in the 21st-century Army are familiar with the DIME principle — that diplomatic, informational, military and economic factors are key to influencing other nation-states and recognized factions. CMO can assist commanders in accomplishing all four of the DIME factors.

Diplomatic. CA units are highly trained in regional relations, cross-cultural relationships and in arbitration and mediation between warring factions. Reconciliation meetings are the best tools for bringing together warring factions within a battalion's sector to establish a peace plan. These can serve as a micro-scale diplomatic model.

Informational. CMO can best be used as part of an information-operations campaign aimed at the populace. Most Iraqi ideological views are formed through word-of-mouth communication rather than from published media.

Military. The U.S. military currently dominates any head-to-head conventional operations in Iraq. Tactically speaking, no organized insurgent forces larger than a squad will directly engage U.S. patrols or bases. At the same time, CATs typically do not conduct direct offensive operations.

Economic. The U.S. dollar can be the most effective instrument in the fight against terrorism, if it is used successfully. When used efficiently, CATs and provincial reconstruction teams have the overwhelming monetary power to influence economically depressed areas and to jump-start local economies.

Influential key leaders

It is crucial that CATs and commanders conduct their “terrain-analysis” — knowing the human element — prior to their deployment to a given area. The foundation of Iraqi society is the family and its ties to the community. Iraqi society has witnessed many changes because of the various regimes that have controlled the tribal communities.

Al-Ussrah (the family). The family is the main pillar of Iraqi society. In accordance with Islamic doctrine, the father is the head of the family and has the authority to make all family decisions.

Qabeelah (tribe). The tribe is composed of many asheerahs (multiple, blood-related families), but the con-



▲ **HUMANITARIAN AID** Deliveries of food supplies and water helped gain the trust of the populace in the peaceful intent of U.S. forces and made the people more receptive to working with the coalition. *U.S. Army photo.*

nections within the tribe are not as strong as within the asheerah, because they may not be blood connections.

Sheik (tribal head). The sheik, the head of the tribe, deals with all issues concerning daily life, as well as economic, social and war-and-peace issues. The sheik mediates conflicts, exerts influence within the tribe and can even wield influence at the national level. It is common for Iraqis to call any respected man in the community a sheik, and that loose usage of the term can be confusing. Nevertheless, we accommodated and honored them by calling them sheiks.

Mokhtar (mayor). This is the primary SOI figure that CATs and maneuver units encounter. The mokhtar is much like the chief of the village. Although he also records places of residence and births, he is not like a sheik, because he is sometimes appointed by the government to control the civic affairs of the village. He has an official capacity in the government, whereby he can make some decisions and judgments.

In our area of operations, we encountered one sheik. He was influential and affluent, and his words carried great power within his personal sphere of influence, which included at least 250 Iraqi key leaders and village mokhtars. He probably influenced more than 50,000 Iraqis. During COIN operations, a CAT can bridge the gap between the sheik and the commander. The continual interaction will in-

crease the flow of dialogue and greatly benefit conventional forces interests.

Key leader review

The Analyst Notebook Program, or ANP, serves as an aid to the CAT in organizing its contacts with key leaders or SOIs. The ANP is essentially a database. We consolidated contact information and standard biographical data. On a daily basis, the unit staff would approach us to get local-leader information in preparation for a key event. The system proved so beneficial that we constructed maps that included leader photos and quick-reference information. The data in the ANP proved beneficial in conveying the political landscape.

Neighborhood watch program

Another nonlethal approach that CATs helped develop was the formation of a neighborhood-watch program throughout Iraq. The neighborhood-watch program is composed of concerned local citizens who are frustrated with extremists such as al-Qaeda and Shi'ite extremists. They are not vigilantes but Iraqis who want to reclaim their towns and volunteer to help stop the violence, shootings and kidnappings. Most of the violence in Iraq is Arab-on-Arab, often in retribution for acts committed decades or centuries ago.



▲ **HIDE AND SEEK** A concerned local citizen looks inside a culvert for signs of hidden improvised explosive devices during a joint clearing operation with Iraqi National Police and U.S. Army Soldiers. *U.S. Army photo.*

There are some caveats to observe when forming neighborhood-watch groups. First, we insisted that they refrain from calling themselves a “militia.” Second, they were not to engage in any offensive actions; they were only to protect key infrastructure in their towns. Third, they were to affirm that they would join the Iraqi police after the neighborhood-watch program expired. As part of protecting the key town infrastructure, they would operate tactical checkpoint operations at critical intersections to hinder AQI and extremist movement along the routes into their towns.

There are risks inherent in arming locals; however, our options were limited, and we had to rely on non-vetted locals to take charge of their towns. At some point, we must rely on the locals who want to reclaim Iraq and help stop the insurgency, by arming them and expecting that they will do the right thing. This is a grass-roots approach.

The neighborhood-watch program is extremely successful and is quickly becoming effective throughout Iraq. When starting a program, it is extremely important to train group members on ethics, checkpoint procedures, weapons readiness, uniform clarification, friendly-fire mitigation and communications planning.

It is also important to note that conventional forces

neither arm nor support rogue elements that are not sanctioned by the government of Iraq.

Conclusion

The CATs from the 95th CA Brigade were resourceful in providing CA flexibility and adaptability to conventional forces throughout Iraq. CATs engaged key leaders, assisted with neighborhood-watch programs, assisted commanders in CMO and helped incoming reserve-component CATs transition to supporting the surge BCTs. Through their actions, the CATs demonstrated the capability of all Civil Affairs forces to operate successfully with conventional forces and to provide numerous nonlethal options to an otherwise lethal operation.

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MEETING THE STANDARDS

PREPARING FOR ADVANCED SKILLS TRAINING

One of the hallmarks of Army special-operations forces are their highly developed skills, and their advanced skills put an even keener edge on the tip of the spear.

Ranging from advanced shooting skills, military free-fall, combat diving and close air support to intelligence and information operations, advanced skills enhance the abilities of ARSOF Soldiers to fight, survive and prevail on the battlefield. Advanced skills are taught by the 2nd Battalion of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Intelligence activities, combat operations and collateral activities from the SF detachment level to the unified-command level. SFISC is taught at Fort Bragg, N.C.; ASOT is taught at Fort Bragg and at Fort Lewis, Wash.

SFISC

Prerequisites: Students must be active- or reserve-component Special Forces enlisted personnel in the rank of E6 or E7.

Special instructions: At class in-processing, students must have their medical records and a memorandum from their security manager, dated

the course. Candidates must have a valid state driver's license.

They must be assigned to or on orders to a two-year utilization assignment that requires ASOT Level III. Candidates must also be airborne-qualified, on jump status and able to participate in airborne operations.

Company B

Company B trains ARSOF and other Department of Defense personnel in the Military Free-Fall Parachutist Course, or MFFPC; the Military Free-Fall Jumpmaster

“Advanced skills enhance the abilities of ARSOF Soldiers to fight, survive and prevail on the battlefield.”

Slots in advanced-skills courses are highly sought-after, but given the operational tempo of the units in the fight, units occasionally send Soldiers who would benefit from further preparation prior to enrollment. To be successful, in the career-enhancing professional-development courses outlined below, Soldiers must seek and units must afford an appropriate amount of time and effort to meeting specified prerequisites. When in doubt about the preparation and documentation outlined below, unit schools NCOs are encouraged to contact the JFK Special Warfare Center and School for clarification.

Company A

Co. A conducts two advanced-skill training courses: Advanced Special Operations Techniques, or ASOT, and the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course, or SFISC. Graduates of these courses are capable of planning, directing and supervising intel-

not earlier than 30 days prior to the class start date, verifying their security clearance.

ASOT

Prerequisites: Students must be graduates of the Special Forces Qualification Course or SEAL Qualification Course in the rank of E6-E8, W1-W3 or O2-O4 and have a validated mission requirement.

They must have at least two years of SOF experience at the tactical level; i.e., SF detachment or SEAL platoon. At the time of in-processing, service members must also have a letter from the first O5 in their chain of command certifying that they have completed a USASOC-validated Level II training program.

Special instructions: Candidates must be U.S. citizens and have at least a secret clearance. The 1st SWTG S2 will verify all clearances, and individuals without a verified clearance will not be admitted into

Course, or MFFJMC, and the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course, or SOTACC. It conducts training at Fort Bragg and at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz.

MFFPC

Prerequisites: Students must be active- or reserve-component DoD personnel in the rank of O1-O3, W1-W3 or E3-E9, DoD civilian personnel or selected allied personnel. They must be assigned to or on orders to a military free-fall coded position. Requests for exceptions to the above must be endorsed in writing by the first O5 commander in the applicant's chain of command.

Applicants must be qualified military static-line parachutists and cannot weigh more than 240 pounds. They must have a current Class III flight physical examination, in accordance with AR 40-501, dated not more than two years before the course completion date.



▲ **ON THE LINE** A student at the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course calls in fire over the Arizona desert. *Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt.*

They must report with complete medical records, including a current Physiological Training Record, High-Altitude Parachutist Initial (AF Form 1274; AF Form 702, Navy Form 1550/28-NP-6 card; or USAAMC AA Form 484).

Special instructions: Initial MFFPC training in the vertical wind tunnel is conducted at Fort Bragg, with follow-on training at Yuma Proving Ground. Students' itinerary will be from their home station to Fort Bragg to Yuma Proving Ground and a return to their home station or the next duty assignment. Students must

provide their own transportation to and from the Yuma airport.

MFFJMC

Prerequisites: Students must be active- or reserve-component officers, warrant officers, NCOs or enlisted personnel of the U.S. military services, or selected students of allied foreign countries. They must be assigned to or on orders to a military free-fall position.

Students must already have completed a static-line jumpmaster course and a military free-fall parachutist course that are recognized

by SWCS. They must have served as a military free-fall parachutist for at least one year and have completed at least 50 military free-fall jumps. They must be rated Military Free-fall Parachutist Level III IAW USASOC 350-2, 27 September 01. They must have a current class III flight examination, IAW AR 40-501, dated within five years of the course completion date, if they are on military free-fall status. Students must have a current Physiological Training Record, High-Altitude Parachutist Initial (AF Form 1274; AF Form 702; Navy Form 1550/28-NP-6 card; or USAAMC AA Form 484). Their weight cannot exceed 240 pounds.

Special instructions: Students' orders must state that they are attached to Co. B, 2nd Bn., 1st SWTG, for the purpose of attending the MFFJMC. Their itinerary will be from their home station to Yuma Proving Ground and a return to their home station or to the next duty assignment. Students must provide their own transportation to and from the Yuma airport. Co. B will provide transportation to and from the daily training events.

SOTACC

Prerequisites: Students must be male, active- or reserve-component officers, warrant officers or NCOs who have at least one year of experience in an operational unit. They must be assigned to or on orders to an SF detachment or the Ranger Regiment. Students must not have any medical condition, such as dyslexia, that would prohibit them from performing the duties of a joint terminal air controller.

Company C

Co. C trains SF and other U.S. SOF, DoD and U.S. government personnel in three courses: the SF Combat Diver Qualification Course, or SFCDQC; the SF Combat Diving Supervisor Course, or SFCDSC; and the SF Diving Medical Technician Course, or SFD-MTC. Training is conducted at the Key West Naval Air Station, Fla.



▲ **ON DECK** Students at the Underwater Diving Facility workout on the pool deck. *U.S. Army photo.*

SFCDQC

Prerequisites: Students must be male service members of units of the U.S. Special Operations Command and must be assigned to or on orders to an authorized combat-diver position. Students must fulfill the following requirements IAW AR 611-75 *Management of Army Divers*, Paragraph 2-18: Meet the medical fitness standards of AR 40-501, *Standards of Medical Fitness*, Paragraph 5-9, with the examination completed within 24 months of the course completion date, and ensure that DD Forms 2808 (Report of Medical Examination) and 2807-1 (Report of Medical History) are sent to the CG; USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-OP (G3); Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610. Students must pass a PT test that requires at least 52 push-ups; 62 sit-ups; seven forward-grip pull-ups; a two-mile run in 14 minutes, 54 seconds or less; a 500-meter open-water swim in BDUs using a side or breast stroke; and a 25-meter sub-

surface swim. Students must present a memorandum signed by the first O5 in their chain of command stating that they have passed all the PT requirements. The memorandum must be dated within six months of the start date of the SFCDQC. Completion of the PT requirements must also be verified in writing by the individual's unit commander. Students must pass an oxygen intolerance/hyperbaric chamber pressure equalization test on the first day of the course, in accordance with the requirements of AR 40-501, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-9W.

SFCDSC

Prerequisites: Students must be graduates of the SFCDQC or the Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Course and in the grade of E6 or above. They must have a current SF diving physical examination, in accordance with the requirements of AR 40-501, *Standards of Medical Fitness*, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-9, completed

within 24 months of the course completion date. Students must have their medical records and originals of the physical-examination documents on the day of course in-processing.

They must pass a physical-fitness test conducted in accordance with the provisions of FM 21-20, *Physical Fitness Training*, consisting of at least 52 push-ups; 62 sit-ups within a two-minute period; and a two-mile run completed in 14 minutes, 54 seconds or less for all age groups, IAW AR 611-75, *Management of Army Divers*, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2-19B. Students must report with a certification that they have passed the physical-fitness test signed by a commander in the grade of O5 or higher.

Special instructions: Students must be proficient in the use of dive tables and in the theory of diving physics and diving physiology. They will be given a written test on the first day of the course, covering subjects taught in the SFCDQC.

SFDMTC

Prerequisites: Students must be male, active- or reserve-component DoD enlisted personnel. They must be qualified SF or Ranger medics who have graduated from the Special Operations Combat Medic Course, U.S. Navy SEAL corpsmen, U.S. Air Force Para-Rescue medics or other DoD medical personnel assigned to or on orders for duty as SOF medics.

Candidates not on dive status must pass an initial SFCDQC physical examination completed not more than 24 months before the start date of the scheduled SFDMTC, IAW AR 40-501, Paragraphs 5-9 and 8-14a(7). Candidates on dive status must have a current SFCDQC physical examination completed not more than 36 months before the start date of the SFDMTC, IAW AR 40-501, Paragraphs 5-9 and 8-14a(7).

All candidates must report to in-processing with their medical records and original DD Forms 2808 and 2807-1. They must have passed an Army Physical Fitness Test within six months of the course completion date and administered IAW the provisions of FM 21-20, *Physical Fitness Training*, Chapter 14, and they must have scored at least 70 percent in each event according to the 17-21 year-old standards, regardless of their age [AR 611-75, Paragraph 2-18d(2)]. They must pass a swim test consisting of swimming 300 meters using any stroke [AR 611-75, Paragraph 2-18D(3)]. Students must report for in-processing with a certification that they have passed the AFPT and swim tests signed by their unit commander.

Students must pass an oxygen intolerance/hyperbaric chamber pressure equalization test on the first day of the course, in accordance with the requirements of AR 40-501, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-9W.

Company D

Co. D trains SF Soldiers in advanced combat techniques and trains SF and other SOF personnel in sniper techniques. Its two courses: the Special Forces Sniper Course, or SFSC; and the Special Forces Advanced

Reconnaissance, Target Analysis and Exploitation Techniques Course, or SFARTAETC, are taught at Fort Bragg.

SFSC

Prerequisites: Students must be active- or reserve-component officers in the grades O1-O3, SF warrant officers or enlisted personnel in grades E4-E8, who are SF- or Ranger-qualified and assigned to or on orders to an SF detachment or Ranger company. Selected DoD personnel may also attend.

During class in-processing, students must have a memorandum from their security manager verifying that they have at least a secret security clearance. No interim security clearances are allowed. Students must also have their medical records and a psychological evaluation (MMPI or CPI) administered within 12 months of the class start date.

Students must have qualified as expert with the current service rifle within six months of the class start date, as certified in writing by their unit commander. They will have to pass a diagnostic shoot, firing five five-round groups from 25 meters, in the prone supported position, using the current service rifle with iron sights. To pass, three of their five-round groups must be equal to or less than 1 1/4 inches in diameter.

Students must not have a medical profile that would prohibit participation in training, and they must not be taking any medications that might affect their reflexes or judgment. Their vision must be correctable to 20/20 in each eye, and they must be on jump status and able to participate in airborne operations.

SFARTAETC

Prerequisites: The U.S. Army Special Operations Command G3 selects Soldiers to attend SFARTAETC. Eligibility is limited to SF enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers and officers who are assigned to specific SF units. Students must have orders assigning them to the designated unit or have a memorandum from their group com-

mander or command sergeant major verifying that they will be assigned to that unit following the course. The memorandum must also verify that the Soldier has completed at least one year on an SF detachment. This can be waived by the commanding general of the Special Forces Command. Students must meet the height and weight standards outlined in AR 600-9. They must have their medical records with them at in-processing, and they must not have a medical profile that would prohibit their participation in training.

Students must have qualified as expert with the M-4 rifle and M-9 pistol within six months of the course start date and have a memorandum signed by their company commander verifying their score. During in-processing, students must qualify as expert with the M-9 pistol. If they fail to qualify as expert, they will be returned to their parent unit.

Special instructions: At class in-processing, students must have a memorandum from their security manager verifying that they have at least a secret security clearance. No interim clearances will be allowed. Clearances will be verified during in-processing, and students without valid clearances will not be allowed to begin training.

Waivers

Any variations from the above listed standards for any of the courses require a waiver from the CG, USAJFKSWCS. All waiver requests will be sent to: Commanding General; USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-OP (G3); Fort Bragg, NC 28319, no later than 45 days prior to the class start date.

For more information, call the S3, 2nd Bn., at DSN 239-4011 or commercial 910-432-4011. Course prerequisites, packing lists and other helpful information may be obtained from the candidate's battalion schools NCO.Soldiers can also download course information from the ATRSS Course Catalog, located at www.atrress.army.mil/atrrsc/, or on the USA-SOC portal at [USAJFKSWCS/1STSWTG\(A\)/2ND BN](http://USAJFKSWCS/1STSWTG(A)/2ND BN).

Enlisted

ARSOF NCOs should prepare for promotion boards

The fiscal-year 2008 Sergeant Major/Command Sergeant Major Promotion-Selection Board will meet June 3-24. Master sergeants who will be considered for promotion should begin updating their records and ensure that their DA photo is up-to-date.

While the board will give special consideration to civilian education, the greatest single determinant for promotion is operational experience and performance. For more information or assistance in updating their records, Soldiers should contact their S1 or personnel services battalion.

The 2009 Master Sergeant Promotion-Selection Board will meet Aug. 5-28 rather than in October. The change is due to the fielding of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System in October. With the continuing increased operational tempo, Soldiers should keep their Official Military Personnel Folder, DA photo and Enlisted Record Brief updated as part of a continuous process.

Taking care of records while not deployed pays dividends by ensuring that a selection board will see a Soldier's true picture. The selection-board schedule is available

on the Army Human Resources Command's Enlisted Selections and Promotions Web page: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/select/Enlisted.htm>.

For additional information, telephone Sergeant Major Jeff Bare at DSN 239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to: barej@soc.mil.

Schedule changes for activation of new SF battalions

The schedule for the activation of a fourth battalion in each of the SF groups has changed. The 4th Battalion, 5th SF Group, will still activate in August, and the 4th Battalion, 3rd SF Group, remains scheduled for activation in August 2009. However, the 4th Battalion, 10th SF Group, is now scheduled for activation in August 2010; the 4th Battalion, 1st SF Group, is scheduled for activation in August 2011; and the 4th Battalion, 7th SF Group, is scheduled for activation in August 2012.

CA NCOs eligible for re-enlistment bonus

Under the Bonus Extension and Retaining program, some NCOs in Career Management Field 38 (Civil Affairs) are eligible for re-enlistment bonuses. Soldiers in the rank of sergeant are eligible for a bonus of up

to \$15,000; staff sergeants are eligible for \$10,000. The Critical Skills Re-enlistment Bonus for sergeants first class and master sergeants is still pending approval by the Office of Secretary of Defense.

For more information on the bonuses, Soldiers should contact their career counselor or telephone SFC Herring or SFC Pease at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, (910) 907-9697.

4th POG to add two regional companies

Beginning in March 2008, the 4th Psychological Operations Group will undergo a reorganization as part of a force-design update. During the reorganization, the 4th Group will activate two additional regional PSYOP companies, giving each of the 4th Group's regional PSYOP battalions two companies each.

In addition, each company will be reorganized to contain four PSYOP detachments comprising two operational detachments each, for a total of 99 Soldiers in each regional PSYOP company.

The operational detachments will contain Soldiers from the following career-management fields: 37F (PSYOP specialist), 35M (HUMINT collector) and 25M (multimedia illustrator).

Warrant Officer

Key and developmental positions mark WOs' path to success

The newly released DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, defines career paths for SF warrant officers, clarifies key and developmental positions throughout the SF warrant officer's career and serves as a basis for establishing further guidance and policies.

Notable changes in the latest

revision of the pamphlet include the requirement that all active-component CWO 3s complete the Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or WOAC, prior to promotion to CWO 4 and that all active-component CWO 4s complete the Warrant Officer Senior Course, or WOSC, prior to promotion to CWO 5.

The changes do not apply to warrant officers in the Army National Guard. In the ARNG, CWO 2s must complete the WOAC to be eligible for promotion to CWO

3, and CWO 3s must complete WOSC to be eligible for promotion to CWO 4.

SF warrant officers are encouraged to attend WOAC and WOSC as soon as they are eligible, so that they will be competitive for promotion.

All SF warrant officers are encouraged to visit the Army Publishing Directorate's Web site to view and download a copy of the revised DA Pam 600-3 (http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/p600_3.pdf).

Officer

Officers eligible for Expanded Graduate School Program

During fiscal year 2006, in an effort to enhance development of the broader intellectual capital required in a joint and expeditionary Army, the Army Human Resources Command was authorized to offer outstanding junior officers additional opportunities for attending graduate school.

Under the Expanded Graduate School Program, officers attend a high-quality degree program in residence (12-18 months) and then return to a field environment for their follow-on assignment. Officers selected for the program attend between their 8th and 12th year of service.

The majority of officers are selected by commanders in the field, who use the program as a tool for development and retention of outstanding officers. Other selections are made by the Army Human Resources Command.

Officers are required to attend a U.S. graduate school. They must study in an approved discipline that enhances the competencies required in an expeditionary Army: cultural awareness, regional

knowledge, foreign language, governance, diplomacy, national security and social sciences that reinforce operational skills.

Application requires a letter of acceptance from the university, as well as an agreement by the school that tuition will not exceed \$15,000 per academic year. Participants incur an active-duty service obligation of three days for every day spent in graduate school.

To be eligible for the 2008 selection, officers must be in the Army Competitive category in Year Group 2005. They must have an outstanding potential for future service, must have a minimum undergraduate grade-point average of 3.0, must hold a secret clearance and must hold a regular-Army commission. They must not be competing or selected for any other Army-sponsored graduate program, fellowship, scholarship or training-with-industry program.

Additional information on EGSP is available in MILPER messages 07-237 and 07-347 or from HRC at <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/active/opfam-acs/acs00.htm>. The point of contact for the Army Special Operations Command

is Major Joseph Worley, DSN 239-5426, commercial (910) 432-5426, or send e-mail to: joseph.worley@us.army.mil.

Definition of success changing for CA and PSYOP officers

The new DA Pam 600-3, released in December, will be revised to reflect the new training pipeline for students in 38A (Civil Affairs) and 37A (Psychological Operations). Officers in both branches should review their branch's key and developmental positions in order to understand the changing environment for promotion and command-selection.

Success will depend not on the number or type of positions held but rather on the quality of duty performance in every assignment. Success is tied to the individual officer's contribution and related to his or her definition of success in the profession of arms. Previously accepted conventions regarding personnel management and branch-qualification no longer apply, and not all officers will be afforded opportunities to perform all types of duty (DA Pam 600-3, Chapter 1 [1-1]).

Pamphlet identifies key SF major, captain's positions

The latest version of DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, was published Dec. 11, 2007.

The pamphlet outlines development and career-management programs for officers in each of the Army's career branches and functional areas. An important part of the pamphlet focuses on key and developmental, or KD, positions. KD positions for SF majors and captains are outlined below:

Captains. SF captains should command an SF detachment for 24 months.

(1) Detachment commander is the only KD position for SF captains.

(2) Upon graduation from the SF Qualification Course, captains should serve at least 36 months (at least 24 as a detachment commander) in an 18A-coded position within an SF group. Reassignment of captains prior to the completion of the 36-month utilization assignment

requires a DA Form 4187 signed by the battalion and group commanders.

(3) Selected captains may remain assigned to an SF group for as long as four years.

Majors. SF majors should serve successfully for approximately 24 months in any of the KD positions listed below or in a combination of these positions:

(1) SF company commander.

(2) SF battalion S3.

(3) SF battalion XO.

(4) SF group S3.

(5) SF group support company commander.

(6) SF group operations detachment commander.

(7) 1st Special Warfare Training Group S3.

(8) 1st SWTG battalion S3.

(9) 1st SWTG battalion XO.

(10) 1st SWTG company commander.

(11) Special Operations Recruiting Battalion XO.

(12) Commander, SFOD-39 in Korea.

(13) Designated positions for operations or plans officers in the SF groups, theater special-operations commands, U.S. Special Operations Command or Joint Special Operations Command.

(14) Designated positions for operations or plans officers at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, Combined Arms Center or Joint Readiness Training Center.

Field units can nominate SF major positions as KD so long as the positions are coded for 18A majors on the modified table of organization and equipment/table of distributions and allowances; have an SF officer in the rating chain (rater or senior rater); and the duties have direct relevance to recruiting, training, employing or commanding SOF at a major's level of responsibility.

See Chapter 17 of DA Pam 600-3 for information on the professional development and career management of SF officers and warrant officers.

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE

Guerrilla warfare has been and will be a challenge for years to come. Currently, the U.S. military is confronting guerrilla insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Colombia and the Philippines, with no end to these conflicts foreseeable. One of the biggest challenges to a military force is urban guerrilla warfare. The book, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*, by Anthony James Joes, provides the reader with a well-written description of the challenges confronting a military force operating against guerrillas in an urban environment.

The importance of studying urban guerrilla warfare is stressed by Joes, as he contends that this type of conflict will be more prevalent in the future. As demographics change, populations have been migrating to urban centers. As the number and size of urban areas continue to grow, guerrilla conflicts in the urban environment will become more frequent. It is apparent that the U.S. military may find itself fighting more often in this challenging environment.

Joes explores eight 20th-century regional urban insurgencies in detail: Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956, Algiers in 1957, Sao Palo and Montevideo from 1963 to 1973, Saigon in 1968, Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1998, and Grozny from 1994 to 1996. As he analyzes each example, he evaluates the common aspects and differences in the methods used by urban insurgents. He also discusses the reasons for the successes and failures of each conflict. Joes also examines how urban insurgents veer from the fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare established by Clausewitz, Mao Zedong and others.


As Joes takes the reader through each of these eight cases, a common theme emerges. All of the urban in-

surgencies outlined failed to achieve decisive success. In fact, most of the cases studied turned into complete defeat for the urban guerrillas. Joes explains that this unsuccessful record continues into the 21st century, as illustrated by the failure of the urban insurgents in the battle of Fallujah in November 2004.

Joes maintains that urban insurgencies fail because they deviate almost completely from the fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare defined by Clausewitz and Mao Zedong. According to their teachings, guerrillas need to operate in rough terrain, thus impeding the movements of well-equipped military forces. Furthermore, guerrillas should operate in a rural area so that their movements do not become predictable and they cannot be easily surrounded. All eight cases demonstrate ways that urban guerrillas have violated these principles.

If recent conflicts demonstrate that urban insurgencies will fail, why should the U.S. be concerned with urban insurgencies? In his concluding chapter, Joes articulates a persuasive rationale for the U.S. to weigh all its options before committing its military against an urban insurgency. He also explains three keys to success when we have decided to commit forces in an urban guerrilla-warfare environment. These keys — isolation, intelligence and political pre-emption — are discussed in detail.

The last point that he discusses, rectitude, or lawful conduct on the part of American forces toward prisoners, defectors, amnesty-seekers and civilians, is the most important component of any U.S. political strategy. The good conduct of American troops is critical for U.S. political success in this environment. As Joes



DETAILS

By Anthony James Joes

Lexington, Ky.:

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217 pages. \$35.

Reviewed by:

Lt. Col. David A. Kilcher

U.S. Air Force

Air Land Sea Application Center

states in the book, inappropriate conduct by occupation forces creates more insurgents, while proper conduct saves counterinsurgent lives. We see this challenge every day in current global conflicts.

Overall, Joes has produced a well-written, in-depth read on the increasingly important topic of urban guerrilla warfare. His historical case studies provide the reader with examples of urban conflict and lessons learned. This book is highly recommended for individuals seeking lessons on urban guerrilla-warfare engagements from both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent viewpoint. **SW**

SUBMISSIONS

Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

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Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th Edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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The Special Forces Creed

I am an American Special Forces Soldier!

I will do all that my nation requires of me.

I am a volunteer, knowing well the hazards of my profession.

I serve with the memory of those who have gone before me.

**I pledge to uphold the honor and integrity of their legacy
in all that I am — in all that I do.**

I am a warrior.

I will teach and fight whenever and wherever my nation requires.

I will strive always to excel in every art and artifice of war.

**I know that I will be called upon to perform tasks in isolation,
far from familiar faces and voices.**

**With the help and guidance of my faith,
I will conquer my fears and succeed.**

I will keep my mind and body clean, alert and strong.

**I will maintain my arms and equipment in
an immaculate state befitting a Special Forces Soldier,
for this is my debt to those who depend upon me.**

I will not fail those with whom I serve.

I will not bring shame upon myself or Special Forces.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I will never surrender though I am the last.

**If I am taken, I pray that I have the strength
to defy my enemy.**

I am a member of my nation's chosen soldiery,

I serve quietly, not seeking recognition or accolades.

My goal is to succeed in my mission — and live to succeed again.

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U.S. Army photo

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