

Special Warfare

NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 2008
VOLUME 21 ISSUE 6



Hitting the ground
with coalition partners

ARTICLES

8 Cleared Hot

The Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course is designed to produce SOF-qualified JTACs.

10 The Sky's the Limit: The Future of Military Free-Fall Equipment

This article takes a look at the advances in MFF technology and how it benefits Special Forces HALO teams.

15 Silent Entrance

A Special Forces team assigned to the 10th SF Group makes a historic combat HALO jump in Iraq.

19 Hitting the Ground with Coalition Forces

This article explores recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and offers recommendations on how to enhance interoperability and integration of coalition special-operations forces.

31 Measuring PSYOP Effectiveness

This article outlines the latest means of measuring PSYOP effectiveness within the battlespace.



DEPARTMENTS

4 From the Commandant

5 Update


35 Doctrine and Training Update

37 Career Notes

39 Book Reviews

ON THE COVER

A U.S. Special Forces Soldier and his Polish counterpart disembark from a Polish W-3W helicopter during training at Camp Echo, Iraq. U.S. Army photo.



Special Warfare

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Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).

Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th Edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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Special Warfare is an authorized, official bimonthly publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

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Since its inception in 1952, the Special Warfare Center and School has been the “Unconventional Warfare Center for Excellence,” and we are currently completing the administrative steps to make that title formal. Our main effort at SWCS will continue to be producing world-class warfighters in Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

After taking command of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School in June, I began an assessment to evaluate the “state of SWCS” to see if we could increase the efficiency of an already extremely effective organization. To that end, we conducted our first off-site meeting in September. The off-site allowed me to work with the leaders of the SWCS directorates and subordinate activities to develop a vision for the organization, make key decisions for change, and begin to create a roadmap for SWCS out to 2020.

Following the off-site, we made decisions regarding a number of organizational changes, including placing key components of the organization under the command and control of the deputy commanding general and the chief of staff; creating a new Language and Culture Division within the Directorate of Special Operations Education; bringing back the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization; and creating a Futures Directorate that will include the current Digital Training Center and Simulation Center as its subordinate organizations. We also plan to study adjusting the length and frequency of Special Forces Assessment and Selection, and we are examining ways to improve our small-group instruction in our SF training pipeline.

Our vision for SWCS includes establishing a wireless campus area network that will serve students during their time at SWCS and throughout their careers. Through continued education, that network will ensure that Soldiers will remain relevant and have every opportunity for career progression, regardless of the OPTEMPO or their geographic location. Along with a world-class network, we plan to develop a world-class training facility by developing a master plan that will address the refurbishing of current facilities as well as acquiring the space required for future growth.

With reference to SF force generation, the manning of a fourth battalion in each of the active-duty SF groups continues to be our five-meter target. The 5th SF Group recently stood up its 4th Battalion at 70-percent strength. The 3rd SF Group is in the process of standing up a fourth battalion, and it will be followed by the 10th, 1st and 7th SF groups, respectively, with all five of the new battalions projected to be manned at 90-percent strength by August 2013.

Active and reserve-component CA units are also projected to grow, in accordance with current plans to provide active-component CA forces to the Army’s general-purpose forces. We are currently working to develop a plan for training the required number of CA Soldiers here at SWCS.

We are also planning, in conjunction with the Special Forces Command, the 2009 Special Forces Symposium, which will be held April 20-24, 2009, in Fayetteville, N.C., and we look forward to an outstanding week of updates, cutting-edge discussions and previews of the latest technologies being developed for future use by the force.

I am extremely proud of our Army special-operations Soldiers and the fact that over the past six years, they have proven time and again to be the most versatile force in the battlespace and across the conflict continuum. Their versatility is evidence of our training relevance and serves as a testament to the excellent job that the trainers, doctrine developers and support personnel at SWCS have done over the years. With the dedication of the SWCS training team and feedback from units in the field, we will continue to adapt to the challenges of the future and to successfully serve our great nation.



Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

CA Soldiers earn awards for valor in Afghanistan

Three Civil Affairs Soldiers were honored for valorous service in Afghanistan during a ceremony in the JFK Auditorium, at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Sept. 25.

Major General John F. Mulholland, incoming commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, honored each of the Soldiers in turn; pinning Sergeant First Class Drew Kimmey with a Silver Star Medal for gallantry in action with marked distinction. Kimmey is reportedly the first active-duty Civil Affairs specialist to receive the award.

Captain Stephen Ward was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Valor Device for distinguishing himself by meritorious achievement while in combat, as was Staff Sergeant Carlo Alcazar. Both Soldiers were also awarded the Purple Heart for injuries sustained in battle.

Civil Affairs Team 745 was stationed at Fire Base Cobra in Oruzgan, Afghanistan, with special-operations detachments from the 3rd Special Forces Group, and members of the Afghan National Army and members of the Afghan National Police.

On Nov. 2, 2007, the teams and their Afghan counterparts left the firebase to visit the village of Sarsina in order to conduct a medical-capabilities mission.

Once they arrived at the village, they discovered that it had been evacuated and that approximately 300 Taliban fighters were entrenched in fighting positions in an attempt to ambush coalition forces.

Only three families came in for medical treatment. The families told the Soldiers that the Taliban made the other people leave the village, but these families had nowhere to go, so they stayed.

The team was engaged by the Taliban fighters, and during the firefight, it appeared that the coalition force would be



▲ **RECEIVING HONORS** Colonel Michael J. Warmack, commander of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, applauds Staff Sergeant Carlo Alcazar, Captain Stephen Ward and Sergeant First Class Drew Kimmey. The three were honored for their valorous service in Afghanistan. *USASOC PAO.*

overrun. The ground-forces commander was pinned down, and Team 745 moved to the forefront of the fighting.

“We went because we were the closest truck to do anything about it, and the others were busy providing cover,” said Ward. Their efforts were stymied when the vehicle crashed into an enemy fighting position, knocking Ward and Alcazar unconscious.

Upon regaining consciousness, Alcazar began reloading ammunition belts, enabling Kimmey, the gunner, to engage enemy forces. Ward exited the vehicle and directed his team to dismount and move to cover. Kimmey remained in the turret, providing cover for the team, despite the fact that the enemy was setting up mortar positions to fire against the vehicle.

“The difference (in the battle) was (that) Kimmey was able to keep them from overrunning us with the 50 cal., and in the process, he was drawing a majority of the enemy fire,” said Ward, who noted that the enemy were approximately 50 to 100 meters away at

that point.

Team 745 moved to the ground commander’s position and helped in the recovery of the commander and the casualties. Since Team 745’s vehicle was immobile, it was stripped of all sensitive equipment, and its gun was dismantled to prevent the enemy from gaining by the team’s loss. Once Team 745’s members sterilized their truck, they had no choice but to run beside the SF team’s vehicle, using it as cover, until they reached safety, because there was no room for them on the truck.

“I could see bullets ricocheting off the ground,” said Alcazar, who was injured.

He knew that his leg hurt, but he didn’t remember injuring it and only later found out that it was deeply cut. All three Soldiers ran alongside the truck until they reached a checkpoint and mounted another vehicle for the ride back to Firebase Cobra.

“The words can’t do justice, nor can the medal on your chest convey what you went up against,” said Mulholland.

7th SF Group Soldier's Family Receives Posthumous Silver Star

Gisela and Dalia Munoz, surviving wife and daughter of Sergeant First Class Pedro A. Munoz, recently participated in a ceremony honoring his sacrifice on Jan. 2, 2005, when he was fatally wounded at Shindand, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Munoz was previously awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Valor Device; however, the award was recently upgraded to the Silver Star Medal. The ceremony recognizing the upgrade was held in a commemorative rock garden designed by Munoz's daughter.

While Munoz was clearing a compound in pursuit of a mid-level Taliban commander, a Taliban fighter opened fire from inside a room containing women and children, said Colonel Mark J. Gorton, deputy commander of the 7th SF Group. Although he was wounded, Munoz returned fire and killed the Taliban fighter, enabling others in his detachment to proceed in clearing the building.

"Sergeant First Class Munoz continued to support his detachment," Gorton said, "firing selectively, engaging only armed combatants without harming any noncombatants. His dedication and his courage are evident through his actions: protecting innocent life, staying in the fight without thought for himself while supporting his teammates — allowing them to successfully accomplish their mission."

Munoz entered the Army in February 1986 as an automated logistical specialist. He graduated from the Special Forces Qualification Course in 1990 and was assigned to the 3rd SF



▲ **FAMILY HONORS** Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, USASOC, and Brigadier General Michael Repass, SF Command, present a Silver Star to the family of Sergeant 1st Class Pedro A. Munoz, who was killed in Afghanistan on Jan. 2, 2005. USASOC PAO.

Group. Soon after being assigned, he deployed in support of operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He later deployed to Haiti for seven months in 1994 in support of Operation Uphold Democracy.

In 1999, he was assigned to the U.S. Army Parachute Team, the Golden Knights. After completing more than 300 static-line and 4,000 free-fall parachute jumps, Munoz returned to the SF community in 2002, serving

with the 7th SF Group.

"You look at a picture of Munoz," said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "and you see a 47-year-old senior Soldier who has served our nation with extraordinary honor, distinction, pride and accomplishment. I suspect that some of the things that he was most proud of were his wife and his daughter, two incredible people who have served our nation."

SF Command Premieres *Why We Fight Now*

A veritable "constellation of luminaries" was on hand at the Kennedy Hall Auditorium, JFK Special Warfare Center and School for the premier of *Why We Fight Now: The Global War on Terror*.


The film, a joint project between the U.S. Army Special Forces Command and EUE Screen Gems Studios, describes the role Special Forces has played and continues to play in the war on terror. The idea for the film came from "a conspiracy of colonels," according to Brigadier General Michael S. Repass, commander of the SF Command.

Repass said the film was a culmination of five years of work, which has continued through three commanders — Major General John Mulholland; Major General Thomas Csrnko and Repass. Repass said the film is a "snapshot of what we (SF

Soldiers) do on a daily basis."

The film is narrated by several SF Soldiers who tell their story in their own words. It was produced by legendary director Frank Capra Jr., whose father made similar movies during World War II.

"For the benefit of our nation and the world, it is time that the truth be known about the United States Army Special Forces — who we are, what we do — and what great potential we bear for the advancement of freedom, peace and stability across the world," said Repass. "Though Special Forces have been traditionally known as the 'quiet professionals,' we can no longer afford to be the 'silent professionals.' For the military and diplomatic challenges of our time, this story must be told."



Ranger Earns Silver Star in Iraq

What began as a mission to find and eliminate terrorists in Iraq turned into a life-defining experience for one member of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

Specialist Joe Gibson was on a secret night mission April 26, 2008, when he placed his comrades' lives ahead of his own while evacuating wounded American Soldiers and engaging in hand-to-hand combat with a suicide bomber. His actions that day saved the lives of fellow Rangers.

Gibson was presented a Silver Star Medal by Admiral Eric Olson, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command. Before presenting Gibson and other Rangers medals for their actions in combat, Olson lauded the men of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

"You are a special breed. We ask a lot of you, and for that the nation and I thank you," said Olson. "Rangers are proven over and over again in battle. Rangers are glorified in Hollywood movies, but you aren't actors, you are real men who make real sacrifices."

Olson added that Gibson's actions during the mission for which he was recognized "exemplify and uphold the warrior culture of the Rangers."

The crucible begins

As the helicopter full of Rangers touched down that April night, Gibson and fellow Soldiers found themselves dodging enemy small arms fire less than 50 meters away.

Gibson's platoon sergeant said the enemy small-arms and machine-gun fire began "less than a minute" after the group disembarked from the helicopter.

"The contact was heavy where Specialist Gibson was," said the platoon sergeant. "We took two casualties there."

He described the setting as "a very dark night, out in the middle of nowhere, with no ambient light, chest-high grass, deep irrigation ditches."

One of the casualties had a life-threatening wound. "The guy that got hit is a real good friend of mine, and he called out to me," said Gibson.

"Me and another guy moved to him. I had the medical equipment, so I started getting that prepped while other people started taking care of him. We got him ready for

(evacuation), patched him up and started moving him out."

Transporting the casualty over an uneven field with irrigation ditches and through enemy fire was a challenge for the Rangers.

"Moving him out was horrible. It was the most 'smoked' I've ever been. It was physically demanding," said Gibson.

The Rangers' dedication to each other motivated Gibson to get his friend to safety. "It was my buddy, I didn't want to quit," said Gibson. "For a while, it was just me on one end of the litter."

The Soldier eventually returned home safely to see his wife and newborn child, and Gibson's actions are credited with saving the Soldier's life.

Making sure

After assisting in the medical evacuation, Gibson and the Rangers continued with their mission. They began to clear a field of tall grass and canals near the helicopter landing zone. The Rangers knew the enemy was still in the area, even though many of them had fled when the Soldiers touched down.

While clearing the field, Gibson stepped on a terrorist hiding in a ditch under some grass.

"I really didn't think it was a person that I stepped on, because I thought it was just another part of the ground, maybe some trash or something," said Gibson.

Initially, Gibson continued for a few more steps past the terrorist. Following his instincts, Gibson turned around to investigate what he had stepped on. The terrorist then moved to kill Gibson and the other Rangers.

"He didn't say anything, other than giving his war cry," explained Gibson. "He had an advantage on me. I didn't have a chance to get my weapon ready, and I knew he was gonna shoot me, so I dived on him."

Gibson grabbed the muzzle of the terrorist's rifle as the terrorist began to fire. Gibson wrestled the terrorist to the ground and gained positional control. He struggled and finally stripped the terrorist of his weapon.

The terrorist then gripped Gibson's rifle. Without the ability to use a firearm, Gibson engaged the enemy with his hands.

"Then he ripped off my helmet and all my (night-vision) optics, so I couldn't see all that



Gibson

well," recalled Gibson.

The terrorist then began to reach for something hidden in his clothing.

"I stopped him 'cause I thought maybe he was grabbing a knife to attack me with," said Gibson.

The terrorist was reaching for the detonator to his suicide vest. The terrorist screamed "bomb!" in English.

"I thought at that moment that I was probably going to die," explained Gibson.

As Gibson worked to stop the terrorist from detonating his vest, the terrorist put Gibson into a hold that was cutting off Gibson's air.

Gibson, in an effort to save himself, began to hit the terrorist as hard as he could. His blows rendered the terrorist unconscious.

"I got my weapon into his stomach and fired," said Gibson. "And he regained consciousness after that. I knew I got him. I stood up and neutralized him."

Doing his job

Gibson, a native of Yale, Okla., explains that he was just doing what he was supposed to do and that he doesn't deserve any special recognition.

He said that he is honored to serve as a Ranger and to have saved his fellow Soldier's life.

Following the incident, Gibson re-enlisted to fight with the Ranger platoon he accompanied that night. He added that he can't wait to return to Iraq.



Cleared
Hot

The Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course meets the needs of the war on terror

Lessons learned during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the value of close air support, or CAS, to special-operation forces, or SOF. The Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course, or SOTACC, began in January 2003 as a joint effort between the Army and Marine Corps to meet the training needs of their warfighters in support of the global war on terror.

The course's goal is to produce fully certified joint terminal attack controllers, or JTACs. Originally created as a detachment under Company D, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, at Fort Bragg, SOTACC was reassigned to Company B, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG, in November 2003, and was moved to Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz., in February 2004. Over the last four years, SOTACC has conducted training with rotary and fixed-wing aircraft from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines and has trained more than 360 controllers.

Special Forces teams comprise a variety of specialties and bring many skills to the fight. One valuable skill is that of the JTAC. In certain circumstances, there may be a member of a combat control team or a tactical air control party attached to the SF team, or more often than not, aircraft terminal control and target prosecution is left to the SF team's SOTAAC-trained JTAC.

The primary mission of SOTACC is to produce SOF-qualified JTACs who are capable of advising the ground commander on the current situation, planning for aircraft

operations, controlling aircraft on station and prosecuting targets with the correct ordnance. They must also consider collateral-damage estimates and pass battle-damage assessments to aircraft as well as to their chain of command for future operations.

Tasked with teaching, coaching, mentoring and training these capabilities, the SOTACC instructors teach the three-week course six times each year. To increase the opportunities for live CAS training and to meet the demand for a greater number of SOF-qualified JTACs in the SF groups, Company B will expand SOTACC's program of instruction to four weeks during fiscal year 2009.

COURSE STRUCTURE

In today's battlefield environments, JTACs must be well-versed in the capabilities of different types of aircraft, ordnance and tools that guide munitions to target. As SOTACC transitions to a four-week program of instruction, the instructors will take the opportunity to further enhance the courseware and to spend more time on these critical and ever-changing areas. SOTACC students will receive the following core classes:

- Introduction to offensive air support.
- Component airspace-control agencies.
- Targeting.
- Fire-support coordination measures.
- Artillery and mortar call-for-fire, or CFF.

- Adjustment of impacts.
- Naval surface fire-support CFF.
- Fire-support integration.
- Suppression of enemy air defense.
- Aviation ordnance.
- CAS mission planning.
- Rotary-wing capabilities and tactics.
- Fixed-wing capabilities and tactics.
- Urban CAS.
- Employment of laser-guided weapons and equipment.
- Controlling CAS missions.
- Night CAS.
- AC-130 employment.
- Bomber employment.
- Introduction to remotely operated video-enhanced receiver, or ROVER.
- Joint air attack teams.
- Illumination operations.
- Precision strike suite for SOF

During the final five days of the course, students train on various observation posts in the vicinity of Yuma Proving Grounds' Prospect Square impact area, conducting live CAS. During that week, each SOTAAC student is tasked with "controlling" aircraft while under evaluation. The student must demonstrate that he can effectively prosecute the correct targets while maintaining a detailed situational awareness. Time-management and planning are critical to effective target planning and mission execution. A student may find himself maintaining control of several aircraft by using holding areas and altitude deconfliction patterns. Upon completion of the course, students who receive a "go" on their evaluation are

considered to be qualified, combat-ready JTACs.

PREPARATION

To enter the course, students must be assigned to a unit of the United States Special Operations Command, have at least a year of operational fire-support exposure and possess a secret security clearance. To graduate, students must pass written exams with an 80-percent average or better, have no fewer than 12 controls and pass a comprehensive evaluation.

FACILITIES

The SOTACC training facility is located at the Castle Dome Annex, Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz. The building houses two CAS simulators and has a capacity of 15 students per class. SOTACC uses OP-9 and Site-9, located in Prospect Square's Cibola Range. Inert bombs of up to 2,000 pounds and live bombs of up to 1,000 pounds can be employed, as well as 20 mm and 30 mm guns, and 2.75-inch and 5-inch rockets.

FUTURE

As SOF units continue to operate in small, decentralized elements, the need for means of calling for CAS on static or moving targets, grows greater, as does the need for JTAC-qualified Soldiers on the battlefield. The effectiveness of those CAS operations will depend on the skills that SOTACC students receive and maintain. The safety and security of SOF forces relies heavily on this additional skill. If a unit is pinned down by enemy fire, the best words one can hear are "cleared hot."



▲ **IN CLASS** SOTACC students spend time in class while at Yuma. *U.S. Army photo.*

The Sky's the Limit:

The future of military free fall equipment

By Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kealoha K. Keoho

The Special Forces operating environment is continuing to change, as our enemies look for new methods of detecting our movement and of disrupting our abilities to effectively engage them. SF does have one skill, however, that offers us the ability to infiltrate quickly and undetected — military free fall, or MFF. MFF teams have the tools to perform the task, but better tools are coming, and to be effective and current, we must acquire and maintain state-of-the-art MFF equipment.

Two important features of the new generation of MFF equipment are commercial procurement and modular design. Commercial-equipment designers are listening to user input, and the resulting products are a better match to the force requirements.

Has the round canopy outlived its usefulness for SF? As it stands now, static-line parachuting is an archaic technique that has little tactical application for SF teams. Apparently, there are commanders who have recognized the benefits of the square canopy, and perhaps all teams should be outfitted with a static-line, square parachute instead.

This article will inform readers about some of the new MFF equipment that is now or will soon be

available to the force. The equipment outlined herein represents items that are being tested by the U.S. Army Program Executive Office, Soldier and Program Manager Clothing and Individual Equipment, Natick, Mass. The bulk of the information came from retired Sergeant Major Al Lamb at Natick. The fielding dates provided are general in nature and will depend upon unit requirements and the success of testing.

EVOLUTION OF FREE FALL

Let's start with the operational history of free fall. It was an American, Leslie Irvin, who made the first free-fall parachute jump in 1919, using a hand-deployed ripcord instead of a static line. His contribution revolutionized parachuting, and free fall had begun.

Free fall seemed predestined to have a military application. In 1960, Captain Joe Kittinger jumped from a balloon 19 miles above the earth. He fell for four minutes and 36 seconds and set a world record. Kittinger experimented with the effects of high-altitude bailouts on the body as part of Project Excelsior. He used free-fall lessons learned to improve safety for military pilots during high-altitude bailouts.

A decade later, June 22, 1971, SOF used free fall for surreptitious entry when four Soldiers — Sergeant Major Waugh, Staff Sergeant Bath, Staff Sergeant Strohlein and Sergeant Campbell — from the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, or MACV-SOG, jumped into enemy territory. With their high-altitude, low-opening, or HALO, parachute jump, MFF began. Shortly after that, SF started the Military Free-Fall School at Fort Bragg, N.C., using lessons learned from MACV-SOG. More recently, SF troops have used MFF in support of the war on terror.

The uses of MFF will become more prevalent as we continue to look for more innovative methods to enter restricted or denied areas undetected. The use of commercially available items offer the operator the ability to perform extreme stand-off operations with a precision guidance system that allows operators to exit, fly and land together on unmarked, restrictive landing areas.

ARAPS

Until now, the MC-4 Ram Air Personnel Parachute has been the standard MFF system used by SF.

Designed from a previous MT1-XX model, the MC-4 was built around a 375 square-foot canopy used for both the main and reserve parachutes. It has been an effective parachute assembly, but it has limitations.

The Advanced Ram Air Parachute System, or ARAPS, is being developed because of the MC-4's limitations. ARAPS will increase team-infiltration capabilities through improvements in performance, safety, modularity, design, versatility and comfort. It offers users a system capable of being deployed in both free-fall and static-line configurations, giving commanders the ability to use the system for both MFF and non-MFF personnel.

ARAPS was designed with jumpers' safety in mind. First, the ripcords are easier to see because of the position of the main lift web. Searching for the ripcord will no longer be a problem, even during night oxygen jumps. Second, clear Mylar pouches have been sewn onto the ARAPS, allowing the insertion of chemlites and giving jumpers the ability to see the ripcord pins without lifting the flap. That feature alone should reduce the number of inadvertent reserve deployments aboard the aircraft.

Third and most significant of the new safety features on the ARAPS is the addition of the Automatic Riser Release Lanyard, or the Collins Lanyard. The Collins Lanyard is designed to automatically release the left-side riser on the main parachute once the reserve ripcord has been pulled. That minimizes the risk of a two-canopy entanglement. With nothing to get in the way, the reserve canopy can do what it's supposed to do — save lives.

The harness adjustment system is another unique design feature of the ARAPS. An improperly adjusted harness can cause a jumper serious problems. The MC-4 sizing system is awkward, and most jumpers have a hard time getting it right. The ARAPS uses a color-coded sizing system, so

jumpers don't have to struggle with six different adjustment straps anymore. The color coding allows users to fit their harness the correct way every time.

The ARAPS is also comfortable to wear, with padding in the container and the back, shoulder and lumbar areas of the harness. Even when they wear combat equipment, jumpers will be less fatigued wearing the ARAPS. Despite the fact that the ARAPS weighs the same as the MC-4, the increased comfort makes the load easier to bear.

The ARAPS can be adjusted as the mission changes. The modular features of the ARAPS include detachable pouches that zip on and off as necessary. If you need to communicate under canopy, attach the radio pouch. When jumping the portable oxygen bailout system, zip on the O2 pouch. During high-altitude, high-opening, or HAHO, operations, the ARAPS has integrated toggle extensions built right in. These are just a few indications of the thought and planning that went into the requirements for the ARAPS design. The projected fielding date for the ARAPS is 2010.

CANOPIES TO COME

We've already said that the ARAPS is ready for two different deployment methods: MFF and static-line. But the ARAPS container can also take two different types of canopies. The first is a 375 square-foot "hybrid" canopy. Even though this canopy looks similar to the MC-4, it is much improved. The differences lie in the canopy design and the fabric of the top skin. The hybrid canopy has a semi-elliptical design that provides better canopy stability and stand-off performance. The canopy's top-skin material is a zero-porosity, or ZP, fabric instead of the usual F-111 material. The ZP top skin seals air inside the inflated

wing. The increased air makes the wing more rigid and gives it better handling capability. The rest of the canopy is still made with F-111 fabric — that's why the canopy is called a hybrid.

To the user, the hybrid canopy means improved performance, better stability and softer openings. It is also tougher and can withstand higher deployment altitudes during HAHO operations. In addition, the ARAPS hybrid canopy can support a total rigged weight of up to 450 pounds, compared to the MC-4's 360-pound TRW. The ability to infil with more supplies and equipment will increase teams' capability.

The second ARAPS canopy option is the fully elliptical, 17-cell high-glide canopy. Designed to have twice the forward glide of a square canopy, the high-glide is capable of a 6:1 glide ratio. That means that for every foot of descent, the jumper travels forward six feet. The tactical possibilities of the canopy will double, as well. MFF teams will be able to conduct stand-off operations from greater distances, reducing aircraft exposure to enemy fire and detection.

NEW JUMP HELMETS

Current MFF jump helmets are either too expensive, have limited communications or have no use after the jump. Some teams jump with one helmet but wear another helmet during the mission, which makes the jump helmet just an air item. Other teams resort to inexpensive commercial helmets to keep the cost low, but those helmets have limitations, too. Teams need something more practical.

Gentex offers one such helmet at half the cost, called the Paramaster High Altitude Low Opening Helmet, or PM HALO. An evolution of the Gentex parachutist helmet, the PM HALO is a completely modular system — each jumper can customize



▲ **CATCHING AIR** A Special Forces MFF student practices jumps under the watchful eye of his instructor. *U.S. Army photo.*

his helmet to the specific mission or to his specific needs. The PM HALO has a completely integrated communications system: The sound-attenuating ear cups are adjustable for comfort, and the boom microphone is attached to the helmet on a flexible rod that can be tucked away when not in use. The padding is also adjustable, and the helmet offers a visor-and-goggle system that snaps on for eye protection.

Gentex identified the problem that the oxygen-mask bayonet connectors on either side of the Gentex parachutist helmet extended beyond the receivers and could snag on the risers when under canopy. The PM HALO improved the oxygen-mask bayonet connectors to cover the ends and eliminate snags.

There is one drawback to the PM HALO helmet: It is useful only for the jump. That's where the Advanced

Combat Helmet, or ACH, outperforms the PM HALO. The ACH, which is already used for ballistic protection in combat, was paired with communications-ready hearing protection to create the newest jump helmet. The battery-operated hearing-protection system, with its integrated boom microphone, is similar to other noise-reduction systems SOF are already using.

If jumpers require oxygen equipment with the ACH, they can use the MBU-12 or the new Parachutist Oxygen Mask. Both masks attach to the ACH by an additional strap equipped with bayonet connectors. Now, the ACH will protect jumpers in the air and on the ground, while providing tactical communications throughout the mission. Because the ACH is effective during and after the jump, using it makes much more sense.

NEW OXYGEN MASK

The new Parachutist Oxygen Mask, or POM, was designed with free-fall parachutists in mind. The POM provides oxygen only when the jumper needs it. Using a diluter-demand process, the POM provides oxygen when the jumper inhales through the mask, instead of supplying a constant flow of oxygen, as the MBU-12



system does. The POM is compatible with all American Flight Systems oxygen connections, so attaching to an outside oxygen source is just as easy as before. Now, the operator will plug directly into the manifold on the oxygen bottles.

The hose will no longer be a problem during oxygen jumps. The new, low-profile mask fits closer to the face, making it easier for the jumper to see the ripcords and attached equipment. The low-pressure hose on the previous oxygen mask has been replaced by a medium-pressure hose that is smaller and thicker. The hose is also attached to the left side of the mask, further increasing the jumper's visibility, and runs over the left shoulder directly to the Twin-53 oxygen bottles. With a smaller hose and a single connection comes increased reliability. In fact, the new system will provide reliable oxygen at altitudes up to 35,000 feet.

NAVIGATION AID

In the past, accurate navigation while under canopy has plagued both HAHO and HALO operations. Previously, MFF teams had to be able to see the target to navigate accurately and land successfully. Many MFF missions were impractical because of the unreliability of the navigation systems. The introduction of the global positioning system changed all that. By integrating the latest GPS technology into a mission, teams will be able to land precisely on target during adverse weather conditions such as clouds, fog, rain and snow. Even better, teams will be able to use this technology to operate deliberately within these conditions, further reducing the chance of detection by the enemy.

Beginning in FY 2011, the Military Free Fall Navigational Aid, or



▲ **UNDER CANOPY** The Advanced Ram Air Parachute System will take the place of the MC-4. The new system will increase team-infiltration capabilities through improvements in performance, safety, modularity, design, versatility and comfort. *U.S. Army photo.*

NAVAID, is expected to change the way teams plan and execute airborne missions. The NAVAIID is basically equivalent to having a GPS, a wireless communication device and a computer mounted on the jumper. All three are linked to assist navigation, the same way that aircraft instruments aid a pilot to fly in thick fog. In addition to standard GPS information, the NAVAIID provides the jumper with the direction to all pre-designated landing areas, information on the closest landing area, the probability of landing at each location and the estimated arrival time on the target.

The MFF NAVAIID has two configurations. The first is the heads-up display, or HUD, which is a small screen positioned in front of one eye. Although the screen is in the field of view, it restricts vision only slightly. The second configuration is chest-mounted. This version is the same

as the HUD, except that the small screen is located on the unit, which is mounted on the chest, where it can best be seen. The NAVAIID is also simple to operate: Jumpers can scroll through menus and navigate options using only two buttons. Both configurations offer the same functions and performance.

The key component of the system is its ability to use the same current-wind profile used by the aircraft's Joint Precision Airdrop System. The real-time information on winds within 50 km of the target provides the jumper with the most accurate ground weather situation available.

MISSION PLANNER

But the NAVAIID is only half of the system. The second half is a GPS computer terminal called the Joint Precision Air Delivery System Mission Planner, or JPADS, mounted

inside the aircraft. The NAVAIDs on the jumpers and the JPADS on the aircraft wirelessly communicate with each other to pass along updated mission information or unexpected weather changes.

How does the JPADS work to improve MFF operations? Near the target, the jumpmaster drops a small torpedo-shaped radiosonde from the aircraft. As it falls, the radiosonde acquires real-time meteorological data and transmits the information back to the JPADS, which calculates the updates against the mission requirement and transmits the data to the NAVAIDs on the jumpers. The near-real-time weather information will be accurate without any guesswork.

ELECTRONIC AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION DEVICE

The Cybernetic Parachute Release System, or CYPRES, is the most reliable automatic activation device used



by skydivers today. The CYPRES has been responsible for saving the lives

of more than 1,000 jumpers so far. It was first introduced to the skydiving community by Airtec GmbH in 1991, and it has since become the main automatic activation device used by 42 militaries around the world. Today, there are more than 90,000 CYPRES units in operation worldwide.

The military version of the CYPRES, called the Electronic Automatic Activation Device, or EAAD, is scheduled to replace the AR2 as the SOF automatic-activation device. The EAAD is already in use at the Military Free-Fall School and has been responsible for saving the lives of a number of MFF students.

The EAAD consists of three parts: the processing unit, the release unit and the control unit. The entire system is placed inside the reserve container, with the reserve closing loop passing through the release unit, but only the control unit is visible to the jumper. Because it is inside the reserve container, the EAAD is part of the parachute.

The processing unit, which is the brains of the EAAD, is responsible for gathering data and comparing it to certain firing criteria. The processing unit can determine whether a jumper is on the ground, ascending to altitude, belly-to-earth in free fall, back-to-earth in free fall, stable or unstable tumbling through free fall. It is always thinking.

The control unit is the input/output device for the user to set, review, self-test and shut down the EAAD.

A unique feature on the EAAD is the power shut-off mode. During start-up, if there is not enough battery power to last for 14 consecutive hours of operation, or if the EAAD has any other issue that will prevent it from functioning correctly, the unit will display an error message and shut down immediately. Simply put, if the unit starts without an error message, jumpers are guaranteed 14 hours of problem-free operation.

The release unit, or the “cutter,” is the business end of the EAAD. The cutter receives the firing command from the processing unit and ignites a small charge. The charge pushes a guillotine-like cutting blade that severs the reserve closing loop completely. When the loop is cut free, the reserve parachute deploys. This is a simple but effective system that increases the user’s safety. The civilian CYPRES model has an outstanding record, and the EAAD, still relatively new, is performing just as well.

CONCLUSION

It is exciting to see the new MFF equipment that is on the horizon. By making it possible to insert operators into restricted and denied areas, MFF offers commanders total control over their respective battlespaces. Through the interaction of end users, combat and materiel developers, trainers and the industrial base, MFF equipment is increasingly safer and more capable, making the MFF option even more relevant and reliable.

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Falling into history:

ODA 074 makes first combat halo jump into Iraq

By ODA 074 team members and Captain Karla S. Owen

In the early morning hours of May 30, 2007, an 11-man Special Forces team crept silently through an Iraqi village. Their target: a suspected terrorist with ties to traffickers in counterfeit U.S. currency and a criminal network known for supporting the movement and funding of foreign fighters, weapons and equipment into the country.

For the mission to be successful, the team had to take the village by surprise. That wasn't an easy task, as the suspected terrorist had implemented a robust early-warning network, taking advantage of the remote location, and thus giving him the ability to escape or destroy

evidence within minutes. The team, Operational Detachment — Alpha 074, 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, went outside the box, electing to conduct the first combat standoff military free-fall insertion of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

After carefully studying the terrain and the capabilities of the terrorist network, the team's leader decided that a military free-fall, or MFF, insertion would be the best option for overcoming the early warning system. On the ground, a joint U.S.-Iraqi quick-reaction force would provide assault support after the team took the village.

An MFF team is composed of personnel with advanced



▲ **GET READY** ODA 074, 10th Special Forces Group, stands in the doorway of the aircraft prior to its historic jump into Iraq. *U.S. Army photo.*

parachutist's skills. These skills include parachute ground training, advanced aircraft procedures, instruction on life-support equipment and procedures with high-altitude airborne operations. The latter are known as high-altitude, low-opening, or HALO, or high-altitude, high-opening, or HAHO, jumps, with exit altitudes ranging up to 25,000 feet and parachute openings as low as 4,000 feet, all while jumpers are wearing combat equipment, supplemental oxygen and navigational equipment.

Military freefall has, historically, been viewed as the last alternative of insertion because of the high risk of the operation. For this reason, commanders usually err on the side of safety by looking at other means of insertion. Furthermore, a traditional MFF team is typically used as a small element for reconnaissance insertions, not for purely offensive operations.

Despite the fact that every company within an SF group has an MFF team assigned, over the years, SF has used this means of insertion only once per military campaign, and even then, primarily for surveillance or targeting. Rarely has an MFF team been inserted to com-

plete an offensive operation. The last documented MFF in combat by an SF team prior to 2007 was in January 1991, when a 12-man team inserted into the northwest deserts of Iraq in support of Operation Desert Storm.

ODA 074 decided during predeployment training that they would approach MFF as a viable combat option, with the objective of changing the mentality regarding its use. The team leadership bought into the idea that by training right and maintaining their skills, the MFF team could become a valuable command asset.

ODA 074 trained for deployment for more than 12 months. Prior to deploying to Iraq, the team completed more than 40 HALO/HAHO jumps in preparation for such a contingency.

The team collectively had an average of four years of MFF and SF experience. The seasoned team members wanted to test themselves, their equipment and their capabilities. In preparation for deployment, the team leaders wanted to give the MFF training a combat focus. That began by acknowledging that mission success is not achieved by simply reaching the insertion point.

At the heart of the training was the idea that a combat HALO jump should not be considered an anomaly in today's war-fighting environment. To gain the confidence and acceptance of the command for using MFF in the war on terror, ODA 074 developed a new approach to training.

"A key training objective ... was obtaining and maintaining Level I proficiency as late as possible prior to deployment," according to the task-force commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dan Stoltz, who was also the 3rd Battalion commander.

Stolz said HALO teams must maintain a Level I proficiency, which includes nighttime combat-equipment jumps with supplemental oxygen and landing as a group, for an entire deployment. Level I proficiency is good only for 120 days, so if an MFF ODA conducts its qualification too early in pre-mission training, the qualification will expire early during the deployment.

"Military freefall has, historically, been viewed as the last alternative of insertion because of the high risk of the operation. For this reason, commanders usually err on the side of safety by looking at other means of insertion."

ODA 074 was prepared and surpassed the Army standards, updating its airborne standard operating procedures and ensuring that it was always combat-focused.

A central aspect of their pre-deployment training was being allowed to perform extensive testing and training with the prototype version of a parachutist navigation system. According to the vendor, the system provides parachutists with accurate navigation capabilities and enhanced situational awareness, allowing them to fly to their designated landing zones.

The use of the system assisted in the training and provided the team with a precision method for determining jumper release points over unfamiliar territory, at night, with no visual references necessary. The system provided the jumpers with the ability to accurately navigate over long distances while under canopy and land together in unmarked drop zones during periods of limited visibility.

The team conducted 13 HAHO jumps while testing the helmet system, constantly verifying its capabilities against navigation boards, or "belly compasses." The

constant checks on the technology gave the team confidence in its ability to navigate with the compass while under canopy.

During the final day of training, ODA 074 made a final nighttime jump, which served to alleviate any concerns that remained with the new technology. The longest HAHO saw the team under canopy for more than 14 kilometers, or 8.68 miles, with all jumpers landing within a 50-meter radius.

While the team did not deploy with the navigation system, its testing improved the team's ability and confidence in its abilities to conduct an accurate combat MFF. When it came time to plan the mission in Iraq, they knew their train-up was solid. Their skills were second-nature.

Having trained on unmarked drop zones, in desert conditions and with full-gear jumps, the team was confident that HALO was the right method for this particular target. They did not go looking for a HALO jump, and in fact, they

had completed more than 12 ground-offensive operations while continuing to train their Iraqi counterparts when the mission in the Ninewah Province came along.

The leaders of ODA 074 were confident in their training and equipment, and when they had met the "go-criteria" for the mission, they knew they could achieve the surprise needed to accomplish the mission.

Mission planning was narrowed down to three days, based on intelligence of the targeted individual's location, nighttime weather conditions and nighttime illumination. Once the approval had been given and the date chosen, the team commenced final preparations.

Force protection was a top concern, according to the commander of Advanced Operating Base 070, Major Isaac J. Peltier.

"With this isolated objective, we were very aware of the potential force-ratio differences between a small 11-man team and a larger ground-assault force," Peltier said. "Contingency plans were put in place, and with the intelligence that we had received regarding the target, we took the needed steps to mitigate the risk."

Early on May 29, the operation began with the movement of ODA 074 and its Iraqi Army counterparts to an airfield located on a nearby forward operating base, or FOB, where the team linked-up with its sister detachment, ODA 075. ODA 075 was responsible for controlling the follow-on ground assault forces that were composed of ODA 074's counterparts in the Iraqi army and ODA 075's in the Iraqi police. At the FOB, the final coordination, air-mission brief with air elements, mission brief for ground forces and rehearsals were conducted in preparation for the actual combat operation.

ODA 074 members moved to the flight line, rigged their combat equipment and conducted jumpmaster inspections while ODA 075 simultaneously moved with its Iraqi counterparts to a secure staging location closer to the target. There ODA 075 would wait for ODA 074 to initiate the assault.

Shortly after midnight, the 11-man MFF team boarded an MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft especially well-suited to conduct the night drop in variable conditions.

When the team and the aircrew went airborne, the illumination provided by the moon was close to 100-percent. At approximately 4 a.m., at an altitude of nearly 13,000 feet, the team performed a diving exit off the ramp of the aircraft. All jumpers used the MC-4 Ram Air Free-Fall Personnel Parachute System, wearing supplemental oxygen, carrying their assigned weapons and a parachutist's drop bag, weighing more than 100 pounds, that contained their combat equipment.

The team knew that conditions on the ground do not always match the conditions in the air, and that lesson was reinforced. Because of an approaching sandstorm, the moon was in a haze, and the team realized that visibility near the ground was going to be far less than they had been told to expect. At 6,000 feet, each jumper deployed his parachute and oriented toward the blacked-out, unmarked drop zone and rally point.

One of the critical aspects of conducting a combat MFF is the ability of parachutists to read their navigation boards so that they can land close together at the predetermined drop zone. The infrared strobes worn by each jumper were only intermittently visible, making it difficult for them to group together under canopy. This resulted in the team landing in three separate, dispersed groups. That did not hinder the outcome of the mission, because each small group conducted a tactical drop-zone assembly. The groups accounted for personnel, recovered equipment, cached parachutes and air items and donned their individual assault gear.

Once combat-ready, the separate elements moved to a link-up site south of the target area. The 11 members of ODA 074 then moved as a team to their final concealed position, 300 meters south of the target area, before beginning their ground assault.

Peltier pointed out that fog and friction are inherent in every operation. The incoming sandstorm was not forecast, and the resulting dispersion led to a longer assembly time. Under those circumstances, patience was key. "Because of the dispersion, the team took longer to assemble than planned," Peltier said, "but I trusted my team. They were one of my best."

ODA 074 then crept up to the buildings and made a stealthy entry into the target area. As the team cleared the rooms and floors of the targeted structures, it completely surprised all the villagers it encountered. Within 10 minutes, all the intended people on the objective were under control. Six minutes later, ODA 075 and its ground-assault force arrived, securing the perimeter and the entire target area.

Although the targeted individual was not in the village, the mission was 100-percent successful in achieving surprise. Because there was absolute silence when the team arrived on target, every person was still asleep instead of being alerted, awake and waiting. Despite landing in and moving through known smuggler and foreign-fighter "ratlines," all the team elements were able to link up and conduct a direct-action mission without compromise.

Since redeployment, the team has continued to train, drawing on lessons learned to further evolve its operating procedures. Planning more realistic timelines for accommodating contingencies is only one consideration. Navigating under canopy using night-vision devices, using drop-zone assembly procedures, and using unmarked drop zones at night continues to build the team's confidence and prepares it for future combat MFF operations.

Since the MFF insertion, the team has seen a few changes. Some members have moved on to other SF organizations, but eight of the 11 original members still train together. The training continues to expand and to improve at every level.

This article was written by the members of ODA 074, 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, in conjunction with Captain Karla S. Owen of the 10th SF Group Public Affairs Office.



**HITTING THE GROUND WITH
COALITION SOF**

by J. Paul de B. Taillon

Defeating terrorists will require not only capturing or killing today's operatives but also influencing the conditions that will impact the vulnerability of future generations to terrorist recruiting. Through careful engagement, the goal is for special-operations forces to provide nations with the tools, training and capabilities to secure their own borders and provide their own internal stability, thus helping civilized people around the work to live free from fear of terrorist attacks.

General Bryan D. "Doug" Brown¹

Today, special-operations forces are acknowledged as accomplishing missions that are tactical in nature but having strategic impact. Over the past decade, successful operations have been conducted by coalition special-operations forces, or CSOF, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, underlining the need to support, facilitate and expedite future CSOF operations. Current and future coalitions face difficulties, as they encompass not only so-called "traditional allies,"² but also nontraditional SOF partners, surfacing a number of sensitive concerns, including intelligence sharing, interoperability and maintaining coalitions while balancing national interests. Moreover, the deployment of SOF into a coalition represents the strategic interests of their respective nations. Hence, coalition operations have become the crucial enabler for success in the war on terror.

To appreciate the spectrum of CSOF capabilities, this article will explore recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, offering recommendations on how to enhance interoperability and integration. These include "outreach" or coalition advocacy programs aimed

at likely SOF partners and initiatives to facilitate the interoperability of partners in a fully integrated joint CSOF command structure.

The Threat

While terrorism was historically viewed as a criminal threat, since the attacks of 9/11, it has become the primary focus of the American national-security efforts and those of U.S. partners; terrorists are viewed as a serious and persistent threat to all nations. American and CSOF are leading the way, using their unique skills, experience, language capabilities and cultural awareness to develop personal links with the local population, thereby garnering critical intelligence, fostering all-important interpersonal relationships and forging strategically important global-coalition partnerships.³

American and coalition SOF are stationed in regions around the world, including the Philippines, the Pacific Rim countries, the South American Tri-Border region (Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina), the African Sahel region (Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), Afghanistan and Iraq, working closely with local police, the military and security authorities to counter the persistent threat from terrorism. As Major General Gary L. Harrell, then-commander of the Combined Special Operations Component Command, United States Central Command, noted, "CSOF are valuable contributions to GWOT (the Global War on Terror), far in excess of their numbers."⁴ This American acknowledgment underlines the necessity of reinforcing and expanding such contributions, particularly as U.S. SOF are reportedly "overstretched" because of their operational tempo.⁵

Today's global terrorism chal-

lenge necessitates the mobilization and maintenance of a collective will and determination, with the requisite resources and elements of national power to facilitate the efforts of coalition partners. The American strategic policy of pre-emption will result in certain U.S. government initiatives taking place beyond what have historically been understood as designated combat zones. One recent incident or pre-emption was noted when a Pakistani security official advised that an American missile launched in Waziristan from an unmanned aerial drone targeted and killed an al-Qaeda trainer believed to be a chemical and biological expert. The action underlines the necessity for closer cooperation, as well as the development of synchronized plans that draw upon the strengths of the U.S. and its coalition partners.⁶

To successfully overcome contemporary terrorism, the U.S. and its allies must create an environment that eschews terrorism and develop an adaptive counterterrorism strategy. This will require the support and full cooperation of the international community, the respective government agencies, and all U.S. departments and agencies, to adhere to the four principles that underlie that strategy:

- Prevent the emergence of new terrorist threats;
- Isolate terrorist threats that have emerged from their respective support bases;
- Defeat isolated terrorist threats; and,
- Prevent the re-emergence of terrorist threats that have already been defeated.⁷

Strategic importance of partners

Politicians, military commanders and their planners understand

that the war on terror cannot be won unilaterally by the U.S. To prevail, U.S. and allied coalition partners must adopt Liddell Hart's "strategy of the indirect approach" to organize and synchronize the efforts of a global coalition. This will necessitate the development of effective coalition military forces and, in particular, the interoperability and integration of CSOF at all levels.⁸

Since 2002, more than 80 countries have supported Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, with 64 countries providing conventional military forces and 12 countries contributing SOF. Current CSOF missions include direct action,

clandestinely, to fight terrorism and other nontraditional threats, forecast a 15-percent boost in the future number of SOF personnel and acknowledged the requirement to operate around the globe.¹⁰ It recognized that SOF would play a major role and that U.S. SOF "will have the capacity to operate in dozens of countries simultaneously,"¹¹ deploying for longer periods of time with the aim of building relationships with foreign military and security forces. This strategy fully acknowledged that the U.S. military could not unilaterally achieve victory and therefore reinforced the strategic importance of allies and coalition partners.

Ryan Henry, principal deputy

military contributions from its international partners.

Building partner capacity and interoperability

In 2005, the director of strategic studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Michael G. Vickers, told the House Armed Services Committee Defense Review on Terrorism and Radical Islam Gaps that the main tasks of SOF in the war on terror are to:

- Build partner capacity and provide persistent, low-visibility ground presence;
- Conduct persistent air, maritime and ground surveillance over ungoverned areas; and

“The level of SOF integration early on, will determine ultimate success in joint and combined special operations. Organizational relationships and communications are always issues in such operations, but feedback from our SOF counterparts reflects fewer integration and interoperability problems at the tactical level than we experienced as recently as a couple of years ago.”

or DA; special reconnaissance, or SR; unconventional warfare, or UW; Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP.⁹ Depending upon the political or military situation, CSOF could expand or contract these missions.

Strategic requirement for building CSOF capacity

CSOF and building partner capacity became strategically salient in early February 2006 when the Joint Staff (J5) planners of the Pentagon laid out a 20-year defense strategy for the war on terror. That strategy outlined the deployment of U.S. forces, often

undersecretary of defense for policy, confirmed this belief, stating, "We cannot win this Long War by ourselves."¹² Operating in a foreign cultural environment demands the linguistic and cross-cultural skills that are inherent to SOF/CSOF. Moreover, coalition commanders have learned through operational experience that no other military force can accomplish as broad a scope of missions, conducted in as wide a spectrum of operational environments. In addition, the operational demand for CSOF will continue to exceed supply.¹³ Should a major crisis occur requiring a "surge" in military forces, the U.S. would request increased

- Conduct clandestine and covert operations, counterproliferation operations and operations in denied areas.¹⁴

Depending upon the level of perceived threat and political support, allied or coalition partners could plan, execute or facilitate any one of these taskings. It is vital that the level of effectiveness of coalition SOF integration is predicated upon the early identification, orientation, training and assimilation of these forces.

To build partner capacity, the 2006 U.S. defense budget proposed that the U.S. Special Operations Command receive \$4.1 billion, with a portion designated to facilitate cooperative

initiatives with allies, including training other nations' military forces. Major General Harrell emphasized at that time the contribution of coalition forces across a spectrum of operations, and that, given the appropriate assistance, time and investments, future CSOF activities could be expanded, predicated on appropriate political support and coalition direction.¹⁵

To date, CSOF have integrated and functioned with relative ease in both Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁶ As SOF from the Eastern European and Pacific regions became active in the coalition, it also became more important that they employed the NATO standards for training and equipment.¹⁷ Major General Harrell acknowledged that the U.S. Central Command's SOF did much to ensure that CSOF would achieve a higher level of interoperability prior to deploying.¹⁸

Notwithstanding, some areas still need attention to ensure closer CSOF cooperation and interoperability, as well as the integration of CSOF staff in joint and combined operations. It has consistently been recognized that the earlier CSOF integration takes place, the better. This can be addressed through enhancing CSOF training and exercises to educate, train and sensitize participating commanders and staff to tactical, operational and strategic issues and to ensuing problems. CSOF partners could also provide other ideas on how best to address this situation. Admiral Eric Olson, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, argued when he was USSOCOM's deputy commander:

The level of coalition SOF integration, particularly early on, will determine ultimate success in joint and combined special operations. Organizational relationships and communications are always issues in such

*operations, but feedback from our SOF counterparts reflects fewer integration and interoperability problems at the tactical level than we experienced as recently as a couple of years ago.*¹⁹

Admiral Olson has noted, however, that the higher up the chain of command one goes, the more the challenges are conceptual. It is therefore important — indeed imperative — that U.S. and CSOF staff and their commanders meet to discuss the concept of operations prior to assigning and engaging CSOF at the lower level. A salient lesson acknowledged by all is that the “campaign plans, mission focus and execution parameters must be consistent across the combined force.”²⁰

Strategic importance of CSOF interoperability

The momentum for embracing CSOF interoperability increased dramatically in the wake of the electrifying attacks on 9/11. Since then, a spectrum of CSOF continue to operate and fight alongside U.S. SOF, on a scale never before conceived possible. Moreover, the deployment and integration of CSOF lends strategically important political and military legitimacy, as well as moral weight, to the war on terror. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Army Special Forces became the core for the combined joint special-operations task forces, or CJSOTFs, the command-and-control, or C2, umbrella for CSOF.

CENTCOM initiative in developing CSOF

To assist nations facing terrorism, the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, has created a special-operations and counterterrorist, or CT, capability so that regional partners can conduct successful CT operations within

their respective borders. CENTCOM is pursuing bilateral SOF operations between regional nations to develop SOF skill sets and expand their respective experience in coalition operations.²¹

Recognizing that there are no simple solutions to interoperability, Major General Harrell sewed together a patchwork of strategic, operational and tactical initiatives to facilitate the inclusion of CSOF. These include:

- A CENTCOM coalition command cell staffed by senior national representatives and defense attaches;
- Pre-deployment and interoperability training;
- Communications-security memoranda of agreements;
- Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements; and
- Combined training and exercises.²²

This CENTCOM initiative has done much to address the challenge of coalition interoperability. To illustrate that point, an overview of CSOF operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will underline the challenges and successes faced in both these theaters.

CSOF partners in OIF

More than 13,000 SOF personnel were deployed during Operation Iraqi Freedom, making it the largest SOF deployment since the Vietnam War. The contingent included Australian, British, Polish and American SOF who undertook a variety of land, air and maritime operations throughout the Iraqi theater. To effect those operations, the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command was created in early 2003 and charged with the command and control of the SOF assets of the U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy, as well as the CSOF provided by the respective coalition nations.²³

To facilitate command and control



▲ **JOINT TRAINING** U.S. Special Forces Soldiers train Afghani Special Forces Soldiers prior to missions. The training ensures that the two entities can work seamlessly in the field. *U.S. Army photo.*

during OIF, three task forces were created to conduct special-operations missions within the Iraqi theater:

- Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North, or CJSOTF-N;
- Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-West, or CJSOTF-W;
- Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-South, or CJSOTF-S.

These task forces were directly supported by the Combined Joint Special Operations Aviation Component, which had Australian and British aviation assets under its command and control. It flew more than 2,181 missions, many of which were behind Iraqi lines.²⁴

The CJSOTF-W was built around the U.S. Army's 5th Special Forces Group and reinforced by coalition

special forces from the Australian and British Special Air Service, including the 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando). Its area of responsibility, or AOR, was the western desert — the area from Baghdad to Kuwait.²⁵

The primary mission of CJSOTF-W was to deny freedom of movement to the Iraqi ground forces, to plan and execute SR, to conduct UW and, most importantly, to restrict Iraq's ability to launch SCUD missiles at coalition and friendly forces.²⁶ Australian, British and U.S. SOF, along with personnel from the U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Squadron, were rapidly deployed throughout the CJSOTF-W AOR. They commenced the forward reconnaissance of Iraqi defensive positions,

monitoring their ground movements and conducting countertheater ballistic missile, or CTBM, operations. Among their assigned tasks, the CSOF teams called in close air support to suppress and destroy Iraqi defensive positions, as well as providing "eyes on the sparrow" intelligence and reconnaissance to U.S. Marine Corps and Army commanders throughout their rapid armored advance to Baghdad.²⁷

The assimilation of SOF coalition partners was facilitated by clear command relationships, a common understanding of the importance of the principle of unity of command and effort, and a solid grounding in the doctrine employed and staff procedures. During the opening phases of the attack on Iraq, Australian and

British SOF were assigned appropriate missions and placed under the tactical control of CJSOTF-W. Their tasks also contributed to the CTBM operations focused in the western deserts of Iraq and were tactically and strategically sensitive.²⁸

Coalition SOF Integration into OIF

From the outset, it was vital to ensure that CSOF were thoroughly integrated into the campaign plan for Iraq. Commanders and their staffs ensured that the integration started at the most senior levels of leadership residing at the theater special-operations command, or TSOC, and then cascaded down to the CJSOTF; to the combined Army special-operations task force, or ARSOTF; and to the respective tactical level.²⁹

In one example, the effectiveness of coalition integration in Iraq was demonstrated when an Australian Special Air Service patrol reached a boundary of their assigned AOR. The patrol commander observed an Iraqi military convoy heading toward his position and immediately sought a close-air-support mission from the Airborne Warning and Control Squadron, or AWACS.

The British AWACS crew subsequently directed a flight of fighters onto the Iraqi convoy, all within eight minutes of the air-support request.³⁰ It should be appreciated that such close-air-support procedures had been developed and fully rehearsed with U.S. SF, coalition SOF and with British and U.S. aircraft during three well-planned exercises that were undertaken leading up to the invasion. This instance illustrates the critical importance of consistently exercising coalition operational and support procedures prior to any combined deployments.

U.S. SOF and CSOF Staff Integration

During the initial stages of the operation in Iraq, the 5th SF Group made up much of the staff assigned to CJSOTF-W. Embedded and integrated coalition staff, consisting of Australian and British officers, served in many of the CJSOTF-W directorates. Notably, the CJSOTF J3 and the deputy commanders, as well as the J3 (western desert) and assistant J2 (intelligence), were all coalition allies. The British J3 and his U.S. staff were so well-acquainted with the doctrine that integration “appeared to be seamless.” A top-down staffing approach with coalition seniors further facilitated multinational interoperability, ensuring that CSOF integrated into each phase of operations.³¹

During the strategically important CTBM operations in Iraq, U.S. SF became a vital asset for the combined-force air-component commander. During operations, coalition SOF units rapidly adapted to new technologies by effectively employing precision-targeted, air-delivered ordnance. However, this coalition capability and flexibility was predicated upon years of training on well-established NATO close-air-support procedures that ensured interoperability with both American aircraft and CSOF.³² These procedures were further exercised and honed by CSOF during follow-on air strikes against Iraqi military targets.

While operating in Iraq’s western desert, CSOF were attacked on a number of occasions by Iraqi forces. Fortunately, these contacts were short-lived, as CSOF were rapidly supported by close air support and could therefore engage or disengage as required. To ensure the effective coordination of air-support tasks, a

combined staff of American and British officers made up the joint fires element of CJSOTF.³³

For CSOF undertaking CTBM operations in Iraq’s western desert, the most harrowing time was during the days immediately after their insertion. Initially, American, Australian and British forces had to deconflict their respective operations to safely conduct a passage of lines when CSOF found it necessary to transit each other’s operating areas. This situation was further complicated by the necessity of conducting all tactical moves at night — the same period when Iraqi forces would conduct aggressive counter SOF operations — resulting in an increased possibility of friendly fire, also known as a blue-on-blue incident.³⁴

To mitigate potential problems, a series of rehearsals was conducted, a common radio frequency was provided, and activities were tightly planned, coordinated and controlled. It is notable that CJSOTF-W’s CSOF/U.S. SF detachments were successful and achieved their missions without loss of any CSOF personnel while concomitantly inflicting substantial material damage and casualties upon the Iraqi formations. The success of CSOF in Iraq was predicated upon tried-and-true interoperable procedures, an integration of CSOF staffs, close coordination and integration of coalition partners up and down the C2 chain and extensive combined training in joint operations.

CSOF assistance to Task Force 145

The close liaison between the U.S. SOF and the Jordanian special forces witnessed a major success in the 2006 pursuit of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al-Qaeda terrorist leader in Iraq. Media reports indicated that the Pentagon’s



▲ **FIRING LINE** U.S. Special Forces Soldiers train with Polish Soldiers while in Iraq. U.S. Army photo.

Task Force 145 received intelligence from a human source working under the direction of a Jordanian SF team operating inside Iraq.

While acknowledging the importance of other intelligence collection methodology and techniques, it is often a single “informer” who can provide the critical piece of timely information to take the operation to the next level — such as the capture of a high-value target. In this case, the Iraqi informant identified Zarqawi’s spiritual leader, and American intelligence was then able to monitor him through his mobile-telephone communications. American intelligence subsequently located the spiritual leader at a safe house, where he was meeting with Zarqawi. The house was surrounded, and an air strike was

called in on the premises. In the wake of the air attack, Zarqawi was found alive in the rubble, but he quickly succumbed to massive internal injuries. This successful mission, where Jordanian special forces played a lead role, further illustrates the critical and growing importance of CSOF in the war on terror.³⁵

CSOF partners in OEF

In 2002, the first year of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, SOF units operated hundreds of miles from CJSOTF-A. To address that situation, the CJSOTF-A commander established an SF liaison element, better known as a coalition coordination cell, that was subsequently staffed from the 3rd SF Group and co-located with the five CSOF task groups.

The coordination cell had staff representatives from J2, J3, J4 and J6. The coordination cell provided an American C2 umbrella, as well as the vital communications and intelligence links to coalition SOF headquarters. The coordination cell also facilitated access and the dissemination of American intelligence responding to coalition requests for information, video feeds, surveillance and reconnaissance reports, radio frequencies and crypto. The coordination cell ensured deconfliction and facilitated the incorporation of coalition SOF throughout the Afghan battle space, as they conducted SR and DA missions against al-Qaeda and Taliban elements.³⁶

In December 2001, CSOF drawn from seven nations were deployed to Afghanistan to conduct operations

under the auspices of OEF. In the following year, those coalition partners conducted more than 200 DA, SR and sensitive-site-exploitation missions.³⁷ The lesson learned was that that tempo could only be accomplished through a high degree of coordination and interoperability. American SOF and CSOF must look at all measures to facilitate the fight in the war on terror, more in a “by, with and through” attitude. Hence, it is necessary for lead nations to do more with CSOF partners, including nontraditional partners, as well as traditional allies.³⁸

The CJSOTF-A represented interoperability at the operational level, as it had CSOF representation from contributing nations. However, interoperability, more often than not, was truly manifested at the tactical level of an American SF battalion. When the 2nd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, was assigned to and established its Forward Operating Base 32 at Kandahar Airfield, it was co-located with five CSOF task groups embedded in the coalition coordination cell. Taking advantage of CSOF expertise in static and mobile SR, FOB 32 commenced the operational preparations for the respective SF detachments. FOB 32 also planned and undertook combat missions with CSOF in the Afghan provinces of Oruzgun, Helmund and Paktika. These initial reconnaissance missions were instrumental in subsequent successful operations against leadership cells belonging to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Moreover, SF detachments conducted many of their missions based upon the intelligence and information provided by CSOF — a true indication of trust in their CSOF partners.³⁹

During initial operations, it was quickly recognized that certain CSOF partners were particularly skilled in mobile reconnaissance missions, enabling the identification, seizure and

destruction of enemy arms caches. Using sound and timely intelligence, as well as close coordination, CSOF members conducted their own successful DA missions, locating and capturing a number of members of the Taliban leadership cadre.⁴⁰

More recently, Afghan National Army commandos and U.S. SOF freed a number of hostages incarcerated in a Taliban prison. The commandos were searching a compound in which the Taliban commander Nungiala Khan had a jail. Fifteen Afghans were discovered being held for ransom and were promptly released. It is through such operations that SOF forces will garner the experiences to hone their professional and operational capability and internal leadership.⁴¹

Coalition SOF and the 160TH SOAR

Supporting CSOF was the 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, better known to those in the community as the “Night Stalkers.” Both CSOF and the supporting air assets acknowledge that interoperability was vital to successful joint and combined SOF initiatives. The 160th planning staff and flight commanders understood the criticality of interoperability and undertook to facilitate CSOF operations to the fullest extent by ensuring intimate coordination between the ground-force commanders and the air planners.

The Danish SOF contingent was officially commended for its exceptional planning ability, as they brought with them two of their U.S.-trained pilots. Both aviators, well-versed in U.S. air-planning formats and requirements were, astutely, assigned to billets on the air-operations planning staff of the 160th. On many occasions, the 160th inserted CSOF into their AOR, includ-

ing insertions on extreme slopes at high elevations. In a number of those, 160th crews took enemy fire while conducting their approaches to drop-off points, underlining the high degree of trust and professional dedication that existed between the 160th and coalition SOF partners.⁴²

Lessons learned and recommendations

The experiences and lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan underscore the critical importance of deliberate planning in coalition SOF operations. Fortunately, the planning and decision-making processes employed by CSOF mirrored American doctrine.⁴³ The “commonality” of doctrine and formats for developing concepts of operations, staff work and briefbacks facilitated interoperability and has further cemented the professional trust between the U.S. and the various CSOF units engaged in operations. Moreover, under the American C2 umbrella, coalition SOF proved their ability to undertake special operations successfully at both the tactical and operational levels. At the strategic level, CSOF contribute directly to the legitimacy and credibility of U.S. and coalition political and military objectives and subsequent initiatives in the struggle against terrorism.

In the war on terror, CSOF operations will remain a vital component of the coalition effort. Hence, it is incumbent upon military professionals to assimilate the experiences and lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to build upon them in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of integrated CSOF operations.

A key lesson from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is the need for early integration of qualified CSOF personnel into senior positions in the



▲ **TRIGGER TIME** A South Korean special forces soldier trains an Iraqi soldier on the range. U.S. Army photo.

CJSOTF. This ensures a unity of effort and maximizes the skills and potential of coalition partners.⁴⁴ Multinational SOF exercises, at both the tactical and operational levels, could improve interoperability and build upon the hard-won lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq. The following recommendations would, if incorporated, expand and enhance future CSOF interoperability and assist in our coalition efforts.

1. *Create coalition SOF mobile training teams.* Operators from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Poland and others under NATO (+)⁴⁵ could develop NATO-standard SOF tactics, techniques and procedures to enhance individual military skills, develop counterinsurgency and counterterrorist expertise and pass on proven techniques.

2. *Create a NATO SOF school.* The international Long Range Patrol School at Weingarten, Germany, had

a cadre of instructors from various NATO nations and was a focal point in developing standardized NATO patrol techniques. A similar-style NATO SOF school would provide a base of knowledge and skills, along with standardized TTPs for a spectrum of SOF missions, enhancing future CSOF interoperability. The January 2006 announcement of the creation of the International Special Forces Training Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is an important and substantial step toward CSOF interoperability. The 15-week program takes students through a comprehensive SF program.

This initiative can also be a vehicle for coalition advocacy and strategic partnering. Moreover, instructors from CSOF nations would give the course a true coalition SOF flavor. CSOF nations would benefit from sending candidates to train and develop personal

connections with other students in anticipation of future coalition initiatives. Another goal is for SOF-led nations to assist nations with the skills, knowledge and experience to secure their own borders and provide for their own internal stability. In January 2008, the Hungarian Special Forces launched its National Special Forces Qualification Course, or NSFQC. Patterned on the American SF Qualification Course, the NSFQC could become the basis for a standardized NATO SOF qualification course.

3. *Ascertain coalition SOF expertise and leverage it.* Many nations have developed unique or niche capabilities, such as the Norwegians for snow or high-altitude conditions. Coalition SOF must have an awareness and appreciation of these respective skills and capabilities and leverage them to the benefit of the CSOF community.⁴⁶

4. *Create a SOF “olympics.”* CSOF would be tested by undertaking several operational scenarios, such as a DA operation, hostage rescue, SR mission and long-range patrol,⁴⁷ to assess the professionalism, flexibility and equipment of those participating, as well as ascertaining the interoperability of these CSOF partners.⁴⁸ This would provide a venue for learning from the respective experience of the participants so as to share successful TTPs in preparation for future deployment initiatives.

5. *Create a SOF staff college.* The college could look at special and asymmetric operations throughout history, including the profiles and experiences of various special forces, to garner insights as to their respective history, skills and methodologies. The SOF staff college would teach new planning methodologies, emphasizing the responsibilities of commanders and staff in planning sensitive, as well as normative, SOF operations. The cur-

riculum could examine the issues and experiences of CSOF partners and the development of their respective SOF.⁴⁹ Courses would be taught to enable SOF operators to understand various cultural mores, behaviors and traditions, as well as to realize that this cultural understanding is as important as the weapons operators carry.⁵⁰

The SOF staff college could also conduct a series of NATO-standard exercises focusing on the spectrum of SOF missions. This would assist in talent-spotting and the training and development of operational skills of U.S. SOF/CSOF personnel, as well as staff planners, trainers/instructors and commanders. This initiative could be extended to incorporate the creation of a SOF planning specialty, similar to the School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., as well as selecting officers to become special-operations and irregular-warfare strategists. This could readily be put under the umbrella of the Joint Special Operations University, based at Hurlburt Field, Fla.⁵¹

6. *Increase coalition SOF attachments and secondments to various SOF/CSOF schools.* The exchange of officers, instructors and students would secure the human dimension of CSOF and put a real coalition face to, in particular, American SOF schools and training programs. This would enhance interoperability through an awareness of the various coalition cultures, staff and operating methodologies, while concomitantly developing vital personal contacts. This has proven successful in the standing up of reportedly four Iraqi special-operations battalions that are now capable of conducting operations, and another two are presently in force-generation.⁵²

7. *Solicit CSOF participation in*



▲ **JOINT TRAINING** The Royal Thai Air Force conducts joint training with members of a U.S. special-operations group. U.S. Army photo.

U.S. and CSOF exercises and, concomitantly, garner coalition input and ideas, similar to Emerald Warrior 07. CSOF observers/participants may have unique cultural, operational or methodological insights that would be advantageous to the SOF/CSOF community. The request or invitation to participate would, in itself, acknowledge coalition value and importance.⁵³

8. *Assist coalition initiatives in the war on terror.* Particularly in regions where post-colonial nations are experiencing confrontations with terrorism and insurgency, and where British or American presence could be problematic, coalition partners may wish to

provide military assistance through a future NATO (+) program.⁵⁴ This multinational team could consist of CSOF members from Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Poland, etc. This would be an expansion of the World War II-era Jedburgh teams.⁵⁵ Those were small units comprising three military officers/noncommissioned officers — one British (Commonwealth), one French and one American — who were parachuted into France to provide intelligence and assist the French underground in aligning underground activities to support Allied operations both prior to and after the Normandy invasion.⁵⁶ Such multinational teams

could conduct foreign training and undertake advisory missions, essentially performing foreign internal defense or stability-and-security operations. Today, this initiative would embrace coalition SOF, taking it to a higher level through team integration — a real Rainbow 6!⁵⁷

9. *Support ongoing international SOF symposiums and academic institutions that study irregular warfare and special operations.* These venues could be employed to enhance coalition SOF exchanges, tap respective SOF academics and build networks internationally within the SOF academic field. In that regard, the four international SOF symposiums that have been held at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston to bring academics and operators together have been quite successful.

10. *Select, train and return intelligence-support personnel.* In recent operations, a major and persistent issue was the difficulty of intelligence-sharing amongst coalition allies. Considering the criticality of intelligence in SOF initiatives, the integral SOF-intelligence organizations, particularly those of the traditional or special alliance comprising Canada, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, must address how to appropriately manage SOF intelligence requirements in a coalition.

While it can be appreciated that intelligence sources and sensitive technology may have to be protected, assigning coalition allies high-risk conventional or SOF missions without providing critical all-source intelligence along with the assigned target package is arguably immoral and particularly disenfranchising. It is vital to ensure that SOF select and retain intelligence-support personnel who are capable of effectively operating on a joint and coalition staff and of working

with ambiguity, prickly intelligence issues, allied/foreign SOF operators and allied agendas.⁵⁸

Conclusion

The war on terror will require great patience and a comprehensive approach to defeating the terrorism threat. More importantly, it must be recognized that this is not purely an American problem but an international one which military forces alone cannot solve. The war demands the concerted multidisciplinary effort of global partners, and CSOF will be instrumental in conducting long-term, effective operations aimed at generating enduring effects to defeat the terrorists and their support networks.⁵⁹

To ensure strategic success, the coalition members must maintain a unity of effort. All avenues that help to seed, nurture and renew mutual trust and coalition interoperability will do much to ensure victory on this new battlefield.

To facilitate successful interoperability, there must be a coalition SOF standard. This will not be easy, as there is no simple, “silver bullet” solution for ensuring interoperability. Hence, the CSOF community must come together and provide the guidance, doctrine, training and education to achieve seamless interoperability, thus ensuring that CSOF remain the “tip of the spear.”

NOTES:

¹ Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, “US Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (1st Quarter 2006), 38–43.

² Sometimes known as the “Five Eyes” community, consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. These countries are viewed as the traditional CSOF allies. For the purposes of this paper, CSOF will encompass both traditional allies and coalition partners.

³ See also Hala Jaber and Michael Smith, “SAS Hunts Fleeing Al-Qaeda Africans,” *Times* (14 January 2007). U.S. Special Forces and British Special Air Services, assisted by Ethiopian and Kenyan forces,

were coordinating the destruction and trapping of AQ terrorists.

⁴ Major General Gary L. Harrell, “Coalition SOF Support to the War on Terrorism,” Presentation (29 January 2005), available from www.dtic.mil/ndia/2005solic/harrell.ppt; Internet; accessed 27 February 2006. See also Andrew Feickert, “U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan: Issues for Congress,” *CRS Report for Congress* (9 June 2006) Order Code RL33503. For an interesting view as to irregular warfare by a former U.S. Air Force SOF officer, see Major General Richard Comer (R) “An Irregular Challenge,” *Armed Forces Journal* (February 2008).

⁵ Alec Russell, “Overstretched American Special Forces Hit the Language Barrier,” *Daily Telegraph* (4 May 2006).

⁶ Thom Shanker and Scott Shane, “Elite Troops Get Expanded Role on Intelligence,” *New York Times* (8 March 2006) and Rowan Scarborough, “Special Operations Forces Eye Terrorists,” *Washington Times* (12 August 2005).

⁷ Lieutenant General Dell L. Dailey and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey G. Webb, “US Special Operations Command and the War on Terror,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 40 (1st Quarter 2006), 45. See also Andrew Feickert, “US and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan: Issues for Congress,” *CRS Report*.

^{8,9} In recent times, much focus has been placed on SOF operations in the direct-action mission areas. These are “attractive” operations, as they are easy to see and report and have an immediate result. This reality unfortunately overlooks or underestimates the critical importance of the indirect-approach strategies that have long-term strategic effects, such as foreign internal defense, national-capacity building and the development of SOF and conventional operational capability.

¹⁰ See Ann Scott Tyson, “Ability to Wage ‘Long War’ Is Key to Pentagon Plan,” *Washington Post* (4 February 2006) and Josh White and Ann Scott Tyson, “Rumsfeld Offers Strategies for Current War: Pentagon to Release 20-Year Plan Today,” *Washington Post* (3 February 2006).

¹¹ Tyson, “Ability to Wage ‘Long War.’”

¹² Tyson, “Ability to Wage ‘Long War.’”

¹³ Admiral Eric T. Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, “Directing, Supporting and Maintaining the World’s Best SOF,” Interview, *Special Operations Technology*, <http://www.sotech-kmi.com>; accessed 28 July 2008.

¹⁴ Michael G. Vickers, “Transforming US Special Operations Forces,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Prepared for OSD Net Assessment (August 2005), 8.

¹⁵ Vickers, 8.

¹⁶ It should be underlined that in the traditional alliance context, the New Zealand Special Air Service and Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) worked intimately against Taliban elements in Afghanistan. As described to this writer, “Our NZ SAS squadron commander would command an op [operation], then the Canadian JTF2 squadron commander led the next op. I believe this was never done before.” Interview with senior New Zealand SAS commander, Auckland, New Zealand (21 November 2006).

¹⁷ Harrell, "Coalition SOF Support."
¹⁸ Harrell, "Coalition SOF Support."
¹⁹ Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson, "SOF Transformer," interview by Jeffrey McKaughan, *Special Operations Technology* 4, 1 (19 February 2006); <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/archives.cfm?CoverID=69>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2006.
²⁰ Olson, "SOF Transformer."
²¹ Harrell, "Coalition SOF Support."
²² Harrell, "Coalition SOF Support."
²³ "A Bid for Freedom," *Global Defence Review* (2006); <http://www.global-defence.com/2006/utilities/article.php?id=41>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2006.
²⁴ "A Bid for Freedom."
²⁵ "A Bid for Freedom."
²⁶ "A Bid for Freedom."
²⁷ "A Bid for Freedom."
²⁸ Mark C. Arnold, "Special Operations Forces Interoperability with Coalition Forces," John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (2005).
²⁹ Arnold.
³⁰ Arnold.
³¹ Arnold.
³² Arnold.
³³ Arnold.
³⁴ A "blue on blue" incident, also known as "friendly fire," occurs when troops from the same or an allied military accidentally fire on each other. This is also known as amicide or fratricide.
³⁵ For an overview of this operation, see Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Fines, "Insurgent Leader Al-Zarqawi Killed in Iraq," *Washington Post* Foreign Service (8 June 2006) and Claude Salhani, "Jordanian Role Larger Than First Reported," UPI (12 June 2006).
³⁶ Arnold.
³⁷ Arnold.
³⁸ Robert Pursell, USJFCOM Newsmaker Profile: SOCFJCOM Commander Army Col. Wesley Rehorn," interview (5 December 2007).
³⁹ Pursell.
⁴⁰ Pursell.
⁴¹ Specialist Anna K. Perry, "Commandos, SOF forces rescue kidnap victim," CJSOTF, Afghanistan Public Affairs (20 July 2008) and Anna K. Perry, "SOF Forces Train New Afghan Commandos," CJSOTF, Afghanistan Public Affairs (27 June 2008).
⁴² Perry.

⁴³ Perry.
⁴⁴ Perry.
⁴⁵ Although Australia and New Zealand are not under the NATO umbrella, for the purpose of such a program, they could be invited to partake in such a NATO (+) initiative. If not, they could be included as Commonwealth attachments.
^{46, 47} During OEF operations in Afghanistan, the Norwegians were considered highly capable SOF intelligence and operational planners, and their methodology was, in part, copied by Canadian SOF intelligence operators. In Afghanistan, the Canadian special operations intelligence cell reportedly set the standard for intelligence support to SOF operations.
⁴⁸ Observers would note differences in equipment, intelligence requirements, communications used, risks taken, commonality of reporting formats, tactics, techniques and procedures employed while assessing real-time variations from the NATO base model.
⁴⁹ For various overviews, see Roy Maclaren, *Canadian Behind Enemy Lines 1939-1945* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1981); William H. Burgess, III, ed., *Inside Spetsnaz: Soviet Special Operations* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1990); Greg Annussek, *Hitler's Raid to Save Mussolini* (Cambridge: Da Capo, 2005); Tim Saunders, *Fort Eben Emael* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2005); Ian Westwell, *Brandenburgers: The Third Reich's Special Forces* (Hersham: Ian Allan, 2003); Otto Skorzeny, *My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of Hitler's Most Daring Commando* (Atglen, Penn.: Schiffer, 1995); Eric Lefevre, *Brandenburg Division: Commandos of the Reich* (Paris: Histoire and Collections, 2000); James E. Mrazek, *The Fall of Eben Emael* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1970); Douglas Dodds-Parker, *Setting Europe Ablaze* (Windlesham: Springwood, 1983); T.E. Lawrence, *Revolt in the Desert*, (U.S.: Tess Press, 1926); John Arquilla, ed., *From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1996); and William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995).
⁵⁰ Students would also undertake a broad spectrum of initiatives in dealing with terrorists, guerrillas and insurgents and study the notables of history: T.E. Lawrence, Vo Nguyen Giap, Mao Tse-Tung, Sun Tzu, Chen Peng, Augusto Sandino, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara and Osama bin Laden.

⁵¹ JSOU is based at Hurlburt Field, Fla., and offers a wide range of courses regarding terrorism, unconventional warfare, special operations and staff-officer training. With an academic staff comprising in-house experts and drawing from international adjunct professors, JSOU would be a logical site for this expansion and could facilitate future USSOCOM/CSOF initiatives in the war on terror. For an overview of the training for SOF staff personnel, see Commander Steven P. Schreiber (USN), Lieutenant Colonel Greg E. Metzgar (USA) and Major Stephen R. Mezhir (USAF), "Behind Friendly Lines: Enforcing the Need for a Joint SOF Staff Officer," *Military Review* (May-June 2004), 2-8.
⁵² Statement by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. permanent representative, delivered at the mid-year review of UNSCR 1790 on behalf of MNF-I, in the Security Council June 13, 2008, USUN Press Release (13 June 2008), U.S. Mission to the UN.
⁵³ Major Scott Covode and Denise Boyd, *Air Force Print News*, (11 July 2007). "There is great value in getting SOF integrated training with joint air assets that will support them during real-world operations," said Navy Lieutenant Commander Patrick Corcoran.
⁵⁴ According to reports, USSOCOM has approximately 7,000 troops overseas, with a major concentration in Iraq and Afghanistan. One report noted that 85 percent of these were in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. Ann Scott Tyson, "New Plans Foresee Fighting Terrorism Beyond War Zones," *Washington Post* (23 April 2006).
⁵⁵ Julian Thompson, *The Imperial War Museum Book of War: Behind Enemy Lines* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2001), 299-301.
⁵⁶ Thompson.
⁵⁷ Taken from Tom Clancy's techno-thriller novel, *Rainbow Six*. The novel focuses upon a multinational counterterrorist unit codenamed "Rainbow." In American military jargon, the numeral six is used to denote the commander.
⁵⁸ Jon-Paul Hart, "Killer Spooks: Increase Human Intelligence Collection Capability by Assigning Collectors to Tactical-Level Units," *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 2005). For an overview of intelligence sharing, see Major Louis-Henri Remillard, "Intelligence Sharing in Coalition Operations: Getting it Right," Royal Military College, unpublished paper (5 May 2008).
⁵⁹ Dailey and Webb, "War on Terror," 47.

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MEASURING PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS

by Captain Gregory Seese and Sergeant First Class Paul N. Smith

In this age of population-centric warfare, military planners increasingly have looked to Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, to “win hearts and minds.” However, while familiar with developing measures of effectiveness or conducting battle-damage assessments for more traditional military operations, planners struggle to evaluate success on this “battlefield of the mind.” To that end, the latest release of FM 3-05.301, *PSYOP Process Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, details an updated evaluation methodology for assessing the effectiveness of PSYOP.

Although PSYOP is very much concerned with influencing attitudes, values and beliefs of the target audience, or TA, the ultimate success of PSYOP missions is determined by the observable modification of target-audience *behavior*. Therefore, any systematic means of assessing and evaluating PSYOP efforts must measure changes in behavior.

The purpose of evaluating PSYOP is twofold: to determine the effectiveness of PSYOP in influencing behavior; and to enable the commander to manage limited PSYOP resources. The evaluation method discussed in this article will achieve both purposes.

Measuring the effectiveness of PSYOP is complicated by the fact that it is only one of numerous factors affecting TA behavior. National media messages, enemy propaganda and spontaneous events in the area of operations, or AO, continually exert competing influences on the TA’s behavior.

Consequently, realistic and pragmatic PSYOP evaluation models do not attempt to establish a direct link between PSYOP activities and TA behavior changes but rather to characterize behavior trends over time. Doing so takes into account the results of PSYOP activities in conjunction with other influences within the AO.

The method of PSYOP evaluation detailed in this article looks at three primary components: TA behavior, spontaneous events and post-testing results. The evaluation method quantifies TA behavior, establishes a behavioral baseline and monitors behavior before, during and after PSYOP to record changes. It also monitors and analyzes spontaneous events, including friendly, neutral and hostile actions in the AO, to determine the extent to which they may influence TA behavior. Finally, the method compares post-testing results (interviews and surveys conducted following PSYOP) to observed TA behavior.

QUANTIFYING BEHAVIOR

Development of a well-written supporting PSYOP objective, SPO, is the critical step in the planning process that will enable commanders to evaluate progress, manage resources and make adjustments to the plan as needed. Well-written SPOs target specific, measurable and observable behavior. “Specific” refers to criteria such as the setting, frequency and intensity of the behavior; “measurable” means it can be counted; “observable” means it can be seen or heard. Without clearly defined SPOs, it will

be difficult to develop the metrics or baseline data needed for measuring change, and in the worst case, the entire PSYOP plan may be ineffective or unmanageable.

In developing measurable SPOs, planners must understand that “behavior” means a specific, observable action. Terms such as “participation,” “support” or “violence” are far too broad, and they must be broken down into their underlying behaviors. In developing SPOs, planners should ask themselves three questions:

1. Can someone observe an individual or group performing this behavior?
2. Can the number of times the behavior occurs be counted?
3. Will observers, such as intelligence collectors, tactical PSYOP teams, etc., know exactly what behavior change to look for from the SPO?

If the answer to any of these questions is no, then the behavior needs to be further quantified.

Examples of behavior include:

- Registering to vote.
- Reporting terrorist activity.
- Turning in weapons.
- Enlisting in the military.
- Surrendering to coalition forces.
- Casting a ballot.
- Nominating a political candidate.
- Joining a neighborhood watch.

“Registering to vote” is measurable, because we can observe and record someone registering to vote and determine whether they have met the objective. However, an objective for a TA to “support the provisional government” is not measurable: How would we know if someone supported

the provisional government? What actions would the TA take if it supported the provisional government? Again, the action needs to be broken down into more measurable and observable behaviors.

Once planners have identified measurable behaviors, the behaviors become the foundation for assessment (see chart on p. 33). Examples of specific, measurable and observable SPOs developed from the behaviors above might include:

SPO No. 1: TA registers to vote at UN voting sites.

SPO No. 2: TA reports suspected terrorist activity on coalition hotline.

SPO No. 3: TA turns in military-grade weapons to the coalition.

many people registered to vote at UN voting sites last month?

- SPO No. 2: TA reports suspected terrorist activity on coalition hotline.

Initial assessment criteria: How many reports of suspected terrorist activity came in on the hotline last month?

- SPO No. 3: TA turns in military-grade weapons to the coalition.

Initial assessment criteria: How many weapons were turned in to the coalition last month?

Following TAA, refined PSYOP assessment criteria may include more specific dimensions of behavior, such as setting, frequency and intensity. The setting could include the city, town or area (e.g., Pineland, Basarah).

Initial assessment criteria: How many weapons were turned in to the coalition last month?

Refined assessment criteria: How many, and what specific types of weapons (rifle, rocket launcher, IED) were turned in to local authorities last month in Patriotsville?

- SPO No. 6: TA joins government-sponsored neighborhood watch program.

Initial assessment criteria: How many people joined the neighborhood watch last month?

Refined assessment criteria: How many joined the Mahalla housing district neighborhood watch program last month, and how many attend the weekly meetings?

“The evaluation of PSYOP effectiveness is critical to the long-term success of PSYOP. The GWOT brings new challenges that place unprecedented demands on PSYOP Soldiers and capabilities. Only through systematic evaluation can PSYOP units obtain the objective feedback necessary for improving the effectiveness of their operations and ultimately to ‘win the mind, win the day.’”

SPO No. 4: TA enlists in the armed forces.

SPO No. 5: TA surrenders to coalition forces.

SPO No. 6: TA joins government-sponsored neighborhood watch program.

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

PSYOP assessment criteria are written as questions. Developed during planning and refined during target-audience analysis, or TAA, the assessment questions are based upon the specific behaviors that PSYOP planners want to influence or encourage, as expressed in the supporting objectives.

- SPO No. 1: TA registers to vote at UN voting sites.

Initial assessment criteria: How

The frequency would describe how often a behavior occurs (e.g., three times per day, 12 times per month). The intensity would measure the consequences or the severity of the behavior (e.g., 11 injuries, four deaths). Consider the addition of the refined criteria below:

- SPO No. 2: TA reports suspected terrorist activity on coalition hotline.

Initial assessment criteria: How many reports of suspected terrorist activity came in on the hotline last month?


Refined assessment criteria: How many, and what specific types of reports of suspected terrorist activity in Patriotsville were made on the hotline last month, and how many turned out to be credible?

- SPO No. 3: TA turns in military-grade weapons to the coalition.

The answers to the assessment criteria are called “impact indicators.” Impact indicators are collected at regular intervals over time and analyzed to determine behavior trends in relation to an ongoing PSYOP series and supporting PSYOP programs.

SPONTANEOUS EVENTS

Many of the events that influence TA behavior are unanticipated or outside the control of PSYOP forces. The effect of these spontaneous events must be taken into consideration, along with impact indicators, when evaluating the impact of PSYOP. Spontaneous events include friendly, neutral or hostile actions that affect the TA’s behavior (other than the PSYOP series). Occasionally, they may also include events that directly



▲ **EFFECTIVE EXAMPLE** The above chart is an example of a PSYOP evaluation plan.

involve PSYOP personnel, products or actions and that demonstrate the impact of a specific PSYOP series.

Some examples are shown below:

- Two coalition soldiers are accused of manhandling a Brcko native.
- A rash of kidnappings spurs sectarian violence.
- The bombing of a sacred mosque by extremists results in renewed sectarian violence.
- A manufacturing-plant shutdown causes widespread unemployment.
- A fatwa issued by the grand muftah of Brcko in August declares the

coalition an “ally of God.”

- Coalition forces conduct a raid, killing 120 terrorists and arresting more than 80.
- A Civil Affairs team conducts an unscheduled medical civic-action program, and village elders turn in suspected insurgents.

Spontaneous events can have a positive or negative effect on the TA’s behavior. Even a well-planned PSYOP series can be overcome by events. When that occurs, the TAA must be reviewed, because the conditions and the resulting vulnerabilities have

changed. Because of these changes, PSYOP planners may need to modify the series or develop a completely new series in order to achieve the objective.

ANALYZING POST-TESTING RESULTS

PSYOP forces conduct post-testing primarily to determine which portions of the PSYOP arguments have been accepted and whether the series requires adjustment. However, for the purposes of evaluation, the post-testing results help assess the degree of influence the series has had on TA behavior.

When assessing this influence, PSYOP personnel analyze post-testing results to determine the degree to which the TA has been exposed to the PSYOP arguments used in the series, how well the arguments were understood, the degree to which the TA accepted the arguments and whether the TA indicated that it would engage in the desired behavior. By analyzing post-testing results, along with the impact indicators and the spontaneous events, PSYOP personnel can better explain TA behavior and draw conclusions about the overall effectiveness of the PSYOP series. (For a more detailed explanation of PSYOP evaluation with example reports, see FM 3-05.301.)

DISCUSSION

Other proposed methods for PSYOP evaluation rely heavily on information from situation reports, or SITREPs, and opinion polls. There are a number of problems with those sources of information. First, SITREPs and polling data provide little objective information about changes in TA behavior. Furthermore, SITREPs often provide only subjective information about events, based upon anecdotal observations of the personnel reporting.

Polls are designed to represent the opinions of a population by conducting a series of questions and then extrapolating generalities. While they provide valuable insight, ultimately, these other approaches do not yield the systematic, behavior-focused information necessary for evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP in achieving its objectives.

SPOs are specific behaviors rather than behavioral outcomes. Properly developing SPOs during Phase I planning allows PSYOP evaluation requirements to be incorporated into the

supported unit's intelligence-collection plan. Reported intelligence is then focused on the actual TA behavior specified in the SPO. Monitored TA behavior, combined with an analysis of all competing influences, allows for a realistic determination of the effectiveness of PSYOP.

When PSYOP evaluation has not been planned or conducted effectively, the evaluation method presented here may be used to determine the effectiveness of PSYOP after execution. Even if objectives were originally broad or vague, new SPOs can be developed based on the behaviors targeted by a PSYOP series. A subsequent trend analysis can be conducted when compared with a series-execution matrix.

CONCLUSION

Evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP is difficult under the best of circumstances, and it requires a different system of evaluation from those used by other military units. The foundation for any method of PSYOP evaluation must be the monitoring of behavior over time. Without specific, measurable and observable objectives, and a dedicated collection mechanism, efforts to accurately measure PSYOP effectiveness cannot succeed. PSYOP evaluation requires close coordination with the supported unit throughout the planning process and participation in the development of the supported unit's intelligence-collection plan.

Furthermore, PSYOP evaluation requires dedicated personnel to coordinate with the supported unit's G2 and to monitor and analyze significant events and friendly, neutral and hostile actions — as they relate to ongoing PSYOP efforts. PSYOP evaluation provides a systematic, “user-friendly” and realistic methodology for gauging

the effectiveness of the PSYOP effort, managing PSYOP plans and tracking the attainment of SPOs.

The evaluation of PSYOP effectiveness is critical to the long-term success of PSYOP. The war on terror brings new challenges that place unprecedented demands on PSYOP Soldiers and capabilities. Only through systematic evaluation can PSYOP units obtain the objective feedback necessary for improving the effectiveness of their operations and ultimately to “win the mind, win the day.”

Captain Gregory Seese is an educational psychologist currently serving as the chief of the PSYOP Training Branch of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine. His assignments include medical platoon leader, PSYOP detachment commander, PSYOP operations officer and Civil Affairs team leader. He served in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Operation Enduring Freedom with the 3rd and 19th Special Forces groups.

Sergeant First Class Paul N. Smith is a PSYOP reservist and former doctrine development analyst in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, SWCS. He holds a master of science degree in international relations from Troy University. His assignments include PSYOP team- and detachment-sergeant positions in the 4th PSYOP Group. He supported several missions and operations in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility, including Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

DOCTRINE LINKS AVAILABLE ONLINE

There are many ways to access current doctrine. Below find instructions and locations of doctrine on the Internet:

AKO Doctrine and Training

On the AKO site, you can access a variety of unclassified publications, including field manuals, training circulars, mission training plans, Soldier training publications and technical manuals.

To access these materials, go to https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/Browse_Series_Collection_1.html.

Reimer Digital Library

To access doctrinal publications in the Reimer Library, go to http://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/appmanager/soldier/start?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=rldservice page.

Log into AKO. Select the RDL Services tab. To locate FMs, TCs, MTPs and STPs, select the Official Departmental Publications radio button. To locate GTAs, STs, TSPs and other training products, select the Commandant Approved Training radio button.

No draft publications or classified publications are posted on the RDL. Most ARSOF publications require a user name

and password, which must be requested directly from the library.

ARSOF Doctrine and Training Library

Doctrinal products can be accessed only by users of the Army Special Operations Command internal network. No classified publications are available. Access to restricted publications must be requested from the Web master at ASOCWeb@ahqb.soc.mil by providing your name, rank, unit and purpose of access.

On the Web, scroll down to browse publications in the categories of general ARSOF, Special Forces, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Rangers, Aviation, and Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape.

Many, but not all, classified ARSOF doctrinal and training publications are available on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network side of the ASOCiNet.

Army Publishing Directorate

Publication types: field manuals, training circulars, mission training plans and Soldier training publications, as well as many other publications and forms produced by the U.S. Army.

Publication formats: Doctrinal and training

publications are available by order in hard-copy format. Other types of publications and forms are available electronically in various formats.

Instructions: A unit may subscribe to an upcoming publication or requisition a publication using the Web site at www.apd.army.mil. The site provides complete instructions on setting up an account and ordering publications, but here are the basics:

- *To set up an account.* Submit a DA Form 12-R, *Request for Establishment of a Publications Account*. This form is available from the APD Web site. Process the form through your installation Directorate of Information Management, then fax it to DSN 892-0920 or commercial (314) 592-0920, Attn: Account Processing. Instructions for completing the DA Form 12-R are in DA Pamphlet 25-33 *Users Guide for Army Publications and Forms*, which can also be downloaded or browsed from the APD Web site. Subscribers will receive publications as they are produced; no further request is necessary.

- *To order publications.* Individual publications may also be requisitioned after an account has been established. To find out which publications are available, search at http://www.apd.army.mil/USAPA_PUB_search_P.asp. Publications may then be ordered at <https://dol.hqda.pentagon.mil/ptclick/index>.

SWCS ANNOUNCES NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PUBLICATIONS

Two new Psychological Operations publications from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School are being published by the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Psychological Operations Division in response to the needs of PSYOP Soldiers and lessons learned from current operations.

STP 33-37F14-SM-TG, *Soldier's Manual and Training Guide, 37F, Psychological Operations Specialist, Skill Levels 1 through 4*, reflects emerging trends resulting from the Army transformation initiatives; FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (August 2007); and revisions to the developmental path of the PSYOP specialist, as described in DA PAM 600-25, *U.S.*

Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide. The STP contains critical MOS tasks for PSYOP Soldiers E1 through E7.

STP 33-37F14-SM-TG reflects the tactics, techniques and procedures contained in FM 3-05.301 and FM 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, which are the primary references for the training and execution of PSYOP critical tasks. The STP provides PSYOP Soldiers with a guide describing the training required for performing their duties. It includes critical MOS tasks, accompanying task summaries and descriptions of the performance standards. The STP is available on AKO at: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/12213523>.

TC 33-02, (S) *PSYOP Targeting Handbook* (U), was developed in response to a need expressed by the PSYOP community. The publication provides PSYOP Soldiers with a reference guide to facilitate PSYOP integration into the targeting process.

The information in TC 33-02 augments doctrine found in joint and Army field manuals on PSYOP and targeting. The handbook is classified and can be accessed through AKO SIPR at: <http://www.us.army.smil.mil/suite/folder/801397>.

For additional information, telephone Captain Greg Seese at DSN 236-0295, commercial (910) 396-0295, or send e-mail to: seeseg@soc.mil.

SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING MATERIALS AVAILABLE VIA BLACKBOARD

Students going through the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, as well as Soldiers already assigned to the SF operational groups, can now access training materials via the Internet.

The Training Development Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the Special Warfare Center and School has populated the school's Learning Management System, or LMS, Blackboard® with training materials that will benefit all SF personnel. The LMS purpose is twofold.

The student in the SFQC now has the ability to preview the curriculum and presentations he will receive in future training; and he is afforded the ability to review previously received instruction and training prior to testing. An additional benefit of the LMS is that members of the operational groups now have a "reachback" resource to assist in preparing and conducting unit training, detachment cross-training, joint combined exchange training, preparation and individual self-study.

All SF-qualified Soldiers now have direct access to propo-

nent-approved training, educational curriculum and distributive-learning products.

The Blackboard SF site contains lesson plans and supporting media for class presentations, including joint and SF doctrinal references and other hyperlinked reference material relevant to all SF military occupational specialties, or MOSs.

Discussion boards and forums within the LMS have been created for each SF MOS, allowing unclassified open communication with fellow SF Soldiers for the sharing of experiences and lessons learned.

Access to the SF site within Blackboard is controlled by the Department of Special Operations Education and is available only to SFQC students and qualified SF Soldiers.

To obtain permission (password) to access the site, operational-group Soldiers must make a request through their unit G1 or S1 (verifying their SF qualification). Requests for access should include name, rank, MOS and AKO log-on and should be submitted to the Director of Special Operations Education via e-mail to DSOE_Support@ahqb.soc.mil.

Doctrinal Products Update

Doctrinal Products Update		
Joint and Army Doctrine Division		
FM 3-05.50	ARSOF Ranger Operations	May 2008
FM 3-05.137	ARSOF Foreign Internal Defense	June 2008
FM 3-05.130	ARSOF Unconventional Warfare	September 2008
FM 3-05.140	ARSOF Logistics	December 2008
Special Forces Doctrine Division		
FM 3-05.203	SF Direct Action (U)	January 2009
FM 3-05.222	SF Sniper Employment and Training (U)	February 2009
FM 3-05.210	SF Air Operations	February 2009
FM 3-05.230	SF Tactical Facilities	May 2009
FM 305.212	SF Waterborne Operations	March 2009
TC 31-73	SF Advisors Guide	July 2008
TC 31-20-2	SF HB for the Fingerprint Identification System	November 2008
TC 31-30-1	SF Sensitive Site Exploitation	November 2009
GTA 21-03-009	Code of Conduct	June 2008
Civil Affairs Doctrine Division		
JP 3-57	Joint Procedures for Civil-Military Operations	July 2008
	CA Brigade (AA) CATS	July 2008
	CA Battalion (AA) CATS	July 2008
	CA Company (AA) CATS	July 2008
	CA CACOM (USAR) CATS	TBP 2009
	CA Brigade (USAR) CATS	TBP 2009
	CA Battalion (USAR) CATS	TBP 2009
	CA Company (USAR) CATS	TBP 2009
Psychological Operations Doctrine Division		
STP 33-37F14	PSYOP Specialist	July 2008
TC 33-02	PSYOP Targeting HB (U)	August 2008

Enlisted

Special Forces

The FY 2008 Sergeant Major Promotion-Selection Board considered 458 NCOs in CMF 18 and selected 46 — a 9.96-percent promotion rate, compared to 6.24 percent for the Army overall.

The FY 2009 Sergeant First Class Promotion-Selection Board will convene soon. All Soldiers in the zone of consideration should review their records to ensure that they paint an accurate picture of their career.

Prior to each promotion board, eligible NCOs should read the promotion board announcement message. The message gives details regarding eligibility criteria, zones of consideration, complete-the-record NCO evaluation reports, electronic review of Enlisted Record Briefs, communications to the board and procedures for updating the official military personnel file and DA photo.

NCOs should also read the documents of the previous year's promotion board: the promotion board announcement message, the memorandum of instruction to board members and the board guidance (the document that tells board members how to determine the best-qualified candidates for promotion). These documents can be found at: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/select/Enlisted.htm>.

For additional information, telephone Sergeant Major J.C. Crenshaw at DSN 239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to john.crenshaw1@soc.mil.

Civil Affairs

Five Civil Affairs master sergeants were chosen by the FY 2008 Sergeant Major Promotion-Selection Board for promotion.

Thirty-one Soldiers graduated from the Civil Affairs Qualification Course in September. CA continues to recruit Soldiers who meet the prerequisites listed in DA Pam 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*. (See link below, sign in using your AKO user ID and password, then go to Chapter 10, 38B) <https://perscomnd04.army.mil/MOSMARTBK.nsf/>

Interested Soldiers should contact SFC Herring or SFC Pease at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, located at Fort Bragg on Macomb Street, Building 2-1120. They can be contacted at (910) 432-9697. The next CA accessions board will be held in December or January.

CA Soldiers in the rank of sergeant are eligible for a selective re-enlistment bonus of up to \$15,000. Staff sergeants may be eligible for a critical-skills re-enlistment bonus of up to \$10,000.

CA Soldiers who wish to explore new assignments should contact Master Sergeant Butler, Civil Affairs assignment manager, at (703) 325-8399.

Psychological Operations

Four Psychological Operations master sergeants were selected by the FY 2008 Sergeant Major Promotion-Selection Board for promotion to sergeant major and attendance in the

Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas.

In July, the Army G1 approved a policy to automatically promote PSYOP Soldiers to E5 once they graduate from the Psychological Operations Qualification Course, or POQC, and are awarded the PSYOP military occupational specialty, 37F. The promotion will be effective on the earliest date that a Soldier meets both requirements.

A 37F accessions board met in September to select the best-qualified Soldiers to attend the POQC and reclassify to 37F. The panel was made up of command sergeants major and sergeants major from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the 4th PSYOP Group. The panel reviewed 94 applications to fill 40 training seats for the FY 2009 POQC.

The files were sorted into three categories: best-qualified, fully qualified and never to reapply. After reviewing and grading the files, the panel established an order-of-merit list. Of the 42 Soldiers selected, 16 were specialists, 24 were sergeants and two were staff sergeants.

The files selected were forwarded to the Army Human Resources Command for processing and placing on assignments. A Soldier's availability to attend the POQC will determine the class date. The next 37F accessions board is tentatively scheduled for December.

For additional information or to submit a reclassification packet, contact the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion at www.bragg.army.mil/PSYOP, or telephone (910) 396-6533. For information about PSYOP assignments worldwide, contact SFC Venon, HRC, at DSN 221-8901.

Warrant Officer

Timely PME attendance key

Special Forces warrant officers are encouraged to attend their professional military education in accordance with DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Official Professional Development and Career Management*. CWO2s with one year of time-in-grade are eligible to attend the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course, and CWO3s with one year time-in-grade are eligible to attend the Warrant Officer Staff Course. All 180As should make plans to attend as soon as they are eligible, so that they can attain the skills necessary for their MOS and remain competitive for promotion. All SF warrant officers are encouraged to view and download a copy of the

revised DA Pam 600-3 (http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdf/files/p600_3.pdf).

WONET Forum seeks to share experiences

The Warrant Officer Net, or WONET, a forum within the Battle Command Knowledge System, is a professional forum committed to developing the finest and most lethal WO corps for the Army at war. Through WONET, warrant officers can share thoughts, ideas, experiences, knowledge and lessons learned, and they can seek assistance from mentors, subject-matter experts and peers. The forum provides insights to questions about WO issues, branch-specific WO issues

or even specific MOS-related questions. To join WONET, go to: <https://wonet.bcks.army.mil>.

National Guard 180A recruiting in full swing

The Army National Guard is continuing its efforts to recruit SF warrant officers. ARNG Soldiers who are SF NCOs and are ready to take on a rewarding career as an SF warrant officer should contact their state command chief warrant officer or the 180A proponent manager at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School to see if they meet the prerequisites. The SWCS 180A proponent manager can be reached at DSN 239-1879/7597 or commercial (910) 432-1879/7597.

Officer

CA, PSYOP to get expanded command opportunities

Effective with the FY 2010 Colonel Command and Key Billet Centralized Selection Board, 02A (combat-arms im-material) garrison commands will be open to officers in the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations branches.

The anticipated release of the FY10 lieutenant colonel and colonel command selection list and slate will be mid-April 2009.

SF officers selected for SSC

The Army has selected or revalidated 20 Special Forces officers for attendance at one of the senior service colleges. The selection rate for SF officers was 7.65 percent. All selectees were former Command Selection List battalion commanders (nine tactical, four special troops battalion, two recruiting, two Joint POWR/MIA Accounting Command, one training, one Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, one garrison). Eighteen of them had all above-center-of-mass officer efficiency reports as lieutenant colonels, and 19 of them had all ACOM OERs as battalion commanders (the one exception had an extremely strong write-up). The SSC alternate list will not be released until after the release of this year's colonel promotion list in November. The selectees are:

LTC Francis Beaudette, new select; LTC Shannon Boehm, new select; LTC George Bond, revalidate; LTC Scott Browe, new select; LTC Leslie Brown, new select; LTC Kevin Colyer, new select; LTC David Dellinger, new select; LTC Antonio Fletcher, new select; LTC Ronald Johnson, new select; LTC Guy Lemire, new select; LTC Patrick Mahaney, new select; LTC John Maraia, new select; LTC

Robert McDowell, revalidate; LTC Christopher Miller, new select; COL John Mulbury, revalidate; LTC Wade Owens, new select; LTC Douglas Raddatz, new select; LTC David Roddenberry, new select; LTC James Saenz, new select; and LTC Mark Strong, revalidate.

Officer promotion information

The FY 2009 ARSOF accession board, targeting officers in year group 2006, will be conducted in April, and results will be released following the announcement of the results of the captain's promotion board.

Officers may attend SAMS following KD assignments

Officers who have served in key developmental assignments but who were not able to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies, or SAMS, after attending intermediate-level education now have two avenues for attending SAMS, the Army's premier operational leadership school:

- 1) Officers can apply directly to SAMS and compete with current ILE students for admission, then attend, based on the needs of the force, or
- 2) Officers may submit a field-nomination packet endorsed by the commanding general, JFK SWCS, prior to submission. ARSOF will allow three SF officers, one PSYOP officer and one Civil Affairs officer to be selected for admission.

SAMS graduates earn the 6S additional-skill identifier and will be used in joint SOF assignments. SAMS requires a one-year permanent-change-of-station move to Fort Leavenworth, Kan., with the opportunity to voluntarily stabilize for an additional year.

For additional application information, officers should telephone Candace Hamm at DSN 585-3302, commercial (913) 758-3302.

Officers may apply now for Naval Postgraduate School

Officers who want to apply to attend the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., in June 2009 must send their applications to the major's assignment officer, Major Jamie Hayes, at the Army Human Resources Command by Dec. 1, 2008. The ARSOF Group will hold an internal selection board in January 2009 and choose the best-qualified candidates. Selectees will be announced by Feb. 15, 2009. In addition to a master's degree, NPS graduates may also complete ILE qualification, provided they take the two-week ILE preparatory course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., offered in June prior to the start of NPS, and complete the Naval CSC Distance Learning Course (P950) afterward.

SF majors to be selected for KD slots beginning in summer 2009

The list of SF majors available for key developmental assignments in the SF groups beginning in summer 2009 has been sent to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command for dissemination to the U.S. Army Special Forces Command and the SF groups. The SF Branch passes to USASOC information related to an officer's preference and prior service. Group commanders decide which majors are to be assigned to their group. Officers who want to be assigned to a particular group can improve their visibility and chances of selection by contacting the commander.

FY 2009 officer board schedule

The table to the right is the fiscal year 2009 schedule of Army boards for command, promotions and schools.

In light of the high operational tempo, all officers should work proactively with the Army Human Resources Command, Special Operations Division, to ensure that their records are up-to-date and that their file contains a DA photo that is less than a year old.

BOARD	TENTATIVE DATES
CPT ARMY	12 OCT - 05 NOV 08
COL MFE CMD	06 -16 JAN 09
CWO 3/4/5	21 JAN - 06 FEB 09
LTC ARMY/MAJ SELCON	18 FEB - 12 MAR 09
SENIOR SVC. COLLEGE	31 MAR - 17 APR 09
MAJ ARMY/CPT SELCON	21 APR - 14 MAY 09
COL ARMY/ LTC SELCON	07 - 24 JULY 09
CFD (YG 02/06)	09 - 22 SEP - 09
LTC MFE CM	22 SEP - 09 OCT 09

KILLING ROMMEL

A NOVEL

Steven Pressfield's *Killing Rommel* is an extraordinary book written about the exploits of one combat patrol by the British World War II unit, the Long Range Desert Group, or LRDG. The mission of the patrol was to kill German General Erwin Rommel, the legendary "Desert Fox." Although a work of historical fiction, the book contains a myriad of lessons about courage, loyalty, honor and the warrior ethos that are important to Special Forces Soldiers in today's world.

The LRDG was one of the first units to be considered special forces, and Rommel himself stated that man-for-man, the LRDG had done more harm to the Axis cause in North Africa than any other unit. That is quite a statement considering the small size of the LRDG. Although mainly a reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering unit, the LRDG caused great damage to German airfields and pulled countless numbers of German soldiers out of the fight to guard against their continual raids.


The book follows R. Lawrence Chapman, affectionately known as "Chap,"

from his time as a lieutenant and a tank officer up to his time in the LRDG and ultimately, to his part in the mission to kill Rommel. Reading about how Chap views himself and the men he is leading is fascinating. He does not view himself as a hero or even a warrior, but as someone who is simply doing his duty.

One of the most striking parts of the book is when Chap speaks about courage in combat. In his experience, "Valor in action counts for far less than simply being able to perform one's commonplace task without messing it up" — a true statement about combat if there ever was one.

The book goes into great detail about the mission to kill Rommel and all the problems and triumphs associated with it.

On a professional note, the book clearly shows the direct application of the Special Forces core competencies, the Special Forces core values and the SOF Imperatives. It is highly recommend for all past, present and future SOF Soldiers. It speaks volumes of what is needed today



DETAILS

By Steven Pressfield

New York, NY:
Doubleday, 2008.
ISBN: 978-0-385-57970-0.
320 pages. \$24.95.

Reviewed by:

Major Jim Gant
USA JFK Special Warfare Center and School

to win on the battlefield. It is a wonderfully told story by an author who will make the reader feel as if he were there hunting Rommel himself.

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