

Special Warfare



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
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Commander & Commandant
Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

Editor
Jerry D. Steelman

Associate Editor
Janice Burton

Graphics & Design
Jennifer Martin

Webmaster
Eva Herrera



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Editor, *Special Warfare*;
Attn: AOJK-DTD-MP; USAJFKSWCS,
Fort Bragg, NC 28310
or e-mail them to steelman@soc.mil.

For additional information:
Contact: *Special Warfare*
Commercial: (910) 432-5703
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George W. Casey Jr.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:


Joyce E. Morrow
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

06329

Headquarters, Department of the Army

In August, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Department of the Army will host the Irregular Warfare Conference at SWCS. This conference will be significant because it highlights the growing appreciation of the importance of the activities of irregular warfare, or IW. It also demonstrates the cooperation between SWCS, USA-SOC and the rest of the Army in approaching the type of warfare that will be increasingly prevalent in the future.

IW is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as “A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.” According to DoD Directive 3000.07, dated Dec. 1, 2008, the list of IW activities includes counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and stability operations.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, states, “Special operations forces conduct most irregular warfare operations. Sometimes conventional forces support them; other times special operations forces operate alone. However, if special operations forces and host-nation forces cannot defeat unconventional and irregular threats, conventional Army forces may assume the lead role.” In IW operations, human factors, such as sociology, political will and the psychology of the adversary, may be more important than the “force on force” aspects of conventional operations. This is a concept that ARSOF understand, and one for which we select and train our Soldiers, but it may require a significant shift in focus for conventional forces.

As BG Bennet Sacolick points out in his article in this issue, the U.S. military is becoming more aware of the benefits of having more forces with qualities that are SOF-like — including advanced skills, cultural appreciation, language skills, flexibility and adaptability. Making conventional forces more SOF-like might require the redesign of some conventional force structure or additional programs of selection and training such as the ones we use for ARSOF. Special-operations forces cannot be created overnight, and neither can SOF-like forces. Nor can SOF-like skills be maintained without a significant investment in training time and money. Some of the IW preparation options might not be immediately feasible because of budgetary or time constraints. Other options might include finding ways of letting ARSOF perform the activities for which they are best-qualified and passing along their hard-earned experience in other IW activities to conventional forces.

A sharing of knowledge between conventional forces and ARSOF and an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of both might be a first step toward ensuring that our nation can build and maintain the capabilities it needs for the challenges of irregular operations. That sharing is a goal of the IW Conference, and if we are successful, it can be a start of a synergistic effort to improve our national ability to conduct irregular warfare.



Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

IN MEMORIAM

May 2008-May 2009

95th Civil Affairs Brigade

SSG Anthony D. Davis
CPL Benjamin C. Dillon
SPC Thomas F. Duncan III
SPC Christopher Gathercole
MAJ Robert D. Lindenau
SFC David L. McDowell
SGT William P. Rudd

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment

CWO Hershel D. McCants Jr.
CWO John A. Quinlan
SPC Travis R. Vaughn
CWO Jamie D. Weeks

U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command

CPT Shane R. Mahaffee
SSG Robert J. Paul

1st Special Forces Group

SSG Joseph F. Curreri
SSG David W. Textor
SFC Michael J. Tully

3rd Special Forces Group

SSG Jeremy E. Bessa
MSG David L. Hurt
SGT Nicholas A. Robertson
SSG Marc J. Small

5th Special Forces Group

SSG Jason L. Brown
SSG Ryan D. Maseth

7th Special Forces Group

SSG John C. Brite
SGT Nicholas A. Casey
CPT Richard G. Cliff Jr.
SSG Travis K. Hunsberger
SFC Jamie Nicholas
SFC David Nunez
SFC Jeffrey M. Radamorles
MSG Shawn E. Simmons
SGT James M. Treber
SFC Gary J. Vasquez
SSG Joshua R. Whitaker
MSG Mitchell W. Young

10th Special Forces Group

SSG Frank J. Gasper
SSG Robert R. Pirelli

Greater love hath no man
than this, that a man lay
down his life for his friends.

—John 15:13

10TH SF GROUP AWARDS DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS, SILVER STAR MEDALS

Three 10th Special Forces Group Soldiers were honored for valorous service during a ceremony at the Fort Carson, Colo., Special Events Center May 14.

Sergeant 1st Class Jarion Halbisengibbs received the Distinguished Service Cross, while Captain Matthew A. Chaney and Sergeant 1st Class Michael D. Lindsay received Silver Star Medals during the ceremony.

The Special Forces Soldiers, from Operational Detachment – Alpha 083, received the medals for their heroism in action Sept. 10, 2007.

Advising a combined assault element of Iraqi National Police on an intelligence-driven raid, the Soldiers had the mission to capture a high-value target, or HVT, from the Islamic State of Iraq who was running a kidnapping and extortion ring.

Admiral Eric T. Olson, United States Special Operations Command commander, and Lieutenant General John T. Mulholland Jr., U.S. Army Special Operations Command commander, presented the awards to the Soldiers.


“You have listened to and read the account of that night on 10 September 2007, a mission that asked the best of some of our nation’s finest,” said Olson. “This was ODA 083, a Green Beret A-Team in action, under pressure, at risk. Sergeant Halbisengibbs exemplifies the spirit and ethos of these warriors. He is a gifted team member and individual Soldier, one who raises the performance and morale of those around him.”

ODA 083’s mission was to capture the HVT, who was entrenched in a fortified stronghold. After infiltrating by air into an unplanned landing zone less than 30 meters from the enemy position, Chaney directed the assault force toward the targeted buildings.

The assault force immediately came under enemy fire, which the team and their Iraqi counterparts returned while assaulting the compound.

After clearing the closest structure, the assault element immediately came under enemy fire from a building approximately 50 meters away.

Lindsay and Halbisengibbs killed three insurgents who were firing from the



▲ MEN OF VALOR Sergeant 1st Class Jarion Halbisengibbs (left), recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross, Captain Matthew Chaney and Sergeant 1st Class Michael Lindsay, recipients of the Silver Star Medal at Fort Carson’s Special Events Center May 14. *U.S. Army photo.*

building as the force assaulted. Chaney and Lindsay placed themselves in a critical position at the breach point, while Halbisengibbs employed a fragmentation grenade, killing two of the enemy fighters waiting inside.

Within seconds of entering the building, the three killed two more enemy fighters before Chaney and Lindsay were hit by AK-47 fire, both receiving major injuries.

Despite their serious wounds, they — along with Halbisengibbs — continued to engage the enemy inside until an enemy grenade exploded and wounded all three, propelling Chaney and Lindsay back through the door of the house and out into the courtyard. The grenade blast sent Halbisengibbs to the floor, with shrapnel wounding his firing hand and damaging his radio and night-vision device.

Chaney, although suffering from multiple gunshot wounds, continued to exercise command, and while directing actions on the objective, killed another insurgent who was firing at him from an open door.

As a result of the grenade blast, Lindsay had been thrown into the line of fire from another enemy position to the east of the main building, but ignoring his wounds, he continued to engage the enemy.

Wounded and alone in the target building, Halbisengibbs was unable to contact the remainder of the assault force to request support. Taking immediate and decisive action, he leapt to his feet and quickly cleared the room.

Making his way out to the courtyard, Halbisengibbs immediately passed a verbal status report to his ODA, indicating his status, but he continued to fight. During the course of relaying the message, he came under close-range small arms fire from an enemy position not yet cleared by the national police assault force.

As Halbisengibbs reacted to the threat, he was shot in the abdomen; the bullet traveled through his stomach and exited at his hip. Ignoring this second debilitating gunshot wound, he engaged and killed the enemy within 12 feet of his position.

Halbisengibbs then took cover and rallied the remainder of the Iraqi National Police and assisted in securing the objective area. Only when the enemy was eliminated and the objective was secure did he reveal the seriousness of his wounds and accept medical attention.

Halbisengibbs was responsible for single-handedly killing six of the enemy on the objective and personally eliminating a high-value target. — *USASOC PAO*

LESSONS-LEARNED CELLS EMBEDDED THROUGHOUT USASOC

By J.O. Olson

At the end of September 2007, Admiral Eric Olson, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, issued the USSOCOM Execution Roadmap for Lessons Learned. The document laid out a vision for a special-operations-wide lessons-learned program and tasked each of the component commands to develop plans of action for improving the collection, analysis, dissemination and integration of lessons learned. As a result, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command created and implemented the USASOC Lessons Learned Program, which originally had three components: lessons learned unit analysts, or L2UAs; the Lessons Learned Fusion Cell, or LLFC; and a collaborative peer-to-peer, or P2P, network. In early 2009, a fourth component was developed and became operational: the Lessons Learned Working Group, or LLWG.

The USASOC L2UAs are located at each subordinate component command and each subordinate component unit across the Army. Those analysts serve as the connectors and conduits to the larger lessons-learned program and serve as the commander's subject-matter experts and research analysts for all lessons-learned related matters. The analysts also conduct unit training on lessons learned and

are prepared to deploy with the unit to gather observations. Each unit is scheduled to receive both a contract analyst and a Department of the Army civilian analyst to add depth and flexibility within the unit. The contact information for L2UAs is shown below.

The USASOC LLFC is the central clearinghouse for all ARSOF lessons learned and is located within the USASOC headquarters. The LLFC houses analysts from both the Center for Army Lessons Learned and USSOCOM. That ensures that USASOC is completely integrated with its sister SOF and the Army. The LLFC also conducts lessons-learned research to support the USASOC staff and directorates.

The P2P collaboration network resides on the USASOC SIPR portal and is SharePoint based. This is a closed network that allows the analysts to rapidly exchange information and large documents, while ensuring that there is no premature or unauthorized release of information. Each of the UAs, in turn, have the ability to establish P2P sites within their respective units for rapidly sharing information internally.

The LLWG was developed to analyze lessons learned and identify potential issues for resolution by the existing resolution processes within USASOC. Not all observations are issues. An is-

sue usually requires the expenditure of resources to resolve, and the fix can be either material or nonmaterial. Once the issues have been brought to the attention of the LLWG, they are either adopted or rejected by the body. If adopted, the LLWG assigns the responsibility for resolution and tracks the resolution to implementation, at which point the issue is "closed."

To date, the LLWG has identified equipment needs and policy-and-procedure changes, and it has identified and submitted items to USSOCOM and the Department of the Army for inclusion in the Quadrennial Defense Review. It is important to note that the LLWG doesn't resolve issues; rather, issues are resolved by commanders, staffs and directorates. The LLWG is only the tool for identifying issues.

USASOC has not been tasked or resourced to archive lessons learned. All lessons learned, whether contained in after-action reviews, the special-operations debriefing and retrieval system, PowerPoint presentations, out-briefs or singular observations, are archived using the Joint Lessons Learned Information System-Special Operations Forces, or JLLIS-SOF, which it is part of the larger Department of Defense system, the SOF portion is managed by USSOCOM. All SIPR-net account holders can access JLLIS-SOF. After establishing an account, all USASOC users will automatically be directed to the ARSOF homepage at each log-in, but they will have access to the entire system, including joint and interagency searches. See your unit analyst for more information about JLLIS-SOF or to receive JLLIS-SOF training.

The key to the success of the program is ownership and participation by the Soldier. There are negative impressions in the force about lessons learned and AARs; those need to be overcome. Leaders at all levels must embrace the concept of sharing their experiences for the benefit of all.

J.O. Olson is a contractor working for USASOC as the lessons learned analyst for the JFK Center and School.

USASOC	Ft. Bragg	Mr. Ritch	910.396.0402
USASOC	Ft. Bragg	Mr. King	910.396.1348
SWCS	Ft. Bragg	Mr. Olson	910.396.0509
USASFC	Ft. Bragg	Mr. Hesnard	910.396.8326
1st SFG	Ft. Lewis	Mr. Farmer	253.967.8987
3rd SFG	Ft. Bragg	Mr. Carter	910.396.1664
5th SFG	Ft. Campbell	Mr. Vandendyke	270.798.4221
7th SFG	Ft. Bragg	Mr. Rulli	910.396.7622
10th SFG	Ft. Carson	Mr. Seideman	719.524.1869
75th RGR	Ft. Benning	Mr. Parker	706.626.0860
528th SB	Ft. Bragg	Mr. Foy	910.432.5143
4th POG	Ft. Bragg	Mr. Harskjold	910.907.1542
95th CAB	Ft. Bragg	Mr. Williams	910.907.1771
160th SOAR	Ft. Campbell	Mr. Covert	270.956.3987

KRAFT TAKES COMMAND OF 7TH SF GROUP

Colonel James E. Kraft Jr., took command of the 7th Special Forces Group from Colonel Sean P. Mulholland during a change-of-command ceremony at Fort Bragg's Meadows Field May 8.

During the ceremony, Mulholland passed the group colors and the responsibility of the unit's Soldiers to Brigadier General Michael S. Repass, commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

"7th Group is, and always will be, my home," Mulholland said to the formation of Soldiers. "These super Soldiers never fail to find solutions to any problem."

"Jim is the best choice for the job," Mulholland said. To Kraft, he said, "Savor the moments and lead from the front."

Expressing enthusiasm for his new position, Kraft said, "Thank you for allowing me to serve in this regiment. It is an honor to be in command of such a superior Special Forces unit. In a few months, we will be heading back to where we are needed. I truly appreciate all that you have done in Afghanistan and Iraq, fulfilling our nation's business with dignity and honor."

Kraft has been a member of the 7th SF Group since he made the transition from Infantry to Special Forces in 1990. His most recent of four 7th SF Group assignments was as command-



▲ IN COMMAND Colonel Sean P. Mulholland passes the guidon to Brigadier General Mike Repass, commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Colonel James E. Kraft, the incoming commander of the 7th SF Group, and Command Sergeant Major George Bequer look on. *U.S. Army photo.*

er of the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group. Kraft has served as the aide-de-camp to the vice chief of staff of the Army, as a professor of military science and leadership at McDaniel College in Westminster, Md., as the USASOC G3,

and as the chief of staff, U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

Mulholland's next assignment will be with the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. — *USASOC PAO*

G9/S9 Conference Brings Civil Affairs Practitioners to the Table

On May 5-7, the Civil Affairs Doctrine Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine hosted the G9/S9 Workshop at the Airborne and Special Operations Museum in Fayetteville, N.C. The workshop brought doctrine writers and analysts from the schoolhouse together with practitioners from the field, as well as former G9/S9 officers and NCOs, to share their experiences and discuss the future of the G9/S9 staff function.

The CA Division hosted the workshop because the growing importance of civil-military operations and the resultant restructuring of organizations at the brigade, division, corps and theater-Army levels has increased the emphasis on the G9/S9 staff function. The role of the G9/S9 has been professionalized, and those positions are being filled by CA officers and NCOs.

The workshop's objectives were to provide CA-proponent support to CA staff personnel across the Army; create a collaborative environment for coordination between G9s, S9s

and supporting units; and provide a conduit for exploring concepts and vetting doctrinal and training products.

More than seventy-five participants, including representatives from the Marine Corps, the Chief of Army Reserve, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Command and General Staff College, attended the workshop. Participants received briefings from the DOTD CA Division and Training Development Division, and presentations by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and discussions by G9s/S9s at the theater-army, corps, division, brigade and SF-group levels. Participants also discussed ideas for the next revision of FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

The workshop presentations can be viewed at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/folder/16887763>. For more information, contact the CA Division at DSN 239-1654, commercial (910) 432-1654, or send e-mail to: AOJK-DT-CA@soc.mil.



SOF vs. SOF-Like

By Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick

There has been significant discussion recently regarding the need for America's conventional military forces to be more like special-operations or "SOF-like." The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently reaffirmed the necessity for more SOF-like forces when he said, "The one requirement that jumps off the page is the requirement for all services to be SOF-like — to be netted, to be much more flexible, adaptive, faster, lethal and precise."

That discussion is not a knee-jerk reaction to our current conflicts but a conclusion drawn from studying our potential adversaries in the 21st century. There have been numerous forecasts describing our future environment — an environment without any peer, or near-peer competitors, one in which our most likely threats will resort to an alternative to conventional military confrontation, such as irregular warfare.

The U.S. intelligence community predicts that our foreseeable future will be one of persistent conflict involving Third World countries, insurgencies and terrorist organizations. It will be fueled by poverty, illiteracy, injustice, expanding Islamic extremism, and competition for energy, food, water and other resources. Although our homeland has not been attacked recently, international terrorism is still spreading.

Like the Cold War, the war on terror may never be

won by a single, decisive battle that will bring stability to the world. Instead, a strategy of global engagement — the strategic use of development, diplomacy and defense to advance our political agenda in areas such as economic prosperity and international cooperation — employing Special Forces Soldiers, may be our best bet for defeating international terrorism. Terrorist organizations must be defeated at the local, grass-roots level by a combination of development, diplomacy and defense, hence global engagement.

It would be helpful to describe the complexities associated with those special-operation forces and the unique role they play in the execution of an American foreign policy predicated upon global engagement. Special Forces, commonly referred to as Green Berets, can serve as a representative example of SOF because they represent the largest single component assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command.

We currently have SF Soldiers conducting various global-engagement activities in several dozen countries. They are not only training host-nation forces but they are also teaching their military personnel about democracy, human rights, freedom and dignity — all while eating, sleeping, living, working, planning, and, if necessary, fighting alongside them. Our Soldiers, our warrior diplomats, are building a coalition of partner nations around the world to

help share the burden of global stability.

Special-operations forces are specifically trained and equipped to conduct many of the activities of irregular warfare. The U.S. Joint Forces Command recently created a Joint Irregular Warfare Center, headed by a Special Forces officer, to guide its efforts in shifting general-purpose-force capabilities more toward a SOF approach to fighting.

In order to attend the Special Forces Qualification Course, a Soldier must first pass the 19-day SF Assessment and Selection, which evaluates three important qualities: character, commitment and intellect. Character depends upon a candidate's moral and ethical foundation; commitment determines the Soldier's level of physical and mental preparation; and intellect is indicative of his ability to conceptualize and solve complex problems.

Those few Soldiers who eventually become Green Berets have demonstrated the highest standards of discipline, dedication, integrity and professionalism. That is why approximately 77 percent of the young men who try out for the challenging, year-long, SFQC rarely make it

“The war on terror may never be won by a single, decisive battle that will bring stability to the world. Instead, a strategy of global engagement employing Special Forces Soldiers, may be our best bet for defeating international terrorism.”

past the first few months. We demand that each SF Soldier master hundreds of tasks specific to his specialty, plus an array of advanced war-fighting skills that are critical for survival on today's complex battlefields. As if that were not enough, every Green Beret learns a foreign language — including difficult languages like Russian, Chinese, Korean, or Arabic — and then must pass a language-proficiency examination before he graduates. But most importantly, Green Berets must demonstrate maturity, judgment, courage, initiative, self-confidence and compassion beyond what we expect from members of any other profession.

In order to appreciate why these qualities are so important, we need to put them in the context of one of our assigned missions: counterterrorism.

Recently, the Secretary of Defense said, “The most important military component in the war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable our partners to defend and govern their own countries.” Special Forces Soldiers are specifically trained and equipped to assist the indigenous security forces of troubled countries and to build their capacity for defeating terrorism. Training military forces has been a core task of Special Forces since our inception in 1952, and nobody does it better. However, in order to accomplish that task, we need access to these troubled countries, and access requires a continued policy of global engagement.

SF Soldiers are the U.S.'s only trained warrior-diplomats, the only force we have that intuitively understands

the balance between diplomacy and force, and the only force that possesses the judgment to determine which actions are most appropriate in any given situation. We specialize in coaching, teaching, mentoring, motivating and training local security forces, and we do this with the patience of a diplomat and in their native tongue. SF Soldiers understand that the key to success is through “the indirect approach” — working “by, with and through” host-nation forces, because ultimately, the most powerful message is one delivered by our partners to their own people.

It is the ability to understand the balance between the two opposite notions of diplomacy and force that makes our Soldiers so remarkably valuable and quite possibly our best military solution against terrorism.

We send our SF Soldiers to the most dangerous countries in the world, working in their 12-man operational detachments, isolated and far removed from any support or protection other than that provided by the forces they are training. Consider that responsibility — consider the trust required to train those who provide the blanket of security under which you live, work and sleep. The men of the

Green Beret live that reality every single day. This is the expectation that our country places upon our SF Soldiers, and this is what they have been trained to do.

Our future may produce more challenges than special-operations forces alone can effectively respond to, hence the critical requirement for more SOF or SOF-like forces. However, despite the doomsday forecast we see in the media, the U.S. remains the most prosperous, powerful nation in the world. But with that greatness comes responsibility. Many Americans believe that our continued engagement in the affairs of our foreign partners is counterproductive. However, our security and prosperity, as well as the safety of our families and our homeland, are inextricably linked to the international community whose members consistently turn to the U.S. for their own security guarantees. Rightly or wrongly, the mantle of leadership has been thrust upon us, and there is no other nation more trusted, more capable or better-suited to assume that role than the U.S.

It is in our best interest to serve as the guardians of democracy while protecting trade, promoting finance and maintaining our own access throughout the world. This all translates into a sustained and continuous process of global engagement, and nobody in any military does this better than U.S. Special Forces. **SW**

Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick is the deputy commander of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.



PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

By Marty Bartram

As a teacher's purpose is to serve the student, so is the purpose of Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, to serve the supported commander. For that reason, the principles that should be most important to PSYOP Soldiers are not PSYOP principles, but rather the principles of war.

The Army's nine traditional principles of war were published just after World War I and have had minor adjustments since that time. Joint doctrine adds three other principles, and taken together, they make up the 12 principles of joint operations, which characterize the conduct of operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Commanders and planners at all levels should look at psychological operations from the perspective of the 12 principles to see how PSYOP supports the principles as well as how the principles apply to the execution of the Army and joint PSYOP processes.

By studying the principles, PSYOP Soldiers can maintain consistency

with Army and joint doctrine and apply that doctrine to PSYOP planning methodology. FM 3-0, *Operations*, states, "Applied to the study of past campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements, the principles of war are powerful analysis tools."¹

But FM 3-0 also cautions, "The principles of war are not a checklist. While they are considered in all operations, they do not apply in the same way to every situation. Rather, they summarize characteristics of successful operations. Their greatest value lies in the education of the military professional."²

Let's take a closer look at the 12 principles and the way they are related to PSYOP.

Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The principle of objective dictates that all actions contribute to the commander's desired end state. Psychological operations must have clear, concise objectives. PSYOP objectives ensure focus of limited resources, emphasis

on outcome and support of the commander's intent and objectives. They promote initiative by establishing parameters for units to develop nested and tailored supporting programs.

Offensive: Seize, retain and exploit the initiative. Staff planners and commanders, through lessons learned and after-action reports, have proclaimed that PSYOP is not effective when it is reactive. As a principle of war, initiative (synonymous with offensive) compels the enemy to react. Likewise, seizing the initiative through psychological operations starts the target audience, or TA, down the desired path of behavior instead of trying to get the TA to change direction later. A PSYOP series consists of all products and actions designed to accomplish one behavioral change in a single TA. PSYOP units retain the initiative by using current intelligence to modify or sustain a series in execution and to modify a planned series. They actively assess and respond to situations, incidents and operations in order to exploit time-

12 PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND OPERATIONS

OBJECTIVE: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.

OFFENSIVE: Seize, retain and exploit the initiative.

MASS: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.

ECONOMY OF FORCE: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

MANEUVER: Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power.

UNITY OF COMMAND: For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.

SECURITY: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.

SURPRISE: Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.

SIMPLICITY: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

PERSEVERANCE: Ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

LEGITIMACY: Develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

RESTRAINT: Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.

sensitive opportunities. PSYOP units exploit the initiative by consistently reinforcing the TA's behavior that supports achievement of objectives.

Mass: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. The principle of mass dictates that PSYOP units use objectives as a discriminatory factor when selecting target audiences and not indiscriminately lump groups together without purpose. The PSYOP process is designed to mass the effects of the behavior of distinct TAs. That can be accomplished by developing PSYOP series that focus on a single TA's achievement of a single supporting PSYOP objective. Series are executed to achieve the desired behavior from multiple target audiences at a decisive place and time in order to achieve the commander's objective.

Economy of Force: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. PSYOP forces are high-demand, low-density assets. Their judicious use is paramount for sustaining the fight. Economy of force does not mean that commanders must do more with less but rather that deliberate decision-making must determine the required capability and the duration of time that capability will be essential. That allows joint-staff planners to achieve the right allocation of forces.

Economy of force also applies to the choice of media, as well as the frequency with which a TA will be exposed to a message. Commanders of PSYOP units must balance the media-selection recommendations of their PSYOP specialists against budget constraints. That does not mean that Army special-operations forces execute PSYOP on the cheap, but commanders must balance execution requirements with known restraints and request required assets in order to execute approved programs. PSYOP specialists understand that overexposure to the message can have a negative effect on a TA and that frequency and media must be appropriate to the TA if it is to influence the desired behavior.

Maneuver: Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver requires flexibility in thought, plans and operations. PSYOP must be flexible in order to adapt to changing situations. Additionally, they assist the commander in positioning the TA, whether friendly, neutral,

hostile or enemy, in the preferred environment for exploitation in order to achieve objectives. PSYOP units and staff elements coordinate with supporting logistics and intelligence elements to assure that those critical enablers provide required support so that PSYOP programs can be flexible in development and execution.

Unity of command: For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. Unity of command requires that a single commander direct the actions of all forces toward achievement of a single objective. Without this unity, the full power of the force cannot be applied. "The joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational nature of unified action creates situations where the commander does not directly control all organizations in the operational area. In the absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate and build consensus to achieve unity of effort."³

The quotation above is especially applicable to PSYOP. Unity of effort can be achieved through the work of organic staff elements at every echelon, from the maneuver-battalion commander to the joint-forces commander and up to the president and the joint chiefs. Unity of command and unity of effort are deliberate considerations that tie into the array of PSYOP forces and promote integration and synchronization of PSYOP with the commander's plan.

Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. While this principle has no separate meaning for PSYOP forces, PSYOP are developed to support military deception plans, and PSYOP forces must be careful to practice and enforce security measures and to adhere to the requirements of operational security. PSYOP units and staff elements also deny the adversary an advantage by educating the supported unit on the enemy's capabilities and techniques of propaganda.

Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise does not mean that adversaries must be caught completely unaware, only unprepared. Surprise is a major contributor to shock, which is a temporary combat multiplier. Shock can be exploited by PSYOP to compound its effect, keeping adversaries off balance, forcing them



▲ **IN THE WIND** PSYOP Soldiers drop leaflets over Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo.

to make decisions before they are prepared to and reducing the value of their actions because they are executed too late to be effective. PSYOP planners also participate in operations planning to determine the potential shock to all target audiences and whether shock is desired. If not, they may recommend eliminating surprise as an element of the operation.

Simplicity: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity is indispensable to clear communication. The meanings of complex messages are often lost during cross-cultural translation or translation into different languages and media. Simplicity applies to the development of supporting PSYOP objectives, or SPO. A clear, concise objective and its SPOs provide the basis for establishing simple arguments that lead target audiences to the intended behavior. PSYOP specialists, commanders and action officers know that translation concerns are not limited to the desired TA. In multinational operations, translation can hinder series approval. Series may undergo scrutiny by individuals whose formative culture and primary language are all different.

In multinational operations, simplicity is of paramount importance when developing plans and orders.

ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES

Perseverance: Ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state. Perseverance acknowledges that “some joint operations take years to reach the desired end state.”⁴ PSYOP intended to change long-term behavior require perseverance by commanders at every level. They must instill in their staffs and subordinate commanders the understanding that the achievement of PSYOP objectives must be evaluated over time. Commanders cannot succumb to the desire for immediate gratification from PSYOP and must discern between long-term change and the immediate effects of temporary behavior modification. During multinational operations, PSYOP units can help develop the value of perseverance within supporting nations and their coalition partners.

Legitimacy: Develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state. The legitimacy of PSYOP and its subsequent actions is grounded in U.S. law

and policy. At varying levels, PSYOP planners consider the viewpoints of TAs, as well as those of third-party governments, nations and coalitions, and their effects upon U.S., multinational and host-nation forces. PSYOP strive to capitalize on the legitimacy of friendly actions as well as the potential illegitimacy of others’ actions. FM 3-0 acknowledges that legitimacy is based on the will of the U.S. population to support operations. PSYOP units exploit the legitimacy of operations to foster and sustain the resolve, perseverance and will of U.S. partners to support operations.

Restraint: Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force. Restraint is “best achieved when rules of engagement issued at the beginning of an operation address a range of plausible situations.”⁵ PSYOP planners must not ask for the world. Rather, they carefully consider what they really need and recommend appropriate authority and approval to conduct PSYOP using appropriate media, toward appropriate TAs, and in the appropriate attribution posture. Restraint is used by following rules of engagement in terms of the legal authority to execute PSYOP under approved media and objectives toward approved TAs. Commanders cannot separate the principles of perseverance, legitimacy and restraint; they use them together to achieve their objectives.

Considering PSYOP from the perspective of the principles of joint operations does not preclude following PSYOP principles, but a separate set of principles may not be required. Commanders must determine whether the principles of joint operations are sufficient to allow PSYOP units to fulfill their obligation to the supported-unit commander. **SW**

NOTES:

¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army), 2008.

² FM 3-0, *Operations*.

³ FM 3-0, *Operations*.

⁴ FM 3-0, *Operations*.

⁵ FM 3-0, *Operations*.

Marty Bartram is a doctrine-development analyst in the Joint and Army Doctrine Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School’s Directorate of Training and Doctrine.



“The tribe was a community which went on forever, because it was based on family relationship, not on the ups and downs of politics.”¹

– Former British Officer John Bagot Glubb, 1948

Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan’s Tribes

My duties were simple; I was to encourage the local inhabitants to stand up for themselves.²

– Former British officer and diplomat Alec Kirkbride, 1971

As United States policy-makers undertake a series of exhaustive reviews of U.S. policies in Afghanistan, they are taking a closer look at Afghan tribes as part of a new strategy for

confronting increasing violence.

Much of this newfound interest stems from the very successful turnaround of Anbar Province, Iraq, where Arab tribes played a key part in changing the province from a hotbed of the Sunni Arab insurgency to a place where security has improved to the point that U.S. troops are beginning to be withdrawn. The tribes are also receiving increased

attention because the U.S. does not have enough troops available to undertake a proper counterinsurgency campaign, because of existing requirements in Iraq and the dwell time required between deployments.

But as tribes assume a more central role in our Afghanistan strategy, it is essential that we approach the challenge *informed* by our experiences in Iraq, not dominated by them,

and that we craft a pragmatic strategy that will achieve enduring security effects for the Afghan population. Afghanistan's tribes must forcefully confront the insurgency and not be overwhelmed by it, while maintaining the active support of the people and reducing the tendency of the tribes to fight among themselves.

All of this must be done while building the capacity of the Afghan state without creating a parallel tribal system. Though this would seem to be an almost insurmountable challenge, it is not impossible, and to quote General David Petraeus's view about creating security in Iraq: "Hard is not hopeless."

Any tribal-engagement strategy in Afghanistan that seeks to use the tribes against the insurgency must begin with an understanding of how the Afghan tribes are different from Iraqi tribes. Though Iraq's tribes were, to varying degrees, suppressed, co-opted, included and divided during Baathist rule, their structures remained largely intact. Even though tribal leadership in Iraq was often quite fluid, as rivals made competing claims based on different familial ties to a tribal patriarch, conflicts were generally circumscribed within a coherent tribal structure.

Many of Afghanistan's tribes have been systematically undermined by the Taliban, Pakistani intelligence and local warlords; perverted by the free flow of arms; and weakened by mass migrations of people. Leaders in power may not be the traditional tribal leaders, and some tribes have been so weakened that no single individual leads them. That situation complicates leader selection, legitimacy and efficacy and leads to conflict within and between tribes.

Because many tribes lack a unifying leader, a key aspect of a tribal-engagement strategy should be the convening of tribal security *jirgas* (a meeting of village elders) throughout a province, primarily orchestrated by the government of the Independent Republic of Afghanistan, or GIROA. The goal of the *jirga* is to introduce the strategy of empowering the tribes

and to identify not only a leader who can marshal the tribe or village against the insurgents but to also select a security committee. The chief goals of the committee are to advise the leader; assist in the selection, vetting and support of *lashgars* (tribal militias); and create a pool of potential replacements for the leader if he is ineffective, corrupt or killed.

These leaders would form the nucleus of a province-wide tribal force who would, in turn, select a provincial leader who could lead the tribes and take decisive action (in some cases, this may be an existing security official). This individual would, in turn, have a small executive committee to advise him and to help with security planning and the administration of salaries and other support.

Another key distinction between Iraqi and Afghan tribes is that most of Iraq's tribal leaders are well-educated, or at least have a modern outlook with respect to the way they run their affairs, and they are used to working within an established state structure. Many of Afghanistan's tribal leaders are illiterate, have limited administrative ability and often see very little reason to cede authority to the state or to other tribal leaders.

Furthermore, in Afghanistan, powerbrokers often struggle to control the few resources that do exist in the country, such as government revenue, land, roads and bazaars. There are no mitigating factors, such as oil profits, a robust state employment sector, a large private economy or an extensive road system facilitating commerce, to dampen tribal conflicts over resources.

For these reasons, an Afghan tribal-engagement strategy may have some natural limits in terms of how well indigenous forces are able to organize themselves. U.S. forces may encounter resistance from some tribes who either oppose an expansion of the state's authority or see an inclusive approach of empowering all tribes as unacceptable. Additionally, many tribes will be reluctant to diminish or eliminate their revenue streams (e.g., increasing transparency

in government revenue as a way of reducing corruption or ceding control of a checkpoint to another force) and will have to be approached in a careful and deliberate manner that seeks to deconflict tribal friction points. Furthermore, because of the limited education of many tribal leaders, the U.S. will likely have to devote some resources to helping with the administrative tasks of tribal security, such as registering tribal members, administering salaries and facilitating other logistical support.

As effective as a tribal *lashgar* would be in confronting the insurgency, it must be nested within the institutions of the Afghan state. To ensure that local warlords are accountable to the people and the government, the tribal security leaders should be answerable to a provincial government committee comprised of the governor, the provincial council and the province's members of parliament. Each district chief would ostensibly lead his local committee of tribal elders, and the security committee would be led by the district police chief.

A provincial security committee, which would answer to the government committee, should be led by the Afghan National Police, or ANP, and have members from the National Directorate for Security, the Afghan National Army, or ANA, coalition forces and the heads of the tribal *lashgars*. To increase political legitimacy, access to the resources of the GIROA and support of the international community, the political leaders would set the tone for the *lashgar*, moderate disputes, build popular support, ensure government transparency and investigate abuses of authority (in conjunction with the judiciary and local mullahs)

While the security committee would have overall command of the tribal forces, it would work with other state security representatives to create the security plan for the province. The provincial security committee would be tasked with identifying the locations for checkpoints, facilitating the fortification of villages by allocating HESCO barriers, concertina wire and

lumber; disbursing pay, ammunition and weapons; registering tribal members and issuing identification cards; and training lashgars while providing overall security direction.

Both the government and security committees would require staff who would process payments, investigate problems, provide reports and facilitate the business of the committees. Following the Iraq model, each tribal member of the lashgar should be promised the opportunity to work for the ANP or the ANA if they perform their tasks well. The promise of future employment works as a check on bad behavior and will eventually serve as an employment magnet for military-age males who support the insurgency out of a need for income. Employment also provides a path for tribes to become legitimate members of the security force.

The role of coalition forces in the raising of tribal lashgars must be targeted, supportive and active. Throughout the process — tribal consultation, selecting leaders, standing up a security committee, creating a provincial government committee, adjudicating disputes and investigating abuses — the coalition must be present. We are often viewed as an honest broker and have the institutional capacity to make the ideas a reality. For example, in a tribe that does not have an identifiable leader, a CF member could facilitate a tribal meeting and work behind the scenes to achieve an understanding among rival candidates. Ideally, the GIROA would undertake this effort, but unfortunately, the GIROA is not viewed as an honest broker by many tribes, and in those instances, a CF member might have to intervene.

Additionally, if an investigation were undertaken by Afghan security and political representatives about claims of abuse, those men would have to travel to the area, convene an inquiry and then make the consequences of their investigation stick. At that point, friction can occur, particularly if a man has to be fired or arrested because he demanded bribes or beat someone. If the coalition is

part of the process, Afghans can feel confident that their decisions will be followed. The CF should assign staff to support government and security committees and enhance their understanding of tribal dynamics by expanding the human-terrain-team system and lengthening the tours of select officials.³

In addition to these mentoring, advising, liaison and support functions, the CF will also have to disperse among the tribes to bolster their fighting capability, advise their leaders, train their men and limit tribal conflict. The CF soldiers would have to live with the tribe or village full-time, as was done in many cases in Anbar Province, in numbers large enough to prevent their being overrun by the insurgents or, quite frankly, betrayed by the tribe, while facilitating an active defense of the village. This is especially needed in villages where tribal structures are weak or a leader's capabilities are lacking. This aspect of Afghan tribal-engagement strategy will require more soldiers and a readjustment of existing forces into a population-protection posture.

But not every tribe will need an increased CF presence. Many tribes are already able to provide their members security and need only occasional meetings with the GIROA and CF to replenish ammunition, provide weapons and humanitarian assistance, and coordinate strategy. Although a population-protection approach has largely been undertaken in eastern Afghanistan, it should be broadened to include the whole Pashtun belt. As our Soldiers live with the tribes, they will also have to undertake a mentoring program for the tribal lashgars, but their efforts shouldn't be confined to security training. They should also initiate a literacy and administrative-training program to better develop the abilities of the tribal members to manage their affairs. This kind of training will help tribes become better ANP members as the lashgars transition into official police forces. As our troops disperse among the tribes, it is imperative that they also receive Civil Affairs assistance and work closely

with the local provincial-reconstruction team. As security becomes the norm, it will be necessary to follow up quickly with community projects.

Winning and maintaining the support of the population must be a central feature of a tribal-security strategy. While the government, security committees, the judiciary and mullahs will adjudicate disputes and investigate claims of abuse and consequently reduce cases of mistreatment, we should also seek to enlist the population as the eyes and ears of the tribal-security effort.

One possible way of doing this would be to create an anonymous reporting system by which the people could regularly inform on tribal and government officials who abuse their authority. For example, during the 1950s, as the Philippine government battled the Huk insurgency, Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay initiated a system of postcards people could use to report abuses of authority directly to him. He would then investigate the claims and take prompt action, thus putting all government officials on notice that they would never know who might inform on them.

That strategy could be adapted to Afghanistan by creating an anonymous reporting system. For the postcard system to work, postcards would have to be distributed throughout the area, at bazaars, mosques, government buildings, etc., and, when completed, dropped off anonymously at boxes erected at area mosques or given directly to a CF member. Because most Afghans attend a mosque regularly, their pattern of going to the mosque to pray would help keep them from being identified and subjected to reprisals.

Because the population is mostly illiterate, each postcard could have a series of symbols indicating various abuses of authority or corruption, such as a picture of a hand with money in it for bribery, and colors for each checkpoint could indicate where an abuse had taken place. Additionally, a phone number could be posted for residents to anonymously report abuses. This process must be effective



▲ **ARMED FORCE** An Afghan man working in conjunction with U.S. Forces protects his tribal area. *Photo by Dan Green.*

and produce results, and the CF must play a central role in its operations, if we hope to maintain the support of the people.

Another element crucial to maintaining the support of the population is incorporating village mullahs into the tribal security process. Mullahs play a crucial role in Afghan village life because they are often the only literate person in the community, and they perform an important function as peacemaker and reconciler, as well as religious leader. While they shouldn't have a formal role on a government or security committee, they should be incorporated into the process as observers. Appropriate roles include: serving on committees investigating abuse or serving as mediators between warring factions.

Additionally, through their participation, they give the tribal security effort the imprimatur of religious sanction, blunting efforts by the Taliban to present the tribes as un-Islamic. Furthermore, if complaint boxes were located in each mosque, the local mullah could be given the

responsibility for ensuring that no harm came to those who filed a complaint. A final benefit of having the help of the mullahs is that they can speak out in favor of the tribal effort, helping to maintain popular support by telling villagers they must help the tribes resist violence and intimidation. Their help could be facilitated by generous Civil Affairs assistance and other support.

No matter how well-organized the tribal security effort may be, it must have a unifying theme and message to effectively counter the insurgents' messages and propaganda and to inculcate the values of the tribal movement in its members. The tribal security effort should have a distinctive name that captures the aspirations of the people and, conversely, negatively portrays the Taliban. For example, the Taliban or "students" initially sought to eliminate warlordism and corruption from Afghan society by portraying themselves as students of Islam seeking to purify Afghanistan. One possible name could be "The *Sarmaalim* Movement" or "Principals Movement,"

which would put the tribes in the dominant position of "teaching" and "directing" the Taliban "students."

Another possibility could be a *Chegha* Council, or "Call for Action" Council, because *chegha* is rooted in the code of Pashtunwali. The themes of law and order, security and justice could be reinforced by messages such as "power to the tribes," "justice for the people" or "revenge for the innocent." Those themes could be summarized as *sialy* (equality), *ezaar* (respect of all people), *badal* (revenge) and *teega/nerkh* (law). Deciding upon a theme and a message reinforces the goals of the tribal lashgar, establishes a code of behavior for tribal members, marginalizes the Taliban and captures the aspirations and hopes of the people.

An individual code of behavior should also be crafted that can be posted in every village, broadcast over the radio, and seen at bazaars, checkpoints and government buildings. Much like the code former British officer John Bagot Glubb used when he created the Southern



▲ **PAY DAY** Members of the 3rd Special Forces Group pay members of Afghan militias for their work with the unit. The disbanding of the militias left a hole in the security of the tribal regions. The Department of Defense is taking a closer look at the role these former militia members can play in bringing security to the tribal regions. *U.S. Army photo.*

Desert Camel Corps and professionalized the Arab Legion in Jordan, the code would spell out the positive behaviors that tribal members should follow and those they should avoid. For example, it could say such simple things as, “Treat the people with respect,” “Be polite and courteous,” “Work hard, be honest, and the people will reward you,” “Don’t lie, cheat or steal,” “Show up on time and work honestly.” These messages may sound a bit simplistic, but the goal is not only to set expectations for tribal behavior but also to limit the ability of the Taliban to feed off of popular distaste for the abuses of power that local security leaders often commit. If a tribal lashgar treats the people with respect and through its positive behavior earns the trust of the people, the people and the government will be united in defeating the Taliban.

One of the central features of the Afghan political and military landscape is the warlord. Many of these men seized power during the struggle

against the Soviets, and their corrupt and violent behavior following the communist withdrawal deeply alienated the Afghan people, who, in many cases, welcomed the rise of the Taliban as a force for justice against the depredations of the warlords. Following the toppling of the Taliban in 2001, U.S. policy focused on putting warlords back in power as an inexpensive and quick way to re-establish authority in the countryside. Since that time, the population has become increasingly alienated from the GIROA because of the behavior of the warlords, many of whom are allies of President Karzai, and the people have often enlisted with the Taliban out of frustration. Though some warlords have been removed, their replacements, who have usually been technocrats, are often systematically undermined by the warlord.

If the tribes are going to rise up against the Taliban, the CF must work to check the power of the warlords, but it must do so in a way

that doesn’t prompt the warlords to sabotage the tribal movement. A necessary first step is to have CF troops train the warlord’s men and live among them. The goal of this effort is not only to train and professionalize the warlord’s militia but also to gather information on him and his men while monitoring their behavior. Over time, the CF will gain a better understanding of the sources of the warlord’s power, identify leaders within his camp who could be influenced to support the new security order, and have opportunities to mitigate the warlord’s predatory behavior toward the local population and to win his support for the tribal movement.

The warlord will likely oppose or undermine the tribal movement if he doesn’t feel that it is in his interest to support it. If he sees the movement as a possible source of funds for his men, he will support it. If his sources of revenue are directly challenged (e.g., control of checkpoints), he will oppose it. If some



▲ **NEW FORCE** Members of the pilot program of the Afghan Public Protection Force line up for graduation in the Wardak province. The APFF is a lightly armed group of trained gunmen pulled from the tribes. They are a neighborhood-watch type organization that works in conjunction with the Afghan Uniform Police. Their focus is on keeping the villages and towns safe. *U.S. Army photo.*

of the warlord's men are known to have committed abuses, it would be better to relieve them quietly and one at a time, so that they don't have an opportunity to organize against the process. If a warlord-controlled checkpoint is notorious for corruption, for example, it would be best to "Afghanize" it by putting the ANA in charge of it or by creating a joint tribal checkpoint. A strategy of warlord containment and enlistment should move carefully and deliberately to remove any obstacles that could prevent the tribal movement from working; reduce and remove tribal conflict points, such as checkpoint control and access to government resources; and seek to transform the warlord and his men into responsible citizens.

As tribes assume a more central role in U.S. security policy for Afghanistan, it is essential that we modify the lessons of Iraq to reflect the history and tactical reality of Afghanistan. We should craft a pragmatic strategy that will achieve enduring security effects for the local population by taking ad-

vantage of traditional authority structures without replicating the rampant warlordism of the past. We must enlist Afghanistan's tribes to help them forcefully confront the insurgency while maintaining the active support of the people and reducing their tendency to fight among themselves.

We will have to embrace some additional risks for our troops as they live among the people and learn the intricate details of tribal political life. But their efforts will be worth it, because the Afghan people are with us, and if we work with them, breaking bread and suffering through the same struggles to secure their communities, we will decisively defeat the Taliban. As one tribal elder recently told a Marine in Helmand Province (as reported in the Associated Press), "When you protect us, we will be able to protect you." Through this active partnership, Americans and Afghans can defeat terrorism, resist intimidation and set the conditions for peace through victory. **SW**

Notes:

¹ John Bagot Glubb, *The Story of the Arab Legion* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), 120.

² Alec Kirkbride, *An Awakening: The Arab Campaign 1917-18* (London: University Press of Arabia, 1971), 104.

³ Members of human-terrain teams are forward-deployed social scientists who help CF members understand the history and culture of a local area to improve their decision-making.

Dan Green is a visiting fellow at the Terrorism Research Center. He recently left the policy office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he worked as a special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In 2005-2006 he was the U.S. Department of State Political Adviser to the Uruzgan Province Provincial Reconstruction Team. In 2007, he deployed with the Navy to Iraq's Anbar Province, where he worked as a tribal-engagement officer. He can be contacted at dantkprt@yahoo.com.

Hearts and Minds as Targets:

PSYOP ANCOC Trains inside the box, but thinks outside of it, too

by Sergeant First Class Mark P. Pelaez

Imagine, if you will, that you have just been put in charge of a marketing campaign of which the goal is not as simple as getting people to buy a specific brand of energy drink — but rather to adopt a practice (e.g., wear a seatbelt, stay in school) or break a bad habit (e.g., quit smoking, stop drunk driving) or even support a cause (e.g., protect the environment, prevent obesity).

This campaign is going to target people who speak your native language, grew up in the same society as yours, are easily reached via every media sources from TV commercials to direct mailing. They live in a democratically governed country, and have access to basic needs such as food, clean water and shelter. This campaign will receive whole-hearted

support from the local government, community leaders and law-enforcement agencies. Also, the messages are already considered credible by the audience. How can they deny that seatbelts save lives? Furthermore, the success of the campaign will be measured over the course of years.

Sounds pretty achievable with the means at hand and circumstances as they are, doesn't it? Why then, do you suppose that on average, someone is killed by a drunk driver every 40 minutes, or that approximately 7,000 high school students drop out every school day? Both campaigns have been active for decades with moderate results, even with relatively favorable conditions and popular support.

Now let us glance at the backdrop found in most of the countries where

Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, missions are conducted. First, the language is usually a dialect of an unfamiliar tongue. The customs are intricately different from what you might learn online. The history is long and complex, with pride and mistrust of foreigners heavily embedded in the collective psyche. Possibly most inopportune is a heavy presence of anti-American/Western propaganda being conducted by people who look, act and communicate just like the locals whose behavior needs to be influenced. Add into the scenario the fact that quantifiable results are expected in the short-term and remarkably, the common operational picture facing a PSYOP specialist at the outset of a mission will come in to focus.





▲ **BOUNCING THE MESSAGE** Iraqi Soldiers blow up soccer balls prior to going on a mission. Conducting PSYOP missions that impact the local population increases the government's credibility with the people. *U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Phillip A. Thorpe.*

Evolutionary tale

“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent,” Clarence Darrow once said, “but rather the one most adaptable to change.”

That same adage can provide insight about the application of PSYOP: It is not the heaviest broadcast, the most expensive PSYOP product or the wittiest that succeeds. The successful product is the one based on analysis of the target's evolving psychological, political, physical, economic and cultural environment. As each class of the PSYOP Advanced NCO Course, or ANCO, graduates, it remains paramount that the students leave with a full toolkit — ready to fill or return to one of the plentiful positions spread out among the three PSYOP groups, brigade combat team PSYOP planner positions or to various other roles that

require competent special-operations professionals. When Soldiers leave the four-week ANCO course, the goal is that they leave ready to employ the best PSYOP product or action with the latest methods adapted to the fight.

Small group method

Since 1988, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's David K. Thuma Non-commissioned Officer Academy has been forging the capstone training event for PSYOP enlisted personnel. Over the years, instructors have taught a curriculum that covers the critical PSYOP tasks essential to winning wars and winning the peace. Practitioners of military occupational specialty 37F constantly deploy around the world, conducting missions that involve “by, with and through” relationships with non-

governmental organizations, private companies and nonprofit charities, in addition to the national power elements of a U.S. Embassy country team and supported-unit military commanders. As the international threat level evolves, so, too, must the tactics, techniques and procedures. This is fundamental to the course in which a large portion of the student's evaluated contribution to group work is based on sharing lessons learned and hard-earned knowledge pertaining to current PSYOP campaigns.

“Methods for selling our messages and persuading foreign populations are infinite, so having a chance to come together with other PSYOPers from all the different groups to confer about what has worked for them was invaluable,” said Master Sergeant Charles Hunter of the 10th PSYOP Battalion.

Lineage continues

In May 2008, the NCO Academy moved from its original building to newly renovated facilities in Kennedy Hall. With the relocation came plasma screens that improve the quality of briefing presentations and a previously unavailable means of teaching with video and Internet platforms. Additionally, students can now take all examinations on computers located in the academy's digital testing facility. This innovation not only saves paper but also provides instant feedback to students once they complete their examinations, by showing them which questions were answered incorrectly in addition to their score.

Engaging the enemy physically

Being flexible, adaptive and resilient does not end in the classroom, but rather begins each morning at 5:45 a.m. in the SWCS combatives cage. This is where, for eight days, all SOF NCOES students endure two hours of demanding Modern Army Combatives level-one training. As per AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, "Commanders in both the operational and institutional domains will implement a combatives training program that certifies safe and professional combatives training and competitions."

The NCO Academy spearheaded the effort to integrate combatives into the programs of instruction for all of its courses and is constantly refining the training sessions based on student feedback and the need for relevant close-combat skills to be used down range.

"Psychological Operations make cogent contributions to overseas contingency operations every day by synchronizing efforts and resources with Civil Affairs and Special Forces. That is how the NCO Academy also functions. Ensuring legitimacy and credibility of special operations is definitely one of the SOF imperatives that is a trademark of instructors in this academy," said Command Sergeant Major David D. Putnam, commandant of the SWCS NCO Academy

Science and art

The process of influencing the behavior of foreign target audiences, or TAs, to support U.S. national objectives by conveying selected information or advising on actions that influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign audiences, i.e., the way to convince someone else to see things your way and feel better about doing so, is a complex procedure.

As already illustrated, the challenges PSYOP faces are multifaceted and often change before the first attempt of solving them has even been introduced. But PSYOP NCOs have the advantage of being experts in a discipline that is equally rooted in both science and art. As a science, PSYOP supports a commander or U.S. ambassadors by utilizing the seven-phase PSYOP Process. It is an analytical methodology that can be put to use by the PSYOP operational detachment NCOIC fighting, for example, al-Qaeda-linked extremist groups in the Philippines, or just as easily by the PSYOP staff planner assigned to a brigade combat team conducting stability operations south of Baghdad. It focuses on the strategy of developing solid series, or products and actions, designed to change specific and measurable behaviors of TAs in support of U.S. national objectives.

The artful aspect of PSYOP incorporates elements of: persuasion, color, design, placement and symbology into the process, thus creatively producing measurable results.

The seven phases are:

1. Planning
2. Target-audience analysis
3. Series development
4. Product development and design
5. Approval
6. Production, distribution and dissemination
7. Evaluation

These form the framework for the skill-level-four training that is accomplished during ANCOG. The critical tasks identified to be taught in ANCOG by the Soldier's Manual and


Trainers Guide (STP 33-37F14-SM-TG) are placed in the larger context of the seven phases. For example, the tasks of developing PSYOP objectives and preparing the PSYOP tab, which are part of phase-one planning, are taught early in the course, before a systematic review of phases two through four can be conducted. Then the next task of submitting a PSYOP series for approval (phase five) can be taught. All instruction culminates in a staff training exercise that puts the students in the driver's seat, with opportunities to task-organize a detachment and engage in real-world scenarios that test their proficiency at utilizing the above-mentioned seven phases.

"The empires of the future are the empires of the mind."

- Winston Churchill, Sept. 6, 1943

This quotation rings true especially today with the unending creation of new systems of information transfer via Internet, cell phones, interactive displays, real-time media, satellite connectivity, etc. The ability to speak to mass audiences or to a lone viewer has grown, and it shapes decisions at every level. Perceptions change by the minute, with populations becoming more skeptical each step of the way, but with PSYOP NCOs shouldering their task by bringing innovation and a firm understanding of doctrine to the fight, U.S. Army Psychological Operations will succeed, as Clarence Darrow said, by being "the one most adaptable to change." **SW**

Sergeant First Class Mark P. Pelaez is the senior PSYOP small group leader for the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Noncommissioned Officer Academy. He has served in the 1st, 6th and 9th PSYOP battalions, deploying on numerous missions to the EUCOM, CENTCOM AND SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility.



MAPPING THE WAR ON TERROR: THE SOF DATA MODEL AND DATA MANAGEMENT

by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Karl Sexton

During the early 1990s, as a fire-support NCO in the 25th Infantry Division, I would walk up to the division-artillery headquarters with a large roll of acetate, a roll of 100-mile-an-hour tape and two boxes of permanent markers to copy the operational overlays on the HQ's situation map, or SITMAP. The data displayed in the overlays included fire-support-coordination measures, friendly and enemy locations and terrain analysis.

It was imperative that all levels of command use the same operational terms and graphics and the same overlays to avoid confusion and ensure the ultimate success of our missions. After painstakingly copying the overlays, I returned to the brigade tactical operations center and displayed the overlays on our SITMAP. Soon, several battalion representatives arrived to copy my overlays and take them to their respective battalion tactical operation centers to update their SITMAPs.

The way we fight and conduct warfare has changed drastically since then, especially since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The asymmetrical threats we face today encompass the globe, and we are asked to absorb and process tremendous amounts of data to produce our SITMAP for the war on terror. New doctrine and terms have been developed, including operational art and design and effects-based operations, or EBO. The Army has recently placed more emphasis on information operations and asymmetrical warfare. The Special Forces community is discussing irregular warfare and EBO.

All the various communities agree that in order to achieve our desired effects, we need to take many additional factors into consideration when we plan and conduct operations. That requires planners to collect tremendous amounts of data for the area of operations and beyond. Planners are instructed to take into consideration the political, economic, military, social, infrastructure and information systems, or PEMSII, as factors in conducting analysis to determine key nodes and centers of gravity to aid in making the correct decisions in the environment.

So how do we manage all the data we collect? Who is

the best source for answers to questions related to PEMSII? How do we conduct analysis on the data we collect? How do we maintain the historical information for future reference? How do we make our SITMAP for the war on terror? This article will provide several options to answer those questions and give readers a model with which to begin planning and continue battle-tracking throughout operations. Additionally, the software applications described will aid in managing data and are easy to back up and pass to a follow-on team to aid in continuity and unity of effort.

Let's begin by looking at the joint planning level and move down to the tactical level to provide the reader with a complete understanding of the process and the ways we can achieve continuity at all levels. The joint planners begin to look at PEMSII in the country of interest and conduct analysis on the information to identify key nodes. This is done by collecting data from various national-level agencies, such as the Joint Warfare Analysis Center and the Defense Intelligence Agency, on the country's infrastructure and military forces. The data is then displayed in ArcGIS, a software application used to depict geospatial information, as overlays, or shape-files, depicting the infrastructure and military forces of the area. The overlays are then passed to subordinate units, which begin their planning. Each level of command analyzes the higher command's order and conducts its own planning and issues its orders. The respective intelligence staff sections will continue to build more detailed overlays within ArcGIS, and they pass the overlays down to their subordinates when they issue their orders. This method replaces the old acetate SITMAPs and allows planners to display more information and create a more detailed SITMAP.

The committee for the SF Intelligence Sergeant Course has developed a file structure for managing the data for the SITMAP, called the Special Operations Forces Data Model. The U.S. Special Operations Command has made the SOF Data Model the standard for all its subordinate units. Using the SOF Data Model in the ArcGIS software

produces continuity at all levels and it makes it easier to pass data up and down the chain of command. It is the same basic concept of using common operational symbols and graphics that we used on our old acetate overlays.

The SOF Data Model contains the file structure for constructing and depicting the overlays required to build a detailed SITMAP that will give operators the ability to fuse intelligence with operations. Although the model was constructed in the ArcGIS software application, it is compatible with the two other software applications included with ArcGIS in the Asymmetrical Software Kit, or ASK: Analyst's Notebook and Orion Magic. Overlays in the SOF Data Model can be exported to the Analyst's Notebook software application in order to conduct further analysis. The intelligence reports used to obtain the data used in constructing the SOF Data Model can be stored in the Orion Magic software application for easy retrieval. Provided is a brief overview of the three software applications and the ways they can be used to manage the vast amounts of data that aid us in preparing our SITMAP for the war on terror.

The ArcGIS software application stores the data used to create overlays as an attribute table in the form of a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet can then be exported to the other ASK software applications. For example, an overlay depicting locations of suspected high-value individuals, or HVIs, will have an attribute table that contains the names and other distinguishing characteristics of the HVIs. The attribute table can be exported to Analyst's Notebook, which will produce a chart depicting all of the HVIs in the overlay. Once the chart has been produced, planners can conduct additional analysis using Analyst's Notebook. The application also has numerous tools for conducting terrain and time analysis on the information. For example, significant activities can be imported into ArcGIS, which can produce overlays by date, time and location. When a unit is planning a patrol, it can use the tools in ArcGIS to conduct a route analysis. ArcGIS will produce a time wheel that depicts the best time for traveling on the intended route and shows the times and locations where attacks are most likely to occur. Other tools in ArcGIS aid the ARSOF Soldier in managing data and conducting analysis. In the end, ArcGIS is a powerful tool for managing tremendous amounts of data, maintaining a detailed SITMAP and conducting data analysis.

Analyst's Notebook depicts systems by graphically displaying their various entities and the links that connect them. Once a system has been constructed in Analyst's Notebook, the user can analyze it using the application's tools that show infrastructure systems, military systems, political systems and, most notably, social networks. Analyst's Notebook aids the SF intelligence sergeant in conducting intelligence preparation of the environment by allowing him to graphically display the adversaries' PEM-SII systems as links and nodes and to identify potential key nodes that overlap multiple systems, further aiding in identifying the adversaries' centers of gravity.

Orion Magic is designed for filing reports and indexing

them for rapid searching and easy data retrieval. There are two methods for storing or indexing reports in Orion Magic. The first is to take an existing report and cut and paste the information into a data-card format. In this method, the user creates a file structure within the application and generates index cards for the various reports that are filed in the cabinet. This can be a time-consuming process for users who receive numerous reports daily. However, if cards are generated in Orion Magic, the program allows users to generate reports based on searches, and it automatically puts the report in a user-friendly format.

The second method involves creating a file structure on the hard drive or external hard drive of the computer, placing all daily traffic into the file structure and simply indexing all folders and subfolders. When the user conducts a search, Orion Magic will automatically search all of the indexed folders and subfolders. This is an invaluable tool for the SF intelligence sergeant in the field, as it allows him to rapidly search large amounts of data quickly and provide his detachment commander and team members the information they need to make sound decisions and track the enemy.

The SITMAP for the war on terror requires the processing of tremendous amounts of data to depict all of the information required to effectively fuse intelligence and operations. The older methods of battle tracking are insufficient to process the information, and older software applications are not capable of depicting all of the required geospatial overlays. The ASK gives ARSOF personnel the ability to process more data and produce detailed SITMAPs. SF Soldiers are leading the way with new techniques for prosecuting the war on terror and defending against asymmetrical threats. The SOF Data Model was designed by SF Soldiers to aid all special-operations forces in processing more data and fusing intelligence with operations.

For more information on the ASK and the SOF Data Model, contact the SF Intelligence Sergeant Course committee, or visit their Web portal (www.us.army.mil/suite/page/461391). **SW**

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Karl Sexton is assigned to Company B, 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group, as an assistant detachment commander. Sexton graduated from the SF Qualification Course in August 1999 and deployed to Kosovo for Operation Joint Guardian and to Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Upon completion of the SF Warrant Officer Basic Course, he began serving as an assistant detachment commander and has deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom III and V. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Sexton is a graduate of the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course, the Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course, the Operational Preparation of the Environment Course and the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course. He has an associate's in criminal justice from Wayland Baptist University. He wrote this article while a student in the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course.

Professional Development

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

There are three ways to apply for School of Advanced Military Studies, or SAMS. Under the traditional method, an officer or warrant officer applies while attending Intermediate Level Education, or ILE.

The field-nomination process became available in the fall 2008. This process is open to both majors and pre-command lieutenant colonels who are key-and-developmental-assignment qualified.

Officers apply by self-nominating and routing the request through the commanding general, U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School for endorsement. This nomination process is open to both majors and pre-command lieutenant colonels.

The newest option for applying for SAMS is pre-selection. When an officer is selected for ILE, he or she can apply for SAMS. Officers selected will be guaranteed a two-year stabilization at Fort Leavenworth, with an option to remain for a third year as a member of the Combined Arms Center SOF Cell, pending concurrence of the Army Human Resources Command. Warrant officers on orders to attend ILE are also eligible.

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

ARSOF has the ability to send up to 50 new students each year, including officers, warrant officers and senior NCOs, to the Naval Postgraduate School, or NPS.

On July 13, 2008, the Department of the Army G-3/5/7 approved a policy that allows NPS students in Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Military Intelligence to receive credit for Intermediate Level Education and Joint Professional Military Education 1 without attending the Common Core Curriculum Course. Students must attend the P-950 Intermediate Staff College Preparatory Course prior to beginning NPS, take the four Naval Command and Staff College courses at NPS, and complete their master's degree in 18 months.

To apply for admission to NPS, Soldiers must have an undergraduate grade point average of 2.5 or better. They will need an academic profile code from NPS to apply for the degree in defense analysis (curriculum code 699/BPU). To request an academic profile code from NPS and to apply for advanced civil schooling, go to https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/opsf/New_SF_page/NPS.htm.

INTERAGENCY MASTER'S DEGREE

The first class of the Interagency Master's Degree Program is in progress. The total enrollment is 16 personnel; 14 ARSOF and two interagency. This is a fully funded graduate course that prepares officers for service in interagency assignments.

The degree requirement consists of 30 credit hours, six of which the University of Kansas, or KU, will transfer as credit for Command and General Staff College core courses. The remaining 24 hours will consist of six core and two elective courses taught by KU faculty. The KU courses will focus on U.S. government structures, interagency organizations and cultures, negotiation theory, conflict resolution and interagency legal considerations. The coursework is taken while attending ILE and finishes with the mini-summer schools (June/July) offered by KU.

All application packets must include official college transcripts, a signed DA Form 1618 and letters of recommendation. They must be received by the Human Resources Command by Feb. 5, 2010. The Directorate of Special Operations Proponency will hold a selection board in late February.

SPECIAL FORCES

The following list is a compilation of elements extracted from past promotion-board guidance. The guidance identifies the traits that boards consider favorably for promotion.

NCOERS

- Strong pattern of quantifiable excellence ratings on NCOERS, particularly in the "Competence" and "Leadership" sections of Part IV.
- Consistently earns the Army Physical Fitness Badge.
- All/strong pattern of "Among the Best" ratings by rater.
- All/strong pattern of "1" per-

formance ratings by senior rater.

- All/strong pattern of "1" ratings by senior rater for potential.
- Consistent recommendations for increased responsibility.

ASSIGNMENTS

- Majority of SF career is in warfighter assignments.
- Exceptional/excellent service at echelons above/outside the SF-ODA. [These assignments include JFKSWCS instructor, staff operations (SFOD-B to ASCC), observer/controller, drill sergeant, recruiter.]

Training and Education

- Jumpmaster-qualified.

- Foreign language proficiency rating of 1/1 or higher on the DLPT.
- Completed one or more advanced skill or functional courses.
- 60 credit hours of advanced civilian schooling.

For more information on the selection-board schedule, go to <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/select/Enlisted.htm>.

For more information, telephone Sergeant Major J.C. Crenshaw at DSN 239-7594 or commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to john.crenshaw1@us.army.mil.

OFFICER


Congratulations to the following officers for selection to command and key billets, FY10 Lieutenant Colonel Centralized Selection List:

Rank	Name	YG	Billet	Location
Combat Arms (02A) Operations				
LTC	Samuel Walther Curtis	92	1-4 ID Transition Tm 2	Iraq
LTC	James Emmett Hayes III	92	170 BCT Transition Tm 4	Afghanistan
LTC	Michael Edward James	92	170 BCT Transition Tm 3	Afghanistan
LTC	David Scott Mann	91	4-82 Transition Tm 2	Afghanistan
LTC	James Andrew Maxwell	92	1-3 ID Transition Tm 2	Iraq
LTC	Carlos Miguel Perez	92	1-4 ID Transition Tm 3	Iraq
LTC	Leonard Rosanoff	91	3 ACR Transition Tm 3	Iraq
LTC	Steven Andrew Warman	93	4-101 Transition Tm 3	Iraq
Special Forces Operations				
LTC	Michael Andre Ball	91	4-5 SF	Fort Campbell
LTC	Marshall Vincent Ecklund	92	3-5 SF	Fort Campbell
LTC	Christopher James Fox	91	Unslated principal	
LTC	Dennis Sherman Heaney	93	2-1 SF	Fort Lewis
LTC	Kevin Christopher Leahy	93	2-5 SF	Fort Campbell
LTC	Otto Karl Liller	93	1-1 SF	Fort Lewis
LTC	Isaac Joshua Peltier	92	1-10 SF	Germany
LTC	John Felix Taft	92	4-10 SF	Fort Carson
LTC	Robert Lee Wilson	92	3-3 SF	Fort Bragg
Special Forces Training				
LTC	George Mark Bond	93	1-1 SWTG	Fort Bragg
LTC	Carls Dalton Kelly, Jr.	92	SPT BN, 1st SWTG	Fort Bragg
Branch Material (01A) Installation				
LTC	Frank Kenneth Sobchak	91	USAG Livorno	Italy

PSYOP

PSYOP to initiate assessment/selection

Beginning in October 2009, all officers and NCOs who volunteer for training in Psychological Operations will first participate in a six-day assessment and selection course. The course will be taught as temporary-duty-and-return. The initial implementation of PSYOP AS will be a pilot course to validate the selection criteria and the course design. The chart shows a model of the proposed course.



FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ

In his book *Fiasco*, Thomas E. Ricks, a Pulitzer Prize winner and Pentagon correspondent for the *Washington Post*, has written an intriguing history of the war in Iraq. From the pre-invasion planning through the rise of the insurgency, Ricks' narrative is based on his own extraordinary in-country reporting, hundreds of interviews and more than 37,000 pages of documents. Many of Ricks' most critical assessments on the conduct of the war come from members of the U.S. military and official government reports.

Ricks' main premise contains several themes: that the U.S. went to war in Iraq with little international support and with incorrect information and then conducted the campaign with a light, fast force that had too few troops and no larger strategic plan. This, in turn, led to adverse consequences for the U.S. military's ability to restore law and order in post-invasion Iraq. Additionally, infighting between the State and Defense Departments, between civilians at the Pentagon and the uniformed military, and between the military and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad severely hampered the creation and execution of a coherent U.S. policy, thus negatively affecting the desired end-state in Iraq.

Failure to anticipate and later to recognize the insurgency, coupled with resistance to making needed adjustments, Ricks argues, contributed further to the U.S. military's problems on the ground. A continuing shortage of troops meant that borders could not be sealed, weapons caches could not be secured, and security and basic services could not be restored

to the Iraqi people. As a consequence, support for the occupation rapidly dwindled among Iraqis.

Indiscriminate roundups of the local populace and the sometimes harsh treatment of detainees by U.S. troops, who Ricks contends had not been trained or mentally prepared for the mission they faced in postwar Iraq, only contributed to bolstering the insurgency. Similarly, Ricks views the Abu Ghraib scandal not as an isolated incident but rather a result of poor policy decisions and low troop levels. His book abounds with warnings from Middle East experts and military veterans who ominously cautioned that the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath would not be as simple or as fast as many in the U.S. government predicted.

There are a number of inspiring characters in *Fiasco* — Army and Marine Corps personnel whose skill and bravery led to battlefield success — but repeatedly, lack of a coherent strategy rendered tactical success meaningless. There was never any question that the U.S. military could destroy Saddam Hussein's regime, but as *Fiasco* demonstrates, there was also never any substantive planning conducted for Phase IV.

Like any comprehensive work on an issue as controversial as Iraq, critics will question the author's motivations. Throughout *Fiasco*, Ricks highlights his contempt for select U.S. government officials and military personnel, and in many cases he oversells his accusations of incompetence. However, Ricks' assessments of mistakes committed, even though occasionally overdone, are thought provoking nonetheless.

THOMAS E. RICKS

Author of *Making the Corps* and Winner of the Pulitzer Prize

FIASCO

THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ



DETAILS

by **Thomas E. Ricks**

New York, N.Y.:

The Penguin Press, 2006.

ISBN: 1-59420-103-X (Hardcover)

482 pages. \$27.95.

Reviewed by:

Major Christopher R. Petersen

U.S. Air Force

Air Land Sea Application Center

Minor flaws aside, *Fiasco* is essential reading for those interested in understanding the reasons the U.S. waged war in Iraq; how the initial mismanagement of the occupation allowed the insurgency to grow; and how these momentous proceedings will affect larger world events in the future. Though other books have depicted aspects of the Iraq war in more intimate and graphic detail, this volume provides the reader with a coherent, insightful overview of the Iraq war. *Fiasco* does not possess the dramatic combat details of some other recently published books; rather, it attempts to chronicle U.S. efforts to contain a growing insurgency. In this respect, *Fiasco* is as readable, insightful and informative as any volume covering the war in Iraq. **SW**

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