

Special Warfare



MAY-JUNE 2009
VOLUME 22 ISSUE 3



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TRAINING AS COMBAT ADVISERS
FOR AFGHANISTAN

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
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A Soldier from the 3rd Special Forces Group advises members of the Afghan National Security Forces during an operation in Afghanistan.
U.S. Army photo



Special Warfare

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DSN 239-5703

Special Warfare is an authorized, official bimonthly publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

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In April, the Special Warfare Center and School and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command hosted the 2009 Special Forces Symposium. The event gave us a chance to honor our forbears in special operations, to discuss where we are going and to update the force on changes to our training and organization at SWCS.

During the past year, the changes at SWCS have been many. To begin with training, we now have the most challenging SF Qualification Course in the history of SF. We have reorganized the training phases to put language training up front, so that Soldiers can acquire language skills early. During the language-training phase, Soldiers also participate in intense physical conditioning that helps prepare them for success in later phases of the SFQC. The SFQC now includes the concept of the instructor ODA — an 18-series cadre team that stays with the students from start to finish — to allow the students to learn the team concept, to build esprit de corps and to allow the instructors to better mentor future ARSOF warriors. SF Assessment and Selection is now conducted by the Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, rather than by the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, to reinforce the mindset of assessing Soldiers instead of training them.

To further extend the use of assessment and selection, we are looking at the feasibility of conducting assessment and selection for officers and NCOs who have volunteered for training in Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. Training for active and reserve-component CA and PSYOP Soldiers continues to take advantage of the latest lessons learned from current operations. The evolution of the culmination exercises for CA and PSYOP training evaluates students' interpersonal adaptability through interaction and negotiation in a cultural setting.

Our courses are producing the best Soldiers in the field, with more than 95 percent of our instructors having combat experience. To ensure that we continue to reap the benefits of operational experience and lessons learned, once our cadre members serve their three-year tour at SWCS, they return to the force — there is no homesteading at SWCS.

Throughout all our training, we are continuing to maximize the use of distributed learning technology. Distributed learning is part of the mission of our newly created Directorate of Special Operations Education, or DSOE, which also works to develop “lifelong learning” — the career-long education and professional development needed to produce proficient Soldiers and strategic leaders. DSOE has a separate Language and Culture Division to concentrate specifically on those two most critical ARSOF skills. Another important function of DSOE, some would argue its most important, is fulfilled by its new Division of Evaluation and Standards, which monitors and ensures the quality of instruction and student learning.

In another innovation, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Futures Division has moved to SWCS to become the Army Special Operations Capabilities Integration Center. ARSOCIC provides the first ARSOF-specific, organic, force-development-and-design capability. It will allow SWCS to identify capability gaps, provide solutions and validate them through experimentation and exercises, following up on them by tracking their implementation.

While this list of changes may seem extensive, these are only the high spots, but change is a necessity if we are to remain competitive in our environment. Throughout all this change, our uncompromising imperative is that we continue to produce Soldiers of the highest caliber. From the comments at this year's symposium, our customers think our product is very good, but if we are to be our best, we can never stop working to improve.



Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

OLSON ADDRESSES SF SYMPOSIUM

Noting that it was a great honor to be with the leadership of Special Forces, Admiral Eric Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, made a brief stop at the 2009 Special Forces Symposium, Tuesday, April 21, at the Crown Exposition Center in Fayetteville, N.C.

Olson joked that he had to invite himself to the gathering, adding that he couldn't miss the opportunity to have a conversation with the men of Special Forces.

Calling the units that compose USSOCOM a "hybrid" force, he noted that the nature of special operations is direct and indirect. "Much of what we do is trying to get the right balance," Olson said. "There are a number of terms being used to refer to this kind of warfare. I'm using the term 'balanced.'"

Olson explained that there are more than 50,000 people working under the auspices of USSOCOM, with 50 percent of those forces being ARSOF; the largest single element is Special Forces.

"These forces combined bring a broad range of expertise to the table," he said, speaking of AFSOC, MARSOC, ARSOF and the Naval Special Warfare Command. Like ARSOF, each of the sister commands is growing and adapting to meet the needs of a force in a state of "perpetual" warfare.

Speaking of growth, Olson said that SOCOM was on track to meet its planned growth to 63,000 by 2012. He explained that 3- to 5-percent growth is the maximum that could be sustained by the force.

"We can grow faster if you can give us a turn-key unit. We would be happy to take it, but with what we can grow intentionally, we are limited to the 3 to 5 percent number," he said.

He added, "The world we are living in now is the one we are going to be living in throughout our time in uniform," adding that the priority for USSOCOM is the deterrence, disruption and defeat of terrorists. The keys to fulfilling that



▲ **STRAIGHT TALK** Admiral Eric T. Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, addresses the Special Forces Symposium at Fort Bragg, N.C., on April 21. *U.S. Army photo.*

mission, Olson believes, are the proper planning and conduct of special operations and persistent, culturally-attuned engagements with other nations.

He said that SOF are better at the cultural piece than the regular Army, but there is still much work to be done in the cultural arena. Referencing an idea he has referenced many times before, Olson talked about the need for SOF to become more like T.E. Lawrence in its approach to the areas where it works.

Olson's remaining priorities are the fostering of interagency cooperation; developing and supporting SOF service members and their families, and sustaining and modernizing the force. To that end, he said, equipping the operator is a top priority, followed by updating SOF mobility, maintaining a persistent intelligence surveillance and developing intelligence projects.

Olson said the changing environment SOF finds itself operating in calls for some changes in the SOF core tasks. Over the past several months, he has added three new tasks to the

nine core tasks (direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, information operations, counterterrorism and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction).

The three additional tasks are security-force assistance, counterinsurgency and activities specified by the president of the United States or the secretary of defense. Olson explained that SOF has always been doing COIN as a subset of FID.

"We gave up the intellectual high ground there, but we are getting it back in regard to COIN as it relates to SOF operations," he said.

He also added that the debate over the term PSYOP has been ongoing, but that the new term USSOCOM uses to describe PSYOP units is military information support teams.

He concluded, "Our forces are at work in remote areas of the world, where knowledge trumps doctrine, and finesse trumps mass."

— *Janice Burton, Special Warfare*

From the Ground Up

SPECIAL FORCES TACTICAL FACILITIES

By R.J. Wagner and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Brad Snortland

Since the initial stages of the war on terror, Special Forces has established and developed more than 75 tactical facilities, or TACFACs, in Afghanistan and Iraq. The TACFACs were established to provide stability; secure the peace; build the capacity of the host nation, or HN; or to transition authority to civilian control. Initially, SF units developed the TACFACs in an ad hoc manner, using their initiative to develop critical support systems. With the publication in February of FM 3-05.230, *Special Forces Tactical Facilities*, there is now an established process, derived from lessons learned, for analyzing the SF TACFAC's environment, planning its location and development, and identifying the materials and personnel that will be needed during its creation and development. This article is based on information contained in the new manual.

An SF TACFAC consists of one or more secure structures that allow SF units to support operations, extend their command and control, and extend their influence into an area. These structures include firebases, camps and team-houses, all of which may be located in rural or urban environments. The primary role of an SF TACFAC is defensive; however, it is also planned and designed to support offensive operations. The secondary role of an SF TACFAC is to develop and maintain liaison with the populace of the host-nation, or HN, as well as with elements of the HN military and civilian leadership. The second role is critical when conducting operations in foreign internal defense, or FID, and counterinsurgency, or COIN.¹

SF units tasked with establishing or developing a TACFAC must understand the political, military, economic and social aspects of their assigned theater or area of operations, or AO. They must know the ethnic groups, customs, taboos, religions and other information that may affect mission execution. The SF unit achieves that knowledge and level of understanding by conducting area studies and area assessments, and deploying site-survey teams.

Site-survey teams deploy in small groups of two to six personnel and operate similar to a reconnaissance patrol. Personnel on the team normally originate from the deploying SF unit; however, they can come from SF personnel assigned to the joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF, within theater, or from other SF personnel located within the designated AO. The team conducts surveys of potential locations for SF TACFACs and documents the commander's critical information requirements and other vital information. The

austere location of an SF TACFAC may require that personnel with area-specific qualifications deploy with the survey team. An SF engineer sergeant should accompany the site survey team whenever possible — especially when the mission is to plan and construct a new TACFAC.²

The information gathered during the area study supports the initial site survey and area assessment.³ An area assessment is a valuable tool used to confirm, correct or refute intelligence acquired prior to infiltration during the area study. The area assessment is an ongoing process and is updated even after the SF unit arrives in country.⁴ The initial area assessment begins early in the military decision-making process — immediately after mission receipt. It includes information on the mission variables identified by METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations), as well as on the different religious and ethnic tribal elements of the indigenous population. It forms the basis for tactical, operational and logistics planning by the SFOD in the AO.

A thorough site survey requires the team to perform a review of all potential HN permanent structures and any available bare-ground locations. If a bare-ground location is selected, the initial site survey must include a tentative construction plan and a tentative bill of materials. That plan should include heavy-construction vehicles, equipment and personnel needed to build the SF TACFAC. It should also address security and protection, water, electricity, administration and HN training, trash, medical, sewage, shelter, facility design, logistics accessibility, topographic layout, elevation, drainage and soil excavation.

Security and protection are the primary considerations for the SF TACFAC throughout all phases of the construction plan. The SF unit must determine who will provide those services and how many personnel will be needed. The plan will also provide a tentative construction timeline to facilitate the integration of all phases of construction.⁵

SF units must determine the advantages and disadvantages of breaking ground for a new SF TACFAC vs. using an existing facility. Certain questions need to be considered when making that decision: Is the AO permissive, uncertain or hostile? Are local HN defense, security and protection adequate? Is the TACFAC located in an urban or rural setting, and is it logistically sustainable? Once a decision has been made, the SF unit must plan the defense of the SF TACFAC



▲ **BUILD UP** Members of the 3rd Special Forces Group work with Afghan nationals to improve an SF tactical facility in the Tagab Valley. *U.S. Army photo.*

using the memory aids METT-TC and OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment).

METT-TC is used in information management (the major categories of relevant information) and in tactics (the major variables considered during mission analysis). Mission analysis describes characteristics of the area of operations in terms of METT-TC, focusing on ways they could affect the mission.⁶

OAKOC analyzes terrain, including natural features (such as rivers and mountains) and man-made features (such as cities, airfields and bridges). Terrain also influences protective measures and the effectiveness of weapons and other systems. Effective use of terrain reduces the effects of enemy fires, increases the effects of friendly fires and facilitates interaction with HN forces and the local populace. Terrain directly affects the location and development of SF TACFACs.⁷

Civil considerations

Understanding the AO and its environment also requires an understanding of civil considerations. Civil considerations reflect the ways that the conduct of military operations will be influenced by the AO's infrastructure and civilian institutions, as well as the attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations and organizations. Commanders and staffs ana-

lyze civil considerations in terms of the categories expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events.⁸

Civil considerations help commanders develop an understanding of the social, political and cultural variables within the area of operations and how these affect the mission. Understanding the relationship between military operations and civilians, culture and society is critical to conducting full-spectrum operations. Civil considerations provide a link between the various actions of military forces who are working with the populace to achieve the desired end state.⁹

Civil considerations are essential to developing effective plans for all operations — not only those dominated by stabilization or civil support. Full-spectrum operations often involve stabilizing the situation, securing the peace, building host-nation capacity and transitioning authority to civilian control. Combat operations directly affect the populace, the infrastructure and the force's ability to transition to host-nation authority. The degree to which the populace is expected to support or to resist Army forces also affects the design of offensive and defensive operations.¹⁰

Commanders use personal knowledge, area studies, intelligence and civil considerations when they assess social, economic and political factors. Commanders consider how

	Initial	Temporary	Permanent
Security and Protection			
Water			
Electricity			
Administration and Host Nation Training			
Trash			
Medical			
Sewage			
Shelter			

Figure 1. Critical Node Matrix Using SWEAT-MSS

those factors may relate to potential lawlessness, subversion or insurgency. Their goal is to develop their understanding to the level of cultural astuteness. At that level, they can estimate the effects of friendly actions across the entire set of civil considerations and direct their subordinates with confidence. By increasing their knowledge of the human variables in the operational environment, commanders and staffs improve the force’s ability to accomplish the mission.

Cultural awareness improves Soldiers’ interactions with the populace and discourages false or unrealistic expectations. Soldiers who have more knowledge of the HN society’s common practices, perceptions, taboos, customs and values have greater insight and understanding about the true intent of individuals and groups.¹¹

The HN population and displaced civilians also influence the commander’s decisions. Their presence and the commander’s need to address their protection, control and welfare affect courses of action and the allocation of available resources. In stability operations, HN popular support is key and directly influences the planning and development of SF TACFACs.

Environments

SF units operate in a wide range of environmental conditions — from desert to mountain to jungle. SF TACFACs are classified by their environment (rural or urban) and phase of development (initial, temporary or permanent).

Rural areas are sparsely settled areas outside towns and cities. Inhabitants live in villages, in hamlets, on farms or in isolated single-family houses.¹² Urban areas contain a dense mix of civilians and man-made structures. Urban areas may be cities, towns or metropolitan areas, but the term is not commonly extended to rural settlements, such as villages and hamlets.¹³

Although an SF TACFAC in a desert probably would be very different in design from an SF TACFAC built in a jungle, both would operate in essentially the same way to support SF missions with similar critical support systems. The progress of the TACFAC’s transformation through the initial, tempo-

rary and permanent phases depends upon the mission. In fact, it is possible to begin an SF TACFAC at a higher level than the initial phase. For example, an SF unit may rent, lease or occupy an existing structure or compound that is already developed, defensible and contains some, if not all, of the critical support systems. Therefore, development may begin or end with any phase, depending on the mission, the critical support systems available and the condition of the existing structure.¹⁴

Analytical tool

The SF TACFAC critical nodes matrix, or CNM, provides a starting point for establishing, modifying or improving an SF TACFAC (Figure 1). The CNM analyzes critical support systems in each of the three developmental phases. Specifically, it uses a modified version of the civil-military operations assessment model SWEAT-MS (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical and security). The CNM interchanges the SWEAT-MS positions of security and sewage (because security is paramount) and changes academics to administration, which encompasses administration and HN training. It also adds shelter, producing the TACFAC model: SWEAT-MSS (security, water, electricity, administration and HN training, trash, medical, sewage and shelter).¹⁵

The CNM allows a commander to identify and analyze critical nodes or resources required for maintaining or sustaining an SF TACFAC and its critical support systems. Using the CNM, SF units can establish a logical progression across the phases for critical-node primary, alternate, contingency and emergency, or PACE, plans. If a critical node fails anywhere in the matrix, the corresponding node from the previous phase can be used as a substitute.¹⁶ For example, if the primary sewage plan fails in a rural SF TACFAC in the permanent phase, the alternative would be to fall back on the burn barrels used during the temporary phase. If that alternate plan failed, the SFOD would use the slit trenches from the initial phase.

The CNM assists the commander in identifying shortfalls

	Initial	Temporary	Permanent
Security and Protection	- 24/7 security - Triple-strand concertina - Fighting positions	- Stackable barrier system-walls - Sandbag bunkers - SF with HN augmentation	- Brick-and-mortar wall - Observation tower - HN augmented with SF
Water	- Bottled water - Water purification kits	- Underground well - ROWPU	- Water tower - Plumbing
Electricity	- Batteries - 5KW generator	- 20KW generator	- 200KW generator
Administration and Host Nation Training	- Sand tables - Tents - Tape drill area	- DZ (bundle drops) - HLZ - HN training areas	- Fixed ranges - Rehearsal area - TACLAN (NIPR/SIPR)
Trash	- Local burn pit	- Local disposal (OPFUND)	- Contract services - Incinerator
Medical	- MOS 18D (Med Bag) - Medical bunker - HLZ	- SF dispensary - HN treatment area	- Clinic with U.S and HN medical augmentation
Sewage	- Slit trench	- Burn barrels	- PVC sewer pipes (local leach fields)
Shelter	- General-purpose medium tents	- Bivouac system, modular (tent) known as "B-hut"	- Permanent hardened structures

Figure 2. Critical Nodes Matrix for a Rural SF TACFAC

or gaps in personnel, equipment or materials. It can identify where the need exists for personnel with specialized skills, such as generator or vehicle mechanics and cooks, and for medical augmentation. The CNM is also a useful tool for SF-unit staff sections to identify, plan and forecast equipment and materials needed in future maintenance and construction of the SF TACFAC.¹⁷

The rural SF TACFAC is usually primitive and may include a large portion of undeveloped land. It may progress through the three development phases in order, it may remain in one phase, or it may skip phases. When a TACFAC is first occupied by an arriving SF unit, it becomes, by default, the initial TACFAC.¹⁸

A rural SF TACFAC may be occupied or used for only a short time and later abandoned. The major concerns of the SF unit during the initial development of an SF TACFAC include basic survival needs (security, water, food, sanitation and electric power). Housing is rudimentary — typically tents — and only basic protection measures are implemented (such as 24-hour guards and short-duration patrols). Electric power is supplied by small, portable, five-kilowatt commercial generators procured off-the-shelf and assigned to most SF detachments. Basic comforts, such as indoor plumbing and running water, are typically nonexistent. To address water needs, a TACFAC should be located so that a natural fresh-water source, such as a stream, will be in close proximity.

Rain water and potable water should be stored in closed containers to prevent potential contamination and disease, and simple showers should be constructed for personal hygiene. Initial-phase slit trenches and cat holes will be used until they can be replaced by burn-barrel latrines in the temporary phase.¹⁹

As the rural SF TACFAC develops, units can enhance security and protection by making longer patrols and emplacing listening posts, observation posts and additional wire around the facility perimeter. After security has been established, initial construction projects, such as inner and outer perimeter barriers, can be built. Early projects may be hampered by the limited amounts of equipment and material that can be carried in by the occupying SF unit.²⁰

As the initial phase of a rural SF TACFAC progresses and units construct new buildings and make renovations to the infrastructure, the initial phase will transition into the temporary phase, and the SF unit's standard of living will begin to improve. During that phase, structures made from available local materials will replace tents and crude huts. Units will install air conditioners and heaters, build improved wooden outhouses and implement a system for providing potable running water. Typical structures built during the temporary phase include an operations center, medical center, dining facility, latrine, shower and workshop. In a temporary



▲ **BACK TO BASICS** Afghan security forces stand watch at a SF tactical facility under construction in the Tagab Valley. *U.S. Army photo.*

SF TACFAC, most buildings will be wired for electricity. The small, portable, five-kilowatt generator will be replaced by a larger generator, such as an Army-issued 20-kilowatt generator. The five-kilowatt generator will then become the backup generator, per the PACE plan identified in the CNM.²¹

During the temporary phase, units enhance protection measures and expand the SF TACFAC's control outward to the access road and surrounding areas. Security patrols extend farther into the surrounding area, and contact with the populace increases. That contact gives the SF unit the opportunity to engage residents on a variety of issues and to achieve increased local support for the HN government and friendly-force operations. During this phase, it is critical that the populace understands that the presence of the SF unit and the HN government will bring increased security and the possibility of infrastructure-development projects. The physical security of the SF TACFAC remains a priority. Earthen berms or a system of stackable barrier walls can be constructed to enhance perimeter defense. As new additions and upgrades to the existing infrastructure take place, the site begins to transform into a permanent rural SF TACFAC.²²

The permanent rural SF TACFAC is highly developed, organized and maintained, and it is better able to handle security and protection emergencies than the initial or temporary TACFAC. The outer perimeter barrier usually consists of a mud or brick wall, and security patrols are conducted at random. Ideally, the permanent rural SF TACFAC should

have at least two covered and protected 200-kilowatt diesel-electric generators of the same brand, type and electrical capacity, in order to optimize efficiency and minimize the need for spare parts. The generator designated as primary will be used for all daily electrical requirements. Other generators identified within the CNM (Figure 2) can provide electrical backup during scheduled outages, routine maintenance, repairs and emergencies.²³

The permanent SF TACFAC differs from initial and temporary facilities in that the facility offers greater security and improved protection through the use of controlled-access roads, in-depth perimeter and barrier defenses, observation towers and interconnected hardened structures or permanent facilities. These permanent facilities support the critical nodes identified in the CNM. Spare parts to maintain these critical nodes should be readily available in order to effectively implement the established PACE plan.²⁴

Urban SF TACFACs, like rural ones, may also evolve through the initial, temporary and permanent phases. SWEAT-MSS is also used in developing a CNM for the urban SF TACFAC. Security and protection remain paramount, as does the overall defensive posture, and the SF TACFAC maintains the PACE planning process in an urban environment.²⁵

Urban SF TACFACs are almost always based on pre-existing urban structures. There are unique advantages and challenges in developing an urban SF TACFAC. For example, an urban SF TACFAC may be able to take advantage of pre-

existing water, sewer and electrical systems (if they are still functional). However, the urban environment offers some significant challenges to security, given the proximity of surrounding buildings and the dense concentration of population in an urban environment — which will likely include hostile elements. Also, certain threats will increase in the urban environment, such as the threat of snipers and explosives, including vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.²⁶

The biggest difference between the initial rural SF TACFAC and the initial urban SF TACFAC is the high probability that the urban TACFAC can use an existing permanent structure. Security questions to consider are: Does the structure have a perimeter barrier, such as a fence or wall? Is the structure connected to the existing infrastructure, such as the power grid and water and sewer systems?²⁷

The ideal urban SF TACFAC will have many of the SWEAT-MSS improvements and upgrades needed to facilitate a rapid transition from an initial to a permanent SF TACFAC. Initial electricity requirements include a commercial five-kilowatt generator, and initial security concerns include triple-strand concertina. If there is no perimeter protection, overlapping and continuous security patrols and manned fighting positions will be required.²⁸

If a perimeter wall or fence does not exist, it can be installed, and a safe room built, during the temporary phase. These additions will create an extra layer of protection and explosive-standoff distance. Electricity upgrades may include two or more 20-kilowatt Army diesel generators. Security should be enhanced to include rooftop security.²⁹

In the permanent phase of the urban SF TACFAC, large diesel-electric generators will be necessary. The electricity requirement will be two 200-kilowatt generators of the same make, model and capacity. SF TACFAC security should be enhanced by the addition of HN military and a rooftop observation tower, as well as by the employment of multiple industrial-grade security cameras, motion-activated lights, sensors, electro-optical devices and increased active and passive security and surveillance measures.³⁰

Conclusion

There are no clearly defined checklists or timelines for SF TACFAC development in the military decision-making process. An SF unit may be given the mission of selecting a location within an AO for constructing a new SF TACFAC, or to occupy or modify an existing one. New construction may begin at any time during any phase, and upgrades, repairs and maintenance should be constant. Regardless of the situation, deliberate planning must establish a tentative timeline and identify resource requirements and the assets available to meet them. The selection of a site and development of an SF TACFAC should also be done with an eye toward influencing the AO's environment, which includes civilian institutions

and the attitudes of the populace and its leaders. The SF TACFAC's potential for mission success will be determined by the effectiveness of its planning and development. **SW**

Notes:

- ¹ Department of the Army, FM 3-05.230 (Final Draft), *Special Forces Tactical Facilities* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2009), 1-1.
- ² FM 3-05.230 (2008), 2-1.
- ³ Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.230, *Special Forces Base Camp Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003), 2-2.
- ⁴ FM 3-05.230 (2003), 2-2.
- ⁵ FM 3-05.230 (2003), 2-2.
- ⁶ Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 5-5.
- ⁷ FM 3-0, 5-6.
- ⁸ FM 3-0, 5-7.
- ⁹ FM 3-0, 5-7.
- ¹⁰ FM 3-0, 5-7.
- ¹¹ FM 3-0, 5-8.
- ¹² Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, United States <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rural>> (accessed 15 August 2008).
- ¹³ Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, United States <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_area> (accessed 15 August 2008).
- ¹⁴ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-2.
- ¹⁵ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-3.
- ¹⁶ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-3.
- ¹⁷ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-3.
- ¹⁸ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-3.
- ¹⁹ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-4.
- ²⁰ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-7.
- ²¹ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-7.
- ²² FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-7.
- ²³ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-9.
- ²⁴ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-9.
- ²⁵ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-11.
- ²⁶ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-11.
- ²⁷ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-11.
- ²⁸ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-11.
- ²⁹ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-12.
- ³⁰ FM 3-05.230 (2009), 1-12.

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▲ **OLD SCHOOL** The cadre of the first warrant officer training program comprised many of the first SF warrant officers. *U.S. Army photo.*

Warrant Officers Celebrate 25 Years of Continuity

by Chief Warrant Officer 4 Tommy J. Austin

More than 28 years ago, two officers at Fort Bragg's JFK Center for Military Assistance formed a working group for a study called "the Special Operations Personnel Career Management Program." With no budget or support, they worked in whatever vacant space was available in the JFK Center's Kennedy Hall and cajoled secretaries to provide the necessary administrative support in their spare time. From their study, the two officers, Colonels Charlie Beckwith and J.H. "Scotty" Crerar, made recommendations that led to the creation of Career Management Field 18 to solve personnel-management problems. To solve the problem of a lack of continuity on SF detachments, they recommended the creation of slots for Special Forces warrant officers.

It has now been 25 years since the first class of 24 SF

warrant officers graduated in June 1984 and received their appointments. The first few years were difficult for SF warrant officers as, with little technical training, they struggled to develop their job descriptions and find their place on the SF detachment. Equipped with only their experience as SF NCOs and the warrant-officer-candidate training they had received at Fort Sill, Okla.; Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.; and Fort Rucker, Ala., they painstakingly forged the way for other SF warrants to follow.

Job titles for the SF warrant officers have made many changes over the years. They were initially called the special operations technician, or the team tech, a title that did not set well with them, as they were not technicians in the same way that the warrant officers of other branches were:



▲ **PROFESSIONAL STAFF** The current cadre of the Warrant Officer Institute at Fort Bragg, N.C. *U.S. Army photo.*

They were unique. As the only ground-combat warrant officers in the Army inventory, they were all “green tab” leaders from day one.

Since the first class, the ranks of 180As have grown to more than 460 active-duty warrant officers who serve at the detachment, company, battalion, group and theater-special-operations-command levels. More positions are being validated every year as SF warrant officers prove to be invaluable to the special-operations community as combat leaders and planners.

Today the reason for the creation of the SF warrant officer — continuity — is stronger than ever, not only on the detachment but at all levels of command. The warrant officer’s flexibility allows him to stay in positions far longer than NCOs and officers can. That factor is by design, and it has proven to be vital to the unity and continuity of the force. SF warrant officers have led detachments into battle and have assured the success of many missions, fulfilling the expectations of those who designed the branch and the warrant officers who came before them.

Today’s SF warrant officer is better trained than he was 25 years ago, because the ever-changing career model is designed to respond to the needs of the force. Using critical feedback from the force, the SF warrant officer’s professional military education, or PME, has been developed and reshaped over the years to better prepare him to execute his mission. The Warrant Officer Basic Course has merged

with the Warrant Officer Candidate Course to form the SF Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course. This one-station unit training returns the warrant-officer candidate to the SF detachment as a fully-qualified warrant officer 1 sooner than the previous training models did. The SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course prepares the 180A to operate in company- and battalion-level operations. There is a critical need for specific 180A training at the group level and beyond, and a Special Forces Warrant Officer Staff Course appears to be on the horizon. One of the most significant changes for 180A PME has been the establishment at the Special Warfare Center and School of the SF Warrant Officer Institute, which is responsible for the PME for all 180As, from the warrant-officer candidate to the chief warrant officer 5.

We owe a great deal to that first class of 24 SF NCOs who, despite the fact that they could receive more pay as a senior NCO than as an entry-level warrant officer, volunteered to take on a job that meant less money, more work and an uncertain future. Their tenacity and professionalism ensured the future of the SF warrant officer career field. They are truly an important part of the history of the SF community and will always hold a special place in the regiment. **SW**

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Out of the Box

3rd SF Group Uses Holistic Approach to Develop SF Combat Advisers for Afghanistan

In July 2008, the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, returned to Fort Bragg after serving seven consecutive deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The battalion's return was its first respite since 9/11 and marked the beginning of an 18-month dwell period.

Shortly after the return, Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Franklin assumed command of the 3rd Battalion. Upon taking command, he challenged his battalion to take full advantage of the 18-month period to recharge, sharpen individual and collective warfighting skills, and most significantly, to find innovative methods of progressively improving on the battalion's core competency as combat advisers.

To that end, 3/3 began pre-mission training, or PMT, upon completion of the redeployment, refit and reconstitution of personnel and equipment. The commander's guidance during the dwell period emphasized achieving the right balance between training the tasks of the directed mission-essential task list and those of the core mission-essential task list.

The training schedule allocated eight months for individual and collective skills, four months for red-cycle taskings, one month for leave, and five months focused on environmental training in a high-desert environment. The approach would focus on training in individual and collective tasks to attain peak tactical performance before moving to a maintenance period that included academic instruction. Both tactical and academic instruction were combined with a consistent outreach to train and develop Soldiers in general-purpose forces, or GPF.

The 3rd Battalion's mission in Operation Enduring Freedom XV will include building the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF, specifically the Commando Brigade, to conduct intelligence-driven, precision operations that separate the insurgents from the popula-

tion in a manner that will enable the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, or GIROA, to connect with its population. The training guidance directed that developing host-nation capability was not the end state but merely a method of providing the means to a successful counterinsurgency campaign.

If the battalion was to accomplish its training mission, it was imperative that it foster a combat-adviser mindset among the Soldiers who would be conducting the mission of foreign internal defense, or FID. The battalion first set about correcting the misperception that the primary emphasis of Special Forces is unilateral direct action. The battalion created an 18-month battalion PMT plan that emphasized throughout the SF role of combat adviser.

Secondly, the battalion found opportunities not only to train its Soldiers but also to influence the perceptions of other units through an aggressive outreach to other units. By conducting training with a variety of GPF, based at Fort Bragg and elsewhere, the 3rd Battalion's Soldiers developed their skills as combat advisers while increasing the combat skills of the GPF. Outreach training included capstone exercises at the combined training centers, or CTCs. The CTCs offer a unique environment for realistically demonstrating SF's competency and capabilities. The CTC coordination was particularly helpful because many of the elements training side-by-side with the battalion were also units with whom the battalion was scheduled to work with during the OEF XV rotation.

A combat adviser develops credibility by consistently setting the example of what "right" looks like. In order to lead the ANSF by example, SF Soldiers must first master the collective warfighting skills that they teach. Then they can responsibly train the ANSF soldiers to the standard required. CTC attendance was timed to put the battalion's

elements in capstone exercises that would challenge SF detachments and SF company headquarters to work out the finer points of operating in a battlespace that belongs to another command. Ultimately, the CTC rotations serve as a mechanism for shaping SF Soldiers' perception of their role as combat advisers. At the CTCs, the 3rd Battalion's Soldiers trained on the combat-adviser skill sets they will use with the ANSF by working with a simulated partner force composed mostly of GPF Soldiers, some of them from units that were themselves going through a CTC rotation.

In order to effectively train host-nation forces, a combat adviser must be highly competent in shoot-move-and-communicate tasks. His level of competency must include not only basic individual tasks but also advanced collective tasks. For example, a combat adviser's individual training should include military occupational specialty, or MOS, task training, language training and training in specialty skills applicable to Afghanistan, such as airborne and air-assault techniques, military mountaineering and military free fall. He should be proficient in shooting tasks, such as employment of joint fires, employment of heavy weapons, close-quarters battle and sniper operations. His movement tasks should focus on the use of ground mobility vehicles; mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles; and nontactical vehicles, with an emphasis on advanced driving techniques for tactical and nontactical vehicles.

The battalion's approach to movement training included courses run by the 3rd SF Group's operations detachment as well as outside courses run by contracted experts. Training in shooting employed tank and aerial-gunnery ranges so that Soldiers could practice effective shooting from a nonstabilized moving platform and directing close air support. Joint training exercises with the U.S. Air Force, such as HAVEACE and RED

FLAG, provided SF Soldiers the opportunity to conduct advanced mobility training using the full array of air- and ground-mobility platforms. The exercises culminated with the employment of CAS and heavy weapons while maneuvering on ranges that resemble the terrain in Afghanistan. The training program made it mandatory that all 18-series Soldiers achieved certification as combat life savers and received medical training on selected advanced realistic training aids.

The overall battalion training concept began with SF detachments conducting training in individual skills. Once that phase was complete, each SF company conducted training and then deployed for training that emphasized collective skills. Every collective training event requires sending satellite and high-frequency communication that exercises the full plan for primary, alternate, contingency and emergency operations. Finally, all collective training requires the timely submission of media products that exploit or mitigate the potential effects of information operations, or IO. This aspect of collective training includes the integration of combat camera and public affairs assets, operational summaries and storyboards.

As in actual SF operations, this IO mitigation/exploitation places Afghans in the lead. It includes training SF to combat-advise ANSF on how to conduct a comprehensive tactical-site-exploitation report that will adhere to the legal requirements for prosecuting an Afghan citizen in a GIRoA court of law. The process includes acquiring moving and still pictures from Afghan combat cameramen, collecting forensic evidence, and most importantly, conducting key-leader engagements immediately followed by gathering written or recorded statements from local Afghans on the scene during or after any potentially sensitive operations, like the search of an Afghan residence or shop. The most important aspect of combat advisers' professional development is the

concept that Soldiers train as they fight. Soldiers whose primary training has been in direct-action missions are conditioned to think that their wartime role will be to perform DA. However, in Afghanistan, the role of SF is FID. The FID mission requires a definitive skill set that must be practiced during dwell time. In Afghanistan, SF does everything by, with and through the host-nation forces. Because Soldiers training for a DA mission are often more focused on developing their own warfighting skills, they are less likely to invest time and the skills needed to nurture and develop the competency of their host-nation units.

In order to develop as combat advisers, Soldiers need to train consistently with a partnered force. A robust amount of training time must be allocated for developing both the mindset and the skills of a combat adviser. That training will establish the expectations of what combat advising entails and, over time, will enable SF Soldiers to develop and refine their combat-adviser skills.

One of the bedrocks for building the capability of a partnered, host-nation force is ensuring that its operations are nested with the effects of other elements in the battlespace. Nesting effects creates an environment in which outside influences will not cause major changes in focus. Among the other actors, the battlespace owner is the most important, because of his central role in ensuring a full-spectrum unity of effort among all the battlespace elements and the resources that the battlespace owner controls.

The 3rd Battalion worked at every level to develop the nesting relationship. For example, at the battalion level, the battalion staff facilitated integration by participating with GPF in two battle labs that focused on the latest systems and procedures used by GPF in Afghanistan and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan. The battalion staff also participated in mission-readiness exercises with Task Force 82 as it prepared for deploy-

ment to Afghanistan. Moreover, the battalion's signal center and support center deployed assets for each company event, as well as for all the CTC events. In addition to building the capabilities of the signal and support centers, those deployments gave the combat advisers the opportunity to train with the same capabilities they will use in OEF XV.

CTCs are an excellent venue for building rapport because personal relationships built during training foster the relationships needed for conducting effective operations in OEF. All of the 3rd Battalion will rotate through the CTCs as part of PMT. The CTC exercises were chosen based on the participation of GPF units with whom the 3rd Battalion would have a supported or supporting relationship during OEF XV. The training rotation included the deployment of two SF company headquarters and their subordinate SF detachments to the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the deployment of the entire special-operations task force, with all its centers and cells, and one SF company headquarters and its subordinate SF detachments, to the National Training Center. Each rotation focuses on SF combat-advising a FID force that replicates the Afghan Commandos. Additionally, the GPF participating in the rotation gained experience by working with SF.

Another initiative is training that simulates the creation and operation of joint Afghan-coalition command-and-control centers. During OEF XV, an SF company headquarters from the 3rd Battalion is scheduled to combat-advise the staff of the Afghan Commando Brigade on controlling operations from a joint tactical operations center, or JTOC. The JTOC facilitates the coordination of operations among coalition forces, tribal representatives, and the Afghan national army, commandos, national police and border patrol. JTOCs allow for real-time planning and action on time-sensitive criminal or insurgent threats and issues. Furthermore, through a tip line, locals can



▲ **MAN DOWN** Soldiers from the 3rd Bn., 3rd SF Group, train as combat advisers during a stressful force-on-force scenario in which Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 321st Field Artillery, evaluate and treat a casualty in a high-threat area. The 3rd Bn., 3rd SF Group has been relentless in creating scenarios that provide SF Soldiers experience in what right looks like while operating shoulder-to-shoulder with a partnered unit. *U.S. Army photo.*

call information into the JTOC. The JTOC provides the ability not only to deconflict operations but also to synchronize them, in order to prevent any tribes from playing one element of the security force against another. Finally, the JTOC is an excellent venue for conducting information operations, including providing updates on GIRoA advancements and conducting consequence mitigation.

Combat advisers will begin by helping the ANSF to establish a joint communications center, or JCC, and then, as their capabilities mature, to develop the JCC into a JTOC. During a heavy-brigade-combat-team rotation at the National Training Center, the 3rd Battalion will prepare for the OEF XV mission by working with a partnered force composed of a battalion from an allied Arab country that will also deploy in support of OEF XV. The 3rd Battalion will develop its combat-advising skill by teaching the FID-force staff how to conduct JTOC planning, operations

and after-action reviews necessary for controlling a simulated command company during the NTC rotation.

Developing world-class combat advisers requires sustained, realistic training that develops the Soldiers and elements progressively. One of the ways to develop the skill set is by teaching the Special Forces Basic Combat Course – Support, or SFBCC-S, to non-special-operations Soldiers stationed at Fort Bragg. The concept behind SFBCC-S is that support personnel are expected to operate alongside 18-series Soldiers while deployed, facing many of the same challenges, and that they should be taught to the standards needed to support 18-series Soldiers.

Basic Soldier skills are the same for every Soldier, regardless of MOS. For example, all Soldiers should handle, load and clear a weapon the same way. SFBCC-S relies heavily on the use of live ammunition and simunitions. Its culmination exercise is designed to increase students'

capability to perform complex vehicle and personnel recovery during a live fire; and to react to an IED-initiated direct-fire ambush, to maintain contact and to assault the enemy.

Traditionally, conducting joint combined exercise training, or JCET, is one of the methods used to develop combat advisers. The 3rd Battalion is participating in three theater-security cooperation plan engagements, or TSCPs, that offer a unique opportunity for conducting FID in an environment closely resembling the OEF mission set, while facilitating the success of the Special Operations Command-Central's engagement plan.

With only three TSCP engagements, the 3rd Battalion's SF detachments created JCET-like experiences using elements of the SFBCC-S instruction through SF detachments participating in 12 training exchanges with GPF, in which the battalion provided small-unit tactics and received tactics, techniques



▲ ON THE MOVE Soldiers from the 3rd Bn., 3rd Special Forces Group, combat-advise ANA Commandos during a successful intelligence-driven precision operation to remove a priority insurgent target in Khowst Province, Afghanistan. This mission set defines the 3rd SF Group's operations in Afghanistan. The missions amplify how combat advisers develop the Afghan National Army Commandos' growing warrior ethos and constantly increase their capability to secure their country in a manner that enables the GIRoA to connect to the population. *U.S. Army photo.*

and procedures from the GPF in the employment of artillery, sensitive-site exploitation and employment of military police on a target.

Working with the GPF in order to develop combat advisers provides additional benefits. Soldiers develop greater combat-adviser skills; training provides the combat adviser with an increased capability for serving as the host-nation forces' bridge to 21st-century enablers; the training increases the capability of the GPF; training enhances interoperability and training provides SF with access to some of the GPFs' excellent training opportunities. One example of the benefits of this outreach, in this case, to the fires brigade, was that it led to use of the joint fires observer mobile training team, or JFO MTT. The battalion fires cell, working with the Artillery Center at Fort Sill, Okla., established a program that imported the JFO MTT. This was the first time that an SF unit has hosted the JFO MTT. The program resulted in 19 Sol-

diers from the 3rd Battalion becoming qualified and registered to call in Type 1 and Type 2 close air support.

Combat advisers often try to build the capability of a host-nation force that may have been organized, trained and even equipped for 18th-century conflict, while bridging the gap to conflict enablers that are available only to modern forces. Those enablers include joint fires; indirect fires; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and rotary-wing support, including medical evacuation. Knowing how to employ these enablers in a counterinsurgency environment is a key part of the battalion's PMT. The multifaceted program includes an academic professional-development portion (seminars, readings, writing and focused discussion) and, most importantly, a continuous series of practical exercises.

This portion of the 3rd Battalion combat-adviser training plan aims to provide Soldiers in the battalion

with an understanding of the major changes that have occurred in the operational environment since 2001. Training consists of three parts: The first part focuses on gaining a historical understanding of Afghanistan, the application of military history and doctrinal changes that have resulted from the changing operational environment. The second part shifts the focus to current developments in Afghanistan that affect ANSF operations. The third portion of the plan, conducted just prior to deployment, provides an in-depth area analysis.

As part of the program, subject-matter experts lead a monthly seminar. For example, in December the battalion hosted a one-week COIN seminar led by Lieutenant Colonel Mark Ulrich from the joint Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Seventy-five participants attended the seminar, including attendees from throughout the SF, Civil Af-

fairs and Psychological Operations communities, and members of the 4th Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. This experience not only imparted knowledge to the Soldiers of 3rd Battalion but also built deeper connections and mutual understanding between the various units that must work together downrange.

The focus of each seminar is the way that a particular subject affects current operations in OEF. Upcoming seminar leaders and topics include Les Grau on the modern military history of Afghanistan; Dave Grossman on combat stress management; and Joe Butta on militant Islam.

Other professional-development training has included education in new COIN doctrine from the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.; briefings from the National Ground Intelligence Center; recent developments and experiences in tribal engagement from the CJSOTF-A; and briefings on the changes to Afghan Commando doctrine and employment made by the Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan.

The professional reading portion of the Soldier-education program includes books intended to nurture critical-analysis skills related to past and current strategy and policy goals. The readings serve to provide Soldiers with the tools needed to link current operations to the overall strategic and policy goals in the region and to examine missteps of the past. The books include: Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*; Sarah Chayes, *The Punishment of Virtue*; and Ahmad Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia*. These books serve as a point of departure for discussing the complex political decisions that affect operations on the ground.

The battalion leaders included this facet of the training because they believe that strategically prepared operators who are attuned to the delicate nature of their operational

environment can best advise their partnered ANSF leadership to exploit opportunities. Discussions about the books help Soldiers develop a detailed understanding of the agendas of warlords and select tribal chiefs with whom some contend U.S. policy (led by SOF) became entangled in the early years of the post-9/11 conflict. The corruption and favoritism shown by these warlords allegedly undermined the legitimacy of the GIRoA, and that loss of legitimacy was partly responsible for the GIRoA being unable to connect with the population. The reading program is not designed to promote a political theory but rather to make combat advisers cognizant of the strategic issues that play out on the tactical level in Afghanistan. Through the critical understanding gained from this aspect of the combat-adviser program, ANSF combat-advised by SF are more likely to nest their tactical operations with operational-level objectives.

Training for combat advisers also encourages written discussion of topics related to connecting Afghanistan's population to the GIRoA. Topics include ways of carrying out clear-hold-and-build operations in Afghanistan; measuring effectiveness; synchronizing and integrating with the other battlespace actors, including the battlespace owner; developing an Afghan forensic and investigative element so that the GIRoA has personnel who can testify and present evidence in GIRoA courts; and developing the ANA commandos' capability for advanced reconnaissance.

During its next OEF deployment, the 3rd Battalion will build select capabilities for missions designed to achieve specific effects in the battlespace. The necessity of the battalion's professional-development program stems from the fact that the future mission in Afghanistan will be complex and nuanced. SF Soldiers must be competent in the skills required to train the ANSF units with which they will be partnered. Although SF is capable of leading ANSF in combat and

ready to bleed alongside them if necessary, SF's role is to train the ANSF to perform the security mission by themselves. Furthermore, in order to be effective combat advisers, Soldiers must understand the historical and current political, military and cultural environment in which they operate. The multipronged approach that the 3rd Battalion is implementing is meant to address the myriad of issues related to both practical skills and the expectations that SF Soldiers have of the mission they are going to perform in combat. **SW**

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Training Management vs. Mission Planning

By Chief Warrant Officer 3 John P. Dowling

According to United States Army Special Forces Command Regulation 350-1, *Component Training*, the commander at each level is required to “develop battle focus to ensure subordinate units (or detachments) train on critical wartime mission requirements.” What are critical wartime mission requirements? Are they the capabilities that the warfighting geographic combatant commander, or GCC, desires that the theater special-operations command, or TSOC, bring to the fight? Are these requirements different today from what they were 10 years ago? Of course they are. Ten years ago, we did not have every Special Forces group converging on one GCC’s area of responsibility, or AOR, performing foreign internal defense, or FID, in such a sophisticated manner or in such dangerous environments. To that end, the force has dramatically changed its training and produced some of the most skilled and experienced operators in advanced special operations, or ASO, and direct action, or DA.

The critical tasks required in the conflicts in which the force is engaged are primarily mounted combat operations in a desert environment, ASO and FID as the primary enabler for success in the “by, with and through” strategy. As combat rotations continue year after year, the force appears to be losing relevant cultural and environmental experience, reducing its ability to meet the needs of the TSOCs and GCCs outside of the U.S. Central Command. The force’s capabilities in the

full spectrum of core tasks, as well as in the various infiltration techniques, have also been degraded.

While the operations tempo is primarily to blame, the force has (out of necessity, originally) given over traditional methods of training management to favor a more expedient model of pre-mission training, or PMT. The PMT model is a direct extension of comprehensive mission planning based in the verbiage, “critical wartime mission requirements.” This evolution of training has unintentionally limited the SF detachment’s autonomy in planning its training, and detachments have therefore abandoned battle focus — a training-management tool that has yielded much mission success in the past. That unintended casualty should be re-instituted as the operational tempo slows with the addition of the fourth battalion to each group.

Pre-Mission Training

PMT has become the predominant tool used for training management by the force during the ongoing conflict. Its use is forcewide, and its results are seen in the dramatically heightened combat abilities (shoot, move and communicate) demonstrated daily in Iraq and Afghanistan. The idea of a PMT is to teach, refine and hone combat skills immediately prior to deploying on a combat or contingency operation, and in common usage, PMT refers to training conducted with a

company-sized element or larger. Used as a training-management tool, PMT is more efficient than other methods because it affords the command the opportunity to better manage limited-range facilities and support assets. The use of a PMT also allows the staff to plan the training early, so that during training they can focus on, and better prepare for, the next combat rotation. Used as a centralized event, PMT can reassure the commander that each detachment and advanced operational base, or AOB, has achieved at least his minimum standard in lethal operations and in the command and control of those operations.

Across the force, the template for PMT has become a 30- to 90-day mandatory training event that is based on the Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course but modified to center on the company. The event culminates in a unilateral, lethal strike operation involving several detachments and controlled by an AOB. Additional training is usually conducted in mounted operations that employ heavy weapons, specifically identified individuals conducting ASO training, and limited training in new equipment. Medical cross-training occurs throughout PMT and is conducted at a level that produces operators skillful enough to stabilize trauma patients without the direct supervision of SF medical sergeants. The training ensures that most SF detachments have common capabilities and are interchangeable for the purpose of assigning missions and rotating assignments.

Commanders need to acknowledge that there are several problems associated with the practical application of the PMT model. The first is the question: "What are we training to accomplish?" Based on the bulk of training the force has conducted over the last few years, our primary core task seems to be DA. While this conclusion is highly contentious in the force, it is clearly evident by the predominant force-wide use of a one-size-fits-all SFAUC-like PMT training event. Although the force's primary mission in the ongoing conflict appears to be FID, that is not reflected in its training. The use of troops from noncombat arms or the National Guard as a tool for training in FID has been largely discarded. Joint combined exchange training, or JCET, fulfilled that training requirement in the past, but because of the operations tempo, that tool has not been available to much of the force. The only aspect of unconventional warfare actively trained falls within the ASO subset.

The force initially identified critical warfighting tasks that, because of the existing region-affiliated environmental deployments and training, were insufficient to prepare for the types of missions and the environment that make up the operational environment in the CENTCOM AOR. In order to rapidly increase the force's capabilities in mounted desert combat operations, much of the force turned to civilian contractors for training. These civilian companies offer training venues, instruction and skill sets, primarily taught by retired SF Soldiers, that were not readily available at their home stations or were not possessed by enough of the force so that it could train itself in a timely manner. The fact that the training could be conducted without draining the command's limited resources in equipment and support mechanisms, using GWOT

monies, appeared to be the most effective means of training to become proficient in the critical wartime tasks designated by the GCC and TSOC. This has become increasingly prevalent in the training of ASO skills, which, in the past, were predominantly trained internally, at the battalion or company level. The individuals who demonstrated an aptitude with ASO skills were then sent to receive advanced training from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS. The result of relying so heavily on contractor training is that some training that is a prerequisite for a specific SWCS course is now taught exclusively by civilian contractors.

The next question for the commander to consider is: "How has the force changed?" Because of the scale and operations tempo of the conflict in CENTCOM, some units use PMT exclusively for their training, causing some Soldiers to feel that the force is retaining capabilities only in those core tasks and infiltration techniques and losing its ability to operate effectively in environments and cultures that are vastly different from those in the Iraq and Afghanistan AORs, where the majority of SF detachments now have their only experience.

The biggest changes the commander should take into consideration are at the micro or SF-detachment level. Because of the considerations mentioned, the training management of the force has shifted, excluding the detachment that no longer analyses the battle focus or develops a mission letter for the commander. The SF detachment has been highly effective in any mission and environment because it is made up of operators who have different backgrounds and varying levels of experience in the core tasks and infiltration techniques. The primary focus forcewide has been on the core tasks of unconventional warfare, or UW, and FID, coupled with the necessary environmental and cultural training needed to employ those skills in a specific region. The majority of operators today, even some in positions of authority, such as detachment operations sergeant and assistant detachment commander, have come to the force since the beginning of the GWOT. They may never have deployed to their region, used an infiltration technique other than mounted or heliborne, or been involved in assessing their detachment's need for training to make it effective in its assigned region. That is not to say that those Soldiers are incompetent or incapable, but all too often, it appears to the SF detachment that training management has given way to mission planning, with the only concern being the next rotation, and much of the force that has been deployed on four or more consecutive rotations is beginning to question that mindset. The question is: Can the SF detachment be proficient in its critical wartime tasks and maintain its regional focus with the time it has to train? The commander should answer that question through an analysis of the battle focus at the detachment level.

Battle focus

Prior to the current conflicts, the regionally-aligned TSOCs and SF groups analyzed their perceived wartime missions in their respective AORs and determined the capabilities that would be needed to best perform those missions. To that end, each group was similar in core tasks but unique in their

AOR's environmental and cultural conditions. The analysis made it possible for SF detachments to be highly specialized in their core tasks, infiltration techniques and language capabilities assigned by the battalion commander. The commander would identify each detachment's critical tasks and provide direction. Each detachment would then determine the individual and collective tasks that would need to be trained or improved for Soldiers to perform the tasks on the mission-essential task list. Then, task by task, the detachment determined its current level of training, assigning each task one of three labels: proficient (P), trained (T) or untrained (U). The next step was to review the battalion's long-range planning calendar to determine which tasks were already scheduled for battalion- or company-dictated training. The detachment would identify training or training events needed to raise its proficiency and create a plan that prioritized training in accordance with command guidance. The detachment would then present the plan for the battalion commander's approval and, after his approval, would begin writing concepts for deployments for training, forecasting ammunition and ranges, or securing school slots for identified requirements. The detachment then briefed the commander quarterly on its accomplishments and progress. The commander validated the detachment's training through battalion evaluation events, which were usually as diverse as the detachments evaluated.

As a training-management tool, battle focus has several positive effects that are seemingly intangible and therefore difficult to quantify. For the junior members of the detachment, it helps illuminate why certain training events are conducted. For most, it marks the first time that they have helped plan their own training, which fosters ownership and pride, as well as a clear understanding of the intent and purpose of each event. For detachment leaders, especially during their first months in the positions, it promotes self-analysis and encourages effective time-management. The key advantage of battle focus is that it teaches leaders to qualify training events by identifying the tasks that were trained and further quantifying the event through an update to the detachment commander's training folder, changing an "untrained" task to "trained" or "proficient." For the commander, detachment-level battle focus provides a means of keeping track of the detachments' abilities to perform core tasks and infiltration techniques. As highly specialized as each of these has become, the commander has the difficult task of being aware of each detachment's capabilities if he is to effectively employ them. The task is made even more difficult by limited budgets and limited numbers of support personnel. The result of battle focus is a much more self-supportive, efficient organization at each level, and even though it is done out of necessity, it yields a positive effect on the force.


The force's combat experience, coupled with the addition of a fourth battalion in each active-duty group, creates opportunities in training management and re-introduces old difficulties. With the employment of the new battalions, the operations tempo for the groups will change, giving each of them the opportunity to refocus on their regional affiliation.

The principal challenge will be conducting the training without GWOT deployment monies. Another challenge to training management will be inherent to the increase in the size of the force: The same limited ranges, training venues and support mechanisms must be utilized by all. To those without experience in this type of training environment, that can be difficult without reinstating battle focus to offer specific direction and guidance. To those in junior leadership positions, the mentorship of their commanders, sergeants major and senior warrant officers will be invaluable. The JCET will most likely re-emerge as the principal training tool, offering training monies and regional experience that will facilitate training objectives and meet regional requirements. JCETs also offer the opportunity for the SF detachment to plan and deploy as a self-supportive, autonomous element that has proven to be hugely beneficial in the past. For some, JCETs will mark the first time they have deployed as a detachment, away from their company or battalion. Events such as JCETs increase the maturity of the force, and when coupled with combat experience, will exponentially increase the confidence and capabilities of the force. The reinstatement of training events such as exercise evaluations of full-spectrum, regionally affiliated environment operations and the increased utilization of the Joint Readiness Training Center will become a more useful tool for the commander and the SF detachment to validate the training conducted.

PMT will remain a positive tool for the commander to use as a result of comprehensive mission planning to teach, refine and hone critical wartime skills before deploying on a combat or contingency operation. Commanders must also recognize the experience level of the force in its CENTCOM-associated critical tasks. As a result, commanders should consider reinstating proven doctrine instead of using PMT exclusively to meet future training objectives. As the groups' operations tempo slows with the addition of the fourth battalions, each group will be able to re-affiliate itself with its particular regional TSOC. That relationship may be challenging to a force whose preponderance of experience is found in its senior leaders. The current commanders of the force, sergeants major and senior warrant officers remember well all that is involved in planning and training to provide the capabilities necessary in their regions, and so the challenge falls on them. Leaders at all levels must mentor junior leaders and foster a command relationship that develops a force capable of the autonomy and maturity required to be relevant in today's battlespace. To this end, the reinstatement of battle focus at the detachment level will be a simple starting point. **SW**

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UNCONVENTIONAL EDUCATION: SOF OFFICERS AND THE OLMSTED FOUNDATION SCHOLARSHIP



By Major Lino Miani and Lieutenant Commander Michael Wisecup

Since the earliest missions of the Office of Strategic Services in Europe and south Asia, America's special-operations forces, or SOF, have gone beyond their conventional counterparts in pursuit of the language and cultural abilities that will give them an edge in warfare. We leverage this capability as a force multiplier, making our impact greater than the sum of our small numbers and doing so in strategically significant ways. These abilities made it possible for the Jedburghs to avoid the pitfalls of Free French politics during World War II, bonded MACV-SOG commandos to their Nung and Montagnard teammates in Vietnam, and enabled SOF in Kurdistan and Anbar Province, Iraq, to secure the approaches to Baghdad.

In today's environment of globalized conflict, the need for such skills has never been greater. SOF are routinely deployed in an estimated 75 countries around the world, where they encounter hundreds of languages and cultures. Soldiers working in small elements within these environments require mature diplomatic skills and expertise in liaison that can be acquired only through time and exposure to other cultures. SOF operators have proven adept at developing a vital

understanding of regional dynamics through years of security assistance, combined operations and unconventional warfare.

It can take a decade or more for SOF professionals to achieve the easy understanding of regional dynamics that distinguishes us from our conventional counterparts. Unfortunately, an ever-expanding list of career milestones, service and joint education, and staff assignments limit the time and opportunities SOF officers have for developing such an intimate relationship with foreign cultures. In many cases, their actual time on the ground is relegated to fewer than five years spread over a 20-year career. The cultural exposure they do receive is gleaned from traditional intelligence products, packed into short missions in theater, or compiled from the experiences of other team members. We should do more to develop our future leaders.

Attendance at service war colleges, where officers are surrounded by peers with very similar political, cultural and military experiences, is intended to deepen, rather than broaden the education of SOF leaders. While this education is important, it is not enough for leaders of unconventional units. The success of our missions is

rooted in understanding the culture, language, history and foreign affairs of nations throughout the world, yet our education in these areas is packed into short operational tours. It is ironic that the SOF community, which prides itself on understanding the strategic consequences of every decision, fails to give more attention to this aspect of our professional education.

Language and cultural understanding have long been tenets of the SOF community and give us an edge in comparison to our conventional counterparts. Recognizing the value of these abilities, the Department of Defense approved the Defense Language Transition Roadmap, or DLTR, in January 2005. Despite its name, the plan goes beyond language proficiency to include military-wide provisions for understanding a broader range of regional social dynamics. In short, it gives DoD the task of converting its members into a force of culturally savvy internationalists.

The first and most important goal of the DLTR is to "create foundational language and regional area expertise" within DoD.¹ This is no small task. The Pentagon seeks to achieve, across all branches of service, an understanding of regional nuances that can take SOF professionals an entire career

of foreign-internal-defense, security-assistance and unconventional-warfare missions to fully understand. At the heart of this ambitious goal are three subtasks that indicate the high importance given to this initiative by DoD:

- 1) Exploit “study abroad” opportunities to facilitate language acquisition.
- 2) Establish the requirement that junior officers complete language training.
- 3) Make foreign-language ability a criterion for general officer/flag officer advancement.

Though these three tasks focus on language acquisition, the methods include one-year assignments for junior officers “with a foreign military or national constabulary/paramilitary force” — a bold break from the conventional military’s traditional lockstep approach to officer development.

OLMSTED SCHOLAR PROGRAM

In many ways, the vision of creating a force of culturally aware and internationally minded Soldiers is new to the conventional military, but the concept is not. Inspired by his experiences in China during World War II, during which he witnessed the difficulties faced by American officers unfamiliar with other cultures, Major General George Olmsted created the George and Carol Olmsted Foundation in 1957 to accomplish the same goal set forth in the DLTR almost 50 years later.

A successful international businessman before and after the war, Olmsted knew well how to train American officers to be effective in what he recognized as an increasingly interconnected world. The first six selectees for the Olmsted Scholar Program began their overseas studies in 1959. Among the 486 scholars who have entered the program since, 31 have become general/flag officers, including four who achieved four-star rank. Those officers later commanded the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Strategic Command, the Air Force Materiel Command and one served as the chief of naval operations.² Drawing upon their experiences as Olmsted scholars, these officers leveraged their

unique skills while serving in positions that required close interaction with our country’s allies.

The Olmsted Scholar Program provides military officers from all services an opportunity to pursue a master’s degree abroad and includes a budget for language training, tuition and regional travel, so scholars can get a firsthand appreciation of the broad dynamics that affect their host country. By virtue of being military officers involved in a highly selective academic program, Olmsted scholars are able to associate with an incredible cross-section of their host societies. They build relationships with their host nation’s academic and security communities, government ministers, business leaders, the international diplomatic corps and even royalty. One scholar in Paris during the 1960s was a classmate and friend of Alain Richard. Their relationship became strategically important



Major General George Olmsted

when Richard became the French minister of defense in 1997. The story is not unique. Olmsted scholars develop lifelong personal relationships with their host-nation peers, personal links that are unattainable through any other education program for military officers. As these same peers rise in importance in political, military and business circles, they create a potential for greater understanding and direct lines of communication between their countries and the United States.

Though one of the stated goals of the Olmsted Scholar Program is to “increase [scholar] sensitivity to viewpoints, cultures and concerns of people around the world,”³ scholars are discouraged from “going native.” On the contrary (perhaps more importantly), the experience teaches the *limits* of cultural awareness. While living overseas as visiting officers, Olmsted scholars quickly learn what they should and should not compromise on. By understanding how to operate within the constraints of their host nation’s culture, scholars develop effective ways to counter common misperceptions about America and American culture. They are often asked hard questions concerning American foreign

policy and regularly find themselves in classrooms led by social fundamentalists. In that environment, they quickly mature into better advocates for the country and the military, a skill set that becomes more valuable as they are entrusted with increasing responsibility for our foreign policy.

WHY OLMSTED IS GOOD FOR SOF

The Olmsted Scholar Program embeds officers in the academic and social fabric of countries in strategically important regions of the world and offers a number of benefits to the SOF community. Some are obvious: the acquisition of a foreign language, cultural awareness and a familiarity with the city, country and region where the scholar lives. But the more subtle benefits of long-term exposure to a community are what really set the Olmsted Scholar Program apart and make it attractive to SOF.

The Olmsted program removes the officer from the mainstream of military education and thought, places him in an unfamiliar civilian environment, and provides him little or no direction or interference. That pushes the individual to exercise his mind, challenge his perceptions and assumptions, and be engaged daily by his classmates, professors and neighbors. The result is completion of a master’s degree, near expert language skills and the acquisition of a deep cultural understanding. No other program offers this to military officers who, for the most part, receive advanced education through service colleges and university programs in the United States.

In much of the world, past and present collide in a way that is often difficult for outsiders to fully grasp. Many of the conflicts that America finds itself involved in today have played out continuously for hundreds of years. Cultures have been built around these conflicts, and in some cases, the actors involved in the origins of the dispute are still at the center of controversy. What we sometimes fail to realize is that the U.S. is fortunate to have had the same two neighbors with roughly the same borders and the same politics for the better part of 200 years. We value nation-states and the sovereignty represented by lines on a map, and we have little understanding of those who would rather relive past conflicts than move forward together in

a positive way. To fully understand history's impact on a society, one must go beyond simply knowing its history and strive to understand the connection of that community's current leaders to the past.

There are only two ways for an American really to come to terms with this. One is through the relentless pursuit of academic expertise, but most special operators distrust those who learn only from books, as most of us prefer to learn by experience. Intelligence summaries are designed to partially satisfy our need for background understanding, but with so much information to absorb, they can become mere abstractions — meaningless lists of names, places and dates that most commanders cannot possibly grasp in time to effectively fine-tune their operations.

The second way for an American to “place the names with the faces,” so to speak, is to be immersed in the targeted environment — to learn by observation and be forced to face the intersecting impacts of history, culture, language, race and geography on daily life.

Over the course of a career, military officers will have many opportunities to learn about the places they serve in, but only the Olmsted Scholar Program offers the unique opportunity to pursue academic expertise while immersed in the culture. The combination is a powerful tool when one considers the complexity of the SOF imperatives and realizes that “understand the operational environment, recognize political implications and consider long-term effects,” is easier said than done.

WHY SOF IS GOOD FOR OLMSTED

SOF officers are uniquely suited for the Olmsted Foundation scholarship. A typical SOF operator's experiences of moving in and out of foreign countries, navigating embassy bureaucracy and understanding the regional and global contexts of the people with whom they come into contact are unmatched. Olmsted scholars are able to separate themselves from the American infrastructure in their host countries and immerse themselves with relative ease in a way that few others can. SOF officers are often given great freedom of movement in and around their host region because they are better equipped than most to avoid the threats posed

by foreign intelligence, terrorists and criminals. While in country, many SOF scholars tailor their academic efforts to coincide with the regional orientation of their parent unit. These officers are likely to seize opportunities for study and seek relationships that will benefit their units in very specific ways in the immediate future. For these reasons and more, SOF officers tend to get far more from the Olmsted Scholar Program than their conventional peers.

Additionally, most young SOF officers have direct experience with the factors that shape decisions at the operational and strategic levels. Their perspective is unmatched precisely because they've borne the brunt of those decisions time and again without the buffer of several layers of command that shelter their peers in conventional units. Because of this, SOF officers in the Olmsted Scholar Program can provide an unparalleled view of events as they unfold in strategic locations around the globe. For example, the authors of this article had front-row seats for the 12th Malaysian general election — and the series of riots surrounding it — in March 2008, as well as the Mumbai terror attacks in November of the same year. In 2006, another SOF scholar was studying in Bangkok during the Thai army's coup d'état. Meanwhile, scholars in Cairo and Tel Aviv live at the intersection of war, insurgency and U.S. Middle East policy.

LIVING THE SOF IMPERATIVES

Reflecting on his own experience as an international businessman, financier and facilitator of American foreign policy both during and after World War II, Olmsted believed that the best leaders must be educated broadly. Having masterminded OSS prisoner-rescue operations in China during the war,⁴ he understood the value of special operations and may have had them in mind when he conceived the Olmsted Scholar Program.

In an age of instant communications and 24-hour news cycles, future conflicts will assume more of the information-warfare aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency than were seen in the large-scale, conventional warfare of the past. In such an environment, special operations forces will play a much greater role than our small numbers would otherwise suggest. Among all the orga-

nizations that make up the vast U.S. military, the U.S. Special Operations Command and its components stand to benefit immediately and directly by sending selected officers through the Olmsted Scholar Program. We cannot wait for our officers to accumulate multiple tours of duty before they learn to leverage the social and cultural aspects of the theater of war to our advantage. The Olmsted Scholar Program represents a unique opportunity, not only to gain regional expertise but also to cultivate a mindset of accomplishment through indirect or unconventional means. **SW**

Major Lino Miani is a Special Forces officer with more than six years of special-operations experience in a half-dozen countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. He is a scholar of the George and Carol Olmsted Foundation and will be completing his master's in strategic and defense studies at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in June 2009. He is a 1997 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, where he earned a bachelor's in regional geography (eastern Europe) and systems engineering.

Lieutenant Commander Michael Wisecup is a Navy Special Warfare officer with 10 years of special-operations experience throughout Asia, Europe and the Middle East. He is a scholar of the George and Carol Olmsted Foundation and has recently completed his master's in business administration from the Indian Institute for Technology and Management in Mumbai, India. He is a 1998 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, where he earned a bachelor's in oceanography.

NOTES

¹ Department of Defense, *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2005), 3.

² General John P. Abizaid, CENTCOM; General George Lee Butler, STRATCOM; General Henry Viscellio, AFMC; and Admiral Carlisle A. Trost, CNO.

³ The George and Carol Olmsted Foundation, “Summary of the Olmsted Scholar Program,” available online at: <http://www.olmstedfoundation.org/olmsted/web/index.cfm?view=scholarsProgram/vwMain&entID=11>.

⁴ Howard L. Dutkin, *Soldier, Patriot, Financier: A Biographical Sketch of Major General George Olmsted* (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1971), 102, 109 passim.

CA/PSYOP

CMF 38 accession board to convene this summer

Civil Affairs continues to recruit qualified Soldiers who meet the prerequisites listed in DA Pam 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*.

To obtain more information, Soldiers can visit the following link: <https://perscomnd04.army.mil/MOSMARTBK.nsf/>. Sign in using AKO user ID and password, then go to Chapter 10, 38B. Soldiers who are interested in reclassifying into CA should contact SFC Herring or SFC Pease at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, located on Fort Bragg on Macomb Street (Building 2-1120), or telephone (910) 432-9697 or DSN 239-9697. CA is no longer accepting applications from sergeants first class or promotable staff sergeants.

The next Civil Affairs accession board will be held either in late July to fill slots for classes in the second quarter of fiscal year 2010.

Some PSYOP Soldiers will receive automatic E5

The Army G1 has approved a policy that will automatically promote Soldiers to E5 once they graduate from the Psychological Operations Qualification Course and are awarded military occu-

pational specialty 37F. The policy is expected to become effective October 1, 2009. Once the Department of the Army releases the official notification message, the promotion effective date will be the earliest date that a Soldier meets both requirements. The policy will apply only to prior-service-accession Soldiers.

PSYOP accession board to convene

The next Psychological Operations accession board will convene in September to select the best-qualified Soldiers for attendance in the PSYOP Qualification Course and reclassification to 37F, Psychological Operations. For more information on a career in PSYOP or to submit a reclassification packet, visit the Web site of the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (www.bragg.army.mil/PSYOP) or telephone (910) 396-6533, DSN 236-6533.

Policy waives CCC requirement for USAR CAQC, USAR POQC

The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Major General Thomas Csrnko, has approved a policy to waive until October 2011 the requirement that Army Reserve officers complete the Captain's Career

Course, or CCC, before attending the USAR Civil Affairs Qualification Course or the USAR Psychological Operations Qualification Course. USAR officer graduates of the CA or PSYOP branch training may thus be considered branch-qualified at the company-grade level without completing the CCC.

Company-grade officers will still need to complete CCC within three years of completing their branch-specific training. For a copy of the policy letter, e-mail Major Glenn Anderson at glenn.anderson@soc.mil, or Master Sergeant Mark Olmsted at olmstedm@soc.mil.

New CA career manager

Master Sergeant Ralph W. Weller has replaced Master Sergeant Stefano Rizzotto as the Civil Affairs senior career manager. Weller can be reached by telephone at (910) 907-4171, DSN 239-4171; or send e-mail to: wellerr@ahqb.soc.mil.

CA NCOs eligible for SRB

CA Soldiers in the rank of sergeant are eligible for a selective re-enlistment bonus, or SRB, of as much as \$15,000. Staff sergeants are eligible for as much as \$10,000.

For more information on eligibility, contact your local career counselor.

Warrant Officer

180As should serve as first-line SFWO recruiters

Special Forces warrant officers, or 180As, should serve as the primary means of identifying and mentoring potential SF warrant-officer candidates. It is imperative that 180As at the company level and higher work with their commanders to implement a program to actively identify and assess

potential candidates. If the force is to remain healthy and maintain an appropriate distribution of experience, each SF company should have a goal of recruiting at least one successful applicant each year. The Army National Guard has an even greater need to foster accessions early on, because of its inherent conflicts in military and civilian scheduling. In order to

better assist potential candidates, ARNG 180As and ARNG state command chief warrant officers should keep up with changes in the application process by periodically reviewing the AKO's 180A Recruiting Web site, or by contacting Chief Warrant Officer 3 Bobby Craig or Chief Warrant Officer 5 Samuel Doyle at (910) 432-7597/1879, DSN 239-7597/1879.

VOICES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE CAROLINAS

Are there parallels between the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the battle for control of the backcountry Carolinas in the American Revolution more than two centuries ago?

Listen to these quotes from a recent article, "Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan," in *Special Warfare*:

"Only after security is established will the elders and the general population see the IROA [Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] as a legitimate force for stabilizing the country."

"The Afghan people understand power, and they will support the element that has the power in their eyes."

Substitute "the British king and army" for "the IROA and its U.S./NATO allies," and substitute "backcountry American colonists" for "the Afghan people."

Then read a book like *Voices of the American Revolution in the Carolinas*, edited by Ed Southern, and you may see that there are some striking similarities.

Southern's book is different from most military histories. He collected a set of writings from people who actually experienced those times and wrote descriptions of what they saw and learned firsthand.

For instance, there are several accounts of the patriot victory at the Battle of Kings Mountain on Oct. 7, 1780, which, Southern says, led, "a little more than a year later, to Cornwallis' surrender and the end of the war."

"In one hour, a bunch of red-necks from the back of beyond changed the course of history."

Revolutionary soldier James Collins wrote that before the Kings Mountain Battle, Cornwallis' trusted commander, Major

Patrick Ferguson, "was coming on with his boasted marksmen, and seemed to threaten the destruction of the whole country. The Tories were flocking to his standard from every quarter."

One of the leaders of the Overmountain Men, who came from what is now Tennessee to confront Ferguson, was Isaac Shelby. He describes the "fierce and gallant charge" of the enemy down the mountain that "drove us near the foot of it," nearly forcing a rout. But the patriot forces rallied "and turned back upon the enemy."


In a few minutes, Shelby writes, they had pushed to the top and the enemy soldiers were surrendering — or attempting to. Some were denied quarter and massacred. As Shelby put it, "It required some time, and some exertion of the officers, to put an entire stop to the firing."

Collins put his finger on a very important and immediate result of the victory in that "many that before lay neutral, through fear or some other cause, shouldered their guns, and fell in the ranks."

The contemporary reports collected and introduced by Southern give the reader a personal and moving connection to the Revolution — much more than the usual historical accounts of military action.

What then are the similarities between this long-ago conflict in the backcountry of the Carolinas and today's challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan?

1. Family and personal safety were more important to most Carolina backcountry people than democracy. Many would have put up with the king or the patriots, whichever could provide safety for their families and free them from harassment.



DETAILS

Edited by Ed Southern

Winston-Salem, N.C.:

John F. Blair, 2009.

ISBN: 978-0-89587-358-3.

252 pages. \$12.95.

Reviewed by:

D.G. Martin

Former Member of the 6th Special Forces Group, Chapel Hill, N.C.

2. In a conflicted area, a continuous show of strength is a powerful recruiter. As James Collins told us, when Cornwallis and Ferguson were winning, the Tories came out. But the victory at Kings Mountain brought recruits to the patriot side.

3. Attacks or threats against the local population make dangerous enemies. When Ferguson threatened to attack the families and farms in the western mountain regions, the Overmountain Men resolved to get Ferguson, and they did at Kings Mountain.

Understanding that the loyalty of backcountry Carolinians was "up for grabs" may help us accept and deal with the similar "shiftable" commitments of the Afghan (and Iraqi) people as described in the quotes above from "Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan." **SW**

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