Special Warfare

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From the Commandant

Special Warfare

In this issue of *Special Warfare*, General Henry Shelton describes the threats that will dominate the political landscape for the next several years and examines the suitability of U.S. special-operations forces for future operations.

General Shelton portrays a future characterized by chaos. He predicts that evolving roles in information warfare and counterproliferation, as well as more traditional roles in coalition support and humanitarian assistance, will place increased demands on SOF.

It is not surprising that SOF will be heavily involved in the diverse operations of the future. SOF recruiting, training and structure have always placed a heavy emphasis upon flexibility.

SOF also places an emphasis on people. In this issue, Captain James Johnson argues that the values considered critical to the Army are the basis of the SOF Truths and the Ranger Creed. Values, he says, define our fundamental character and provide fuel for the ultimate weapon — man. Michael Dechert points out that SF camps in Vietnam were successful because SF personnel maintained a close relationship with the native population and incorporated local villages into the camp structure. Dechert recommends that similar camps be set up to provide regional stability in current and future operations involving ethnic conflict and civil war.

SOF's emphasis on people is also apparent in our personnel structure. Specialist Daniel Savolskis, in his article, interviews Special Forces members to assess the impact of the Special Forces Branch, created 10 years ago.

As General Shelton points out, even with their strengths and skills, SOF may be forced to evolve, and we must continue to anticipate and to debate changes in doctrine, roles and missions. Sergeant First Class Michael Devotie suggests that SF's

unconventional-warfare skills might be effective in containing a second major regional conflict. Major Tim Howle cautions against CA and CMO forces becoming too closely associated with information warfare. Although SOF's role in IW will become increasingly important, Howle reasons that the deception and intelligence-collection aspects of IW could cause CMO forces to lose their credibility with the local population.

As foreboding as the future seems, we must do what SOF have always done — anticipate and adapt. SOF's ability to perform a wide range of operations comes not from the fact that we are elite, but from the fact that we have different missions that call for specialized skills and uncommon soldiers. Through changing political situations and varying missions, the one constant has been the special-operations force itself. It represents our link to the past and our key to success in the future.

Major General William P. Tangney

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Special Operations Forces: Looking Ahead

by General Henry H. Shelton

We cannot predict the future with absolute certainty, but we can make assumptions about our future security environment, based on global political, military, economic, technological, and demographic trends. From these trends, we can speculate that chaos, not calm, will permeate the future geopolitical landscape for the next several years.

Although the Cold War is over, we must face the reality that the United States still has enemies — some apparent, others not so apparent. Our nation's role as the sole superpower also obligates us, if it is in our national interest, to assist other states and peoples when they are in need or when they are threatened by adversaries.

But future U.S. military involvement will not be driven necessarily by what our military forces perceive to be a threat to our national security or our vital interests. How we use our military forces, how we view threats and establish our national interests, and how we wage war as a nation will still be determined by American society at large and by our elected officials. The key to preparing special-operations forces, or SOF, for the future is to anticipate change.

In the process, we must also take a hard, non-ethnocentric look at world developments, analyze SOF employment trends, and examine American societal and cultural trends. Then we must consider DoD's expectations regarding the use and the role of SOF. In the future, SOF will be more in demand than ever in traditional roles; however, SOF must also prepare for nontraditional environments and for far more sophisticated threats.

Force for the future

SOF have a long and proud history of serving their country in war and in peace. Time and time again, SOF have demonstrated — most recently in Haiti, Liberia, the Persian Gulf and the Balkans — that they are an affordable, versatile, capable and relevant force, always mission-ready and tailored to meet the challenges of today's uncertain and dynamic world.

SOF, with their proven capabilities and achievements in fostering calm and stability in regions and environments where anarchy and violence reign, coupled with their ability to perform in high-risk and politically sensitive environments, have been propelled into the forefront of operations other than war. The U.S. also depends on SOF to resolve situations quickly, quietly and, when necessary, with violent force. Their uniqueness, adaptability, flexibility and reliability have made SOF the force of choice today, and it is their attributes that will make SOF an ideal force in the future.

Special-operations forces today are a global, joint and versatile force. With little fanfare, they operate worldwide, often in areas where disease, poverty and civil strife riddle the countryside, and in areas where even CNN may fear to tread. They operate in the shadows against elusive foes and targets; in extremely harsh conditions; under the cover of darkness; and in the high-tech realm of cyberspace. They can operate either as cohesive joint-service teams or as single-service units.

A hallmark of SOF is their ability to participate in operations with coalition forces and with other foreign militaries. SOF can respond to conflicts or crises such as insurgencies, subversion, sabotage, narcotrafficking and terrorism. Although they are not a force designed to win wars singlehandedly, SOF are

capable of helping to prevent and deter wars, and they can assist our conventional forces in achieving victory as part of a theater joint task force.

Since its creation in 1987, the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, has provided joint, highly trained, well-equipped and mission-ready special-operations forces in support of worldwide taskings from the regional commanders in chief, or CINCs, American ambassadors, and the national command authorities. USSOCOM has enhanced SOF's command and control, operational readiness, capabilities, and success. Furthermore, USSOCOM provides DoD's only standing joint-service force — an aspect of SOF that will be key in meeting future force requirements for increased "jointness," as outlined in *Joint Vision 2010*. Additionally, USSOCOM's authority for SOF's program and budget, procurement, and acquisition allows the U.S. to achieve efficiencies sought by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee process.

SOF must be politically, regionally, culturally, linguistically and operationally attuned to the foreign and domestic ramifications of their actions. This is true whether they are operating directly for the national command authorities or on behalf of American ambassadors or CINCs. Often they interact with the senior political and military leadership of the countries to which they deploy, and they establish enduring relationships with their host-nation military counterparts. The key to SOF's success and viability can be attributed in part to special tactics, agility, rigorous training and technologically superior equipment. It is the individual, though, who exemplifies the backbone of today's special-operations forces. Quality, not quantity, and high standards in the selection process ensure accession of the right personnel for the demanding tasks that SOF are asked to perform.

High-quality people, innovative leadership, versatile forces, jointness, and adaptability are the terms that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff used in *JV 2010* to describe the characteristics of the U. S. armed forces of the future. These are the same terms that aptly describe the special-operations forces of today. According to the chairman's vision and to observable trends, SOF will play a significant role in the more unpredictable, less stable future security environment defined in *JV 2010*.

Today's SOF offer special skills; unconventional tactics; small, rapidly deployable units; and unique capabilities that set them apart from conventional forces. It is these distinctions that will make a strong case for SOF in the future. But as the world changes and as future adversaries, threats and crises emerge, we must remain open to the idea that SOF may be compelled to evolve and to adapt to the challenges ahead, possibly in nontraditional ways.

Maintaining a high state of readiness and flexibility in an era of diminished resources and increasing noncombat contingencies is a constant challenge for SOF. During the next decade, we can expect noncombat contingencies or operations short of war to dominate our national security environment, and we must plan accordingly. Considering their traditional missions, activities and capabilities, regional orientation, unique language skills and cultural awareness, SOF will likely continue to serve as a key implementing force for the U.S. preventive-defense strategy (peacetime engagements designed to detect and resolve pending crises or conflict) and continue to create the conditions that support peace. Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry has said, "The U.S. program of preventive defense rests on the premises that fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands makes America and the world safer; that more democracy and more free-

Photo by Sean M. Worrell

A U.S. Special Forces soldier assists in providing security for Haitian demonstrators. SOF have the ability to participate in a variety of operations with foreign militaries.

market economies in more nations means less chance of conflict; and that defense establishments have an important role to play in building democracy, trust and understanding in and among nations."[1] In this role, SOF have become extremely skilled in practicing the art of peace, while remaining prepared for and preserving the option of force.

Operational implications

Tomorrow our nation will be faced with a new set of challenges — a myriad of new dangers and diverse threats, and potential adversaries who may use insidious means to achieve their goals. In fact, a 1995 DoD study ascertained that the "Next century adversary will aggressively use offensive information warfare, rely on underground and covert urban facilities, and have some ability to attack low earth-orbiting satellites. It will allocate 20 percent of its budget on a 'revolution in military affairs' achieved through enhanced surveillance capabilities, weapons of mass destruction, thousands of inexpensive missiles, a few very low observable cruise missiles, mines and diesel submarines."[2]

Former Secretary of Defense Perry described the new dangers as nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states; regional aggressors or terrorists undeterred by the threat of retaliation; fragile Eastern European democracies falling victim to civil war; the reemergence of hostile totalitarian regimes; and "an explosion of local and regional conflicts, often rooted in deep-seated ethnic and religious hatreds," inflicting massive suffering worldwide.[3] The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that future threats will come from states or groups that oppose or threaten the interests of the U.S. or those of our friends and allies. The trends in global interaction will result in wider, faster access to advanced technology and weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, and information technologies. Unfortunately, these new capabilities could create more dangerous adversaries and a wider range of unpredictable threats.[4]

Photo by Milton R. Savage

U.S. Navy SEALs train aboard ship. In order to prepare for unpredictable threats, SOF will have to continually update their training strategies.

To prepare for our future security environment and to adapt to the changing nature of warfare, SOF may have to consider new methodologies, strategies and training; debate possible changes in doctrine, roles, missions and force structure; further streamline and improve their acquisition process; and examine new options and operational concepts for the conduct of special operations in traditional and nontraditional environments.

SOF should be technologically provocative, adaptive and innovative. They must always be attuned to the latest technological developments and capabilities, both foreign and domestic. Equipment currently in the pipeline and scheduled to be fielded by the year 2010 may be obsolete by the following decade, or it may be vulnerable to future technological developments in countermeasures or advanced weaponry. Finally, the SOF community should anticipate trends and future scenarios involving

America's national interests, values and public perceptions regarding the deployment and the use of military forces, particularly SOF.

Proliferation of WMD

One of the most serious challenges to our national security and vital interests now and for the foreseeable future is the threat posed by WMD in the hands of aggressors, terrorists, criminals or pariahs. Despite arms-control efforts, imposed sanctions and other methods of preventing the manufacture, transfer, sale or theft of technology, materials and weapons, WMD will continue to proliferate. The number of nuclear-capable states will expand, as well as the number of nonstate actors that will gain access to WMD, particularly chemical and biological weapons. Prominent U.S. political leaders and military analysts have expressed concerns about the inadequacy of physical security as well as the questionable trustworthiness and capabilities of the security forces who are in charge of nuclear warheads and materials in volatile parts of the world. These concerns, combined with the discontent among underpaid and unemployed foreign nuclear scientists and program managers, pose a potential formula for disaster. The apparent and documented laxity in accountability and in the security procedures in these areas creates not only an ideal opportunity for a lucrative nuclear black market but also the possibility of nuclear terrorism.[5]

The move to acquire WMD has been precipitated by the U.S.'s overwhelming superiority in precision engagement. According to some analysts, North Korea might use WMD to affect critical nodes and centers of gravity in South Korea. Still another prediction is that North Korea will use WMD to affect the capabilities of the U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command by attacking other targets in the region.[6] Unfortunately, there is a significant lack of international resolve to tackle the proliferation of WMD head-on. Further complicating the problem is the growing elusiveness of our enemies; the low signature of the threat; technology transfer and smuggling; and the impenetrable nature of underground, hardened and covert facilities used for the production and storage of WMD. Civilian and military personnel are also exposed to great hazards of deliberate or accidental contamination from WMD. While the U.S. takes great pains to minimize collateral damage and casualties, many of our potential adversaries lack the same concerns.

Given the inherent high risk involved, special-operations forces are expected to play a significant role in countering the WMD threat in the future. While the debate and the research continue as to how to halt the spread of WMD through conventional means, SOF already offer the most acceptable counterforce capability.[7] The counterproliferation mission continues to grow in significance for SOF and for our nation. In fact, a recent comprehensive report, the Commission on America's National Interests, concluded that it is a vital national interest to "prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons attacks on the United States."[8]

To meet future CP requirements and to counter the growing threat from WMD, SOF will need a dedicated intelligence apparatus and short- and long-range technology capabilities. With proper equipment, SOF should be able to identify, detect, track and locate the full spectrum of current and projected nuclear and fissile materials, as well as biological and chemical agents. Verification is a critical component of CP.

Given the inherent high risk involved, special-operations forces are expected to play a significant role in countering the WMD threat in the future. While the debate and the research continue as to how to halt the spread of WMD through conventional means, SOF already offer the most acceptable counterforce capability.

SOF also require intelligence on the status of WMD programs worldwide, on technology transfers, and on black markets. Technology will enable SOF to precisely neutralize or destroy WMD, their means of delivery, their operational sites, and their necessary infrastructure. SOF must also pursue and exploit technologies and systems that can offer alternative options to the employment of conventional ground-penetrating munitions and lasers, particularly if the threat employs unconventional tactics, such as unmanned aerial vehicles used as a delivery means for WMD. Another concern is the protection of SOF personnel when they are operating

in a high-risk environment. State-of-the-art protective suits and advanced inoculations are logical protective devices.

To achieve an effective counter-proliferation strategy, we will need both domestic and international support in dealing with conventional and unconventional capabilities of the growing NBC threat. This support will be particularly crucial in our attempts to stem smuggling and terrorism worldwide and to deter and defeat WMD-capable adversaries on future battlefields. In this area, SOF can help to strengthen the cooperation among our allies and coalition partners. Rogue states such as Libya and Iran pose a serious challenge in that they may opt to employ WMD against the U.S. as part of a deliberate terrorism campaign. Our current sanctions, international control regimes, and deterrence strategies have not been as effective in stemming the proliferation of terrorism as we had anticipated. As the American public becomes more aware of the threat of NBC terrorism in the U.S., and of its possible effects, public demand and support for some form of pre-emptive response and force will increase.[9]

New forms of warfare

New forms of warfare will emerge in the foreseeable future, and their terrifying nature will be primarily influenced by advances in information technology. In fact, information may someday be just as crucial as ammunition. Violent clashes may be replaced by the systematic destruction of a nation's economic infrastructure — economic warfare.

War may transcend traditional boundaries and evolve into a form of extraterrestrial warfare that employs space vehicles and satellites as armed platforms and that targets other satellites for destruction. Should this occur, our current targeting methodologies and our philosophies and definitions of strategic centers of gravity would need revising. Advances in global communications will enable competing powers to influence mass audiences. Consequently, we can expect significant global or regional implications for our future U.S. psychological operations.

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Information systems and networks provide tempting avenues of attack to aggressor states, insurgents, terrorists and nonstate actors. Accordingly, the evolving role that SOF have in information warfare, or IW, demands that they exploit and employ emerging technologies and systems, and that they adapt reciprocal tactics, weapons, and skills to respond to these new forms of conflict. The highly technical aspects of IW may warrant the creation of new military occupational specialties and organizations within SOF.

Special-operations forces are ideally suited to contribute to DoD efforts and initiatives in IW, and they could, perhaps, serve as future global information warriors. In this role (once the legal issues have been resolved), SOF could pursue dedicated technology that would allow them to detect, identify and pursue intruders; to penetrate an adversary's networks and databases; to install viruses and antivirus programs; and to electronically mimic foreign languages and dialects. The contributions affect an entire target population. Hardware and software that is highly adaptive to colloquial and dialectic languages would facilitate instantaneous language translation. SOF personnel would need to be highly proficient in the use of U.S. and foreign primary communications systems and information systems and technologies. They would also have to be knowledgeable of network infrastructures. The pace of our efforts in IW must meet or exceed the pace of networking.

SOF defensive IW, integrated with other DoD counterintelligence activities and IW programs, could be the cornerstone in protecting our systems from attack, intrusion, manipulation and destruction. SOF would therefore need to be knowledgeable of information security, enhancements in cryptographic technology, and the application of biotechnology for activation and recognition.

Small, mobile, clandestine SOF teams of technical personnel — equipped with state-of-the-art, portable, discreet systems for command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, or C^4I, and weaponry and software for electronic destruction and disruption — is one possibility to consider in countering the global IW

U.S. Air Force photo

An Air Force special-operations MH-53 helicopter prepares for in-flight refueling. Equipment currently in the SOF inventory may be rendered obsolete by future technological developments.

threat and in conducting offensive IW missions. IW will also introduce new intelligence requirements and systems for identifying attackers and intruders (friendly and enemy) and their methods of operation. Finally, we must remember that global connectivity also makes us vulnerable to psychological operations,[10] and in our efforts to develop new doctrine for counter-psychological operations, we may need to consider the implications for SOF.

Future chaos, flash points

Most analysts agree that there will be no genuine rival or peer capable of threatening the sovereignty of the U.S. for several years. However, conflict among emerging regional powers, nation states or nonstate actors could threaten the national security and the vital interests of both the U.S. and its allies. Such conflict may precipitate instability and turmoil, thereby prompting unilateral or multinational action. The possibility of nontraditional alliances emerging or strengthening among nations could also pose significant military and technological implications for the U.S. Some regions could see an upset in their balance of power. Additionally, favorable relations with current coalition partners or traditional allies of the U.S. may dissipate and threaten U.S. interests — in some cases, affecting U.S. long-term access and basing rights. Foreign area strengths, such as regional orientation and language and cultural adaptation, will enable SOF to play a pivotal role in understanding and diffusing tensions, in strengthening coalitions, and in restoring stability. Perhaps SOF could even pre-empt the use of force.

We can expect human atrocities, genocide, ethnic cleansing, violence and torture to continue to taint the geopolitical landscape. The vivid images portrayed through the international media will continue to capture the attention of the American public more so than the less tangible and less visible threats generated by WMD proliferation or by potential regional aggressors. In some cases, even though it may not be in our national interest, we, as the world's only superpower, cannot sit idly by and watch atrocities being committed against thousands of people without responding to their pleas for assistance. Given this fact, SOF can anticipate being called upon to respond to crises in the future, as they have done in the past.

SOF's global forward presence, regional orientation, established military-to-military relationships, interoperability and cultural awareness will be critical in future military operations, particularly coalition warfare. SOF's role as warrior-diplomats will be crucial, especially as relations between nation states evolve or dissolve in the future. In many regions of the world, a country's military may be its most cohesive institution. In addition, the military wields significant power to affect the affairs of government and to influence the outcome of events during a crisis. By working and training with foreign militaries, SOF can play a major role in reducing tensions, in enforcing democratic values, and in building trust among nations. We may find ourselves engaged increasingly in military-to-military activities in China, for example, in an effort to enhance U.S.-Chinese relations and to prevent future conflict.

Special-operations forces deployed on overseas missions should remain vigilant and attuned to indicators of potential flash points and instability throughout the world. If detected in the early stages, flash points, such as the tenuous situation between India and Pakistan, can be tempered with intervention, either through diplomatic means or through other deterrent options. The genesis of

potential flash points lies in various complex factors or trends; for example, competition over scarce resources; forced migration because of overpopulation, civil wars or natural disasters; severe economic disparity; ethnic, tribal or religious unrest; failure of nation-states; or historical rivalries. Chaos can easily ensue, leading to catastrophic humanitarian crises well beyond the scope of what we are seeing now in Central Africa.

If the U.S. is to remain committed to humanitarian-relief missions in the future, SOF must prepare now for future disasters. SOF should enhance and expand their capabilities to use nonlethal weaponry to contain riots; and to employ multi-spectral sensors and imaging systems (including unmanned aerial vehicles) to locate and track the flow of refugees and to detect low-tech threats from armed factions. SOF must also pursue new and innovative techniques and technologies for more precise field medical treatment and disease control, for an automated field laboratory, and for advanced inoculations to protect SOF personnel from indigenous diseases. To reduce the logistics train and to increase sustainability in austere environments, SOF should consider the adoption of hybrid-fuel vehicles, compact portable energy sources, and enhanced water-purification systems.

Future military operations involving the employment of SOF may be conducted in response to threats from nonstate actors rather than from nation-states. The number of nonstate actors, such as transnational terrorists, radical separatist groups, crime syndicates and narcotraffickers, will increase dramatically in the future, as will their influence. Such groups could have a tremendous impact on world politics, economics and international security, and they may someday have the capability of waging IW and employing WMD.

One need only examine the hostage crisis in Lima, Peru, involving the Tupac Amaru rebels, to see the potential threat that well-organized, well-trained and well-equipped terrorists groups can levy on the international community. American citizens working or traveling abroad may be increasingly targeted for, or become inadvertent victims of, terrorism or extortion.

DoD photo

U.S. and Saudi personnel survey the damage to the Khobar Towers, which was damaged by a terrorist bombing in June 1996.

Recent comments by General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerning the Khobar Towers bombing implied that terrorist tactics are changing: "Some nations and international groups opposed to the United States see U.S. military power to be so formidable that they now use terrorism against the U.S. forces as a form of warfare."[11] He added that the bombing showed a "much higher degree of sophistication" among terrorist groups.

SOF's response to terrorism may range from nonlethal procedures, to rapid, precision surgical strikes in order to compel a desired behavior or to pre-empt violence. The traditional role that SOF have played in combating terrorism, in hostage rescue, and in noncombatant evacuation operations, combined with their increasing emphasis on force protection and IW, will again launch SOF into the forefront of countering such threats and in conducting operations other than war. SOF are ideally suited for discreet, yet effective use of force or nonlethal persuasion. The independent and low-profile nature of the unpredictable and emerging threats from nonstate actors will also prompt SOF to seek new tactics, new intelligence-collection requirements, and a closer interaction with U.S. domestic and foreign law-enforcement and security agencies.

Urbanization

Urban warfare is not a new phenomenon for SOF. However, we can expect it to become the norm

rather than the exception. One of the most significant, observable global trends with operational implications for SOF is the expanding urbanization and shifting demographics of the developing world. The populations of the developing world are exploding, further exacerbating perennial problems such as starvation, wretched poverty, disease, and environmental degeneration.

The developing world is also rapidly becoming the largest urban population in history: "The developing world's total urban population will be almost twice the industrialized world's in the year 2000, a figure expected to be four times greater by 2025."[12] Large numbers of people migrate from the countryside to urban centers in search of a better way of life — only to find worse conditions. Unable to afford urban dwellings, these migrants settle in slums and shanty towns on the outskirts — creating a fertile ground for crises, conflict, terrorism, insurgency and other forms of political violence.[13] Contributing to the violence is the unrestrained proliferation of small arms throughout the developing world.

Demographic shifts are predicted to affect the subnational conflict in the developing world (Latin America, Africa and Asia), particularly the methods of conducting urban insurgency and counterinsurgency, and possibly the support that the U.S. offers to foreign nations for their counterinsurgency efforts.[14] The trends in population growth and in urbanization would have a direct impact on U.S. military doctrine and training in urban counterinsurgency, host-nation and U.S. intelligence capabilities (predominantly human intelligence), SOF foreign-internal-defense doctrine and missions, and foreign security-assistance activities.

Indirectly, these trends would affect the full spectrum of SOF military operations in the developing world. According to analysts Jennifer Taw and Bruce Hoffman, "The future killing grounds of the developing world will not be the impenetrable forests of remote mountain areas where guerrilla wars have traditionally been fought, but the crowded, built-up areas in and around the less-developed world's burgeoning urban centers, whose residents will become inextricably enmeshed in insurgent-government conflict."[15] Cases in point include Mogadishu, Somalia; Monrovia, Liberia; and Kabul, Afghanistan.

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Threat to the homeland

The threat to the homeland is a subject that naturally triggers controversy and debate within the military community in terms of current laws, traditional roles and missions. However, circumstances may arise several years from now to prompt new methodologies, philosophies and strategies for dealing with foreign threats to the North American continent and to the U.S. borders.

The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, along with the planned terrorist attacks that were revealed during the subsequent trial of the perpetrators, illustrates that our homeland is no longer immune to the violence and the chaos that we observe in foreign lands. Current foreign programs for the sea-based launching of ballistic and cruise missiles from various types of ships could provide rogue states with a reliable and effective capability of striking us from off our shores with weapons of mass destruction. Heavily armed drug traffickers are crossing our southern border and inflicting terror against Southwestern ranchers. In recent testimony to Congress, a former CIA director warned of unconventional threats to the U.S. and of the necessity for developing an appropriate national defense system — one that goes beyond attempts to shoot ballistic missiles from the sky.

There are differing assessments and opinions as to the nature and severity of the threat to our homeland. Our geography has embedded a belief in most of us that the U.S. is secure and invincible — safe from foreign invasions. "Geography also protected the nation from the need to guard its borders, permitting Americans to develop a defensive view of the role of the military and the belief that the need to fight a war was a decision to be made, not an inevitability to be faced."[16] This belief, our traditional American values, and our tendency to view the world with ethnocentrism are factors that influence the use of

our military forces.

It is difficult to gauge what threats or events might trigger a public outcry for military action in defense of our nation. Pearl Harbor was the last significant event in U.S. history to stir a nationwide call to arms. Given the nature of future warfare, the globalization of critical U.S. infrastructures and nodes, the trends in technology, and the nature of our potential adversaries, we cannot discount a future attack, particularly an unconventional one, on U.S. territory. The technology and the intent already exist, thereby warranting preparations to deter or defend against the possibility of attack.

The potential for chemical and biological terrorism against the U.S. is perhaps the threat of most concern, and it is receiving substantial attention by our government. The U.S. intelligence community and other federal agencies are calling on the military to strengthen its capabilities as well. One senator holds the belief that the U.S. is not prepared to deal with chemical and biological terrorism. He warns, "An attack of this kind is not a question of 'if,' but is a question of 'when.' "[17]

Conventional forces will most likely have the lead in defending U.S. territory or deterring strategic conventional attacks. However, unconventional threats to the homeland may prompt SOF to assist traditional law-enforcement agencies (because of SOF's unique capabilities, discreet mobility and low profile). Unconventional threats could include missiles launched from foreign vessels off U.S. shores; diesel submarines (for clandestine infiltration and exfiltration); unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, launched against critical U.S. targets; shoulder-fired missiles aimed at U.S. commercial airliners; and ultralights employed by terrorists. Conventional national-defense capabilities, such as surface-to-air missiles, radar detection, signals intercept and coastal patrols, may neither be adaptable to nor capable of countering unconventional threats such as these.

Photo by Jeffrey S. Viano

A Predator unmanned aerial vehicle flies a simulated aerial reconnaissance flight. UAVs offer another option for performing reconnaissance against threats from the sea.

Threats to the homeland establish new requirements for intelligence resources (especially in early-warning and detection capabilities) and human intelligence, and they place new demands on our interdiction and tracking capabilities. Options available for dealing with a threat from the sea include SEAL submersibles and discreet surface craft, satellite-tracking systems used in monitoring the movement of specific threat vessels from origin to target area, UAVs employed in reconnaissance and surveillance on the open seas and shorelines, and aerostatic balloons used in detecting and tracking small vessels operating within U.S. extended territorial limits.

As the threat moves farther inland, the distinction between the roles of U.S. law-enforcement agencies and military forces may begin to blur. The issue of expanding the role of military forces to defend against threats to the homeland has already been raised, most recently in a proposal by a former U.S. senator to employ the National Guard in patrolling U.S. borders. SOF's involvement in such nontraditional roles is certain to be the subject of much political, legal and public debate, and the extent of that involvement will depend on the public's perception of the threat.

Conclusion

The diverse threats and dangers that loom in the future demand that we remain vigilant. In particular, we should look for signs of dramatic shifts away from our current assumptions about warfare and the operational environment. To remain relevant as a force, SOF must be able to offer a wide range of options to our political leadership. It is imperative that SOF maintain a technological edge and that they continue to invest in the quality and the skills of their oper-

ators. These are two SOF characteristics that have served us well in the past, and they will continue to be critical in protecting our nation's security in the future.

Without doubt, the demand for SOF will continue to increase — they are exceptionally well-suited to the future strategic environment. In a world of diminished U.S. diplomatic and military presence, SOF can provide access, influence and stability. In a world of unpredictable threats, SOF can provide a flexible, precise and lethal option. In a world of increasing global interaction, SOF can provide a mechanism for extending U.S. ideals and values. In a world of diminishing resources, SOF can provide an affordable yet effective force to implement our national military strategy.

It is important that both the American public and our elected officials feel confident about SOF's capability and applicability in future conflicts. It is equally important that our civilian leaders clearly define our future vital national interests and that they articulate to the American people any anticipated threats to those interests. It is imperative that those of us who must protect and defend those interests from an increasingly wider range of threats help define and articulate those threats. Although we may have our own ideas about the future of SOF, we should examine and anticipate the public's future expectations for SOF and public perceptions of threats to the United States.

While some of the ideas proposed in this article may be provocative, it is important that we ponder these ideas now — to be forewarned is to be forearmed. As we look ahead, we should encourage lively, productive and intellectual debate to help us map our course, so that we can be sure we are on the right azimuth as we move into the future.

General Henry H. Shelton is commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla. Prior to assuming this position in February 1996, he served as commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg. Other assignments include commander, 82nd Airborne Division; and assistant division commander for operations, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He also served as the Joint Task Force commander during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. General Shelton holds a bachelor's degree from N.C. State University and a master's degree in political science from Auburn University. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses, the Air Command and Staff College and the National War College.

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Ten Years Later: Evaluating the SF Branch

by Specialist Daniel L. Savolskis

In April 1987, the Army activated the Special Forces Branch, thereby establishing SF as a distinct entity within the Army. Ten years later, three soldiers long associated with Special Forces assessed the branch from its roots to its continually evolving role and its prospects for the 21st century.

Major General William P. Tangney, commander of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, has seen various facets of the branch since he joined Special Forces. Prior to his current assignment, he served in positions ranging from A-detachment commander, to chief of the Special Forces Branch in the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, to commander of the Army Special Forces Command.

Photo courtesy JFK Special Warfare Museum

Members of an early Special Forces detachment take time out from their mountain-warfare training.

"I went through the Q-course in 1969," Tangney said. "At the time it was called the Special Forces Officers' Course because we had separate officer and enlisted courses. I was assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group after my first tour in Vietnam in 1969 and I came here to Fort Bragg to attend the course."

Tangney has witnessed many changes since 1969:

"I have seen substantial change in terms of technology enhancements, but two things which have not changed are the emphasis that we place on selecting quality people and the importance of our noncommissioned officers to the force," Tangney said. "Our NCOs have historically been, and remain, the backbone of the force. Without them, Special Forces would not exist."

Today's Special Forces are direct descendants of World War II's Office of Strategic Services and 1st Special Service Force, also known as the Devil's Brigade. It was not until June 1952, however, that a new military unit, the 10th Special Forces Group, was formed at Fort Bragg. It met the need for a force that would be able to wage guerrilla warfare in the event of a Russian invasion of western Europe. Special Forces continued to grow, eventually including seven active-duty Special Forces groups during the Vietnam War period.

"In the late 60s and early 70s, the force structure was projected for Southeast Asia and the needs therein," Tangney said. "Following the Vietnam war, Special Forces underwent a significant downsizing. It wasn't just in Special Forces; the entire Army, as well as the other services, was sized down. Our structure went from seven active Special Forces groups and one separate company in Thailand in the late 60s to three active groups in the late 70s. By the

early 1980s, it became apparent to the national command authority that the cuts that had been made went too deep, and a series of actions was undertaken to rejuvenate the force.

"The catalyst for this shift was the problems experienced by the force during Desert One, the attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran. The activities that flowed from that tragic accident resulted in a re-analysis and examination of special operations in general and of Special Forces in particular.

"We still had a deterrence mission in Europe, and the United States was actively engaged in all five of the commanders in chief's regional areas," Tangney said. "The re-examination and comprehensive mission analysis of U.S. special operations led to the formation of both the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command. The formation of USSOCOM was especially important because it gave the joint SOF community a unified command that would develop doctrine, oversee training, acquire equipment, consolidate the budget, and monitor promotions and assignments for all U.S. SOF. In 10 years, USSOCOM has allowed us to fulfill the promise of a joint special-operations force.

"The re-examination also led to an increase in SF force structure and the current authorization for five active-duty Special Forces groups."

Besides the increase in the number of SF groups, there were other changes in Special Forces:

"The most important changes that I have witnessed in Special Forces occurred in the personnel arena," Tangney said. "These changes include the establishment of Career Management Field 18 as a distinct career field for our NCOs; the creation of the 180A warrant-officer technician program; and the establishment of the Special Forces officer branch. All of these initiatives, which occurred in the 1980s, institutionalized the force as an integral member of the Total Army team, and they facilitated the high-quality force that we have today."

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The advent of the Special Forces officer branch changed Special Forces, granting it self-governing powers as well as solidifying

U. S. Army photo

The structure of the 12-man Special Forces A-detachment has remained constant since 1952 because of its inherent flexibility.

A Special Forces soldier "pops smoke" during an airborne operation. SF soldiers must be prepared to perform their missions in a variety of environments.

U. S. Army photo

its position within the Army.

"Having been in the Army for about 22 years and in SF for nearly 19, I've seen the evolution," said Chief Warrant Officer Shaun P. Driscoll, commander of the JFK Center and School's Company A, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. "The best things that came out of the creation of the branch were the officers themselves. They were very fit and mentally sharp. (The creation of the branch) gave Special Forces more credibility within the Army.

"The design methodology which led to the structuring of the 10th Special Forces Group in 1952 has remained viable over time. … We have modified the TOE structure of the Special Forces group to accommodate evolutionary change, but the structure of the Special Forces detachment, the ODA, has remained constant because of its inherently tremendous flexibility."

"We now have missions that would normally have gone to regular infantry units, because we had senior (career) officers who held influence in higher headquarters. Our work spoke for itself and we began to integrate into the overall Army strategic plans," Driscoll said.

"The creation of the branch was something that had to happen," said Master Sergeant Richard C. Lamb, acting sergeant major of Company C, 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group. Lamb has been in the Army for 19 years and in Special Forces for about 12 years.

"We are now masters of our own destiny," Lamb said. "We were given the power to promote, and the chain of command was now from within (the SF career field)."

One aspect that many regard as the constant in the evolution of Special Forces is the SF operational detachment-alpha, the 12-man A-detachment.

"The design methodology which led to the structuring of the 10th Special Forces Group in 1952 has remained viable over time," Tangney said. "We have modified the TOE structure of the Special Forces group to accommodate evolutionary change, but the structure of the Special Forces detachment, the ODA, has remained constant because of its inherently tremendous flexibility." A table of organization and equipment, or TOE, is a list of a deployable unit's structure, manpower and equipment needed to accomplish its mission.

Both Driscoll and Lamb agreed that the ODA is the core of Special Forces.

"The Hollywood image of an SF soldier is skewed," Driscoll said. "Using a borrowed phrase, I look at SF as more of a McGyver type rather than a Rambo. SF soldiers pride themselves on being smarter — not more brutal. If there's a better way to do

something, we try to find it.

"A good example of this philosophy is the foreign-internal-defense missions of SF," Driscoll said. "In those missions, we train indigenous people to do the job — whether it's warfare, tactics or building a sewer system. It's just a smart way to do things, because then those people become more self-sufficient."

"The ability of 12 guys being able to work together for extended periods of time is largely due to their closeness," Driscoll said of the SF A-detachment. "They develop that closeness through training hard as a team. It allows them to learn each other and formulate a team personality."

"Each team develops its own personality," Lamb said. "It usually takes on the characteristics of the team sergeant. The unique thing about these teams is that everyone's prior Army experience gets instantly pooled together. It's a real eye-opener once a team gets together, because of the diverse backgrounds meshed with the different personalities. The end product makes the whole experience worthwhile. The end product is that this 12-man team can do anything it sets its efforts toward."

"It seems that the more dynamic and ambiguous a situation, the better a team reacts. That's because of the variety of skills," Driscoll said. "Therefore, they (the team) become the force of choice in those situations. ODAs have become very important to the regional commanders in chief as a source of true on-site information."

The future of Special Forces is also on the minds of its soldiers during this anniversary.

"Special Forces will continue to be an integral part of the U.S. Army force structure," Tangney said. "As you look at the world which confronts us for the next 20 years, it's similar to what we see right now. As a nation, we must watch each of the flash points and be ready to deal with them as required. As we transition to the 21st century, we may find that some of our missions will change. We may pick up some new missions and shed some older ones. But the force will remain a critical component of our national defense."

As Special Forces celebrates the 10th anniversary of its branch activation, Tangney reflected on what Special Forces means:

"I would like to stress the fact that we really aren't so much special as we are different," he said. "When you look at what we do with respect to the rest of the Army, we just have a different mission that calls for a different set of skills and a different brand of soldiers.

"We have been fortunate in attracting sufficient numbers of highly qualified volunteers in fielding what I feel to be the best force that I have seen in my 30 years of service.

"I would also like to note that we are grateful to our many host installations and their surrounding communities, like Fort Bragg and Fayetteville, for their continued support. Without that support, our mission would be much more difficult."

Specialist Daniel L. Savolskis is a journalist assigned to the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Information Operations: The Role of Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs

by Major Timothy E. Howle

Unrelenting advances in technology have caused the military community to focus much of its attention on a new operational method — information operations, or IO. But while IO promise to be an important aspect of future operations, their affiliation with civil-military operations is extremely problematic.

The two major components of IO are information warfare and command-and-control warfare. Information warfare, or IW, is defined as the actions undertaken to achieve information superiority by affecting an adversary's information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks, while defending one's own information resources. Command-and-control warfare, or C^2W, is defined as the integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, all supported by intelligence, to deny information to, to influence, to degrade, or to destroy an adversary's C^2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C^2 capabilities against similar actions.

Because of the emphasis on IO, the Civil Affairs Training and Doctrine Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has received requests to develop procedures for civil-military operations, or CMO, and Civil Affairs support to IO. However, because of the possibility that CMO and CA might be perceived as having ties to intelligence-gathering or deception activities, it is important that CMO and CA personnel and activities not become closely involved in the conduct of IO, IW and C^2W.

Honest brokers

Once a commander controls an area of operations, he is responsible for that area's civilian populace. CMO and CA forces assist the commander in dealing with the civilian dimension of his operations. Rather than expending his own resources to assist the local populace, the commander may also use local resources and the resources of nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs; private volunteer organizations, or PVOs; and international organizations.

Before CMO and CA activities can be performed, CMO personnel and CA forces must establish rapport with the local populace, NGOs, PVOs, international organizations, and other agencies. It is imperative that CMO personnel and CA forces maintain credibility with these organizations and with the local populace. Therefore, if they are to accomplish their mission, CMO and CA personnel must be perceived as honest brokers.

If the reputation of CMO and CA personnel becomes tainted, all credibility with the civilian dimension will be lost. Commanders may lose the ability to effectively communicate with elements of the civilian dimension. Any degradation of communications would most certainly lead to signifi-

cantly more problems than would be caused by the lack of CMO or CA activities in the information-operations arena.

Assistance to IO

Despite the need to keep CMO and CA separate from IO, there are ways in which CMO and CA can assist the IO mission. In the commander's CMO staff section, the CMO staff officer, or G5, serves as a link to the civilian dimension. The G5 can assist in the planning of any mission, including IW. In addition to being responsible for the development of both the CMO estimate and the the CA annex, the G5 is responsible for the development of any required courses of action. The G5 and other CA personnel can also make recommendations concerning the effects of information operations on the civilian population.

In the information-operational arena, one major role for CMO and CA is to re-establish the vital links between military forces and the civilian population that may have been damaged during the conduct of information warfare and command-and-control warfare.

Another major role for CMO and CA elements in IO is to collect information during the conduct of civil-military operations. The collection of information is purely passive — CMO personnel and CA forces routinely obtain information concerning the civilian dimension that may be pertinent to information operations. The collected information is then passed by normal reporting through the supported unit's C^2 channels.

Conclusion

Civil-military operations will become increasingly important in the future. CMO and CA forces will provide the bridge between military units and the civilian dimension of military operations. CMO and CA forces can also provide information and assistance that can be useful in information operations. But if they are to be effective in civil-military operations, CMO and CA forces must have the trust of the civilian parties. They must avoid any link to information operations, and their role in assisting IO must be entirely passive.

There is therefore no compelling reason to develop new procedures to address the role of CMO and CA in IO. It is imperative that the CMO and CA elements not be seen as intelligence-gathering or deception forces — such a misunderstanding would undermine the credibility of these critical elements and greatly reduce their effectiveness.

Major Timothy E. Howle is a Special Forces officer assigned to the Civil Affairs Training and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous assignments include S2, USAAG; detachment commander and assistant S3, 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group; and company commander and executive officer, 96th CA Battalion. Major Howle was commissioned as an ROTC distinguished military graduate from Francis Marion College, Florence, S.C. He holds a master's degree in international relations from Troy State University.

SF Fire Bases in Vietnam: Lessons for the Future

by Dr. Michael S.A. Dechert

During the Vietnam War, the most successful field fortifications employed by United States forces were the unique camps set up by U.S. Special Forces. An improvement on the basic fire-base design, these camps provide valuable lessons for current and future operations involving ethnic conflict and civil unrest.

For most of the 20th century the U.S. has, by and large, ignored, neglected, or actually rejected the concept of fortification and systematic defense. "Maginot Line," "bunker mentality," and even "on the defensive" evoke images of incompetence. The systematic study of defensible space and fortifications no longer merits a place in the curricula of the military academies or the National Defense University.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. found itself with no doctrinal basis for designing, building and employing fortifications during the Vietnam War. And although defensive works played a critical role in Vietnam, ranging from the siege of Khe Sanh to the containment of the assault on the U.S. Embassy at Saigon during the Tet Offensive, there has been little coherent effort to date to pull together the wealth of experience generated there. That experience spanned a vast range of local "experiments" in fortification: fire-base encampments, civil communities, depots, landing strips, airports, and communications and command facilities.

In Vietnam, field fortifications played a traditional role not only in preventing or blunting external attack, but also in territorial pacification and peacekeeping. One of the most common manifestations of the American military presence was the "fire-support base," usually referred to as a "fire base." The fire base is a field fortification established to provide tactical fire support to patrolling units in a specified area. Often, two or more fire bases were simultaneously established to provide mutual support. These bases varied considerably in size, design and longevity. In the U.S. Army, the fire-base design and planning often reflected the commander's personal or organizational philosophies regarding defense and the conduct of tactical operations.

Around 1967, North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap increasingly emphasized attacks on fire bases by well-trained regular army "sappers." Giap's goal was to weaken the territorial control held by the Americans and their allies and to reduce the effectiveness of field units that relied heavily on the artillery support the fire bases provided. Giap had successfully used a similar approach against the French in the 1950s.[1]

Initially, fire bases were established by temporarily setting up an artillery fire position around which berms and foxholes were excavated. Early American field fortifications in Vietnam were little more than

multiple standard squad-defensive positions joined by continuous trenches, with the additional placement of infantry heavy weapons, internal communications lines and a command post. In most fire bases, the perimeter was composed of a raised berm, a moat and multiple belts of loosely laid concertina wire. Occasionally, light fences were erected to prematurely explode incoming rocket-propelled grenades. Trip flares, claymore mines and canisters of "fougas" (jellied gasoline and C-4 explosive) were routinely set on the barbed-wire barriers and berms.[2]

Special Forces camps

The only type of fire base that consistently followed a formal set of organizational rules was the type set up by Special Forces. Special Forces instituted explicit organizational guidelines for the establishment, operation and support of their camps.[3] SF are also the only group currently studying and compiling engineering and planning data on base design and construction.[4] In Latin America, SF have recently established fire bases in areas where there is active insurgency or where illicit drug production is centered.

In Vietnam, SF developed a distinctive approach to field fortifications, characterized by a strong sociological/anthropological outlook.[5] As a matter of fact, SF essentially rediscovered territorial defense and organization in its classical form. Operating in small numbers amid local inhabitants, SF learned the culture, language, customs, habits, thought patterns, values and motivational structure of the people with whom they lived and worked. They established camps that were essentially fortified villages.

Over a period of a few years, the planning of these camps recapitulated the medieval and Renaissance experience in territorial military defense and community planning. Italian architects and planners refer to this as *citta-territorio*, or city-territory planning. In the *citta-territorio* concept, the urban aggregate (the village, town or city) is seen as a defensible, socially cohesive structure, intimately tied to the adjacent countryside. The countryside supports and supplies the urban aggregate and, in turn, is defended by it. During medieval and Renaissance times, numerous such fortified village-town aggregates formed defensive territories through or around which enemies might move, but only at the risk of constant harassment and interdiction by the villagers.

The comparatively sophisticated approach that SF took toward peoples and settlements was reflected in their camp layouts. The success of many of the SF camps seems largely due to their relative longevity, their adaptation to and collaboration with the existing social structure, and the quasi-feudal relationship between SF and some of the tribal peoples.

Prior to 1965 in Vietnam, SF had no say in the selection of their camp sites. Many of the indigenous people that SF were organizing into Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, or CIDG, were moved from their native territories into rather distant camps established on the remains of old French forts. This policy was unpopular with the tribal people, and large numbers of them later abandoned their outposts.

Photo courtesy Ron Johnson

U.S. Special Forces soldiers work with Vietnamese villagers to prepare bamboo stakes. The stakes were often used as part of the Special Forces camp defenses.

In the mid-1960s, Special Forces received permission to select camp sites on the basis of the topography, the water supply and the needs of the indigenous peoples. A key document, *Special Forces A-Detachment Camp Planning Handbook*,

systematically outlined the organization, planning and integration of camps into both local and regional command, communications and logistics structures. Furthermore, there were detailed listings of materiel; tools; and construction tasks.[6] In 1968, a more specific technical-constructional document was produced by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, or ARPA, based on the historical and operational experience. The ARPA document established the definitive equipment, materiel and construction requirements of SF camps. It described the "fighting camp" as "a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp based upon the concept of mutually supported platoon positions surrounding a hardened central control facility … facilities are provided at the campsite for the Special Forces team and 200 to 600 CIDG and their dependents. The overall defensive posture of this camp is enhanced by continued, aggressive offensive operations conducted by camp personnel in their tactical area of responsibility."[7]

The most important structure, the communications center, often became, at least for a handful of men, the last point of resistance. Therefore, it was often the most heavily revetted and "hardened" position. … The communications center was normally built around CONEX containers.

The 1968 ARPA report described three idealized camp designs. Type I camps, built in low groundwater conditions, were characterized by almost completely earth-covered and underground facilities composed of "hardened," i.e., reinforced, CONEX shipping containers. Type II camps were constructed in areas where the water tables were high. These camps were characterized by numerous structures, which were typically above-ground, fully revetted and sandbagged. Type III camps, also called floating camps, were built in tidal or delta areas. Type III camps were largely assembled on rafts of empty 55-gallon drums in such a way that the camps would rise and fall as the water level changed. Typically, all three camp designs called for emergency helicopter pads inside the walls and regular runway facilities adjacent to the camps.[8]

SF camps, characterized by their strong geometric designs, maintained a strong emphasis on providing enfilading fire along their perimeters. This emphasis encouraged the creation of large projecting bunkers at salient corners, much like those that appear in traditional bastioned fortifications. The dominant geometric perimeter designs are *rectangular* (e.g., My Phuoc-Tay, Chau Doc, Dak Seang); *triangular* (e.g., Trang Phuoc, Plei Mei, Plei Djereng); *pentagonal* (e.g., Thien Ngon, Binh Than Thou, Lang Vei); *star-shaped and strongly angular* (e.g., Ben Don, Thien Ngon, Lo Ninh); *irregular polygonal* (e.g., Gia Vuc, Cue); and *irregular, roughly linear* [following a ridge or hilltop] (e.g., Chi Lang, Nong Son, Tra Bong, Ha Thanh).[9]

Typically, each camp's main perimeter had an inner camp at least 75 meters square, occupied by an SF A-detachment and Vietnamese Special Forces. This internal compound, surrounded by berms and bunkers, contained the camp's tactical operations center, or TOC, and communications bunker, some artillery or mortar positions, critical supply structures, generators, and SF team houses. The most important structure, the communications center, often became, at least for a handful of men, the last point of resistance. Therefore, it was often the most heavily revetted and "hardened" position (analogous to the medieval "keep"). The communications center was normally built around CONEX containers. The living quarters were reinforced with sandbags; a substantial number of openings provided ventilation. Because of the climatic conditions, most of the living quarters were situated above-ground.[10]

In the surrounding camp compound were the living quarters for the members of the indigenous defense group and their families. Artillery positions were often located next to the numerous cabins and

Photo courtesy JFK Special Warfare Museum

A star-shaped and strongly angular SF camp.

Photo courtesy JFK Special Warfare Museum

A rectangular SF camp.

Photo courtesy JFK Special Warfare Museum

A triangular SF camp. The strong geometric designs of the camps demonstrated an emphasis on providing enfilading fire along the camp perimeter.

Photo courtesy Ron Johnson

An interior view of a Special Forces camp.

shanties of the villagers, who typically placed their buildings along the inner edge of the outer-perimeter defenses.

Some SF camps had an additional or outermost compound area where people of uncertain loyalties were congregated. Some SF veterans of Vietnam estimate that perhaps 10 to 18 percent of the population within the camps was not loyal. Although there were numerous reports of infiltrators entering the compounds, relatively few SF personnel were actually killed outside of combat.

Important roles

SF camps were normally situated in the heart of enemy-controlled territory, and they became regular targets of battalion-sized attacks. Loc Ninh experienced several assaults between Oct. 29 and Nov. 4, 1967, which it handled with air support and reinforcements from the 1st Infantry Division.[11] Like many other such camps, Loc Ninh served as a "lightning rod," attracting substantial enemy forces that were then defeated by a well-supplied territorial defense group supported by substantial air support.

The SF camp at Lang Vei played an important role in assisting the U.S. Marines in the successful defense of Khe Sanh. Khe Sanh, besieged for 77 days by the North Vietnamese, was not unlike Dien Bien Phu in its siting and military role. Khe Sanh was intentionally situated in an enemy-dominated area in order to establish a presence and to impede North Vietnamese infiltration. Giap saw the opportunity to repeat his Dien Bien Phu victory, along with its psychological, military and political consequences.

At Khe Sanh, major fire-base innovations and operational procedures were implemented, tested and proven effective. One important defensive innovation was the 250 seismic and acoustic sensors placed on major approaches to the base. Signals from the sensors were relayed to a data-processing center in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, which analyzed the data and then transmitted back intelligence on enemy movements.[12]

Colonel David Lownds, commander of the 26th Marine Regiment, reported that through the use of sensors, units probably of regimental size were detected approaching the base, and they were subsequently annihilated by artillery fire and airstrikes. Air and artillery coordination was so efficient that hundreds of artillery missions, scores of radar-directed bombing missions, and more than a dozen B-52 missions could be coordinated in a 24-hour period.[13]

Considering the number of defenders (about 6,000) at Khe Sanh, there were surprisingly few howitzers — 18 light and six medium.[14] Khe Sanh was supported by heavy guns from both Camp Carroll and the Rock Pile, fire bases some 10 to 12 miles away. These supporting bases were critical to Khe Sanh's defense. Some three miles from Sanh was the Lang Vei SF camp.

Lang Vei was the object of the first large assault by the North Vietnamese during the envelopment of Khe Sanh. For its size, Lang Vei was reasonably well-equipped with recoilless rifles, mortars, machine guns, and light antitank weapons. Lang Vei was literally overrun by a half-dozen PT-76 tanks and the NVA infantry. Although outside artillery and air support eventually arrived and was reasonably

effective, delays and communications difficulties contributed to Lang Vei's being overrun. The greatest design defect of Lang Vei was that it was interred to such a degree that tanks were able to roll over the installation.

Interestingly enough, the TOC at Lang Vei had been built as a reinforced concrete bunker. It was here that 35 men took refuge. Despite being subjected to tank fire, satchel charges, gas and thermite grenades for some four hours, most of the men survived the ordeal.

Lessons learned

Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Piper, an Australian observer in Vietnam, was much taken by the fire-base concept and saw its many possibilities: it could provide close fire support for maneuvering units; it could surprise the enemy by rapidly deploying artillery in unexpected locations; it could provide reliable communications terminals; and it could secure forward logistics bases. Piper felt the shortcoming of establishing a fire base was that substantial logistics methods would be required in order to deliver personnel, equipment and materials to a given site, whether by ground or air transport.[16]

The SF camps were exceptional in that they served the same role as other U.S. fire bases, but with the important additional role of creating villages and native community centers in areas of war. SF camps provided relatively secure havens for indigenous peoples and their cultures. Evidence suggests that under appropriate conditions, stable communities can be formed and that these communities could eventually assume responsibility for their local territorial security. Clusters of such camps/settlements could become strong stabilizing elements and could mutually support one another defensively, economically and politically.

Historically, gates and other means of access have been the preferred avenues of hostile approach because they are the weakest parts of a fortification. Not surprisingly, the poor entry configurations were the greatest weakness of SF camps and other fire bases. More often than not, the entrances were simply straight cuts made through the defensive perimeter. Fire-base entrances normally faced the runway next to the camp, and the runway could be found even on the darkest of nights. As a result, the edge of the runway became the most commonly used starting line for an assault on a camp.

Runway security is one of the great dilemmas in contemporary fortification. Placing the runway within the fire base tremendously increases the length of the defensive perimeter, and placing it outside allows incoming aircraft and the main access to the fire base to be exposed. Further protection of the aerial-resupply capability might include placing landing areas larger than helicopter pads within the defenses, perhaps associated with the further development of heavy-lift vertical and short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft.

The SF camps were exceptional in that they served the same role as other U.S. fire bases, but with the important additional role of creating villages and native community centers in areas of war. … Clusters of such camps/settlements could become strong stabilizing elements and could mutually support one another defensively, economically and politically.

Historically, V-shaped outworks have been placed directly in front of the main gate. These outworks make it necessary for people and vehicles to approach the defensive perimeter at an angle, then to turn sharply and pass through an intermediate defended compound, then to turn sharply again to enter the main defenses. The outwork also serves as a position from which enfilading fire can be provided along the faces of the main defensive line (moat and berm). The outwork solution is still valid.

It is worth noting that the most sophisticated fire bases point to prefabricated building components as the future direction in assembling and designing major

field fortifications, whether or not they are permanent. With the introduction of the CONEX shipping container came proof that prefab elements save time and that they are readily transportable by truck, ship and train. Appropriately hardened and revetted on-site, fire-base and defensive structures of the future could be tailored to serve specific site conditions and specific levels of effort.

In studying fire bases, one frequently encounters references to sensor screens, early-warning devices, battlefield radar and infrared night-vision equipment. In Vietnam, SF had limited experience with sensor systems. And while SF personnel appreciated the systems and used them whenever they were available, the systems were rather unreliable and difficult to maintain in the field. Furthermore, seismic sensors could be triggered by animals, and unless the sensors were used in large numbers so that readings from a given area could be compared, they often proved misleading. Although night-vision equipment operated well, it was not available in adequate quantities, and it required excessive skilled maintenance.

It seems reasonable to assume that sensor technology, coupled with a system of mutually supporting fire bases and effective command, control and communications, will be the next step in the evolution of defensive planning. The Vietnam experience, with its nascent technology, proved the value of the "electronic battlefield" in terms of defending given points and in providing information about enemy movement. Dependable detection and tracking of intruders, coupled with rapid and effective assembly and analysis of data, rapid decision-making and well-coordinated communication and action, can effectively interdict and defeat hostile military units while maintaining the essential conditions of civic order for the local population and territory.

Applications

The Special Forces camp has numerous current and future applications to the ethnic conflict and civil insurrection that are becoming dominant forms of warfare. Of all the fire-base types, the SF camp was unusual because it was the only type that could be easily modified to become an integral part of existing communities. The creation of villages within the defensive perimeters of the camps, with their local self-defense forces, became significant stabilizing factors. The Special Forces camp was not just a fortification, but a place where local populations could avoid the depredations of their enemies. It also gave the local populations a defensible place from which to fend off often superior and better-equipped foes.

SF Camp A-415 in the Plain of Reeds used concrete spread over mud walls to prevent the walls from eroding.

Photo courtesy JFK Special Warfare Museum

In studying the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in other areas, where ethnic conflict has created several million refugees, one can readily see the utility of fire bases and SF camps in several roles:

First, fire bases could provide fortified centers of operations and logistics bases for forces attempting to enforce the peace within the former Yugoslavia. They could provide fire support to mobile forces in the field and deter aggressive border crossings.

Second, SF camps could become a suitable setting for attracting displaced people and establishing new communities. Providing refugees with defensible places would enable them to feel relatively secure from their hostile neighbors. These camps could be used initially as a means of directing aid to refugees and eventually as the nuclei for towns.

If established in a coherent and rational manner, SF camps could serve as a powerful and long-term means of establishing and maintaining secure and viable borders. The people who would be residing in the camps could begin the process of establishing territorial control by farming the land and using it as a basis for long-term subsistence. Mutually supporting camps and towns could make it difficult for offensive operations to penetrate previously contested border areas. Each new foundation would become a fortification that would have to be taken or besieged. Camps could not safely be bypassed, as that would expose the aggressor's lines of communication.

The conduct of siege operations is always slow and costly in terms of men and materiel. One possible recommendation is that all these future SF camps be equipped with reinforced concrete structures for their command sections. As the example of the Lang Vei TOC demonstrates, reinforced concrete structures are excellent core defensive elements. Concrete structures are inherently strong, and should a camp be overrun, they would be unharmed by artillery and airstrikes called in directly over them.[15] The use of reinforced concrete might also be encouraged when permanent housing is eventually built within the camps, for the purpose of further hardening these new urban foundations with defensible and mutually supportive structures.

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Notes:

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[2] Peter J. Offringa, "Bunker Hill: Anatomy of a Firebase," *The Engineer*, Summer 1973, Vol. 3, No. 2, 19-25.

[3] See Francis J. Kelly, *Special Forces "A" Detachment Camp Planning Handbook* (Fort Bragg N.C.: U.S. Special Forces, 1965).

[4] U.S. Special Forces Engineering Committee, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, *Base Camp Planning* (Fort Bragg, N.C.).

[5] Francis J. Kelly, *Vietnam Studies: U.S. Special Forces 1961-1971* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973, reprinted 1985), 19 ff.

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[9] Archival photographs from JFK Special Warfare Museum, Fort Bragg, N.C.

[10] See Gordon L. Rottman, "Anatomy of a Special Forces Camp (1)," Houston, Texas: Special Forces Association, 1987, reprinted from *Military Illustrated Past and Present*.

[11] Kelly, *Vietnam Studies*, pp. 97-103. See also Paul Dickson, *The Electronic Battlefield* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1976), 71 ff.

[12] Bernard C. Natty, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1973), 90-95.

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[14] BDM Corporation, *A Study of the Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam* (DTIC No. ADA 096429) Vol. 3, 74-76.

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Army Values, SOF Truths and the Ranger Ethos

by Captain James H. Johnson III

Since 1775, more than 42 million Americans have taken an oath of service to their nation and to the United States Army. They declared their loyalty not to a king or to a flag, but to the ideals that our nation represents.[1] The allegiance pledged by these Americans has made the U.S. Army what it is today — the premier fighting force in the world and a values-based institution closely bound to the nation and to its people. This allegiance to ideals gives our Army a strong foundation of values — values that are instilled into members of U.S. special-operations forces and values that define the ethos, or fundamental character, of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

The Army's contribution to joint warfighting is, in essence, the power to exercise direct, continuing and comprehensive control over land and over the resources and the peoples of that land. It is this control that allows land power to make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval forces.[2] If the Army is to achieve its mission, it must be more than an organization: It must be an institution based upon a set of core values. These values provide the sense of purpose needed to sustain soldiers in combat and to help resolve the ambiguities of military operations where war has not been declared. The Army defines these values as honor, integrity, selfless service, courage, loyalty, duty and respect.[3]

Leaders of character live the core values: They treat their subordinates as they themselves would like to be treated, and they do what is right.[4] Leadership at all levels has always been an exceptional aspect of our Army. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry often demonstrated this concept by relating a story about General Andrei Nikolayev, deputy chief of the Russian general staff, who was visiting military bases in the United States. After visiting the first base and observing our NCOs in action, Nikolayev said to one of his aides, "I know that these men and women wearing sergeants' uniforms are really officers in disguise."[5] He could not understand that core values motivated American soldiers.

There is no denying that information and technology will affect our ability to fight on future battlefields; however, our Army must remain a values-based institution.[6] It is upon this base that all else is built, and without it, the organization could fail at the most critical moment. General Dennis J. Reimer, chief of staff of the Army, has noted, "Refocusing on the values and making sure that we've got that right is a terribly important part of the Army. … I think it's important that we not just talk about them, but that we actually live those values and demonstrate them in leadership positions."[7]

Special-operations forces have always understood the importance of values and

U.S. Army photo

The roles of Army Rangers are demanding. The Ranger Regiment assesses Ranger candidates through stringent mental and physical examinations.

leadership. A fundamental truth in special operations is that SOF *is* people. A SOF leader's primary responsibility is to develop people: to enable them to reach their full potential and to demonstrate to them how to perform exemplary actions under complex and demanding conditions.[8]

The belief in the importance of the SOF soldier has spawned the SOF Truths, the fundamental precepts that clearly define the individual soldier's importance:

- Humans are more important than hardware.
- Quality is better than quantity.
- Special-operations forces cannot be mass-produced.
- Competent special-operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

The SOF vision for the future does not abandon these truths. In *SOF Vision 2020*, General Henry Shelton, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, lists quality people as the first instrument of success. He states, "People are the key to success. Lifelong military experience must train for certainty but educate for uncertainty. We must maintain our traditional emphasis on high-quality, rigorous training and reinforce it with effective education that encourages creative, thoughtful solutions to sensitive and high-risk situations."[9] Finding enough self-reliant people with physical and mental strength, endurance, and stability under extreme stress poses an immense challenge for the future.

The 75th Ranger Regiment is fully integrated into SOF values. Since its formation in 1974, the regiment has been recognized as a unit with guaranteed standards of performance. Then-Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams stated in the unit's charter, "The Battalion is to be … [the] most-proficient infantry battalion in the world. A Battalion that can do things with its hands and weapons better than anyone. The Battalion will contain no 'hoodlums or brigands' and if the battalion is formed from such persons it will be disbanded. Wherever the Battalion goes it must be apparent that it is the best."[10] Although Generals John Wickham and Gordon Sullivan have updated the Rangers' charter over the years, it still represents the values of the Army and of the SOF community.

The Ranger Regiment is a highly visible

The Ranger Creed:

Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor and high esprit de corps of my Ranger Regiment.

Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land sea or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger, my country expects me to move further, faster, and fight harder than any other soldier.

Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong and morally straight and I will shoulder more than my share of the task whatever it may be. One hundred percent and then some.

Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well trained soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, my neatness of dress and care of equipment shall set the example for others to follow.

Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country, I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.

Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor. Rangers Lead the Way!!

and recognizable SOF component. It could be argued that the regiment is a major source of the warriors and the warrior ethos in the SOF community: In 1996 alone, 14 Rangers were selected for Special Forces training; many others moved into flight positions in special-operations-aviation units; and many more progressed into other units within the Army Special Operations Command.

The Ranger mindset and ethos are embodied in the Ranger Creed. The creed's six stanzas represent not only the past achievements of Rangers but also the Ranger standards for today and for the future. Each stanza directs actions that are founded upon the Army's core values. By adhering to the standards of the Ranger Creed, Rangers are guaranteed to do what is right under the most demanding of conditions.

Recent events are replete with examples that the Ranger Creed lives in the hearts and souls of Rangers. No example speaks louder than the actions of Oct. 3-4, 1993, in Somalia, in which the Rangers lived up to the section of the Ranger Creed that states, "Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy."

Like other components of the SOF community, the Ranger Regiment assesses candidates through stringent mental and physical examinations. Candidates learn that they are volunteering for a part of the Army that has a different tempo and a different attitude. They are told that the SOF community trains constantly at a high level of complexity on joint operations in all environments. Rangers do not have the most technically challenging role in these operations, but they do have a role that is physically and mentally demanding. The regiment demands that its leaders prepare soldiers physically and mentally to accomplish whatever our nation asks of them.[11]

The success of the 75th Ranger Regiment and of other SOF is testament to the importance of values within an organization. Our Army is the most technologically advanced in the world, and technology enables us to multiply combat effectiveness while reducing casualties. But the Army cannot forget that man is the ulti-

mate weapon, capable of going as far as guts and brains will take him. By defining the fundamental character of our Army forces, values are the fire that fuels the ultimate weapon.

Captain James H. Johnson III is the S5 for the 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Ga. He has commanded companies in the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; and in the 7th Infantry Division (Light). He has also served with the 82nd Airborne Division. Johnson is a 1986 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point.

Notes:

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[3] Sean D. Naylor, "The Core of the Matter/Army Defines Ethics in Seven Central Values," *Army Times* (16 December 1996), 7.

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[6] Lieutenant Colonel Joel A. Buck, "Reflections on Leadership," *Military Review* (November-December 1996).

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[8] General Henry H. Shelton, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Forces 1996 Posture Statement* (November 1996), 4.

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Unconventional Warfare: A Viable Option for the Future?

by Sergeant First Class Michael W. Devotie

The United States bases its national-defense strategy on the assumption that we must maintain sufficient forces to deal with two simultaneous major regional conflicts, or MRCs. But with the recent cutbacks in defense spending and with the continued downsizing of military forces, many experts believe that the U.S. would be hard-pressed to handle even one MRC.

One suggested contingency plan may reflect the reality of the current situation: This plan assumes that the majority of U.S. military power would be required to quell an emerging MRC. If a second conflict, MRC-2, were to erupt, it would have to be contained by airpower alone, until ground forces could be freed from the first MRC.

This scenario could have major implications for U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF. Our airpower could have a devastating effect on the enemy forces in MRC-2, and perhaps the U.S. would be able to achieve air superiority. However, history has demonstrated that airpower alone cannot completely control events on the ground. Even if the U.S. should plan only to delay the enemy, many critical tasks would need to be completed before ground reinforcements arrived.

U.S. interests today extend to almost every region of the world. In most countries, the U.S. government is officially represented by permanent embassies, most of which have large operating staffs. U.S. private businesses, as players in the global trading community, also have facilities and personnel scattered around the world.

In the event of MRC-2, evacuating U.S. noncombatants from the area of conflict would be a top priority. Evacuees would include embassy personnel, civilian workers, military dependents, and key foreign leaders and their families. An evacuation can be orderly or chaotic, depending on the time available for the process. Film footage of the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in 1975 graphically portrays how disorderly a situation can become. We could also expect massive problems with refugees.

A second priority would be to remove or destroy sensitive documents and equipment. Facilities would have to be destroyed as well, to prevent the enemy from using them. Airpower could be used to take out many of the targeted facilities, once U.S. personnel had been evacuated.

In order to delay the enemy as long as possible, any large U.S. military formations stationed in the MRC-2 region would be expected to fight a holding action or to make a fighting retreat. However, with only limited reinforcement and resupply, our forces would eventually be overwhelmed, resulting in large numbers of U.S. personnel being captured. An unscrupulous enemy could place groups of newly gained prisoners of war around his key installations to deter U.S. airstrikes. Large groups of captured U.S. civilians could be detained in camps or in other loca-

tions, but they would probably be kept separate from captured military personnel. Accurate information on the numbers and the locations of U.S. military and civilian prisoners would be critical to target planning and to any planned rescue attempts.

Modern air-defense systems, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and even small-arms fire would likely claim large numbers of U.S. aircraft. Pilots who eject safely or otherwise survive being shot down would, no doubt, appreciate networks for evasion and escape, or E&E — if anyone had bothered to establish them. A friendly resistance force operating in the area could establish E&E nets and could even attempt raids or ambushes to free captured airmen. The best time to conduct rescue efforts is before captured personnel are placed in a POW facility.

The presence of "eyes on the ground" could enhance the accuracy of aerial bombing. These "eyes" could provide damage assessment; they could designate high-payoff targets with lasers or beacons, or they could establish the target's geographic location. They could also distinguish enemy decoy targets, which are easier to detect from the ground. They could also relay other information, such as whether or not U.S. POWs or civilian detainees are in the vicinities of planned targets.

Conducting unconventional warfare, or UW, to delay, disrupt and harass the enemy could become a long-term mission for SOF. In this role, SOF would be engaged in establishing resistance forces, or in aiding, training, and advising existing resistance groups, if any could be identified. Resistance forces could strike at the enemy whenever and wherever possible by conducting raids, ambushes, sniping, mine emplacement, sabotage and subversive activities.

The concept of using special-operations soldiers to delay and harass the enemy is not new. During World War II, Winston Churchill, then-prime minister of Great Britain, employed special units to strike at the German forces occupying Europe. Especially after the withdrawal from Dunkirk, Great Britain and the other allies lacked the forces needed to engage the Germans in pitched battle. They used commando forces and other small, highly trained units to

U.S. Army photo

Vietnamese soldiers of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group receive an issue of equipment at the Dong Tre Special Forces camp in June 1969.

strike at and distract the enemy.

During the first few months of 1965, the conflict in Vietnam escalated as the North Vietnamese Army, or the NVA, and the Vietcong, or VC, forces introduced a new family of Soviet weapons and began operating in battalion strength and larger. The U.S. responded to this threat by deploying like-sized regular Army and Marine units into the country.

Before U.S. forces could be deployed, however, General William Westmoreland, commander of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, used U.S. Special Forces detachments to fill the gap. SF detachments had been operating in Vietnam for some time, primarily training minority villagers under the program known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG. Under the CIDG program, villagers were organized into companies that were trained and advised by SF. CIDG companies were designed specifically for village self-defense, not for conventional operations against main-force VC or regular NVA forces.

Despite the intended purpose of the CIDG companies, Westmoreland desperately threw the companies and their SF advisers into the breach. Together, they provided highway security and convoy escort, defended airfields, cleared projected base areas for incoming Army brigades, swept critical VC infiltration routes, and even replaced regular South Vietnamese Army battalions that had been sent elsewhere. The CIDG also prevented many portions of South Vietnam from falling under VC control prior to the introduction of large U.S. military formations. Although the CIDG and SF were not used in the capacity for which they were intended, they accomplished the majority of the missions assigned to them.

When and if the U.S. completes its activities in the first MRC and turns its attention to the second, having personnel already operating in the MRC-2 area who can provide critical intelligence and detailed target information would prove beneficial. The value of employing "eyes on target" cannot be overemphasized. Resistance units operating in the area could attack key targets, interdict lines of communication, delay troop movements and create deceptions. They could also secure drop zones, landing zones, port facilities and amphibious landing sites. At the very least, they could create general chaos in support of U.S. operations.

Because the MRC-2 scenario could become a reality, SOF, especially SF, should concentrate their training on the core mission of UW, for it is the specialized UW skills that will be indispensable in fighting a delaying action.

Just as the U.S. maintains the capability of conducting nuclear warfare, it should also maintain the capability of conducting UW. As we cut defense spending and reduce our military forces, we are also reducing the number of our available options. At this rate, the U.S. may soon discover that UW is one of its few remaining viable options.

Sergeant First Class Michael W. Devotie is a doctrine writer assigned to the Special Forces Training and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS. During his military career, he has served in the 101st Airborne Division, the 2nd Infantry Division, the 24th Infantry Division, the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment of the Tennessee National Guard, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 1st, 7th and 3rd Special Forces groups.

Letters

CSAR valid SF mission

In the December 1996 issue of *Special Warfare*, the article "Special Forces Mission Focus for the Future" addresses combat search and rescue. It states "CSAR, as performed by SF during the Gulf War, was not a suitable SF mission. While the lack of conventional aircraft might have necessitated the use of SOF aircraft, the security mission lacked any aspects that required SF-unique (or SOF-unique) skills."

As a member of the 5th SF Group CSAR team during Desert Shield and part of Desert Storm, I find this statement ignores the following:

The missions conducted by the 5th SF Group CSAR team in the Gulf War were behind enemy lines in denied territory. Operations beyond friendly support require (the skills of) SF to plan and execute small-unit missions. The 5th Group CSAR team was led by a captain and a master sergeant. All three-man CSAR teams were composed of SF E-7s — this is the level of expertise needed to make sound decisions in situations of that type.

It was necessary to have a SOF CSAR team in place and prepared for a prolonged war. We were projected to lose more than 100 aircraft in the first 10 days of the air war. In that case, CSAR teams would have been required to use SF skills of escape, evasion and resistance, and cross-trained skills of communications and emergency medicine.

Many SF missions are classified. Only personnel with appropriate clearances are qualified to recover teams on classified missions.

The CSAR team in the Gulf employed 18Ds, along with other 18s, as security. The 18D possesses critical medical skills that regular army medics do not have.

The "magic warehouse in the sky" that we were all led to believe in never materialized, and we were required to use what we brought. The radios, night-vision goggles, survival and medical gear we needed were scrounged from other teams in the group. Conventional units would not have had access to that equipment as fast.

Finally, a special force must have special soldiers. Special Forces soldiers are not replaceable with apparently identical soldiers from other units. We must be committed to: (1) mission, and (2) morale and welfare of the troops, because without (2), (1) won't succeed. I was a SOG recon team member on missions behind enemy lines, and nothing was more important to me than the knowledge that my buddies would rescue me, no matter what.

MSG Dan Ross
Army Special Forces Command
Fort Bragg, N.C.

The author responds:

MSG Dan Ross raises some excellent points regarding the planning, execution, and decision-making skills that enable SF soldiers to successfully operate in a denied area. Joint Pub 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue*, notes that the capability to operate clandestinely in a denied environment makes SF an appropriate CSAR asset, but only when terrain, weather or enemy air-defense artillery makes other methods untenable. FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, in discussing the collateral capability of SF to conduct CSAR, states "SF does not employ standard CSAR procedures when executing such a mission."

In the Gulf War, the SF participation in CSAR missions was contrary to this doctrine. The terrain and the threat dictated conventional CSAR operations; i.e., missions were planned and executed based on confirmed communication with an airman using a survival radio. Once the airman's location had been pinpointed, a helicopter would pick him up. The situation was not suited to inserting ground elements to conduct extensive searches, establishing E & R networks, or prepositioning elements in denied territory to conduct precautionary CSAR. In the absence of CSAR operations requiring SF-unique skills, SF soldiers were allocated to conventional CSAR mission profiles. The USAF conducted numerous successful conventional CSAR operations in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War without SF soldiers riding shotgun — why did we need to add them 20 years later?

The intent of my article was not to denigrate any of the many contributions SF soldiers made during the Gulf War; however, it did seek to use doctrinal criteria to demonstrate where SF can make the greatest contribution to the overall effort. The skills that MSG Ross ably highlights are not easily developed; consequently, SF will always be a limited resource in any operation and must be used judiciously.

MAJ Kenneth E. Tovo
G3/DPTM
Fort Carson, Colo.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Zone B BEAR bonus instituted for FY 97

A bonus opportunity for Special Forces soldiers under Bonus Extension and Retraining, or BEAR, became effective April 25, 1997, according to MILPER Message No. 97-084. A Zone B bonus (6-10 years), it will target and attract the Army E5/E6 population and provide Special Forces recruiters with a significant tool for accomplishing the FY 97 active-component enlisted recruiting objectives.

Army releases statistics for 1997 E8 promotions

The results of the master-sergeant promotion board for calendar year 1997 have been released. The breakdowns by MOS are as follows:

	Primary Zone		Secondary Zone		Total		
	Elig.	Sel.	Elig.	Sel.	Elig.	Sel.	%
18B	148	13	71	1	219	14	6.4
18C	156	9	48	0	204	9	4.4
18D	173	8	50	1	223	9	4.0
18E	187	9	46	1	233	10	4.3
18F	346	19	24	2	370	21	5.7
CMF 18	1,010	58	239	5	1,249	63	5.0
CMF 37	10	3	9	1	19	4	21.1
Army	11,206	1,983	7,052	528	18,258	2,511	13.8

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SF Officer Branch has new points of contact

The Special Forces Officer Branch, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, has announced that the following personnel changes will take effect July 15:

LTC Charles King	SF Officer Branch chief
MAJ Alex Findlay	Field-grade assignments officer
CPT Nestor Sadler	Captains' assignments officer
CPT Mark Schwartz	Branch accessions officer
Mrs. Sandra Bryant	Branch technician

Telephone inquiries may be made by calling DSN 221-3178 or commercial (703) 325-3178. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall St.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0414. Officers can also keep in touch with the Branch by reading the latest Special Forces Branch newsletter through PERSCOM On-line, http://www-perscom.army.mil.

Foreign SOF

Illegal immigration and refugees challenge Russian security services

Russian authorities now estimate that at least 100,000 illegal immigrants (most of whom are from Vietnam, China, and Afghanistan) are living in Moscow. In March 1997, the problem of illegal immigrants — which has grown in the wake of the Soviet collapse — prompted Russia's Federal Security Service and Federal Border Service to begin "streamlining" their interaction and cooperation with one another in order to deal with the issue. The two agencies raised special concerns regarding illegal immigrants, including the potential for their engagement in subversive activities under the sponsorship of foreign intelligence bodies; their involvement in the flow of drugs and arms from the south; their potential for spreading serious diseases; and the economic impact of their taking jobs away from Russians. In Kyrgyzstan — a transit area for illegal aliens, drugs and weapons on their way to Russia and beyond — government resources are being taxed by some 20,000 refugees from the civil war in neighboring Tajikistan. An even larger concern is the ever-increasing amount of drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan that pass through Kyrgyzstan into Russia and on into Europe. "Mountains" of seized raw opium, along with the violence that erupts among drug traffickers or that is caused by bandits preying on refugees, mark an early leg of the journey of people and contraband north to Russia. A recently established "special control zone," aimed at regulating the flow of illegal goods along the heavily traveled highway linking Kyrgyzstan with Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, appears unlikely to seriously affect the flow of contraband.

Chilean terrorists strike from air and cyberspace

Peru's extraordinarily successful operation to free hostages held by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, or MRTA, in Lima did not end the regional unease over the potential for small, obscure or badly damaged subversive groups to reassert themselves with dramatic acts of violence. Remnants of old insurgent groups — such as those in Paraguay, Uruguay and Ecuador — are largely inactive, while some former guerrillas in Argentina, Chile and elsewhere in Latin America are widely believed to be working now for the government intelligence services they once fought. Nevertheless, occasional acts of violence and terrorism by remnants of these or other groups remind affected states that even obscure subversive organizations are not quite destroyed. In Chile, for example, a still-active faction of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, or FPMR, executed a stunning Dec. 30, 1996, rescue of four FPMR leaders from a maximum security prison near Santiago. The four, who were picked up from the prison by a helicopter flown by a kidnapped Chilean police captain, escaped in an exchange of automatic-weapons fire between the helicopter and the prison guards. The breakout, which is rumored to have had foreign support, underscored that the FPMR (split off from a larger organization formed in 1983 to struggle against the military rule of Augosto Pinochet) is still capable of effective action. It also raised the immediate specter of other actions (possibly with the MRTA or other groups), and it introduced

a sensitive new issue into Chilean internal politics — the current "threat of radical groups." Around the same time that Peruvian police and military special-operations forces were freeing MRTA hostages in Lima in late April, the FPMR appeared on a well-organized, colorfully presented Spanish-language site on the Worldwide Web (http://www.cyberplus.ca/~labbe). The site has instructive material on FPMR history, goals, leaders and revolutionary heroes, relationships with Cuba, and other features.

Thais establish Rapid Deployment Strike Force

Drawing on especially well-trained military personnel with field experience, the Thai Army is setting up the Rapid Deployment Strike Force. The unit — which will be able to deploy by land or by water — will be tasked to respond to especially challenging problems, including those arising along Thai borders. The force may also be used to support United Nations peacekeeping efforts. The 3rd Battalion of the 31st Infantry Regiment, in the southwest central province of Lop Buri, may be used as the basis of this new formation, owing to its location and to its assigned personnel who are "trained in special warfare." The unit will be supported by C-130 aircraft and combat helicopters. Additional equipment, transportation and firepower are to be procured from the U.S. and elsewhere. The force is to be "ready for combat round-the-clock in any weather condition and terrain." The unit may serve as a model for additional formations set up in each Thai military region.

Russia views Internet and PSYOP links

In a spring 1997 assessment of U.S. planning for information operations, a Russian commentator judged that the Internet was seen by the U.S. as a particularly promising dimension of "offensive information warfare." This was thought to be the case especially for U.S. military integration of Internet capabilities and "psychological operations." In this regard, Internet monitoring and dissemination would serve for the early detection of threats to U.S. interests, as a means of exercising psychological influence, and as a means of alerting U.S. sympathizers during special operations conducted outside U.S. borders. The Russian commentator judged that an added advantage for special operations is that there would be virtually "no trace of direct interference."

Indonesian special ops force praised for protecting national security

In April 1997, a written statement by Indonesian President Soeharto singled out the 45-year-old Special Army Commando, or Kopassus, of the Indonesian armed forces as a central component in protecting the nation's security — specifically, as "guarantors of national unity in the face of many threats and challenges." Soeharto's remarks were read at the force's 45th anniversary celebration, which was attended by past Indonesian commando officers and military leaders, as well as by the commanders of the Myanmarese and Cambodian Special Forces. It is interesting that the statement emphasized domestic sources of "disturbance that need to be dealt with," while it noted that the international situation had changed for the better.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Bingham takes command of USACAPOC

Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham took command of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command from Major General Donald F. Campbell May 17.

Bingham told the audience that one of his top priorities will be to care for USACAPOC soldiers. "We owe them an active and meaningful family-support program," he said. "We owe them the flawless handling of their pay, orders and other support so they can focus on their jobs."

Bingham was formerly the commander of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade. He also served as the Civil Affairs adviser to the commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command during the Haiti intervention in 1994; he served eight years with the 11th Special Forces Group; and he served with the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam.

Campbell had commanded USACAPOC since May 1993. Following the change-of-command ceremony, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the Army's second-highest award given during peacetime, for exceptionally meritorious service to the government. Campbell's next assignment will be at the Pentagon. — *SGT Michele H. Barker, USASOC PAO*

USASOC units sport new flashes, crest

Two major subordinate commands of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command have new unit flashes, and one of them has a new unit crest.

SOSCOM crest

The U. S. Army Special Operations Support Command has a new unit crest and flash. The crest consists of a black dagger with two yellow lightning bolts superimposed on a silver parachute. The insignia is enclosed by a black scroll inscribed, "Assured Support" in silver letters.

SOSCOM's new flash is edged in yellow and is divided diagonally by a maroon slash fringed in yellow. The upper half of the flash is dark green; the lower half is black.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group has a new flash produced in black, white, gray and yellow, the same colors used in the SWCS flash.

The 1st SWTG flash has a yellow border. A white diagonal band divides the flash from upper left to lower right. The upper half of the flash is black; the bottom half is gray.

Colors and features of both flashes and unit insignia are symbolic of the missions and the history of special-operations forces. Black signifies wisdom and prudence; white symbolizes perfection and faith; yellow denotes constancy and inspiration; and gray alludes to the myriad missions conducted by Special Forces.

On SOSCOM's crest, the parachute represents airborne capabilities and unconventional-operations support missions. The dual lightning bolts represent the speed with which SOSCOM performs its missions, and SOSCOM's combat-support elements and combat-service-support elements.

1st SWTG receives new commander

Colonel Remo Butler assumed command of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group from Colonel Lance E. Booth III May 16.

Butler was previously chief of the Special Operations Coordination Element for the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg. He has also served as a detachment commander with the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, in Panama; as a company commander with the Infantry Training Group, Fort Benning, Ga.; as a company commander with the 2nd Battalion, 7th SF Group; as the special-operations plans officer for the Special Operations Command-South; as an instructor at the Armed Forces Staff College; as commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group; and as deputy chief of staff for the Army Special Forces Command.

"We are fortunate to have Remo. He is a great trainer — a master trainer — who perfected his trade at Fort Benning before he came here in the early 80s, and I know that the training group will be in good hands," said Major General William P. Tangney, the SWCS commander.

Booth, who had commanded the 1st SWTG since July 1995, will become chief of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group-Thailand. — *Paul D. Nelson, USASOC PAO*

Closed-circuit rebreather returns to ARSOF units

Army special-operations units once again have the capability of conducting underwater operations using closed-circuit diving equipment.

In January 1997, the commander of the Army Special Operations Command made the decision to reintroduce closed-circuit diving to the Army SOF community, according to CW3 Richard Mumma, USASOC DCSOPS.

Rebreather training has also resumed in the Combat Diver Qualification Course, or CDQC, taught in Key West, Fla., by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. The last CDQC class to take closed-circuit training graduated in November 1994.

Soldiers who have completed the CDQC but who did not receive closed-circuit training can be certified by one of four methods: by attending the closed-circuit portion of CDQC as a guest student; by receiving closed-circuit training at Key West during annual requalification; by receiving training from mobile training teams from Key West; or by attending closed-circuit training at the Navy Special Warfare Center at Coronado, Calif.

Divers previously qualified on closed-circuit equipment who have not used the equipment within the last 12 months must be recertified in accordance with AR 611-75 and USASOC Regulation 350-20. For more information, telephone CW3 Richard Mumma at DSN 239-3084/2069 or commercial (910) 432-3084/2069.

SWCS notes changes in nonresident training

The Reserve Component Directorate of the Special Warfare Center and School announces the following changes in SWCS nonresident training:

• *Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course.* Students must complete all Phase I requirements, except the written practical exercise, 30 days prior to enrolling in CAOAC Phase II. Students must submit their written practical exercise during Phase II in-processing or they will be immediately disenrolled.

Students are also required to pass the APFT during CAOAC Phase II as part of the officer-advanced-course graduation criteria. Profiles must be based on a military doctor's recommendation of restricted activities. Students who have temporary profiles should not attend Phase II until they are cleared of the profile.

• *RC Special Forces ANCOC and O&I.* The 1997 edition of the Army Correspondence Course Catalog does not list RC Special Forces ANCOC and O&I because these courses are being upgraded. RC SF ANCOC will be offered in the future through various media as part of the Army and SWCS distance-learning programs. The RC SF ANCOC correspondence course is scheduled to be available in January 1998.

• *Correspondence-course grades.* With more than 1,500 students from all four services enrolled in its correspondence courses, the SWCS Reserve Component Directorate cannot respond to all inquiries regarding the status of those students.

When a student completes a subcourse or a course phase, the Nonresident Training Branch prints and forwards three sets of grade reports: one to the student's home of record, one to the reserve personnel center for the student's branch of service, and one to the student's unit. Training officers or NCOs can track a student's progress by referring to the information in the grade report.

For additional information, telephone Major J.R. Richardson, chief of the Reserve Component Training Branch, at DSN 239-5326 or commercial (910) 432-5326.

Course teaches joint PSYOP planning, operations

The Joint Psychological Operations Staff Planning Course provides students with the planning and operations skills required to apply and employ PSYOP doctrine in a joint, combined or interagency environment.

The course emphasis is on information operations, information warfare, and joint planning and execution, according to Major Andrew R. Eisemann of the PSYOP Detachment, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Training also covers operations of the joint task force, operations of the joint PSYOP task force, and PSYOP campaign planning.

The course is available to officers; NCOs (staff sergeant and above); and civilians of selected government agencies. Prospective students must possess a secret security clearance or higher.

The next JPSPC is scheduled for Sept. 8-19, 1997. Prospective students should contact their training office to enroll and to reserve a class slot through the Army Training Requirements and Resources System. For additional information, telephone Major Andrew Eisemann at DSN 239-7015, or commercial (910) 432-7015.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander. *By Edwin Price Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele. McLean, Va.: Brassey's Publishing, 1996. ISBN: 1-57488-052-7. 333 pages. $17.95.*

For the Special Forces operator who seeks to expand his knowledge of the guerrilla-warfare craft by reading that field's literature, there is a wealth of choices.

The underlying philosophy and violently applied theory of guerrilla warfare are well laid out in both of T.E. Lawrence's accounts of his operations in World War I: *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1938) and the more austere *Revolt in the Desert* (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., 1927).

Beyond this near-essential foundation, there are numerous accounts of guerrilla operations dating back at least to biblical times. If, like this writer, one attempts to reduce this wealth to manageable levels by giving preference to works from relatively modern times — that is, the "gunpowder era" — there are still broad and varied choices.

Among these are about a half-dozen, primarily of the World War II period, that by hard criteria of content or readability are of exceptional value. These select few describe operations as diverse as those of the OSS's operational groups and Jedburgh teams in Europe; General Bor's Home Army in Warsaw; Navy-supported operations in China; OSS Detachment 101's tribal forces in Burma; and



the Philippine Guerrilla War.

To the American guerrilla-warfare student, the Philippine Guerrilla War is particularly relevant. It was, by necessity, America's longest-lasting guerrilla war, extending from early 1942 until the end of hostilities in August 1945. The war became America's largest, both in its geographical expanse over most of the Philippine Islands and in the numbers of people involved as guerrillas, agents, coast watchers, auxiliaries, and as members of the underground. For the U.S., Japanese dominance of the area and the enormous distances from friendly forces added exceptional difficulties to conducting, directing and supporting that war. Over its lifetime, the Philippine Guerrilla War would pass through each step of guerrilla- warfare development and would include many ancillary intelligence, psychological-operations, communications and logistics aspects.

Overwhelmingly, the guerrilla warriors were Filipinos, and most, but not all of them, were young. The leaders were both Filipinos and Americans. Pre-war political and military relationships gave the Americans a numerically disproportionate role. These Americans were an exceptional breed. Unlike some of the other guerrilla leadership cadres, such as those of the OSS in Europe, they were self-selected. Their entrance rite consisted of ignoring or evading valid military orders directing them to surrender to the Japanese. Instead, they took to the bush. The Japanese, with considerable justification, considered them bandits. These evaders realized that their surrender refusals and escapes were unknown to their countrymen, and they did not know how American military authorities would view such independence of mind. Because the United States had failed to succor its forces during the five months of the desperate defense of the Philippines, the evaders could hold little hope for rescue or for help from the outside. Yet they had the moral and physical courage to venture into the unknown.

Lieutenant Ramsey's War is the story of one of these evaders. The story follows one young Philippine Scout officer's evolution — from his initial intent to escape to Australia, to his participation in a guerrilla organization, to his eventual leadership in combat. There are few, if any, aspects or difficulties of guer-

rilla warfare or individual survival that this evader did not experience. The book can be read for its numerous exemplary professional lessons; it can be read as an adventure as exciting as any fiction; or it can be read as a military history of a fascinating time and place. Regardless of the motivation of the reader, one cannot avoid being impressed by the enduring loyalty and courage of the Philippine people and by the indomitable spirit of Lieutenant Edwin Ramsey, who persevered through danger, loneliness, exhaustion, malnutrition and frequent sickness.

Lieutenant Ramsey's War is clearly one of those half-dozen guerrilla-warfare books that are fit to join Lawrence's works on the professional's shelf. By all means, every Special Forces operator or SFQC student should read it — or better yet, own it. It would be ideal if this book could capture an even wider readership: every soldier who is even thinking of volunteering for Special Forces. *Lieutenant Ramsey's War* should be just as effective as the Special Forces Assessment and Selection in helping an individual decide whether he really wants to enter this demanding field.

COL Scot Crerar
U.S. Army (ret.)
Vienna, Va.

The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army Special Forces. *By Anna Simons. New York: The Free Press, 1997. ISBN: 0-684-82816-2. 240 pages. $25.*

The Company They Keep is an account of an anthropologist's 18 months with several Special Forces A-detachments within one company of the 3rd SF Group.

Anna Simons' academic credentials are impressive — she has a Ph.D. in anthropology from Harvard University, and she is an assistant professor of anthropology

at UCLA. Her experiential knowledge of SF is also welcome — she is married to a former SF NCO whom she met while conducting field research in Somalia for her Ph.D. During her 18 months with A-detachments, she accompanied the team members on field training exercises, on training missions, and during certifications and social gatherings. She also spent innumerable hours in the team room.

The Company They Keep deals with the A-detachment and the dynamics of the team: how the team works or, in some cases, how it fails to work. Deployments, training, family and the necessity of the team members' bonding with one another are all examined in detail. This book examines the intricacies of the ways by which SF teams train, form and become one. It is an exceptional attempt to demystify Special Forces by dissecting the special relationships within an A-detachment, while at the same time understanding the challenges and respecting the accomplishments of SF teams, both past and present.

The author, of necessity, looks only at those things that immediately affect the A-detachment, but on that subject she is relentless in her search for truth. She examines the team, the team members, their training (individual and collective), their family members, and the synergistic effect that all these things have on the team's morale, readiness, effectiveness and cohesion.

Anthropologists have conducted numerous studies on group dynamics, but never before has their research focused on the A-detachment. Simons gives a rarely seen view of the A-detachment from the inside. She argues that the A-detachment is an outstandingly conceived organization, capable of the kinds of missions demanded of it, not solely because of the training of the individuals, but partly because of the dynamics of the group. It is the A-detachment that makes Special Forces special. And in order to remain special, Special Forces must be trained to a fine edge, exercised in real-world foreign-internal-defense missions, funded to the level necessary to maintain that edge, and defended against attempts to make them just another conventional Army organization.

Simons does an outstanding job of explaining why men of diverse backgrounds are drawn to Special Forces. At the same time, she admits that any attempt to define an SF "type" is hopeless. It may be difficult to believe that such an understanding of team dynamics and of the bonding among men on an A-detachment could come from a woman with no personal military experience. Believe it, and read the book.

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Special Warfare

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