Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



Thinking Outside the Box

PB 80–97–1 Winter 1997 Vol. 10, No. 1

From the Commandant

In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Lieutenant Colonel Kalev Sepp examines the Army's efforts to plan for the Army After Next. He points out that those efforts demand that military planners, trained to work within established definitions and published doctrine, develop a perspective of war that is more comprehensive than our current view.

Certainly, doctrine is valuable as a basis for our training and operations. But in developing concepts for the future, we cannot rely completely on what is already established. Occasionally we need to step outside the realm of the familiar and do what Sepp and others have termed "thinking outside the box."

The ability to develop creative solutions to problems and to deal with ambiguous situations has always been a hallmark of SOF, and this ability will serve us well in the future. In fact, Sepp suggests that SOF is the type of force that part of the Army will need to be by 2010, and that the Army would do well to follow SOF's example in its organization, selection and training. Corporal Len Butler's report of SF activities in Bosnia serves as an indicator of the strengths that SOF and similar organizations could bring to future operations.

SOF must continue to be receptive to new ideas, and this issue of *Special Warfare* offers several new points of view. Among these is Dr. Robert Bunker's view of the terrorist as a post-Western form of soldier in terms of both his war-fighting orientation and his level of technical sophistication.

In the article following Bunker's, Tim Thomas discusses the Russian concept of information activities and explains several differences between the Russian concept and our concept of psychological operations. Thomas suggests that we can learn much from the Russian viewpoint.

Thinking outside the box includes learning new technologies and techniques and adapting them to our use. Charles Elliott details a procedure used during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti to assess the need for SOF in various regions of Haiti. This procedure combined new technology with the techniques of quantitative analysis. Major Jon Custer explains how technology is being used in the Warfighter exercise to create realistic scenarios that not only allow SOF to develop their skills but also afford conventional forces a unique opportunity to work with SOF.

To keep pace with the current environment, we must train for our assigned missions and be prepared to execute them on demand. To prepare for the future, we must anticipate demands yet unspecified. If we are to succeed, SOF and the entire defense establishment must encourage, develop and utilize the ability to think outside the box.

William P. Tangney

Major General William P. Tangney

PB 80–97–1

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

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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Dennis J. Reimer
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Chief of Staff

Official:
Joel B. Hudson
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

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Features

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Preparing for 2010: Thinking Outside the 'War Box'

by Lieutenant Colonel Kalev I. Sepp

There is already a great deal of debate over the issues that will shape the Army after the year 2010. This debate will help create the Army After Next; that is, the Army after Force XXI. Central to this debate is the need to define the nature of future war and of future warfare — the ways in which we will wage war. The definitions that evolve will be crucial in positioning the Army for war-fighting in 2010 and beyond.

In seeking these definitions, we must constantly admonish ourselves to see war differently than it is now perceived by the American military — in other words, we must "think outside the box." This charge is difficult to fulfill, because most national-security personnel are rightly dedicated to fulfilling their requirements strictly within the parameters of published doctrine.

But current doctrine is insufficient to answer the question, "What military force must be available to help secure our national interests in the future?" As we debate the issue of how reduced military capabilities might handle simultaneous regional conflicts, there are two main points of contention: the predicted threats (based on projections of the world political array) and the Army's organization and missions within a smaller and more thoroughly joint armed forces. One point not in contention is that the Army will be a component of the future security force that will serve as the tool of our future strategies.

This article is adapted from remarks presented by the author at a Yale-U.S. Military Academy strategy workshop and at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's "Army After Next" conference. Both events were held in November 1996. — Editor

Force components

From the continuing dialogue, an image of the Army component of these future security forces is now emerging — an Army with heavy, light and special elements. There are several possible major security competitors, or competitive coalitions, that may rise to challenge the United States in the next two decades, China and Russia chief among them. To defend against these opponents and to overmatch any potential enemies in non-nuclear general war, or simply put, conventional war, part of our Army must continue to perform as a heavy force — with tanks, armored artillery, mechanized infantry and attack aviation. This heavy force will be complemented by the Army's light force.

It is likely, however, that contests with our major competitors or coalitions will be played out through proxies in the Third World. These indirect confrontations will be reminiscent of the widespread unconventional struggles, or "wars of national liberation," that took place during the Cold War.

It is also reasonable to believe that the U.S. will actively seek to maintain the existing nation-state system against the contrary forces of regional Balkanizations, civil strife, criminal enterprises, rogue-state dictators, and resurgent ethnic and religious movements. Forecasts of widespread decline, such as the pop futurism of Robert Kaplan and Alvin and Heidi Toffler, must not distract our attention from the realities of geopolitics.

If we do seek to maintain the existing nation-state system, the use of military force may not always be appropriate, but the use of military *forces* may often be essential. This concept is recognized in the current (and controversial) doctrinal term "operations other than war." This term will probably soon become doctrinally obsolete, but the components of OOTW will be recognized as separate doctrinal entities. New groupings will be created and will include, as a minimum, "stability and support operations" — the title of the new Army Field Manual 100-20 — and perhaps "constabulary operations," similar to the British concept of "military assistance to civil authorities," or the Marines' "expeditionary warfare."

While OOTW include peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building, there are other associated peace-promotion activities such as disaster relief, counterdrug operations, demining, and nation assistance — the replacement term for the arguably more appropriate "nation-building."

Much closer to (and often slightly across) the threshold of violence are deterrence and conflict-resolution missions: shows of force, strikes, raids, counterterrorism, counterproliferation and, of course, counterinsurgency and support of insurgency. These last two are often assigned to the realm of unconventional war and special warfare.

Accepting this wide range of ambiguous missions will require us to have a fuller understanding of war than the concept now defined by the Army and, hence, depicted to government policy-makers. There are strong similarities between military operations other than war and the disappearing doctrinal term, "low-intensity conflict," or LIC. It can be argued that LIC was, in part, created during the Army's post-Vietnam reconstruction specifically to help the U.S. avoid another enervating

Photo by Perry Heimer

U.S. Marines on a weapons sweep during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Army PSYOP teams normally accompanied the Marines to help convince residents to surrender weapons.

Vietnam-style war. The so-called Weinberger doctrine drew a line across the spectrum of conflict, and LIC fell below the line, or "outside the box." In this arena of war — where success is relative and not absolute, where engagement is necessarily lengthy, and where the enemy's center of gravity is perhaps not a part of the enemy force at all — if the Army believed that it could not decisively win (in the classic sense of victory), then it would not commit itself.

Concept of war

War, as prescribed in the current FM 100-5, *Operations*, and as essentially understood by the Army, is still conflict between nation-states, fought with large-unit regular forces. LIC and, by extension, OOTW are some vague forms of "not-war." Steven Metz has called for a "conceptual expansion" of this range of conflict, which John Guilmartin foresees as the most likely venue of future U.S. engagements overseas. Lawrence Freedman differentiates between "wars of necessity," fought for national survival, and the all-others category of "wars of choice." Secretary of State George Schultz recognized the limited use of force to attain limited ends as "ambiguous warfare," while acknowledging that Americans are "uncomfortable" with such conflicts. Certainly, Karl von Clausewitz, in his comprehensive explication of conflict in *On War*, does not confine the concept to state-on-state contests, and Michael Howard's key defining word regarding war is "violence."

In the U.S. Army, there are "crossover" organizations, such as military police, intelligence, engineer, aviation, medical and logistics units, that handily adapt to OOTW. However, U.S. ambassadors and regional commanders in chief regard special-operations forces as their most valuable asset.

The thoroughly Clausewitzian USSOCOM Pub 1, *Special Operations in Peace and War*, includes the threat of violence and covert hostilities as types of war and acknowledges paramilitary and non-national, subnational, and transnational forces as combatants. The draft version of *Army Vision 2010* offers a striking and sophisticated projection of redefined Army missions to enable engagement in a spectrum of crises, unconstrained by any arbitrary line between peace and war. Less satisfactory are the inferences (there are no definitions) regarding war in *Joint Vision 2010*.

JV 2010 appears to present a paradox: The publication's "war box" encompasses only conventional high-intensity conflict, presumably to help the U.S. avoid engagement in what could be called unconventional war (a term never used in *JV 2010*). But *JV 2010* recognizes the possibility that military forces may be sent outside the box by our political leadership, and it deems conventional forces fully adequate to perform unconventional tasks as well. This seems to echo Earle Wheeler's 1962 "Design of Military Power," which promised the conventional Army and the nation success in Vietnam. As the corporate consciousness of the military's senior leadership places Vietnam into the perspective of a longer view of history, there will come — one must hope — a broader view of war.

Force of the future

Within the Army of today, units and organizations already exist that are closely tailored to the types of doctrinally marginalized military operations that we anticipate. In fact, some of these units are currently engaged in operations that are remarkably similar.

Inside U.S. embassies worldwide, defense attachés and officers of U.S. military groups, or MILGROUPs, work directly for their respective ambassadors. They integrate and coordinate military, diplomatic, economic and informational efforts to effect the strategies that are necessary in achieving U.S. policy objectives. The Army units most commonly employed by the embassies are special-operations forces: Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces.

Photo by Erick Saks

A soldier from the 3rd SF Group directs soldiers from Mali arriving in Liberia to begin a peacekeeping mission. SF are often the common element in multinational operations.

CA is the lead agency in most nonlethal situations. CA personnel bring their expertise from both our military and our national communities — in economics, government, health and sanitation, public works and safety, and civic planning. CA teams are masters of "stability operations," a soon-to-be resurrected and perfectly fitting concept. Appropriately, the majority of billets in active-duty CA units are filled by Special Forces personnel.

Some military commanders think of PSYOP as "loudspeakers and leaflets," but these are simply two of the tools of PSYOP dissemination. PSYOP teams aid in opinion-shaping, are proficient in marketing and media communications, and are keenly aware of host-nation public sentiment and perceptions. PSYOP involvement is necessary throughout an entire military campaign in order to effectively manage the beliefs and views of the target audience.

SF are considered particularly useful because of their combination of military, linguistic, cultural and technical skills. Equally as valuable is their detailed knowledge of the functions of the American embassies. It is our ambassadors who are most directly responsible for the promulgation and execution of U.S. foreign policy abroad when a state of declared war does not exist, as has been the norm since 1945. In multilateral operations, SF teams are the common element uniting the various military players — all of whom will certainly be present in future multinational interventions.

In the U.S. Army, there are "crossover" organizations, such as military police, intelligence, engineer, aviation, medical and logistics units, that handily adapt to OOTW. However, U.S. ambassadors and regional commanders in chief regard special-operations forces as their most valuable asset.

Indigenous armed forces will be critical in future scenarios. While unstable or destabilized countries such as Botswana and Colombia are dealing with "the guys with the Kalashnikovs" — narcotraffickers, pirates, bandits and insurgents — their militaries can be approached, guided, and remade into "engines of change" to nurture democracy and the idea of military subordination to civilian rule. Army SOF is the element most accomplished to fill this influential role.

More broadly, Army schools can have a powerful long-term impact. The School of the Americas is acknowledged as a key factor in the democratization of Latin America. The George C. Marshall Center in Bavaria is attempting to serve a similar role for the states of the former Soviet Union. Perhaps a U.S. Army school devoted to teaching military leadership could serve as a potent vaccine against the rabies of war on the continent of Africa.

RMA vs. AAN

The success that SOF have achieved in OOTW represents what the Army would like to become in the 21st century. The well-publicized Force XXI effort, tied to a perceived ongoing revolution in military affairs, is basically a wholesale digitalization of the Army. Its goal is to gain a common radio-wave battlefield awareness and to accrue those efficiencies possible from electronic standardization. Although this undertaking is an essential endeavor, it represents an enhancement and transition of the force, not a fundamental change.

Sometime around 2015 to 2025, the real revolutions will take hold. Combinations of beam weapons, power sources, robotics, and artificial intelligence will bring the amplified man, envisioned in Robert Heinlein's *Starship Troopers*, strikingly close to reality, and the Army's war box will have to extend into space. The Army intends for part of the Army After Next to become more like today's SF — smarter, older, more mature, more culturally aware, and more broadly educated — able to handle high technologies and diverse responsibilities, whether working alone or in small teams, or while deployed for long periods in either conventional war or OOTW.

A significant part of the Army's future light force may be structured in the fashion described above. Unfortunately, this arrangement could create "roles and missions" mayhem — perhaps a hyper-infantry forced to compete with Rangers and Special Forces, but lacking the full capabilities of either. The Marine Corps — a light force of note — is similarly preparing for the next century. Accordingly, it will have to be considered, and consulted, in devising the tools of future strategy.

What requires no prediction is the future central purpose of the U.S. Army: to fight and win our nation's wars, and to serve and defend our Constitution, as guided by our constitutional government. In this effort, over the past two centuries, the U.S. Army has freed more captive peoples, liberated more conquered lands, and ensured greater progress of democracy than any like institution in the planet's history.

In the 21st century, the Army's missions may be accomplished less by campaigns like the D-Day landing or Operation Desert Storm than by operations other than *conventional* war. Yet these OOTW missions will need to be as effective, as successful, and as just in their means and ends. Imagining the nature of war in the year 2010 must begin with an understanding of today's wars — an understanding that requires a willingness to think outside the war box.

Lieutenant Colonel Kalev I. Sepp teaches international and strategic history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He has served in the 82nd Airborne Division, 2nd Ranger Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 2nd Infantry Division. He also served as a brigade adviser in El Salvador. Sepp holds an M.M.A.S. from the Army Command and General Staff College, and an A.M. from Harvard University, where he is writing his Ph.D. dissertation on the U.S. campaign in Central America, 1979-91.

The Terrorist: Soldier of the Future?

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker

The terrorist bombing of the Centennial Olympic Park in downtown Atlanta on July 27, 1996, represents yet another incident in a pattern of terrorism taking place upon American citizens and upon the representatives and institutions of the government that serves them. "Atlanta" will now be added to our collective memories and mentioned in muted tones, along with a growing roll call that includes TWA Flight 800,[1] Dhahran, Oklahoma City, the World Trade Center, Lockerbie and Beirut.

In dealing with these heinous crimes, we focus an enormous effort on identifying the perpetrators — who they are and the groups to which they belong. Now that domestic terrorism has become a reality, right-wing militias and radical Islamic sects receive equal attention. The groups have strange sounding names: Hezbollah, Hamas, Viper and Freemen. They represent extremists of one kind or another, with little stake in or love for American society.

While United States governmental

This article examines the nature of terrorists and terrorist groups and predicts the implications of future terrorists emerging as "criminal soldiers." Opinions expressed are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. — Editor

DoD photo

U.S. and Saudi military personnel survey the damage to the Khobar Towers near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The facility was damaged by a terrorist bombing in June 1996.

authorities attempt to identify *who* these people are, another equally important concern, *what* they are, is too often ignored. It is imperative that the U.S. special-operations community not make this oversight.

Given the altered nature of the post-Cold War security environment, asking the question "What is a terrorist?" should become fundamental in our attempts to better understand the future. The answer to that question will give the SOF community insights that can lead to a critical re-evaluation of its perceptions of terrorists and of war-fighting in general.

Our current legal interpretations define a terrorist as a criminal. This must be a correct assumption, because such a person violates our conventions concerning the conduct of modern warfare. A terrorist is not viewed as a traditional soldier because he is not a representative of a nation-state's military forces. A terrorist does not wear the distinctive uniform of a soldier, and he views all targets, including women and children, as legitimate. But the characterization of a terrorist as both a criminal and a coward, echoed repeatedly by our political and military leadership, may be only partially true.

Advanced form of soldier

Like the Roman god Janus, a terrorist also bears a second image: the image of an advanced form of soldier. This is a soldier who is not only non-Western, he is also potentially post-Western in his war-fighting orientation and in his level of technical sophistication. For many, this perception may be both surprising and sobering. It reflects the brutal realities of today's changing world — a world where narcocartels have gained the capacity to wage war against legitimate governments, where intrastate warfare has spread as nation-states continue to implode over many regions of the globe, and where competing tribal and cultural groups select ethnic cleansing as their preferred method of settling disputes.

We may be able to accurately assess the technical sophistication of a terrorist by examining the following advanced war-fighting components that help to define his capabilities:

• *Organic stealth*. Because a terrorist eschews the traditional symbols of a soldier and does not operate within the boundaries of the Western-defined battlefield, he is almost invisible to detection. And with his ability to blend into the civilian populace of an urban environment, the terrorist is a highly survivable military asset, because what cannot be seen cannot be killed. The war-fighting advantage that is gained by the terrorist is no different from one achieved by a high-technology stealth fighter or bomber, but it is purchased at a fraction of the cost.

• *Precision engagement*. While we in the

High-technology munitions, such as this Tomahawk cruise missile, provide precision forms of attack. Terrorists' precision weapons are purchased at a fraction of the cost.

DoD photo

Photo by Gordon Peterson

A section of the fuselage from TWA Flight 800 is transferred from a Navy recovery ship. The plane's explosion has generated terror of strategic significance.

West use high-technology precision-guided munitions, such as laser-guided bombs and Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, to destroy our targets, terrorists have their own forms of precision weaponry. A truckload of explosives detonated in front of a building, inside a building, or in a parking garage must be considered a precision form of attack. Using a radio-controlled bomb in a culvert over which a head-of-state's motorcade is traveling, or smuggling plastic explosives inside the luggage of an unsuspecting airline passenger represent two other methods of precision engagement. The fact that terrorist capabilities can be purchased cheaply does not mean that they are inferior to Western methods of launching precision strikes.

• *Information warfare.* Terrorists are extremely effective in conducting information warfare. Their violent activities are routinely far less significant than the threat of further violence that the acts themselves create. Within the greater context of American society, the loss of TWA Flight 800 to a possible act of terrorism, while a monumental tragedy to the friends and families of the citizens aboard, is irrelevant to our society's continued functioning. However, because such an act introduces the specter of further violence occurring anywhere and anytime, "terror" is generated in the minds of our citizens far out of proportion to the terror caused by the initial terrorist act. Thus, an event that should be no more significant than a tactical-level operation is elevated into an event of strategic significance.

• *Environmental and resource conservation*. Because terrorists engage in tactical operations that assume strategic-level importance, terrorists are able to accomplish more with lower expenditures of violence than traditional nation-states can. Mass industrial armies waste huge amounts of human and materiel resources in the conduct of war, and in the process they severely degrade the environments within which they operate. Terrorist groups are far more sophisticated in their war-making approach. Rather than destroying peoples, governments, armies and the environment around them, the terrorists use precision in attacking the ideological and sociological bonds that hold a society together.

• *Internetted command and control.* Unlike conventional organizations, terror-

ist groups organize themselves into small cells. For the purposes of command and control, these cells interact in a web-like fashion. The internetted structure offers terrorist groups distinct advantages over conventional organizations that have more traditional hierarchical structures. First, terrorist groups tend to be highly entrepreneurial in nature, which allows them to quickly adapt to changing "battlefield conditions," unlike the more rigid organizations they are opposing.

Second, terrorist groups are immune to a decapitation attack, since no traditional hierarchical leadership is needed to coordinate their actions. Third, the destruction of a single terrorist cell will have little effect upon the rest of the network. Finally, because we do not fully understand the decision-making process of the network, we may fail to recognize the terrorist network in the traditional sense. As a result, acts of terrorism may go unnoticed. In reality, the current rash of church burnings in the South may be the work of terrorists. Although no conspiracy has been found, the unrelated node that each burning represents may ultimately be recognized as part of a more insidious scenario.

The war-making monopoly that is unique to nation-states is, for now, the underlying reason they are considered the dominant form of modern political community. But should that monopoly be shattered, nation-states would eventually cease to exist, in the same manner as did their medieval and classical predecessors.

War-fighting implications

The emergence of a criminal soldier, one who is more advanced in technology and who possesses more war-fighting capacity than the traditional soldier fielded by nation-states, is cause for immense concern. The war-making monopoly that is unique to nation-states is, for now, the underlying reason they are considered the dominant form of modern political community. But should that monopoly be shattered, nation-states would eventually cease to exist, in the same manner as did their medieval and classical predecessors.

Besides its impact on the nation-state, the emergence of a criminal soldier would alter our perceptions of war and of terrorism. First, we would have to rethink our basic definitions of terrorism. The presence of an advanced form of soldier, incompatible with the institutions and the ethical system of modern Western civilization, would mean that war as we understand it is changing. Naturally, our perceptions of terrorist attacks upon our nation would also have to shift. No longer would terrorist attacks be viewed as unrelated criminal incidents; rather, they might be perceived as the opening battles in a global struggle over humanity's future social and political organization. This would be a struggle not to determine a victorious nation-state or coalition, but to determine the social and political structure that would succeed the nation-state.

Second, we would have to re-examine our perceptions concerning state-sponsored terrorism. Viewed from our new perspective, terrorist organizations would likely represent an advanced form of mercenary group, one not representative of the minor groups that have existed during the last few centuries of history. The new terrorist groups would have parallels to those mercenary companies that dominated warfare during the early modern European era.

The less-technical explosive devices and the small arms employed by early terrorist groups are now giving way to advanced munitions, precision-guided missiles and computer viruses. The 1995 Sarin nerve-gas attack in the Tokyo subway, while it was not undertaken by a state-sponsored group, has shown that given sufficient funding, many of these groups may soon be capable of fielding weapons of mass destruction.

Third, we can expect the distinction between crime and war to become blurred as an outcome of the development of this new form of soldier. State-sponsored terrorism in the late 1960s initially broke

down this barrier. Since that time, the distinction has been further eroded by non-national groups (such as narcocartels, religious sects, and ethnic clans) that engage in private wars against nation-states. In some failed nation-states, it is already impossible to distinguish between the criminal activities and the war-making activities of local warlords and regional groups.

Conclusion

The emergence of the terrorist as a criminal soldier is likely to have profound effects upon future American society and government. Some of those effects are apparent today, now that the war over future social organization, already being waged across much of the globe, is beginning to take place on American soil. Direct social costs can be measured by our citizens who have been killed or maimed, our burned-out federal buildings, our loss of productivity resulting from communication and transportation disruptions, and our resource expenditures for counterterrorism, such as the $227 million to protect the Olympic Games in Atlanta.

Indirect social costs will be difficult to calculate, but in the long term they may be more debilitating. They represent the erosion of immaterial goods such as the stability of our social institutions, the trust between our government and its citizens, and the basic psychological health of our people. Further, new debates can be expected to arise over the rights of citizens vs. the need for new security measures. While such measures will better protect our people, they are bound to infringe upon the very rights that we so cherish.

By necessity, the role of special-operations forces in combating terrorism will increase. Because terrorists represent an advanced form of soldier, our conventional forces will be ineffective against them. Only by fielding our own advanced form of soldier, supported by an array of emerging technologies, will our nation have the capability to defeat this enemy.

In the future, we should not be surprised if the U.S. Special Operations Command is increasingly called upon to respond to incidents of domestic terrorism, to shield our foreign bases from terrorist attack, and to engage in the war against drug cartels. During times of uncertainty, such as those we now face, we will increasingly place the burden of our country's defense upon our elite troops. We will have no choice, for in the battle to determine the future social and political structure of humanity, second best is unthinkable. ✂

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is an adjunct professor in the National Security Studies Program at California State University - San Bernardino; and a professor in unconventional warfare at American Military University, Manassas Park, Va. His research focuses on the national-security implications of emerging forms of warfare, and on the influence of technology upon warfare and political organization. Bunker's writings have appeared in Parameters, Military Review, Airpower Journal, The Marine Corps Gazette, Military Intelligence *and* Armed Forces Journal International.

Notes:

[1] Even if the destruction of TWA Flight 800 was due to mechanical failure, the psychic damage has already been done.

Russian Information-Psychological Actions: Implications for U.S. PSYOP

by Timothy L. Thomas

It is July 18, 1999, and a battle is raging somewhere on Russia's southern border. During a lull in the fighting, Russian loudspeakers emit provocative messages (produced through voice-synthesis processors) designed to influence or "hypnotize" enemy forces. Holograms, designed to induce fear or uncertainty, display messages and images embellished with cultural and religious connotations. One special hologram, depicting specific combinations of colors and numbers, reportedly causes some bodily functions to shut down. Titanium robots move about the battlefield, shooting leaflets with instructions to the enemy on how to surrender. As the fighting resumes, multiple-rocket launchers and artillery rocket attacks pose yet another type of psychological war — one based on the shock effect of tons of explosive ordnance.

Meanwhile, at the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Moscow, Russian specialists in information-psychological activities coordinate operations and project their impact on the war effort. Years before the current conflict, computer-stealth viruses had been implanted into military sales systems located at enemy command-and-control units. As part of their present plan, the Russian specialists activate these viruses; they conduct "reflexive control" and information-warfare operations against enemy decision-makers; and they transmit morphed images over the aggressor's television networks to manipulate the enemy's perceptions.

These specialists also consult with doctors to ascertain the extent of psychoses that might be imposed upon enemy forces and the number of depression-induced injuries that might occur. After gathering this information, the specialists plan additional information-psychological strikes. As the battle abates on the giant computer-activated TV screens, the loudspeakers once again begin broadcasting soothing messages.

This future-war scenario combines a number of Russian theories about 21st-century information operations and offers suggestions as to how these operations might be coupled with psychological operations, or PSYOP. For the short term, at least, these Russian theories may be only wishful thinking — the recent conflict in Chechnya, during which Russian forces struggled to maintain parity with Chechen rebels, indicates that Russian armed forces have significant problems with which they must contend before they can focus on information-psychological activities.

However, Russia, like other countries, is seriously studying the impact of the information age on its military forces. Russian military planners understand that in the information age, everyone is vulnerable to some degree. Developments in information technology will enable some technologically deficient countries to quickly catch up to those with more technologically advanced information networks.

Russian military theorists have always been particularly sensitive to the enemy's ability to control, through either propaganda or the manipulation of information, the psyche of Russian soldiers. They consider the concept of "moral-psychological" preparation of the soldier to be a Russian principle of war.

In the past, political commissars were charged with maintaining the

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This article discusses the Russian concept of information activities and the increasing importance of information operations. Views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. — Editor

ideological, moral and psychological stability of the soldier. But Russian society is now in a transition period, and Russian sociologists consider the populace and the armed forces to be psychologically unstable and extremely vulnerable to foreign-based and foreign-run information operations. The requirement to counteract the information-psychological capability of the enemy has become even more important. As one Russian author has noted:

Countering information expansionism and protecting the national interests of Russia are to a certain extent synonymous. … More likely now is a situation in which "quiet" aggression may be unleashed … several weeks, months or even years before the beginning of full-scale military operations. In reality there is no war or armed conflict, but in fact aggression has already been unleashed. … Therefore, if measures to counteract information-psychological aggression are not developed and mastered in a practical manner ahead of time, the consequences for the country could turn out to be extremely serious.[1]

When Russia admits that one of its principles of war is vulnerable to the developing field of information operations, the whole world should take notice — there may be lessons for all of us to learn.

General definitions

In the former Soviet Union, the Communist Party used propaganda as a means of controlling society and the armed forces. The transition from communism to democracy has left an absence of ideology, but it has created an emphasis on a new concept: the information security of society. To adapt to this new concept, the Russians have instituted several changes: First, the information-psychological struggle has replaced the propaganda-agitation struggle of Marxism-Leninism.[2]

Second, some theorists now consider psychological operations to be an independent form of military activity that requires specialized personnel and training. Third, as a consequence, the Russian armed forces may be developing a special military occupational specialty devoted to psychological confrontation. Fourth, some Russian officers have come to view the information-psychological struggle as an integral part of information warfare. These changes will also have an impact on the future of U.S. PSYOP.[3]

During the Cold War, it was extremely difficult to obtain information on the Soviet/Russian conduct of PSYOP. For years, the Russians held all of their archives, force structure and operating procedures under tight secrecy. Only through the recent declassification of several Russian journals has more information become available.

Since about 1992, the Russians no longer consider information regarding the existence and the training of their PSYOP units to be classified. Still, acquiring knowledge about these units and their actions remains difficult. Some sources believe that the military's main intelligence directorate controls these organizations, which may explain the scarcity of information.

The Russian military does not use the term "psychological operations." In Soviet times, these operations were called "special propaganda." Russian military authors

Russian military theorists have always been sensitive to enemy control of the psyche of Russian soldiers. They consider "moral-psychological" preparation of the soldier to be a Russian principle of war.

use the term "information-psychological actions" to refer to what Westerners call PSYOP-related activities. Therefore, the term "information-psychological actions" and the more familiar U.S. term "PSYOP" are used interchangeably throughout this article.

Information operations

The Russian concept of information-psychological actions usually includes leaflets, loudspeakers and radio/TV transmissions. On occasion, the Russians use TV and radio transmissions to override the signal of an enemy system. An official Russian government signal is then used to transmit either overt or covert information to fool or mislead enemy forces.

Some nontraditional uses of information-psychological actions have also worked quite well. For example, the shock and the psychological terror produced by artillery and air attacks have long been considered by some leadership elements to be a psychological action. When Russian tanks attacked the Russian parliament building in October 1993, the primary purpose of the attack was to inflict shock or a psychological effect on the occupants of the building.[4] When in January 1996, in the town of Pervomaiskaya, Russians attacked Chechen rebels with massive artillery and multiple-rocket launcher strikes, the Russian commander described the action as a form of psychological warfare.

DoD photo

Some Russians believe that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative was a reflexive-control measure designed to compel the Soviet Union to spend vast sums of money on its own missile-defense system.

Reflexive control

Another nontraditional information-psychological action is the Russian concept of reflexive control, a "branch of the theory of control related to influencing the decisions of others. In a military context, it can be viewed as a means for providing a military commander with the ability to indirectly maintain control over his opponent commander's decision process."[5] Reflexive control is the process of manipulating information so that one's enemy will be compelled to take actions favorable to one's own side.

Reflexive control is somewhat foreign to a U.S. audience. Russians employ it not only on the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare, but also on the strategic level, associated with internal and external politics of the country. Of course, reflexive control has not always been used exclusively to Russia's benefit. Some Russians perceive the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, as a political maneuver designed to compel the Soviets to respond according to a plan favorable to the U.S. In its efforts to keep pace with America's achievements in the SDI

The Basic Content of Russian Information-Psychological Warfare

Analyzing the moral-psychological environment in Russia, in strategic areas, on the operational axes and in the areas where operations are taking place.
Seeking, collecting, analyzing and summarizing information about the capabilities of potential participants in conflict.
Forecasting the probable nature of and possible impact of enemy PSYOP on the Russian forces and population.
Halting (or mitigating the effects of) enemy PSYOP on the strategic level, using all branches of service, branches of arms and special forces.
Carrying out measures to counteract the constant and large-scale ideological and info-psychological influence on the Russian forces and the Russian population.
Neutralizing the negative consequences of the enemy's influence on the consciousness, the morale and the mental state of service personnel.
Constantly shielding the troops and the populace from info-psychological influences.
Preparing the forces and the means to conduct info-psychological warfare.
Carrying out info-psychological and special operations to lower the morale and the psychological state of the enemy's forces and population, and to demoralize and disinform them.
Exerting constant info-psychological influence on the enemy's personnel and population.
Conducting psycho-energetic warfare and other types of nontraditional influence on the consciousness and the mental state of the enemy.
Developing the methodology and the theory of info-psychological warfare, and developing recommendations and proposals for government agencies and for military leadership.

arena (or at least what we said were our achievements), the Soviet Union exhausted itself economically. Some Russians now question whether the concept of information warfare is simply another U.S. attempt to reflexively control them and to persuade them to invest vast sums of money in a subject area supposedly beyond both U.S. and Russian technological reach in the near future.

The Russian armed forces, at the tactical and operational levels, have long studied the reflexive-control concept for its value both in controlling enemy decision-making processes and in developing techniques for *maskirovka* (deception and disinformation).[6] In the early 1900s, there was actually a Russian military *maskirovka* school that became the base of *maskirovka* thinking from which manuals for future generations were created. The school was disbanded in 1929.

A recent flurry of articles on reflexive control has appeared in Russian military writings, indicating that the *maskirovka* theory is alive and that it is undergoing renovation to adjust to current conditions, including the intricacies of the computer age.

Major General M. Ionov (retired) wrote an article in *Morskoy Sbornik* (1995) that focused on reflexive control.[7] He offered several principles for "control of the enemy." First, the initiator must anticipate the enemy's response to the conditions he plans to impose. Second, the initiator should anticipate that the enemy may uncover the activity and institute his own countercontrol measures. Third, the initiator should be aware of the technical level of the enemy's combat assets, especially reconnaissance (the higher the level of technology, the more likely it is that the disinformation actions will be exposed). Fourth, the initiator should consider the effect of using harsh forms of pressure

against the enemy, taking into account social elements and intellectual, psychological, ethical and ideological factors.[8]

Psychological support

Many Russian sociologists believe that the Russian armed forces (in part because of their lack of moral-psychological training) are now vulnerable to an information-psychological attack. In the past, propaganda departments in the school system and in the armed forces had fulfilled the moral-psychological training role. But in the absence of political organs and the Communist Party apparatus, ideology no longer dominates or guides psychology, sociology, psychiatry and the other sciences. No independent moral-psychological support apparatus exists to fill the gap.

Moral-psychological support can be defined as a goal-oriented influence on the minds and the psyches of Russian military personnel. Commanding officers, staffs and indoctrination bodies are responsible for reinforcing psychological stability among personnel and for forming their moral readiness so that they will be able to perform effectively under any conditions. Field commanders must direct special effort toward keeping the correlation of moral-psychological forces in balance.

According to one Russian analyst, the events of the 1990s have caused a "cardinal change in the military-political situation in the world, and also in the political, social-economic, and moral-psychological situation inside countries. The modern tendency in the development of forces, means, and capabilities of armed combat ... has sharply grown in connection with these roles, as has the significance of the laws of the course and the outcome of war and their dependence on the correlation of the moral-psychological forces of the opposing sides. Therefore, there is a real need to form an understanding of the moral-psychological support activity of the armed forces."[9]

Many Russian sociologists believe that the Russian armed forces ... are now vulnerable to an information-psychological attack. In the past, propaganda departments in the school system and in the armed forces had fulfilled the moral-psychological training role. But in the absence of political organs and the Communist Party apparatus, ... no independent moral-psychological support apparatus exists to fill the gap.

Information-psychological security is "the use of information to guarantee the functional reliability of the psyche and consciousness of a person in peacetime or wartime."[10] Information-psychological security includes measures to combat enemy actions that would have a negative effect upon the correlation of moral-psychological forces, and measures to curtail or reverse any information-psychological impact upon population groups or Russian society in general. Information-psychological security should also counteract any negative effects of information operations upon the moral-psychological preparation of the soldier.

A system of information-psychological security is important because:

In the past half century the potential for working on the consciousness, psyche, or morale of a person, society, or the composition of an armed force has grown dramatically. One of the main reasons is the considerable success achieved by many countries in their systematic research in the areas of psychology, psychotronics, parapsychology, other new psychophysical phenomenon, bioenergy, biology, bio fields, and psychoenergy in the fields of security and defense.[11]

A Russian perspective on information-psychological security tasks for friendly troops, as well as the basic content of information-psychological warfare tasks against enemy troops, is shown in the chart on page 15.[12]

Psychological attacks

Some Russian military theorists believe that contemporary developments in military affairs, especially the U.S. emphasis on information-warfare techniques, indicate that the information-psychological confrontation has become an independent type of military activity,[13] much like the defense or the offense. As a result, in any armed conflict, the use of military force will be preceded by measures designed to act on the consciousness, morale and psyche of people.[14] This makes superiority in the information-psychological confrontation necessary for success.

There is a close link between information warfare and the information-psychological confrontation. One Russian officer noted:

The main objective of information war is to capture the consciousness of the population of the Russian Federation, to undermine the moral-fighting potential of the



Photo by Joel M. Torres

U.S. PSYOP persuaded large numbers of Iraqi soldiers to surrender during the Gulf War. Russian theorists consider information-psychological activities to be an independent type of military activity.

armed forces; i.e., to set the stage for political, economic, and military penetration. With this goal in mind, both secret information and psychological operations (actions) are being prepared and continuously conducted, not just by designated state structures of traditional enemies of Russia, but also by its allies and friendly countries.[15]

The same officer also blamed most of the current ills of Russian society, including an increase in psychological illness, on the information-warfare activities of states hostile to Russia. He concluded that in crisis situations, such activities would cause more mental or trauma casualties than in any preceding war.[16] As a result, the armed forces must address the information-psychological challenge by creating systems to counteract any information-psychological operation directed against Russia.[17]

Another Russian officer noted that information-psychological operations should be considered a combat weapon. He believes that the failure to counteract or to respond to these operations, which he calls "propaganda," can hasten one's defeat, as in the case of the Iraqi army in the Persian Gulf War. This officer's study of U.S. operations, written in 1994, came to the following conclusions:

- It is essential to ensure the comprehensive theoretical elaboration of the problem of propaganda and psychological support in peacetime, in periods of aggravated military political confrontation, and in wartime.
- It is expedient to unite the bodies involved in providing propaganda and psychological support for the armed forces of Russia with a common goal and a single command-and-control structure.
- Commanders at all levels must become proficient in the use of psychological-support organizations, and there should be a training course on the subject in the military curriculum.
- Technical-support equipment must be continuously updated.[18]

A new MOS?

One of the more interesting suggestions by a Russian officer is that it would be wise to form a special military occupational specialty within the Russian military to train specialists in the art of coun-

teracting and containing information. Special financing would be required because of the unique nature of the training.

This suggestion reaffirms Russia's desire to put in place, during peacetime, specialists who can detect information operations oriented against either Russian society or the armed forces, or who can initiate offensive operations on their own. Such operations could range from subtle, provocative voice-synthesis operations designed to "hypnotize" victims, to virus attacks on computers. Not instituting such countermeasures could be dangerous:

As specialists note, it's worse to fall behind here [the information-psychological confrontation] *than to fall behind in cybernetics. Nonresolution of the problems of the information-psychological confrontation makes the consolidation of society and the stabilization of the situation in the state impossible, even though they are fundamental to the rebirth of Russia.*[19]

Conclusions

Russia is extremely interested in the development and the implementation of information operations by powerful nations around the world. Information operations have serious implications for Russia in both a technical and a moral-psychological sense. Because of the current psychological instability that permeates Russia, the Russians view information operations with alarm, suspicion and mistrust. The Russians have identified the information security of the individual, of the society and of the state as a priority of national interest.

The Russian military is particularly interested in the impact of information operations on the moral-psychological character of its soldiers because this is a Russian principle of war. We should expect the Russian military to be vigilant in its attempts to exploit information operations against the soldiers of other countries.

Discussion of the PSYOP concept and related issues is on the rise. A March 1994 Russian TV program noted that although every military unit has a psychologist, the problem of creating a psychological service has not been solved.[20] A March 29, 1996, report indicated that a decision had been made to recreate the unified military news system, since the first job is to win the "news war." Most likely because of media problems during the Chechnya conflict, some military specialists believe that various mass-media elements are waging war against the Army.[21]

Finally, a May 23, 1996, report in the Russian newspaper *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* speculated that the Russian military might return to "propaganda" units as a means of controlling information. Reportedly, coded cables were sent to each military district, and commanders were asked to offer their opinions on subordinating each district press center to the Main Directorate of Educational Work. The report suggested that such a subordination would eventually lead to the educational directorate's control of the press centers, the military press and special propaganda divisions. In other words, "all those services that, prior to 1991, together with the political agencies, constituted the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy."[22]

The above discussion contains several suggestions for U.S. planners. First, it is clear that the U.S., at the joint-staff or strategic level, must not lose sight of developments in the PSYOP arena. Not only is Russia exploring potential means of using PSYOP as a weapon, but so are some of America's enemies, and they may not be bound by the same rules of employment of PSYOP weaponry as the U.S.

Second, U.S. planners must recognize the increasing synchronization of PSYOP and information operations — the two may become inseparable in the near future because of the ability of both to influence the psyches of decision-makers and soldiers alike. The PSYOP/information-actions interface may indeed become, as many Russians believe it will, an independent type of military activity worthy of closer study and more creative utilization.

Timothy L. Thomas is an analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Prior to retiring from the Army as a lieutenant colonel, Thomas served in the 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, from 1979 to 1982. From 1987 to 1990, he served as the director of Soviet studies at the former U.S. Army Russian Institute at Garmisch, Germany. Thomas has written another PSYOP-related article, "Manipulation and the Age of the New Persuaders," scheduled for publication in an upcoming issue of Military Review.

Notes:

[1] E.G. Korotchenko, "Informatsionno-psikhologicheskoye protivoborstvo v sovremennykh usloviyakh" [Information-psychological confrontation under modern conditions], *Voennoye Mysl* [Military Thought], January/February 1996, 22-28.

[2] Evidence is mounting that the term "information-psychological" is replacing the term "propaganda." For example, in the article "Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye" [The Bloodless and Noiseless Means], 27 January 1996, 2, author Nikolai Plotnikov

discusses "indirect propaganda (information-psychological) actions"; and Andrei Mikailov's article "Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye" [The Word — Also a Weapon] 13 January 1996, 2, carries the subheading "Information-psychological support of military actions by Russian forces in Chechnya." The journal *Orientir*, which appears to be devoted to many PSYOP-type articles, very seldom uses the word "propaganda," replacing it with the more popular "information-psychological."

[3] For the U.S. armed forces, PSYOP involves changing attitudes or manipulating someone's thoughts, emotions, impressions or beliefs through intimidation, blackmail, disinformation or rumor. PSYOP finds particular utility at the operational and tactical levels of military activities. PSYOP techniques are universal, yet cheap, if put into the hands of skilled and competent operators.

[4] Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Random House, 1994), 278.

[5] Clifford Reid, "Reflexive Control in Soviet Military Planning," in *Soviet Strategic Deception*, edited by Brian Daily and Patrick Parker (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books), 294.

[6] Disinformation is a Russian technique for manipulating perceptions and information, and for misinforming people or groups. Some disinformation procedures are obvious, some are unconvincing, and some work through delayed perceptions, rumors, repetition or arguments. Specific persons or particular social groups can serve as disinformation targets. The purpose of a disinformation campaign is to influence the consciousness and mind of man. In Russia today, where there is an unstable public-political and socio-economic situation, the entire population could serve as the target of influence for an enemy campaign.

[7] M. Ionov, "Control of the Enemy," *Morskoy Sbornik* No. 7, July 1995, 29-31, as reported in FBIS-UMA-95-172-S, 6 September 1995, 24-27.

[8] *Ibid*., 25.

[9] Aleksander Cherkasov, "Formirovat' gotovnost' k boyu" [Forming Military Readiness] *Orientir*, June 1995, p. 15. Translation by Robert Love, Foreign Military Studies Office.

[10] *Ibid*., 47.

[11] *Ibid*., 45.

[12] *Ibid*., 25.

[13] Aleksander Cherkasov, "The Front Where Shots Aren't Fired," *Orientir*, April 1995, 48.

[14] *Ibid*., 52.

[15] Korotchenko, 23.

[16] *Ibid*., 24.

[17] *Ibid*., 27.

[18] N.D. Plotnikov, "Psychological Operations: Objectives, Tasks, Content," *Military Thought*, April 1994, 69.

[19] Korotchenko, 27.

[20] Moscow TV and Dubl Networks, 27 March 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-061, 30 March 1994, 28.

[21] "News War at Defense Ministry," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 29 March 1996, 3, as reported in FBIS-SOV-96-062, 29 March 1996, 33.

[22] Aleksandr Khinshteyn, "Commissars in Dusty Helmets ... The Political Agencies Are Coming Back," *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 23 May 1996, 1, as reported in FBIS-SOV-96-101, 23 May 1996, 24, 25.

Special Forces and Warfighter: Preparing for BCTP

by Major Jon M. Custer



You are a member of a Special Forces A-detachment deployed to a tropical paradise. Your 90-day mission of teaching skill-level-one tasks in the local language has been extended twice. The forward operational base, or FOB, notifies you that your unit has been selected to participate in an upcoming rotation of the Battle Command Training Program, or BCTP. You immediately begin thinking of ways to avoid participating, but you soon realize that, barring the development of a major regional conflict in your theater of operations, you must prepare for this mission.

BCTP exercises are important to the Special Forces community because they offer SF soldiers a unique training opportunity. The BCTP provides both a corps and a division headquarters, plus $2 million worth of computer simulation as training aids, to the FOB and the special-operations command-and-control element, or SOCCE. SF soldiers who have an understanding of the BCTP operational environment prior to attending the program can enhance the effectiveness and the value of their training. This article addresses a number of topics to help prepare soldiers for a successful BCTP mission.

What is BCTP? Also known as Warfighter, the BCTP is a computer-driven division and corps staff exercise. It is normally accompanied by a corps element, which may also be one of the players. The goals of the BCTP are to improve

advanced collective training at the division level and above; to integrate doctrine, command and control, and leadership; and to become the Army's focal point for large-unit collective training. The computer simulation used is called the Corps Battle Simulation, or CBS.

In order to challenge participants in the planning and decision-making phases, the CBS portrays unit movements and combat actions. The system contains seven terrain databases: Korea, Central America, the Caribbean Basin, Central Europe, Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and the central United States. The division enters the battle in progress and conducts a four-day operation against the world-class opposing force, or WCO.

The composition of the WCO varies between scenarios to provide a specific force ratio with the division and its attachments. Typically, the WCO resembles a Warsaw Pact force on steroids. Human players position and maneuver both enemy and friendly units. When the forces initiate contact, the computer rolls digital dice and provides battle outcomes and losses to work cells inside the battle-simulation center, or BSC.

Exercise controllers in the BSC (soldiers provided by the player units and trained by the BCTP staff) translate the computer's information into reports (formatted in accordance with the unit SOP) and forward the reports to the player headquarters. This process makes it appear that the reports were submitted by subordinate units. The work cells within the BSC also make subordinate-unit decisions. For example, if a computer-simulated A-detachment initiates enemy contact, the human controller decides how the detachment should react: Should it fight? Should it evade? Should it continue the mission? All of these options can be simulated by the computer.

Background

In 1989, General Carl Vouno, at that time the Army chief of staff, directed that Special Forces would participate in Warfighter. This led to SOCCEs occasionally playing in corps BCTP rotations. After Operation Desert Storm, it became apparent that SF were inextricably linked to conventional operations, and SF BCTP participation increased. The Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC, recently mandated that in addition to the participation of SOCCEs, FOBs must also participate in all Warfighter exercises. The FOB commanders, however, are given some latitude as to the size of their staffs. SF participation in the BCTP has evolved from the occasional participation of a SOCCE in special-reconnaissance, or SR, to SOCCEs engaged in coalition warfare at the corps level. In addition, there are as many as 10 FOBs a year working at the level of the joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF. The process of integrating SOF into division and corps operations is accomplished primarily through the BCTP.

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Preparation

Upon being notified of an upcoming BCTP rotation, FOB and SOCCE commanders should become familiar with the appropriate portions of FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*; FM 100-5, *Operations*; and the requirements of USASFC Regulation 350-1, Annex K. The Army SF Command normally grants units permission to conduct direct coordination with the corps special-operations coordination element, or SOCOORD, and with the BCTP SF representative. Once the coordination has been approved, it should be accomplished as soon as possible.

For SF units, BCTP preparation begins at the Startex conference, which is held six months out for active-component units and

12 months out for reserve-component units. During the conference, the all-important details in the Startex agreement are agreed upon and the agreement is signed by the participants. The agreement establishes the structures, capabilities and missions of friendly and enemy forces; and the geographic area, or play box, of the exercise. Representatives of all major player elements and selected sections of the BCTP attend the Startex conference. The representatives from the FOB or SF group, assisted by the corps SOCOORD and the SOF adviser from the BCTP, integrate SF's training objectives with those of the division. Through this process, the concept for SF operations is established and the joint-command structure for the exercise is determined.

SF operations

All SF missions, from direct action to unconventional warfare, can be portrayed in the BCTP. (Lieutenant Colonel Ed Phillips' article, "SF Direct Action and Targeting," in the April 1995 issue of *Special Warfare* explains the use of direct-action missions in the BCTP and the integration of the FOB into the simulation.) The coalition-warfare subset of foreign internal defense, or FID, in the BCTP simulation is highly effective — it brings additional combat power to the division and provides realistic solutions to any potential problems involving rear-area security and reconnaissance in the corps and division deep-battle areas.

If SR missions are portrayed, they should be realistic: There should be an SF-unique requirement for each one. ... Assigning an SF detachment to perform tactical reconnaissance in the division deep battle not only wastes a valuable asset, it also teaches the wrong lesson to conventional commanders and staffs.

If SR missions are portrayed, they should be realistic: There should be an SF-unique requirement for each one, and that requirement should be validated by the JSOTF role player. Assigning an SF detachment to perform tactical reconnaissance in the division deep battle not only wastes a valuable asset, it also teaches the wrong lesson to conventional commanders and staffs. Appropriate SF reconnaissance missions employ a special-operations team-alpha, or SOT-A; or indigenous forces in FID or unconventional-warfare missions at a strategic depth, requiring SOF infil and exfil platforms.

Normally, the number of SF A-detachments in the competitive zone is limited to 10; there can be as many as three SOT-As. In a coalition-warfare scenario, however, as many as two battalions have been played with liaison-coordination elements, or LCEs. The level of SF participation in each exercise is subject to negotiation — the correlation of blue and red forces is carefully managed to produce a challenging situation for player staffs.

Joint SOF command structure

Although the joint command structure of the exercise has little direct impact on the simulation, the FOB should consider that structure when developing its plans. The exercise simulates a division (under a corps) working for a joint task force or a theater army. It is important to determine a feasible SOF command architecture — one that SF soldiers can use as a model to teach the conventional players about the tasking and command of SOF. The theater special-operations command to which the player SF unit would be assigned in wartime should provide input, if not personnel, to each exercise.

Special Forces fight on a joint battlefield, and they depend on joint assets for infil, exfil and fire support. These joint assets must be allocated and integrated into the FOB plans. There are two logical alternatives for accomplishing this:

- Designate the theater special-operations command as a JSOTF, with the SF group as a subordinate Army special-operations task force, or ARSOTF.
- Designate the SF group as the



JSOTF, with attached Air Force and Navy elements.

Once the command structure has been established, joint assets can be scripted to provide a realistic, balanced JSOTF. The simulation can employ SEALs, special-boat units, AH-6s, AC-130s, and almost anything else if planners ask in advance.

Time line

After the SF player unit has determined the SF concept of operations, it must produce a time line, called the SF Road to War. The time line sets the stage for the unit's entry into Warfighter: It describes the command relationships, locations and past and current activities of all SOF units in theater. The time line provides the legend for the SF players and describes SF capabilities and limitations to conventional players. The SF Road to War must be coordinated with the corps SOCOORD and the BCTP.

About four months out, the corps should be war-gaming and producing its operations order, or OPORD (the OPORD for the reserve-component divisions is written by the BCTP). The corps SOCOORD, the primary advocate for SOF during the planning process, is intimately involved in writing the OPORD. The FOB should provide input to the OPORD process and, if possible, send a representative from the SOCCE to begin integration with the corps staff.

At the same time, the home-station FOB should be conducting a mission analysis,

based on its SF Road to War and the corps concept of operations, to determine the composition of the player elements and the communications requirements. The command-and-control structure normally requires a SOCCE at the corps level and a substantial liaison team, or LNO team, at the division level. An exception could be made in a forced-entry scenario in which only one division is initially present in the operational area.

The focus of the SOCCE must be the corps. If the corps is an active player in the exercise, the SOCCE should work in the corps main headquarters. If the corps play is merely scripted, the SOCCE should function within the element that plays the role of the corps headquarters. The employment of the LNO team at the division level

must be justified by division control of SF elements, such as LCEs, or by imminent linkup with SR elements. If there are no SOF units under division control, there should not be an LNO team.

The next step is the Warfighter seminar, which takes place about five months out. The division staff deploys to Fort Leavenworth, Kan., receives training on the simulation and rehearses its planning procedures under the guidance of the BCTP staff. USASFC Regulation 350-1 requires that the SOCCE commander and one NCO attend the seminar and that the group commander or his representative visit the seminar. The regulation should be revised to place greater emphasis on seminar attendance by the division LNO team. It is essential that the SOCCE's senior LNO attend the seminar and be prepared to brief the division staff on SF capabilities and limitations. The senior LNO serves as the division commander's primary adviser on SF, and he should establish a relationship with the staff and familiarize himself with staff procedures as early as possible.

After the seminar, the BCTP and the FOB must work together to produce a JSOTF operations order. The JSOTF operations order provides the joint commander's guidance to the FOB and, in conjunction with the SF Road to War, describes to the player staffs the past and current activities of SOF in theater. This order provides the FOB and the SOCCE with information necessary to conduct their mission planning. The FOB should also prepare SF A-detachment mission profiles and isolation packets in order to provide the SOCCE with the same level of information it would have in an actual mission. Prior to the exercise, the FOB and the BCTP must also determine the suspense dates for providing subordinate-unit locations and activities to the BCTP.

USASFC Regulation 350-1 requires two briefings for USASOC, one at D-90 and a prebrief to the commanding general of USASOC. A unit representative must provide slides to the USASFC G3 not less than three days prior to the D-90 briefing.

Train-up exercises

The division normally conducts a train-up exercise, or a series of them, at its home station. Active-component divisions exercise in separate terrain boxes for train-up and Warfighter exercises, and they use two distinct OPORDs. Reserve divisions use the same OPORD and terrain box for train-up and Warfighter exercises.

In determining the degree of SF participation, the SF group and the FOB must consider costs. Participation in train-up exercises is funded by the SF player unit, and it can be very expensive. At a mini-

mum, the SOCCE and the FOB must participate in the five-day final or ramp-up training exercise, which is normally conducted 30 to 60 days before the Warfighter exercise.

All SOCCE and FOB staff procedures should be established in advance of the train-up exercise. Communications links to be used in Warfighter should also be exercised. USASFC Regulation 350-1 states that the USASOC commander expects group commanders or their representatives to accompany the SOCCE to the train-up exercise, where they can become acquainted with the division commander and his G3.

The Warfighter exercise is conducted at the division's home station (reserve-component units play at Fort Leavenworth). The division normally stands up its main and alternate command posts, brigade command posts and battalion command posts. Usually, the division sets up its headquarters in the field, while the corps main command post or response cell sets up in permanent buildings. Although the situation can vary depending upon the mission analysis, the SOCCE is usually located in or near the corps main command post and an LNO team is assigned to the division main command post.

SOCCE

The primary missions of the SOCCE are to command and control special-operations forces in the corps area and to act, in conjunction with the SOCOORD, as a special-operations adviser to the corps commander. SOCCE communication connectivity with both the FOB and the SF detachments in the field is critical.

The composition of the SOCCE is determined by the mission, but, typically, it resembles the configuration shown in the chart on page 26.

The FOB plans missions in accordance with the JSOTF mission taskings, provides forces to the SOCCE, and isolates additional SF detachments for infiltration. The FOB also brings additional intelligence and signal assets to assist the SOCCE in providing quality intelligence and near-real-time communications to the supported corps and division.

The FOB may set up at its home station, collocate with the corps, or deploy to a third location. The primary factors affecting the location should be the preferences of the supported unit, the available communications links, and the actual missions (outside the BCTP) that are being monitored by the FOB. The FOB may participate at full strength, actually isolating teams, or it may provide a response cell manned by key staff members working in shifts. The FOB commander determines the level of FOB participation based on an evaluation of his ongoing missions.

It is important to remember that the role players in the simulation center are the brains for the deployed elements. During the planning process, units must select soldiers who are tactically proficient and computer literate, or the entire SF portion of the simulation could fail.

Battle simulation center

The exercise control cell and the BCTP staff operate out of the BSC, where controller cells from the player units (using soldiers from the player units to operate the workstations) input commands to their subordinate units. It is important to remember that the role players in the simulation center are the brains for the deployed elements. During the planning process, units must select soldiers who are tactically proficient and computer literate, or the entire SF portion of the simulation could fail. If possible, the same soldiers who were chosen to work in the BSC during the train-up exercise should return for the Warfighter.

In order to serve as controllers and to man the workstations, BSC personnel must meet specific requirements outlined in USASFC Regulation 350-1, Table H-2, and shown in the chart on page 26.

SOCCE Personnel

CORPS MAIN SOCCE

■ 1 X MAJ	18A	SOCCE Commander
■ 1 X SGM	18Z	SOCCE SGM
■ 2 X CPT/WO	18A/180A	Shift Leader
■ 2 X MSG/SFC	18Z/18F	SOCCE Shift NCOIC
■ 2 X SGT/SSG	CMF18	Fire Support NCO
■ 4 X SGT/SSG	18E	SOCCE Commo
■ 2 X SFC/SSG	18F	Intelligence NCO
■ 2 X SSG/SFC	92Y/54B	Support NCO

DIVISION LNO TEAM

■ 2 X CPT/WO	18A/180A	Shift Leader
■ 2 X SGT/SSG	CMF18	Ops/intel NCO
■ 2 X SGT/SSG	18E	Commo

22 Total

BSC Controller Personnel

■ 1 X MAJ	18A	SF Cell OIC
■ 2 X CPT	18A	Shift OIC
■ 2 X CPT/WO	18A/180A	Ops Officers
■ 2 X WO	180A	SF SME
■ 2 X NCO	CMF 18	SF Ops NCO
■ 2 X NCO	18E	Communications

Controllers in the BSC are task-organized according to the particular mission. BSC mission requirements fall into the following categories:

• *Higher HQ replication*. The BSC must be able to answer FOB and SOCCE questions about the commitment of SF forces, additional A-detachments, SOT-As, AC-130s, etc. (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units have their own controllers.)

• *Subordinate-unit replication*. The BSC is responsible for planning and recording subordinate-unit actions and movements. For example, the BSC plans infil and exfil routes, and it records the actions of A-detachments or SOT-As as well as their reactions to factors such as the terrain and enemy. The BSC then enters this data into the computer.

• *Intelligence*. The BSC receives intelligence reports from A-detachments and from SOT-As. The A-detachment intelligence comes from the CBS, and the SOT-A intelligence comes from the BCTP intelligence-collection model, or BICM. The BSC converts the intelligence into seemingly realistic reports from subordinate units. The BSC must ascertain what the team would realistically see, evaluate the report against the reporting priorities from the FOB and the SOCCE, and send the player units an accurate but brief report. For example, a three-page computer printout listing vehicles and personnel could be condensed into a report as simple as "081830Z three T-72 tanks moving north from NAI One." The BICM will provide a complete report of all units within detection range, including unit identifications. If the exercise employs a simulated SOT-A, the SOT-A's task can be simplified by having an intelligence officer or a SOT-A NCO provide subject-matter expertise on electronic warfare.

• *Communications*. The BSC must submit reports (formatted according to the unit SOP) to the SOCCE or the FOB. These reports provide necessary mission and intelligence data to the player staffs. By translating computer printouts into properly formatted reports, the BSC makes it easier for the players to focus on the staff problems at hand rather than on the mechanics of the simulation. Communications should follow the contact schedule

developed during the team isolation (regardless of whether the isolation was actual or simulated). The reporting guidance for the exercise dictates whether the BSC should make a real-time transmission or wait for a scheduled contact.

The enemy is played by the WCO from the BCTP at Fort Leavenworth. When friendly reconnaissance elements "see" an enemy unit, intelligence reports are generated by the BICM. The BSC role players follow their reporting guidance and send a message (formatted according to unit SOP) to the SOCCE. The range at which an A-detachment conducting SR can detect an enemy unit varies according to the capabilities outlined in the Startex agreement. Normally, an A-detachment can detect enemy units within a 500-meter radius at night and within a 2-km radius during the day. A SOT-A can normally detect units within a 15-km radius.

It should be explained here that the BCTP computer-simulation program is not designed to predict the outcome of an actual battle between two forces. It is an exercise driver that presents staffs with realistic problems. The computer cannot predict whether a given course of action will succeed or fail in reality, but it can present the SOCCE with teams who send reports, fail to make radio contact, request fire support, have wounded soldiers, and require resupply or exfiltration. As the battle progresses, the SOCCE terminates communications, analyzes and passes intelligence, and integrates SF actions with corps and division operations. The FOB supports the SOCCE, provides additional intelligence analysis and makes decisions about the commitment of additional forces. The situational challenges produced by the BCTP simulation cover the spectrum of staff actions that units face in the real world.

The BCTP is the Army's focal point for large-unit collective training. By participating, SF not only trains its FOBs and SOCCEs, it also ensures that conventional staffs gain invaluable experience in the integration of SF into their unit operations. Prior to the exercise, it is critical that SF units become familiar with staff procedures and rehearse their integration with corps and division staffs. An obvious benefit of this preparation is that it will help the Special Forces units deal with problems they are likely to encounter on the battlefield. Experiences in Panama, Kuwait and Haiti have shown that proactive planning and aggressive liaison with other staffs, in addition to ensuring the proper employment of SF soldiers, contribute greatly to mission accomplishment. ✂

Major Jon M. Custer is the S3 for the 1st Battalion, 19th SF Group. As the Special Forces plans and operations officer for the XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD, he has worked as OPFOR, as a controller, and as a corps planner for various Warfighter exercises. In previous assignments, he commanded A Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, and several SF detachments in the 7th and 3rd SF groups. He served as the civil-defense adviser in El Salvador, as a detachment commander during Operation Just Cause, and as a battalion staff officer and a detachment commander during Operation Desert Storm.

Quantitative Analysis in Haiti: Allocation of SOF Assets

by Charles W. Elliott

In 1994, a United States-led multinational force, or MNF, entered Haiti to assist in re-establishing the democracy of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In March 1995, when the U.S. turned its operations over to the United Nations Mission in Haiti, or UNMIH, it established Special Operations Task Force-Haiti (as an element of the U.N mission) for the purpose of conducting special operations throughout the country. SOTF-Haiti consisted of soldiers from U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, as well as soldiers from the active- and reserve-component U.S. Special Forces groups. In many areas, the SOTF-Haiti personnel were the only U.N. forces present.

To maximize the operational capabilities of his personnel upon deployment, the commander of SOTF-Haiti, Lieutenant Colonel David Fridovich, required a highly efficient means of ranking strategic locations throughout Haiti. The author was given the assignment of developing an allocation system that could be used to determine the relative need for a special-operations presence among the cities in Haiti. Although the author had developed a similar system for the Defense Commissary Agency in Europe a year earlier, the new assignment included an additional requirement: the SOTF-Haiti allocation system had to be capable of measuring the success of SOF missions in the various locations. This article explains both the development and the operations of the system, with the hope that the process used to determine the allocation of SOF assets in Haiti will have a useful function in future SOF operations.

This article is based on the author's experience during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. It is presented here to illustrate how such a plan may be useful in the allocation of special-operations assets during future military operations. — Editor

The concept used in the development of the SOTF system was based on the general facility-placement business model, which is used to identify, quantify and evaluate factors that can affect the success of a business. These factors can be categorized as demographics, culture, infrastructure and nature.

Building the model

The process of developing the model consisted of eight steps. The first step was to gain an understanding of the local environment. Before leaving for Haiti, the author had gathered information on the country from various sources — maps, area studies, and interviews with people who had been there (a good source is The World Factbook on the Worldwide Web – http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook.htm). From this information, the

location and the population of the major towns and cities of Haiti were derived.

The second step was to gain an understanding of the mission. Fridovich had provided six clear, discrete mission tasks: maintain a stable environment; maintain a secure environment; facilitate free elections; facilitate fair elections; assist in the return of a functional government; and embed the democratic process.

The third step was to identify the factors that could affect each mission task. Fridovich identified 12 factors, shown below as F1 through F12. With his approval, two more factors, F13 and F14, were added.

F1-*Haitian National Police presence.* This factor showed the presence of the HNP, which was replacing the Interim Police Security Force, or IPSF. The factor was assigned a number between zero and five, with zero indicating "not present in an area" and five, "making a strong, positive contribution."

F2-*IPSF presence*. This factor showed the presence of the IPSF, which was being replaced by the HNP. The factor was assigned a number between zero and five, with zero indicating "not present in an area" and five, "making a strong, positive contribution."

F3-*Civilian police presence.* This factor showed the presence of the multinational civilian police force. The factor was assigned a number between zero and five, with zero indicating "not present in an area" and five, "making a strong, positive contribution."

F4-*United Nations Mission in Haiti presence.* This factor showed the presence of UNMIH troops. The factor was assigned a number between zero and five, with zero indicating "not present in an area," three, "frequent patrolling," and five, "fixed installations."

F5-*Local support for the U.N*. This factor showed the level of local support for the U.N. presence. The factor was assigned a number between one and five, with one indicating "no support" and five, "maximum support."

F6-*Local support for the government of Haiti*. This factor showed the level of local support for the Haitian government. The factor was assigned a number between one and five, with one indicating "no support" and five, "maximum support."

F7-*Infrastructure.* This factor showed the combined condition of all infrastructure. The factor was assigned a number between one and five, with one indicating "extremely poor infrastructure" and five, "excellent infrastructure."

F8-*Election turmoil*. This factor showed the amount of turmoil among the popula-

Mission - Tasks Matrix

Mission Tasks	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8	F9	F10	F11	F12	F13	F14
Maintain a stable environment	X	X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X
Maintain a secure environment	X	X		X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Facilitate free elections	X	X	X	X				X			X	X	X	X
Facilitate fair elections								X			X	X	X	X
Assist in the return of a functional government				X		X	X		X	X				
Embed the democratic process													X	

Factor Weights

NUMBER	FACTOR	RANK	WEIGHT
F1	Haitian National Police presence	4	.09
F2	Interim Police Security Force presence	10	.06
F3	Civilian police presence	3	.09
F4	United Nations Mission in Haiti presence	1	.12
F5	Local support for UN	6	.08
F6	Local support for government of Haiti	9	.06
F7	Infrastructure	7	.07
F8	Election turmoil	14	.04
F9	Judicial system	8	.07
F10	Lines-of-communication mobility	5	.08
F11	Vigilante and gang activity	11	.05
F12	Haitian-on-Haitian violence and crime	13	.04
F13	SOTF locations	2	.10
F14	Population	12	.05

NOTE: This chart illustrates the relative ranking of each factor and its assigned weight.

tion in regard to the upcoming election. The factor was assigned a number between one and five, with one indicating "frequent disturbances" and five, "perfect conduct."

F9-*Judicial system*. This factor showed the combined condition of the court system and the prison system. The factor was assigned a number between one and five, with one indicating "no functioning system" and five, "a fully functioning system."

F10-*Lines-of-communication mobility*. This factor showed the condition of roads. (Haiti's road network served as the only line of communication for the Haitian population.) The factor was assigned a number between one and five, with one indicating "no road network" and five, "a well-maintained road network."

F11-*Vigilante and gang activity*. This factor showed the level of vigilante and gang activity and the impact of that activity upon the population. The factor was assigned a number between one and five, with one indicating "overwhelming activity" and five, "very little activity."

F12-*Haitian-on-Haitian violence and crime*. This factor showed the trend in Haitian-on-Haitian violence and crime. The factor was assigned a number between one and five, with one indicating "an increased trend," three "no change," and five, "a decreasing trend."

F13-*SOTF locations*. This factor showed the proximity of SOTF locations. The factor was assigned a number between one and five, with one indicating "an ODA/ODB facility in the immediate vicinity," two, "a coalition support team," three, "a facility within range and capable of responding to or monitoring local conditions," four, "a facility capable of responding within 2.5 to 4 hours," and five, "no facility close enough to respond or to monitor local conditions in less than four hours." (This information

was based on the assumption that SOTF elements had been initially placed in locations where there was a perceived need.)

F14-*Population*. This factor was used as an indicator of the population density. The factor was assigned a number between one and five: the lower the number, the higher the population density. (This analysis was useful in scaling the population count.)

The fourth step consisted of developing a mission-tasks matrix. Fridovich marked each factor with an "X" to link it to the six mission tasks.

In the fifth step, Fridovich was asked to determine the relative importance of the 14 factors. First, he ranked the factors by order of importance. Next, he assigned a weight to each factor. (Ranking was done only to help in assigning the weights.) The assigned weights had to add up to 1.

Normally, the sixth step would have been to design the data-collection project. The seventh step would have been to collect the data. And the eighth step, had it been necessary, would have been to normalize or scale the data. However, SOTF-Haiti had accomplished the sixth and seventh steps before the author's arrival in Haiti, and the data collected was fully satisfactory.

The task force had collected data from written surveys conducted by the S2 of SOTF-Haiti in January and August of 1995. The S2 surveyed Special Forces A-detachments stationed throughout Haiti. SF personnel are highly trained, mature troops who speak the local language. They were living in their respective communities and interacting with the local population daily. The data provided by the SF personnel was deemed highly reliable.

The SOTF Facility Location Model diagram represents the final model for the analysis. A spreadsheet was used in preparing the model. The 14 factors were

SOTF Facility Location Model

HAITIAN CITIES	POPULATION	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8	F9	F10	F11	F12	F13	F14	
	Weights =	0.09	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.10	0.05	1.00
Limbe	43,000	1	0	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	4	1.7
Jeremie	90,000	0	1	3	3	5	3	3	1	1	2	1	3	1	2	2.1
Cap Haitien	107,000	2	0	3	5	1	1	3	1	1	3	3	1	1	2	2.1
Magasin (island)	80,000	0	4	1	1	5	3	1	3	3	1	5	5	1	2	2.2
Les Cayes	132,000	0	1	3	3	5	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	2.3
Miragoane	68,000	0	3	3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	2.4
Grand Rivere du Nord	35,000	1	0	1	5	5	1	1	2	2	4	3	3	1	4	2.4
Deschapelles	5,000	4	0	2	3	5	4	4	2	5	1	5	5	4	5	3.4
Thiote	20,000	4	0	3	3	5	4	4	2	5	1	5	5	4	5	3.5
Petionville	114,000	4	0	4	3	5	4	5	3	3	5	4	5	3	1	3.6
Ft. Liberte	24,000	4	0	4	4	5	3	4	2	5	3	5	5	2	4	3.6
Delmas	229,000	4	0	4	4	5	4	5	3	3	5	4	3	3	1	3.6
Aquin	50,000	4	0	4	3	5	4	4	2	5	3	5	5	4	3	3.7
Mt. Organise	16,000	4	0	2	3	5	4	3	2	5	3	5	5	4	5	3.7
Port au Prince	772,000	4	0	4	5	5	4	5	4	3	5	4	3	3	1	3.8
Cities Total	3,058,000															
Population Total	7,000,000															
Rural Total	3,942,000															
Percent of factor optimized =		39	21	67	68	88	65	61	50	64	58	74	73	38	58	59

NOTE: A break was made in the chart to save space. The original speadsheet contained 33 cities; the population figures and the percentages in the bottom row are for all 33 cities.

entered as column headings; the factor weights as an individual row; the city names as row headings; and the various data as cell entries. All that remained was to enter the appropriate formulas for the mathematical calculations, and the model would be ready to run. The results are displayed on the SOTF Facility Location Model spreadsheet on page 31.

Reading the model

The individual cells of the spreadsheet indicate the status of a specific factor and the need for SOTF assistance in improving it. A "5" indicates that the factor had been optimized and that no further SOTF-Haiti resources were needed.

The general condition of each city is determined by combining the factors across that row. The number in each cell is first multiplied by the weight assigned to its corresponding factor. Then the weighted results are added across each row, and their sum is shown in the cell at the far right. A comparison of the numbers in the column at the far right indicates the cities' relative need for a SOTF-Haiti element: The lower the number, the worse the condition of a city, and the greater the need for a SOTF-Haiti element.

The overall degree to which each factor had progressed toward its desired end state is obtained by adding the numbers in each column and dividing that sum by the sum of the optimal numbers (in this case, 33 cities x 5, or 165). The answers are expressed as percentages: 100 percent indicates that the factor had been optimized and that no further resources were needed for that factor in any location. If all mission tasks had been completed, each column total be 100 percent. (F2, however, is a unique case — as F1 nears 100 percent, F2 should near 0 percent, which is the desired end state.)

Using the model

The former commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Lieutenant General James T. Scott, approved the model's use in the SOTF-Haiti decision-making process. Fridovich then sought approval from the commander of the UNMIH, Major General Joseph Kinzer, to use the statistical data from the model as a basis for withdrawing and redeploying selected special-operations forces from Haiti. (Because of the rapid accomplishment of its mission, SOTF-Haiti used the model to develop an order of withdrawal from various locations rather than an order of deployment.)

The quantitative analysis model does not replace the judgment of a decision-maker. It should be only one of several inputs into the decision-making process. A conflict between the relative ranking generated by the model and the information generated by another source does not negate the value of either. However, if the statistical data in the model confirms other sources of information, the decision-maker can place a high degree of confidence not only in his sources but also in the results he will achieve. ✂

Author's note: I would like to thank the men and the women of SOTF-Haiti for their excellent support in developing the quantitative-analysis model during September of 1995. During my time in Haiti, I saw a united team of dedicated and cheerful professionals accomplishing their missions while living under austere conditions. I especially thank the commander of SOTF-Haiti, Lieutenant Colonel David Fridovich, and the S2, Captain Edward J. DeSantis. I could not have completed the model without their help.

Charles W. Elliott is chief of the Systems Analysis Branch in the Office of the Comptroller, 8th Army, Seoul, Korea. During Operation Uphold Democracy, he was an operations research analyst with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C. Elliott has worked with the federal government in Asia, Europe and Washington, D.C. He holds an MBA and an MA. Elliott has published numerous articles on government operations.

Special Forces in Bosnia: Versatile and Effective

by Corporal Len Butler

Special Forces soldiers have been involved in so many operations within the American sector of Bosnia that many people believe that SF detachments are the size of companies.

Thanks to Hollywood, there are still those who think of Special Forces as heavily armed men with their faces disguised by camouflage. Others perceive them as quietly paddling in rafts to secret objectives, or dropping out of the sky, deep behind enemy lines.

"What a lot of people think is that we are some kind of ninja warriors," said Captain Roy Weidanz of Company B, 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group. "But we use our brains more than our muscles."

Weidanz, 36, the outgoing commander of the special-operations command-and-control element, stated that the versatility of Special Forces is the attribute that makes SF a successful organization.

"Every SF soldier has had some type of schooling in a foreign language," Weidanz said. "Most of our guys here know Russian, which has helped us in the Russian sector, as well as in the local population."

The SF soldiers have achieved much interaction with the Russian Brigade in Bosnia. SF troops have participated in joint patrols and in rifle-range exercises with their Russian counterparts, and SF and Russian troops have assisted each other in monitoring Bosnian and Bosnian-Serb observation posts.

During the Thanksgiving Day 1996 visit by then-Defense Secretary William J. Perry, four SF soldiers served as interpreters for Russian generals attending the ceremony.

"With language capabilities come liaison capabilities," said Staff Sergeant Joseph R. Betz, 31, of Glastonbury, Conn. "When you speak another language, you may think a little differently of people, because you may get a better idea of how they may feel about something."

Betz noted that although Serbo-Croatian is somewhat different from Russian, the two languages have similar words and phrases that can be understood.

Civil Affairs and Special Forces have worked together to achieve and maintain good relations with the local civilian population.

Working with Civil Affairs has also given Special Forces an opportunity to get to know the local population.

"We just basically sit in and listen to what they have to say," Betz said. "We interact with them, drink coffee, and ask how they are feeling."

A primary goal of every Special Forces team is to teach and to train future teachers.

Recently, the U.S. State Department sponsored a program in which four SF demining teams were dispatched to the Croat, Muslim and Serb areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their objective was to teach demining techniques to the local citizens so that the citizens (with special training and proper assistance) could, in turn, become trainers themselves and teach others.

Special Forces, with their specialized training and their technologically advanced equipment, indeed create an illusion of a much larger force.

Although seldom seen and often shrouded in a perception of secrecy, Special Forces soldiers assigned to Task Force Eagle in Bosnia continue to live up to their nickname, "the quiet professionals."

This article is reprinted from the Dec. 20, 1996, issue of The Talon, *the DoD newspaper published for U.S. troops in Bosnia. — Editor*

Corporal Len Butler is a member of the U.S. Army Reserve's 100th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, based in Austin, Texas.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

CMF 37 gains additional authorizations

Enlisted Career Management Field 37, psychological-operations specialist, has gained six authorizations that offer senior NCOs the opportunity to excel outside the 4th PSYOP Group. The positions are for one staff sergeant with the Army Land Information War Center, Fort Belvoir, Va.; one master sergeant and two sergeants first class with the 8th Army in Korea; one sergeant first class with the Southern European Task Force in Italy; and one sergeant first class with the 3rd Army, Fort McPherson, Ga. Soldiers interested in applying for one of these positions should submit a request through their S1. Applicants must have served in the key leader position for their current grade and must not be currently assigned to a TDA position. For more information telephone SFC Timothy Prescott at the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395.

SF Branch seeks drill-sergeant volunteers

The SF Enlisted Branch is seeking volunteers for drill-sergeant duty. Applicants must be an 18B, 18C or 18F and in the grade of E6 or E7. Successful candidates will serve a two-year tour of duty in basic-training units at Fort Sill, Okla.; Fort Jackson, S.C.; Fort Knox, Ky.; or Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

PERSCOM points of contact

Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows:

LTC Michael W. Grant	SF Enlisted Branch chief
MSG R.B. Gardner	Senior career adviser
SFC Timothy Prescott	CMFs 18, 37; USACAPOC; 4th POG; 96th CA Bn.; CMF 18/37 ANCOC, schools; drill sergeants; recruiters
SFC Tod Young	Career branch integrator; analyst
Ms. Faye Matheny	1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10th SF groups; USASOC; USASFC; JFKSWCS; JRTC; JOTB; SFOD-K; ROTC; All SOCs and SOTSEs
Ms. Dyna Amey	SFAS; SFQC

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager. Career-development questions should be directed to the PDNCO or senior career adviser. SFQC students who have assignment questions should contact their student PAC or their company first sergeant or sergeant major. Questions regarding NCOES should be directed to the SF unit's schools NCO. Telephone inquiries may be made by calling DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452. The e-mail address is epsf@hoffman-emh1.army.mil.

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Prerequisites for SF warrants explained

The Special Forces Warrant Officer, MOS 180A, provides tactical and technical expertise necessary for effectively conducting SF missions worldwide. An applicant for 180A must:

- Be serving as a staff sergeant or above.
- Possess a Career Management Field 18 MOS.
- Be a graduate of the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Sergeant Course (nonresident or resident) or be a graduate of SF ANCOC after Oct. 1, 1994.
- Have a minimum of three years' experience at the SF ODA level.
- Have a current 1+/1+ language proficiency, or have a score of 85 or higher on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery.
- Meet the medical-fitness standards for SF duty and for the SERE Level-C Course according to AR 40-501.
- Pass the Army Physical Readiness Test (must complete a minimum of 50 pushups and 60 situps within two minutes and a two-mile run in 14:54 or less, regardless of age).
- Have a secret security clearance or higher.
- Have recommendations of company and battalion commanders.
- Have an endorsement from the servicing personnel office verifying that applicant is not under a suspension of favorable action or a bar to re-enlistment.

The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office also requires a letter of recommendation from the applicant's SF group commander and from a senior SF warrant officer. An applicant who is not currently assigned to an SF group must furnish two letters of recommendation from his former SF company chain of command. Active-duty applicants can be no older than 36; National Guard applicants can be no older than 42. For more information, telephone CW4 Wayne Searcy, 180A manager in SOPO, at DSN 239-2415/8423 or commercial (910) 432-2415/8423.

Branch proponent sets career-development policies

Every officer branch has a personnel proponent that develops the major policies affecting the career development of officers in that branch. The personnel proponent for Special Forces is the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Within SWCS, personnel-proponent functions are performed by the Special Operations Proponency Office, or SOPO. A sampling of SOPO tasks includes:

- Planning the fill of the force, including yearly recruiting requirements.
- Monitoring promotion-board results and making recommendations to DA for future SF officer promotions.
- Recommending to PERSCOM the functional-area breakout for the yearly cohort of SF captains pending FA designation.
- Developing branch-qualification requirements.

Officers who have questions or comments may telephone SOPO's 18A manager, Major Dan Adelstein, at DSN 239-2415 or commercial (910) 432-2415.

Foreign SOF

Military counterdrug roles debated

Thailand's promises to vigorously attack the burgeoning drug trade have raised the prospect of greater Thai military participation in counterdrug activities. Among the options being considered — all of which have generated sharp discussion or controversy — is the possibility of giving military personnel limited arrest powers; assigning second-year conscripts and military police to community-policing duties; and developing other approaches of military-police cooperation. While many specialists acknowledge that the Thai drug problems exceed the capabilities of the Thai police, fears of military human-rights abuses and greater drug corruption within the military itself promise to temper the most ambitious proposals for armed forces' participation. Meanwhile, on another continent, Argentina is addressing similar issues. Namely, Argentina's air force and navy are considering ways by which to monitor air and maritime drug-trafficking activities, which have increased in recent years. In part, these efforts may involve increased radar coverage of Argentina's borders with Brazil and Paraguay, with other military support possible. But in Argentina, as in Thailand and a number of other countries, using the military in law-enforcement roles — combined with the danger of a too-close association with the corrupting influence of international drug criminals — evokes controversy and discussion in and out of the Argentine armed forces. An Argentine commentator posed the same question that other states have recently asked: "If the militaries do not destroy the drug traffic, who will?" This question will clearly continue to preoccupy security establishments in those states facing drug trafficking and transit problems that exceed traditional law-enforcement resources.

Colombian guerrillas concern Venezuela

The ambush of a Venezuelan army and national-guard patrol in February 1997 in the western state of Apure, an apparent reduction of Colombian military and police presence in parts of the border area with Venezuela, and the increased activities of Colombian drug traffickers and other violent criminals crossing into Venezuela have generated worry among the border residents and have evoked a Venezuelan government protest to Colombian authorities. Clashes with Colombian guerrillas — along with coca-planting activity and cross-border kidnappings and robberies — have led to closer interaction among Venezuelan forces near border areas; more focused intelligence work; and the creation of the Sierra Nueve Special Command, whose role, in part, is to eliminate drug crops on Venezuelan soil. In planning for more effective border countermeasures, Venezuelan authorities recognize that Bogota's efforts to counter the attacks of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, or FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN, in other parts of Colombia have reduced the Colombian army's border presence. As a consequence, it seems likely that Venezuela's attention to the cross-border activity of guerrilla and criminal groups — and to the progress of FARC and ELN insurgent efforts in Colombia — will remain concentrated.

Russian assessment calls for special-ops reform

In Russia, struggles to formulate and to implement military reforms have sparked criticisms of past and current approaches regarding the organization, equipment, employment and affiliation of Soviet and Russian special-operations forces. A 1997 assessment by a Russian general-staff officer highlights many examples of such organizational and performance shortfalls and singles out the past association of "spetsnaz" and military intelligence as a particularly flawed and incompatible relationship. The assessment is also critical of the performance in Chechnya by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or MVD, and the Federal Security Service, or FSB. For the armed forces, the assessment calls for the creation of a General Staff Special Operations Directorate (within the Main Operations Directorate). With regard to all of Russia's other special-security units, a Federal Special Operations Committee would handle the restructuring of Russian special-operations forces (e.g., the MVD, the FSB, the Federal Border Service, etc.). Under a proposed scheme for the military, there would be nine categories of "special operations" or "special actions." They are as follows: commando operations (direct action against command and control and other military targets during a period of threat or at the start of military operations); reconnaissance operations (collection prior to the start of operations and in support of the first and subsequent conventional operations); psychological operations (altering civilian or military behavior and countering enemy efforts); operations to support internal security and constitutional order (of the Russian Federation, foreign nations, and regions or territories); operations to protect the rights and the property of Russia and its citizens (in and out of Russia); search-and-rescue operations (of Russian military and civilian personnel, including hostage rescue); operations to form, support and employ foreign irregular forces (on behalf of Russian military objectives or Russian Federation interests); auxiliary operations (to support the security of peacekeeping operations, of humanitarian-assistance operations and of various kinds of support to civil authorities); and other unspecified operations or actions that the minister of defense or the president might designate. Whatever the merits of the arguments outlined in the assessment, it is the slow, under-funded status of Russian military reform that makes a major change in military special-operations forces unlikely in the near future.

Colombian authorities link guerrillas to drug trafficking

Against a backdrop of strong, continuing guerrilla activity that is challenging government forces, Colombian authorities continue to highlight the evidence of enduring narco-insurgent linkages. In February 1997, Colombian national police discovered near Cali a cache of automatic weapons, grenades, explosives, uniforms, and an antitank missile, together with 500 kg of cocaine — an indication of drug-insurgent linkage. The director of the Colombian national police echoed views heard often over the last decade in Colombia and elsewhere, "One does not know if the drug trafficker is a guerrilla or if the guerrilla is a drug trafficker. The line is now blurred; it is a brotherhood community."

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DUSA-IA, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Bragg thoroughfare renamed for SF MOH winner

Fort Bragg's Community Access Road was officially renamed Zabitosky Road March 7 in honor of retired Master Sergeant Fred W. Zabitosky, a Special Forces Medal of Honor recipient who died in 1996.

A native of Trenton, N.J., Zabitosky enlisted in the Army in 1959 and later served as a member of the 1st, 5th, 7th and 20th Special Forces groups. He served four tours in Southeast Asia between 1964 and 1972.

On Feb. 19, 1968, Zabitosky was an assistant team leader of a nine-man, long-range reconnaissance patrol in Laos, when the patrol was attacked by a numerically superior North Vietnamese army unit. The 25-year-old staff sergeant worked to rally his team members and to deploy them defensively. Rescue helicopters picked up the team, but Zabitosky's helicopter was immediately shot down, and Zabitosky was thrown from the craft. After regaining consciousness, and despite serious burns and crushed ribs, Zabitosky returned to the helicopter and pulled the pilot to safety. For his actions, he was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Richard M. Nixon in March 1969. Zabitosky retired from the Army Nov. 11, 1977.

"With the renaming of Community Access Road to Zabitosky Road, it is hoped that our soldiers will be reminded of who he was," said Major General Kenneth R. Bowra, commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. "Once they learn more about him and of his values and ethics, they will find he was more than a hero. He was, and still is, the epitome of what each of us is capable of becoming. He will continue to inspire others to be what he was and what made him a Medal of Honor recipient." — *SGT Brian Thomas, USASOC PAO*

SF ANCOC to offer distance learning

Students in the Special Forces Advanced NCO Course, or SF ANCOC, will soon receive some of their instruction by means of distance learning.

By October 1997, SF ANCOC is scheduled to be connected to a distance-learning network that will give SF ANCOC instructors and students access to the Internet and to video teletraining and teleconferencing, according to Command Sergeant Major Henry Ramirez, commandant of the SWCS NCO Academy.

Currently 18 weeks of resident training, SF ANCOC contains three weeks of common leader training, two weeks of MOS-specific training, 12 weeks of operations-and-intelligence training, and a one-week field-training exercise.

The Army Training and Doctrine Command has provided $934,000 to the Special Warfare Center and School for a course conversion, Ramirez said. SF ANCOC will be divided into 10 weeks of resident training and eight weeks of distance learning.

In preparation for this new training strategy, 40 students — 20 from the Operations and Intelligence Transition Course at the SWCS NCO Academy and 20 from the 19th and 20th SF groups — are scheduled to complete three blocks of intelligence-related instruction via the Internet in April, Ramirez said.

Special Warfare available on Worldwide Web

Special Warfare is now available on the Worldwide Web as part of the home page of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The *Special Warfare* site contains all issues from March 1992 to the present. Eventually, all issues from the first, April 1988, will be available. The site also features an index of the articles that are available on-line.

The issues and the index are in portable document format, or PDF. To read PDF files, users will need to download a copy of Acrobat Reader software from the Web site. The software allows users to read, copy and print from the files. It also has a "find" feature that can be used to search for particular words throughout an issue.

The universal resource locator is www.usasoc.soc.mil. Once on the USASOC home page, click on the item, "USASOC Public Affairs Office-approved command web pages." When the "What's New" list appears, click on "Special Warfare Magazine" to access the magazine site.

Air Force school offers SOF courses

The U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, located at Hurlburt Field, Fla., offers courses that focus on special-operations missions and functions, regional and cultural orientation, antiterrorism, joint planning

and crisis-response skills. The school's mission is to educate U.S. military and other personnel in the mission and the functions of special operations in the evolving world threat.

Over the next few months, the following courses will be offered:

Cross-Cultural Communications Course (May 5-9 and July 7-11) offers a look at the development of American culture and provides a brief overview of different world regions and of ways to interact with people of different cultures.

Dynamics of International Terrorism (May 5-9 and June 23-27) provides a basic awareness of the terrorist threat on both an international and a regional basis. Emphasis is placed on individual protective measures that government personnel and their families can employ to minimize the terrorist threat.

Introduction to Special Operations Course (May 13-16 and July 22-25) covers the forces assigned to USSOCOM and uses case studies to provide analyses of select special-operations missions.

Joint Psychological Operations Course (May 19-23) provides officers, NCOs (E5 and above), and equivalent civilian students with an awareness of PSYOP doctrine and techniques. The course requires a secret clearance.

Middle East Orientation Course (May 19-23) is a one-week orientation to the region. The course will enhance the students' historical, cultural and political background and help them to develop cross-cultural strategies.

Aviation in Foreign Internal Defense Course (May 19-23) is a week-long seminar that addresses planning and executing aviation activities in support of joint foreign-internal-defense operations. Guest lecturers will address legal issues, interagency air operations, employing airpower in support of internal-defense-and-development strategies, and joint-planning requirements.

Asia-Pacific Orientation Course (June 14-18) focuses on Asian-Pacific culture, history and politics. It also covers personal security and antiterrorism training for the region.

Latin American Orientation Course (June 21-25) provides an introduction to the Latin American region, with an emphasis on cultural, military, political and security issues. Speakers will discuss counterdrug operations, security assistance, regional terrorist threat assessments and country studies.

Joint Senior Psychological Operations Course (July 8-10) is for senior-level officers and equivalent civilians who need to know about psychological operations and how to request and obtain PSYOP. The course requires a top-secret clearance.

All USAFSOS courses are free. Sponsoring units fund the lodging, per diem and travel costs for personnel attending. Application procedures and detailed course descriptions are contained in the USAF Special Operations School FY 97 course catalog. For further information, telephone the USAFSOS registrar at DSN 579-4731 or commercial (904) 884-4731.

SWCS to publish new SF training circulars

The Special Warfare Center and School's Special Forces Training and Doctrine Division is in the process of publishing two new documents that apply to current Special Forces operations.

In November 1996, SWCS held the initial draft conference on TC 31-34, *Humanitarian Demining Operations Handbook*. Because of recent U.S. legislative changes to the humanitarian demining program, publication of the final draft of TC 31-34 has been rescheduled for June 1997.

TC 31-27, *Army Special Forces Liaison Coordination Element Handbook*, is intended to provide a doctrinal base for Special Forces personnel engaged in liaison/coordination operations in all environments, including coalition warfare. Publication of the final draft is scheduled for May 1997.

For more information, telephone the SF Training and Doctrine Division at DSN 239-5333/3416 or commercial (910) 432-5333/3416.

New SWCS directorate to design future ARSOF

The commander of the Army Special Operations Command has recently designated the Special Warfare Center and School as the architect of future Army special-operations forces.

To deal with that new function, the SWCS commander, Major General William P. Tangney, has created the Concept Development Directorate. The new directorate is staffed with personnel transferred from USASOC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements Integration. The director of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine will also serve as the Director of the Concept Development Directorate.

The Concept Development Directorate is composed of three divisions: Concept, Science and Technology, and Experimentation. The directorate's mission is to:

- Manage the execution of the TRADOC Requirements Determination Process.
- Manage the development of operational concepts and the establishment of future operational capabilities, or FOCs, for ARSOF.
- Integrate ARSOF FOCs into the TRADOC FOC-development process.
- Develop and manage the USASOC future technology plan.
- Develop the USASOC experimentation plan.
- Integrate ARSOF into advanced war-fighting experiments.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

From Hitler's Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942-1945. *Edited with Commentary by Neal H. Petersen. University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. ISBN: 0-271-01485-7. 684 pages. $85.*

Of the approximately 500 record groups maintained by the National Archives, Record Group 226, the Records of the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, is among the most heavily referenced.

Many a researcher has used these records to great advantage. An outstanding example is Neal Petersen's *From Hitler's Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942-1945.*

Under the leadership of the dynamic William ("Wild Bill") Donovan, the OSS developed the entire intelligence cycle: collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, synthesis, interpretation, presentation, and dissemination of processed intelligence. The OSS also conducted covert-action operations behind enemy lines, perfected an astonishing array of special weapons and devices, disseminated black propaganda, developed special-operations units that became the prototypes of the Special Forces, laid the groundwork for the postwar Nazi trials, produced films and did much more. One could almost write a history of World War II from the OSS records alone.

Like other members of his family before him, Allen Dulles served with distinction in the American diplomatic corps. In November



1942, he brought his knowledge and experience of State Department methods and procedures to his Bern, Switzerland, office at Herrengasse 23. Spies were everywhere in Switzerland, a neutral nation surrounded by Axis powers. Pouch mail was unsafe, so radiograms and cablegrams provided the only reliable means of contact with Washington and other OSS posts.

Over the course of years, as he was researching for his biography of Allen Dulles, Petersen studied the Bern cables thoroughly. His careful selection from the OSS cable files, arranged with comments and abundant citations, makes a highly useful and surprisingly readable history of the war — the view from Herrengasse 23.

Though Petersen finds that Dulles' reports had little influence on high-level policy, Dulles' methods often proved effective. Early in the war, he developed his own list of "useful Germans." British intelligence regarded American efforts to work with the resistance as ill-advised amateurism. The Brits also threw back Fritz Kolbe, an anti-Nazi walk-in from the German Foreign Office, dismissing him as a Nazi plant. Kolbe later became one of the most important agents-in-place of World War II, providing Dulles with more than 2,000 document texts and summaries.

With the assistance of Kolbe and other German agents, Dulles revealed the German penetration of the British embassy in Ankara (code name Cicero) and determined the launch sites of the V-1 and V-2. Before July 20, 1944, Dulles advised Washington of the imminent attempt on Hitler's life, identifying the major plotters. His best-known success was his clandestine negotiation of a surrender of German forces in Italy (Operation Sunrise). Only the disarray of the German general officers in Italy and the hesitancy of Washington and London, writes Petersen, delayed Sunrise and precluded a more timely capitulation that could have changed the face of postwar Europe.

Dulles made some mistakes. Order-of-battle intelligence provided by the OSS Bern office was decidedly poor at first, but in time it improved enough to be used to confirm and supplement Ultra intercepts. Petersen also adds that Dulles doubtless spent too much effort on ineffectual intellectuals, British castoff sources, and danger-

ous political renegades. He also contributed to the idea that the Germans were preparing to make a last-ditch stand in an alpine redoubt. Although no alpine redoubt actually existed, the Germans encouraged the notion as a deliberate deception operation.

Petersen's bibliography is thorough and well-annotated. He notes, however, that the OSS's "collection totals over 3,000 cubic feet of records." In fact, despite their varied history, the OSS records are not a collection, but an organic body of records created and received by a federal agency and maintained by successor agencies. They total more than 6,500 cubic feet: some 1,800 cubic feet accessioned from the State Department and more than 4,700 cubic feet accessioned to date from the Central Intelligence Agency. These are minor distinctions, however, of far more concern to an archivist than to historians and other researchers.

This book of select documents and commentary is the work of a mature historian, one who has researched his subject well. It is the finest book of its kind to be found. It includes a sound introduction, is well-footnoted and provides a highly useful list of code names and cover names. Its thorough index will make it a major asset to scholars who seek to explain the origins of the American intelligence community and to understand the largest single event in history, the Second World War.

Dr. Lawrence H. McDonald
National Archives
College Park, Md.



From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times. *Edited by John Arquilla. Lanham, Md.; University Press of America, 1996. ISBN: 0-7618-0186-3. 360 pages. $19.95.*

Was the Trojan Horse a distant forerunner of the Combat Talon II? Dr. John Arquilla, who teaches in the Special Operations and Low Intensity-Conflict curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, would have you believe so, as he takes you through a diverse set of factual, fictional and even mythical cases of special operations throughout history.

From Troy to Entebbe is an anthology of literary and eyewitness accounts of military and paramilitary operations that fell outside the realm of conventional warfare during their respective time periods. Arquilla ties the individual accounts together, using his own analytical framework to form a representative sampling of raiding and *coups de main* throughout history.

Specifically developed to encourage the analysis of issues such as the importance of surprise, the need for integration of general-purpose forces and special forces, and the impact of special operations on war, this work also covers the range of missions associated with the U.S. special-operations forces of today. Intertwined with dramatic stories of raids by specially manned and equipped forces are enlightening portrayals of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, reconnaissance and counterterrorism.

Beyond its intended purpose, this varied array of writings addresses the vital factor of personal character in the military profession, along with examples of leadership (effective and otherwise), and an insightful story of courage and fear in combat written by a keen observer of the human condition: Leon Tolstoy.

In summary, *From Troy to Entebbe* is an excellent vehicle for expanding the literary horizons of the casual reader of military history. More importantly, it is a valuable source of material for the serious discussion of special operations in professional-development sessions and in professional-military-education courses.

GEN Henry H. Shelton
USSOCOM
MacDill AFB, Fla.

Special Warfare **adopts quarterly designation**

Beginning with this issue, Special Warfare *will designate each issue by the quarter during which it appears rather than by the month. — Editor*

Special Warfare

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