


# Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



# From the Commandant



## Special Warfare

In the previous issue of Special Warfare, we emphasized the future of ARSOF by presenting the ARSOF XXI operational concept and SOF Vision 2010. In this issue, we continue to look toward the future as we examine the role of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the challenges that lie ahead for its forces.

General Peter J. Schoomaker, commander of USSOCOM, discusses the current state of U.S. SOF, SOF's relevance to the national military strategy, and its current missions and challenges. Those challenges cover a wide range, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, advances in technology and the use of information operations, and participation in peacetime and conflict operations. General Schoomaker forecasts a constantly changing operational environment and provides tenets that will guide SOF in adapting to new demands.

Other articles in this issue amplify or expand the ideas in General Schoomaker's article. Louis R. Beres examines our problems in defining terrorism, the importance of a precise definition of terrorism, and the implications that the definition has for SOF. Anthony Marley discusses the issue of determining the proper DoD role in peacekeeping and in conflict resolution, and he details the strengths that SOF can offer to those operations.


Major Fletcher Crews points to the likely increase in information operations and the need for PSYOP integration into joint campaign planning. He suggests coordination techniques and a planning tool that could contribute to more efficient PSYOP planning and that could also improve communication between PSYOP forces and other components of the joint force. Lieutenant Colonel Frank Pedrozo discusses the Army's implementation of OPMS XXI and explains its long-range effects on SOF.

One of General Schoomaker's tenets for the future is: "A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change." One of our primary concerns at the Special



Warfare Center and School is that ARSOF doctrine, organization and training keep pace with change. We are already updating FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, to incorporate changes in the strategic environment and in joint doctrine. We are planning for the implementation of OPMS XXI, and we will ensure that SOF officers receive the training and the assignments that will be essential for their professional development under the new system.

Our efforts are guided by the idea contained in another of the tenets: "The 21st-century SOF warrior ... will remain the key to success in special operations." That idea emphasizes what has historically been the basic focus of SOF — the human dimension. People are the heart of special operations — our forces may employ technology, but their creativity and flexibility give them an adaptability that weapons and machinery do not have. In the future, as in the past, that adaptability will be a critical asset.

  
Major General William P. Tangney

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# U.S. Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead

by General Peter J. Schoomaker



Having emerged from the Cold War as a uniquely postured superpower, America stands at the threshold of a new millennium — and her armed forces peer into a seething cauldron of global activity. As we venture into an uncertain future, threats to U.S. interests are developing new dimensions. We are being increasingly challenged by regional instability, transnational dangers, asymmetric threats, and the likelihood of unpredictable events — threats that are not easily addressed by simple force-on-force calculations.

To meet these challenges, we must leverage the best capabilities and potential of our armed forces. This will be a difficult undertaking, for as Joint Vision 2010 counsels, “We will have to make hard choices to achieve the trade-offs that will bring the best balance, most capability, and greatest interoperability for the least cost.” America’s special-operations forces, or SOF, effectively satisfy the cost-benefit criteria, and they have an important and growing role in addressing many of the future’s challenges.

Since its creation by the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the DoD Authorization Act

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This article is a statement of the perspective of the commander in chief, USSOCOM, regarding issues that SOF will face in the future. Other articles in this issue and in future issues will cover these topics and others, such as the Army After Next Program, in more detail. — Editor

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of 1987, the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, has provided highly trained, rapidly deployable and regionally focused SOF in support of global requirements from the National Command Authorities, or NCA; the geographic commanders in chief, or CINCs; and our American ambassadors and their country teams. During 1997, SOF deployed to 144 countries around the world, with an average of 4,760 SOF personnel deployed per week. These statistics represent a threefold increase in missions since 1991.

SOF consist of more than 46,000 people, active and reserve, who are organized into a variety of land, sea and aerospace forces, including:

- U.S. Army Special Forces, or SF; the 75th Ranger Regiment; the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; Psychological Operations units and Civil Affairs units.
- U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land forces, or SEALs; special-boat units; and SEAL-delivery units.
- U.S. Air Force special-operations squadrons (fixed and rotary wing), special-tactics squadrons, a foreign-internal-defense squadron, and a combat weather squadron.

Although the acronym “SOF” is used to describe this community of world-class organizations, no one joins SOF per se. Instead, personnel join one of the above units, each of which is unique in its history, culture and contribution to the joint SOF team — and our nation is better served as a result of this diversity.

The legislation that created USSOCOM also specified certain SOF activities and assigned to the command specific authorities and responsibilities. USSOCOM’s tasks, similar to those assigned to the services, include:

- Manage a separate program and budget (Major Force Program 11) for SOF-unique requirements;
- Conduct research, development and acquisition of SOF-peculiar items;
- Develop joint SOF doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures;
- Conduct joint SOF-specialized courses of instruction;

- Train all assigned forces and ensure their joint interoperability;
- Monitor the readiness of all assigned and forward-deployed joint SOF;
- Monitor the professional development of SOF personnel of all the services.

The first two tasks give USSOCOM great flexibility in training, equipping and employing its forces.

### Relevance of SOF

The U.S. national military strategy requires our armed forces to advance national security by applying military power to help shape the international environment and to respond to the full spectrum of crises, while also preparing for an uncertain future. SOF support this “shape,

***Joint Vision 2010 counsels, “We will have to make hard choices to achieve the trade-offs that will bring the best balance, most capability, and greatest interoperability for the least cost.” America’s special-operations forces, or SOF, effectively satisfy the cost-benefit criteria, and they have an important and growing role in addressing many of the future’s challenges.***

respond and prepare now” strategy by providing an array of expanded options, a strategic economy of force and various “tailor to task” capabilities — and SOF are particularly adept at countering transnational and asymmetrical threats.

Expanded options. SOF expand the options of the NCA and CINCs, particularly in crises that fall between wholly diplomatic initiatives and the overt use of large war-fighting forces. Decision-makers may choose SOF as an option because SOF provide the broadest range of capabilities that have direct applicability in an increasing number of missions — from major theater wars to smaller-scale contingencies to humanitarian assistance.

SOF allow decision-makers the flexibility to tailor U.S. responses, lethal and non-

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lethal, to encompass this wide range of possibilities and to reduce the risk of escalation associated with larger, more visible force deployments. Consequently, SOF may be the best choice for crises requiring immediate response or precise use of force, such as Operation Assured Response — the evacuation of 2,115 noncombatants from Liberia in 1996 with no loss of life.

Strategic economy of force. SOF may be most effective in conducting economy-of-force operations, thereby generating a strategic advantage that is disproportionate to the resources SOF represent. For example, combat-ready Army SF teams are routinely deployed around the world in support of peacetime engagement that will prevent conflict and conserve resources. By training

ing land, sea, air and space dominance. SOF also conduct information operations; train indigenous forces; assist conventional forces in managing civilians on the battlefield; and provide advisory and liaison capabilities that can be used to rapidly integrate coalition partners and to leverage those partners' unique qualities in order to enhance the capabilities of the entire force.

During postconflict situations, SOF's training skills, coupled with CA and PSYOP expertise, help speed the transition to normalcy, thereby allowing conventional forces to redeploy quickly. SOF use these same skills during peace operations, such as those in Haiti and Bosnia, to defuse volatile situations, to provide "ground truth" to commanders, and to assist in the development of posthostilities controls.

"Tailor to task" capabilities. SOF are readily adaptable to a broad and constantly varying range of tasks and conditions. Their organizational agility allows SOF to quickly concentrate synergistic effects from widely dispersed locations and to assist joint-force commanders in achieving decisive results without the need for the time-consuming and risky massing of people and equipment. Even under the most austere conditions, SOF can conduct 24-hour, multidimensional operations to penetrate denied or sensitive areas and resolve terrorist activity; to pre-empt the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, or WMD; or to strike key targets with precision and discrimination.

Although a potent military force, SOF can often accomplish their missions without resorting to the use of force. Their training skills, combined with language proficiency, cultural awareness, regional orientation, and an understanding of the political context of their missions, make SOF unique in the U.S. military — true "warrior-diplomats." Moreover, this broad array of versatile capabilities allows SOF to "tailor to task" and to operate effectively in any situation or environment.

Through their recurring interaction with current and potential allies, SOF use their expertise to assist American ambassadors and the geographic CINCs in influencing

***Although a potent military force, SOF can often accomplish their missions without resorting to the use of force. Their training skills, combined with language proficiency, cultural awareness, regional orientation, and an understanding of the political context of their missions, make SOF unique in the U.S. military — true 'warrior-diplomats.'***

host-nation forces to provide their own security — and by strengthening government infrastructures through programs integrating Civil Affairs, or CA, and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP — SF foster stability and help prevent local problems from developing into threats to international security. Should conflict arise, these "global scouts" can quickly transition to combat operations and spearhead decisive victory. As SOF engage in additional peacetime operations, it is important to remember that we are — first and foremost — warriors.

During conflict, SOF conduct operational and strategic missions that directly or indirectly support the joint-force commander's campaign plan. Fully integrated into the joint campaign plan, SOF can attack high-value, time-sensitive targets throughout the battlespace to assist in rapidly achiev-



Photo by Richard M. Heileman

American civilians evacuated from Monrovia, Liberia, during Operation Assured Response head for the airport terminal in Dakar, Senegal.

situations to favor U.S. national interests. During fiscal year 1997, SOF conducted 17 crisis-response operations and 194 counterdrug missions; they also performed humanitarian demining operations in 11 countries. In addition to meeting these real-world requirements, SOF maintained a robust exercise schedule — participating in 224 combined exercises for training in 91 countries around the world.

This proactive peacetime engagement not only allows SOF to help host nations meet their legitimate defense needs, but also to encourage regional cooperation, to maintain U.S. access, and to visibly demonstrate the role of a professional military in a democratic society. SOF's ability to help mold the international environment, rather than merely to respond to it, is our most important day-to-day contribution to national security and represents our "steady state" for the future.

Asymmetric realities. U.S. conventional military dominance encourages future adversaries and competitors — ranging from established nations to nonstate groups such as terrorists, insurgents and new and unpredictable extremists — to avoid direct military confrontation with the U.S.

Instead, our adversaries may use asymmetric means — such as WMD, information warfare, terrorism, fighting in urban areas, or technological or operational surprise — to offset our conventional advantages and to achieve their goals — perhaps even posing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Moreover, an adversary already engaged in conventional warfare with the U.S. could still employ any of the above means to gain temporary or localized battlespace parity or asymmetrical advantage.

The asymmetric challenge with the gravest potential facing the U.S. today is the threat posed by the global proliferation of WMD and the means of delivering WMD. In recognition of the significant dangers associated with WMD, in May 1995 the Department of Defense assigned SOF specific responsibilities in support of the broader interagency task of preventing the proliferation of WMD.

Today, counterproliferation, or CP, has been given top operational priority at USSOCOM. CP includes actions taken to locate, identify, seize, destroy, render safe, or transport WMD. We are pursuing several approaches to address the WMD threat, including working with the geo-

graphic CINCs to determine how best to bring SOF's capabilities to bear in support of theater CP objectives. We continue to refine our tactics, techniques and procedures in order to allow us to engage the full range of WMD targets, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; improvised devices; means of delivery; and supporting infrastructure.

Another serious asymmetric reality is information-based conflict. The power of information is growing exponentially, and the increasing dependence of the U.S. and its adversaries on information presents many vulnerabilities and opportunities. In the past, information operations were the "punctuation" on the grammar of conflict — enhancing the impact of the military, diplomatic and economic efforts. Today, the military often augments the other elements of national power to punctuate information operations — adding support, emphasis and authority.

The information age has also opened up a wide range of new opportunities, seemingly endless possibilities, and significant vulnerabilities for SOF. Accordingly, we are examining new ways to enhance our capabilities to ensure uninterrupted information exchange, to reduce an adversary's ability to use information, and to influence situations in order to support mission accomplishment. These capabilities range from passive defense to psychological oper-

ations to precision-strike operations against key information nodes.

The revolutionary capabilities offered by information-age technologies are forcing us away from traditional assumptions about SOF's organization and even the conduct of operations. For example, future psychological operations will employ a "CNN Central" approach — deploying small teams that can reach back to a supporting network of expertise and disseminate information quickly over satellites, the Internet, television, radio and other media.

Meanwhile, the explosive growth of commercial information technologies has made it possible for terrorist organizations, crime syndicates and drug cartels to organize, plan and coordinate activities from multiple locations around the world. With ties to rogue states, corrupt public officials and business organizations, these transnational entities can target many important public infrastructures (financial institutions, air-traffic-control systems, energy grids and telecommunications networks), U.S. military forces, and American citizens.

One consequence of this increased connectivity will be the creation of "distributed" threats and conflicts that will make national boundaries irrelevant. Given this threat evolution, SOF will operate with increasing autonomy within the commander's intent — relying on distributed command and control, technology templating,

An instructor from the 10th Special Forces Group explains lane-marking techniques to a student demining team in Bosnia.



Photo by Thomas Newell

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and information avenues of approach to locate widely dispersed targets and to neutralize those targets using cyber weapons and kinetic weapons. Maintaining operations security and employing deception will become increasingly critical as our own digitized signatures multiply.

Clearly, those who can exploit rapid advances in information and information-related technologies stand to gain significant advantages — and the most momentous changes in this sector are yet to come. But technology alone is not the answer. We must also capture the true art of information operations — the techniques typified in the reality manipulation employed daily by the marketing and advertising behemoths of Hollywood and Madison Avenue.

The capabilities required to counter WMD, to conduct information operations, and to deal with other transnational and asymmetric threats are extremely resource-intensive, and in some cases they are dependent upon the continued development of revolutionary technologies. That development will be critical in ensuring that SOF have the resources and the increasingly sophisticated capabilities required to dominate any form of conflict. Equally important is the development and the continued adaptation of a definitive U.S. policy for addressing these and other emerging threats. Considerable progress has already been made in both areas of development. Much, however, remains to be done.

### **The way ahead**

USSOCOM faces an operational environment characterized by accelerating geopolitical change, rapid technological advancement, evolving threats, constrained resources, and potential new roles. These factors require innovative thinking and new ways of shaping change if we are to provide the widest array of options in protecting America's interests. And the truth is, a business-as-usual approach will not provide the capabilities that we need in order to deal with the transnational and asymmetric opponents of tomorrow.

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change — and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehensive, enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team. As the president of AT&T once said, "When the pace of change outside an organization becomes greater than the pace of change inside the organization, the end is near."

This reality means that USSOCOM must embrace and institutionalize the process of change in a disciplined manner that will allow us to move closer to our vision. During this journey, only our core values will be permanent and non-negotiable. Everything else — our organization,

***We need to anticipate trends and future scenarios, conditioning ourselves not to be surprised by surprise or by the rapidity and the dynamics of change. As new threats arise, we must decide which of our current capabilities to retain or modify, which new ones to develop, and which old ones to discard.***

force structure, platforms, equipment and missions — must continuously evolve to meet the needs of the nation and to seize the opportunities brought about by change.

To be relevant in the future, we must continue our transformation while maintaining the readiness required to shape and respond to the world today. We need to anticipate trends and future scenarios, conditioning ourselves not to be surprised by surprise or by the rapidity and the dynamics of change. As new threats arise, we must decide which of our current capabilities to retain or modify, which new ones to develop, and which old ones to discard.

SOF must focus on emerging threats that either exceed the capabilities of conventional forces or that can be dealt with better by small, highly specialized units. We must carefully assess those threats and, as appropriate, provide an effective

SOF soldiers must combine warrior skills with language and cultural skills. Here, Special Forces soldiers inspect parachutes of Thai soldiers during Exercise Cobra Gold.



Photo by Keith D. Butler

solution through strategic planning, resourcing, acquisition, and operational-support initiatives. Equally as important, we must identify those missions that are no longer relevant for SOF and recommend shifting these missions to our conventional forces in order to better focus our resources on critical special-operations activities.

SOF must be a full-spectrum, multi-mission force — providing a comprehensive set of capabilities to the nation. This means that we must swiftly adapt to diverse and evolving threats from less technologically advanced adversaries as well as from peer competitors. We must continue to operate effectively in joint, combined and inter-agency environments — yet we must transcend these traditional parameters to fuse all of America's political, military, economic, intellectual, technical and cultural strengths into a comprehensive approach to future challenges. This approach will allow SOF to tap into such diverse areas as commercial information technologies, utilization of space, biomedicine, environmental science, robotics, organizational design, and commercial research and development.

The 21st-century SOF warrior — selectively recruited and assessed, mature, superbly trained and led — will remain the

key to success in special operations. These warriors must be proficient in core competencies, training for certainty while educating for uncertainty. We must be capable of conducting strategic operations in tactical environments — combining a warrior ethos with language proficiency, cultural awareness, political sensitivity and the ability to use information-age technology. We must also have the intellectual agility to conceptualize creative, useful solutions to ambiguous problems and to provide a coherent set of choices to the supported CINC or joint-force commander — more like Sun Tzu and less like Clausewitz. This means training and educating people how to think, not just what to think.

SOF must examine every advantage that our technological genius can supply — and selectively exploit those few required for success. We cannot afford purely materiel fixes to every future problem; therefore, we must leverage those critical technologies that give us a decided advantage. We must be quick to capitalize on emerging technologies that have the potential for significantly enhancing the human dimension — especially low-observable, masking technologies; smarter weapons; long-range precision capabilities, and information tech-

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nologies. Merging technology with the human dimension will improve the SOF warrior's survivability, lethality, mobility, and ability to access and use all relevant information sources.

We must also recognize that the benefits of technological change cannot be fully realized until they are incorporated into new organizational forms — SOF organizational innovation is as important as innovation in our weapon systems. Replacing technology without replacing old structures will not work. Most importantly, we must remember that the purpose of technology is to equip the man, not simply to man the equipment. SOF people are at the heart of all special operations; platforms and equipment merely help people accomplish the mission. The fingers on our future triggers must be controlled by willing warriors of courage, compassion and judgment — individuals of character with strong legal, moral and ethical foundations — organized into dynamic and agile joint SOF teams.

## Conclusion

As USSOCOM moves into the 21st century, we are evolving to meet future challenges and to sustain the relative capability advantage that we enjoy today. USSOCOM is already considering new and innovative methods of assessing and developing people; debating possible changes in doctrine, roles, missions and force structure; preparing an investment plan for modernization and streamlined acquisition that leverages the revolutions in military affairs and business affairs; and examining new operational concepts for the conduct of special operations in future environments. USSOCOM headquarters is leading this change by transitioning from a traditional military staff to an information-age staff that is shaped around a matrix of core functions — making it more flexible and better postured to resource and support global SOF requirements.

We cannot know with certainty who our foes will be or precisely what demands will be placed on us in the future. However, in a time of uncertainty and opportunity, USSOCOM will continue to provide our

nation with the means to protect our interests and to promote a peace that benefits America and the democratic ideals that we cherish. ✕

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General Peter J. Schoomaker is commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, headquartered at MacDill AFB, Fla. Prior to this assignment, he commanded the U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C. His other special-operations assignments include command at the Special Forces detachment, company, battalion and group levels; and command of the Joint Special Operations Command. In other general-officer assignments, General Schoomaker served as assistant division commander, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and as deputy director for operations, readiness and mobilization, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, the Command and General Staff College and the National War College.



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# SOF in Conflict Resolution: Operational Capabilities vs. Political Constraints

by Lieutenant Colonel Anthony D. Marley, U.S. Army (ret.)

**I**dentification of an appropriate role for the U.S. Department of Defense's special-operations forces, or SOF (including Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Air Force Air Commandos, the Psychological Operations groups, and the Civil Affairs brigades), remains a contentious issue. Rather than the question of "What role could SOF play?" the central policy question is "What role should SOF play?" The principal problem is that the operational capabilities of SOF personnel and SOF units greatly exceed the comfort levels of Washington policy-makers (both civilian and military).

Separate from the question of an appropriate role for SOF, but having an obvious impact on it, is the fundamentally important issue of whether DoD should play a role in conflict resolution of the so-called nontraditional variety. There is a general reluctance on the part of the Pentagon, but a reluctance shared by many others within the policy-making community, to see U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations, or PKO.<sup>1</sup> Part of this reluctance is driven by

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the fact that PKO participation potentially decreases U.S. security by tying down the participating units, thereby reducing national capability to carry out operations elsewhere. There is also a major concern on the part of DoD policy-makers that U.S. participation in a peacekeeping operation virtually guarantees that the PKO will become a sinkhole for DoD resources — personnel, equipment, and operations and maintenance funding.

Numerous non-DoD policy-makers are also concerned about the resource aspect, although strictly from the budget-busting optic. The U.S. government is already \$1 billion in arrears to the United Nations for U.N. peacekeeping assessments, and policy-makers are reluctant to see us add to that debt (irrespective of whether the U.S. were to commit troops or materiel to the PKO). Further, the hurt to U.S. public opinion caused by the U.S. casualties in the Somalia PKO has sensitized policy-makers (and policy influencers such as the U.S. Congress) to the serious political costs that participation in peacekeeping can entail. While these concerns do not absolutely predetermine our policy position on a specific PKO, they do make approval increasingly difficult; the resource issue weighs against our approving the start (or extension) of a peacekeeping operation in the first place, while the Somalia imagery pushes us toward a policy of avoidance of U.S. casualties through non-participation in peacekeeping.



Photo by Luis Deya

An American officer talks with Bosnian women following a PSYOP broadcast in which the details of a proposed resettlement of their town were announced.

The muddle resulting from these inter-agency policy issues concerning participation in peacekeeping in general is compounded by attitudes concerning special-operations forces. There appears to be an ongoing (and seemingly permanent) rivalry between the “real DoD” (i.e., regular forces) and SOF. The driving force on this is mostly resource allocation. SOF not only get allocations through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, but additional funding out of the real DoD’s hide also comes to SOF from the service secretaries. The real DoD seems to be reluctant to see SOF units demonstrate how “special” they are. But since real DoD lacks other capabilities that they are willing to provide to a peacekeeping operation (with the obvious and major exception of cargo airlift), nothing gets done.

Another part of the problem is one of image. Some within the policy-making community, Congress, and the media still think of special-operations forces in terms of Vietnam-era activities, or of various shadowy, perhaps unsavory, politico-military activities in Latin America. In this view, SOF elements are better suited to winning a conflict than they are to helping heal the wounds of the conflict.

This image problem is further compounded by the name of one of the key SOF components: psychological operations, or

PSYOP. The name itself conveys to many a vision of a manipulative propaganda machine, somewhat like Goebbels’ Nazi Ministry of Information.

Regardless of the outcome of the policy decision concerning what role SOF should play in conflict resolution, I would like to discuss a variety of ways in which special-operations forces could play a productive role. While the military/technical assistance needs will vary from conflict to conflict, and it is unlikely that policy-makers would agree to task DoD (and SOF) with the entire menu of possibilities, I believe that all of the following are realistic possible uses for SOF.

### **Provision of information**

SOF personnel could fill a dangerous void by helping to “sell” the peace to the citizenry and combatants. PSYOP (hopefully renamed) could play a beneficial role by assisting with the process of accurately informing the members of all warring factions, as well as the civilian populace of the affected state, of the details of what has been agreed to in the peace accord. In several conflicts the factional leadership has tried to distort the impression given to their adherents concerning the negotiated peace agreement and disarmament/demobilization plans.<sup>2</sup>

An American officer of the 353rd CA Command confers with German army officers in a civil-military operations center.



File photo

PSYOP could also play a useful role in providing timely and objective (nonpartisan) public news and information on a continuing basis throughout the transitional period agreed to in the peace accord. Additionally, PSYOP personnel could facilitate the local access of the international news media in an effort to encourage multi-source journalistic reporting of the peace process.<sup>3</sup>

### Disarmament

Special-operations “shooters and trainers,” coupled with Civil Affairs teams, could provide essential services throughout the encampment, disarmament and demobilization process. Among these services would be: establishing camps; performing weapons inspection and disposition; and conducting intelligence assessments.

The following skills and services are critical for the establishment and successful operation of disarmament and demobilization camps: camp administration and management; perimeter security; provision of health care for encamped person-

nel; camp sanitation, to include provision of both clean water and sewage disposal; and logistics planning and management for the camps. All of these activities, which are critical to the success of the camps, are within the capabilities of SOF.

A multiplicity of weapons and munitions types will be surrendered in a wide range in operating conditions (non-repairable, repairable, and fully functioning). SOF armorers could assist with the conduct of a triage operation to identify, register, inspect, and appropriately dispose (in accordance with the terms of the peace accord) of the weapons and munitions.

The peacekeeping force and international community could benefit from periodic politico-military assessments (intelligence) concerning the health of the ongoing peace process: What percentage of each faction’s forces have turned themselves in? What are the current threats to the process? Are there major elements who do not intend to carry through with the terms of the peace accord and, if so, what actions are they apt to take? SOF elements are well-suited to collect, ana-

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lyze and report such information in a timely manner.

### **Humanitarian assistance**

Civil Affairs teams are capable of providing a variety of services in support of peace-building/national reconstruction efforts following the end of a conflict. They could provide personnel to participate in humanitarian-assistance assessment missions, or to coordinate between humanitarian-assistance agencies and DoD within a civil-military operations center, or CMOC. In this capacity, Civil Affairs personnel would liaise with non-government organizations to provide and exchange information in an effort to better meet the needs of the populace while enhancing the security of all concerned.

Civil Affairs units could also provide teams of medical personnel and public-health experts and assistance teams to assist with the restoration and operations of public utilities, and with the management and operation of public transportation systems. Civil Affairs personnel could assist the local populace with the restoration of public administration, to include fire and police protection.

Special Forces units are also capable of participating in assessment missions and of providing medical teams.

### **Integration of military forces**

By performing defense-requirements surveys and by providing military training, SOF teams can assist with the planning and the implementation needed to integrate former opposing forces into a unified, national military.

Defense-requirements surveys can be conducted to identify and recommend the force size and force structure for the country in question.

In the realm of training, SOF units and personnel could conduct both technical/professional military education courses and professional ethics training. They could present a variety of professional courses, to include military basic training, NCO training, officer-candidate courses, staff-officer training, and unit tactical training, to the integrating forces.

SOF personnel could also provide train-

ing in special subjects that can be important to the success of the integration process and the image of the new national military. These subjects would include the law of war, respect for human rights, and the role of a military in a democracy.

### **Demining**

SOF elements could provide important assistance for demining efforts (as they are already doing in several countries). Mines are extensively employed in an increasing number of contemporary conflicts. SOF personnel and units could provide critically important demining services in support of conflict resolution. These could include assessing the nature and extent of the mining problem; mine awareness information and training campaigns (to include "train the trainer" efforts) to sensitize the populace to the problem; and train-the-trainer instruction in detection, clearance and destruction of mines.

In any situation in which antipersonnel mines have been widely employed, there will be numerous citizens who have lost limbs. SOF personnel could help in placing



Photo by Edward Cranick

Mines have been employed in a number of contemporary conflicts. SOF personnel can provide critically important demining services during conflict resolution.

SOF personnel can provide training to foreign militaries identified for peacekeeping duties. The training would include the majority of skills that SOF already teach as members of mobile training teams.



File photo

prosthetics workshops into service and in training local staff to operate them.

### Peacekeeping

Another service that SOF can provide to conflict-resolution efforts (as they are already doing) is to train units from foreign militaries that have been identified for participation in an international peacekeeping operation. The type of training to be provided would include the vast majority of skills already being trained by mobile training teams, and would comprise both peacekeeping-specific and “traditional” subjects.

This, in turn, raises an issue concerning the development of a U.S. “peacekeeping” doctrine and a course of instruction that could be presented by U.S. trainers. Up until now, DoD has not had an agreed-upon peacekeeping curriculum with which to conduct training (for either U.S. or foreign personnel).<sup>4</sup> This lack does not prevent DoD (and SOF) from making valuable contributions on an ad hoc basis, but it does prevent them from taking a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping training.

In addition to the myriad possibilities discussed above, SOF units and personnel are

obviously capable of serving as conventional forces in international military observer, peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement missions. In this capacity, they could draw upon their politico-military expertise to aid efforts to resolve local-level conflicts.

### Early warning

All the efforts above are concerned with resolving, and recovering from, wars and other violent conflicts. Like the dog that did not bark, conflicts that are resolved in their early (pre-violence) stages are harder to identify than most efforts associated with conflict resolution (peacekeeping and peace building). But SOF are particularly well-qualified in their training and missions (mobile training teams and joint combined exercise and training deployments) to identify dysfunctional aspects of a country’s military establishment. This can permit SOF (if the SOF elements are particularly sensitive to the politico-military situation) to serve as an “early warning” system. Effective early warning might permit political intervention sufficiently timely to prevent the outbreak of

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violence. In cases of conflict, as in most of the other ills of the world, prevention is preferable to a cure. Further, the professional training SOF provide might possibly influence the foreign military forces to move in more productive directions.

## Conclusion

Every effort at conflict resolution is different, requiring a response tailored to the specifics of the local situation. As outlined above, SOF elements are well-suited to play an important role in conflict-resolution operations.

Temporally, I believe that SOF elements could make their greatest contribution during the ill-defined transition from war to peace. Peace enforcement, while at times of critical importance, draws upon only a limited slice of SOF capabilities. Longer-term recovery and development efforts, on the other hand, should remain the responsibility of the traditional assistance agencies and organizations.

Their training, missions, politico-military sensitivity, and readiness make SOF elements uniquely qualified to contribute to a diverse variety of peacekeeping situations. The principal question remains one of operational capabilities vs. political constraints: whether policy-makers will capitalize on these capabilities and employ special-operations forces in international peacekeeping and peace-building operations. ✂

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### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Presidential Decision Directive On Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25)7, signed in 1993, was intentionally written so as to limit the likelihood of participation by U.S. forces in peace operations.

<sup>2</sup> For example, following the July 1993 signing of the Cotonou Peace Accord that sought to end the civil war in Liberia, each of the multiple factions disseminated information to its fighters concerning the details of the accord that made that faction appear victorious, rather than explaining that a compromise agreement had been negotiated. The U.N. monitoring force in Liberia lacked the capability to simply read the agreement word-for-word in a radio broadcast.

<sup>3</sup> U.N. forces recognized this important benefit of PSYOP in Somalia, where they called upon U.S. forces to conduct such a program. The U.N. failed to include a PSYOP radio-broadcast capability in subsequent peace operations in Mozambique, Liberia and Rwanda.

<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Army has published FM 100-23 to provide guidance to the Army for the conduct of peace operations, but there is not yet a joint doctrine for peacekeeping.

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# PSYOP Planning and the Joint Targeting Process

by Major Fletcher Crews

If psychological operations, or PSYOP, is to be a key element of information operations and command-and-control warfare, PSYOP must be integrated into campaign planning at the theater and joint-task-force levels, and the PSYOP campaign must be linked to the overall campaign.

To be effective, PSYOP planners must understand the targeting and coordination process. They should also have an effective means of expressing their ideas so that non-PSYOPers can understand and apply them to their own campaign-planning processes.

This article explains the role of the PSYOP planner in campaign planning and recommends a tool and the coordination procedures that will help synchronize PSYOP planning and targeting with the activities of the other components of the joint task force, or JTF.

Targeting is the process of selecting targets and determining the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and force capabilities. Targeting and joint fires are intended to delay, disrupt, divert or destroy the enemy's military potential throughout the depth of the operational area.

At the JTF level, targeting and joint fire support are derived from the guidance of the joint-force commander and from the concept for the campaign or operation. In order to effectively employ all joint forces against the enemy, the commander of the

joint task force, or CJTF, must prioritize, deconflict and synchronize all actions of the joint forces. Through the J3, the CJTF provides targeting guidance and priorities, apportions and allocates resources, establishes the timing and specific effects required on each target, and tasks components to strike targets or to support those strikes.

In general, the joint-force commander relies on his joint targeting coordination board, or JTCB, to implement his guidance. The JTCB must ensure unity of effort across the JTF spectrum of fire. This is no easy task, given the frequently overlapping and sometimes competing interests among the various components of the JTF.

The targeting process begins with guidance and priorities issued to the CJTF by the National Command Authorities and continues with identification of requirements by components, prioritization of requirements, acquisition of targets, attack of targets and the assessment of target effects. Targeting is performed by all JTF components who have the capability of delivering fires. Components coordinate and integrate their targeting recommendations at the JTCB.

A campaign is the operational process by which the commander coordinates, employs and sustains his available resources in a series of phased joint actions in order to achieve strategic objectives. A campaign plan translates strategic guid-

ance into operational directives. The PSYOP campaign plan is nested within the overall campaign plan: It is intended to translate strategic guidance into operational PSYOP.

Army Field Manuals 33-1 and 33-1-1 attempt to codify the elements of the PSYOP campaign-planning process, but the 4th PSYOP Group's planning and readiness standing operating procedure, or PSOP, offers a more detailed explanation of the process as it is currently practiced.

The mission-planning process described in Chapter 3 of the 4th POG PSOP is designed to ensure that planning is conducted in a focused, efficient manner, with input from higher headquarters and subordinate units. The process consists of eight steps, shown in the chart at right. To produce a PSYOP plan that is nested within the supported commander's plan, the PSYOP planner must take each step in sequence and apply the process in a timely manner.

The PSYOP campaign-development process is designed to ensure that every PSYOP activity contributes to the accomplishment of the supported commander's intent. Chapter 4 of the 4th POG PSOP lists 14 steps in the process, also shown at right. The key to the campaign-development process is to work down from the analysis of the supported commander's mission to the development of psychological actions, or PSYACTs, and then to integrate those PSYACTs with the other actions of the ground tactical plan.

However, even the PSYOP campaign-development process described in the PSOP is incomplete. A step seems to have been omitted between Steps 12 and 13: 12a. Develop and integrate a PSYOP targeting matrix. The PSYOP targeting matrix is intended to be used primarily by the JPOTF J3 as a tool for war-gaming possible effects of PSYACTs or other activities in relation to each other, for sequencing of PSYACTs, and for prioritizing PSYOP fires. The matrix offers a format that is recognizable to conventional-force planners from all services, and it

## Mission Planning Process

1. Receive the mission/issue warning order.
2. Conduct mission analysis and present mission-analysis brief.
3. Develop courses of action.
4. War-game courses of action.
5. Compare courses of action.
6. Present course-of-action decision brief and receive commander's decision.
7. Prepare OPLAN/OPORD.
8. Issue OPLAN/OPORD.

## PSYOP Campaign Development Process

1. Receive supported unit's mission.
2. Analyze/determine supported commander's objectives.
3. Conduct PSYOP mission analysis.
4. Develop PSYOP courses of action.
5. Analyze potential target audiences.
6. Select target audiences.
7. Analyze target audiences.
8. Develop PSYOP actions and products.
9. Develop PSYOP activities.
10. Develop PSYOP series.
11. Develop PSYOP programs.
12. Develop PSYOP campaign.
13. Execute PSYOP campaign.
14. Monitor/modify PSYOP campaign.

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provides a smooth process of integrating PSYOP nonlethal fires into a standard targeting-and-fire-support architecture.

### **PSYOP targeting**

PSYOP targeting is perhaps the single most important element of PSYOP planning. Its role is especially critical in making the PSYOP campaign relevant to the other elements of the joint task force. PSYOP targeting synchronizes the PSYOP campaign with the overall campaign plan of the supported commander and, if properly formatted, gives the other planners something concrete to link to.

In the author's view, the PSYOP targeting process begins with Step 6 of the PSYOP campaign-development process — Select target audiences. To maintain a common frame of reference, PSYOP planners must use the same terminology used by the other planners with whom they work. This is not to say that PSYOP planners should abandon the standard PSYOP target-audience-analysis process, but rather that they should group their target audiences according to the categories used by information-warfare and command-and-control-warfare planners. The target categories are:

- **Links.** Connections, human or mechanical/electronic, between nodes.
- **Nodes.** Key centers of power and influence, human or mechanical/electronic.
- **Human factors.** Intelligence, attitudes, emotions, beliefs, values, morality, personality, etc.
- **Weapon systems.** Primarily mechanical systems; however, a weapon system could be human; e.g., a suicide bomber.
- **Databases.** Computer data, software and hardware, electronic media.

A critical node is an element, position or communications entity whose disruption or destruction would immediately degrade an adversary's abilities. A vulnerable node is one that is susceptible to PSYOP attack, is a realistic target, and is accessible by means at our disposal or means available to others that we understand and can access. (A PSYOP target will most likely need to be a demonstrably critical node to warrant the apportionment of a JTF com-

mander's assets to attack it.)

Targets are further characterized as high-value targets, or HVT; and high-pay-off targets, or HPT. An HVT is critical to the success of the enemy's mission. An HPT is critical to the success of the friendly unit's mission.

### **Targeting matrix**

The first block of the targeting matrix assigns a number to the target. (Any number of PSYACTs can be executed against the same target.) The second block assigns a priority to the target, based upon the supported commander's guidance and an analysis of the target audience. Priority is assigned by the J3 and the chief of the product-development center, or PDC. The third block is simply a yes-or-no answer for HVT and HPT criteria.

The fourth block identifies the type of target to be attacked: link, node, human factor, weapon system or database. The fifth block expresses briefly the priority intelligence needed to determine the attack guidance. For example, "Will interceptor pilots fly in response to cross-border air operations?" In this case, the target would be the interceptor pilots. The sixth block is the trigger or the event that would cause the JPOTF to execute PSYOP fires against the target. In this example, the trigger could be the increased activity of the ground-support personnel at the interceptor air base.

The seventh block describes the PSYACT itself, such as a leaflet drop. The eighth block shows the attack guidance derived from a target-audience analysis and a mission analysis. In the example of the air base, for instance, analysis of the target audience might show that leaflets would be the proper medium for communicating the desired message. A mission analysis might indicate that because of the air-defense threat, only fast-moving aircraft would be capable of reaching the target, so the attack guidance would be MK-129 leaflet bombs.

The ninth block is the source of feedback once the PSYACT has been executed. In the example of the air base, a good source of feedback would be reconnaissance pho-

## PSYOP Targeting Matrix

Target #	Priority	HVT/HPT	Type Target	PSYOP PIR	Trigger	PSYACT	Attack Guidance	Feedback	Planned Effect
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									
6									
7									
8									

tos of the airfield during the days following the leaflet drop. The 10th block describes the desired effect of the PSYACT, such as reduced activity of ground-support personnel at the airfield and a decreased likelihood of sorties in the near term.

### Pitfalls

PSYOP planners are subject to two common pitfalls. The first, the “contemplating infinity” trap, occurs when a unit begins detailed planning based on fragmentary information or incomplete guidance. The trap springs when planners realize that without clear guidance, the number of possible actions, reactions and counteractions of the multiple target audiences is overwhelming. At that point, the planners place detailed PSYOP planning in the too-hard-to-do box. They then generally fall back on product development and concentrate on producing pretty products.

In most cases, the PSYOP campaign-planning process must begin at Step 3 of the mission-planning process — Develop courses of action. It is a fatal error to begin developing PSYOP products and actions before a detailed mission analysis

has been completed.

The second pitfall is the “put-a-bow-on-it” trap. In this situation, the PSYOP planner, hoping to eliminate the troublesome gray areas that exist in operational planning, narrows the focus of the PSYOP campaign-planning process by making broad assumptions at the outset. One common assumption is that the campaign will progress from start to finish in accordance with some scripted plan. The PSYOP planner who falls into this trap will develop detailed product books and execution matrices that depict every target audience, PSYOP objective, PSYOP campaign objective, PSYOP theme, PSYACT and PSYOP series, from beginning to end. The PSYOP campaign will appear impressive in its thoroughness, but it will be inflexible in its execution. If one of the basic assumptions changes or is shown to be false, the entire campaign plan will be invalidated, forcing the planner back to the drawing board.

It is important for the PSYOP planner to remain linked to the overall campaign-planning process and to keep in mind the purpose and the limitations of a campaign plan. It is no more feasible for a PSYOP planner to attempt to synchronize every

supporting action of a campaign plan at the outset than it is for an artillery planner to attempt to plot every target that will be needed in support of a campaign. PSYOP is a supporting player in a cast whose stars are the JTF commander and his combatant forces. The best a PSYOP planner can hope to offer is a detailed PSYOP plan for the initial phases of the operation and a functional methodology for developing more plans as the operation evolves.

### Coordination

In order to guarantee the synchronization of lethal and nonlethal fires, the PSYOP targeting process must be coordinated with the JTF's targeting process. The JPOTF J3 is the focal point for planning the PSYOP campaign and for integrating it with the JTF campaign plan or theater campaign plan. To be of value to the JTF, the JPOTF must provide its targeting input in a timely manner.


Once the JPOTF J3 has carried the mission-planning process through Step 3, he

must direct the PDC to begin an analysis of possible target audiences and to begin the development of prototype PSYACTs. Once the J3 is armed with the supported commander's objectives, the JTF planners' template of projected enemy positions, the target audiences and some recommended PSYACTs, he is ready to war-game the PSYOP fires. Keeping in mind that the focus of the overall PSYOP campaign will change over time, perhaps even from day to day, the PSYOP planner should plan only current fires in detail; planned fires should be developed in concept.

The PSYOP targeting board is chaired by the JPOTF J3 and is attended by the JPOTF J2 and J5, as well as by representatives from the PDC. The board meets before the daily JTF targeting board so that the JPOTF targeting board's product can be integrated into the JTF targeting board.

The PSYOP targeting board begins with the J3 giving a quick synopsis of the current friendly and enemy situation, including the number of sorties currently on the air tasking order, or ATO, and any signifi-

## The Joint Targeting Process



- JFSOC Joint-force special operations command/component
- JFFC Joint-force fires coordinator
- JIPTL Joint integrated prioritized target list
- JAOC Joint air-operations center

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cant shift in the JTF's targeting priorities or in the upcoming ATO. The JPOTF J5 (J3 plans/future ops) then gives a rundown of the JTF's enemy templating for the next two ATO cycles. The J3 follows with a restatement of the JTF commander's intent.

Next, the PDC chief briefs all ongoing PSYACTs, including any not scheduled in the ATO. The PDC chief presents the evaluation by the PDC and the strategic studies detachment of the enemy's vulnerable nodes and submits his nominations for PSYACTs in support of current, future and planned operations. These PSYACTs are validated by the J3 and prioritized by the board members. The PSYOP targeting board then submits its final product, the PSYOP targeting matrix, to the JPOTF commander for concurrence and validation. The matrix then serves as the vehicle for the JPOTF to nominate targets at the JTCCB.

The JPOTF J5/future-ops planner represents the JPOTF at the JTCCB. He nominates targets and requests the allocation of resources through the same process that the other components use. The PSYOP targeting matrix will allow the J5 to negotiate with the other components on equal ground.

The functions of the JPOTF J5 are not currently well-addressed in the 4th POG PSOP, FM 33-1 or FM 33-1-1. JPOTFs and PSYOP battalions conducting routine operational support are typically organized along the lines of a conventional Army battalion task force. But that organization often results in a less-than-ideal relationship between the JTF or theater-CINC staff and the JPOTF, because the higher-level staffs have clear and distinct organizational functions for operations and planning, while the PSYOP battalion does not. The creation of a dedicated planner/future-ops element is a key ingredient to the successful integration of PSYOP targeting into the overall campaign plan.

## Conclusion

In operations for the foreseeable future, the JPOTF will function as part of a joint task force, and PSYOP training and plan-

ning must be focused on joint operations. The current system used by JPOTFs to derive missions, analyze targets, develop PSYACTs, deliver PSYOP and assess effects is fundamentally a closed circuit. While the basic principles of PSYOP campaign development are well-understood within the PSYOP community, the PSYOP campaign remains largely a mystery to other JTF components.

Unless PSYOP planners can understand and contribute to the planning and the operations of the JTF, they risk being seen as irrelevant. It is time for PSYOP to move out of isolation and begin to work within the framework of the JTF and the JTCCB. PSYOP has a place at the table with the other components, but to be effective, it must bring the appropriate tools. The PSYOP targeting matrix is one such tool. ✕

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Major Fletcher Crews is the executive officer of the 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group. He recently returned from Bosnia, where he served as the C/J3 of the Combined/Joint Information Campaign Task Force.



In previous assignments he served as a platoon leader, company executive officer, battalion S3 air, and battalion adjutant in the 101st Airborne Division; and as a rifle-company commander and headquarters-company commander in the 3rd Armored Division. His PSYOP assignments include detachment commander, 9th PSYOP Battalion; assistant S3 (Plans), 4th PSYOP Group; assistant S3 (Ops), 4th PSYOP Group; and Battalion S3, 1st PSYOP Battalion. Crews served as a commander in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as a commander in Restore Hope, and as an operations officer in Operations Provide Promise, Uphold Democracy and Joint Guard. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a B.A. in European history and an M.S. in international relations.

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# OPMS XXI: Implications for SOF

by Lieutenant Colonel (P) Frank Pedrozo

**M**any changes have occurred since the U.S. Army reviewed its personnel management system 14 years ago. The nation's operational and political environments have seen dramatic changes. The Army itself has experienced a turbulent period involving base closures; considerable downsizing; and increases both in its operating tempo, or OPTEMPO, and in its personnel tempo, or PERSTEMPO.

Additionally, the Army is preparing to assimilate 21st-century technology and high-end equipment that will allow its soldiers to deploy faster; that will enable them to better detect the movement, size and capabilities of enemy forces; and that will enable them to outmaneuver and overpower any adversary. Special-operations forces, or SOF, must keep pace with these changes, and SOF officers must have the comprehensive knowledge, skills and attributes that will be needed under many different circumstances in the next century. As we look ahead, we must ask ourselves whether our officer corps, as it is currently structured and managed, will be able to lead high-tech soldiers into the coming millennium.

In July 1996 the Army expanded its overall Force XXI review to include a thor-

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Graphics used in this article are taken from the OPMS XXI briefing that can be found at the OPMS XXI web site (<http://www.army.mil/opms>). — Editor

ough assessment of the Army's Officer Personnel Management System, or OPMS. General Dennis J. Reimer, chief of staff of the Army, chartered a task force to conduct the assessment and selected Major General David H. Ohle, the Army's assistant deputy chief of staff for personnel, to direct the year-long efforts of the OPMS XXI Task Force.

OPMS XXI represents the third major study since the Army War College's 1970 study on professionalism. The other two studies — OPMS I and OPMS II — were conducted in 1971 and 1983.

OPMS I recommended the centralized command-selection process, designated command tours, assigned primary and secondary specialties for officers, and abolished the Chemical Corps. The changes were fully implemented by July 1974.

OPMS II recommended single-branch development; functional areas not related to any branch; multiple career tracks; and a revised officer-classification system. The changes recommended by this study were approved in 1984. Implementation of these changes, which began in 1985, is still taking place.

The starting point for the OPMS XXI study was the Precursor Study Group, or PSG. Composed of seven officers, the PSG examined approximately 60 issues related to active-component officers and warrant officers. The PSG considered issues that are of major concern today and those that have

potential ramifications for the Army of the 21st century. These issues covered the spectrum of OPMS responsibilities — from questions about manning and inventory to questions about assignment management and leader development. The PSG organized these issues into three groups: structure and distribution, leader development and training, and career management.

Using the groupings established by the PSG, Ohle organized the task force into three divisions: the Structure and Distribution Division, the Leader Development and Training Division, and the Career Management Division. The task force also included an operational-research and system-analysis cell, an operations and plans cell, and an administrative-support team.

“The TF spent its first three months

thoroughly reviewing previous studies, the ‘hot’ issues surfaced by the PSG, and getting up to speed on the current system,” Ohle said.

“They worked closely with their counterparts in the field and at the schoolhouse, and with a council of colonels, to address those issues and determine what changes, if any, the Army should make to prepare its officer corps for the requirements of the 21st century.

“We want to ensure our recommended changes are on-track with developments in the current officer personnel management system, and we are taking the best approach for our officer corps, our Army and our nation,” Ohle said.

After briefing the CSA in October 1996, the task force began developing the char-

# Architecture of OPMS XXI Study

OPMS

XXI

## Vision for OPMS

- *Competent Officers of character*
- *Leading the finest Army in the world*
- *Serving the Nation’s best interests*

## Mission

### Tasks:

- *Determine required changes to OPMS*
- *Recommend an implementation plan*

### Purposes:

- *Satisfy Total Army Reqmts into XXI Century*
- *Develop officers with the right Skills, Knowledge, and Attributes*
- *Develop officers whose behavior reflects Army values*

## OPMS XXI Goals

- *Better for the Nation*
- *Better for the Army*
- *Better for the Officer*




**...Leaders for the 21st Century Army**

# OPMS XXI Concept Four Career Fields

OPMS

XXI

Four Career Fields established to develop and manage Field Grade officers



## ...Leaders for the 21st Century Army

acteristics for OPMS XXI, defining potential problems, and designing the options for the new officer-development system.

In January 1997, Ohle briefed the Chief of Staff of the Army, or CSA, on options for revising the system. The options ranged from simply tweaking the current system to organizing the Army Competitive Category into four distinct career fields, aligned with the battlefield functions outlined in Army Vision 2010. (A career field is an administrative grouping of similar functions and disciplines.)

Once the CSA submitted his recommendations, the task force began to develop the options. After further briefings and more work, the task force briefed the CSA in June, and he approved the majority of the recommendations. After developing a strat-

egy for the Army to use in implementing the changes, the task force presented its final briefing to the CSA in early July. The final OPMS XXI report will be published in the near future. Additionally, an informational OPMS XXI chain-teaching kit, composed of a VHS videotape, a CD-ROM disc, a floppy disk and several viewgraphs, will be sent to officers in the field so that commanders can ensure that their officers are familiar with the new system.

### Career fields

OPMS XXI consists of four career fields that group branches and functional areas for promotion purposes. An officer who is in a specific career field competes for promotion only with other officers in that same

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field. A brief description of the four career fields follows.

**Operations Career Field.** The OPCF is composed of the 16 officer branches and two functional areas, FA 39, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs; and FA 90, Logistician Program. Officers in this career field will serve in branch-specific positions throughout the Army. All SF commands and FA 39 commands are in this field. SOF officers who are selected to remain in the SF Branch or in FA 39 will serve in the OPCF.

**Information Operations Career Field.** The IOCF responds to the information requirements of the 21st century. The IOCF brings together functional areas FA 46, Public Affairs; FA 53, Systems Automation; and FA 57, Simulation Operations. It also creates several new FAs: FA 30, Information Operations; FA 34, Strategic Intelligence; and FA 40, Space Operations.

**Institutional Support Career Field.** The ISCF focuses on the increasingly technical and complex task of running the Army. It is responsible for managing, planning and programming Army resources, both for the near term and for the long term. Included in this career field are FA 45, Comptroller; FA 47, U.S. Military Academy Permanent Associate Professor; and FA 49, Operations Research/Systems Analysis. The ISCF also contains some new functional areas: FA 43, Human Resource Management (similar to the old FA 41); FA 50, Strategy and Force Development (includes parts of the old FA 54); and FA 52, Nuclear Research and Operations.

**Operational Support Career Field.** The OSCF includes the Army Acquisition Corps and its associated FAs, and FA 48, Foreign Area Officer, or FAO.

## Implications

What does OPMS XXI mean to the SOF community? Officers in Special Forces, PSYOP and Civil Affairs will be affected to some extent, but not greatly. The procedures used in accessing officers into SF will remain the same, and some officers will receive functional-area training once they are branch-qualified. In all probability, the procedures used in accessing FA 39 officers

will also remain the same.

Perhaps the most significant change, and the one that will affect SOF most directly, is that all officers, after promotion to major, will be assigned to one of four career fields. This will mean that officers who are chosen to work in a career field other than the OPCF will not work in their branches again.

Dual tracking, as we know it today, will not exist. An officer will serve in a branch or functional area, and in branch-immateral assignments, for the duration of his or her Army career. These officer assignments will be located throughout the Army. For example, after career-field designation, an 11/39 will serve either in Infantry operational assignments or in PSYOP/CA assignments, but not in both. The 11/39 will rotate those assignments with branch-immateral ones. The same will apply to Special Forces: An 18/48 will serve either as a Special Forces officer or as a FAO, but not both.

About 20 percent of the officers accessed into the Special Forces Branch will later be required to leave the branch to work in one of the functional areas. FA 39 will access fewer officers than it does currently, but otherwise, it will remain unchanged.

Officers will compete for promotion only with other officers from the same career field and functional area. The number of officers who are selected for promotion will count against the ceiling established by DA for their functional area and career field only. This process will eliminate the current system of "dual counting," in which officers selected for promotion are counted against their branch and against their functional area.

This new system for promotion will have important implications. Although the total number of promotions will not increase, the potential for officers to attain the rank of colonel without having served in command positions will increase. This does not mean that promotions in all four career fields will be equal, but promotion opportunities for those officers who are outside the traditional command track will greatly improve. Promotion opportunity to lieutenant colonel will be roughly equal in all

# OPMS XXI Concept More Functional Areas

OPMS

XXI

**OPMS XXI: Develops officers in additional skills required by future Army**

<b>OPMS Functional Areas</b>	<b>OPMS XXI Functional Areas</b>
<p>39 <i>PSYOP and Civil Affairs</i></p> <p>41 <i>Personnel Programs Management</i></p> <p>45 <i>Comptroller</i></p> <p>46 <i>Public Affairs</i></p> <p>47 <i>USMA Permanent Associate Professor</i></p> <p>48 <i>Foreign Area Officer</i></p> <p>49 <i>Operations Research/Systems Analysis</i></p> <p>50 <i>Force Development</i></p> <p>51 <i>Research, Development, and Acquisition</i></p> <p>52 <i>Nuclear Weapons</i></p> <p>53 <i>Systems Automation Officer</i></p> <p>54 <i>Operations, Plans, and Training</i></p> <p>90 <i>Logistician Program</i></p> <p>97 <i>Contracting and Industrial Management</i></p> <p>Deleted or Revised Functional Area</p>	<p>30 <i>Informations Operations Officer</i></p> <p>34 <i>Strategic Intelligence Officer</i></p> <p>39 <i>PSYOP and Civil Affairs</i></p> <p>40 <i>Space Operations Officer</i></p> <p>43 <i>Human Resource Managers</i></p> <p>45 <i>Comptroller</i></p> <p>46 <i>Public Affairs</i></p> <p>47 <i>USMA Permanent Associate Professor</i></p> <p>48 <i>Foreign Area Officer</i></p> <p>49 <i>Operations Research/Systems Analysis</i></p> <p>50 <i>Strategy and Force Development</i></p> <p>51 <i>Research, Development, and Acquisition</i></p> <p>52 <i>Nuclear Weapons</i></p> <p>53 <i>Systems Automation Officer</i></p> <p>57 <i>Simulations Operations</i></p> <p>90 <i>Logistician Program</i></p> <p>97 <i>Contracting and Industrial Management</i></p> <p>New or Revised Functional Area</p>

## **...Leaders for the 21st Century Army**

four career fields.

All captains who are selected for promotion to major will receive some form of resident MEL-4 education. The details for implementation are pending.

Officers will receive their career-field assignment through the career-field designation process. During their sixth year of service, officers will receive a functional area in much the same way as they do today. They will serve in branch-qualifying positions as captains and may receive functional-area training.

Prior to the majors' promotion board, captains will submit a career-designation preference statement to PERSCOM.

PERSCOM will develop a profile on each captain after assessing the officer's performance, assignments, education and aptitudes for the various career fields. Using the information in an officer's profile, along with the recommendations of the chain of command (received as part of the new officer-evaluation report) and the officer's declared preference, a formal career-field-designation board will designate the officer's career field. The board will forward its recommendation to the office of the Army Chief of Staff for final approval.

By now, every officer should have received a pamphlet in the mail that addresses frequently-asked questions. The chain of com-

mand will receive additional information and guidance about the new system. The implementation team will also continue to update the OPMS XXI home page (<http://www.army.mil/opms>) during 1998.

The reasons for implementing OPMS XXI should be clear: War-fighting must remain the No. 1 job for the U.S. Army, but the system must also be able to develop skilled and highly qualified specialists who will be prepared to take the Army into the 21st century. As we develop those specialists, we must also create alternative career paths to success for those officers who have demonstrated the necessary skills, knowledge and attributes.

Because of the number of officers who will be affected and the number of personnel-policy changes that will be required, the task force has recommended a phased implementation strategy for OPMS XXI. Key pieces of the new system will be implemented almost immediately; other facets will take place later, either because the time required for implementation is lengthy or because the exact direction the Army should take has not yet been determined.

To account for the longer-range objectives and for the decisions that must be made over the coming year, the task force is building an adaptable plan. A key element of the plan will be officer-development action plans, or ODAPs. Each ODAP will combine sets of related issues for further development, for a decision, or for implementation in a logical sequence that is synchronized with other affected ODAPs.

Each ODAP will have its own proponent, who will be charged to execute that ODAP and to monitor its progress. Further, ODAPs will include long-range provisions for identifying potential events or actions that could trigger the Army to change the manner by which it implements an ODAP or to completely alter the nature of the ODAP itself.

Underpinning all these plans will require the Army to conduct an annual review to monitor the progress of each ODAP and to address whether an ODAP needs to be changed. A transition team, formed from the members of the task force, will oversee the implementation of the new system and

ensure a smooth hand-off to proponents.

Our goal is to develop a win-win system for the Army and its officer corps. Reaching that goal demands that we achieve a balance between the Army's diverse personnel requirements and the need to provide Army XXI with a technically and tactically competent officer corps — one with leaders who can create learning organizations focused on excellence in all that they do. One thing is certain: The officer-development system approved by the CSA is effective and flexible. It is a system best-suited not only for the officer corps but also for the Army and for our nation. ✂

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The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has requested that FA 39 officers be allowed to serve in both branch and FA 39 assignments in the operational Army. At press time, the proposal was being staffed at Department of the Army. — Editor

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# Terrorism, Law and Special Operations: Legal Meanings for the SOF Commander

by Louis René Beres

**T**he legal meaning of terrorism has become exceedingly broad and obscure. Encompassing forms of guerrilla or irregular warfare<sup>1</sup> against military targets and criminal attacks on noncombatant<sup>2</sup> urban populations, the term “terrorism” is losing all operational precision.

As a result, planning and executing counterterrorism operations could become excessively confused and difficult. To improve these circumstances, we must recognize the central importance of definition. Before our special-operations forces can be expected to cope effectively with terrorism, they must be able to identify what terrorism is.

Despite the growing volume of academic writing on the subject, little progress has been made in clarifying the concept of terrorism or in distinguishing terrorism from various other uses of force and from other related crimes under national or international law. Indeed, judging from the standard definitions of terrorism now in “professional” use, the term has become so

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. — Editor

vague that it sometimes embraces even the most divergent and unintended activities. For example, according to the definitions of terrorism that have been adopted by some U.S. government agencies and by some scholars, the American Revolution, the Gulf War (Desert Storm),<sup>3</sup> the contra insurgency in Nicaragua, and the anti-Castro insurgency supported by the U.S.<sup>4</sup> could all be classified as examples of “terrorism.”

Typical of these definitions are the following:

“The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological purposes.” — Department of Defense

“The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” — FBI

“Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents.”<sup>5</sup> — Department of State

“Violent criminal conduct apparently intended: (a) to intimidate or

coerce a civilian population; (b) to influence the conduct of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.” — Department of Justice

“The unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups or to modify their behavior or policies.” — The Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism (1986)

“Terrorism is the deliberate employment of violence or the threat of the use of violence by subnational groups and sovereign states to attain strategic and political objectives. Terrorists seek to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened. Acts of individual and collective terrorism committed in modern times have introduced a new breed of extralegal ‘warfare’ in terms of threats, technology, targets, and impact.” — Yonah Alexander, *Middle East Terrorism* (1994)<sup>6</sup>

## Legal criteria

What is wrong with these definitions? Why are they troublesome?

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First, although a few do attempt to distinguish between lawful and unlawful uses of force, they leave it entirely to the individual decision-maker to determine which particular criteria of legality should be applied — national law criteria? international law criteria? Both? What constitutes pertinent criteria under national and international law?

Under national law, pertinent penal provisions (murder, assault, theft, illegal detention of persons, hostage-taking, arson, etc.) normally contain no actual reference to terrorism, and they are applicable irrespective of any such reference.<sup>7</sup> Under international law, criteria of lawfulness are more or less present in pertinent treaty provisions, but these criteria are one step removed from judgments regarding terrorism; i.e., the analyst must first understand that terrorism is a “conglomerate” crime under international law,<sup>8</sup> and then understand which particular penal components terrorism comprises. Even if the analyst has an in-depth understanding, analysis may still be confounded by contradictory expectations, especially in regard to standards of “just cause.”

Americans will be quick to understand the overriding rationale of such standards in general. After all, this country's origins lie in the inherent right of individuals to express insurgent force when their “unalienable” natural rights are trampled upon. Nevertheless, in particular circumstances, the just-cause standards will be problematic, depending upon such things as the prevailing geopolitical objectives of both the president and the Congress. Moreover, just-cause decisions are certainly not normally made at the tactical level.

### **‘Permissible’ insurgencies**

Second, the definitions of terrorism that make no explicit reference to legality also omit the essential ele-

ments of just cause<sup>9</sup> and just means.<sup>10</sup> Under international law, these elements distinguish permissible insurgencies from impermissible insurgencies.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, in view of the supremacy of certain international laws over national or domestic law,<sup>12</sup> these elements are relevant no matter which realm of law or combination of realms is under consideration. Without the just-cause and just-means elements, a definition of terrorism necessarily includes permis-

***The October 1983 suicide truck bombing in Beirut ... and the shootings that same year at a café in San Salvador ... were considered acts of terrorism when they were committed. Today, under the terms of the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, these same acts could not be construed as terrorism.***

sible and impermissible forms of insurgency and is altogether useless.

The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995 is founded upon a definition of terrorism that includes just-means criteria but not just-cause criteria. According to the act, “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against non-combatant targets.”<sup>13</sup> It follows from this definition that all considerations of motive are extraneous to defining terrorism, and that any instance of premeditated, politically motivated violence that is not per-

petrated against noncombatant targets is not terrorism. Hence, any such instances that are altogether lacking in just cause cannot be identified as terrorism.

Is this really the meaning intended by the framers of this act? The October 1983 suicide truck bombing in Beirut that left more than 200 Marines dead, and the shootings that same year at a café in San Salvador that killed U.S. soldiers, were considered acts of terrorism when they were committed.<sup>14</sup> Today, under the terms of the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, these same acts could not be construed as terrorism. Such actions could be considered instances of terrorism if the operational definition were extended to include both just-means criteria and just-cause criteria.

Under international law, not all resorts to insurgent force are terroristic. Just cause for the “inalienable right to self-determination” and for the enjoyment of peremptory human rights is an integral part of customary and conventional norms. The right of insurgency is affirmed in the first part of the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. But insurgency is unlawful, irrespective of just cause, whenever the means fail to satisfy the just-means criteria; i.e., whenever the use of force is indiscriminate, disproportionate or beyond the codified boundaries of “military necessity.”

In order to distinguish permissible insurgencies from impermissible insurgencies, we should place our primary emphasis on the question of just means. Although considerations of just cause can be especially difficult to sort out, the standards of just means are substantially straightforward. Codified in the laws of war, which are binding upon insurgent forces as well as on regular armies, these standards should become the operational determi-

nant of authentic terrorism.

There is an important “flip side”: Not only is the just-means standard essential to the identification of terrorism (and every insurgency that violates this standard is terroristic), but the standard also applies to the permissible limitations of effective counterterrorism. Like the insurgents themselves, military forces that are used to oppose terrorists are constrained by certain restrictions of the laws of war. Failure to comply with such restrictions does not make these military forces terrorists, but it does make them guilty of war crimes and possibly even crimes against humanity.<sup>15</sup>

The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995 [Title II, Sec. 201(4)] stipulates: “The President should use all necessary means, including covert action and military force, to disrupt, dismantle and destroy infrastructure used by international terrorists, including terrorist training facilities and safe havens.” But the limitations on “necessary means” that are binding upon the SOF military commander are codified in other parts of U.S. law and under international law (which in turn forms a part of U.S. municipal law). It follows that although counterterrorism may enjoy, from time to time, exceedingly broad support, the military commander must be governed not by momentary political sentiments but by operative expectations of national and international law. Means that are “necessary” must always be consistent with long-standing principles of just means.

On occasion, the war against terrorism may even involve forcible abduction of terrorists to one’s own judicial jurisdiction for trial and possible punishment.<sup>16</sup> For the pertinent SOF commander, there will likely be little effective need to ascertain the legality of such abductions.

These judgments will have already been made at the very highest operational levels and by political leaders in the National Command Authorities. Yet, in our post-Nuremberg world legal order, ultimate responsibility is diffuse, and all levels of military participation should know (and are expected to know) what is right and what is wrong.

Forcible abduction is not an unknown remedy in international criminal law. Although great care must be taken not to violate fundamental human rights, in situations

***Under existing customary international law, ... if the threat is sufficiently imminent in point of time, states can choose to strike first, providing ... that the strike is within the parameters of discrimination, proportionality and military necessity.***

where extradition is not a viable option, the only alternative may be to leave terrorist crimes unpunished. Here, forcible abduction may represent the only way to prevent future terrorist crimes and to give needed effect to the expectation “no crime without a punishment.”

There are several relevant examples of forcible abduction: In 1960, Israel abducted Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann from Argentina on charges not of terrorist crimes, but of Nuremberg-category crimes. In 1985, a U.S. military aircraft forced down an Egyptian aircraft over international waters on the grounds that the Egyptian plane held persons accused of terrorism

in the Achille Lauro affair. In 1987, again in international waters, the U.S. FBI lured Fawez Younis, a Lebanese national, onto a yacht and transported him to the U.S. for trial. And on April 2, 1990, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a medical doctor and a citizen of Mexico, was abducted from his office by persons answerable to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, or DEA, and flown by private plane to Texas to face charges of kidnapping and murdering a DEA agent and the agent’s pilot. The charges were related to narcoterrorism.<sup>17</sup>

### **Threshold of threat**

The third problem is that the definitions referencing the “threatened use of force or violence” or the “threat of violence” never establish needed and identifiable thresholds of threat.<sup>18</sup> When is the threat sufficient to argue convincingly for the presence of terrorism? In the absence of settled, unambiguous thresholds, inclusion of “threat” within the definition can serve propagandistic or political purposes.

How, then, might definitions of terrorism that would be useful to the SOF commander incorporate precise and essential thresholds, and distinguish authentically terroristic threats from nonterroristic ones? One way might be to focus on the “hardness” of the prospective target. Here, drawing upon the previously identified rules of just means, threats directed toward noncombatant populations would be expressions of terrorism. Of course, such threats would also have to be embedded in political demands; otherwise, they would merely represent ordinary forms of criminality.

Another way would be to focus on the degree of anticipated harm. Thus, for example, threats above a specified level of destructiveness could be con-

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strued as terroristic, while those below that level might not be. But here, too, irrespective of the level of expected harm, a threat would be terroristic only if it was directed at "soft" targets and if the just-cause argument were manifestly political. Although it is true that violence above certain thresholds would be patently violative of the laws of war (because such violence would be inherently indiscriminate, disproportionate and/or beyond the boundaries of military necessity), it is not true that such violence would necessarily be terrorism. Still, in keeping with the twin criteria of just cause and just means, threats made by insurgents without just cause would be terroristic, regardless of the levels of intended harm.

Finally, it is worth noting that terrorist threats of special urgency, because of the softness of intended targets or because of the level of intended harms, could elicit anticipatory self-defense attacks by states. Under existing customary international law,<sup>19</sup> states do not always have to wait until after an attack to undertake self-defense. Rather, if the threat is sufficiently imminent in point of time,<sup>20</sup> states can choose to strike first, providing, of course, that the strike is within the parameters of discrimination, proportionality and military necessity.

In extremely rare circumstances, even assassination can be construed as a permissible expression of anticipatory self-defense. Operationally, this means that if terrorist threats are sufficiently credible and ominous, assassinating certain terrorist targets pre-emptively may be law-enforcing. Although such assassination is itself normally a form of terrorism in times of peace,<sup>21</sup> and although it is prohibited explicitly by U.S. law,<sup>22</sup> various "higher law" and international-law arguments could conceivably support such extraordinary means. Consider the possibility

of a plausible terrorist threat to employ nuclear weapons against American city dwellers. Would the rights of terrorists to be absolutely secure from extrajudicial remedies override the rights of New Yorkers or Washingtonians to survive?

The permissibility of pre-emptive assassination to counter nuclear terrorism derives from the logic of international law, from the multiple sources of international law identified at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and from the frequently irreconcilable nature of competing norms. If the world legal order were more centralized, all forms of anticipatory self-defense, including assassination, could be strenuously and correctly condemned. But in the absence of a capable supranational authority, self-help is often the only available means of law enforcement against terrorism — including self-help via the use of force.<sup>23</sup>

The above arguments assume possible use of special-operations forces for intranational counterterrorism operations. Yet the U.S. Department of Justice has stated that such use is unlikely except in "extreme cases of highly sophisticated, paramilitary terrorist operations" that lie beyond the capabilities of nonmilitary federal personnel.<sup>24</sup> In an age of mass-destruction weaponry, such cases may become plausible. If they do, military commanders engaged in domestic counterterrorism will have to balance effective operational measures with respect for constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties.

Contrary to widespread public misunderstandings, the domestic use of federal troops has been a feature of our government since George Washington called out the militia in 1794 to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion. Express constitutional authority for such use can be found at Article I, Sec. 8, which states: "The Congress shall have the power ... to pro-

vide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." Additional authority can be found at Article IV, Sec. 4, which imposes on the federal government the obligation to protect each state "against Invasion, and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." Authority is also found for the president in his Article II powers to faithfully execute the laws and to act as commander in chief of the armed forces.<sup>25</sup>

These sources of authority must be viewed against the background of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 U.S.C., Sec. 1385), which provides: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."<sup>26</sup> Civilian rule is at the heart of government in the U.S., and there is a long-standing interest in limiting military involvement within the country.<sup>27</sup> This interest has been expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, certain acts of Congress and certain decisions of the Supreme Court.

In the Declaration of Independence, a stated ground for severance of ties with Great Britain is that "the King has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without Consent of our Legislature ... (and) has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power."

The Constitution limits the role of the military in civilian affairs. It calls for a civilian to serve as commander in chief of the armed services (Art. II, Sec. 2); it limits the appropriations for armed forces to two years; it grants to the Congress

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the power to make the rules by which the armed forces are governed (Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 14); and it prohibits the involuntary quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace (Third Amendment).

Congress has enacted several statutes limiting the use of the military in enforcing civil law. In addition to the Posse Comitatus Act, Title 10 U.S.C. Secs. 331-335 delimit the circumstances under which the president may call upon the National Guard or the military to suppress insurrection or domestic violence.<sup>28</sup>

The Supreme Court has also recognized constitutional limitations on military operations in civilian law enforcement. Leading cases here are *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2, 124 (1866) and *Laird vs. Tatum*, 408 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972). *Laird vs. Tatum* involved U.S. Army intelligence surveillance of civilians engaged in antiwar protests, for the purpose of planning to quell disorders under Sec. 331 of the insurrection statutes.<sup>29</sup>

### State sponsorship

The fourth problem is that the definitions that do not exclusively specify insurgent organizations broaden the meaning of terrorism to unmanageable and operationally useless levels. As a crime under international law,<sup>30</sup> terrorism cannot be committed by states. This is a most sensible exclusion, because the alternative would lead to unwieldy conceptual expansion, “blending” with other related crimes (e.g., aggression<sup>31</sup>) and a consequent watering-down of the crime. Moreover, in the simultaneous absence of precise just-cause/just-means criteria regarding the use of force, virtually all force exercised by governments could conceivably be construed as “terroristic.”

Terrorism, of course, can be supported by states. Hence, counterterrorism measures may be directed at

various state sponsors of terrorism as well as at insurgent forces. For the SOF commander, conducting these measures might involve various tactical considerations that, more often than not, are inextricably intertwined with legal questions. If, for example, a decision is made to strike certain targets within the sponsoring state, concern for compliance with the laws of war becomes far more comprehensive.

Faced with state and nonstate adversaries, states seeking to fight terrorism might need to assess the correlations of forces on tactical, operational and strategic levels. Traditionally, the assessment of such correlations in war has been intimately tied to what Clausewitz called the “law of numbers”; that is, that superiority of numbers, beyond a certain point, can overwhelm all other combat factors.<sup>32</sup>

But for today’s military commander engaged in counterterrorism operations, this “law” is almost always irrelevant. The essence of terrorism is the capacity to inflict harm, even catastrophic harm, with extremely small forces. Hence, the SOF commander assessing correlations of forces in the fight against terrorism will have to look beyond numbers of troops to more subtle sources of power. For example, military planners must pay particular attention to the diffusion of intellectual and financial assets among pertinent terrorist groups, and to the associated proliferation of the components of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

From the standpoint of law, we would have to monitor interpenetrations between states and terrorist groups in order to identify their jurisprudential rights and responsibilities. We would also have to monitor our own rights and responsibilities concerning the control of threatening forms of diffusion and proliferation.

Of course, wars against terrorism

and traditional wars between states need not be mutually exclusive. In certain circumstances, to the extent that terrorist groups are supported or sustained by particular states, the war against terrorists will have to be fought, at least in part, as a war against states. In these circumstances, Clausewitz’s law of numbers may be relevant. In the final analysis, the meaning of counterterrorism for the SOF military commander will be determined by the configuration of the state and substate adversaries that are involved, and by the mix of enemy combatants that will have to be countered by the appropriately parallel mix of traditional and non-traditional remedies. Understood in terms of law, this suggests that military commanders are obligated to recognize the broad applicability of humanitarian international law and, at the same time, to differentiate between state and substate terrorist adversaries. Without such a differentiation, SOF commanders would find it impossible to meet the essential expectations of discrimination, proportionality and military necessity.

### Political violence

The fifth problem is that definitions referring to “political” violence and objectives fail to clearly delineate the boundaries of politics. What are these boundaries? When is violence unambiguously political? What are the differences between political violence and the violence of ordinary criminality? These questions have been around for a long time, especially in connection with the international law of extradition<sup>33</sup> and the pertinent criteria of the “political offense exception.”<sup>34</sup>

Today, some states calculate that politically motivated violence, by definition, cannot be terrorism. In their view, acts of violence committed on behalf of “national liberation,” “self-determination” or “anticolonialism” fall outside the definition of terror-

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ism. As observed by John F. Murphy: "Under this approach, sending letter bombs through the mails, hijacking airplanes, kidnapping or attacking diplomats and international business people, and indiscriminate slaughter of civilians could never constitute terrorism if the revolutionary groups committed them on behalf of a just cause."<sup>35</sup> From the standpoint of international law, this approach ignores that the criterion of just cause<sup>36</sup> is always augmented by the criterion of just means. The latter standard has been brought to bear upon resorts to insurgent force by both the common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and by 1977 Protocols I and II. Indeed, even if these authoritative extensions of humanitarian international law had not been enacted, the Martens Clause would pertain in relevant circumstances, confirming that "Civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience."<sup>37</sup>

### Importance of natural law

It must also be understood that all law is rooted in natural law, and that natural law could never countenance violence against the innocent; that is, natural law would not consider such violence to be outside the boundaries of terrorism. Recalling Cicero's classic expression of natural law in *De Republica*, we see clearly why politically motivated violence by insurgents must be unlawful whenever it ignores the obligations of discrimination, proportionality and military necessity dictated by "right reason": "True law is right reason, harmonious with nature, diffused among all, constant, eternal; a law which calls to duty by its com-

mands and restrains from evil by its prohibitions. ... It is a sacred obligation not to attempt to legislate in contradiction to this law; nor may it be derogated from nor abrogated."

For more than 2,000 years, the idea of natural law has served as the ultimate standard of right and wrong, of lawfulness and unlawfulness. Already apparent in the *Antigone* of Sophocles and in the *Ethics and Rhetoric* of Aristotle, this idea — tied closely to theology for many centuries — has placed law above lawmaking. At the

***Today, some states calculate that politically motivated violence, by definition, cannot be terrorism. In their view, acts of violence committed on behalf of 'national liberation,' 'self-determination' or 'anticolonialism' fall outside the definition of terrorism.***

same time, it is obvious that governments have not only been generally indifferent to the law of nature but have also coupled that indifference with adherence to undiscovered "laws" that reject justice. Such coupling is evident in the use of the term "political" to excuse terrorism, and in the exclusion (from the definition of terrorism) of a number of resorts to insurgent force that simply are not excludable under natural law.

When Thomas Jefferson set to work on the Declaration of Independence, he drew freely upon Aristotle, Cicero, Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui and John Locke. Asserting the right of revolu-

tion whenever government becomes destructive of "certain unalienable rights," the Declaration posits a natural order in a world whose laws are external to all human will and discoverable through human reason.

Because reason is the only sure guide for humankind, Jefferson affirmed, reason is ultimately the only true foundation of law. This classic American idea of natural law — an idea that is altogether relevant in distinguishing terrorism from permissible force, and is therefore vital for the SOF commander — can be found not only in the Declaration but also in the Bill of Rights. The Ninth Amendment, in stipulating that "the enumeration of certain rights in this Constitution shall not prejudice other rights not so enumerated," reflects the belief in a law superior for all time to the will of particular states.

### Scholarship vs. realpolitik

Even if the concept of terrorism were suitably clarified and improved, unless the states in world politics — especially major states such as the U.S.<sup>38</sup> — begin to take seriously their counterterrorism responsibilities, the scholarship benefits of clarification and improvement will be moot. Scholars must assuredly do their part to refine the terrorism concept, but political leaders must also do their part in honoring the incontrovertible expectations of national and international law.<sup>39</sup> Without such efforts at both levels, military commanders will be caught in the middle: prepared intellectually to identify the terrorist enemy, but restrained politically by civilian authorities with more narrowly geopolitical agendas.

Consider, here, the expectations of the Middle East Peace Process.<sup>40</sup> Although Title II ("Combating International Terrorism") of

the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995 stipulates at Sec. 201: "The Congress finds that (1) international terrorism is among the most serious transnational threats faced by the U.S. and its allies, far eclipsing the dangers posed by population growth or pollution," the Congress, together with the president, now recognize the PLO. Significantly, the PLO has refused to amend its charter, which continues to call for the annihilation of Israel in phases, and Yassir Arafat continues to demand jihad for the "liberation" of Jerusalem.

In the matter of Arafat, the peremptory expectations of "No crime without punishment" require not only that he be excluded from valid legal agreements, but also that he be appropriately punished for multiple terrorist crimes under international law.<sup>41</sup> Such punishment would be founded, in part, upon the general principle of "universal cooperation,"<sup>42</sup> and upon various specific resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly.<sup>43</sup>

### Geopolitical definitions

During the Cold War, American and Soviet leaders accepted narrowly geopolitical definitions of terrorism. For Washington, any insurgent force operating against an allegedly pro-Soviet regime was characterized as lawful ("freedom fighting" was the operative term), irrespective of the means used in that insurgency. Reciprocally, any insurgent force operating against a pro-American regime was characterized as terrorism, period. In the Soviet view, however, the U.S. was using the term "terrorism" simply to discredit what the Soviets alleged were legitimate movements for self-determination and associated human rights. To Moscow, insurgent force against

what Washington freely called authoritarian regimes (e.g., those in El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and, for a long time, South Africa) was not terrorism, as the U.S. had maintained, but rather "national liberation."

For the future, the U.S., as the sole remaining superpower, should reject altogether such narrowly geopolitical definitions of terrorism. Aware that the Cold War is now over and that jurisprudential criteria are consistent with our own

***Scholars must ... do their part to refine the terrorism concept, but political leaders must also do their part in honoring the incontrovertible expectations of national and international law. Without such efforts at both levels, military commanders will be caught in the middle.***

incontrovertible norms and traditions, our country should begin to articulate and apply a single set of standards whenever insurgents resort to force. When such resorts express both just cause and just means, they should be recognized as permissible. But when they lack just cause or just means, they should be recognized, and opposed,<sup>44</sup> as terrorism.

When violence is directed toward political objectives within the U.S., the legal imperative will not be to distinguish permissible insurgencies from impermissible insurgencies (there can be no judgments of "just cause" for insurgency within this country), but to distinguish ter-

rorism from ordinary forms of criminality. As we have already noted, this task is apt to be problematic, requiring — at the outset — an appropriately precise definition of terrorism. In the absence of such a definition, SOF commanders with counterterrorism responsibilities will be unable to tell exactly who the enemy is, and prosecuting authorities will not know for certain whether captured insurgents should be tried under long-standing criminal statutes or under the terms of newly fashioned antiterrorism legislation.<sup>45</sup>

A precise legal definition will also be vital in answering the antecedent question: Should military forces be employed in the first place within the U.S. for counterterrorism? If there is no precise legal definition of terrorism, it is conceivable that such forces could be authorized wrongfully; i.e., to combat forms of ordinary criminality in ways that are inconsistent with U.S. law. Here, the absence of definition could result in military commanders substituting for police agencies in wholly nonpolitical circumstances and resorting to forms and levels of violence that are patently unsuitable. ✕

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Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Irregular warfare is a term covering a broad area of military and nonmilitary operations below the level of conventional combat between regular military forces. Terrorism is one of several possible manifestations of unconventional warfare.

<sup>2</sup> Criteria for distinguishing between combatant and noncombatant populations were introduced for the first time at the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

<sup>3</sup> The official account of the Gulf War may be found in U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Conduct of the Gulf War* (1992). Appendix O of this document addresses the following pertinent issues under the law of war: hostages; treatment of civilians in occupied territory; targeting; collateral damages and civilian casualties; enemy prisoner-of-war programs; treatment of prisoners of war; repatriation of prisoners of war; uses of ruses and perfidy; war crimes; environmental terrorism; conduct of neutral nations; and "surrender" in the conduct of combat operations.

<sup>4</sup> The anti-Castro insurgency supported by the U.S. is also in violation of this country's own Neutrality Act. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 960 (1988).

<sup>5</sup> An authoritative source seems to have used this particular definition as the jumping-off point for a definition of international terrorism. According to the authors of "Legal Aspects of Terrorism" in the *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia* (1993): "International terrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets in or from a second state by subnational groups or individuals."

<sup>6</sup> These definitions are found in R. Kidder, "Unmasking Terrorism: The Fear of Fear Itself," in *Violence and Terrorism* 14 (B. Schechterman & M. Slann, eds., 3rd ed., 1993).

<sup>7</sup> These sorts of penal provisions are tied to the crime of terrorism in the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, yet the act excludes the essential element of the political in its enumeration of "terrorism activity."

<sup>8</sup> This "conglomerate" crime is identified and prohibited in several diverse sources under international law.

<sup>9</sup> The principle of just cause maintains that an insurgency may exercise law-enforcing measures under international law.

<sup>10</sup> The standard of just means has been brought to bear upon nonstate actors in world politics by Article 3, common to the four Geneva conventions of August 12, 1949, and by the two protocols to these conventions.

<sup>11</sup> Although it may appear that definitional references to "political" motives or objec-

tives should satisfy the just-cause criterion, antecedent definitional questions would remain unresolved concerning precise meanings and parameters of the "political" and various associated issues of fact.

<sup>12</sup> Under the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, international law forms part of the law of the U.S. This incorporation is reaffirmed and broadened by various Supreme Court decisions.

<sup>13</sup> See Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Senate, April 27, 1995, S 735 PCS1S, pp. 36-37.

<sup>14</sup> Another pertinent example is the April 1985 bombing of Libya by the U.S. in reprisal for alleged Libyan "terrorism." Here, President Reagan ordered the bombing of several sites within the Libyan cities of Benghazi and Tripoli, 10 days after a discotheque frequented by U.S. soldiers in Berlin was bombed (killing two and wounding scores of other U.S. servicemen). The U.S. bombing was publicly and officially identified as a legitimate retaliation against "terrorism." See W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, *The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflict* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), p. 316.

<sup>15</sup> Crimes against humanity are defined in the London Charter, August 8, 1945, Art 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, as: "namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during a war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated."

<sup>16</sup> The 1990 case involving forcible extraction of Manuel Noriega from Panama — an abduction involving U.S. military invasion of that state — centered on narcoterrorism. No Nuremberg-category or "ordinary" terrorist crimes were identified in justification of the invasion. Only drug-related offenses by Noriega were alleged by the U.S. The trial of Noriega found, *inter alia*, that "Noriega is plainly a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention III. He is, and will be, entitled to the full range of rights under the treaty, which has been incorporated into U.S. Law." See: *United States of America vs. Manuel Antonio Noriega*, 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

<sup>17</sup> See *United States vs. Alvarez-Machain*, No. 91-712 (U.S., June 15, 1992), which held that a respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a U.S. court for violations of this country's criminal laws.

<sup>18</sup> The inclusion of "threat" in the definition of terrorism is derivative from U.N. Charter,

Art. 2(4), which deals generally with the use of force.

<sup>19</sup> Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice describes international custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law." 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (June 26, 1945). Norms of customary international law bind all states irrespective of whether a state has ratified the pertinent codifying instrument or convention.

<sup>20</sup> In response to the 1837 Caroline case, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion in Upper Canada against British rule, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require actual attack. Here, military response to a threat was judged permissible so long as the danger posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." See 2 J. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, 409-14 (1906).

<sup>21</sup> Under international law, distinguishing between conditions of peace and conditions of war can be somewhat problematic. Traditionally, a "formal" war was said to exist only after a state had issued a formal declaration of war. In 1907, the Hague Convention III provided that hostilities must not commence without "previous and explicit warning" in the form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum. See Hague Convention III on the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, Art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 263. Currently, a declaration of war might be tantamount to a declaration of criminality, because international law prohibits aggression. It follows that a condition of belligerency may exist without formal declarations, but only if there exists an armed conflict between two or more states and/or at least one of these states considers itself "at war."

<sup>22</sup> See Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (1981), U.S. Intelligence Activities, Part 2, *Conduct of Intelligence Activities*, 2.11, "Prohibition on Assassination": "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the U.S. Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." See 50 U.S.C.A., War and National Defense, 1988, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 66.

<sup>23</sup> We may note also *Ubi cessat remedium ordinarium, ibi decurritur ad extraordinarium*. "Where the ordinary remedy fails, recourse must be had to an extraordinary one." See *Black's Law Dictionary*, Sixth Ed., St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishers, 1990, p. 1520.

<sup>24</sup> See U.S. Dept. of Justice, *The Use of Military Force Under Federal Law to Deal with Civil Disorders and Domestic Violence* 28 (1980). Cited in Stephen Dycus, et al., *National Security Law* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), p. 452. In such an event, assuming federal jurisdiction, the president could invoke

two of the insurrection statutes, 10 U.S.C. Secs. 332 and 333(b), by signing a pre-positioned proclamation and executive order.

<sup>25</sup> See Dycus, *op. cit.*, p. 421.

<sup>26</sup> The literal meaning of the Latin term *posse comitatus* is "power or authority of the county." It brings to mind a body of persons summoned by a sheriff to help preserve the peace or to help enforce the law. These persons might be either civilian or military.

<sup>27</sup> On the applicability of the *Posse Comitatus* Act outside the borders of the U.S., see Siemer and Effron, "Military Participation in U.S. Law Enforcement Activities Overseas: The Extraterritorial Effect of the *Posse Comitatus* Act," 54 *St. John's Law Review* 1 (1979).

<sup>28</sup> See Dycus, *op. cit.*, p. 423. See also 32 C.F.R. Sec. 215 (1984).

<sup>29</sup> These five statutes comprise an important exception to the *Posse Comitatus* Act. Codified at 10 U.S.C. Secs. 331-335 (1988), they authorize the president to provide military assistance to state governments upon request, or, upon his own initiative, to use the armed forces or the federalized militia to suppress any rebellion that makes it "impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States ... by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. Sec. 333 also permits military intervention when the constitutional rights of any state's citizens are threatened by insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy. Under the terms of Sec. 334, before the militia or armed forces can be called out, the president must "by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse"; that is, quite literally, to read them the riot act.

<sup>30</sup> An authoritative listing of offenses that constitute the crime of terrorism can be found in *The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism*, Nov. 10, 1976, Eur. T.S. No. 90, reprinted in 15 *I.L.M.*, 1272 (1976).

<sup>31</sup> See *Resolution on the Definition of Aggression*, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 *I.L.M.* 710 (1974).

<sup>32</sup> See Clausewitz, *On War* (1984), pp. 194-95.

<sup>33</sup> The "extradite or prosecute" formula, which needs to be applied more systematically to crimes of terrorism, derives from the peremptory norm of *Nullum crimen sine poena*, "No crime without a punishment." Without punishment, there can be no distinction between a penal statute and any other statute.

<sup>34</sup> The principle of the political-offense exception permits a state to refuse an extradition request from another state if the offense charged in the request is of a "political nature." For an excellent treatment of this principle, see Christopher Blakesley, *Terrorism, Drugs International Law and the*

*Protection of Human Liberty* (Ardley-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1992), pp. 75-89.

<sup>35</sup> See John F. Murphy, "Cooperative International Arrangements: Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism and the Extradition and Prosecution of Terrorists," in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 361.

<sup>36</sup> Moreover, it is by no means certain that all politically motivated violence is necessarily expressive of "national liberation," "self-determination" and/or "anticolonialism" objectives (the only objectives associated properly with just cause), or even that "national liberation," "self-determination" and/or "anticolonialism" are necessarily expressive of just cause in all particular circumstances.

<sup>37</sup> The Martens clause, named after the Russian delegate at the first Hague conferences, extends the law of armed conflict to all types of liberation wars. The clause is included in the preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague conventions. In the 1977 Protocol I, it is included in the main text of Article 1, but in Protocol II, the clause is again moved to the preamble.

<sup>38</sup> This argument for special or enlarged major power responsibility is based on codifications expressed in 19th- and 20th-century peace settlements and international organizations, particularly the role of permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and is deducible from the more or less persistently decentralized authority structure of international law.

<sup>39</sup> The generic imperative to punish crimes under international law, crimes that include terrorism, was reaffirmed at Principle I of the Nuremberg Principles (1946): "Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment."

<sup>40</sup> The Madrid Process, which began with the U.S.-Soviet Letter of Invitation to the Peace Talks in Madrid of 18 October 1992, produced the Cairo Agreement of 9 February 1994. For a complete compendium of the documentary record, see *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994, Revised Second Edition), 306 pp.

<sup>41</sup> For a comprehensive narrative of these terrorist crimes, see Louis René Beres, "International Law Requires Prosecution, Not Celebration, of Arafat," *University of Detroit Mercy Law Review*, Vol. 71, Issue 3, Spring 1994, pp. 569-80.

<sup>42</sup> The principle of universal cooperation is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between states in the battle against criminality, including terrorism. The case for universal

jurisdiction, which stems from the principle of universal cooperation, is codified, *inter alia*, at the four Geneva conventions of August 12, 1949. These conventions impose upon the high contracting parties the obligation to punish certain "grave breaches" of their rules, regardless of where the infraction occurred or the nationality of the perpetrators.

<sup>43</sup> See *Resolution on Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity*, G.A. Res. 3074, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30 at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030, 1973; G.A. Res. 2840, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 29 at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429, 1971; G.A. Res. 96, U.N. Doc. A/64 at 188, 1946; *Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity*, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2391 (XXIII) of 26 November 1968, entered into force, 11 November 1970.

<sup>44</sup> Such opposition should go beyond tactical measures involving armed force to criminal prosecution within American national courts. Regarding U.S. competence in such a prosecution, federal law confers jurisdiction of general court martial "to try any person who, by the law of war, is subject to trial by a military tribunal." 10 U.S.C. Sec. 818 (1988). In addition, federal law grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts for all offenses against the laws of the U.S. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3231 (1988). Since its founding, the U.S. has reserved the right to enforce international law within its own courts. The U.S. Constitution confers on Congress the power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 10.

<sup>45</sup> Whether prosecution is based upon ordinary criminal statutes or upon special antiterrorism law, defendants may assert violations of the *Posse Comitatus* Act. Such assertion was the case when Native Americans at Wounded Knee were charged with interfering with a "law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties." (See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 231(a)(3) (1988). The defendants argued that the federal marshals and FBI agents were not performing their duties lawfully because they enlisted military forces as a *posse comitatus*. (See *United States vs. Jaramillo*, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Neb. 1974), appeal dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975); *United States vs. Red Feather*, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975). For the future, defendants could be barred from asserting violations of the *Posse Comitatus* Act as a valid defense if pertinent antiterrorism law were to incorporate legally binding exceptions to the act.

# Letters

## Special Warfare

### IO would not violate sanctity of Civil Affairs

I read with great interest MAJ Tim Howle's article in the Spring 1997 issue of *Special Warfare* about the relationship of information operations to Civil Affairs and civil-military operations. Clearly, we all benefit when professionals like MAJ Howle help to further our understanding of new doctrine by expanding our horizons or by challenging our thinking.

As with all doctrinal discussions, any given issue will have many facets worthy of consideration. I offer my response to MAJ Howle's piece in that vein.

The author has missed the intended thrust of information operations, or IO, in a couple of places as he discusses the relationship between IO, Civil Affairs, or CA; and civil-military operations, or CMO. In his second paragraph, he identifies the components of IO as information warfare, or IW, and command and control warfare, or C<sup>2</sup>W. In fact, current doctrine, in FM 100-6, identifies three interrelated components of IO: information systems, relevant information and intelligence, and operations. Operations consists of C<sup>2</sup>W plus public affairs and Civil Affairs. I suspect the author may have been

a victim of the lag time between his writing the article and seeing it published, which is always a problem in the face of rapidly emerging doctrine.

A more serious deviation from approved IO doctrine becomes evident as the article unfolds, specifically the inference that CA risks its operational effectiveness by becoming too closely aligned with information operations or intelligence. The author is justifiably apprehensive about the deception component of IO, but deception planners go to extremes to ensure that elements like public affairs and Civil Affairs do not become expendable pawns in the deception process.

From an intelligence perspective, there is a significant difference between operating as an intelligence collector in response to an intelligence tasking, and passing on CA-type information to IO planners. Keeping in mind that the overarching objective of IO is information dominance, the fact is that any element of a deployed force may become involved with and contribute to the commander's IO campaign plan. How actively each participates and how much each contributes will depend on the nature of the operation and that element's mission. CA is no exception.

Next, the author appears to

believe that the sanctity of CA will be preserved by avoiding requests to develop CA interface procedures with IO. Arguing the counterpoint, by taking the initiative and developing the IO-CA procedures, the author would be better able to achieve his "separation of church and state" goal while meeting the needs of IO. The absence of established IO-CA procedures simply invites spontaneous, ad hoc approaches in the heat of an operation, clearly not the best course of action, given a choice.

Finally, the author addresses the subject of trust, implying that involvement with IO may result in the severance of a vital link with the civilian population. Let there be no doubt, should a command conduct itself in a manner that destroys the civilian population's trust, the chastity of our Civil Affairs elements would be inconsequential. We are one Army!

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Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in *Special Warfare* or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor, *Special Warfare*; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

# Officer Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### SF, CA get highest promotion rates in Army Reserve majors' board

The FY 97 Army Reserve promotion-selection board for majors considered 9,421 officers and selected 3,405 for promotion. This was the first RC majors' promotion board to use the "best-qualified" method of selection implemented by the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act. Under the best-qualified criteria, the board determines which officers are fully qualified for promotion and then compares the records of fully qualified officers to determine which ones have the highest potential for fulfilling the needs of the Army Reserve. A fully qualified officer must meet time-in-grade requirements, must have completed civilian and military educational requirements, and otherwise be qualified for promotion. In FY 97, the SF and CA branches had the highest and second-highest selection rates compared with the other Army branches. Statistics are as follows:

	Cons.	Sel.	% Sel.	Qual.	% of Qual. Sel.
CA	89	63	71	77	82
SF	67	51	76	65	78
USAR	9421	3405	36	5520	62

The 1997 board waived the requirement that officers be graduates of the Combined Arms Services Staff School, or CAS<sup>3</sup>; however, those officers who were selected for promotion must complete the CAS<sup>3</sup> requirement. If they fail to meet that requirement, they cannot attend the Command and General Staff Officers Course or be selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel. For more information call MAJ James Berenz, Civil Affairs Branch Chief, at DSN 239-6406/9002 or commercial (910) 432-6406/9002.

### Plan details SF participation in OPMS XXI

The commander of the Special Warfare Center and School has tentatively approved a concept for SF participation in OPMS XXI. That concept forms the basis of a detailed action plan, which is being prepared by the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. The plan, expected to be complete by mid-FY 98, will be long-term and will require periodic revalidation as the specific provisions of OPMS XXI become solidified. The desired end state is total branch integration — Army and joint — coupled with two-year branch-qualifying assignments for all SF officers. The capstone for the branch will be a sufficient population of SF colonels in the operations career field serving in branch and functional-integrator (branch immaterial) assignments throughout the Army and the joint community.

As the SF personnel proponent, SWCS will achieve the end state by reaching two goals: (1) Achieve an SF captain population of the proper size. (2) Achieve the correct field-grade-officer inventory, by grade, for the branch.

For the first goal, success is defined as having a sufficient number of SF captains to fill all the branch's captain authorizations, with the requisite level of participation by SF captains in functional-integrator and initial FA assignments. To achieve the required number of captains, SWCS will ensure that the requisite number of officers graduate from the SF Qualification Course each year.

For the second goal, success is defined as filling the SF field-grade authorizations at a percentage on par with that of the other combat-arms branches and

providing the opportunity for all SF field-grade officers to serve two years in a branch-qualifying assignment. The proponent will endeavor to create the right field-grade inventory, by grade, for the branch by recommending instructions to the Army's career-field designation, or CFD, boards. These boards will consider all selectees for promotion to major, after the release of the majors' list each year, in order to designate the selectees into one of the Army's OPMS XXI career fields. The object of the SWCS recommendations to the CFD boards would be the retention of the optimum number of majors in the SF branch.

**SWCS seminar trains warrant-officer advisers**

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School recently conducted the Second Annual Senior Warrant Officer Adviser Seminar to train unit SWOAs and to identify MOS 180A-related issues to the chain of command. The seminar members recommended a diagnostic MOS 180A career survey and the creation of additional senior-warrant-officer billets at SF battalion and group levels. Other areas discussed were recruiting, assignments, utilization, pay and entitlements, promotions, and professional development. MOS 180A will be recruiting highly motivated NCOs to become Special Forces warrant officers in the accession year 1998-99. Senior warrant officers are encouraged to recruit proactively by identifying high achievers — the potential warrant officers — early in their careers so they can best benefit the Army. Ideal candidates will be SFCs with fewer than 12 years' active federal service (because of the DA cap), ANCOG graduates (after October 1994), language rating of 1+/1+ or a DLAB score of 85, GT of 110 or higher, a minimum of three years' rated time on an SFODA, favorable recommendations from all commanders to group level, a solid performance history as a conventional soldier, unquestionable character, and a distinct pattern of high achievement as evidenced by honors in Army schools, civilian education and self-development. For more information call the MOS 180A manager, CW4 Shaun Driscoll, at DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

**1997 command-and-staff-college selection board selects 29 SF officers**

The SF selection rate for the 1997 command-and-staff-college selection board approximated the Army average. This was to be expected because the Army manages CSC selection rates to ensure an approximately equivalent percentage of officers are selected from all branches. The raw number of SF officers selected will increase as larger year groups enter the zone of consideration. Board results were:

	Considered	Selected	% Selected
SF	183	29	15.8
Army	4567	756	16.6

For more information call LTC Daniel J. Adelstein at DSN 239-2415 or commercial (910) 432-2415.

**Colonel promotion board selects 7 FA 39 officers**

The FY 97 colonel promotion-selection board considered 18 FA 39 officers for promotion and selected seven. For the second year in a row, the FA 39 selection rate was competitive with the Army average. Of the officers selected, six are former battalion commanders, none are senior-service-college graduates, one is attending a senior service college, four have been selected to attend a senior service college, and four are joint-specialty officers. For more information call Jeanne Schiller, SOPO FA 39 manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.



# Foreign SOF

## Special Warfare

### **Communist-era officers staff Polish security firms**

Many former intelligence and police personnel from Poland's communist-era security establishment have made a smooth transition into private security firms, and that transition has been a notable feature of the post-1989 period. A recent Polish assessment judged that many officers of the old Security Service, the Citizens Militia (police), and the Internal Military Service quickly set up or joined private security organizations. These organizations have engaged in a variety of activities ranging from providing personal and physical security to selling arms and equipment. In the 1989-1993 period alone, more than 5,000 organizations were set up in Poland as the old communist-era security establishments were being reorganized or disestablished and as a host of new political, economic and security problems were facing the state. These firms have continued to evolve, recruit and grow in number since that time. By the end of 1997, more than 7,000 Polish private security firms had been established. The Interior Ministry, or MSW, estimates that more than 100,000 security guards now work in Poland, while according to other sources, the number could be 250,000. These organizations have no doubt performed some useful and legitimate services. Nevertheless, the negative dimensions of this development in terms of terrorism and criminality are many in the view of Polish security specialists. That is, the private security agencies are poorly monitored, if at all; private guards have been involved in a multitude of criminal acts; firms have been involved in paramilitary assaults on behalf of criminal organizations, sometimes in collusion with active law-enforcement personnel; on at least one occasion, former Polish security officials now in a private firm were arrested for smuggling radioactive substances (1 kg of powdered uranium oxide); some firms have established "business" ties with other former eastern-bloc security officers and sometimes serve foreign intelligence purposes; and some may constitute obstacles to continued reforms and integration with the West through their direct opposition or through the criminal nature of their activities.

### **Paraguay forms police antiterrorist unit**

A special police antiterrorist unit has been established in the Paraguayan-Argentine-Brazilian tri-border area to deal with criminality in Ciudad del Este. The unit's creation was hailed as an important contribution to security in the region, which is a center of drug trafficking, illegal immigration, other forms of criminal activity, and even purported activity by pro-Iranian Party of God "Hizballah" members who are thought to be present in Ciudad del Este and elsewhere. Hizballah terrorists are thought to have carried out two major terrorist attacks in Argentina: one that in 1992 destroyed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires; and another in 1994 that destroyed the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association. The creation of this antiterrorist unit is one of a number of measures being taken by Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil. Other actions include increased border checkpoints, greater airspace control and efforts to locate clandestine drug-trafficking airfields, and better joint planning and information-sharing.

### **Russian roles possible in Latin American cocaine trafficking**

Since at least the early 1990s, cocaine has been shipped to and through Russia and the former Soviet Union by Latin American traffickers and their associates as well as by Russian criminals operating from the United States. A growing Russian criminal presence in south Florida, for example, has been well-documented. Recent Russian reporting, however, suggests that Russian cocaine-trafficking criminals established bases, bought property, and set up bank accounts in Costa Rica beginning in the mid-1990s. A role in facilitating this activity was allegedly played by officers of the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU — said to be specialists in Latin American national-liberation movements — as well as by former Cuban intelligence officers who maintain links with revolutionary groups having a role in coca cultivation. This setup reportedly became fully operational by the end of 1996 and is thought to have involved substantial maritime shipments of cocaine to northern Europe and to northern Russia.

### **'Home guards' may be forming in Caucasus**

Unsuccessful efforts by Russian Internal Troops and police to control the "administrative border" between Chechnya and other Russia territories have allowed kidnapping, cattle rustling, robberies, drug trafficking, and other criminal acts to continue at high levels. As a consequence, residents have begun to leave the area, and the formation of local armed "home guard" detachments in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and affected Cossack areas is being considered. This development has not been well-received by Russian Internal Troops charged with area security. The regional Internal Troop commander notes that the resources to arm these new provisional units could be better spent on the Internal Troops themselves, whose heavily used light armor is 10 years old and whose logistics situation is less than satisfactory. He suggests that these personnel could better be incorporated on a contract basis into existing troop or police units to help fight the "criminal free-for-all" in the region.

### **Greek Militant Guerrilla Formation damaged**

European terrorist groups continue to form, split and combine. One of the recently formed leftist urban terrorist groups — the Militant Guerrilla Formation — appeared in 1996 and has since claimed credit for a series of bombings against businesses, national targets and foreign targets in Greece. The most recent of these was the December 1997 bombing at the Greek Development Minister's private office in Athens. Prior to the bomb's detonation, a warning was evidently made in a successful effort to "hurt antiterrorism police forces," since a police specialist was injured as he prepared to defuse the device. The group's leader had at one time been a member of the long-established Revolutionary Popular Struggle, which reportedly serves as an umbrella organization for a number of small groups like the Militant Guerrilla Formation. Early in 1998, Greek antiterrorist police launched a series of successful raids against Militant Guerrilla Formation houses in the Athens area, arresting eight members and seizing explosives and detonators from a number of the 10 houses raided. These kinds of recent experiences underscore Greece's continuing problem with enduring and newly emerging terrorist groups.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

# Update

## Special Warfare

### Museum rededicated to Bull Simons

The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum was rededicated to the late Colonel Arthur D. "Bull" Simons Dec. 9.

The facility is the official museum for the Special Forces Branch and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. It focuses on the history of Special Forces and special operations.

"It is fitting that 'Bull' has a museum dedicated to the history of special warfare," said Major General Kenneth L. Bowra, commander of the Army Special Forces Command. "So much of his military career was centered around special warfare, and so much of special warfare was centered around him."

Simons entered the Army in 1941 after having been commissioned through ROTC. During World War II, he commanded a field artillery battery in the South Pacific and later commanded a company in the 6th Ranger Battalion. He left the Army after World War II, only to be recalled in 1951, during the Korean War. He joined the 77th Special Forces Group in 1958 and later commanded the 8th SF Group in the Panama Canal Zone. Simons is probably best remembered as the leader of the Son Tay Raid, the 1970 attempt to liberate American prisoners of war held in North Vietnam.

### 7th SF Group dedicates Fronius Language Facility

The 7th Special Forces Group remembered one of its fallen soldiers during a rededication and award ceremony Dec. 12 at Fort Bragg.



*Simons Hall, home of the Special Warfare Museum*

The 7th SF Group Language Training Lab was renamed the Fronius Language Facility in honor of SFC Greg Fronius, who was killed in El Salvador in 1987.

Fronius was assigned as a military adviser in El Salvador. On March 31, 1987, El Salvadoran guerrillas penetrated the installation where Fronius was assigned and launched an intense offensive. Fronius immediately engaged the enemy with rifle fire and was seriously wounded. Despite his wounds, he continued to fight and to offer encouragement to his fellow soldiers. Fronius died assaulting the attackers.

Colonel Edward Phillips, the 7th SF Group commander, described Fronius as a warrior who was willing to go beyond the call of duty in defense of freedom.

"Greg ... did not go there for personal advancement, or recognition, or decorations," Phillips said. "He

went into harm's way because he was a Special Forces soldier and because El Salvador needed the help of calm, dedicated, selfless men who counted duty above personal gain."

Following Phillips' speech, Fronius was posthumously awarded the Silver Star, the fourth highest medal in the U.S. Army. The medal was accepted by Fronius' son, Gregory, 16. — SFC T. Anthony Bell, USASOC PAO

### Information on SFQC, SFAS on-line

Information on the Special Forces Qualification Course and on Special Forces Assessment and Selection is available at a new site on the Worldwide Web.

The web site, developed by the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, SWCS, includes a physical-training handbook, packing lists for SFAS and the Robin Sage field-training exercise, a directory of points of contact, and course dates for SFAS and SFQC.

The web-site address is <http://usasoc.soc.mil/qcourse.htm>. For more information call Captain Ronald Green at DSN 239-3453 or commercial (910) 432-3453.

### 528th breaks ground for logistics facility

The 528th Special Operations Support Battalion held a groundbreaking ceremony at Fort Bragg Oct. 22 on the site of the future Special Operations Logistics Facility.

Located adjacent to the intersection of Gruber Road and the All-American Freeway, the facility will serve as the support center for all units in the U.S. Army Special

Operations Command. The new facility will allow the 528th, which currently operates from five locations at Fort Bragg, to consolidate its operations into one area.

The \$11-million project, begun in September 1997, will include a headquarters building, two direct-support maintenance facilities, and a medical warehouse, as well as housing and maintaining sections for parachute operations, water purification and transportation. It is scheduled for completion by the end of 1998.

"This facility will be the premiere combat-service-support facility in the command, a virtual one-stop shop for all support needs," said Lieutenant Colonel Albert E. Ballard Jr., commander of the 528th. "From this facility, we will be able to support and deploy our combat-service-support assets anywhere in the world." — SPC Daniel L. Savolskis, USASOC PAO

### **ARSOF capstone manual undergoes revision**

The capstone publication for Army special-operations forces doctrine, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, is being revised to reflect changes in the global-security environment and in joint war-fighting doctrine.

Since the last revision of FM 100-25 in 1991, many of the organizational changes brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Cohen-Nunn Amendment in 1986 have been integrated into joint doctrine and do not need to be addressed, according to Steve Cook, a doctrine analyst in the Special Warfare Center and School's Joint and Army Doctrine Division.

There have also been changes in ARSOF missions and collateral activities since 1991, Cook said. Accordingly, some information in the current FM 100-25 will be deleted, condensed or reapplied:

The chapter on strategic environ-

ment will be deleted. Chapters on the fundamentals of special operations and on mission planning and targeting will be consolidated, and the chapter on ARSOF missions will be expanded. The chapter on command and control will incorporate new material about the special-operations coordination element and the the special-operations command-and-control element.

Chapters on the SF groups, Ranger Regiment, Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP will be consolidated into one chapter that will give an overview of each component and provide references for more information. A chapter on ARSOF logistics support will contain the previous chapters on the theater Army special-operations support command, on combat-service support, and on other forms of support.

The revised FM 100-25 is scheduled to be published in the fourth quarter of FY 98, Cook said.

The SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine is also developing or revising three field manuals dealing with combat support and combat-service support for ARSOF operations.

FM 34-31, Intelligence Support for ARSOF, is a revision of FM 34-36, SOF Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. This manual will provide a reference for Military Intelligence personnel who support ARSOF units. It will also help commanders and operators to understand intelligence-support requirements and to better plan and execute ARSOF core missions and collateral activities. Applicable joint and service fundamentals, as well as emerging ARSOF XXI doctrine, will be included. For more information call Captain Wilcox at DSN 239-5393/8689 or commercial (910) 432-5393/8689.

FM 24-31, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C<sup>4</sup>) for ARSOF, will describe the information flow and the com-

mand-and-control architecture from operational units up to the level of theater special-operations commands and theater or national command-and-control systems. For more information call Captain Steele at DSN 239-5393/8689 or commercial (910) 432-5393/8689.

FM 63-31, Special Operations Combat Service Support, is a revision of FM 63-24, Special Operations Support Battalion. FM 63-31 will include the future structure of ARSOF combat-service support and will integrate the Force XXI and focused-logistics concepts. For more information call Captain Walls at DSN 239-5393/8689 or commercial (910) 432-5393/8689.

### **Rangers looking for enlisted volunteers**

The 75th Ranger Regiment is seeking motivated enlisted soldiers.

The Regiment has openings for soldiers in the following MOSs: 11B, 11C, 11Z, 13F, 31C, 31U, 31Z, 35E, 54B, 63B, 71D, 71L, 71M, 73D, 74C, 75B, 75H, 79S, 88N, 91B, 92A, 92G, 92Y, 96B, 96D and 97B. Soldiers already assigned to the Regiment, regardless of their MOS, are eligible to attend the Ranger Course contingent upon their unit commander's approval. All soldiers must pass an orientation program prior to assignment to the Regiment.

Volunteers must be active-duty, male, U.S. citizens who are airborne-qualified or willing to attend airborne school. They should send a copy of their DA Form 2A, DA Form 2-1, DA Form 705 and DA Form 4187 to Commander, PERSCOM; Attn: TAPC-EPMD-EPK-I (Ranger Team); Alexandria, VA 22331. For more information call PERSCOM's 75th Regiment liaison at DSN 221-5566 or commercial (703) 325-5566.



# Book Reviews


## Special Warfare

**Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces.** By Susan L. Marquis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. ISBN: 0-8157-5475-2 (paperback). 319 pages. \$19.95.

Today, U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF, are directed by a special-operations combatant command. The regional combatant commands have subordinate special-operations subunified commands for SOF planning, preparation and employment. The special ops forces themselves are in good shape: SOF are heavily committed, and although that causes considerable individual and family hardship, the commitment is evidence of a high level of regard at the theater and national levels.

There may be some who view these facts as evolutionary or even inevitable, reasoning that as warfare became more joint in execution, the Department of Defense recognized the need for a joint special-operations command structure and that either in appreciation of SOF's long and valiant service or in recognition of the growing probability of operations other than war, DoD initiated programs to rejuvenate SOF. If there are such believers in inevitability or in bureaucratic wisdom, they should be protected from unscrupulous individuals who would sell them bridges.

There was nothing inevitable about SOF revitalization. Every one of the facts enumerated owes its existence to the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and every one of them was strongly resisted by the armed services and by many senior members of the DoD.



The overall DoD attitude was neatly summed up in 1984 by one of the central figures in the battle to rejuvenate SOF, Noel Koch: "I have discovered, in critical areas of the Pentagon, on the subject of SOF revitalization, when they say no, they mean no; when they say maybe, they mean no; when they say yes, they mean no."

Unconventional Warfare is the story of how a few determined individuals made a difference: how they struggled to get adequate funding, equipment and manning and a better command structure for special operations. Those waging this struggle were not a large group, nor did they all have extensive special-operations backgrounds.

In DoD the principals were Noel Koch and Lynn Rylander. Koch was principal deputy assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Lynn Rylander was an analyst in the Office of International Security Affairs. Ted Lunger,

who had served in SF, was the third principal player. He was a staffer for the House Armed Services Committee. Although this trio provided the direction, they were not alone. A number of others provided critical assistance for long or short periods: Retired Lieutenant General Sam Wilson provided expertise, advice and entrée; Senate Armed Services Committee staffer Jim Locher labored diligently crafting the legislation; Representative Dan Daniels of Virginia generated House support.

Many other officials, Congressional staffers and Washington-area special-operations staff officers assisted or provided expertise and information. Their contributions were important, at times critical, but it was the central trio who provided the continuity necessary for the six-year struggle.

Those three eventually pursued the legislative path when every other attempt foundered on the rocks of service opposition. Tenacity and the refusal to recognize defeat were their primary characteristics. Like the American revolutionary army described by General Nathaniel Greene, they "fought, got beat and rose to fight again." And like that army, they won but one battle: the last and decisive one.

Marquis has provided an extremely readable account of this struggle from its early motivations, its development, its many failures and its ultimate success. She projects an understanding of the culture and mores of the SOF community that could come only from close contact with and keen observation of those who knew it. Unlike many books on the inner workings of government,

Unconventional Warfare flows well and maintains the reader's interest. The author has included extensive end notes that should not be missed: they contain many gems.


The book is not without flaws. There are about a dozen mistakes in the sections on SOF history that grate. For instance, former members of the 5th Special Forces Group's Bluelight counterterrorism organization will be surprised to read that that effort is attributed to the commander's desires rather than (as it was) to the competent orders of higher headquarters. The Gettys will be equally surprised to learn that their soldier son is named "Kevin." And the SOF experiences that are attributed to a couple of general officers are more colorful than accurate.

But these are minor flaws in an outstanding work. Despite the nits, *Unconventional Warfare* is good SOF history, and it is a good look into the often contentious workings of government. It should be read by those who have an interest in either of these areas — before the passage of time makes all that was accomplished appear evolutionary or inevitable.

COL J.H. Crerar  
U.S. Army (ret.)  
Vienna, Va.

*Civil Military Operations in the New World.* By John T. Fishel. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997. ISBN: 0-275-94797-1. 269 pages. \$65.

In *Civil Military Operations in the New World*, John T. Fishel examines a recently acquired skill for the U.S. military: planning for civil-military operations, or CMO. Fishel was the chief CMO planner in the U.S. Southern Command prior to and during Operation Just Cause in Panama. He is one of the Army's leading experts on CMO and on



transition-operations planning.

Fishel begins the book with a solid introduction to CMO and their application to transition (or postconflict) operations. He then goes into a thorough discussion of CMO planning conducted during recent U.S. military operations.

Using his in-depth knowledge of Just Cause, Fishel discusses the intricacies of CMO planning, task organization, and reserve-component involvement during that operation. He also conducts a detailed analysis of the operation's various planning functions.

Fishel describes how planners revising a 1987-88 plan repeated erroneous assumptions that were later magnified by the geographical separation of staff elements and headquarters. Security classification was another issue: Classification complicated planning even more, because rotating teams of reservists could neither receive advance briefings nor discuss the plan while in transition at the reserve center.

Reviewing interagency participation in the planning of Just Cause, Fishel finds that the classification of

the plan and a lack of interagency planning between DoD, the State Department and other agencies were a major deficiency — one that made it difficult for DoD planners to involve critical elements from other agencies.

Fishel discusses other Just Cause CMO issues that are still being debated: Who is responsible for CMO planning and execution? Should we mobilize Reserve Civil Affairs units? If so, how many units, and for whom should they work? Fishel discusses the establishment of the civil-military operations task force and its relationship to the Civil Affairs task force.

Fishel next examines CMO planning during the Gulf War, Provide Comfort, operations in Somalia, and Uphold Democracy. For each operation, he shows the application of lessons learned from CMO planning in previous operations.

Tying the various operations together, Fishel examines the strategic impact of CMO and a number of critical CMO issues — well-defined end states; task organization of CMO assets; establishment of a CMO task force; command and control of a CMO task force; and the relationship between CMO and national policy objectives.

Any officer assigned to or anticipating a role in CMO planning or transition planning will benefit from reading *Civil Military Operations in the New World*. John Fishel has produced a book that is not only sound professional reading but also a great resource for CMO planners and operators.

LTC George Pogge  
CGSC  
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.



Special Warfare is available on the Worldwide Web at [www.usasoc.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm](http://www.usasoc.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

# Special Warfare

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