



Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



From the Commandant



Special Warfare

As the special-operations forces of the United States adapt to an ever-changing environment, some of their activities and operations must also change. The articles in this issue of *Special Warfare* discuss the directions, or azimuths, that some of those changes are taking.

But even in time of change, some things should remain the same. In developing a force for the future, we must find bedrock on which to build. For the U.S. Army, that bedrock is a set of seven values:

Loyalty — Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers;

Duty — Fulfill your obligations;

Respect — Treat people as they should be treated;

Selfless Service — Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own;

Honor — Live up to all the Army values;

Integrity — Do what's right, legally and morally;

Personal Courage — Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).

These values are essential, but they must be learned. As trainers, we must discuss the values with our soldiers so that they will understand them. As leaders and mentors, we must exemplify the values so that our soldiers will believe in them.

In this issue, we are publishing the first of a series of articles that illustrate the Army values as practiced by members of SOF. The articles will show that the Army values are more than words — values, too, are azimuths, and they can guide us in difficult, dangerous and uncertain situations.

To initiate the series, I have chosen Roger Donlon, the first Special Forces soldier to win the Medal of Honor. His story is particularly appropriate because it demonstrates moral courage and the trust and respect among members of Special Forces teams.



At the Special Warfare Center and School, we are working to establish the core purpose and the core values of Special Forces. This is a vital endeavor that must be accomplished if we are to remain a relevant force in the future. The SF core values will reinforce, not replace, the Army values. The fact that SOF operate in isolation, far from traditional command and control, only makes it more imperative that we embrace the Army values.

SOF soldiers have always exemplified the best qualities of the service, and we must ensure that they will exemplify the values we consider essential for success. In the years ahead, special operations may involve traditional SOF missions, separating warring factions and restoring order, evacuating civilians, delivering humanitarian assistance or fighting battles. These operations will require soldiers who have the same character, moral courage and firm will as those who have distinguished themselves in the past.

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Unconventional Assisted Recovery: Providing the Doctrinal Framework

by Staff Sergeant Michael McCrann

As our country's military capabilities are increasingly employed in military operations other than war, or MOOTW, failure to recover United States military personnel lost during these operations can have profound consequences on the political-military situation. Personnel recovery, or PR, reduces the enemy's exploitation of captured personnel.

The U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, is the only combatant command with responsibility under Title 10, U.S. Code (Subsection 167, paragraph f), for recovery operations. With their operational expertise and special equipment, U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF, can be used in areas where the enemy air threat or ground threat prevents conventional recovery, or in situations where political sensitivities call for clandestine recovery.

The general concept of using SOF in PR operations is to link the survivor with a recovery force as soon as possible and to move the individual to an area under friendly control. When properly tasked, SOF may be able to pre-position a recovery force in areas where the threat of loss would be too great for conventional recovery forces.

In 1995, USSOCOM's *Strategic Planning Guidance* specifically addressed PR:

"The level of effort trend for PR is steady. ... Special operations forces (SOF) will have varying degrees of responsibility across all

subtasks. USSOCOM must study the potential role of SOF in the subareas of new PR definitions, as well as evolving requirements such as PR in urban environments."

In February 1998, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, in coordination with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, designated the Army Special Operations Agency as the point of contact for unconventional PR policy issues, and designated the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or USAJFKSWCS, as the proponent for unconventional PR. USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-14, *Unconventional Assisted Recovery*, from which this article is taken, forms the basis for understanding the unique contribution that unconventional assisted recovery, or UAR, makes to PR. The publication provides a doctrinal framework for UAR operations as they pertain to the execution of PR. It also describes the role, mission tasks, capabilities, limitations and UAR employment techniques of U.S. Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF.

By the year 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense, or DoD, plans to have a fully integrated PR architecture that is capable of recovering designated personnel worldwide through military actions. Designated personnel include U.S., allied and coalition personnel; friendly military and paramilitary forces; and other personnel, as directed, who are in danger of isolation, belea-

guerment, detention or capture as a result of hostile or nonhostile action. DoD's PR architecture will also complement the recovery of personnel through diplomatic actions or other means.

Background

Recovery of isolated personnel has always been a DoD priority. Yet prior to 1994, there had been little PR guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Each service conducted its own search-and-rescue operations in accordance with its assigned functions. The services, as well as the Coast Guard, were directed to consider each other's capabilities and to conduct joint combat-search-and-rescue, or CSAR, operations when required.

In September 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, or ASD-SO/LIC, to review existing PR policies, requirements and capabilities. Their review revealed that there was no single proponent for the PR mission and that unified commanders were often forced to divert personnel and equipment from other missions to meet their PR requirements.

On May 30, 1996, Congress passed the Defense Missing Persons Act of 1996. With the implementation of the act, policy proponenty for PR was realigned from ASD-SO/LIC to ASD-International Security Affairs. In this capacity, ASD-ISA coordinates DoD's PR policy with the director of operations for the Joint Staff and with designated executive agents.

The *Defense Planning Guidance*, or DPG, issued by the Secretary of Defense, details U.S. policy, articulates strategic objectives, and reflects the national military strategy. The DPG for fiscal years 2000-2005 contains several references to PR. The most significant statement reads:

"A robust personnel recovery capability contributes directly to protecting the U.S. forces. DoD should continue to develop a fully integrated personnel recovery architecture. To ensure that the DoD meets this goal, emphasis on PR must continue to increase throughout the force. DoD must

broaden coordination among its components and establish and enhance cooperative ties with the interagency community on PR matters. The Services must provide the commanders in chief (CINCs) sufficient equipment and trained personnel to conduct PR operations effectively. The CINCs must include PR in their operational planning and joint training program and ensure adequate PR-capable personnel and equipment are available to support contingency plans."

Likewise, the 1997 *Contingency Planning Guidance*, or CPG, directs combatant commanders to "include personnel recovery planning in all operations and contingency plans." The CPG is the principal source document for the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, or JSCP. With its coverage of PR, the CPG ensured the incorporation of PR into the JSCP. The latest *Strategic Intelligence Review for Support to Military Operations*, or SIRSMO, also addresses PR. Inclusion of PR in this document indicates that the intelligence community will resource PR with a high priority. The discussion of PR in all four documents bolsters efforts to develop and staff a DoD



Coast Guard photo

Personnel recovery is an umbrella term that includes all military and civilian efforts to recover captured, missing or isolated personnel.

A Navy MH-53 helicopter hovers over the wreckage of the aircraft that crashed carrying Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, near Dubrovnick, Croatia, in 1996.



Photo by Kyle Davis

vision for PR and provides justification to combatant commands to ensure either that sufficient PR-dedicated and PR-capable assets are present in-theater or that they will be immediately available.

Personnel recovery

Personnel recovery is an umbrella term that encompasses all military, civilian and political efforts to recover captured, missing or isolated personnel from hostile or denied territory. PR efforts include search and rescue; CSAR; survival, evasion, resistance and escape, or SERE; evasion and escape, or E&E; and the coordination of negotiated or forcible recovery. PR also includes attempts to communicate with isolated persons and to build up their morale during captivity. PR occurs primarily through military actions; however, non-governmental actions and diplomatic actions can also play an important role. In some cases, a combination of all three actions will be used.

Five specific tasks must be performed

during each PR incident: reporting, locating, supporting, recovering, and repatriating.

Reporting. Actions performed to report all incidents, using required PR report formats; preparing additional reports as directed by the joint search-and-rescue center, or JSRC, and by the joint-force commander, or JFC; and recording all information received about a given incident.

Locating. Actions performed to locate an isolated person and to pass information to the appropriate organizations for coordination and action.

Supporting. Actions performed once the isolated person has been located, and actions performed to support the isolated person's family during a PR incident.

Recovering. Coordinating all efforts to recover the isolated person. Recovery efforts may employ any of the capabilities available and acceptable to the National Command Authorities, or NCA. Recovery operations are classified as either assisted or unassisted. In an assisted recovery, assistance is provided by an outside source.

Repatriating. Efforts to return recovered persons to their previous way of life or to return their remains to the next of kin.

The five PR tasks represent the core of DoD support and recovery of isolated persons. They are critical to the success of PR operations, but three other factors — individual training, support agencies and recovery methods — are also relevant.

Individual training. Individuals who are at risk of becoming isolated must have adequate preparation to support their own recovery. Preparation includes training on policy, on force structure, and on operational concepts.

Support agencies. Support agencies provide functional expertise specifically related to the support and recovery of isolated persons. Agencies supporting PR include the Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; National Imagery and Mapping Agency; Department of State, or DoS; and Department of Transportation.

Recovery methods. Peacetime recovery methods include search and rescue, or SAR; diplomatic solutions worked out by DoS, U.S. embassies, and host nations; and the employment of UAR in uncertain or nonpermissive environments. During war, conventional CSAR is normally employed when the enemy air-defense threat is at the medium level or below. UAR supporting U.S. operations may involve SOF, other government agencies, indigenous personnel or other foreign nationals. It may also make use of various combinations of those groups. SOF resources can be used for UAR when the threat is above the medium level. However, the use of SOF requires deliberate planning and preparation, and planners should decide carefully where and when to employ SOF's specialized recovery capability.

Planners should also remember that the greater the risk, the more time it will take to prepare for the recovery operation. Normally, PR decisions are reached as expeditiously as possible. It is extremely important that the SOF component of a joint force provide the theater special-operations command's UAR options to the JSRC

in a timely manner. The SOF component continuously coordinates with the JSRC to ensure the correct employment of SOF in the UAR role. Because many aspects of UAR are sensitive in nature or involve compartmented information, they may require direct coordination with the JSRC director or deputy director. SOF representatives at the JSRC work for the commander of the special-operations command, or SOC. The SOC rescue-coordination center, or RCC, facilitates the coordi-

SOF resources can be used for UAR when the threat is above the medium level. However, the use of SOF requires deliberate planning and preparation, and planners should decide carefully where and when to employ SOF's specialized recovery capability.

nation and exchange of information between the JSRC and SOF recovery forces, as appropriate, to prevent duplication of the PR effort.

Terminology

The following definitions clarify common PR terminology:

Evasion and escape: The procedures and operations that enable military personnel and other selected individuals to emerge from enemy-held or hostile areas to areas under friendly control. E&E is an integral component of unconventional warfare, or UW. UW organizations, tactics, techniques and procedures are essential in developing a manned recovery mechanism.

Evasion and escape net: The organization within an enemy-held or hostile area that receives, moves and/or exfiltrates military personnel or selected individuals. E&E nets have a cellular structure; they move personnel by clandestine means through enemy-held or hostile areas to areas under friendly control. When developing an E&E net, a Special Forces team creates preplanned evasion-and-escape routes that will allow the operational ele-

ment to depart the area undetected.

Evasion and recovery, or E&R: The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces and operational recovery planners to return isolated personnel to friendly control. E&R can be conducted with or without assistance, as the result of planned operations, as the result of evader or escapee actions, or by conventional or unconventional recovery forces.

Recovery mechanisms, or RMs: DoD Instruction 2310.3, *Personnel Recovery Response Cell*, defines an RM as “that entity, group of entities, or infrastructure in enemy-held or hostile areas that is designed to receive, support, move, and/or

combat recovery. In some cases, recovery tasking can originate at the lowest organizational level that is aware of the situation and that can react quickly. In all cases, the recovery effort should be coordinated with the JSRC that monitors ongoing and planned recovery operations.

- **Combat search and rescue.** CSAR is a specific task to recover distressed personnel during wartime or during MOOTW. Joint Publication 3-50.2; JP 3-50.21, *Combat Search and Rescue Procedures*; and AR 525-90, *Combat Search and Rescue Procedures*, describe doctrine and procedures for joint CSAR operations. According to the *1998 SOF Posture Statement*, “SOF are equipped and manned to perform CSAR in support of SOF missions only. SOF perform CSAR in support of conventional forces on a case-by-case basis not to interfere with the readiness or operations of core SOF missions.”

- **Unassisted recovery.** In an unassisted recovery, the evader makes his way back to friendly control independently or travels toward a point where he can make contact with a manned recovery mechanism or a CSAR force. Success depends largely on the evader’s will and ability, personal background, physical condition and previous training in SERE. Air-delivered or pre-positioned survival equipment significantly improves the evader’s potential for success. An evasion plan of action should always address the possibility of an extended unassisted recovery.

Unconventional recovery operations. Unconventional recovery operations use specially trained SOF, clandestine organizations, indigenous forces, or third-country nationals that have specialized equipment to assist an evader in returning to friendly control. Unconventional recovery operations may be covert or clandestine. The primary intent of a covert operation is to conceal the identity of the sponsoring country, whereas the primary intent of a clandestine operation is to conceal the operation itself. SOF activities related to unconventional recovery include the following:

- **Direct action, or DA,** is a combat operation conducted primarily by SOF in hostile or denied territory that is beyond the

Unconventional recovery operations may be covert or clandestine. The primary intent of a covert operation is to conceal the identity of the sponsoring country, whereas the primary intent of a clandestine operation is to conceal the operation itself.

exfiltrate military or other designated personnel to friendly control.” The RM infrastructure consists of personnel, specialized equipment and facilities. RMs may be established by SOF, other government agencies, UW forces, insurgent groups or clandestine organizations.

Recovery operations

Recovery operations fall into two categories: conventional and unconventional. Recovery planning should evaluate available assets and projected conditions to determine the most effective operation to use.

Conventional recovery operations. Conventional recovery operations, which use conventional aerial, surface and subsurface military forces, may be of three types:

- **Search and rescue (available on-scene).** Conventional recovery assets can be drawn from appropriately equipped air, ground or naval forces that happen to be on-scene, even though they may not be trained in

Recent Personnel Recovery Incidents

INCIDENT	CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION	RECOVERY METHOD	PR MISSION
CWO Hall North Korea	OOTW (peacekeeping)	Diplomacy	Diplomatic
CWO Durant Somalia	OOTW (humanitarian assistance/peacekeeping)	Diplomacy	Diplomatic
LT Goodman Lebanon/Syria	Contingency operation (retaliation for the bombing of the Marine barracks)	Diplomatic/civil	NGO/diplomatic
CPT O'Grady Bosnia/Herzegovina	OOTW (peacekeeping)	Marine TRAP	CSAR
Desert Storm Kuwait/Iraq	War	SOF Avn and SF	SOF CSAR
Compromised Intel Activities – Haiti	OOTW (intel activities)	SOF and TF 160	Theater SAR
Just Cause Panama	Contingency operation	SOF and TF 160	Force recovery
Sec Brown Bosnia	OOTW (peacekeeping)	SOF Avn and SF	SAR

operational capabilities of tactical weapons systems and conventional military forces. DA operations are normally limited in scope and duration — they seek to achieve specific, well-defined, and often sensitive results of strategic or operational significance. DA missions may be conducted in high-priority operations to locate and recover persons who are isolated, threatened, or held captive in sensitive, denied or contested areas. DA missions may also be used to rescue personnel who are being detained by a hostile power, such as political prisoners and prisoners of war, or POWs; or to locate, identify and recover other personnel who wish to be placed under U.S. control, such as downed aircrews and political or military leaders.

DA operations to recover isolated personnel take one of two distinctive forms. In the first form, the evader's general location is known, and the SF detachment conducts a contact reconnaissance. In the second form, the SF detachment deploys to a designated area of recovery prior to the start

of an air campaign so that it can be prepared to provide a recovery capability during operations.

- Special reconnaissance, or SR, encompasses a range of intelligence-collection activities, including reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition. Like DA operations, SR operations are normally unilateral in nature and are limited in scope and duration. SR supports PR efforts by locating and surveilling the detention facilities of hostages, POWs or political prisoners. Operational elements conducting SR can also be redirected to recover isolated personnel.

- Special activities are highly compartmented and centrally managed and controlled. The theater SOC plans and directs all E&E activities in-theater. When supporting or conducting a special activity, SOF may perform any of their primary wartime missions, subject to the limitations imposed by the NCA. When conducting special activities, SOF may be required to coordinate with other government agencies. In some cases, those agen-

cies have the authority to oversee or control SOF. If an SF team is conducting special activities, an area specialist team, normally assigned at the group level, supports the team's missions.

- Combating terrorism, or CT, includes all offensive measures taken by the U.S. government to prevent, deter or respond to terrorism. (Note: CT does not necessarily involve a PR incident.) In CT, SOF apply their specialized capabilities to preclude, pre-empt or resolve terrorist incidents abroad, including hostage situations.

- Psychological operations, or PSYOP, can significantly influence the target audience. Psychological preparation of

- Civil Affairs, or CA, operations are valuable because of their direct access to nongovernment organizations, private voluntary organizations, and diplomatic channels. CA soldiers have an inherent role in early PR planning and intelligence analysis. During the SOF mission-planning process and during the development of a PR contingency plan, CA soldiers are an essential information source. CA units have valuable resources that can assist SOF recovery teams and RMs. CA subject-matter experts who have been in the target area can provide details on the infrastructure. Should negotiations become necessary, CA teams can provide negotiators with key information acquired through an analysis of both the situation and the operational environment. As planners identify possible intermediate staging bases, CA teams can bring all players together in the civil-military operations center to centralize resources and to provide the greatest unity of effort toward the PR mission.

- Army Special Operations Aviation, or ARSOA, is an integral part of special operations. ARSOA units provide the ground commander a means by which to infiltrate, resupply and extract SOF engaged in all core missions and collateral activities. Personnel recovery is inherent in the development of ARSOA operational and contingency plans. ARSOA can be tasked to provide aircraft for the JSRC and to provide a liaison officer to coordinate ARSOA assets allocated to the JSRC force. ARSOA may be tasked to conduct CSAR if it is the only asset in the theater that can perform the mission. However, because CSAR is not a primary ARSOA mission, the aircraft and the aircraft crews should be released to their supported unit as soon as possible to perform special-operations missions.

- Ranger personnel-recovery operations are specialized raids used to recover designated personnel and to return them to friendly control. Ranger operations include CSAR to recover and extract downed aircrews, and noncombatant-evacuation operations to recover American citizens or designated foreign nationals. PR operations often require that the

SF possess several capabilities required for UAR: an understanding of UW theory and insurgent tactics; language proficiency; area and cultural orientation; small-unit tactical skills; advanced medical skills; knowledge of clandestine operations; and communication skills.

both the PR and the UAR area of operation is essential in establishing the conditions for recovery mechanisms. Specifically, PSYOP forces can persuade the populace to provide assistance to escaping and evading personnel; they can warn the populace of retribution if evading personnel are mistreated or captured; they can reduce the interference of noncombatants and minimize the resistance of combatants; and they can facilitate the concealment of the timing and the method of PR/UAR operations. PSYOP forces can also assist in negotiations through multidisciplined public diplomacy and information campaigns; they can conduct an assessment of how the indigenous populace will deal with isolated individuals who are in captivity or who are in the process of escaping; and they can develop "pointy-talkies," which can be used by isolated personnel to communicate with the indigenous population.



Photo by Gudrun Cook

Soldiers from the 10th SF Group discuss a search-and-rescue exercise to be conducted as part of U.S. operations to enforce a no-fly zone on Iraq.

Ranger force be augmented with non-Ranger personnel who possess special skills or abilities — medical personnel, technical experts, or translators, for example. The Ranger PR mission usually ends in close combat during darkness or limited visibility. Recovery operations may employ any method or combination of methods of insertion and extraction, including ground, helicopter, or fixed-wing transport. The Ranger PR mission normally requires close planning and coordination with both ARSOA and Air Force special-operations aviation for delivery and evacuation.

- Submarine operations are normally tasked by the theater Navy-component commander. Attack submarines and submarines equipped with dry-deck shelters are the most effective platforms for establishing submarine pickup points. Attack submarines are capable of inserting SOF PR teams clandestinely to conduct overland PR missions in coastal areas. The principal advantage of using the attack submarine in the recovery role is its capability to clandestinely position itself close to the enemy coastline.

- UW encompasses a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations con-

ducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. UW includes E&E performed by military personnel and other individuals who are attempting to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to an area under friendly control.

Unconventional recovery

The military aspect of UAR is classic UW, for which U.S. Army SF are specifically trained, organized and equipped. In fact, SF are the only DoD forces with the primary mission of planning and conducting UW. SF possess several capabilities required for UAR: an understanding of UW theory and insurgent tactics; language proficiency; area and cultural orientation; small-unit tactical skills; advanced medical skills; knowledge of clandestine operations; and communication skills.

During unconventional recovery, ARSOF normally operate in a selected area for evasion, or SAFE, or in a designated area of recovery, or DAR. The distinguishing factor between a DAR and a SAFE is that a DAR supports short-term evasion, whereas a SAFE supports long-term evasion.

ARSOF may conduct or support two types of assisted recovery: planned and unplanned.

Planned assisted recovery. In most SF missions, E&R is an implied task that requires the same planning, preparation and support as the primary tasks. Deliberate recovery planning includes a follow-on SOF mission, recovery forces, and RMs that can be operated by indigenous forces and by other clandestine organizations.

If ARSOF are conducting short-term operations, such as SR or DA, and the JFC directs them to conduct an assisted recovery, ARSOF must assess the risk to the evader and to themselves:

- Should the evader be recovered immediately?
- What is the impact of diverting ARSOF from their primary mission?

Responsible authorities must carefully consider the sensitivity of RMs and the potential consequences for the SOF who perform them. If a hostile power detains or exposes UAR participants within politically denied areas, that power may consider the activity of the participants illegal, and thereby deny them protection under international conventions.

- Can the evader be recovered after ARSOF's primary mission has been completed?
- Can other assets recover the evader?

Any SOF operation may involve PR, and planning for a recovery force is becoming an implied primary task for SOF. If tasked to include potential recovery actions in their initial planning, SOF teams operating in or near an evader's known location could move to the area to contact, authenticate and recover the evader. When the enemy situation permits and when adequate planning has been conducted, resupply operations can reconstitute the team before it contacts the evader.

Recovery mechanisms

RMs support E&R operations, particularly in situations where U.S. unconventional forces or allied personnel support or direct

the RM's activities. An RM or its elements may recover personnel through different operational areas and environments. Depending on its size and range, an RM can vary the nature of its actions from overt to covert to clandestine.

Indigenous forces or third-country nationals may serve as an RM, and SOF may also be directed to assist or operate with insurgent groups. These insurgent groups will normally be classified as either sponsored or unsponsored.

- Sponsored insurgent groups may be supported, led or advised by U.S. or allied SF elements. These groups may be recruited and trained by friendly forces, or they may be dependent on allied countries.

- Unsponsored insurgent groups may include mercenaries, dissidents and outlaws. These groups may provide assistance to evaders if they perceive that doing so is in their best interests, or if they anticipate a reward. The use of unsponsored insurgent groups presents certain problems. Limitations in communication between friendly forces and insurgent groups can increase the difficulty in arranging the recovery of evaders, thereby extending the evasion period. Under certain conditions, an insurgent group may attempt to use the evader to augment its forces. This situation could create legal problems for the evader if the insurgent group conducts operations in violation of U.S. policy or international law. Such groups may also want to retain an evader for use as a bargaining chip.

Because independent insurgent groups may perceive the evader as a de facto representative of the U.S. government, the evader should conduct himself with the utmost discretion. While in an RM, the evader should:

- Project a favorable image of the U.S. and its values.
- Avoid acts that violate international law or that discredit the U.S.
- Avoid expressing any ideas that could be misconstrued as official U.S. policy.
- Refrain from making any agreements contrary to the interests of the U.S.
- Demonstrate high moral character.

Unplanned assisted recovery. Unplanned assisted recovery may occur when members of the general population in an enemy-held area assist an evader in returning to friendly control. These people may be classified as follows:

- **Opportunists.** Individuals or groups may assist an evader with the expectation of monetary gain, materials, or political recognition for the evader's safe return.
- **Accidental contacts.** Individuals may help an evader for personal reasons or because they anticipate a reward.
- **Good Samaritans.** Individuals who perform acts out of mercy or sympathy.

Legal considerations

SOF missions frequently involve complex issues. Federal laws and executive orders, federal-agency publications and directives, and theater rules of engagement may affect mission execution. The guidelines become especially critical during sensitive peacetime operations, when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political agreements affect the planning and execution of the mission and of post-conflict activities. Responsible authorities must carefully consider the sensitivity of RMs and the potential consequences for the SOF who perform them. If a hostile power detains or exposes UAR participants within politically denied areas, that power may consider the activity of the participants illegal, and thereby deny them protection under international conventions.

Planners must appreciate the distinction between an evader and an escapee. Under international law, an evader is a lawful combatant until captured. An individual who has escaped from an enemy confinement facility is legally an escapee (a noncombatant). However, evaders and escapees use the same tactical skills to evade and avoid capture. The difference between an evader and an escapee becomes significant when the individual emerges in a neutral state: The neutral power will likely detain the evader until the cessation of hostilities, and it will allow the escapee to remain at

liberty. Thus, the isolated person's legal status can directly affect his course of travel.

Conclusion

Because they offer the NCA several options for recovering isolated personnel, SOF are invaluable in dealing with military and civilian PR issues. One of the greatest strengths of SOF, in addition to their cross-cultural training and language skills, is their ability to respond immediately to a wide range of conflict situations with a only minimal preparation. SOF must be prepared to act pre-emptively to protect U.S. national interests. Whenever a crisis develops within a region, SOF will be ready to respond. Once they have been introduced into a country, SOF can establish on-the-ground contacts and develop a network infrastructure that can sustain and protect the recovery mechanism.

While many functions (legal affairs, casualty and mortuary affairs, public affairs and operational support) are integral to the preparation and execution of a PR mission, ARSOF are the principal developers and users (and in many cases the sole providers) of RMs that support UW missions. ARSOF must be prepared to plan, support and execute UARs in peace and in war. ✂

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Humanitarian Demining Operations: Relieving Human Suffering Worldwide

by Sergeant First Class Paul Clarke

The United States Humanitarian Demining Program, or HDP, is designed to relieve human suffering by helping selected countries develop their own indigenous demining capability.

The HDP concentrates on two elements: the research and development of technology for identifying and eliminating the threat posed by land mines, and programs designed to assist designated countries in eliminating their uncleared mines. A key objective of the HDP is to ensure that

cadres of the host-nations, or HNs, are capable of training their countries' personnel and of establishing a self-sustaining infrastructure that can conduct independent demining operations.

Since 1993, the U.S. has provided more than \$246 million in humanitarian demining, or HD, assistance to mine-affected countries. DoD has spent more than \$28 million in research and development, and has transferred nearly \$10 million worth of equipment directly to host-nation national

The threat from anti-personnel mines is a growing concern worldwide. In 1998, the U.S. provided nearly \$92 million in demining assistance to 21 countries.



DoD photo

demining organizations. In 1997 alone, some 300 U.S. military and civilian personnel trained more than 1,200 indigenous deminers to conduct mine-clearance operations, to provide emergency medical care, to establish national mine-action centers, and to train others to conduct mine-awareness campaigns. In 1998, the U.S. provided nearly \$92 million in HD assistance to 21 countries in Asia, Africa, Central America and eastern Europe.

U.S. Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, play a major role in supporting the HDP. They are responsible for organizing, equipping and training demining elements ranging from battalion to company size. Although worldwide interest in humanitarian demining is relatively new, ARSOF have supported the demining programs of the United Nations for several years. During fiscal year 1995, ARSOF supported demining operations in Namibia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Honduras. During FYs 1996 and 1997, ARSOF supported demining operations in Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Laos, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Listed below are the specific demining activities of ARSOF:

- Special Forces conduct limited mine-awareness operations as required, but they are primarily responsible for training personnel of the national demining headquarters and mine-clearance organizations to plan, organize and execute demining operations. One of SF's key objectives is to assist host-nation cadres in developing their capabilities so that they can train forces over the long term.

Cadre training includes basic skills and individual tasks — officer and NCO professional development, leadership, communications, emergency medical techniques, instructor training, land navigation, and engineer and demining techniques. Cadre training also covers collective and team skills, from the team or squad level through the company level, including demining mission planning. The SF element supervises the HN cadre responsible for training operational platoons, then it monitors the operational platoons in the conduct of their day-to-day operations.

- Civil Affairs assets also provide train-



Photo by Justin D. Pyle

A U.S. Special Forces sergeant helps a student during a land-navigation practical exercise conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina during Operation Joint Endeavor.

ing to the national demining headquarters and conduct liaison activities with the HN infrastructure, the U.N., and international or local nongovernment organizations. CA personnel teach leadership skills, management techniques, and staff procedures required for the headquarters to maintain command, control and communication with its subordinate organizations.

- PSYOP forces educate the HN national government, local governments and the HN population in the proper procedures of reducing the hazards caused by mine contamination. PSYOP personnel also teach HN forces to develop and execute mine-awareness campaigns, to conduct mine-awareness training programs, and to develop and disseminate mine-awareness products.

- The Special Operations Support Command contributes to the demining effort through its forward-deployed, special-operations theater-support elements. SOSCOM can assist ARSOF forces in planning and obtaining logistics resources from within the theater or from the HN support systems.

The Army Engineer Center and School, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., is the proponent for the U.S. Army's military countermine operations. The school's Humanitarian Demining Training Center conducts a two-

A U.S. PSYOP soldier distributes mine-awareness comic books to children in Bosnia-Herzegovina.



Photo by Donte Robinson

week Humanitarian Demining Course. The course prepares SF A-detachments to conduct humanitarian-demining programs. A new publication, TC 31-34, *Humanitarian Demining Operations Handbook*, prepared by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, sets the standard for humanitarian-demining training and is the primary reference source used in the course. The demining training center also conducts a one-week, theater-oriented course for liaison officers, or LNOs, who may be required to assist in humanitarian-demining operations, or HDOs.

U.S. HD efforts are implemented through four theater commands: U.S. European Command, or EUCOM; U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM; U.S. Pacific Command, or PACOM; and U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM. The U.S. Atlantic Command, whose area of responsibility is the U.S. and the Atlantic Ocean, does not participate in an HD program.

The theater commands conduct HDOs within their specific areas of responsibility. Each theater command requires a national demining organization, or NDO, established in accordance with the requirements of the theater commander in chief, or CINC. Each command uses a different approach in organizing and running its NDO:

In EUCOM, the J3 of Special Operations Command-Europe is the executive agent for HDO and has established a demining cell that is supported by LNOs both from ARSOF and from explosive-ordnance disposal units. EUCOM's HDP has increased from two countries in 1995 to seven in 1998. EUCOM expects to add six more countries to its program before the end of FY 2000.

In CENTCOM, the Special Operations Command-Central, or SOCCENT, passed executive-agent responsibility to the CINC in FY 1996. While the CINC relies on his component commands and on a civilian contractor to manage the HDP, the SOCCENT provides the training force. CENTCOM's HDP has increased from two countries in 1995 to five in 1998. CENTCOM expects to add three more countries to its program before the end of FY 2000.

In PACOM, Special Operations Command-Pacific, the executive agent for HDO, has two active-duty soldiers to manage the demining program. The PACOM program provides training and resource support to regional mine-action centers, or MACs. MACs are responsible for in-country operations, which includes organizing, equipping and training host-nation demining elements. The number of countries that the PACOM program supports has increased

from one in 1995 to two in 1997. PACOM expects to add another country to its program before the end of FY 2000.

In SOUTHCOM, the Organization of American States/Inter-American Defense Board controls the HDP. The CINC provides training and resource support to a regional demining training center in Danli, Honduras. The center is responsible for organizing, equipping, training and coordinating operations throughout the theater. The Special Operations Command-South plans to transfer executive-agent responsibility for HD to Joint Task Force Bravo during FY 1999. The number of countries that SOUTHCOM's HDP supports has increased from one in 1995 to five in 1998. SOUTHCOM expects to add five more countries to its program before the end of FY 2000.

Differences in cultures and in regional requirements, as well as variations in HDOs, make it difficult to standardize demining efforts. In an effort to develop an effective HD program and to reach the ultimate goal of eradicating all land mines, the SWCS and USASOC are working with the Army Engineer School, the United Nations, and international HDOs to standardize the recording and reporting of HD efforts.

In May 1996, President Clinton announced a major land-mine policy that would expand research-and-development efforts for HD technology and that would strengthen the U.S.'s HD program. At the same time, the U.S. stopped using non-self-destructing anti-personnel land mines, or APLs, except in marked and monitored minefields in Korea. The U.S. also announced that it would seek alternatives to APLs and have them ready for use in Korea by 2006. In 1997, more than 120 countries signed the Ottawa Convention, banning the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of APLs. The U.S. plans to sign the Ottawa Convention as well, if it succeeds in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to APLs by 2006. Regardless of whether we sign the convention, the U.S. is committed to eradicating the land-mine threat by 2010.

For more information about the Human-

itarian Demining Course, telephone the Engineer School at (573) 563-5518. Questions or input regarding TC 31-34 should be directed to SFC Paul Clarke, SF Training and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFKSWCS, at DSN 239-9802/7690 or commercial (910) 432-9802/7690. ✕

Sergeant First Class Paul Clarke is a doctrine writer assigned to the Special Forces Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

SOF Initiatives in Demining: The Bosnian Entity Army Training Centers

by Captain Brian S. Petit

Concerned over the worldwide proliferation of land mines and the suffering those mines produce, the United States has pledged to lead the world in global humanitarian-demining assistance.¹

During 1996 and 1997, the U.S. government funded more than 14 demining missions worldwide,² and U.S. Army special-operations forces were involved in nearly every one of those missions. It is probable that Special Forces groups will increasingly participate in demining missions over the next three to five years. Not surprisingly, the operational tempo of the demining missions is outpacing their published doctrine.

This article examines a unique demining mission — the establishment of demining training centers for each of the entity armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina — performed by the 10th SF Group. The principles of that pilot demining program may serve as a model for future special-operations teams deploying in similar foreign-internal-defense or humanitarian-assistance roles.

Mine problem in Bosnia

An estimated 750,000 land mines remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are 19,000 recorded minefields, and the locations of approximately 350,000 mines have been identified.³ Large sections of former confrontation lines are heavily laden with

mines laid in random patterns for which no mine-emplacement records exist. Even in areas where records do exist, confrontation lines shifted throughout the war, causing many minefields to become over-seeded.

Time and weather adversely affect mines. Overgrowing vegetation conceals minefield indicators such as tripwires, demolition spools, small craters and animal carcasses. Erosion displaces lightweight plastic mines, often washing them into previously safe areas. Heavy rains increase the weight of the covering earth, thus sensitizing buried, pressure-fused mines.

In many instances, local civilians emplaced mines in the areas surrounding their homes. The lack of records pertaining to these minefields impedes the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees. To further complicate the demining problem, Bosnian soil has a high metallic content that reduces the reliability of mine detectors.

According to estimates, each month Bosnia suffers 50 mine-related incidents that result in injury or death.⁴ The mine-recovery efforts of both the international community and the local government are hindered by the real and psychological threat of mines.

Unfortunately, the extent of the mine problem was unknown to the authors of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The demining clause mandated the total clearance of the zone of separation (1,075 km long and



Photo by Carl Fountain

Soldiers from the 10th SF Group attend the opening ceremony of a demining training center at Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 km wide) within 30 days, with an additional 30 days allocated for clearing mines from roads and areas necessary to the duties of the implementation force, or IFOR.⁵ This stipulation grossly underestimated the ground truth. At the current rate of mine removal, it will take 34 years to clear the country by mine-lifting operations (the removal of mines with the aid of mine-emplacment records) or 150 years to clear the country by mine-clearing operations (removal by mine detection).⁶

To further complicate the situation, the demining efforts conducted by the former warring factions in 1996 were wholly unsatisfactory. In 1997, the commander of the stabilization force, or SFOR, adopted a more coercive approach toward mine-clearance operations by establishing specific manpower and man-hour requirements for teams from the entity armed forces, or EAF.⁷

Overall, the mine situation remained bleak: indigenous mine-removal efforts were sluggish; mine-removal operations were highly dangerous and costly; and all aspects of entity-army demining operations became a compliance issue, resulting in SFOR-enforced sanctions against entity armies that did not meet the stated requirements.⁸ The country's demining picture further deteriorated when dozens of private and commercial organizations attempted to conduct demining operations without any centralized direc-

tion or oversight. During 1996 and 1997, no unity of effort existed for the Bosnia-Herzegovina demining operations.

Feasibility assessment

To assist the EAF in building their demining programs, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group, deployed to Bosnia in December 1997 to plan a standard "train the trainer" mission.

Prior to its deployment, Company C had received technical mine-clearance training

At the current rate of mine removal, it will take 34 years to clear the country by mine-lifting operations (the removal of mines with the aid of mine-emplacment records) or 150 years to clear the country by mine-clearing operations (removal by mine detection).

at Fort Carson, Colo., and at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. The training complied with the international standards for demining developed by the United Nations. SF engineers became experts in the family of Yugoslavian mines, as well as in the regulations governing internationally recognized mine-clearing operations.

When Company C arrived in Bosnia, SFOR engineers were already conducting the

second and third iterations of basic demining courses for the EAF. The 10th Group representatives therefore proposed the idea of establishing entity-army training centers throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

These permanent school sites would house a fixed cadre and staff, train all entity-army demining teams, and ultimately serve as the EAF proponent for demining operations. Company C's long-term vision included the concept that the training centers would develop and operate military-occupational-specialty qualifying courses in accordance with the standards of the U.S. Army NCO Education Schools, or NCOES. The concept was approved in January 1998, and Company C began establishing the first EAF demining training centers.

Training center concept

In formulating the core of the training-center model, Company C used Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulations 351-1, 361-1-R, 351-17, 350-24, Army Regulation 351-1, materials from the Special Warfare Center and School's


Instructor Training Course, and knowledge gained from visits to various NCO academies. Company C planned its mission using the principles outlined in the FID ARTEP Manual. Next, Company C formulated the objectives and concept for the training centers.

Given the magnitude of the mine situation and the political and cultural considerations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SFOR determined that three separate entity armed-force training centers would need to be established. This would give each center the best chance for success without undue ethnic or political disruption. Each entity army (Bosnian-Croat, Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Serb) agreed to the establishment of a training center on its existing military base. Each center would be chartered by an SF A-detachment.

Equipping the school

The 10th Group soldiers initially assessed a pool of entity officers and NCOs to man each training center. The candidates were

Demining School Cadre Organization



tested in map reading, demolitions, demining, first-aid and basic troop-leading procedures. The best-qualified candidates were selected to serve as instructors and as school staff members. Each school operated under a commandant, with a training section and a staff section. Cadre training was conducted over four weeks. All staff members and instructors received common instruction in small-group leader techniques, mentoring and teaching techniques, and school disciplinary measures. The trainees then split into three groups: demining and demolition instructors, medical instructors and school staff.

The demining and demolition instructors were required to demonstrate all aspects of mine-clearing operations, including the destruction, in place, of land mines. The SF engineers reinforced the safety measures required for compliance with international standards of mine clearing. The demining and demolitions final exam covered all the technical mine data, demining-site setup, mine-detecting and -marking, U.N. regulations and demolition operations.

The EAF medical instructors received training in first aid, in primary and secondary survey, and in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation. All EAF medical instructors were soldiers or army nurses with previous medical experience. This proved to be especially helpful to the SF medics, because they were able to teach the advanced medical skills necessary in treating severely injured mine victims. The medical final examination consisted of a written portion and a minefield-evacuation-trauma scenario involving multiple casualties.

The staff training focused on techniques for effectively organizing and operating a training center. SF soldiers taught the school staff the duties of the S1, S3, S4 and commandant, in accordance with U.S. Army staff-operations doctrine. Automation training constituted a large portion of the staff training. Staff members learned computer basics, database management and hardware maintenance. Each school staff created a similar training-center database designed to codify the training centers' operational and administrative requirements.



Photo by Brian Petit

Cadre training culminated in a one-week training exercise that tested all of the instruction presented.

Following their four weeks of training, the entity cadre began a two-week rehearsal: They assumed responsibility for all the instruction, logistics and planning of the demining course. During this period, instructors received their class assignments and rehearsed their class presentation under the tutelage of the SF instructors. The staff planned the inprocessing, billeting, meals, training schedule and logistics requirements. The SF advisers ensured that the curriculum presentation was accurate, professional and organized.

A Special Forces soldier gives instruction to Bosnian demining-instructor trainees. Training covered all aspects of mine-clearing operations.

During this period, local contractors and entity-army soldiers renovated the facilities to create a functioning academic and training environment. Each school received more than \$175,000 worth of equipment, including protective gear, training aids, copiers, and a full complement of computer hardware and software.

First basic deminer's course

In June 1998, each of the three training centers began its first Basic Deminer's Course. The four-week course trained three nine-man demining teams at each

served as monitors, there were SFOR monitors; monitors from the United Nations Mine Action Center; and representatives from various private agencies interested in the indigenous programs.

Altogether, the three training centers produced 73 entity-army deminers, medics and team leaders who were qualified to conduct demining operations to the internationally recognized standard. Encouraged by the progress of the entity army programs, the Canadian and Norwegian governments soon thereafter announced a plan to insure EAF deminers through 2001 against the loss of life or limb while conducting humanitarian mine-clearing operations.

Course sustainment

SFOR mandated that the training centers would conduct a minimum of three courses per year, with the option of conducting refresher courses as necessary. SFOR assigned full-time monitors to the training centers to ensure that the curriculum and training remained to standard. The overall responsibility of sustaining and maintaining the training centers fell to their respective entity army and government. Failure to provide an adequate operating budget or failure to conduct courses according to schedule would result in training and movement bans being imposed on the offending army.

Essential to the effective sustainment of the training centers was the integration of each training site into the national demin-

The concept of the entity-army training centers was to make the host nation responsible for clearing mines, and at the same time, to provide the host nation with the expertise, confidence and organization it would need to conduct mine-clearance operations.

training center. All of the personnel trained were either active or reserve military members. The centers' goal was for each demining team to graduate, receive equipment, and begin conducting demining operations as part of the summer 1998 campaign.⁹

Each center conducted its course with a high level of professionalism and intensity. In addition to the SF advisers who

Soldiers from the 10th SF Group meet with Bosnian and Serbian military leaders and officials of the U.N., to discuss demining training plans.



Photo by Justin D. Pyle

ing program. In a textbook example of facilitating interagency activities, Company C brought entity-army representatives into discussions with civilian demining agencies and members of U.N.-sponsored programs.

To ensure that the training centers became the focal points for all country-wide demining training, technology and expansion, Company C leaders aligned the groups and presented a vision of sustaining a low-cost, indigenous training program in each of the training centers. This effort resulted in project plans for civilian demining teams to work with the training centers in a mutually beneficial relationship. SF involvement in the establishment and operation of the training centers greatly contributed to the legitimacy and credibility of the indigenous demining programs, and it helped to reduce much of the reluctance of private organizations to invest in the EAF program.

The 10th SF Group has demonstrated its commitment to the centers by sending SF engineers on periodic inspections of the schools. SFOR continues to monitor all entity-army activities, including the operation of the three training centers. The program's long-term success will be measured by the continued operation of the centers, and by the safe but aggressive efforts of the EAF demining teams to clear the Bosnian countryside of mines.

Conclusion

The proliferation of land mines and unexploded ordnance impedes the restoration of peace, the restructuring of war-torn economies, and the normalization of life.

The concept of the entity-army training centers was to make the host nation responsible for clearing mines, and at the same time, to provide the host nation with the expertise, confidence and organization it would need to conduct mine-clearance operations.

With their ability to build, to teach and to operate in situations polarized by ethnic and political issues, SOF are ideally suited for humanitarian-demining activities. They will likely continue to assist

indigenous populations in implementing demining programs similar to the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. ❧

Captain Brian S. Petit is a detachment commander in Company C, 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group. His detachment established one of the three entity-army demining training centers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Notes:

¹ Associated Press, "U.S. to lead effort to clear world of land mines by 2010," *The Gazette* (Colorado Springs, Colo.), 1 November 1997.

² Interagency Working Group report on demining, 28 June 1997.

³ Mine Information Coordination Cell database as of 1 May 1998, Tito Barracks, Sarajevo.

⁴ Mine Information Coordination Cell database as of 1 May 1998, Tito Barracks, Sarajevo.

⁵ Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 1-A, Article IV.2(3)(d).

⁶ Peter Aldwinckle, "Background Brief — Bosnia Demining," 1997.

⁷ London Peace Implementation Conference, Chapter 8, Commander, SFOR, Instructions to the Parties, December 1996.

⁸ *Ibid.* Training and movement bans were placed on entity armies who did not achieve "effective effort" levels for the prior month's mine-removal operations.

⁹ The delayed arrival of donated demining equipment prevented an immediate transition to live demining operations.

The Trek: Critical Event in SF Officer Training

by Lieutenant Colonel Charles King

The Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course, or SFDOQC, offers an individual training exercise known simply as Trek. Over the years Trek has had various names; it has been scheduled at various points throughout the program of instruction; and it has been conducted under a variety of conditions. However, two things about Trek have remained constant: It has always centered around a solo land-navigation event of several days' duration, and it has always been a critical event in the training of Special Forces officers.

Trek is contentious. To some, Trek is the holy grail of officer training; to others, Trek is an example of outdated tab protection; and to still others, Trek is simply a gut check that belongs in Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS. And yet, all student officers, in class after class, consider Trek to be the defining moment of the SFDOQC. Trek and Robin Sage (the final FTX in the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC) are often mentioned as the two most memorable events of SF training. Admittedly, however, the purpose of Trek is not self-evident, and bears some definition.

First of all, I submit that Trek is the

In this article, the author shares his ideas on the value of Trek and describes Trek's role in the training of SF officers. From 1995 to 1997, the author served as commander of the battalion responsible for conducting the SFDOQC. — Editor

most critical event in the development of SF officers. It shapes the unique brand of leadership that we need for our future. Although the training objective of Trek is somewhat counter-intuitive, and the standards for the event are certainly open for debate and change, the existence of Trek in the broad scheme of training events that make up SF qualification is critical.


Second, allow me to propose two assumptions from which to begin:

- SFAS is not perfect.
- Officers who have reached the midpoint of the SFDOQC should be able to complete Trek.

Given these assumptions, it follows that although the training objective of Trek should be attained by most, it may not be attained by all. The training objective can be stated as follows:

- *Task:* Make independent decisions.
- *Condition:* Alone, with basic issue equipment, under stress and fatigue, accomplish a task that you have been trained to do.
- *Standard:* Accomplish the given task to the prescribed standard.

The primary purpose of Trek is to evaluate the decision-making capabilities of our student officers. Trek is a test to ensure that capable, independent decision-makers have been trained. It is not an assessment tool; at least it is no more of an assessment tool than any other test is. It cannot be conducted during SFAS because Trek presup-



File photo

While Trek is centered around a land-navigation exercise, its primary purpose is to examine the decision-making capabilities of student officers.

poses a high level of training and conditioning. That first precondition is, by definition, missing during SFAS.

The second purpose of Trek is to provide the student officers with an experience that will serve as an inoculation against the very challenges that can cripple their decision-making in the future: fatigue, uncertainty, stress, and lack of counsel. In this sense, Trek is similar to the resistance-training-lab, or RTL, phase of the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Course, or SERE, in that part of the point of the event is the experience itself. Again, just as the RTL phase is not conducted until the SERE students have received training, Trek is not conducted until the student officers have been trained.

The third purpose of Trek is to present the student officers with challenges (both physical and mental). These challenges, in turn, produce two benefits. First, they instill confidence and pride, which simply amplifies the inoculation mentioned above. Second, they reinforce the credibility of the student officers' training. Trek is not offered to the NCO students in the SFQC. It cannot be said that their leaders have not been adequately tested and challenged.

Trek further illuminates the difference between the end state of the enlisted SFQC (which is designed to produce "journeymen" SF soldiers who are qualified at the entry level for service on an ODA) and the end state of the SFDOQC (which by neces-

sity must produce officers who are capable of commanding detachments). Unlike the NCOs, officers must be (at least in the sense of being prepared to command) fully qualified upon graduation.

Last, as long as SFAS remains an imperfect tool, Trek will provide those students who want out of the SFDOQC an opportunity to leave voluntarily. Even though those students represent only a small percentage of the officers who enter SF training, if Trek causes them to quit, then its value is significant.

It is also important to note what Trek is not. Trek is not a test of land navigation — land navigation is trained and evaluated in Phase I. Trek requires students to demonstrate the skills and the knowledge that they acquired earlier in the course. In fact, every task required by Trek will already have been accomplished by the students. Seldom indeed does a student officer fail Trek because he can't navigate or because he doesn't know the material being tested. Land navigation is used merely as a vehicle for the decision-making exercise. Given our resources and the nature of SF, land navigation is an appropriate vehicle, but it is not the only vehicle.

Trek is not an assessment or a test of endurance, although it is physically demanding. Physically, Trek is conducted at a pace that should be achievable, given the other physical standards that the students have met prior to that point. If stu-

dent officers fail Trek at an unacceptable rate, the cause could be traced back to SFAS. The problem is not that Trek is an extension of SFAS. The problem may be that SFAS is not adequately assessing the student officers, or the problem may be that the officers selected for the SFDOQC are not properly preparing themselves.

Trek is an important and valuable tool for training and preparing unconventional warfare leaders for the future. My experience with eight iterations of Trek leads me to conclude that failure can largely be attributed to the student's inability to make appropriate and timely decisions, or to the student's inability to trust his own skills and knowledge. Students who have been overcome by the stress of solitude and fatigue have also failed Trek. Implicit here, just as it is in SERE, is the realization that a response to stress can be learned — that we can inoculate ourselves against certain eventualities. The goal of decision-making education is unsupervised predictability.¹ The experience of Trek tests to that end.

Is there a need for Trek? Surely, the SF Branch has a justified requirement to train its officers to be both capable and ready to make independent decisions. Indeed, this requirement is unique in degree among the other branches. The requirement to be independent is such an overwhelming part of what we expect from our officers that it lends itself to being considered a core value of our branch. Army Research Institute studies conducted on SF candidates during SFAS show that the vast majority of the candidates have never been alone for a significant period of time. For the rest of the Army population, being alone is atypical and is avoided. Yet our officers must be consummate decision-makers and self-reliant to the highest degree. Maybe they won't be completely alone; perhaps their team will be with them. But they will be alone in the sense that they will be making fundamental decisions without any supervision. Trek is a critical building block in the development of our officers, and it is directly focused at preparing them for an uncertain and ambiguous future. ✂

Lieutenant Colonel Charles King is chief of the SF Officer Branch, Officer Professional Management Division, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command. His previous Special Forces assignments include commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School; company commander, operations officer and group executive officer, 10th SF Group; detachment commander, 5th SF Group; and branch assignments officer, SF Branch, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command.



Notes:

¹ Major Peter Dillon, "Ethical Decision Making on the Battlefield," MMAS Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 1992.

Army Values

Personal Courage

Roger Donlon

In July 1964, Captain Roger Donlon was commander of Special Forces detachment A-726, stationed at Camp Nam Dong, Republic of Vietnam. In the early-morning darkness of July 6, a reinforced Viet Cong battalion launched an attack on the camp. During the five-hour battle that followed, Donlon, under intense fire from small arms and mortars, directed the defensive operations of the camp, personally recovered weapons and ammunition and moved them where they would be more effective, rescued wounded soldiers, and administered first aid. Despite his own wounds in the stomach, face, shoulder and leg, he moved around the camp perimeter, directing firing operations, hurling hand grenades back at the enemy, and encouraging his soldiers to fight on. For his actions, Donlon was awarded the Medal of Honor, the first given during the Vietnam War and the first given to a Special Forces soldier.

Reflecting on his actions and those of his team, Donlon said, "When you read the award citation, you think of physical courage. That's only one dimension of it. There is a greater courage that feeds physical courage: moral courage — a kind of mental toughness. ... That was the core that allowed us to do things beyond what we thought we'd be capable of. When we saw what the other members of the team were doing, we gained more strength."

Donlon retired from the Army in 1988 as a colonel. He is executive director of the Westmoreland Scholar Foundation, a nonprofit educational foundation dedicated to supporting academic scholarships and exchange programs that will foster reconciliation and harmony between the people of the United States and the people of Vietnam. He is donating all proceeds from the first edition of his 1998 book, *Beyond Nam Dong*, to the foundation.



Captain Roger Donlon, the first Special Forces soldier to win the Medal of Honor.

Beyond Nam Dong is available through the Special Warfare Museum Gift Shop (910-436-2366) or directly from R&N Publishers (913-772-5480). — Editor

Scud Hunting: Theater Missile Defense and SOF

by Captain John M. Clearwater

One of the most significant trends in 21st-century warfare has been the rapid proliferation of offensive missile systems. Theater missiles, or TMs, which include theater ballistic missiles, or TBMs; cruise missiles; and air-to-surface missiles, pose a great threat to world stability and can diminish our nation's future ability to conduct force projection and to resolve regional conflicts.

Worldwide, a buying spree is under way for advanced missile systems. Affordable in comparison to other weapon systems, such as combat aircraft and warships, missiles offer countries with small budgets a chance to get the most bang for their weapons buck. As TMs make leaps in range, accuracy and lethality, developing militaries will view them as strategic equalizers.

The TM threat is diverse: South Korea and the Japanese mainland are now within range of North Korea's latest Nodong missile. And Iran is building two new missile systems based on the Nodong design. Both of Iran's systems will be equipped with 2,200-pound warheads, and both will be capable of hitting targets as far away as central Europe.¹ Israeli intelligence reports that Iran has a goal of an even longer range — 6,000 miles — that would allow Iran to hit targets in the eastern United States.²

As weapons of terror, missiles present a formidable threat to U.S. forces, population centers, and critical assets. This threat

becomes even greater when the missiles are combined with chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, or WMD. In July 1997, the highest ranking official ever to defect from North Korea testified that North Korea prides itself on its chemical-warfare capabilities, and that if the U.S. should attempt to intervene in an invasion of South Korea, North Korea plans to annihilate Japan with a massive wave of missiles armed with chemical warheads.³ In September 1997, Alexander Lebben, former Russian Minister of Defense, announced that possibly 100 or more suitcase-sized, one-kiloton nuclear bombs were missing from the Russian inventory. Presumably, they had been sold or were on the black market.⁴ The potential of converting such devices into missile warheads emphasizes the importance of refining our tactics, techniques and procedures necessary in combating the theater-missile threat.

Importance of SOF

One of the core functions at all levels of command is force protection. With their increased accuracy and versatility of launch, TBMs will most likely demonstrate their effectiveness at the very outset of a conflict. Suitable as weapons for long-range surprise attacks against U.S. forces, TBMs are a priority of the theater commanders in chief, or CINCs.

Special-operations forces, or SOF, will perform crucial roles in the theater-missile-defense plans of the CINCs. Joint Pub 3-01.5, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense*, states that locating and targeting the launchers and support structure *before* launch is the most effective method of combating the TBM threat.⁵

Defensive measures aimed at disrupting the enemy's attack preparations and momentum would draw SOF into the earliest stages of a conflict, and could lead to short-notice SOF mission taskings. Such was the case during the Gulf War, when elements of the British Special Air Service found themselves rushed from England and quickly inserted into Iraq.⁶

Background

The Gulf War remains our only experience with ballistic missile defense. It still influences our thinking on theater-missile defense, or TMD, and shows the value of SOF in TMD operations.

From 1982 to 1988, Iraq and Iran exchanged more than 500 Scud missiles during the infamous "War Between the Cities." Iran subsequently claimed to have killed more than 3,000 civilians in a single week.⁷ While the Iraqi and Iranian Scud campaigns accomplished little militarily, they did allow Iraq to begin the Gulf War with a pool of experienced rocket teams and engineers. Saddam Hussein was hopeful of using Scud attacks against Israel to prompt an Israeli response and to draw Israel into the Gulf War.

To avoid the political consequences of such a situation, the coalition began a massive air campaign to destroy the Iraqi Scud infrastructure. The objective was to eliminate missile manufacture, storage facilities and fueling installations. The coalition's attacks against the fixed infrastructure were very effective, but locating the highly mobile MAZ-543 transporter, erector, launcher, or TEL, was remarkably difficult even in a desert environment. The TELs proved to be surprisingly elusive and sur-



Photo by Bill Thompson

During the Gulf War, the U.S. deployed Patriot missiles such as these to help defend Israel against Iraqi Scud missile attacks.

vivable, despite the intense efforts to find and destroy them.

The Soviet Scud missile and the MAZ-543 launcher were designed for mobility. Thirteen meters in length, the MAZ-543 launcher is an extremely powerful, 560-horsepower, rough-terrain vehicle. Power, ground clearance and a central tire-presurization system allow the vehicle to negotiate rough terrain while transporting a 12-meter, 15,000-pound missile.

At the start of the Gulf War, intelligence services estimated that Iraq had 18 launchers. When coalition aircraft destroyed 16 in the first night's strikes, the threat seemed to have been eliminated. Unfortunately, the initial estimate had been wrong, and the intelligence services revised their figures to reflect 15 Scud battalions and as many as 225 launchers.⁸

In 43 days, the coalition carried out more than 1,500 strikes against Iraqi missile targets — ranging from suspected hiding places to Scud support facilities. Only 215 strikes were reported against TELs. Coalition aircrews reported destroying 80 TELs, mostly by A-10s.⁹ (It now appears that many of these “TELs” were either decoys or vehicles unfortunate enough to have had “Scud-like” infrared and radar signatures. However, as the air campaign intensified, Scud launches, which had averaged five per day for the first 10 days, dropped to only one per day for the last 33 days of the war.¹⁰

On Feb. 25, 1991, a SOF element operating in western Iraq reported a force of approximately 20 Scud launchers. Saddam Hussein may have planned to use the Scuds in a massive saturation strike to overwhelm Patriot batteries defending Israel and to trigger an Israeli intervention. During the six hours following the SOF report, A-10s, guided in by SOF, destroyed all of the mobile launchers. Then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who later met with members of the SOF element, reportedly told them, “Thanks for keeping Israel out of the war.”¹¹

During the Gulf War, Iraqi forces fired 93 Scuds: 42 at Israel, 48 at Saudi Arabia, and three at Bahrain.¹² The worst tragedy, however, occurred when a Scud missile hit a barracks in which American soldiers were being housed. In all, 97 were wounded, and 28 were killed — 36 percent of the U.S. Army deaths from enemy action during the war.

Missile unit procedures

Missile units undergo rigorous training, and they are often noted for their high level of discipline and morale. Independently employed and sustained from remote locations, missile units have a support infrastructure that is streamlined and flexible.

Iraqi and North Korean Scud missile brigades consist of three battalions, each with nine TELs, for a total of 27 TELs per

An Iraqi Scud missile hit this barracks in which U.S. soldiers were being housed, killing 28 and wounding nearly 100.



Photo by Lee F. Corkran



File photo

The MAZ-543 transporter, erector, launcher is a mobile, powerful rough-terrain vehicle.



File photo

brigade. North Korean surface-to-surface missile forces consist of two or more brigades of Nodong launchers. Brigades also maintain headquarters companies, as well as signal, engineer, weather, decontamination, and technical-maintenance companies.

The missile battalion's survival depends upon speed of execution; preplanned hide sites, launch sites and reload sites; and some form of cover and concealment. When conflict appears imminent, the missile brigades and all support vehicles disperse from garrison locations and move to separate battalion forward operating bases, or FOBs.

The FOB may comprise 30-50 vehicles: command-and-control vehicles, cranes, fuel trucks, a pressure-test vehicle, oxidizer trucks, electrical-system-test vehicles, and missile-warhead-transport vehicles. The battalion also has two or more resupply missile transporters, each of which carries 1-3 spare missiles. The missile battalion's Achilles' heel is its size. Such a large collection of vehicles may cover an area of 500 square meters. The FOB will have indicators pointing to it from two directions: supply routes and traffic to and from higher echelons, and support routes and traffic to and from the TELs.

Among the most critical of the missile battalion's assets is the crane vehicle, and

a battalion may have two or more. The crane is used to lift a missile off the missile-transport vehicle and onto the TEL, a process that takes about 20 minutes. Warheads can be switched out in less than an hour.¹³ For sustained operations, a brigade may be allocated as many as 50 missiles. Resupply sites are generally located near the brigade headquarters, but their location varies depending upon the terrain and the roads.

Prior to operations, battalion commanders will very likely have selected TEL hide sites, launch sites and reload sites. Hide sites, in particular, are chosen for their natural cover and for their ability to reduce detection by electro-optical, infrared, and radar sensors. Some countries, such as North Korea, use an extensive network of hardened underground facilities, often designed with multiple camouflaged exits and entrances spread over a wide area. In time of war, the TELs emerge briefly, move a short distance, launch, and return to the safety of the hardened facility to reload.

Decoys are a significant part of each missile battalion. Decoys and real TELs are nearly indistinguishable when observed by the naked eye, daylight video, or video imaging. Only subtle differences can be distinguished by infrared and radar sensors.¹⁴ U.N. observers who oversaw the

destruction of Iraqi launchers after the Gulf War reported that it was impossible to visually distinguish a decoy from a real launcher at a distance of more than of 25 yards.¹⁵

Targeting decisions are normally made at the strategic level and are then passed to the missile battalion for execution. The battery commander receives targeting data and launch-site locations, and designates the TELs to fire. Launch plans pass down the chain of command from the brigade commander approximately 12 hours in advance. To preserve electronic silence, the battalions transmit execution orders by land line or courier.

Missile launches are conducted under the direct supervision of an officer or a senior NCO. This person carries with him the vital target and launch data as he moves about the assigned missile-operations area in a command-and-control vehicle. In order to launch, the MAZ-543 requires virtually level ground, and its operators can level the vehicle as much as two degrees left-to-right, and three degrees front-to-rear. Locating level ground can be a major constraint in establishing new, unsurveyed launch sites. However, even in rough terrain it is still possible to find small level spots.¹⁶ Immediately after launch, as the missile is still climbing, the crew readies the vehicle to move out of the area to a preplanned hide site. U.S. Army tests of the MAZ-543 have demonstrated a move-out time of less than two minutes after launch.

Prior to the Gulf War, researchers who studied Soviet missile exercises and Iraqi launches during the Iran-Iraq war theorized that there might be enough prelaunch signature to give patrolling aircraft time to attack the launchers before they fired. But during the Gulf War, the Iraqis executed 80 percent of their launches at night; they drastically reduced their prelaunch set-up times; they avoided prelaunch electromagnetic emissions; and they seeded their launch areas with decoys. Even F-15Es orbiting in the vicinity of the launches experienced great difficulty spotting the TELs. For these reasons, searching for the TELs is considered a los-

ing effort, and TMD planning and analysis cells focus on locating and destroying the FOBs, instead.

The missile unit's strengths lie in skilled and motivated crews using well-designed equipment; preplanned operations deep behind the border; and the effective use of decoys. The missile unit's vulnerabilities include large vehicles; a sizable support-vehicle signature; and the dependence upon a road network. The TEL itself requires a virtually level surface for launching. After each launch, the TEL must expose itself in order to link up with a missile transporter and a crane for reloading.

Attack operations

With the proliferation of the missile threat, TMD has become a major battlefield challenge and a major research-and-development challenge. TMD involves locating and destroying missiles before launch (attack operations), shooting down missiles in flight (active defense), and alerting soldiers at predicted points of impact (passive defense).

Considering the immense challenge of intercepting inbound missiles (essentially hitting one bullet in flight with another), and the consequences of missing, U.S. doctrine stresses the urgency of locating and destroying the missiles before they can be launched.¹⁷ Attack operations are designed to prevent launches by attacking and eliminating each element of the overall system — launch platforms, command-and-control nodes, support vehicles, missile stocks and infrastructure. The more effective the attack operations, the less active our defense will have to be in contending with inbound missiles. Attack operations is an area for which SOF are particularly well-qualified.

As the TEL launches, the satellite system of the Defense Support Program picks up and reports the missile's infrared signature. With that report, in-theater TMD networks will, within minutes, plot and distribute the estimated location of the launch. Attack assets, such as F-15Es or A-10s, may deploy to the area, but the TEL will most likely depart the site before they arrive. During

the Gulf War, orbiting strike aircraft observed 42 Scud launches, but on only eight occasions were they able to acquire the target long enough to drop ordnance.¹⁸ TMD analysts will define a named area of interest, or NAI, whose boundaries are based upon the distance the TEL could have traveled after launching. To aid in a systematic search of the NAI, analysts also identify sensor requirements and availability.

For TMD planning, SOF are usually classified as a sensor asset, along with satellites; unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs; and radar systems. However, SOF provide additional benefits to the CINC in the critical areas of dependability, attack operations and battle-damage assessment, or BDA. Effective TMD hinges on accurate and timely intelligence. SOF surveillance, with its ability to conduct near-real-time, eyes-on reporting, is widely considered the most reliable method of obtaining target information. SOF reports may initiate a targeting process that SOF can further assist in by guiding attack assets toward the target. SOF can then follow up with

immediate BDA. The importance of BDA is evident: If the attack fails to destroy the target, the attack must resume while the target is still identified and pinpointed. Once the target has been destroyed, it is important to call off further attacks to conserve attack assets.

The search for TELs and their support structure can be enhanced by blending the human strengths of SOF with emerging sensor technologies, including remote sensors, thermal imagery, UAVs and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, or JSTARS.

Remote sensors. SOF can establish a network of various types of remote sensors in an area, as well as monitor a network of air-dropped sensors. Remote sensors can significantly strengthen SOF's ability to monitor areas when the enemy is most likely to be active — during hours of limited visibility.

Thermal imagery. Thermal imagery offers the ability to peer through effective camouflage, and advances in technology have reduced the size and weight of ther-



Photo by Lance Cheung

While satellite communications can provide real-time battle information, eyes-on reporting by SOF surveillance is still considered the most reliable method.



Photo by Larry Aaron

Two JSTARS aircraft wait on the airfield at Rhein-Main air base in Germany. The flying radar stations can track hundreds of targets simultaneously and build databases of enemy activity.

mal-imagery equipment to the point that it can easily be carried by SOF elements.

UAVs. UAVs are making great leaps as a reconnaissance tool. Their infrared and thermal imagery can rapidly scan selected road networks, and they are particularly effective when used in conjunction with SOF. For the near term, UAVs remain in short supply, and they are limited in range and staying power when used for hunting deep targets like TELs.

JSTARS. The JSTARS is a flying radar station designed to locate and target ground forces. With its powerful, deep-looking radar, JSTARS can track hundreds of potential ground targets, especially vehicles. It can also build a database of enemy activity. Its radar, however, cannot determine the *kind* of vehicle being observed. As SOF teams transmit reports detailing vehicle types, airborne observers can electronically tag and track the vehicles as they move around on the battlefield. This scenario shows the value of having eyes on the ground and detailed reporting.

In the search for the enemy, communications flow is the key to effectiveness. Just as the intel gathered by SOF is used to alert intel and analysis cells to TBM activity and to assist sensors in narrowing their search area, the same intel must be used to alert SF detachments in isolation and on the ground. The MI detachment of the SF FOB maximizes its links to the joint intelligence center and theater analysis and

control elements, normally located at the corps level. Periodic intel updates to the SOF element in an NAI or in a joint special-operations area significantly improve the element's survivability and its ability to perform the mission.

Effective sensor-to-shooter report flow requires constant refinement. Hitting mobile, time-sensitive targets like MAZ-543s requires that the sensor-to-shooter time line be measured in *minutes*. Army TMD attack operations are a subset of deep-attack and precision-strike operations, but while they use the same processes for planning and destroying targets that deep attack and precision-strike operations use,¹⁹ TMD attack operations have a much faster tempo. TMD operations planned according to an air tasking order, which is normally built around a 37-hour planning process, will probably not be effective unless their mission is to eliminate fixed support sites.

During TMD operations, the SOF element should report its observations in accordance with the SALUTE format (size, activity, location, unit, time and equipment). In addition, the SOF element should include information regarding its proximity to the target. With the distance-to-target information, the targeting cell can determine whether the SOF element is in the "danger close" range. The SOF element does not report itself "clear for fire" because it may not know the type of aircraft, weapon system or munitions allocated to the strike. Also, if the SOF element is able to employ a ground-laser designator, it should report that fact to assist the targeting cell.

To transmit the SALUTE report from the SR site to the targeteers as rapidly as possible, a solid theater-level liaison network must exist between joint organizations. Liaison personnel located with the joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF, serve as conduits to various groups such as the Army Air and Missile Defense Command, or AAMDC; the corps deep-operations coordination cells, or DOCCs; and the air operations center, or AOC.

The AAMDC represents the Army's effort to develop a command that focuses

on analyzing, coordinating and directing the TBM fight. The AAMDC commander, a brigadier general, is the TMD special staff officer for the joint forces land-component commander, or JFLCC. The AAMDC serves as both principal adviser and operational integrator for TMD, and it coordinates on behalf of the JFLCC and the JSOTF.

The 5th Special Forces Group, whose area of operations (southwest Asia and North Africa) is home to a number of rogue nations and potential adversaries with TBM and WMD capability, has placed particular emphasis on training for the TMD fight. During Exercise Roving Sands 1997, held at Fort Bliss, Texas, the 5th Group's desert-mobility teams, whose mounted capability gives them critical mission endurance and flexibility, demonstrated their potential.

During the week-long exercise, two mounted SF detachments infiltrated into NAIs and established SR sites from which to observe remote road networks in New Mexico. The detachments sent back more than 60 SALUTE reports detailing enemy missile activities. According to the AAMDC commander, these reports were an "absolute success."²⁰ The reports were sent back to a special-operations command-and-control element and a forward element of Special Operations Command-Central that was acting as the JSOTF. An AAMDC liaison officer copied the SALUTE report as it came in and flashed it to the AAMDC's analysis and targeting cells. If the SALUTE report presented an opportunity for an immediate strike (such as a TEL erecting for launch) it was

passed to both the corps DOCC and the battle-coordination element of the AOC as a target nomination. Attack responsiveness then became a matter of asset availability.

Three TMD-related exercises in 1997²¹ revealed the need for further refinement in communication with the inserted SOF element, principally in regard to notifying the element of impending strikes, and in repositioning SOF to observe areas in which other sensors have reported possible TBM activity. Although the SOF element may have to be repositioned in response to a developing intel picture, SOF personnel do risk exposure during movement. Restricted-fire areas, or RFAs, must also move as the SOF element relocates. During the Gulf War, a SOF element that had moved outside its RFA was spotted by patrolling A-10s. The element's vehicles, hidden in a wadi and parked end-to-end under camo nets, appeared on infrared sensors as a TEL. Fortunately, the pilot missed the element with his first shot, and before he could fire again, he was alerted to the SOF presence.²²

Combat air patrols, or CAPs, are often conducted as near as possible to the potential location of Scud launchers in an effort to minimize fighter-response times. SOF elements may find themselves guiding in Air Force or Navy CAPs via laser-target designators. TBMs, however, are often protected by an integrated air-defense network because of their strategic value. Once these enemy air-defense systems assume a wartime full alert, they may check the free employment of air



Photo by John Clearwater

The mounted capability of SF desert-mobility teams gives them flexibility and mission endurance that are important in TMD operations.

This Iraqi Scud was shot down during Desert Storm by a Patriot missile. Although missiles are thin-skinned, highly volatile targets, targeting the missile support structure is more effective than targeting the missiles themselves.



DoD photo

assets, and the risks associated with aerial insertion may be prohibitive. Necessity may require a CINC to ask the National Command Authorities for cross-border authority in order to insert SOF prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities.

It appears unlikely that an SR element would be asked to jeopardize itself and its mission by attempting to engage and destroy the missile and the launcher. Such a direct-action mission would depend upon the criticality of the target (for example, the known or potential launches of WMD), the availability of other attack assets, and the proximity of the SOF element to the target. In these kinds of circumstances, surprise, speed, and shock effect, particularly at night, are likely to accomplish the goal of destroying or disabling the missile and the launcher. All the vehicles associated with the missile battalion are thin-skinned, and their night-vision capabilities are limited. The ground defense of the TEL may be limited to a crew equipped only with small arms, and the defense may have to rely upon assistance from a reaction element.

The missile itself is an especially easy target. Because missiles must be capable of operating at high speeds and at high altitudes, even the smallest puncture from small-arms fire can render them inoperable for launch or incapable of reaching their target. Considering the amount of highly volatile liquid propellant carried within the missile, tracer rounds might

very likely detonate the propellant and destroy the TEL. Stand-off weapons with night optics, such as the .50-caliber Barrett or the M-24 sniper system, are ideal for that purpose. Assaulting the TEL itself would be necessary only for gathering critical intel, such as maps and targeting data, or for destroying the warhead.

Even though a TEL may appear to be a great target of opportunity, the more valuable objective will almost always be to locate and destroy the support structure — the FOB. In the larger perspective, skillful SR and timely, accurate reporting will have the greatest impact on the enemy's ability to conduct missile operations.

Conclusion

While there is no magic formula for conducting TMD, solid intelligence-gathering, rapid communications and close cooperation are the keys to success. Attack operations require a close working relationship between the SOF team on the ground and the quick-reaction strike assets. Effectiveness comes only from extensive coordination all along the chain of command — from the theater's joint forces commander to the SOF team in a hide site.

During Roving Sands 1997, the sensor-to-shooter communication time line was measured in minutes. After-action comments concentrated on the need to bring response times down to seconds. Advances

in communications and data-processing equipment will continue to shorten the time line, as will liaison links and the commitment to refine organizational tactics, techniques and procedures.

As the range, accuracy and payloads of TBMs continue to evolve, the influence of TBMs will increase dramatically. These weapons could pose a potential threat to U.S. forces employed in force projection, intervention or peacekeeping. They could also generate significant political and military pressure. China's missile demonstrations off the coast of Taiwan in March 1997 sent a clear signal to the Taiwanese people as they prepared to hold elections.

The successful use of tactical ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles during the Gulf War indicate a major shift in the nature of future warfare.

Cheap in comparison to their catastrophic results, missiles will allow states with otherwise limited power-projection capabilities to exert regional or global influence. Because missiles and unmanned attack vehicles will have a forceful impact on virtually every aspect of 21st-century warfare, TMD will most certainly be included in a theater CINC's priority intelligence requirements. SOF will be a crucial asset for the CINC in prosecuting the missile battle through timely reconnaissance, attack operations and BDA. ✂

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¹³ Briefing by Joint Theater Missile Defense-Joint Test Force; Republic of Korea, August 1997.

¹⁴ Army Air & Missile Defense Command Handbook, January 1997, p. 21.

¹⁵ Hallion, p. 75.

¹⁶ Briefing by Joint Theater Missile Defense-Joint Test Force; Republic of Korea, August 1997.

¹⁷ Joint Pub 3-01.5, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense*, March 30, 1994.

¹⁸ Keaney and Cohen, p. 76.

¹⁹ FM 100-12, *Army Theater Missile Defense Operations*, September 1996.

²⁰ BG Dennis Cavin, commander, AAMDC, during after-action review of Roving Sands 1997, describing SF participation in the exercise.

²¹ Author's notes from Roving Sands 1997, Fort Bliss, Texas; Coherent Defense 1997, U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Va.; Ulchi Focus Lens 1997, Republic of Korea.

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Mentoring: Critical Assistance for the SOF Community

by Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

Throughout most of history, the conventional mentoring paradigm has defined mentors as those who impart wisdom, advice and guidance to their protégés.

The word mentoring is taken from the *Odyssey*. Odysseus is getting ready to fight the Trojan War and realizes that he must leave behind his heir, Telemachus. Odysseus recognizes that he won't be around for several years, and that someone will need to coach and teach Telemachus.

It is doubtful, in spite of all the zeal and idealism surrounding mentoring, that the Army or the SOF community will establish a formalized mentoring program. ... Mentoring is critical, but it is not urgent. And, as we all know, most of our time and energy are spent on urgent stuff that is not critical.

Odysseus must find someone to complete Telemachus' education. He chooses a trusted family member named Mentor to be the tutor. Mentor possesses wisdom and sensitivity — both of which are important ingredients in any mentoring situation, even today.

The form of mentoring, as many envision, has as its aim to increase the ability

of key personnel to achieve organizational goals while at the same time inspiring them to more easily realize their own wants and needs. As a result of this process, protégés will have gained improved performance, increased satisfaction and greater knowledge. The context is therefore different from counseling, which focuses on the evaluation of an individual's performance, from an organizational perspective, by someone within the individual's chain of command. Counseling is hardly a situation in which an open, wide-ranging, and frank discussion can take place.

The problem with mentoring in the SOF community is that it just "happens" spontaneously or naturally — it's a matter of being in the right place at the right time to be noticed by the right person who provides the right kind of help. This is not the systematic assistance that key personnel need in order to enrich themselves and add value to their organization. Too many people "fall through the cracks" and do not get the mentoring they require when it is most needed.

It is doubtful, in spite of all the zeal and idealism surrounding mentoring, that the Army or the SOF community will establish a formalized mentoring program. The reason is simple: Mentoring is critical, but it is not urgent. And, as we all know, most of our time and energy are spent on urgent stuff that is not critical. However, although it is spotty, mentoring does occur in our com-

Pick 'em up, dust 'em off ...

In one of my assignments as a young infantry officer, I was sent to the 48th Infantry near Frankfurt, Germany. In those days our prize weapon was a huge 280-mm atomic cannon. Guarded by infantry platoons, these guns were hauled around the forests on trucks to keep the Soviets from guessing their location. One day Captain Tom Miller assigned my platoon to guard a 280. I alerted my men, loaded my .45-caliber pistol and jumped into my jeep. I had not gone far when I realized that my .45 was gone.

I was petrified. In the Army, losing a weapon is serious business. I had no choice but to radio Captain Miller and tell him. "You what?" he said in disbelief. He paused a few seconds, then added, "All right, continue the mission." When I returned, uneasily contemplating my fate, Miller called me over. "I've got something for you," he said, handing me the pistol. "Some kids in the village found it where it fell out of your holster."

"Kids found it?" I felt a cold chill.

"Yeah," he said. "Luckily they only got off one round before we heard the shot and took the gun away." The disastrous possibilities left me limp. "For God's sake, son, don't let that happen again."

He drove off. I checked the magazine and found it was full. The gun had not been fired. Later I learned that I had dropped it in my tent before I ever got started. Miller had fabricated the scene about the kids to give me a good scare.

Today the Army might hold an investigation, call in lawyers and likely enter a bad mark on my record. Miller gave me the chance to learn from my mistake. His example of intelligent leadership was not lost on me. Nobody ever got to the top without slipping up. When someone stumbles, I don't believe in stomping on him. My philosophy is "Pick 'em up, dust 'em off and get 'em moving again."

— General Colin Powell, *U.S. Army (ret.)*

From *My American Journey*, by Colin Powell (New York: Random House, 1995). Copyright 1995. Used with the author's permission.

munity. For an individual who is contemplating becoming a mentor, a good start is to keep in mind the six universal desires that motivate people to work, volunteer, join and affiliate:

1. The desire for recognition, which causes a person to seek experiences that bring social approval, commendation or prestige, and to avoid experiences that result in ridicule, scorn or disapproval.

2. The desire for affection, which causes a person to seek experiences involving appreciation, understanding, intimacy or support, and to avoid situations in which there is a lack of appreciation or support.

3. The desire for power, which causes a person to seek experiences that promise achievement, success, self-determination

or mastery; and to avoid situations that promise frustration or a sense of failure.

4. The desire for new experiences, which causes a person to seek novelty, adventure, thrill, excitement or change; and to avoid dullness, monotony or boredom.

5. The desire for security, which causes a person to seek experiences that give a sense of protection, belonging or confidence, and to avoid situations involving disloyalty, abandonment, insecurity or fear.

6. The desire for friends, which causes a person to seek experiences that involve meeting and interacting with people who share some common values.

If one has an appreciation of what motivates people, knowledge to impart, and a willingness to give his or her time and

effort to help an individual, one is ready to be a much-needed mentor. At the same time, the mentor will enjoy a rewarding and satisfying experience.

For mentoring to be successful, there must be a good relationship between the mentor and the protégé. The relationship should be based on trust and confidence, so that effective communication can take

For mentoring to be successful, there must be a good relationship between the mentor and the protégé. The relationship should be based on trust and confidence, so that effective communication can take place. Mentoring is not lecturing. The protégé may seek information, propose or exchange ideas, express feelings, solve a problem or pursue opportunities.

place. Mentoring is not lecturing. The protégé may seek information, propose or exchange ideas, express feelings, solve a problem or pursue opportunities. This is not a complete list, but merely a sampling of topical exchanges. The mentor's role, on the other hand, is to coach, nurture, collaborate, advise and support.

At the individual level, the benefits of having been mentored will vary widely, depending on the protégé's particular needs, aspirations and situation. One may:

- Have the confidence not simply to tag along with organizational changes but to lead the organization and to champion the new culture.
- Have improved leadership and management skills.
- Have improved listening, challenging, and empathizing skills.
- Have the confidence to set and achieve performance goals.
- Have someone with whom you can speak freely and candidly.
- Be more ordered and reflective, rather than rushing into things.
- Have a wider perspective on the impact of his or her leadership and

management style.

- Be less ruled by feelings and more able to cope with difficult situations.
- Have the courage to be more bold and to sell one's ideas more strongly, thereby opening up additional ways of thinking.
- Be more mindful of the need to be compassionate and understanding, and be able to deal with the underlying problems, not just the symptoms, of subordinates.

Needless to say, the list could be much longer. Mentoring is one of those rare activities that makes everyone a winner — the protégé, the mentor and the organization. ✂

Major General Sidney Shachnow's commissioned service spanned more than 30 years, during which he served as either a commander or a staff officer with Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, airmobile, airborne, and Special Forces units. He served as commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, of the Army Special Forces Command, and of U.S. Army-Berlin. Shachnow holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska and a master's degree from Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, Pa. He retired from the Army in August 1994.



Unconventional Warfare: Refining the Definition

by Chief Warrant Officer 3
Michael J. Ivosevic

Unconventional warfare, or UW, is a popular topic of discussion among Special Forces operators and commanders. Around the world, there seems to be a great deal of interest in everything implied under the heading of UW.

According to Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (7 December 1998), UW is "A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape."

One school of thought in the UW discussion questions whether the term "unconventional warfare" should be replaced by the term "unconventional operations," or

UO, and proposes the following definition for UO:

The conduct of missions and operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate elements throughout the operational continuum. Unconventional operations include, but are not limited to, a broad spectrum of operations that can be of long duration. UO are conducted by elements that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, or directed in varying degrees by external sources. UO are characterized by their joint and interagency complexion and are either overt, covert, or clandestine. Examples of UO include stability operations; guerrilla warfare; subversion; sabotage; information and intelligence activities; evasion and escape; special reconnaissance; underground operations; auxiliary operations; establishing support systems; establishing command-and-control systems; and direct action conducted by indigenous or surrogate elements.

It has been argued for some time that our definition of UW refers more to an environment than to a mission, and that the UO definition does provide greater detail in defining the nature of operations to be conducted. But while our definition of UW does have room for improvement, the validity of the term "unconventional warfare" is in no way negated. In fact, there are good reasons for preserving it.

Army FM 100-5, *Operations*, speaks of principles of war as they apply to wartime operations. It does not speak of principles of operations. A second reason for preserving the term is to maintain the focus on our war-fighter capabilities. Our task as soldiers is to fight our nation's wars and to win them. It is imperative that all soldiers, SF in particular, preserve and nurture the war-fighter outlook. SF were designed to conduct

unconventional warfare, and they have developed the capabilities to combat insurgencies and their effects around the globe.

FM 31-20-2, *Unconventional Warfare, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*, is currently undergoing revision at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and the initial draft is scheduled for publication in the near future. Now is the time for SF soldiers to address and discuss the UW issue. With further discussion and comments from the field, we hope to clarify the definition of UW and to bring clarity to our doctrine.

In 1962, John F. Kennedy stated, "There is another type of warfare — new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him ... It preys on unrest." He also said, "Our forces, therefore, must fulfill a broader role, as a complement to our diplomacy, as an army of our diplomacy, as a deterrent to our adversaries, and as a symbol to our allies of our determination to support them."

UW was the original premise of Special Forces. We owe it to ourselves and to our nation to maintain a capability for unconventional warfare and to preserve the war-fighter outlook in Special Forces. ✕

Debate or comments may be submitted to Special Warfare or to CW3 Michael J. Ivosevic, DSN 239-9802; commercial (910) 432-9802; fax -5341; or e-mail ivosevim@soc.mil. — Editor

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael J. Ivosevic is chief of the Doctrine Branch, SF Doctrine Division, in the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

The Liaison Coordination Element: Force Multiplier for Coalition Operations

by Captain Chadwick W. Storlie

Coalition forces assemble to conduct a variety of operations, from combat to operations other than war. But whatever their mission, all coalition forces face similar challenges: differences in their language, military perspectives, training, doctrine, command-and-control architecture, and support relationships. To minimize these challenges and to maximize the coalition's power, theater commanders may employ a flexible, effective, economy-of-force option: liaison-coordination elements, or LCEs.

When employed, LCEs are attached to units of the coalition to help those units achieve seamless integration into the overall force. LCEs do not duplicate the elements or the missions of the supported unit, nor do they provide additional combat-maneuver elements. Instead, LCEs provide or enhance the battlefield operating systems that the supported unit must have in order to accomplish its mission.

LCE activities are designed to be transparent, so that the presence of the LCE does not overshadow the supported unit's accomplishments. The LCE mission is truly a task for quiet professionals. And the skills of U.S. Army Special Forces — in training, planning, executing independent operations, operating in varied environments, language and intercultural communication — form the foundation for successful LCE employment.

In recent years, there have been several

successful LCE operations: During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, LCEs (referred to as coalition-support teams, or CSTs) provided liaison, communications integration and close air support, or CAS, to the various coalition countries. During Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, CSTs provided communications connectivity and liaison support that strengthened the operational proficiency of coalition units.

During Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia-Herzegovina, LCEs were employed initially with units of the United Nations Protection Force. LCEs assisted in the redeployment of those units or in integrating them into the lead peace-implementation force, or IFOR, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the later stages of IFOR and in the eventual stabilization force, or SFOR, LCEs were attached to the Hungarian Engineer Battalion, or HUBAT; to the Romanian Engineer Battalion, or ROBAT; and to the Independent Russian Airborne Brigade, or RUSBDE.

There are five LCE supporting tasks: provide communications connectivity; provide intelligence connectivity; provide close-air support, or CAS, capability; provide liaison support; and provide medical-evacuation, or MEDEVAC, capability. LCE mission-essential tasks focus on the supporting tasks. The LCE mission-essen-

tial task list, or METL, is shown below:¹

- Deploy.
- Build rapport.
- Provide command, control, communications and intelligence, or C³I.
- Conduct terminal-guidance operations.
- Maintain mobility.
- Redeploy/recover.

LCE individual tasks, collective tasks, and cross-training tasks vary according to the detachment training levels and the specifics of the mission.

Task organization

Depending on the requirements of the operation, the LCE employs from four to 12 personnel. A solid mission analysis that examines detachment manning, theater-specific movement policies, and individual soldier strengths will determine the most effective task organization and positioning.

There are two types of LCEs: the static-position and the multiple-position. The static-position LCE is appropriate when the supported unit has adequate tactical skills but requires additional support in command-and-control functions at the battalion level and higher. A four-man element located in the supported unit's headquarters can conduct a static-position LCE,

through coordination with an established higher headquarters. The LCE that was initially attached to the RUSBDE during Operation Joint Endeavor was the static-position-type.

The multiple-position LCE is appropriate when the supported unit requires assistance at the tactical level and at the battalion-headquarters level or higher. Consisting of a base station and one or more mobile teams, the multiple-position LCE may require a 12-man detachment. During Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation Joint Guard, the LCEs that were attached to the HUBAT and ROBAT, as well as the LCE that was attached to the RUSBDE during the latter half of Joint Endeavor, were of the multiple-position type.

The LCEs that were attached to the HUBAT and the ROBAT performed liaison and coordination with other engineer units, supporting forces, adjacent IFOR units, and higher headquarters; and their mobile teams provided protection for work crews. The RUSBDE LCE's mobile teams accompanied area patrols and weapons-storage-site inspection teams.

The special-operations terminal attack controller, or SOTAC, a highly trained combat-control team of the U.S. Air Force, provides the LCE with CAS capability, and

Types of Liaison Coordination Elements

STATIC-POSITION LCE

BASE STATION

18A Commander
 180A/18Z Asst det commander
 18E Communications
 18D Medical

SOTAC

MULTIPLE-POSITION LCE

BASE STATION

18A Commander
 18F Ops & intel sgt
 18E Sr communications
 18E Jr communications

TEAM 1 – MOBILE

180A Tm 1 commander
 18B Asst Tm 1 commander
 18C Engineer
 18D Medical

SOTAC

TEAM 2 – MOBILE

18Z Tm 2 commander
 18C Asst Tm 2 commander
 18B Weapons
 18D Medical

Phases of a Liaison Coordination Element Operation

PHASE	DEFINITION	ASSOCIATED TASKS	BEGINNING	ENDING
PREDEPLOYMENT	Training and planning that the LCE conducts prior to entry into the theater of operations	Order preparation; weapons qualification; cross training of mission-essential skills; and immunizations	Upon receipt of the warning order or initial notification of the mission	Upon takeoff of the departure aircraft
DEPLOYMENT	Movement of the LCE from home station into the theater of operations	Equipment shipping and personnel movement	Upon takeoff of the departure aircraft	Upon arrival at the initial point of contact and link-up with the supported unit
EMPLOYMENT	Initial assessment; transition; and execution of the specific subtasks of the LCE mission	Providing CAS and fire-support capability; MEDEVAC; liaison; intelligence and communications connectivity	Upon arrival at the initial point of contact with the supported unit	Upon completion of the operation; relief by another unit; or change of mission
REDEPLOYMENT	Return of the LCE from the theater of operations to home station	Property accountability; equipment maintenance; and movement of personnel and equipment	Upon completion of the operation; relief by another unit; or change of mission	Upon redeployment of all personnel and equipment to home station and completion of mission recovery and maintenance

trains LCE members in the proper procedures for requesting emergency CAS.

LCE operations consist of four phases: predeployment, deployment, employment, and redeployment.

Predeployment

The predeployment phase is the time during which the LCE prepares for its entry into the theater of operations. The predeployment phase consists of three sub-phases: mission planning, training on mission-essential tasks, and individual and unit administrative preparations.

Mission planning. Mission planning begins with a thorough mission analysis, in accordance with the guidelines of the tactical decision-making process, or TDMP. TDMP is “the military decision making process that includes a systematic approach to decision making, which fosters effective analysis by enhancing application of professional knowledge, logic, and judgment. It must consist of the estimate of the situation and one of the three

methods of decision making (deliberate, combat or quick).”²

The TDMP cannot ensure that the mission plan will be flawless. Creativity, critical thought and shrewd analysis must be exercised throughout each step of mission planning.

Training on mission-essential tasks. The second subphase of the predeployment phase is the period during which the detachment trains on individual and collective mission-essential tasks. These tasks are derived through the detachment’s mission analysis, and are incorporated into training schedules, situational-training exercises, and other events used in preparing the detachment for the LCE operation.

Pre-mission training, or PMT, should include mounted and dismounted immediate-action drills, or IADs. IADs should be simple and tactically sound. Any member of the detachment must be able to lead the drills and be able to execute them during day or night. IADs should include standard deployment configurations for daily patrol operations as well as special

employment configurations for CAS and MEDEVAC operations.

The detachment should use information gathered through the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB, in developing or modifying IADs. An IPB analysis of the use of mines in the heavily mined areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as an analysis of the activities in those areas, led to the formulation of the IAD titled "React to a Mine Detonation." Existing IADs, such as "React to Indirect Fire," were modified to restrict their activities to routes and areas that have been cleared of mines. Ideally, IADs should be formulated in two sets: one for heavily mined areas and one for areas clear of mines.

A solid area orientation should include the history of the region, local courtesies and customs, survival language phrases, and information about hostile and nonhostile military forces in the area. Collectively, the IADs, IPB, standard mission configurations, and area orientation provide soldiers with a comprehensive understanding of what they are likely to encounter and what their reaction should be.

Individual and unit administrative preparations. Individual and unit administrative preparations encompass the final step in the predeployment phase. Individual preparations include required immunizations; counseling; preparation of wills and powers of attorney; and the initiation or the deletion of additional pay allowances. Unit administrative preparations include coordination of departure aircraft; equipment packing and palletization; declaration and labeling of hazardous cargo; and family-support-group meetings.

Deployment

The deployment phase is the period during which the LCE and its equipment are moved from the home station into the theater of operations. Although this phase is relatively simple, it does include some important considerations.

Civilian airlines or military aircraft, or a combination of the two, can be used for transporting the LCE and its equipment. Although civilian airlines offer the greatest flexibility and responsiveness, their policies

Individual and Collective Tasks

LCE SUPPORTING TASKS

Provide communications connectivity

Provide intelligence connectivity

Provide CAS capability

Provide liaison support

Provide MEDEVAC capability

INDIVIDUAL TASKS

Operate an LST-5C SATCOM radio system
Operate an MST-20 SATCOM radio system

Perform an area orientation

Call for NATO CAS strike
Operate an AN/PRC-113 radio

Conduct refresher training in the target language

Call for a nine-line MEDEVAC request
Initiate an IV
Treat for shock

COLLECTIVE TASKS

Incorporate language skills into STX lanes

pertaining to the transporting of weapons, equipment and hazardous materials are inflexible.

Military aircraft offer the best deployment option. Equipment can be either palletized in footlockers or placed in shipping containers. The footlocker method (with detailed packing lists for both civilian and military aircraft) allows the greatest flexibility. Footlockers are also easy to transport inside both U.S. and foreign vehicles. Weapons, sensitive items and hazardous cargo can be shipped in accordance with existing military transportation regulations and systems.

Employment

The employment phase encompasses all activities necessary to accomplish the LCE supporting tasks. There are three subphases in the employment phase: the initial assessment or transition; the execution of the LCE supporting tasks; and the transition or end of mission.

Initial assessment. To determine the scope of its duties, the LCE conducts an assessment of the supported unit. During the assessment, the LCE should meet with the commander, the chief of staff, each staff section, and other significant personnel, such as subunit commanders and liaison officers. The assessment should reflect the supported unit's strengths, areas that need improving, and recommendations for improvement.

The LCE should not attempt to force the supported unit to function exactly as a U.S. unit does. Instead, the LCE should encourage the supported unit to integrate with other coalition units. Eventually, the supported unit should view the improvements in its operational methods as being its own accomplishments. The LCE should accompany the supported unit on patrols, observe checkpoint operations, and visit work sites in order to learn about the terrain, to interact with the local population and civic leaders, and to understand the supported unit as much as possible.

A smooth transition between the incoming LCE and the outgoing LCE is critical. If the outgoing LCE fails to properly advise

the incoming LCE of the task at hand, the incoming detachment could be misinformed, leading to a lack of mission support, loss of capabilities, and degradation of force protection. Once the transition is complete, the incoming detachment should assess the supported unit in order to revalidate its needs. Throughout the mission, periodic assessments will help to ensure that the supported unit's needs are being met.

Execution of the five supporting tasks. During the second subphase of the employment phase, the LCE executes the supporting tasks in order to improve the supported unit's combat power, flexibility and coalition cohesiveness. The LCE's capabilities supplement, but do not replace, the supported unit's capabilities.

- The LCE provides communications connectivity horizontally (with the supported unit) and vertically (with higher headquarters). LCEs should develop primary, alternate, contingency and emergency communication plans to ensure connectivity during all operations. Primary and alternate communication systems should offer real-time, long-range, consistent and secure communications, such as that offered by satellite radio systems. Older capabilities, such as high-frequency radios and Morse-code skills, should be maintained in order to supplement the communication plan and to reduce traffic on high-traffic communication nets.

- The LCE provides intelligence connectivity by giving the supported unit access to U.S. and NATO intelligence products. To accomplish this, the LCE may give intelligence reports to the supported unit, or the LCE may become involved in the supported unit's IPB process. The LCE's IPB analysis can serve as an excellent supplement to the supported unit's intelligence system. Intelligence connectivity also helps to ensure that the supported unit provides timely intelligence, SALUTE reports (size, activity, location, unit, time and equipment), and other intelligence products to support cohesive intelligence operations.

- By providing CAS and MEDEVAC capabilities, the LCE can give the supported unit significant improvements in non-organic firepower and ensure timely access to med-

ical facilities. MEDEVAC and CAS requests can occur at any time. Each member of the LCE should carry a laminated 3-by-5 card with the CAS and MEDEVAC formats, frequencies and code words printed on it.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, CAS presence missions coordinated by the RUSBDE LCE were a significant factor in the de-escalation of potentially explosive situations and were instrumental in demonstrating the resolve of IFOR and SFOR soldiers. In July 1996, a ROBAT soldier was injured by a mine while clearing a railroad line in a heavily mined area of Maglaj, along the zone of separation. Members of the ROBAT LCE stabilized the patient and evacuated him to a U.S./Norwegian hospital for treatment. MEDEVAC became a major point of validation for the continued presence of LCEs with the Romanian and Hungarian engineer battalions. The LCEs' ability to conduct CAS and MEDEVAC operations improved the morale among the personnel in the supported units and strengthened their units' mission focus.

- Providing liaison support is vital in creating rapport with the supported unit. Without strong rapport, the LCE will not be able to create a significant impression upon the supported unit. Liaison tasks range from advising the supported unit commander to emulating the customs and military courtesies of the supported unit. Simple acts, such as setting a positive example or treating the supported unit's soldiers as equals, facilitates the process of building and maintaining rapport. Mutual training events, such as weapons-firing and vehicle-driving instruction, provide excellent opportunities for establishing and maintaining rapport.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, SF soldiers immediately established credibility with supported-unit soldiers when they demonstrated their tactical and technical proficiency. Russian and Romanian soldiers were impressed when SF weapons sergeants expertly disassembled and assembled Russian and Romanian weapons. Cross-training skills also yielded tremendous dividends when SF NCOs demonstrated their proficiency in executing each other's MOS tasks.

It is important that LCEs build and maintain rapport with units of the U.S., NATO, and other coalition forces. In Bosnia, the ROBAT was a subordinate element of the Multinational Combat Support Elements, or MCSE, and the RUSBDE was a subordinate element of the Multinational Division-North, or MND-N. For both the ROBAT LCE and the RUSBDE LCE, it was vital to develop professional relationships with the commanders, staff and liaison officers of the MCSE and the MND-N to ensure unity of effort and exactness of purpose in their operations.

To adequately assist the supported unit in its command-and-control functions and in the execution of its operations plans, the LCE needs a centralized operations center, or OPCEN, that can track, record and

The LCE should not attempt to force the supported unit to function exactly as a U.S. unit does. Instead, the LCE should encourage the supported unit to integrate with other coalition units. Eventually, the supported unit should view the improvements in its operational methods as being its own accomplishments.

report the operations of the LCE and the supported unit. The OPCEN should be manned by two personnel during the duty day, usually from 0600 to 2200, and it should be capable of conducting limited 24-hour operations. OPCEN personnel are responsible for the daily base-station operations, including monitoring communication nets; reporting; coordinating with LNOs, the supported unit, and adjacent units; performing routine area maintenance; assisting mobile teams in mission preparation; planning missions; and monitoring special projects.

Force protection should be an overriding concern for all operations, but force-protection methods will vary depending on the mission. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, LCE personnel traveled with all their equipment; and when outside their vehicles, they

dressed according to the threat conditions.

Maintenance is a vital aspect of force protection. During operations, an LCE must perform proper maintenance on all its assigned equipment. All vehicles should receive preventive-maintenance checks and services, or PMCS, at least once a week. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, LCE vehicle drivers performed the required PMCS. Other detachment equipment (night-vision devices, radios, etc.) was checked once a week. Any inoperable equipment was immediately sent to supporting maintenance units.

Transition or end of mission. The final subphase of the employment phase encompasses the transition of a newly arriving LCE or the conclusion of the mission. A supported unit will not always require the continued employment of an LCE. In conducting its mission, the LCE may augment the supported unit with systems that will reduce the need for the LCE's contribution. In turn, as the coalition performs or changes its assigned missions, a supported unit may "outgrow" its need for an LCE, while another unit may develop a need for LCE support.

Redeployment

During the final phase, redeployment, the LCE returns from the theater of operations to its home station. Once again, equipment maintenance, inspections and equipment-packing become key concerns.

Redeployment requires an after-action review, or AAR. The AAR should include the following:

- Purpose of the mission.
- Detachment mission statement.
- Task organization through all phases of the operation.
- Concept of the operation.
- Equipment employed.
- Sequence of events.
- Issues (in issue-discussion-recommendation format).
- Listing of daily detachment missions throughout the deployment.
- Photo log of major missions.

The AAR provides a detailed record of the LCE mission. Detachment briefing

slides, operations orders, results of the TDMP, photos, and an AAR provide commanders, staffs and future LCEs an excellent record of plans, coordinations and lessons-learned.

Summary

LCEs are vital to the coalition commander in improving and sustaining effective operations. LCEs foster excellent team-building between U.S. and coalition forces. These team relationships can often help the supported unit overcome the sometimes high learning curve encountered during the initial periods of coalition operations. With their unique qualifications and special competence, LCEs are an ideal option for enabling countries to integrate into coalition operations and to execute their required missions to NATO standards. ✂

Captain Chadwick W. Storie is the S4 for the 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, Fort Carson, Colo. As the commander of SFOD-A 045 (maritime operations), he served one rotation during Operation Joint Endeavor with the Romanian Engineering Battalion LCE and one rotation during Operation Joint Guard with the Independent Russian Airborne Brigade LCE. He is a 1989 graduate of Northwestern University.



Notes:

¹ 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, "Mission Guidance," November 1996, Fort Carson, Colo.

² Joint Readiness Training Center, "Isolation AAR" (slide presentation), Fort Polk, La., 1996.

Letters

Special Warfare

SO/LIC program has appropriate focus

Although I agree with the central message of retired Navy Captain Paul Shemella's article "Academic Preparation: Sharpening the Tip of the MOOTW Spear" (Fall 1998) that higher education is essential for SOF personnel, the rest of his argument contains some misperceptions and fallacies about the Naval Postgraduate School's Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict program. As a SO/LIC graduate, I would like to respond to two of his points.

First, Captain Shemella thinks that a SO/LIC student "does most of his or her critical thinking in the language of mathematics." This is incorrect. Of the more than 20 classes I took to earn my degree, only four were math-oriented. Furthermore, these classes were far from irrelevant for my military professional development. They gave me the skills necessary to thoughtfully analyze and critically question the math-based models and simulations that are so prevalent in today's military.

Second, Captain Shemella argues that the SO/LIC program lacks "classes pertaining to area studies and government" and results in a master of *science* (his emphasis) in defense analysis. But when you consider more that just the name of the SO/LIC degree, you may find that the program is actually an innovative interdisciplinary curriculum that gives students a broad understanding of the world around them and allows them to focus on their area of interest. My transcript, for instance, shows classes in international-relations theory, military history, ethnic conflict,

and information warfare.

In conclusion, instead of being a narrowly focused program with limited relevance to the SOF community, the NPS's SO/LIC program is especially appropriate for SOF officers of all services. Students in the program learn a mix of skills and produce a thesis focused on their chosen regional or operational area of interest. To get a full appreciation of the value of this program, I suggest one go beyond Captain Shemella's or my opinions, and look at the theses produced by SOF students. The broad range of topics covered and the insights within reveal the full story of the SO/LIC program.

Captain Michael R. Lwin
Army student
Defense Language Institute

Review failed to give book's author credit

J.H. Crerar's review of *Night of the Silver Stars* (Fall 1998) fails to give the book's author the credit he deserves.

Bill Phillips went to great lengths to capture the lack of unity of command in the northwest I Corps area of South Vietnam. One of the book's theses was that there was no healthy relationship between the various commands and that this contributed greatly to the fall of Special Forces Camp A-101, or Lang Vei.

The Marines did not respond to Westmoreland; C Company, 5th SF, did not respond to the Marines; SOG's CCN did not respond to C Company; and because the A-camp was trying to protect its CIDG from the I Corps Mike Force soldiers,

there was even some bad blood between the commanders of the A-team and the Mike Force.

If Phillips erred, he erred on the side of attention to detail. He consulted too many people, gathered too much information and captured the heart of the problem: A-101 was hung out to dry.

Through lengthy interviews with the A-101 commanders, ops sergeant, members of the rescue team from CCN, and the Mike Force commander sent to do the camp's long-range patrolling, the author had the total picture and relayed it very clearly in the book.

The one area that I found humorous in the review was the implication that there were no distinct differences between the camp strike-force members and the I Corps Mike Force members. To help the uninformed understand: Mike Force soldiers were paid and retained based on their performance. They were offensive in nature, commanded by U.S. SF, airborne-qualified, and they left their families to seek out the enemy.

CIDG soldiers had the job of protecting their women and children. They were "legs," and conducted limited defensive patrolling in the vicinity of their village or the A-camp site.

Is *Night of the Silver Stars* perfect? No. Does it belong in every SF soldier's library? Yes. Even if my picture weren't on the front cover, I would still recommend it.

Paul Longgear
Pine Mountain, Ga.



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SF Branch leads Army in O6 selection rate

The 1998 Army colonel promotion-selection board considered 32 SF officers in the primary zone and selected 20. The SF selection rate was 62.5 percent — higher than that of any other branch, and 12.9 percent higher than the Army's overall selection rate. The promotion rate reflects the high file quality of year group 1977: 11 of the selectees are former battalion commanders. Board statistics were as follows:

	Cons.	Sel.	% sel.
Army (AZ)	868	29	3.3
SF Branch (AZ)	32	0	0
Army (PZ)	806	341	42.3
SF Branch (PZ)	32	20	62.5
Army (BZ)	1990	30	1.5
SF Branch (BZ)	70	0	0

Selections announced for NPS SO/LIC program

Selections have been made for this year's Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict program at the Naval Postgraduate School. The program is sponsored by the U.S. Special Operations Command as a means of training joint SOF officers. It features a rigorous academic curriculum designed to help students meet the future requirements of special operations. Although various concentrations are available within the program, all graduates receive a master of arts in national-security affairs. Utilization is expected within joint or Army SOF billets. Officers selected this year are: MAJ Franco, SF; CPT Bendewald, SF; CPT Amato, SF; CPT Orman, SF; CPT Tester, SF (USMA, SF representative); CPT James, AV; CPT Mingus, CM; CPT Bottiglieri, IN; CPT Stebbins, MI; CPT Gardner, FA 39; and CPT Zacheral, FA 39. Applications for FY 2000 are now being solicited. Contact your branch manager at PERSCOM or phone CPT Les Brown at the Special Forces Branch, DSN 221-3178 or commercial (703) 325-3178.

Board selects 4 FA 39 officers for O6

The 1998 Army colonel promotion-selection board considered seven FA 39 officers in the primary zone and selected four. The FA 39 PZ selection rate was 57.1 percent, vs. 42.3 percent for DA. Two FA 39Bs and two FA 39Cs were selected for promotion. Two of the selectees are former battalion commanders, and one is scheduled to attend senior service college. The increase in the number of FA 39C officers who were considered and selected for promotion indicates the functional area's improving health. Board statistics were as follows:

	Cons.	Sel.	% sel.
Army (AZ)	868	29	3.3
FA 39 (AZ)	10	0	0
Army (PZ)	806	341	42.3
FA 39 (PZ)	7	4	57.1
Army (BZ)	1990	30	1.5
FA 39 (BZ)	15	0	0

RC SF, CA selections for O6 below Army average

The 1998 Army Reserve colonel promotion-selection board considered 3,379 officers and selected 405. Board statistics were as follows:

	Cons.	Sel.	% sel.	Qual.
CA Branch	159	13	8.1	152
SF Branch	29	1	3.4	29
Army	3379	405	11.9	3254

The number of SF officers selected was nearly 9 percent below the Army's average, which is unusual, because SF officers have exceeded the Army's average for the past six years. Civil Affairs officers finished 4 percent below the Army's average. Of the 13 CA selectees, seven of the nine troop-program-unit officers were current or former battalion commanders. Self-development was another factor in the selection process: Six of the selectees had earned a master's degree, and two were Army War College graduates or enrollees. Although manner of performance is the most important criterion that distinguishes an officer for promotion, Army Reserve and National Guard officers should seek self-development courses to maximize their chances for promotion. Officers should follow guidance in the revised DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management* (http://books.army.mil:80/cgi-bin/bookmgr/books/p600_3/ccontents), to enhance and sustain their military competencies. For more information, telephone MAJ Jim Berenz, Civil Affairs Branch Manager, Special Operations Propensity Office, at DSN 239-6406, commercial (910) 432-6406, or e-mail berenzj@soc.mil.

Acquisition Corps to conduct accession board

The Army Acquisition Corps will conduct its annual accession board in October 1999. Year group 1993 will be the target for this year's board. Officers from prior year groups may still apply. Officers interested in the Army Acquisition Corps can telephone Rick Yager at DSN 221-3127 or commercial (703) 325-3127, or contact the SF Branch for more information.

46 FA 39 officers selected for CSC

The 1998 Army command-and-staff-college selection board considered 250 FA 39 officers and selected 46 — a selection rate of 18.4 percent, vs. the DA selection rate of 16.7 percent. Results by year group were as follows:

	FA 39 Cons.	FA 39 Sel.	FA 39 % sel.	Avg sel. % (other FAs)
YG 1985	38	3	7.9	5.6
YG 1986	49	5	10.2	10.3
YG 1987	68	21	30.9	21.6
YG 1988	95	17	17.9	21.5

Officers may volunteer for recall to active duty

In March 1998, the Army initiated a voluntary recall to active duty for prior active-duty officers. This is a *recall* to active duty, not a call to active duty, so officers who have never served on active duty (other than for training) are not eligible. There is no requirement for the officer applicant to be branch-qualified. Officers who wish to be recalled to serve in SF do not have to be previously qualified in SF, but they must complete SF qualification in order to remain on active duty. Officers must meet the following eligibility criteria:

- Captains must have a date of rank of 941002 or later.
- Applicants must have served at least four years of active commissioned service.
- Applicants must be medically qualified.
- Applicants must meet all prerequisites for SF training as outlined in DA Pam 600-3, paragraph 15-7b(1).

A volunteer statement for SF duty must accompany the officer's application for SF training and branch transfer. Officers interested in the recall program should contact the SF branch at DSN 221-3178 or commercial (703) 325-3178. Officers interested in being recalled to service in other areas of ARSOF should contact the manager of their basic branch.

41 SF officers selected for CSC

The 1998 Army command-and-staff-college selection board considered 222 SF officers and selected 41. The selection rate was 18.5 percent — 1.8 percent higher than the Army's overall rate of 16.7 percent. This year's results, by year group, were:

	Cons.	Sel.	% sel.
YG 85	29	1	3.4
YG 86	31	4	12.9
YG 87	58	14	24.1
YG 88	104	22	21.1

YGs 81, 87, 90 slated for CFD in FY 2000

Officers in year groups 81, 87 and 90 will receive their career-field designation, or CFD, next fiscal year. YGs 81 and 87 will go before their CFD board Oct. 5-29, 1999; YG 90 will go before the board June 1-15, 2000. Officers' career-field preferences will be gathered electronically through PERSCOM's new CFD internet site (at the PERSCOM web site under "career field designation.") Officers should ensure that their current mailing address is on file with the branch manager and annotated on their officer record brief. Officers should also ensure their branch has their e-mail address so that the branch can contact them electronically. The CFD time line is shown below:

CFD mail-out	April or May 1999
Suspense for CFD preference	5 September 1999
YG 81 and YG 87 CFD	5-29 October 1999
YG 81 and YG 87 CFD results	December 1999
YG 90 CFD	1-15 June 2000
YG 90 CFD results	August-October 2000

SF recruiters commended for outstanding work

SF accessions from year groups 92, 93 and 94 are on track, according to the SF Branch. The Branch acknowledges the outstanding job performance of the SF recruiters in accessing officers for SF training.

Selection boards to meet in summer of 1999

The following boards are scheduled for the summer of 1999:

Board	Dates
Captain (Army)	1 Jun 99-2 Jul 99
Joint specialty officer	15-21 Jun 99
Colonel (Army)	3-23 Aug 99
CGSC (Army)	24 Aug-24 Sep 99

MILPER messages concerning the boards will be available at <http://www-perscom.army.mil/tagd/msg/1999.htm> upon release.



Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

PSYOP soldiers can request regimental affiliation

Soldiers in CMF 37F, Psychological Operations, may now request affiliation with the PSYOP Regiment, which will have its home base at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Soldiers must complete a DA 4187 in accordance with AR 600-82, Chapter 7, paragraph 7-2, and forward it to Commander; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; Alexandria, VA 22332. For more information, telephone MSG Julius C. Storch III at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

MOSs 18D, 18E eligible for BEAR

MOSs 18D and 18E are now in the Bonus Extension and Re-enlistment, or BEAR, program. Soldiers in MOSs 18B and 18C may reclassify into 18D and 18E and receive a bonus. Contact your unit retention NCO for further details.

Raters reminded of NCO-ER pointers

MILPER Message 98-044 contains significant changes to AR 623-205, including the deletion of paragraph 6-136 (3). The bullet comment "within body-fat standards of AR 600-9" is no longer authorized when "yes" is entered in the height and weight data in IVc. "Yes" now indicates that the NCO is in compliance with AR 600-9's body-fat standards. Raters are also reminded that when counseling dates are omitted from the NCO-ER, the senior rater will state in part Ve why counseling was not accomplished.

32 SF MSGs chosen for promotion to SGM

The 1998 sergeant-major selection board chose 32 CMF 18 master sergeants for promotion — a selection rate of 11.8 percent, vs. the Army average of 22.1 percent. Twenty-five selectees were in the primary zone; seven were in the secondary zone. Time-in-service and time-in-grade statistics are as follows:

	TIS	TIG	Education	Age
CMF 18 (PZ)	19.2	4.5	13.7	39.2
Army (PZ)	20.4	3.9	14.4	40.4
CMF18 (SZ)	16.0	2.7	13.6	36.7
Army (SZ)	19.9	3.5	14.1	40.0

The following comments were extracted from the board's review and analysis:

- Excellence ratings were frequently not supported by quantifiable data. Raters routinely did not address "Areas of Special Emphasis." Across the board, senior raters discussed potential and failed to address performance and competence. The majority of senior-rater ratings were "1" in performance and potential, but they were often accompanied by comments such as "promote with peers" or "promote after additional assignments in demanding positions."
- NCO-ERs that gave marginal ratings for misconduct did not always reflect the soldier's potential for future service, making it difficult for the panel to evaluate the soldier for possible action under the Qualitative Management Program.
- Raters are not listing three positions in which the NCO can best serve the Army. Instead, they are listing general positions that sometimes do not show a line of progression to the next higher grade.



Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Ecuador employs military in anti-crime role

Rising levels of crime and violence in Ecuador — particularly in the capital city of Quito and in the major port of Guayaquil — have prompted the government to make wider use of army troops in anti-crime patrols. Ecuador's President Mahaud declared a state of emergency in early 1999 and ordered the army to more intensively support law enforcement. By February 1999, the Ecuadoran armed-forces chief reported that more than 8,000 soldiers were assisting the police in dealing with criminality. Ongoing troop-patrol efforts in rural areas and along the coast are intended to free police for demanding urban law-enforcement duties. The army is also engaged in border-protection duties aimed at halting the flow of drugs and illegal immigrants, as well as maintaining what Ecuador considers a requisite presence opposite Peru. The armed forces have controlled customs since 1996 — a move undertaken to reduce corruption and inefficiency. The military claims that customs receipts have increased by 40 percent during the armed forces' tenure in this role. However, customs is scheduled to return to civilian control in 1999.

Exercise highlights Chinese SOF

A Hong Kong publication — reportedly with close ties to the Chinese military establishment — has recently described the structure, roles and missions of special-operations units of the People's Liberation Army, or PLA. Attention focused on an exercise in northern China in which a newly organized special-operations unit from the Beijing Military Region surprised opposing forces in an assault conducted thick fog. The unit parachuted in, using steerable "powered parachutes," and was followed by additional forces rappelling from a helicopter. The mission of blowing up the targeted command post and other objectives was supposedly completed in three minutes, after which the special-operations unit departed by helicopter. According to the publication, China began to organize its modern version of special-operations units in the late 1980s, selecting personnel from the best PLA units. Dropout rates for selected recruits are reportedly 50-90 percent, and the training is described as analogous to that received by other special-operations forces around the world.

Russia reorganizes antiterrorist groups

Despite the proliferation of and the continued reorganization of "counter-terrorist" and other special-operations forces in Russia in recent years, the topic of restructuring and coordinating these various military and security units preoccupies Russian planners. In February, Russian Federation Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov endorsed the idea of "creating a nationwide system for antiterrorist action" in light of the continuing violence in a number of regions and the threat of intensified Chechen terrorist acts. Among the organizations expected to take part in this system are the Antiterrorist Center of the Federal Security Service, or FSB, and the Antiterrorist Center's principal arms, the Department for Combating Terrorism, the Directorate for Special Operations (that was formerly called

Vympel), and the *Alfa* counterterrorist unit. The Ministry of Internal Affairs' Militia Detachments of Special Designation, stationed in areas around the country, constitute another major contribution. The FSB's Directorate for Counterintelligence Operations is also present in all of Russia's major cities. While it is not clear how these organizations would be reorganized, the intent is to "make the antiterrorism system in Russia flexible, controlled from a single center, well-equipped, and capable of inflicting pre-emptive strikes." Drug trafficking is also a concern for special-purpose police units. A heroin shipment of 220 kg was seized in Astrakhan in January 1999 — one of the largest shipments ever for Russian law enforcement. On a different terrorism front, the FSB has also established a new organization, the Information/Computer Security Directorate. Its aim is to protect Russian information systems from foreign special services and from other attacks and penetrations.

Colombian special-ops unit fights urban crime

Colombia's Urban Antiterrorist Special Forces Group, or AFEAU) — with approximately 70 officers and men — is intended to fight violent crime and to combat a range of terrorist activities. The unit is composed of specialists drawn from the armed forces and police who are skilled in hostage rescue, urban-assault operations, and sharpshooting. A special team from the AFEAU recently deployed to Cali to combat "the activities of the guerrillas, narcotraffickers, and common criminals" at the request of Cali's mayor. The city has experienced rising murder rates and heightened activity by armed groups and gangs throughout the area.

Chinese express 'strategic' Internet-security concerns

A recent article in a publication of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, or PLA, highlighted Internet security as a critically important strategic issue. In defining the problem confronting the PLA, the article cited "hacker" efforts to attack or access U.S. military computers and noted what is characterized as a high success rate (65 percent) and a low detection rate (only one detection in 150 attempts). Attention also focused on U.S. countermeasures, including the formation of special groups intended to counter information attacks and penetrations. After establishing a wide range of measures that the PLA must undertake to increase the security of its Internet and other information systems, the article summed up its message: "We need to be highly responsible to our country, drawing up Internet attack and counterattack countermeasures, and ensuring the security of our computer systems, to ensure that our armed forces 'win' future information wars!" In fact, in another recent PLA publication, an article authored by a recognized Chinese information-warfare specialist called for the Chinese establishment of "information protection troops" to guard the "national information boundary," just as navies guard maritime borders and air forces protect air space. Such information troops, in the author's view, should include military, police, scientists, and information specialists who would be prepared not only to protect systems, but to counterattack against countries, groups or individuals.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Special Warfare

SOSCOM welcomes new commander

Colonel Yves J. Fontaine assumed command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Support Command from Colonel Brian I. Geehan Jan. 8.

Fontaine, a native of La Louviere, Belgium, moved to the United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1973. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Ordnance Corps in 1975.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Fontaine served as chief of plans for the 24th Infantry Division and as liaison officer to the 6th French Light Infantry Division. He was previously assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division as a logistics officer.

Geehan's new assignment is chief of the Deployments Division, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

New manual to reflect changing SF activities

The Special Warfare Center and School is revising FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Army Special Forces*, to reflect changing SF mission requirements and to address the full scope of SF activities.

To give greater emphasis to unconventional warfare, foreign-internal defense, direct action, and special reconnaissance, the subject matter in the current FM 31-20 that pertains to those SF missions has been expanded and published as separate manuals: FM 31-20-2, *Unconventional Warfare*; FM 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense*; FM 31-20-4 *Direct Action*; FM 31-20-5, *Special Reconnaissance*. To reduce

redundancy, these missions will be addressed briefly in a single chapter of the revised FM 31-20.

The revised manual will address two new SF missions: information operations, and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will also address several modifications to existing SF missions: Counterterrorism will remain a mission, but only as a subunit of the combatting-terrorism mission. The definition of direct action has been modified to include close-quarters battle.

The revised FM 31-20 will also list countermining activities as a new SF collateral activity. Countermining activities are measures taken to reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines, booby traps and other explosive devices. These activities include providing instruction in demining and mine-awareness to host-nation personnel. TC 31-34, *Humanitarian Demining Handbook*, contains the details of how SF conduct humanitarian demining operations.

Another SF collateral activity, personnel recovery, or PR, has been modified to include the former collateral activity of search and rescue. PR describes the entire spectrum of activities to locate, recover and restore to friendly control selected persons or material isolated and threatened in sensitive, denied or contested areas. The full scope of SF's role in PR is addressed in SWCS Pub 525-5-14, *Unconventional Assisted Recovery*.

Some liaison and command-and-control activities not previously unaddressed in doctrine, or

addressed only in handbooks, have been included as appendices to FM 31-20: the special-operations coordination element, the special-operations command-and-control element, and the SF liaison element.

The draft of the revised FM 31-20 is available on the Army Special Operations Command homepage (<http://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd>) and on the Army Training and Doctrine Command homepage (www-tradoc.army.mil). To access the draft on the TRADOC homepage, users must first obtain a user identification and a password from the SWCS SF Doctrine Division. For passwords or for additional information, contact Major Gregory McMillan, DSN 239-5333 or commercial (910) 432-5333; fax -5341; e-mail mcmillag@soc.mil.

Pub outlines current PSYOP characteristics

A new publication from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School outlines current characteristics, organization and command and control of U.S. psychological-operations forces.

USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-15, *Psychological Operations: Capabilities and Employment*, incorporates the recommendations of a process-action team chartered at SWCS in 1998 to examine Army psychological-operations issues. The PAT recommended a PSYOP force that leverages technology and achieves flexibility through centralized planning and decentralized execution.

The PSYOP organizational structure depicted in the new pub reflects the current task-organiza-

tion of the 4th PSYOP Group. Regional battalions are task-organized into PSYOP development centers, and tactical battalions are task-organized into smaller elements that allow more flexible and responsive support to commanders at all levels. The publication also addresses PSYOP equipment, as well as changes in approval authority that result from the organizational changes.

SWCS Pub 525-5-15 will be superseded later this year by the revised FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*.

SWCS Pub 525-5-15 is available from the SWCS PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division on the ASOC internal web (<http://asociweb/swcs/dotd/PSYpage.htm>). The site lists missions, projects, and points of contact for the PSYOP Division, and it contains examples of recent PSYOP products and recommended PSYOP readings.

SWCS 3rd Battalion has web site

A new web site on the ASOC internal web offers a variety of information for students in Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations training.

The site, which belongs to the 3rd Battalion of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 1st Special Warfare Training Group, caters to students in courses taught by the 3rd Battalion: CA and PSYOP courses, special-operations language training, Functional Area 39 training, and Special Forces warrant-officer basic and advanced courses.

Students can visit the web site to obtain welcome letters, school area maps, class schedules, policy letters, course descriptions and doctrinal reference materials.

Researchers can read and download Army, joint, and Department of Defense publications. The site contains various CA and PSYOP publications, including a complete

set of CA special texts not available elsewhere. The site also features an extensive listing of links to military and strategy-related sites.

The web site address is <http://asociweb/swcs/tng/3/>.

Manuals geared toward ARSOF CS, CSS

The Special Warfare Center and School is developing or revising five field manuals oriented toward combat support and combat service support for ARSOF operations.

Produced by the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, the manuals will supplement the ARSOF capstone manual, FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*.

FM 1-108, *ARSOF Aviation*, is a revision of FM 1-108, *Army Special Operations Aviation Forces*, dated 1993. The manual describes command and control, employment, combat support, and combat service support for ARSOF aviation operations. The manual is in final-draft editing and will be forwarded to TRADOC for approval. The project officer is Mr. Funk at DSN 239-4427; e-mail: funkf@soc.mil.

FM 8-43, *Combat Health Support for ARSOF*, is a new publication that establishes doctrine for the provision of combat health support to ARSOF. Designed for use by command surgeons and their staffs and by personnel planning CHS operations in support of ARSOF missions, the manual discusses ARSOF organic capabilities and the conventional support required from theater or CHS elements of the Army service-component command. The project officer is CW2 Malone, at DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: maloned@soc.mil.

FM 24-31, *C⁴ for ARSOF*, is a new publication that will cover command, control, communications and computers for all ARSOF units. The manual describes the architecture of command-and-control, or C², in operational com-

mands and the information flow from ARSOF operational units to SOC, theater and national C² systems. The project officer is Captain Glynn, at DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: glynnm@soc.mil.

FM 34-31, *Intelligence Support for ARSOF*, is a revision of FM 34-36, *SOF Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, dated 1991. The manual describes the organization and the capabilities of intelligence elements within ARSOF units. The manual also describes the intelligence structures of theater SOCs, joint intelligence centers, and higher-level agencies, and their connectivity with ARSOF operational units. The initial draft will be available for review in April 1999. The project officer is Captain Glynn, at DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: glynnm@soc.mil.

FM 63-31, *Combat Service Support for ARSOF*, is a revision of FM 63-24, *Special Operations Support Battalion*, dated 1995. It will provide a base document for determining future CSS doctrine and procedures. The revised manual addresses ARSOF CSS structure, capabilities, and support requirements and provides users with a single publication that will assist in operational planning and in educating personnel. The project officer is Captain Glynn, at DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: glynnm@soc.mil.

A unique aspect of all these manuals is that their development and proponentcy are being shared with their respective TRADOC service institutions. Drafts of the manuals will be posted on the DOTD web site (<http://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd>) and on the Automated Systems Approach to Training.



Book Reviews


Special Warfare

Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies. Edited by Colonel Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, and Colonel Benjamin F. Findley Jr., USAR. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996. 364 pages. \$21.

The inherent strength of *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* lies in the expertise and experience of its editors and contributors, most of whom participated in the Cold War's "war of ideas" during their service in academic, government and military positions.

As with any edited volume, some of the essays contained in this book are better than the others. Specifically, the case studies are not as strong as the articles dealing with principles. The four-part volume begins with a block of essays that provide a foundation for the understanding of psychological warfare. This section includes not only a strong introduction to the nature and the elements of PSYOP (by Goldstein and Colonel Daniel Jacobowitz) but perhaps the best-written essay of the volume: A study of U.S. military psychological operations, by Colonel Alfred H. Paddock Jr.

Part II of the work focuses on PSYOP planning at the national level and includes an exceptional essay by Dr. Carnes Lord, who writes about the historical influences that have shaped U.S. psychological-operations strategy. Part III includes several assessments of Soviet PSYOP activities during the latter stages of the Cold War, as well as short pieces on the role of the U.S. Information Agency, PSYOP during the Hukbalahap insurgency in the Philippines, and intelligence



activities related to PSYOP. Part IV contains traditional case studies, including an analysis of U.S. and Viet Cong psychological warfare in Southeast Asia, one of the few unclassified assessments of PSYOP in Operation Just Cause, and case studies on both Iraqi and U.S. psychological-warfare activities during Desert Shield/Storm. The highlight of the final two sections is General Stilwell's classic study of PSYOP and counterinsurgency, a solid examination of the psychological dimension of conflict within the American way of war.

Despite the strengths of the volume, it contains a few deficiencies. The volume has suffered at the hands of time: It was conceived almost a decade ago, and several of its essays are notably dated. Major James Keifer's essay does not assess PSYOP support to counterdrug operations in recent years, while Lloyd Free's piece on public

opinion — written almost 30 years ago — cannot take into account the effect that satellite news has had on public opinion and on the making of foreign policy. Additionally, the reader is forced to examine case studies developed largely within the framework of the Cold War. Though the volume is fortunately not filled with gratuitous homages to "IW" and the "information revolution," there are almost no references to the profound technological advances and political revolutions that have already affected the nature of PSYOP as a tool of diplomacy and as a weapon of war.

An additional shortcoming lies in what the volume omits. One of the strengths of earlier PSYOP casebooks was the use of several dozen case studies to illustrate particular points addressed in the casebook. In this volume, however, the inclusion of some of the case studies can be questioned, because they do not sufficiently address either the critical organizational and conceptual issues, or the problematic areas such as target-audience analysis and success criteria for PSYOP. Furthermore, the reader will notice the absence of case studies on U.S. PSYOP support to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations (Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti) and assessments of peacetime PSYOP programs, such as mine-awareness campaigns.

While the volume accomplishes the editors' goal of bringing together a number of articles that might otherwise have gone unread, it may not prove as useful a tool to practitioners and policy-makers as it will to historians. If the volume as a whole could have explored the sig-

nificant and unsettled issues facing PSYOP today and expanded its conceptualizations beyond those of the Cold War, it might have proven more instructive regarding future directions in PSYOP.

Mark R. Jacobson
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.

Crippled Eagle: A Historical Perspective of U. S. Special Operations 1976-1996. By Rod Lenahan. Charleston, S.C.: Narwhal Press, 1998. ISBN 1-886391-23-8 (paper). 272 pages. \$19.95.

In the Japanese classic movie, "Rashomon," a number of observers tell the story of the same event, but with markedly different views. If one were to gather and condense the accounts of the 1980 American effort to rescue the hostages in Iran, one could readily create a modern military "Rashomon."

Chronologically first was the report of the Halloway Board, which analyzed the operation and gave its opinions of why the effort failed. The conclusions were not heartily accepted by all of those who had participated in the rescue effort. Next was Colonel Charlie Beckwith's book, *Delta Force* (Harcourt, Bruce and Jovanovich, 1983), which told the story from the ground commander's not necessarily unbiased viewpoint.

Colonel Jim Kyle, the senior air planner, wrote *The Guts to Try* (Crown, 1990), which gave outstanding descriptions of the aircraft and weather aspects. Now, Colonel Rod Lenahan, the J2 of the joint task force that was created to plan and conduct the operation, has added *Crippled Eagle*, which brings a joint-staff view of this intriguing subject.

Crippled Eagle is an outstanding addition to the list of accounts. In its buildup to the rescue effort, the book provides an understanding of how gaunt the special-operations forces of

the United States had become since the end of the Vietnam War, and it describes the nation's first stumbling steps in the attempt to create a counterterrorism capability.

Those familiar with the modern standing joint task forces and with the theater SOCs as joint task forces in-waiting will probably find the assembling of Joint Task Force 1-79 quaint. While many assigned to the task force were having their first taste of the heady elixir of special operations, the task force's nucleus was a couple dozen experienced special operators who were pulled in from all over the world. These were members of the small, all-services fraternity who by their dedication and determination had kept the coals of special operations glowing despite numerous efforts to stamp them out.

In conjunction with the air- and ground-force commanders, the JTF planned an operation of great daring in order to overcome the problems of enormous distances, limited target-area intelligence, aircraft that were inadequate in numbers and in capability, and aircrews that were inexperienced in long-range operations. For its daring, dedication and willingness to attempt the near-impossible, the

JTF deserved success, but even a surfeit of those sterling values could not overcome equipment inadequacy. An aircraft accident that occurred after the decision to withdraw the force short of the target added tragedy to the already acute disappointment and frustration.

As the J2 of the joint task force, then-Lieutenant Colonel Rod Lenahan had probably the best position of all the participants for observing the development and the execution of the operation. The nature of his job ensured that he knew all the problems, all the plans, and what was known and unknown. He has augmented his on-the-spot knowledge with materials that have been declassified in recent years. He tells his story well: His style is comfortable, informative and, where necessary, sufficiently explanatory for most non-military readers. The reader, however, is cautioned to keep track of the abbreviations, or he may lose his way.

Unfortunately, this excellent presentation is undermined by publication faults. The book suffers from lack of a good index, from a minimal glossary, and from numerous misspelled words and names. But while they are annoying, these faults are considered petty in an otherwise highly competent presentation that deserves the attention of professional special operators. The modern operator who has much greater resources at his disposal should be spared JTF 1-79's pains, but he might find it interesting to read how a rescue effort was attempted in the bad old days of shortage, make-do and dedication.

COL J.H. Crerar
U.S. Army (ret)
Vienna, Va.



Special Warfare

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