


Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



From the Commandant



Special Warfare

The 1999 Special Forces Conference and Exposition was an unqualified success. This year's conference theme, "Regional engagement and the future," gave the SF community an opportunity to examine our future role, our future training, and the values that will sustain us.

The conference consisted of three symposiums that allowed senior SF soldiers to discuss topics that will ultimately influence the direction of Special Forces. From the symposium "Special Forces Ideology," we will eventually prepare the statement of our core ideology. From "Army Special Operations Task Force/Regional Engagement Force," we will outline concepts for the future employment of SF units. From "SF Assessment and Selection/SF Qualification Course," we will determine the changes necessary in the training of future SF soldiers.

Junior and mid-grade SF soldiers participated in workshops and generated recommendations for resolving a number of contemporary issues.

The National Defense Industrial Association, or NDIA, hosted an exposition of contemporary and future equipment, weapons and technology that are relevant to the SF mission area. Conference attendees were able to observe equipment that is in production as well as some that is in prototype.

The Family Readiness Conference helped reinforce the link between the welfare of families and SOF readiness. SOF unit family-advocacy representatives were updated on the available training materials that can help families learn to cope with the stresses associated with special operations.

The conference's activities gave us a chance to see old friends and to make new acquaintances. The dedication to fallen comrades allowed us to remember those who are no longer in our ranks, and to honor their sacrifices.

This year's conference was a cooperative effort by the Special Warfare Center and



School, the Special Forces Command, the Army Special Operations Command, the NDIA, and the Special Forces Association. The special guests attending — General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General John M. Abrams, commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command; General Peter J. Schoomaker, CINC USSO-COM; Ross Perot; and Wayne Newton — showed the wide range of support for Special Forces and its activities.

But the true stars of this year's conference were the soldiers themselves: the participants in the symposiums and in the workshops who contributed with their own insights. The SF Conference was not the final word on REF, core ideology or SF assessment and training. Those issues will continue to be tested, debated and studied elsewhere. The real success of the SF Conference is that members of the SF community came together, discussed the topics, gained a consensus, and recorded their recommendations. Those recommendations and the support of the SF community will be invaluable as we build a force relevant for the future.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra

Commander & Commandant
Major General Kenneth R. Bowra

Editor

Jerry D. Steelman

Associate Editor

Sylvia W. McCarley

Graphics & Design

Bruce S. Barfield

Automation Clerk

Gloria H. Sawyer



Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to *Special Warfare* and the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Special Warfare* is also available on the USASOC internal web. (<http://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm>).

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Dennis J. Reimer

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. Hudson

*Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army*

05233

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Features

- 2 Special Forces Conference: Looking to the Future, Celebrating the Past**
by Private First Class Jon Creese
- 4 Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces**
by Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Chris Tone
- 16 Building Special Forces to Last: Redesigning the Organizational Culture**
by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Larry E. Bush Jr.
- 21 Army Values: Duty**
- 22 Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the Needs of the Force in 2020**
by Michelle M. Zazanis, Robert N. Kilcullen, Michael G. Sanders and Doe Ann Crocker
- 32 The History of the 1st Special Service Force Air Detachment**
by Ray Cart
- 36 Special Forces at West Point: Planting the Seed**
by Major Rich Young
- 40 Special Forces: In Search of a Core Ideology**
by Sergeant Major Edward A. Berg

Departments

- 43 Letters**
- 44 Foreign SOF**
- 47 Enlisted Career Notes**
- 48 Officer Career Notes**
- 50 Update**
- 52 Book Reviews**

Special Forces Conference: Looking to the Future, Celebrating the Past

by Private First Class Jon Creese

Many of the Army's best war fighters and humanitarians met April 19-22 to discuss the future of Special Forces, or SF. They also celebrated their past.

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School sponsored the annual Special Forces Conference and Exposition at the Holiday Inn-Bordeaux in Fayetteville, N.C. The conference, attended by more than 500 current or former SF soldiers, was designed to bring members of the SF community together to discuss important topics.

"The real benefit of the conference was in having an open debate in an open forum to identify perceived issues and challenges of the future so we could start working on solutions today," said Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Celeski, chief of staff of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

To ensure open debate and to gather input from senior and junior SF soldiers, SWCS divided the conference attendees into two groups. Senior SF soldiers, including lieutenant colonels and higher, sergeants major and higher, and chief warrant officer four and higher, participated in three symposiums.

The symposia concentrated on the nature of Special Forces, the way SF participates in regional engagement, and the selection and training of SF soldiers.

Junior SF soldiers participated in 10 workshops that examined topics such as

enhancing force protection; establishing alternate methods by which to train advanced skills; and refining materiel requirements.

"It was really important to (Major) General Bowra (the SWCS commanding general) that he receive the input from junior soldiers," said Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein, director of the Special Operations Proponency Office, the office in charge of the conference. "This conference was unique because he insisted that it be outcome based — that we come away with recommendations for some of the topics we discussed."

Each symposium and workshop had an action officer whose job was to distill the discussions, suggestions and recommendations into a concise report.

"We wanted a conference to produce (results) and engage junior levels of the SF community," Adelstein said. "We received a lot of input from the field, and once the reports are received, we expect many useful recommendations."

Special Forces units perform five doctrinal missions — foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, direct action and counterterrorism. Foreign-internal-defense missions are the main peacetime initiatives; they include humanitarian and civic projects in friendly developing nations.

General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, praised the SF sol-

diers in his speech to the conference attendees April 21. "Each of you is a true national asset ... perhaps the best we have in the Department of Defense."

While at Fort Bragg, Shelton participated in a high-altitude, low-opening parachute jump with SF soldiers and members of the U.S. Army Parachute Team.

Besides Shelton, there were other distinguished guests who supported the conference by celebrating with the SF community. Entertainer Wayne Newton and Texas businessman H. Ross Perot joined about 700 soldiers and their guests during the Special Forces 12th Anniversary Ball, April 22.

Newton has been a supporter of the SF community since the Vietnam era. He accompanied Bob Hope on several trips to Vietnam, entertaining troops during USO tours. While in Vietnam, Newton collected family-contact information from the soldiers. Upon returning to the states, Newton contacted the family members of approximately 7,000 soldiers he had met.

Perot, also a long-time SF supporter, has contributed significantly to special-operations soldiers and their families over the years. In 1997, he provided funds to erect a statue honoring the late Major Richard J. Meadows. The statue is located outside the U.S. Army Special Operations Command headquarters. Perot has also commissioned a statue of retired Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons, which is slated to be dedicated in November at the John F. Kennedy Plaza.

For their support, Newton and Perot received green berets and honorary memberships to the 1st Special Forces Regiment. Newton ended the formal part of the ball by entertaining the crowd.

Then the band struck up, and the members of the SF community and their guests took to the dance floor. Perhaps it was only fitting that after having spent three days looking to the future and celebrating the past, the SF community took time to enjoy the present. ✂

Private First Class Jon Creese is assigned to the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Special Operations Command.



Photo by Jon Creese



Photo by Jon Creese

Top: Retired Command Sergeant Major Franklin Miller, a Special Forces Medal of Honor recipient, participates in the laying of the wreath during the fallen-comrades ceremony at the Army Special Operations Forces Memorial Plaza. The ceremony kicked off the four-day Special Forces Conference.

Bottom: A Special Forces rifle party prepares to fire a three-volley salute to honor fallen comrades during the fallen-comrades ceremony.

Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces

by Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Christopher Tone

As a mission and as a concept, unconventional warfare, or UW, is the heart and soul of the United States Army's Special Forces, or SF. Since SF was created in 1952, UW has provided its values, its focus and its uniqueness. Although our UW doctrine is outdated, current and future political, social and economic situations promise continued relevance for UW's core tasks.

At a commanders' conference held by the U.S. Army SF Command in October 1998, an SF group commander asked if UW is still a relevant mission. "If not," he asked, "why should we train for it?" Major General William Boykin, the USASFC commanding general, directed the commanders present to examine the relevance of the UW mission and to present their findings at the commanders' conference in January 1999.

This article contains the response that the 3rd SF Group presented in January. By publishing it in *Special Warfare*, the authors hope to reach a larger part of the SF community and to contribute to the current debate on the core ideology of SF and on the future of UW.

Unlike other combat units that are required to perform several missions, SF was developed for one

purpose: to conduct guerrilla warfare, or GW, whose definition in the 1950s was as follows:

Guerrilla Warfare is defined in [Special Regulation] 320-5-1 as operations carried out by small independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying and disrupting military operations of the enemy. The term is sometimes limited to the military operations and tactics of small forces whose objective is to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy rather than to seize or defend terrain; these operations are characterized by the extensive use of surprise and the emphasis on avoidance of casualties. The term ... includes organized and directed passive resistance, espionage, assassination, sabotage and propaganda, and, in some cases, ordinary combat. Guerrilla warfare is ordinarily carried on by irregular, or partisan, forces; however, regular forces which have been cut off behind enemy lines or which have infiltrated into the enemy rear areas may use guerrilla tactics. — FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare (October 1951)¹

Over the years, the GW terminology has been replaced by UW, but the concept has remained constant. It provides the fundamental principles for SF organization, doctrine, training and recruitment. SF operational detachments, battalions and groups were manned and equipped to accomplish the UW mission in remote areas with little or no support. SF required mature, self-disciplined and physically fit soldiers who could operate independently, communicate across cultural barriers, accurately assess complicated problems, create innovative solutions, and function well when placed in small groups of similar soldiers for long periods of time.

"Improvise - adapt - overcome" was the mantra of the SF soldier. The ability to perform those activities was required for success in UW, and SF sought to nurture and develop that ability through its training. The SF A-detachment had to be versatile, capable and self-reliant: It would have to accomplish the UW mission with little or no support. The team also had to be cohesive, because there would be no one else upon whom its members could depend in their remote area of operations. The fact that the ODA has proven very capable of conducting other missions

must not detract from its intended purpose.

According to the vocabulary of the current debate on SF core ideology, core ideology is composed of two elements: core values (the organization's essential and enduring tenets); and core purpose (the organization's fundamental reason for existing).² The authors believe that the core purpose for SF is, and always has been, to conduct UW. The core values may be debated, but all of them are related to the uniqueness of the UW mission.

SF soldiers and units are doing excellent work around the world, and they continue to add to SF's reputation for excellence and versatility. However, we have lost touch with our core purpose — UW. In a recent letter published in *Special Warfare*, Master Sergeant Brian Duffy, team sergeant of ODA-376, astutely observed, "When you get lost, you go back to your last known position and get your fix. We should do the same with our core ideology."³ We must clearly establish what UW is. After having established our position, we must then move forward.

The past as prologue

UW has been SF's *raison d'être* since 1952. The other Army components have focused on the conventional battlefield, which envisions states at war, professional armies clashing on the field of battle, and clear winners or losers.

Having observed the war in Korea, and drawing directly on their experiences of World War II, General Robert McClure and two of his sharp subordinates, Colonel Aaron Bank and Colonel Russell Volckmann, recognized a need for a capability that our postwar Army did not possess — units capable of fighting on unconventional battlefields. The Ranger battalions were,

by structure, training and attitude, incapable of the task. There is a significant difference between elite units that develop high levels of proficiency in conventional combat skills and units, elite or otherwise, that develop unconventional warfare skills.⁴

World War II was not the first war in which GW had been used, nor was it GW's best showcase. Much better examples of GW are T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Brotherhood's

support to General Allenby's operations in Palestine during the First World War, and the Spanish *guerrilla* support to Wellington during the Iberian peninsular campaign against Napoleon. But in the early 1950s, our WWII experience was recent, and the lessons were fresh in our memory. During World War II, the U.S. and its Allies had realized significant successes by supporting partisan resistance in all theaters.

In France during the later part of the war, Jedburg teams helped train and organize the French resistance forces. The activities of resistance forces were coordinated to assist Allied conventional efforts by targeting forces, supplies and infrastructure that would affect



Courtesy USASOC archive

Colonel Aaron Bank, commander of the first Special Forces unit, the 10th SF Group. Bank, General Robert McClure and Colonel Russell Volckmann recognized the need for a postwar UW force.

the Nazi ability to fight on the battlefields of France.

In Yugoslavia, British commandos provided assistance to the resistance forces of both Tito and Mikhailovich. In Burma, U.S. Detachment 101 trained and employed Kachin tribesmen against the Japanese. Even though there were no Allied conventional efforts in these theaters, the UW actions had two purposes: First, they were designed as an economy of force effort that would interfere with the administration of the occupied territories, and force the enemy to devote large numbers of military forces to secure the strategic infrastructure. Second, these small efforts demonstrated Allied solidarity with the defeated peo-

ples and encouraged their continued resistance.

On those unconventional battlefields, there were no battles, and there were no clear winners or losers. The “states” were not at war: one state had surrendered and was being occupied by the other. Most of the partisans were not professional soldiers: They fought either as members of auxiliaries or as members of the undergrounds. It was for this type of scenario that the 10th Special Forces Group was established in June 1952. Bank took command of the group, while McClure and Volckmann continued the “good fight” in Washington.

Unconventional warfare consists of military, political, psychological, or economic actions of a covert, clandestine, or overt nature within areas under the actual or potential control or influence of a force or state whose interests and objectives are inimical to those of the United States. These actions are conducted unilaterally by United States resources, or in conjunction with indigenous assets, and avoid formal military confrontation. — FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations (February 1969)⁵

During the three decades following the establishment of the 10th SF Group, the U.S. witnessed numerous insurgencies around the world, most of which were sponsored or assisted by our Cold War adversaries as “just wars of national liberation.” The U.S. military struggled with the counterinsurgency issue with limited success.

SF was frequently called upon to combat insurgencies for two reasons: First, their employment would give the U.S. the capability to take advantage of perceived opportunities to develop or support insurgencies against the commu-



Photo by Keith Butler

The unconventional-warfare exercise conducted at the end of the SF Qualification Course, Robin Sage, is essentially the same as the guerrilla-warfare exercise conducted by Aaron Bank in 1952.

nist bloc. Second, the experts in conducting insurgency would be most useful in fighting hostile insurgencies as advisers and trainers. Who better to fight guerrillas than the trainers of guerrillas?

As SF and the other Army components developed their roles in foreign internal defense, or FID, doctrine writers incorporated a portion of the insurgents’ doctrine into our UW doctrine. The excerpt from the 1969 edition of FM 31-21 reflects the incorporation of the insurgents’ doctrine, but this doctrine has never been tested in an insurgency or incorporated into our UW training.

Unconventional Warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or

clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape (E&E). — Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (April 1998)⁶

The current joint definition of UW (shown above) would lead us to believe that our UW mission is relevant and that our UW doctrine is sound. Unfortunately, when our supporting doctrine interprets this broad joint definition, it limits SF’s UW role to “training indigenous forces and leading them in the conduct of guerrilla war or insurgency.” This “UW=GW+Insurgency” equation must be revised if UW is to have relevance as a mission for SF in the next century.

In the minds of most SF soldiers, UW doctrine has been oversimplified. “UW is just FID in a denied area” is the often-stated justification for the “Ts” (trained) on our UW mission-essential task lists, or METLs, which are presented during quarterly training briefs. While

this is clearly incorrect, it is indicative of the state of our UW doctrine. Our force has lost sight of its purpose. Our teams today are more comfortable conducting a long-range surveillance mission (disguised as special reconnaissance) or a Ranger-platoon raid (disguised as direct action) than they are of assessing and developing a UW operational area and creating havoc in a denied area.

Even if we could accept the $UW=GW+Insurgency$ equation as valid, the training to prepare SF for UW would be outdated and insufficient, because today's SF does not train for insurgency. There are no training materials to support insurgency training. Except for one block of classroom instruction on the theory of insurgency in the SF Detachment Officer Qualification Course,⁷ our UW training focuses on GW. The culmination exercise of the SF Qualification Course, Robin Sage, is essentially the same GW exercise conducted by Aaron Bank in 1952.

Although it conforms nicely to conventional TRADOC standards, the 1988 UW Mission Training Plan (ARTEP 31-807-30-MTP) is very thin on detailed training guidance for the core UW tasks.⁸ Of the 56 tasks listed, only 15 are UW-specific; and these are devoted to GW, combat operations and link-ups with friendly conventional forces. A task as complicated as "develop the area complex" has two pages of broad subtasks, but these subtasks are no real help to the ODA leadership looking for guidance.

In 1994, the Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine distributed the initial draft of FM 31-20-2, *Unconventional Warfare Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces*.⁹ While the draft FM 31-20-2 was a better effort than ARTEP 31-807-30-MTP and was

more focused on UW, it focused on the UW of yesteryear. The manual was never published in final form, and we understand that SWCS is working on another effort.

In light of our outdated UW doctrine, the misconception in the SF community regarding SF's core purpose is understandable. UW, *as currently defined in SF doctrine*, is not relevant as an SF mission, either in today's security environment or in that of the future. While there is and will continue to be a need for forces with UW capabilities, filling that need will require

Our teams today are more comfortable conducting a long-range surveillance mission (disguised as special reconnaissance) or a Ranger-platoon raid (disguised as direct action) than they are of assessing and developing a UW operational area and creating havoc in a denied area.

more than simply revising our doctrinal definitions. The doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldier skills, or DTLOMS, that were adequate for UW during Colonel Bank's era are inadequate for the UW battlefield of the 21st century. If the SF community can agree that our UW doctrine must evolve, we still would have to develop the other elements of DTLOMS for the "improved" UW mission. In fact, updating our UW doctrine will be

the easiest task.

Today's UW doctrine refers to two related missions: GW and insurgency. In both GW and insurgency, SF units perform tasks such as raids, ambushes, sabotage, subversion, intelligence collection; they train indigenous forces; and they operate in denied areas. However, GW and insurgency have different operational environments, campaign objectives, and success criteria.

GW is part of a larger war. GW consists of operations conducted by small units that work in conjunction with resistance movements behind enemy lines and in occupied territories. Guerrilla forces tie up enemy forces that are necessary to maintain control of occupied territories and rear areas; guerrilla forces also assist conventional efforts in theater by targeting facilities, units and infrastructure that directly affect the enemy's ability to fight.

Insurgency is not part of a larger war. Insurgency is a mission of long-duration, whose continued operation does not depend upon the outcome of a conventional war. There are no economy-of-force issues. The success of an insurgency depends upon the continued political will of both the U.S. government and the U.S. people to support (1) the aspirations of insurgents and the opposition to the targeted regime, and (2) the involvement of U.S. forces, with its associated cost in men and materiel. Insurgency is not the war described by Clausewitz; it is the armed struggle described by Mao and Che Guevara, and political concerns are paramount.

Operational environment. The contrasts between the operational environments of the two UW missions are striking. GW is conducted when our nation is at war; insurgency is conducted when our nation is at peace. GW supports a conventional military campaign or



Courtesy USASOC archive

Subversion and sabotage were part of the World War II UW experience and continue to be an important UW activity. UW's primary purpose is creating mayhem.

diverts enemy forces, resources, effort and attention away from one. Insurgency does not involve friendly conventional forces.

GW forces fight against an occupying army, which has a built-in legitimacy problem with the occupied people. Insurgent forces fight against an established regime, which has some degree of popular support. GW is usually supported by the conquered government, which may be in exile or underground. In GW, political activities support the military. During an insurgency, the political implications of military action are of paramount importance. In insurgency, military activities support political goals.

Campaign objectives. During GW, the strategic objective is to defeat the occupying enemy. The guerrilla campaign may be but a sideshow for a greater allied effort. The occupying army is the main target. The tactical and operational objectives are either military or military-related. GW may involve some movement for political reforms, but polit-

ical reforms are not the focus of the military campaign. During an insurgency, however, political goals are far more important than military ones. The strategic objective is to overthrow the established regime and to replace it with one that will support the interests of the U.S. Although some tactical objectives can be attained by targeting military and security forces, operational objectives can only be attained by reducing the legitimacy of the established regime at home and abroad, and by enhancing support for the insurgent movement, of which the armed struggle is only a small portion.

Success criteria. Success in GW requires that the military defeat the occupying enemy, and that the occupied country return to some form of its previous condition. The long-term political stability of the indigenous regime is not a primary concern for the U.S. Success in insurgency requires that the indigenous regime undergo a change from its previous condition. The legitimacy and the stability of

the new regime is a primary concern for the U.S.

The differences in the environments, objectives and success criteria of GW and insurgency will greatly influence the way we conduct UW. We must recognize that GW is primarily a military activity and that insurgency is primarily a political activity. Many aspects of the two missions will vary greatly, including targeting, the willingness to accept U.S. and indigenous casualties, and the role of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. The clandestine or covert nature of U.S. involvement, which is all but irrelevant in guerrilla war, may be a tremendous factor in our support to an insurgency.

The CINC's charge

The commander in chief, or CINC, of the U.S. Special Operations Command, General Peter J. Schoomaker, has charged U.S. special-operations forces to *be the most capable and most relevant special-operations force in existence*.¹⁰ Recognizing that people are SOF's most important asset, he demands that they be *trained for certainty and educated for uncertainty*. He insists that our organizations maintain a *broad array of relevant capabilities*. He has established a clear standard by which to judge our success: We provide the National Command Authorities, or NCA, with *value-added relevant in time, space and circumstance*. As the CINC looks to the future, he recognizes that *SOF must evolve to remain relevant. We must determine which capabilities to develop, which ones to maintain, and which ones to shift to conventional forces*.

The recurring theme in the CINC's charge is "relevance." SOF must provide the NCA with capabilities that are relevant not only to the problems that we face today

but also to those that we will face tomorrow. SOF must train to fight today's certainties, and our organizations must provide the capabilities and the options that are relevant to today's crises. But if today's missions and capabilities do not appear to be relevant to tomorrow's environments, we must be ready and willing to evolve to missions and capabilities that are.

Analysis

To answer the CINC's charge, SF must move beyond its current definition of UW, which is not relevant today and is unlikely to be relevant in the foreseeable future.

We have no peer competitor that would force us into a GW scenario as described in our current definition of UW. Neither of the two current major-theater-war scenarios that we envision would be likely to require the establishment of an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force from an indigenous people in an occupied territory.

Granted, the GW mission is possible in several imaginable scenarios, and SF is the only force in the U.S. military that is capable of executing the mission. But we must be careful not to train for *possibilities* at the expense of *training for certainties*.

Insurgency is also an unlikely SF mission. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ideological struggle of our generation has passed. The U.S. is not a revolutionary power; in fact, throughout much of the world, we represent the status quo. In terms of law, commerce, finance, communications, information, etc., the current international system is one that we have established or is one to which we have adapted. Our ideology underpins it, and we are its primary beneficiaries. The U.S. people and policy-makers would be unwilling to commit U.S. forces to the overt support of an insurgency, and SF is currently not capable of conducting the long-duration covert or clandestine operations that an

insurgency would require.

There is the more likely possibility of overt U.S. support to an insurgency, either from a third country (as from Honduras in the 1980s) or from a portion of the adversary's country secured by U.S. or allied forces (as in Kurdistan in the 1990s). But because that possibility would not involve direct U.S. combat operations or U.S. operations in a denied area, it does not fit our current definition of UW.

SF will never be large enough or have sufficient resources to conduct all possible missions. The CINC's guidance is sound: we must focus on relevant capabilities. And SF must either rewrite its UW manuals and training materials to make them relevant, or put them away until the world situation changes and UW becomes a relevant mission once again.

Redefining UW

The following definition for UW would carry SF into the next century:

Unconventional Warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, that are not usually directed at the conventional objective of defeating the enemy's military forces in combat. It includes subversion, sabotage, intelligence-collection, training and employing surrogate forces, offensive information operations, and offensive command-and-control warfare. These operations may be conducted in peace, conflict or war, and they may be overt, covert or clandestine in nature. If these operations are conducted when our nation is not at war, their success, failure and even exposure are politically sensitive and carry strategic implications. — Proposed definition



Courtesy USASOC archive

Soldiers from Detachment 101 show guerrilla fighters how to load .45-caliber automatic pistols during World War II.

Many of today's hot spots are located in parts of the world where languages are difficult to learn and cultures are remote from our own.



DoD photo

The most important element about UW is that, as its name denotes, it is not conventional. Conventional warfare is focused on the contest of armies on a battlefield where the full weight of our technological advantages can be brought to bear on our opponent. UW is not directly involved with that battlefield.

We must also move beyond the idea of GW. The fact that guerrillas may be involved in the conduct of our indirect activities must not be our focus — we must focus on the activities themselves, and on their unconventional nature.

The proposed definition also returns to the term “unconventional warfare,” as opposed to “unconventional operations.” Earlier, the authors had labeled their definition “unconventional operations,” not because we envisioned that these operations would not involve war-fighting, but because we wanted to ensure that the definition

would cover the operational continuum of peace-conflict-war. While our nation may be at peace, those involved in UW would be fighting a war at their level.

But at least one recent proposal has included stability and support operations in the concept of unconventional operations,¹¹ turning the concept away from a strict war-fighting interpretation. To avoid any confusion, the authors have returned to the original term — unconventional warfare.

To compare the proposed definition with the one in current UW doctrine, we can analyze it in terms of core tasks, operational environment, campaign objectives and success criteria.

Core tasks. Most of the core UW activities, tasks or sub-missions would be unchanged: Subversion, sabotage, intelligence-collection, and the employment of surrogates were all part of Aaron Bank's Jedburg experience in World War II. Subver-

sion is defined as actions taken to undermine the political legitimacy and psychological strength of a regime or nation. Sabotage is defined as actions taken to weaken a regime and its military by damaging or disrupting critical infrastructure from within. Activities directed against the enemy's military, such as raids and ambushes, could be included in the list of tasks, but they should not detract from the indirect nature of the mission. UW's purpose is not to destroy the enemy's military; it is to create mayhem.

Our doctrine must recognize that advances in technology, global commerce and communication have opened many new avenues for sabotage and subversion — some of which do not require physical access. Intelligence-collection must evolve beyond the process of gathering information on targeting and on enemy order of battle. It must include the human intelligence, or HUMINT, concerns of will, morale and intention, which cannot be collected by our high-tech overhead platforms. By identifying and leveraging the influence hierarchy of a target regime, we may often be more successful in influencing its actions than we could be by directly attacking the regime or its forces. Unlike many of our HUMINT efforts that recruit agents of questionable reliability, UW can employ the SF soldier himself as the intelligence collector.

The proposed definition deliberately avoids using the terms “partisan,” “guerrilla” and “indigenous forces.” The first two terms have perpetuated a WWII mindset. Furthermore, the foreign forces that we may employ in future conflicts may be from another tribe, a different ethnic group or even from a third country. The definition also avoids any requirement that UW be conducted in a denied area. Many UW activities can be con-

ducted in or from secure areas.

The spread of information-age technology brings new opportunities for UW. According to Joint Pub. 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, offensive information operations, or IO, involve “the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities to affect the adversary decision-makers or promote specific objectives.”¹² Offensive IO can target the enemy’s decision-makers, soldiers, or population (human factors); the systems that collect, process and store information (nodes); and the transportation and communication infrastructure that connects them (links). The authors of Joint Pub. 3-13 address special operations specifically: “The unique capabilities of SOF enable the [joint force commander] to access, alter, degrade, delay, disrupt, deny or destroy adversary information systems throughout the range of military operations and at all levels of war.”¹³ The indirect nature of information operations, and their close relationship to sabotage and subversion, clearly warrant the inclusion of offensive IO in UW.

Offensive command-and-control warfare, or C²W, is a subset of IO. At a tactical or even an operational level, the destruction of the enemy’s C² capability directly affects the battlefield, and C²W is a component of conventional warfare. However, the disruption of an adversary’s C² during periods of competition or conflict can also send a signal or achieve a limited goal. Also, as our doctrine for C²W explains: “Physical destruction in support of C²W refers to the use of ‘hard kill’ weapons or other means such as sabotage or covert actions against designated targets as an element of an integrated C²W effort.”¹⁴ For these reasons, C²W can be included as a UW activity.

The reader may be better able to understand UW in terms of managing chaos. As we consider the effect

of the indirect UW activities already discussed, we must recognize that we are creating chaos in the adversary’s country. Routinely sabotage public services, transportation and communications, and you subvert the government’s authority. The regime and its security forces will appear powerless, and a PSYOP propaganda campaign can help drive that message home. By creating, escalating, reducing or eliminating chaos in an adversary’s country, as directed by the NCA, we could achieve national-security goals without involving conventional military forces. It is conceivable that we could create public chaos to overthrow an adversarial regime, and that we could then step in to restore order in support of a new regime. We need not even replace the old regime: Turning chaos on and off could encourage the desired behavior.

Operational environment. The

future UW operational environment will be significantly different from the one described in our current doctrine. If UW is to be relevant, we cannot restrict it to an unlikely GW scenario that conveniently allows us to avoid political issues. We must recognize UW’s inherent political nature and embrace that nature, especially during peacetime competition and conflict. We cannot pretend that there will be no political consequences, domestic as well as international, should U.S. UW activity be exposed. We must consider these consequences during the planning, execution and post-execution phases of UW.

The presence of uniformed SF troops has taken on a great deal of significance around the world. There will be an increasing need for covert and clandestine operations, not so much to fool the enemy as to keep photos of our sol-



Photo by Steven Collins

PSYOP soldiers talk with the news editor of Radio Tuzla to plan a radio talk show about the stabilization force. PSYOP campaigns can help to reduce chaos and achieve national-security goals.



Photo by Atiba Copeland

Situations like the one in Kosovo, with a large resistance potential and committed local popular support, present an environment ripe for unconventional warfare.

diers out of the news.

In 1994, a true tactical victory in Somalia was transformed into a strategic disaster by the media frenzy. Although an objective comparison of casualties would suggest a resounding victory for U.S. forces in Mogadishu, those who returned home from that battle were not hailed as victors.

More recently, the 3rd SF Group has seen legitimate support to host-nation units withdrawn because of media attention. Journalists, who had seen uniformed U.S. servicemen in Rwanda, mistakenly reported that the U.S. military was involved in the training of Tutsi paramilitary forces that had participated in the attempted overthrow of Kabila's regime.¹⁵

We must also recognize that global demographic changes have affected the UW operational environment. We can no longer expect to operate only in rural or remote areas, because the world's populations are moving into large cities. Most of the important players and key targets will be in or around

cities, and SF must be capable of operating in urban areas.

During the first half of the 20th century, most of this country's conflicts took place in western Europe. But, today, most of our hot spots are located in other parts of the world. The languages in these areas are more difficult to learn and their cultures more remote, both of which make communication and rapport-building, the crucial elements of Jedburg-style UW, especially difficult for most Americans. The U.S. military does not have a pool of natives or native speakers from these areas that can be employed in UW operations. Thus SF will have to be capable of conducting UW tasks unilaterally, as well as through or with surrogates.

Campaign objectives. There will also be significant changes in future UW campaign objectives. Because of the requirements of peacetime competition and conflict, we must identify and accept more limited goals. In other words, we may not be able to defeat the enemy's military (GW) or over-

throw the established regime (insurgency). Behavioral changes, such as complying with treaties, halting weapons development or observing human rights, are more likely to be our campaign objectives. SF must expect to be employed in UW missions that have political goals as well as (or even instead of) military goals.

In addition to seeking limited goals, we will be performing limited targeting: the right message to the right group. UW activities can be directed against specific ministries or bureaucracies, social or economic classes, regions or sub-regions, and ethnic or tribal groupings. The mayhem and chaos created during UW need not affect all of the adversary's population equally. Unlike air strikes or embargoes, UW activities of sabotage, information operations and chaos-development can be selective in choosing who feels the "stick." UW actions can easily be reinforced by targeted PSYOP campaigns. Conceptually, we need not destroy an opposing military's ability to resist in order to attack the ruling party and its supporters, nor do we need to punish a nation in order to force a small leadership clique to change its behavior.

Success criteria. The UW success criteria have not changed substantially. In war, we win by defeating the enemy's military (as in GW). In peacetime competition or during conflict short of war, we win either by replacing an unfriendly regime with one supportive of U.S. interests (as in insurgency) or by forcing a regime, group or leader to change its behavior.

From the analysis of its core tasks, operational environment, campaign objectives and success criteria, the proposed definition appears to be sound, but we should compare it to two other proposed definitions of UW being advanced

at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The first definition is taken from the initial draft of FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (December 1998), which has been distributed to the field for comment.

*Unconventional Warfare: UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes guerrilla warfare and the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (UAR). UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. UW is thus protracted politico-military activity. SF units do not create resistance movements. They provide advice, training and assistance to indigenous resistance movements already in existence. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain the supported insurgent or resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further U.S. national security objectives. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on politico-military and psychological objectives. Military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives. The political and psychological implications remain, however. — FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (Initial Draft) (Dec 1998)¹⁶*

Quoting from the manual's pref-

ace: "Field Manual (FM) 31-20 is the keystone manual for Special Forces (SF) doctrine. It describes SF roles, missions, capabilities, organization, command and control (C2), employment, and sustainment operations across the operational continuum."¹⁷ That is a large task for such a thin manual.

This proposed definition is a small evolutionary step forward from the definition in the 1990 version of FM 31-20: It clearly identifies the political nature of the mission. The definition is nearly iden-

If UW is to be relevant, we cannot restrict it to an unlikely GW scenario that conveniently allows us to avoid political issues. We must recognize UW's inherent political nature and embrace that nature, especially during peacetime competition and conflict.

tical to the currently accepted joint doctrine of Joint Pub. 3-05, but it excludes the "other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations."

Unfortunately, this definition pursues the UW=GW+Insurgency equation that we wish to avoid, and it perpetuates the requirement for indigenous or surrogate forces. However, with the inclusion of the word "predominantly," the definition does leave open a window for unilateral operations, although it does not embrace the idea. In short, this definition is more of the same: It does not address the issue of relevance for the present and

future national-security situations.

The second definition is taken from an article that proposes a change to joint UW doctrine.

Unconventional Operations: The conduct of missions and operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate elements throughout the operational continuum. Unconventional operations include, but are not limited to, a broad spectrum of operations which can be of long duration. UO are conducted by elements organized, trained, equipped, supported, or directed in varying degrees by external sources. UO are characterized by their joint and inter-agency complexion and are either overt, covert, or clandestine. Examples of UO include stability operations; guerrilla warfare; subversion; sabotage; information and intelligence activities; evasion and escape; special reconnaissance; underground operations; auxiliary operations; establishing support systems; establishing command and control systems; and direct action conducted by indigenous or surrogate elements. — JFKSWCS/DOTD Proposal for a New Joint Definition (APR 1999)¹⁸

This catch-all definition combines UW with FID, and it includes SR and DA as subtasks. The only unifying concept is the requirement to accomplish these "sub-missions" *through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate elements*. Some in the SF community have advocated that it is precisely this concept that makes SF unique.¹⁹ While this mantra may be worthy of consideration as SF's core purpose, we are going too far if we attempt to make it a mission. We train our soldiers that a mission includes a task and a purpose. *Through, with, or by indigenous populations* is a method, not a mission.

The proposed definition raises two other issues: future relevance and the need for adequate supporting DTLOMS. Guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and underground and auxiliary operations are taken from the experience of World War II; these kinds of operations are unlikely to be re-fought in the next conflict. Furthermore, by limiting ourselves to operations through, with or by surrogates, we have precluded USSF from conducting UW activities unilaterally. This will significantly limit UW's applicability to the current security environment and UW's relevance for the NCA. Any attempt to conduct covert or clandestine UW operations would be greatly complicated, if not made impossible, by requiring us to work with less reliable surrogates.

Our second concern is with the DTLOMS requirements that would be needed to support unconventional operations. The DTLOMS issue appears when we attempt to implement UO as a doctrinal mission. By including UW, FID, SR, DA and the formerly collateral activities of humanitarian and stability-support operations in UO, we have made it much more difficult to establish priorities.

We have already experienced the consequences of overloading ODAs with requirements to prepare for too many missions. Should we assign an ODA to prepare for UO, as defined above, that ODA would be required to be trained in almost all current SF missions. In times of limited resources, this means that the ODA would become good at none. When everything is a priority, nothing receives priority. Imagine the ODA METL to support UO. And try to envision the TTP manual and the Mission Training Plan to support these "unconventional operations." These concerns are related only to the "training" piece

of DTLOMS. The materiel requirements to support UO are probably an even greater obstacle. We strongly recommend that DOTD reconsider pursuing this addition to our doctrine.

The way forward

Our UW doctrine, designed for scenarios of the 1940s and the 1950s, has little relevance in 1999, and it promises to have even less relevance in the next century. However, the UW core tasks remain relevant. In fact, today's rapidly changing political, economic, social and technological situations have brought new opportunities for UW operations. To capitalize on these changes, we must redefine UW by focusing on its core tasks. The definition proposed earlier is only a start; we must follow up with advances in the remaining DTLOMS so that we refocus the entire force, not just the doctrine writers.

Before we choose to move on, we should be sure of what we are leaving behind. Without its core purpose of UW, SF is adrift. SF requires a renewed focus on UW. Renewing that focus is a tall order, but the alternative is irrelevance.

As we complete this article for publication (spring 1999), we are struck by its relevance to the current events in Kosovo. We are confronted by a situation ripe for UW in the terms of our current doctrine: a large resistance potential (in Kosovo and among the refugees), committed local popular support, a brutal occupying army, bases and sanctuary nearby (Albania), air superiority, and domestic political desire to avoid the commitment of conventional forces. *De Oppresso Liber* comes immediately to mind. ✂

Colonel Gary M. Jones is commander of the 3rd SF Group. His other SF assignments include detachment commander, company commander and



plans officer, 5th SF Group; executive officer, JFK Special Warfare Center and School; company commander and group operations officer, 7th SF Group; executive officer, J3, U.S. Special Operations Command; battalion commander, 3rd SF Group; and deputy chief of staff, U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Colonel Jones is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the Marine Amphibious Warfare School, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. He holds a bachelor's degree in general law from Louisiana State University.

Major Christopher Tone is the executive officer for the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group. Commissioned



through ROTC as an Infantry officer, he has served as an SF detachment commander in the 10th SF Group and as an SF company commander in the 3rd SF Group. His functional areas are 48E, Russian foreign-area officer; and 6Z, strategist. He holds a bachelor's degree in international relations and economics from Tufts University and a master's degree in Russian studies from Harvard University.

Notes:

¹ Colonel R. W. Volckmann, Department of the Army Field Manual 31-21: *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 5 October 1951), p. 2. Although it is not the current practice, this FM has an author clearly identified.

² The catalyst for this debate has been a book that General Peter J. Schoomaker distributed when he was commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. See James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), pp. 73-79.

³ Master Sergeant Brian Duffy, letter to the editor, *Special Warfare* (Winter 1999), p. 43.

⁴ For more on this theme, see Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998). While we do not like Adams' choice of a title or his definition of UW (p. 2), we support his UW focus and most of his conclusions (p. 287). His book is excellent reading and a good place to start for readers who wish to pursue UW study.

⁵ Department of the Army Field Manual 31-21: *Special Forces Operations (U.S. Army Doctrine)* (Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 14 February 1969), p. 3-1.

⁶ Joint Publication 3-05: *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 April 1998), pp. II-6 - II-7.

⁷ Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course, Student Text 31-20-2: *Unconventional Warfare* (Fort Bragg, N.C., July 1998), pp. 1-2 - 1-8.

⁸ ARTEP 31-807-30-MTP: *Mission Training Plan for the Special Forces Company: Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 28 September 1988). See the training and evaluation outlines in Ch. 5, "Task List," pp. 5-2 - 5-4.

⁹ FM 31-20-2: *Unconventional Warfare Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces* (Initial Draft); Fort Bragg, N.C.: USAJFKSWCS, February 1994).

¹⁰ The italicized phrases are taken from the slide presentation delivered in October 1998 by General Schoomaker to his incoming subordinate commanders as his command philosophy.

¹¹ CW3 Michael Ivosevic, "Unconventional Warfare: Redefining the Definition" in *Special Warfare* (Spring 1999), p. 39.

¹² Joint Publication 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (9 October 1998), p. viii.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. I-17.

¹⁴ Joint Publication 3-13.1, *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)* (Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), p. vi.

¹⁵ A 3rd SF Group JCET to Rwanda in the summer of 1998 was ordered to return after the press observed a EUCOM assessment team near the country's western border. The JCET was being conducted in the southeastern part of the country and was focused on peacekeeping tasks.

¹⁶ Department of the Army, FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Army Special Forces Operations* (Initial Draft) (Fort Bragg, N.C.: USAJFKSWCS, December 1998), p. 2-1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, v.

¹⁸ Ivosevic, p. 39.

¹⁹ Colonel Mark D. Boyatt has published three articles in *Special Warfare* on this theme: "Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations" (October 1994); "Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?" (Summer 1998); and "Special Forces Core Purpose: 'What' vs. 'How' " (Winter 1999).

Building Special Forces to Last: Redesigning the Organizational Culture

by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Larry E. Bush Jr.

Future institutional redesigns will change the current organizational structure, manpower requirements and mission profile of Special Forces. But by maintaining its core ideology, SF will be able to function well into the 21st century as a relevant asset of the theater commander in chief, or CINC.

The future fighting force of the United States will look quite different from our military of today. Over the years, the U.S. has seen a gradual movement from a threat-based military structure to a capability-based military structure that can move quickly to anywhere in the world to meet any foe. Shifting the paradigm from a threat-based structure to a capability-based structure is a short trip for SF. The mission profile of SF has always been based on the capabilities of small, autonomous units working independently in support of the objectives of the theater commanders in chief, or CINCs.

SF's basic mission profile will not change for the future. The theater CINC has only two weapons systems capable of striking deep behind enemy lines: airborne platforms and special-operations elements.

Airborne platforms are capable of rapidly deploying and redeploying, using endless configurations of ordinance to engage multiple targets. Airborne platforms can be easily reconfigured and redeployed to support a theater campaign plan.

Special-operations, or SO, elements¹

are not easily reproduced. Nor are they easily reconfigured or maneuverable. However, they do represent one of the CINC's best assets for projecting influence in theater. When used as designed, SO elements can move deep into the theater area of operations and remain there for extended periods of time. With their various functional capabilities, these elements can support the CINC's strategies before, during and after hostilities. SO elements are capable of covering the combat continuum, from deep reconnaissance to Civil Affairs. Each element is designed to operate independently. However, the elements do share a common link: The theater CINC who deploys one of these elements into his area of operations must have the highest level of faith, trust and confidence in that element to assign it against critical targets in his campaign plan. This article will explore that common link in terms of the core ideology, the core values, and the core purpose for which SF units exist.

To understand the concept of building SF to last, we must develop a new perspective of SF elements. Instead of perceiving SF as an asset that performs certain strategic missions, we should perceive the strategic missions as the reason for SF's existence. This approach will emphasize change and evolution over time. Future missions may change, but the foundations that have allowed SF to succeed will remain con-

stant. The single most important constant is the core ideology of SF.

Core ideology

Conceptually, the core ideology of an organization is the philosophical foundation upon which that organization exists. An organization's core ideology changes seldom, if ever. To put this into context, core ideology is the primary element in the development of an organization. Like the founding principles of this nation, as embodied in the Declaration of Independence, an organization's core ideology is built on a set of guiding principles that distinguish that organization from other organizations.

With the signing of the Declaration of Independence, our founding fathers established a core ideology that has not changed in 222 years: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." This simple core ideology is freedom and equality.

It is important to understand that the

core ideology is not affected by external factors. For example, our founding fathers envisioned freedom and equality as timeless ideals that would provide guidance and inspiration to all future generations.

The core ideology of SF is trust. The CINC can trust that SF will accomplish its job with little or no guidance. The core ideology results from the other two elements — core values and core purpose — that enable an organization to build for the future.

Core values

The core values of an organization are its essential and enduring tenets. These are not to be confused with cultural or operating practices, and they are not to be compromised in order to achieve short-term expediency.² Core values can be stated in a number of ways, yet they remain simple, clear, straightforward and powerful. The core values of the Declaration of Independence are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. They have provided this country with a guiding force and direction for more than two centuries.

The enduring values that are pervasive



With his promise, "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship ... to assure the survival and the success of liberty," President John F. Kennedy gave SF its enduring purpose.

Courtesy USASOC archive

in SF are a combination of qualities and capabilities that build trust and that distinguish SF from conventional forces: integrity, maturity, dependability, judgment and adaptability to the environment.

Throughout history, success achieved by a small force against a strategic or operational objective usually has called for a special combination of equipment, training, people and tactics that is not found in conventional units. It is precisely these kinds of resources that have enabled SF to function in unusual ways for which the enemy often was unprepared.

SF's core values are critical in building trust, and all of them will remain a part of the fabric of SF. The absence of any one of the core values will destroy trust and damage SF's credibility. Without credibility, SF will cease to be relevant.

Core purpose

In the 21st century, the relevance of SF will be tied directly to SF's ability to perform unique missions in support of the theater CINC's campaign strategy. Unique missions define the core purpose of SF. By definition, the core purpose of an organization is the organization's fundamental reason for existence. Core purpose is not to be confused with specific goals or strategies.³

The core purpose embodied in the Declaration of Independence preserves the basic human rights of U.S. citizens. When properly conceived, a core purpose is broad, fundamental and enduring. A core purpose should serve to guide and inspire an organization for years.

President John F. Kennedy granted SF its enduring purpose. He stated, "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." This purpose has been the guiding light in the development of SF for almost 40 years.

Over the years, special-operations missions have changed dramatically. In support of the national-defense strategy, SOF are currently organized and trained to conduct nine principal missions. Given their unique capabilities, SOF are also frequent-

ly called upon to perform collateral activities. These activities tend to shift in response to the changing international environment, but our trust must remain unchanged.

The theater CINC must trust that SF units will perform the job they are tasked to do. The security environment, for now and into the foreseeable future, is marked by the lack of a global peer competitor with the capability to militarily challenge the U.S. We will, however, continue to confront a variety of regional dangers. To meet these challenges, SF will continue to provide the U.S. with a combat-ready, highly capable, and flexible force — a force that is structured, manned, equipped and trained to meet current and future security challenges in support of national-defense objectives.

Preserving trust should be the personal mission of every SF soldier. From the soldier on the ground to the CINC, every member must believe that he can trust the other SO members to get the job done. Every SO soldier who is deployed must trust that the other members in his sustaining base will get the job done. This feeling of trust must be pervasive throughout the SF community, flowing up and down the chain of command.

Achieving trust requires a two-pronged strategy: a top-down implementation strategy and a bottom-up implementation strategy.

In the first prong of the strategy, commanders should conduct a survey of their organizations, beginning with the senior leadership, to get a sense of what the organization's members believe to be the core ideology, the core values and the core purpose. This survey can be either a formal or an informal process. The formal process could be conducted by an organization such as the Army Research Institute. The senior leadership could conduct the informal process, or the commander could establish a working group composed of representatives from every level of the organization. The information collected would provide a point of reference for further development of the core ideology.

The next step is to define the future. Pick a time in the future, say 2005, and determine the missions that will be relevant to the theater CINC's campaign plans. The

Special Operations Forces Core Ideology

T	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Think about the soldier • Teach others to do your job • Take a stand – believe in something 	Preparing for the future
R	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respect for others • Reach the objective • Respect is mutual • Responsibility for subordinates 	This must be earned – not demanded
U	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand the mission • Use every asset available • Ultimately believe in mission success 	Requirements for mission success
S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the soldier • Stick with the mission 	Building the total fighting force
T	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tell the truth – ALWAYS • Treat others with dignity • Try new things 	Building credibility

relevant missions now become the future purpose of the organization. Determine which values in the present will support the development of the relevant missions of the future. These become the core values. The core values and the core purpose form a central conceptual idea: the core ideology.

Redesigning the core ideology of an organization is not an easy undertaking. Such lofty objectives are usually dismissed by lesser organizations. However, the most successful organizations in this country routinely accept and even cherish “big hairy audacious goals.”⁴ Clear and compelling goals serve as unifying focal points of effort – often creating immense team spirit. Clear goals have a clear finish line, so the organization can know when it has achieved its objective. Redesigning the core ideology of SF is itself a big hairy audacious goal: one that will inspire the members of the organization to achieve success and that will promote cohesion. The point is, people must have a reason or a purpose for wanting to belong to an organization.

They need an objective or a flag to rally around.

During the next step, senior commanders should produce a video to express the desired changes in the core philosophy. As part of the total-force concept, every member of the organization, including civilians, should view the video. Afterward, commanders should employ a concept known as management by walking around — making themselves visible and accessible.⁵

In the second prong of the strategy, organizations should encourage all of their members to promote efficiency and ideas that are relevant in accomplishing desired objectives. Commanders should use all available media forms as a means of encouraging personnel and promoting change. Symbols of the new cultural change, such as posters and signs, should be visible to every member of the organization. Customers at the point of service could fill out short customer-service surveys, indicating satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the service provided by the organization.

Surveys would provide continuous feedback of the changing culture. Divisions, sections or units that achieve continually high customer-satisfaction ratings could be rewarded with incentive awards or commendations.

As a culture changes, an interesting social phenomenon emerges. Organizational members who embrace new ideological concepts and who have similar beliefs will grow and prosper within their organization. Members who have opposing values and ideals will find it increasingly more difficult to work within that environment. They will find themselves isolated and, ultimately, unable to continue working for their organization.

In conclusion, SF will continue to be a relevant force for theater CINCs in the 21st century. The goal of the SF commander is to support the theater CINCs, ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies. To achieve this goal, the SF commander must prepare his forces to conduct the entire spectrum of special operations, including Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.⁶ In addition, the SF commander must ensure that trust is the capstone of development throughout the SF community.

The need to develop a core ideology applies to all services, and the procedures for accomplishing this task are the same for any organization. The key is to define and to codify what makes an organization unique or important to its customer. For SF, the one simple element is trust. The trust chart shows some of the elements necessary for building trust. Trust and respect are commodities that must be earned; they are directly linked to credibility. Losing credibility will destroy a unit's effectiveness on the battlefield, and, ultimately, that unit will become an irrelevant wartime factor. ✕

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Larry E. Bush Jr. is assigned to the 3rd SF Group. His 24 years of active military service include assignments in the 82nd Airborne Division, the 10th SF Group, the 7th SF Group and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He is a graduate of the SF Qualification Course, the Defense Language Institute, the SF Operations and Intelligence Sergeant Course, the warrant officer basic and advanced courses, and the Army Management Staff College. Mr. Bush holds an associate's degree from Mount Wachusett Community College and a bachelor of science degree from Fayetteville State University, and he is pursuing a master's degree in business administration.



Notes:

¹ A special-operations element is the smallest combat force of a special-operations unit. For Army Special Forces, this is called an A-detachment, which consists of 12 men. For the Navy SEALs, it might be a platoon, as it would be for the Army Rangers.

² James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies*. (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 73-76.

³ Collins and Porras, pp. 73-76.

⁴ Collins and Porras, pp. 94-96.

⁵ James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, *The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organization* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987), pp. 200-201. MBWA is a standard operating procedure in many companies, because it ensures that managers are visible to their employees. Visibility enhances accessibility.

⁶ Posture Statement, United States Special Operations Forces, 1998, General Peter J. Schoomaker, CINC, United States Special Operations Command, p. 4.

Army Values

Duty

Russell Volckmann

Russell Volckmann put duty to his country ahead of his own personal safety. In April 1942, Major Volckmann, one of the defenders of the Bataan peninsula in the Philippines, refused to surrender when Bataan fell to the Japanese. He joined with a few other American Army officers, infiltrated Japanese lines, and linked up with Philippine guerrillas in the mountains of northern Luzon. There he helped organize five regiments of guerrillas that totalled some 20,000 Filipinos and Americans. He helped lead the guerrillas in a desperate war against the Japanese, tying down divisions that otherwise might have invaded Australia. Because of the courage of the Philippine guerrilla force, General Douglas MacArthur found little resistance to his landing at Lingayen Gulf in October 1944.

With the landing of conventional forces, Volckmann's partisans became part of the U.S. 6th Army. They provided support to other units and continued to work behind enemy lines. For his bravery and leadership in the Philippines, Volckmann received the Bronze Star, the Silver Star, the Distinguished Service Cross, and numerous Philippine decorations.

After World War II, Volckmann developed the doctrine and the policies of U.S. unconventional-warfare forces, worked to establish a special-warfare directorate within the Army general staff, and helped activate the first Special Forces unit at Fort Bragg, N.C. — *Dr. Richard Stewart*



Courtesy USASOC archive

Russell Volckmann, developer of the Army's early doctrine and policies of unconventional warfare.

Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the Needs of the Force in 2020

*by Michelle M. Zazanis, Robert N. Kilcullen, Michael G. Sanders
and Doe Ann Crocker*

Both the selection process and the training process designed for Special Forces, or SF, are inextricably linked to the requirements of the job that SF must accomplish. To meet the selection-and-training needs of SF for the year 2020, we must establish what the job requirements will be at that time.

As we begin, we should examine the current job requirements and determine how they might change by 2020. If the job requirements are projected to change, the selection process (Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS) would probably also change. SFAS is the three-week program that SF candidates must attend prior to attending the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC.

In the event that the job requirements change, the training process (SFQC) may also need to change. To explore these issues, the U.S. Army Research Institute, or ARI, and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, are collaborating on a project, the SF Pipeline Review.

Previous research analyzed the SF job requirements and identified 11 SF roles that encompass 26 basic performance categories.¹ The roles

and the performance categories are shown on the facing page.

Job requirements

We have linked the job requirements to 29 attributes that are critical to the SF soldier's effective performance (see chart on pg. 24). SF subject-matter experts, or SMEs, ranked these attributes in order of their overall importance to SF, with lower numbers indicating greater importance. The next five columns show the relative importance of the attributes within each SF military occupational specialty. Although all 29 attributes are important, the more important an attribute, the more critical it is that that attribute be included in the SFAS or the SFQC.

Because the current selection and training processes were developed prior to the compilation of the critical attributes, one of the Pipeline Review's first tasks was to determine the extent to which the 29 attributes are currently being assessed.

Mapping the pipeline

The initial question is whether the SFAS and the SFQC are producing soldiers who have the attributes required for successful perform-

ance on the SF operational detachment-alpha, or ODA. Although the SFAS and the SFQC have produced thousands of high-quality soldiers over the years, and while both processes seem to be meeting the needs of the force, some of the critical attributes being assessed may have increased in importance. For this reason, we may need to improve our selection and training processes.

To examine the question, we have chosen three methods:

First, we collected ratings from the SMEs who operate SFAS and the SFQC. SFAS SMEs were asked the following questions: To what extent are the listed attributes being assessed? How likely is it that a candidate who scores low on an attribute could still complete the SFAS program?

SFQC SMEs were asked the following questions: To what extent are the attributes required during training? How likely is it that a candidate who scores low on an attribute could still complete the SFQC?

Second, we reviewed research that has identified predictors of success in SFAS and in the SFQC. If an attribute has been identified statistically as a predictor of success in either SFAS or the SFQC,

Special Forces Roles and Performance Categories

ROLE	PERFORMANCE CATEGORIES
Teacher	A. Teaching others
Diplomat	B. Building and maintaining effective relationships with indigenous populations C. Handling difficult interpersonal or intercultural situations D. Using and enhancing own language skills
Professional	E. Contributing to the team effort and morale F. Demonstrating initiative and extra effort G. Displaying honesty and integrity
Planner	H. Planning and preparing for missions I. Making decisions
Soldier/Survivor	J. Confronting physical and environmental challenges K. Navigating in the field L. Troubleshooting and solving problems M. Being safety conscious N. Administering first aid and treating casualties
Administrator	O. Handling administrative duties
Weapons expert	P. Operating and maintaining direct-fire weapons Q. Employing indirect-fire weapons and techniques
Engineer	R. Employing demolitions techniques S. Construction for mission-related requirements
Communications	T. Following communication procedures and policies U. Assembling and operating commo equipment
Medic	V. Evaluating and treating medical conditions and injuries W. Determining and administering medications and dosages X. Ensuring standards of health-related facilities, conditions, and procedures
Leader	Y. Considering subordinates Z. Providing direction

then that program would require a measurable amount of that attribute. If an attribute has not been identified as a predictor of success, then the SFAS or the SFQC does not require a measurable amount of that attribute.

In the third method, we will survey members of SF ODAs to find out whether new SF soldiers are demon-

strating adequate proficiency in the critical attributes.

SME ratings

A prospective SF soldier must meet certain prerequisites before he can attend SFAS: The candidate must have achieved a minimum score of 206 on the Army Physical

Fitness Test, or APFT; he must have achieved a minimum score of 100 on the General/Technical, or GT, of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or ASVAB; he must have achieved the minimum rank of specialist/corporal; and his Uniform Code of Military Justice, or UCMJ, history must have been reviewed.

Critical Special Forces Performance Attributes

ATTRIBUTE	OVERALL	18A	18B	18C	18D	18E	CHANGE	REASON
Physical Fitness								
Swimming	26	26	25	26	27	27	None	
Physical flexibility and balance	24	25	22	24	25	23	None	
Physical strength	17	23	15	12	22	10	None	
Physical endurance	7	12	10	10	15	4	None	
Cognitive								
Judgment and decision-making ability	3	1	2	3	3	14	Increase	Problem-solving
Planning ability	12	4	15	16	16	20	None	
Adaptability	5	6	3	8	12	5	Increase	Problem-solving
Creativity	13	17	14	7	12	16	Increase	Problem-solving
Auditory ability	29	29	29	29	28	1	None	
Mechanical ability	28	28	18	6	29	13	None	
Spatial ability	11	20	8	12	21	11	None	
Perceptual ability	27	27	28	25	23	12	None	
Basic mathematical ability	21	24	26	1	9	15	None	
Language ability	20	22	21	23	18	22	Increase	Diplomatic role
Reading ability	18	14	19	18	2	16	None	
Personality/Interpersonal								
Diplomacy/persuasiveness	16	2	20	22	10	25	Increase	Diplomatic role
Cultural/interpersonal adaptability	6	11	12	14	6	21	Increase	Diplomatic role
Ability to motivate	19	16	17	19	23	26	Increase	Diplomatic role
Autonomy	10	18	7	11	3	8	None	
Team player	1	7	3	4	8	6	None	
Dependability	3	9	1	2	5	2	None	
Initiative	8	14	6	8	6	7	None	
Perseverance	9	13	13	15	14	3	None	
Moral courage	14	9	11	17	19	18	None	
Supervisory ability	23	18	24	21	26	29	None	
Maturity	2	2	3	5	1	8	Increase	Diplomatic role
Communication								
Communication ability	15	4	9	20	17	18	Increase	Diplomatic role
Writing ability	25	7	27	27	19	23	None	
Nonverbal communication ability	22	21	23	28	10	28	Increase	Diplomatic role

NOTE: 1. Attributes are ranked numerically according to their importance to overall SF mission and to each MOS. Lower values indicate greater importance.

2. Expected change in importance of attribute and reason for change are listed in last two columns of chart.

These prerequisites directly measure the following attributes: physical strength and physical endurance (through the APFT); basic mathematical ability and reading ability (through the ASVAB GT score); and moral courage (through the UCMJ history). These prerequisites may also offer limited indirect measures of three other attributes: maturity (through the rank restriction), initiative and perseverance (given that applying for SFAS is voluntary and requires effort to complete paperwork and to meet the APFT requirements).

Next, the SF candidate must attend SFAS. Ratings collected from 24 SFAS cadre and board members indicated that the attributes most extensively assessed in SFAS are the physical-fitness attributes. Other attributes that are highly assessed include spatial ability and team-player qualities,

perseverance and maturity. As shown in the chart below, SFAS provides “many” or “several” opportunities to assess nine of the 10 most important attributes. The one exception is cultural/interpersonal adaptability, with only one or two opportunities for assessment. With regard to all 29 attributes, SFAS SMEs perceived the set of communication attributes as having a low overall level of opportunity for assessment.


Responses from SFAS cadre and board members reflected different perceptions on some attributes. Most notably, the board members demonstrated more confidence than the cadre regarding SFAS’s ability to identify soldiers with low levels of adaptability, creativity, supervisory ability, perseverance, and maturity. Disagreement among the SMEs as to the level of assessment for a specific attribute may indicate that assessments of

that attribute are insufficient.

Responses from the field phases of the SFQC indicated that some of the attributes that are not highly assessed in SFAS, such as judgment and decision-making ability; planning ability; supervisory ability; oral communication ability; and nonverbal communication ability, become more critical during Phase I of the SFQC. This suggests that soldiers are being evaluated in these attributes, and that they are receiving feedback to improve their weaknesses. Of the 10 attributes listed as most critical for success in SF, only one, cultural adaptability, is not required during Phase I.

SME responses indicated that all SFQC MOS courses and the officer course require high levels of the physical-fitness attributes except for swimming. Oral communication ability, writing ability and nonverbal communication ability are among the attributes

Assessment Opportunities of the 10 Most Critical Attributes



NOTE: 1. Results are based on the ratings by SFAS cadre and SFAS board members of the 10 most critical attributes required of SF.
2. Results of cultural/interpersonal adaptability attribute are based on a subset of these raters.

that are required least. Although adaptability, creativity, judgment and decision-making ability, and planning ability are rated as moderately required, the medical course and the officer course report somewhat higher requirements for these attributes. The MOS courses require particularly high levels of reading ability and initiative. And some attributes are particularly relevant for a specific specialty (for example, perceptual ability for medical specialists; and auditory ability and language ability for communications specialists).

Robin Sage, the final exercise of the SFQC, requires all of the attributes except swimming and language ability. Despite the fact that Phase III requires such a high number of the attributes, the SME ratings suggested that soldiers who receive low scores in certain critical attributes may still pass Phase III and graduate from the SFQC. SME ratings suggested a 51- to 80-percent chance that a soldier could pass Phase III even if he had received low scores on adaptability, creativity, supervisory ability, initiative, maturity, and on the set of communication attributes.

This does not suggest that the soldiers who are graduating are typically scoring low in these specific attributes. Rather, it suggests that *even if* candidates do score low in these attributes, and if they pass Phase I and Phase II, there is a possibility that they will graduate from the SFQC. In the future, we may need to investigate whether high scores in one attribute can compensate for low scores in another attribute. For the current project, however, the results of the survey of ODA SMEs should provide additional information as to whether soldiers who have received low assessments in cer-

tain attributes are actually entering the ODAs.

Predictors of success

The second method of determining the extent to which the selection and training processes assess critical SF attributes is to examine the statistical predictors of success in both SFAS and the SFQC. Research suggests that the strongest predictors of performance in the SFAS are the physical measures (including the APFT and pullups)² and the measures of Army experience (including Ranger qualification,³ combat-arms-branch type,^{4,5} and airborne qualification^{6,7}).

It is not clear which attributes are measured by the Army-experience variables, but it is likely that these variables indirectly measure an individual's initiative, perseverance and maturity. In addition, while the APFT is clearly a measure of one's physical strength and physical endurance, it may also provide an indirect measure of initiative and perseverance, given that soldiers who prepare for an event ahead of time and achieve a high score on it must have demonstrated those attributes.

Cognitive and personality measures have not been shown to predict success in SFAS. For example, when a group of enlisted non-Ranger candidates were evaluated using 34 measures (cognitive, personality, and physical-fitness attributes as well as other demographic information), the candidates' APFT scores were the best predictors of SFAS selection.⁸

Statistical results relating to the top 10 attributes demonstrated that physical endurance was the only attribute measured directly, and that initiative and perseverance are possibly measured indi-


rectly. The relative importance of the physical, motivational and cognitive predictors of success in SFAS is illustrated in the chart on the facing page.

For the most part, the statistical results corresponded to the ratings provided by the SFAS SMEs. The statistical results and the SME ratings indicated that the physical-fitness attributes are the most highly assessed attributes in SFAS, and that there are fewer opportunities to measure the cognitive and personality attributes. The statistical results, however, suggested a lower level of measurement for cognitive and personality attributes than did the ratings provided by the SMEs.

Measuring personality attributes is more difficult than measuring physical attributes. Two of the mechanisms that SFAS uses to measure personality attributes are cadre evaluations and peer evaluations. Recent analyses suggested that the peer evaluations (provided by the SFAS candidates) are the best predictors of an individual's performance in SFQC.⁹ The SFAS candidates evaluate their peers in three areas: (1) interpersonal skills, which encompass team-player qualities, maturity, and possibly cultural/interpersonal adaptability; (2) leadership, which encompasses judgment and decision-making ability; and (3) effort/motivation, which encompasses initiative, perseverance and possibly dependability. If these measures are such strong predictors of success in SFQC, it is conceivable that they could be given more weight in making SFAS selection decisions.

The experience variables are logical predictors of success in the SFQC, given that some of the candidates would have acquired similar knowledge and skills prior to attending SFQC. With respect to

Comparison of Testing and Evaluation Methods for SFAS



NOTE: 1. Results represent percentage of soldiers selected in SFAS and are based on sample of enlisted non-Rangers from five SFAS classes in FY96 and FY97.
2. APFT failures are removed from the sample.

cognitive variables, research has been equivocal; however, it appears that general aptitude is a predictor of success among the low-experience soldiers (e.g., E4s with non-combat arms backgrounds).¹⁰ Other than the peer-evaluation research, there has been little research published regarding the prediction of SFQC performance based on the personality attributes.

A-detachment ratings

In our final method, we will survey experienced soldiers on SF ODAs regarding two questions: What percentage of new soldiers coming to SF teams demonstrate adequate proficiency with respect to the critical attributes? How difficult is it for teams to remedy shortfalls in each attribute, if they occur? We plan to collect this information as part of the 1999 U.S. Army Special Forces Command Field Survey,

which will be distributed in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1999.

Summary

Results of the SME surveys indicated that SFAS provides a high level of assessment regarding the set of physical-fitness attributes, a moderate level of assessment regarding the cognitive and personality attributes, and a low level of assessment regarding the set of communication attributes. Results from the SFQC SME surveys suggested that nearly all of the 29 attributes are used during Robin Sage. Results also suggested that cultural/interpersonal adaptability, although rated as one of the top 10 attributes, is not required until Phase III of the SFQC. Responses also indicated that the set of communication attributes are not highly required until Phase III. This implies that opportunities for pro-

viding feedback and training to soldiers or for removing soldiers who are unsuitable in the communication attributes are minimal prior to Phase III. Examining these attributes earlier in the pipeline might be advisable, given their importance to performance on SF ODAs.

Once the ODA surveys have been completed, we will use the information to determine whether a modification is necessary. The results will also indicate whether we are meeting the current needs of the ODAs. Then, we will determine what changes will have to be made in the SFAS and in the SFQC in order to meet the needs of the future.

Changing for the future

The 1999 Special Forces Branch Conference in April included a symposium designed to determine how SFAS and SFQC need to

change in order to meet the needs of the future. In dealing with this issue, we must not only determine the attributes that future SF soldiers will need, we must also determine the tactical and technical skills that our future SF soldiers will need. The methodology used here to identify the necessary attributes could also be used to identify changes needed in SF tactical and technical skills.

There are three basic steps in determining the changes needed for the missions of the future: First, we must determine the performance requirements of the future or changes in the relative importance of the current performance requirements. Next, we must determine how these performance requirements will affect the attributes required for successful performance. Finally, to ensure that the attributes critical for the future will be selected or trained, we must determine what changes need to be made to SFAS or SFQC.

Identifying requirements

First, we must determine how the performance requirements for the future will be different from those of today. In the Fall 1998 issue of *Special Warfare*, Major General Kenneth Bowra and Colonel William Harris discussed the concept of the Regional Engagement Force, or REF. The REF is a proposal for implementing preventive defense through peacetime engagement. It is an interagency operational concept that focuses on military information-gathering activities and proactive measures to influence the conditions in a given region of the world. The REF comprises three purposes: providing situational awareness for the region; developing war avoidance; and preparing the battlefield. A corresponding sol-

dier role was identified for each purpose: *global scout* — gathers human-intelligence information; *strategic shaper* — executes plans developed to defuse potential crises; and *operational combat outpost* — provides a forward military presence that can shape the battlespace to provide favorable conditions.

We used the REF concept as a basis for identifying changes in SF performance requirements for the future. According to the ideas expressed in the REF article and the discussions held during the 1999 SF Branch Conference symposium on REF, we expect some of the performance categories to become more important in the future.

Specifically, the REF concept emphasizes a continuing and expanding role for regional orientation; a greater level of interagency work; and the increasing importance of diplomacy-related functions, such as building and maintaining effective relations with indigenous populations, handling difficult interpersonal or intercultural situations, and using or enhancing language skills. Operating continuously in the turbulence of the multinational and interagency environment, the concurrent global-scout, strategic-shaper and operational-combat-outpost functions would also create a greater need for flexibility and problem-solving. Other performance requirements are expected to remain largely the same.

Identifying changes

Second, we must link the changes in performance requirements to the changes in the attributes. Given the changes in performance requirements for the REF concept, some of the 29 critical attributes may become more or less important; and new attributes

may have to be added to the selection-and-training processes.

The chart on critical SF performance attributes shows the attributes that are expected to contribute highly to the diplomatic and problem-solving functions in the future. For the diplomatic role, the attributes include language ability, cultural/interpersonal adaptability, ability to motivate, maturity, oral communication ability and nonverbal communication ability. For problem-solving, the attributes include judgment and decision-making ability; adaptability; and creativity.


Modifying SFAS, SFQC

Third, we must determine the changes that need to be made to SFAS or to SFQC to ensure that we are selecting and training the attributes that will be required for success in the future. In meeting this goal, we have to decide whether the change should be made to selection or to training. Two issues must be considered: the trainability of the attribute, and the characteristics of the incoming population with respect to that attribute. While some attributes may be very trainable, others may be difficult, if not impossible, to train. A panel of six SME psychologists rated the trainability of the 29 critical attributes. The chart on the facing page shows the results.


Physical-fitness attributes tend to be highly trainable; communication attributes are somewhat trainable; and cognitive and personality attributes tend to be the least trainable. On the basis of this classification, adaptability, creativity, and judgment and decision-making ability appear to be the least trainable, while the set of communication attributes and cultural/interpersonal adaptability are listed as more trainable.

Trainability Ratings of Critical Attributes


PHYSICAL FITNESS ATTRIBUTES




PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES




COGNITIVE SKILLS




COMMUNICATION SKILLS



COGNITIVE ATTRIBUTES



INTERPERSONAL ATTRIBUTES



ATTRIBUTES LEGEND

- | | |
|---|--|
| A. Swimming | O. Reading ability |
| B. Physical flexibility and balance | P. Diplomacy/persuasiveness |
| C. Physical strength | Q. Cultural/interpersonal adaptability |
| D. Physical Endurance | R. Autonomy |
| E. Judgment and decision-making ability | S. Team player |
| F. Planning ability | T. Dependability |
| G. Adaptability | U. Initiative |
| H. Creativity | V. Perseverance |
| I. Auditory ability | W. Moral courage |
| J. Mechanical ability | X. Supervisory ability |
| K. Spatial ability | Y. Maturity |
| L. Perceptual ability | Z. Communication ability |
| M. Basic mathematical ability | AA. Writing ability |
| N. Language ability | BB. Nonverbal communication ability |

The second issue is the characteristics of the incoming soldiers, and how those characteristics may or may not change. For example, language ability may increase in importance, but if future Army recruits are more likely to be multilingual, then no change may be necessary. This second issue requires further research. We do know that with the military's difficulty in meeting its recruiting goals and with the Army's shrinking population, we can expect to have more difficulty in attracting soldiers to Special Forces. If the demand for SF soldiers already exceeds the supply, then improving the training process, as opposed to raising the selection gates, appears to be the preferred course of action.

Conclusions

Using the current REF concept as a basis, we can identify two performance areas that are expected to become even more critical for SF in the future: diplomatic functions and problem-solving. Other performance requirements, such as planning, preparing and executing missions, and confronting physical challenges, remain largely the same.

According to our assessment, language ability, cultural/interpersonal adaptability, motivation, maturity, oral communication ability and nonverbal communication ability may become more critical in enabling soldiers to perform diplomatic functions. In addition, judgment and decision-making ability and creativity may become more critical in enabling soldiers to solve problems in increasingly turbulent, ambiguous and complex situations.

It is uncertain how long the current difficulty in filling the force will continue, but it is prudent to assume that it will continue, and we should plan accordingly. To

begin with, we could adopt a strategy that would maximize the amount of training we provide in the pipeline and minimize the amount of selection we perform. Such an orientation on training could provide the greatest gains in areas such as the communication attributes and cultural/interpersonal adaptability. Although training might not provide as much gain in areas such as judgment and decision-making ability, and creativity, the strategy may be worth pursuing nevertheless.

Finally, it may not be necessary that *each* soldier be extremely strong in *each* area (for example, creativity or language ability), as long as some of the soldiers on the ODA demonstrate the required strengths in these areas. This team-level approach is a critical area for future investigation. The results of the 1999 field survey will be instructive in determining whether there are currently any notable shortfalls in the attributes of soldiers entering ODAs.

Planning for the future is a difficult process. While it is important that we envision the future and forecast necessary changes in the SFAS/SFQC pipeline, it is also important that we approach our planning in a calculated, systematic manner in order to prevent haphazard and unnecessary changes. ✕

Michelle M. Zazanis is a member of the Organization and Personnel Resources Research Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, located in Alexandria, Va. Since she joined ARI in 1991, Dr. Zazanis has worked on a variety of research projects involving the selection and



training of SF soldiers. She has worked to develop the training program for SF Assessment and Selection cadre, new peer-evaluation systems for both SFAS and the SF Qualification Course, longitudinal SFAS-SFQC databases, and a variety of performance and manpower modeling analyses. She holds a BA in psychology from the University of Virginia and an MA and Ph.D. in industrial/organizational psychology from George Mason University.

Robert Kilcullen is a research psychologist in the Organization and Personnel Resources Research Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Since joining ARI 10 years ago, Dr. Kilcullen has developed measures of leadership potential, work motivation, adaptability, and personal integrity that have been validated for predicting job performance and other outcomes in the SF, conventional Army, and DA-civilian communities. He has also developed command-climate and values-climate surveys and administered them to various Army units. Dr. Kilcullen has written numerous scientific papers and has made several presentations at professional conferences and to representatives of foreign countries. He received a BA in psychology from the University of Pennsylvania and a Ph.D. in industrial/organizational psychology from George Mason University.



Mike Sanders has served as chief of the Fort Bragg office of the Army Research Institute since July 1994. He and other ARI psychologists provide research support to the SOF community on topics that address the life cycle of the soldier, including recruiting, assessment and selection, training and reten-

tion. He began service in the Army at Fort Rucker, Ala., as an active-duty aviation psychologist at the Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory. At the Fort Rucker ARI Field Unit, his research continued on aviator selection, screening, training, performance assessment, and retention. Dr. Sanders has also served as chief of the ARI field unit at Fort Gordon, Ga., where his unit performed research on training-technology enhancements for Signal soldiers. He holds a master's and a doctorate in experimental psychology, with an emphasis on human factors.

Doe Ann Crocker is the statistician for the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. For the last eight years, she has managed the USAJFKSWCS Research Database. She is a graduate of the Women's Executive Leadership Program and holds a BA in biology and a master's degree in business administration from the University of Missouri-St. Louis.



cullen and M.G. Sanders, *Prescreening Methods for Special Forces Assessment and Selection* [ARI Technical Report 1094] (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1999).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Brooks, "Special Forces recruitment."

⁸ R.N. Kilcullen, G. Chen, F. Brown and M.M. Zazanis, *Identifying High Quality Special Forces Candidates* (Unpublished ARI research report).

⁹ M.M. Zazanis, *Special Forces Qualification Course Longitudinal Database: FY95-FY97* [ARI database] (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1998).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Notes:

¹ T.L. Russell, J.L. Crafts, F.A. Tagliareni, R.A. McCloy and P. Barkley, *Job Analysis of Special Forces Jobs* [ARI Research Note 96-76] (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1994).

² R.N. Kilcullen, G. Chen and S.T. Simsarian, "Selection Measures for Special Forces," in J.E. Brooks and M.M. Zazanis (eds.), *Enhancing U.S. Army Special Forces: Research and Applications* [ARI Special Report 33] (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1997).

³ J.E. Brooks, "Special Forces Recruitment and Manpower Planning," in J.E. Brooks and M.M. Zazanis (eds.), *Enhancing U.S. Army Special Forces: Research and Applications* [ARI Special Report 33] (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1997).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ M.M. Zazanis, G.A. Hazlett, R.N. Kil-

The History of the 1st Special Service Force Air Detachment

by Ray Cart

Although much has been written about the 1st Special Service Force, the Canadian-American special-operations unit that served during World War II, little coverage has been given to the training and activities of the 1st SSF Air Detachment.

My association with the Air Detachment began on Sept. 15, 1942, when War Department Special Orders #250 assigned Second Lieutenants Jean Daly, Eben S. Lapworth, Orville B. Verdery and Richard R. Cart to the 1st Special Service Force, headquartered at Fort William Henry Harrison, near Helena, Mont. At the time, the four of us were assigned to the 56th Fighter Group, headquartered at Bendix, N.J., and were flying P-47s. Once we received the orders, we set out across country in Jean Daly's car and arrived in Helena seven or eight days later.

After arriving in Helena, we met four other pilots who were assigned to the 1st SSF: Lieutenants Hubbard, Montgomery, Champion and Jarrett. We were evidently their replacements, because the next day, they were gone. When we reported to Fort Harrison, we were told to go to the municipal airport and report to the Air Detachment. Commanded by Captain James W. Bennett, the Air Detachment had three other pilots: Lieutenants Charles

Raus, Brandon Rimmer and Ernest Kelly. First Lieutenant Richard V. Brattain was also assigned to the Air Detachment, but he was not a pilot.

The Air Detachment also contained approximately 20 enlisted personnel: Technical Sergeant Robert A. Broadbelt, Staff Sergeant William H. Beck, Staff Sergeant Francis L. Daly, Staff Sergeant Leslie P. Rogers, Sergeant Jack D. Cassini, Sergeant Norman W. Champagne, Sergeant Richard L. Culver, Corporal Neno L. Paolini, Private Harold L. Finkelshtein, Technical Sergeant Anthony G. Burich, Staff Sergeant Howard R. Martin, Staff Sergeant Robert W. Smith, Staff Sergeant Vernon W. Webb, Sergeant Rex E. Fogleman, Sergeant Wallace A. Cook, Sergeant Russell E. Waid Jr., and Private Fred R. Gray Jr.

There were two other sergeants, one whose last name was Harris, and one whose first name was Jake.

The Air Detachment's equipment consisted of two C-47s (used for parachute jumps and for hauling equipment); two Cessna C-78s (small twin-engine, five-passenger planes used for transporting personnel and light equipment); two Stinson L-9Bs (small two-seater planes with dual controls, used for reconnaissance and for transporting personnel); one L-74 (a powerful, highly stable, high-winged mono-



plane that flew very slowly and landed very slowly — used for reconnaissance and for flying in and out of airfields that had short runways).

Colonel Frederick, the 1st SSF's commanding officer, was a precise but fair man. He promoted every one of us after we arrived at Fort Harrison.

The Air Detachment's duties consisted of flying the planes during jump training; performing reconnaissance work for the 1st SSF; transporting personnel and equipment; and generally making ourselves useful in every way possible. Our organization was loose-knit. We were required to do certain things on schedule, but when nothing was scheduled, we were permitted to fly as often as we wished, in order to maintain our proficiency. We lived to fly, and we kept the planes ready at all times.

Once we received a call from the governor of Montana. There had been a mine accident in his state, and several miners were trapped. The governor had called in

rescue teams from other places and needed to get them to the scene as rapidly as possible. He asked us to pick up the rescue teams at the airport in Billings and fly them to Butte. We were in the air almost immediately. The teams were waiting for us at the Billings airport, and we flew them to Butte, where emergency vehicles were waiting to take them to the scene. We learned later that all of the miners died in the accident, but we had done our best.

Although we supported the 1st SSF, we had little contact with the troops, and we never knew who was in the group. When the troops were scheduled to jump, we flew from the airport to Fort Harrison to pick them up, or they arrived at the airport in trucks. They usually loaded immediately into the cargo bay; we took off, flew to the drop zone, and out they went. When we were off duty, the troops were generally on training missions, so even our off-duty contact with them was limited.

At first, the 1st SSF intended that the



Members of the 1st Special Service Force practice exiting a C-47 during their training at Fort William Henry Harrison, near Helena, Mont.

National Archives

Members of the 1st Special Service Force take jump training at Fort William Henry Harrison, near Helena, Mont.



National Archives

pilots would receive the same training as the troops, and that the pilots would accompany the troops to their intended destinations. Our training was supposed to have included parachute training. But the plan was later changed, and the idea of extra training for the pilots was dropped. We did, however, receive training in hand-to-hand combat from Pat O'Neil, a civilian judo expert who was hired to train the 1st SSF. Pat was the best in his field and was a nice guy. Pat and I became close friends, and when he married a girl from Helena, he asked me to be his best man.

All went well with our training until Dec. 21, 1942. That afternoon, Orville Verdery and a Lieutenant Mansfield took off in a Stinson L-9B. They did not return that day, and the next morning they were reported missing. We began a search

from the air early that morning, and at about 11:30 a.m., Eben Lapworth and I located the plane and landed nearby to investigate. The plane had crashed into the side of a mountain just outside Fort Harrison. It had been demolished in the crash, and both men were evidently killed instantly. There were no witnesses to the crash, and I do not know what kind of mission the two soldiers were on, but they certainly gave everything that day. There were no other deaths during our training.

Early in January 1943, the 1st SSF traveled east to Camp Bradford, near Norfolk, Va., for training with the Navy in marine landings. The Air Detachment went to Langley Field, Va., and waited for the rest of the force to complete its training. The 1st SSF then went to Fort Ethan

Allen, Vt., near Burlington, Vt., for mountain training in the Green Mountains and in the White Mountains. The Air Detachment's duties there were the same as in Helena, and we were based at the municipal airport in Burlington, too. Our planes were the same, except that we no longer had the two Stinson L-9Bs.

While we were in Vermont, we received orders to equip the Air Detachment for operations overseas. I was in charge of requisitioning, and I acquired a large gasoline tanker truck, a tractor and trailer, and 10 crates of aircraft mechanic's tools for maintaining our aircraft in a war zone. The tools were sealed in large wooden crates for overseas shipment. All our efforts proved to be for nothing. When the 1st SSF left for Europe, the Air Detachment and all its equipment were left behind. Of the Air Detachment's pilots and ground crew, only Lieutenant Rimmer accompanied the 1st SSF when it left Burlington. Rimmer remained with the 1st SSF as late as the Italian campaign, but he was not with it when it was disbanded Dec. 5, 1944.

After the 1st SSF left Burlington, it was my job to return all of the equipment to the air depot at Grenier Field, N.H. The sergeant there said that the equipment was expendable and that he did not want it back. The equipment was already in the depot yard, so I left. I don't know what happened to the equipment, but I know I returned it, and my conscience is clear.

The Air Detachment remained at Fort Ethan Allen for two months with no duties. In July 1943 the Air Detachment of the 1st SSF was officially disbanded, and its members were reassigned to various units in the Army Air Corps.

The members of the Air Detachment were highly trained, and they were excellent soldiers. I am sure that wherever they went, they were a credit to their assignment. I would love to know how they fared.

This, then, describes the Air Detachment of the 1st SSF. We did what was asked of us, and when we were released, we accepted our lot with no questions asked. As far as I know, I am the only member of the Air Detachment to have participated in 1st

SSF functions. We respected the 1st SSF then and now, and I feel honored to have been affiliated with such a great and proud outfit. ✂

Ray Cart is president of the 1st Special Service Force Association. He entered the Army Air Corps in September 1941. Cart received his primary, basic and advanced pilot training and was assigned to Mitchell Field, N.Y., and Bendix Field, N.J., prior to his service with the 1st Special Service Force. Following the disbanding of the 1st SSF Air Detachment, he was assigned to the Air Technical Service Command. Discharged from the Army Air Corps in 1946, he worked in sales until his retirement in 1982. A native of Iota, La., he is a 1941 graduate of Louisiana State University. He lives in Crowley, La.

Special Forces at West Point: Planting the Seed

by Major Rich Young

Recruiting in the United States Army and in Special Forces, or SF, is becoming increasingly more difficult because of three factors: (1) A smaller Army population due to post-Cold War downsizing; (2) A generation of Americans who are not familiar with or interested in serving in the armed forces; and (3) Competition with the economic sector for personnel who have specialized technological skills.

Given these formidable recruiting challenges, SF must work harder to maintain the quality and quantity of future SF detachment commanders. With these challenges in mind, a small group of SF officers and NCOs at the U.S. Military Academy, or USMA, have begun a campaign to educate and recruit America's outstanding future leaders for service in SF and in the special-operations community.

The USMA commissions approximately 1,000 new lieutenants each year — roughly 25 percent of the Army's officer population. The selection process is rigorous — USMA accepts about one applicant in 14. Those accepted spend four years learning to become leaders who have character, a quality required in all SF officers. Cadets receive a top-rated undergraduate education in various disciplines, undergo rigorous military education and training, and execute demanding physical training throughout their tenure at the academy. The result is a pool of candidates rich in potential for service in SF and in the spe-

cial operations. Although women are not allowed to join the SF branch, they can serve in combat-support and combat-service-support roles in SF group headquarters and in Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units.

Because SF is a nonaccession branch, cadets cannot be commissioned directly into SF after graduation. Why, then, spend time and effort recruiting and educating them? SF needs to win the “hearts and minds” of cadets at an early, formative stage — to plant the SF seed that will yield a harvest a few years later. Providing cadets with exposure to SF personnel, briefings, training and classes will motivate many of them to join SF at their earliest opportunity. Cadets who do not join SF will still have gained valuable exposure that will facilitate their relationships with SF when those cadets become leaders of conventional forces.

Master Sergeant Tony Douglas realized the potential strategic payoff of a recruiting campaign when he began his assignment in 1996 in the only SF position at the academy. He, along with a few SF officers, developed an operational plan to ensure that cadets would be educated about the SF branch. The objective of the plan was to increase the probability that more cadets would choose SF after completing their initial branch assignments. The SF contingent arranged for cadets to conduct cadet troop-leading training, or CTLT, with SF

Progressive Success of the SF Initiative at West Point

1995

- 5/5 passed pre-SCUBA, conducted by the 10th SF Group at West Point.
- 5/5 graduated from the CDQC, conducted at Key West, Fla.

1996

- 10/10 passed pre-SCUBA, conducted by ODA 585 (Master Sergeant Barchers, team sergeant; and Captain Prairie, detachment commander).
- 10/10 graduated from the Combat Diver Qualification Course.
- 2/2 graduated from the Military Free-Fall Course. (Cadets Jason Sabat and Chris Rose were national intercollegiate skydiving champions.)
- 4/4 graduated from the SERE Course.
- Two cadets conducted CTLT with the 5th SF Group.

1997

- 12/12 passed pre-SCUBA, conducted by ODA 385 at West Point (Master Sergeant DeGross, team sergeant; and Captain John Wheeler, detachment commander).
- 11/12 graduated from the Combat Diver Qualification Course at Key West. (Cadets Tim Marvich and Alan Deware were the distinguished honor graduate and the honor graduate.)
- 5/5 graduated from the Military Free-Fall Course (Cadets Travis McIntosh, Mark Weaver, and Neal Gouck).
- Four cadets conducted CTLT with the 5th SF Group (participated in JTF-6 mission planning).
- Three cadets conducted CTLT with the 3rd SF Group (traveled to France; trained with French commandos).
- Two SF ODAs from the 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, trained 1,100 cadets in small-unit tactics at West Point.

1998

- 18/18 passed pre-SCUBA at 5th SF Group, conducted by ODA 525 (Master Sergeant Perrigo, team sergeant; and Captain Franks, detachment commander; and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Gomoluh).
- 15/17 graduated from the CDQC. (Cadets Matt Powell and Jason Hawksworth were the honor graduate and the leadership award recipient.)
- Two cadets conducted CTLT with the 7th SF Group.
- Four cadets conducted CTLT with the 3rd SF Group (local training and CONUS missions).
- Four cadets conducted CTLT with the 5th SF Group (local training and training in Africa and Kuwait).
- Two SF ODAs from the 7th SF Group trained 1,100 cadets in small-unit tactics at West Point.

1999

- Four cadets are conducting CTLT with the 7th SF Group.
- Four cadets are conducting CTLT with the 5th SF Group.
- Two cadets are conducting CTLT with the 3rd SF Group.
- 24/25 passed pre-SCUBA run by ODA 535, 5th SF Group.
- 22 cadets are attending the CDQC.
- Two SF ODAs from the 1st SF Group will train 1,100 cadets in small-unit tactics at West Point.

Cadets Matt Powell and Jason Hawksworth receive honor-graduate and class-leadership awards from Major Mark Peasely, commander of the Combat Diver Qualification Course at Key West, Fla.



Photo courtesy Rich Young

operational detachments-alpha, or ODAs, and to attend SF training courses, such as Military Free-Fall; the Combat Diver Qualification Course; and Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape. The SF soldiers involved in the training explain to the cadets what SF does and how SF units should be utilized, either alone or with conventional forces.

The plan should start paying dividends for SF soon, as the first cadets to train with SF become eligible to submit applications for SF Assessment and Selection. The initiative is becoming increasingly popular with cadets and with SF teams. Comments from the cadets have been positive: “Professional soldiers, extremely mature, the kind of soldiers I want to be associated with,” is typical of cadet responses. The SF teams appreciate having motivated cadets accompany them on deployments (CONUS and OCONUS), and they enjoy having the opportunity to influence future detachment commanders.

With the assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Charlie King (the former chief of the SF Branch), the USMA now has a coded 18A position in its Department of Military Instruction — Course Director, MS360: Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC). The officer who is selected to fill this position attends the Naval Postgraduate SO/LIC master’s program,

with a three-year follow-on assignment at West Point as an instructor and as the SF Branch representative.

The MS360 course is a popular elective with cadets because of its relevance to current events. The course offers a broad view of SO/LIC and introduces cadets to the various special-operations units. MS360 invites distinguished special operators to brief cadets and faculty about SF and the special-operations community. Former guest speakers include Colonel (P) Stan McChrystal, former commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment; Brigadier General William J. Leszczynski Jr., former deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; Colonel Stan Florer, commander, Special Operations Command, U.S. Atlantic Command; Retired Command Sergeant Major Joe Lupyak, a Son Tay raider; and Command Sergeant Major Carron and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas of the Joint Special Operations Command.

The continuous USMA recruiting campaign is linked to two key SOF imperatives: “Consider the long-term effects” and “Ensure long-term sustainment.” With our busy operational tempo, we need to look inward for force sustainment and preservation. SF is renowned for the exceptional job it does training indigenous forces. According to Douglas, “Sometimes we need to look at the benefits of training our own

forces for the future good of SF.” The SF initiatives at West Point are accomplishing that training. In the rich recruiting and educational environment of West Point, the SF initiatives are planting the seed whose harvest will sustain and preserve the SF Branch. ✂

Major Rich Young is an instructor in the Department of Military Instruction at West Point. He teaches the Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine Course and will teach the Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Course in academic year 1999-2000. Commissioned as an Infantry officer, Young served as an Infantry platoon leader and as company executive officer with Company B, 1/15th Infantry (Mechanized) in Korea. He served as a company training officer and as the battalion S3 with Company D, 3/61st Infantry and with the 2/39th Infantry at Fort Jackson, S.C. His SF assignments include detachment commander for ODAs 181 and 174; and S1, 3rd Battalion, 1st SF Group. Young holds a master’s degree in management from Webster University and a master’s degree in public affairs from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.



Notes:

¹ Lieutenant Colonel Gunner Sepp (former commander of Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group); Colonel David McCracken (former chief of PERS-COM’s SF Branch, and former commander of the 3rd SF Group); and Lieutenant Colonel Al Aycock (former commander of the 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG) were instrumental in steering the SF initiative at West Point.

Special Forces: In Search of a Core Ideology

by Sergeant Major Edward A. Berg

In January 1999, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command held a commander's conference in Colorado Springs, Colo. Attendees discussed the idea of core ideology, as expressed in the book *Built To Last*.¹ Afterward, Major General William Boykin invited conference attendees to share in a debate regarding SF's core ideology.

After the conference, I discussed SF's core ideology with friends in the 10th SF Group, with my teammates at the III Corps Special Operations Coordination element and with a number of other III Corps soldiers. The discussions proved interesting. Many of us initially equated ideology with religions and philosophies, and we had never thought of the U.S. Army, SF in particular, as having an ideology.


Webster defines ideology as "The body of doctrine, myth, symbol, etc., of a social movement, institution, class, or large group."² According to the authors of *Built*

to Last, core ideology is the combination of core values and core purpose.³

Core values

The Army's leadership manual, FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, states, "Values are attitudes about the worth or importance of people, concepts, or things. Values influence behavior because we use them to evaluate alternatives."⁴ Not surprisingly, the Army is taking steps to "refocus on its core values."⁵ It has expanded its professional military ethics of loyalty, duty, selfless-service and integrity to include honor, respect and personal courage. These are now the Army's values, so why does SF feel the need for something unique? Do the Army's values fail to give us the emphasis we are seeking? Are the Army's values truly core values? Do all soldiers share them equally? Did the Army require consensus on its core values? Is consensus necessary for core values to be core?

The Army is an institution that demands loyalty. In fact, the Army's first value is loyalty. Prove to be disloyal and you could face swift and terrible consequences. But suppose, because of political necessity, the Army were to modify its position on loyalty to its soldiers? Would the change be acceptable? After all, we are adults who understand that such things happen. If the Army stands its ground in defense of its core values, how far should it go? By the same



token, what if the Army were to place a demand on SF that challenged one of SF's core values? Would we in SF stand our ground, and, if so, how far should we go? If we do not stand our ground because of our loyalty to the Army, then would our value have been a core value?

After serious consideration, I believe that SF has four core values: courage, candor, competence and commitment.⁶ These will neither compromise the Army's values nor will they threaten the changing attitudes of our society.

Courage. There are two types of courage: physical and moral. Our emphasis should be on moral courage, the courage to tell the truth — not the calculated truth articulated by experts of legalese, but the plain truth. Truth is the bedrock upon which we build trusting relationships.

Candor. SF highly values candor. Candor allows us to communicate our opinion, to argue constructively, or simply to disagree. Sometimes our use of candor lacks proper protocol or etiquette, and occasionally we ignore the consequence of its misuse, but largely we do well with it.

Competence. Competence is another area in which we do well, but we could always do better. Competence is so vital to SF that without it, SF would cease to exist. Every year SF units measure their soldiers' proficiency by various internal and external means, including the SF Command's certification, situational training exercises, and live-fire exercises. Units also conduct after-action reviews of their operations.

Commitment. Commitment is an individual's pledge to his nation, the Army, SF, SF missions, and SF soldiers. Equally important is our organization's commitment to helping SF soldiers develop into professionals that our own country as well as other countries will look upon as the best in the world.

I doubt that SF will ever achieve a consensus on its core values, but if we insist on trying to formulate them, perhaps the SF Command should initiate a global mailing list on the Army Special Operations Command Network, and request that each SF soldier nominate 3-5 values. The command could input the results into a database. The

values that receive the most nominations would warrant consideration as SF's core values, and we would instill these values in SF soldiers.

In an article on SF core ideology in the Summer 1998 issue of *Special Warfare*, Colonel Mark Boyatt wrote that new core values cannot be instilled.⁷ But no one is born with values; we must learn them. I have served a considerable time in SF — long enough to know that I can instill, or modify, any value deemed fit into nearly any SF soldier. SF soldiers attach great significance to wearing the Green Beret. They come to the unit motivated and ready to learn. You simply get their attention, tell

SF soldiers attach great significance to wearing the Green Beret. They come to the unit motivated and ready to learn. You simply get their attention, tell them what you want them to be, and they will usually assimilate it or adapt to it. Those who cannot do either will eventually get out of the way.

them what you want them to be, and they usually assimilate it or adapt to it. Those who cannot do either will eventually get out of the way.

Core purpose

When I attended Phase III of the SF Qualification Course, it was my belief that the core purpose of SF was to conduct guerrilla warfare. That belief was reinforced by every team sergeant for whom I ever worked. We have since changed our focus to "unconventional warfare," but it is still our reason for being. Ask any SF soldier to name our core purpose, and his response will be "UW."

But if we acknowledge that guerrilla warfare is only one component of unconventional warfare, and if we accept the fact that the "unconventional" attracts those who disdain traditional institutions (much to the chagrin of some of our senior mem-

bers), then perhaps we should propose a core purpose.

SF soldiers and the SF organization do not have the same purpose. The core purpose of SF *soldiers* is to support national policy as part of the nation's armed forces by working to achieve tactical, operational or strategic objectives for which general-purpose forces are unsuited. The core purpose of the SF *organization* is to prepare SF soldiers (1) to be technically and tactically proficient; (2) to be competent decision-makers, whether they are discussing tactics with the local guerrilla chief, or U.S. engagement with an American ambassador; and (3) to use critical thinking skills appropriate to the operational and strategic levels of war.

Core ideology

If you were to ask several SF soldiers to define SF's core ideology, you would probably get several different opinions, none of which would be the response you were seeking. SF soldiers do not believe that they joined SF because of an ideology. They joined because they had seen the movie, heard the song, or read the book. They come to SF because they believe themselves to be extraordinary soldiers who are looking for extraordinary challenges. We give them the challenges they are looking for. We teach them our doctrine. We help them become rugged individuals. We make them savvy in the ways of unconventional warfare. Then, we adorn their heads with our symbol of excellence and deliver them to an SF group.

SF already possesses the components of its core ideology. But we have not written it in stone, nor are we ready to articulate it. First, we must determine our core values and our core purpose. Then we will be able to articulate SF's core ideology.

Meanwhile, we must consider some serious questions: Will this ideology work? Who will decide what is to be visionary and what is to remain traditional? Will the architecture remain in place after the leadership has changed hands several times? What mechanism can we emplace to ensure that some future commander's per-

sonal politics do not realign the architecture to suit his or her own agenda? I encourage every SF soldier to read *Built to Last*, and then to join in the debate regarding SF's core ideology. You make SF what it is. Don't let someone else determine SF's core ideology without you. ✂

Sergeant Major Edward A. Berg is assigned to the 5th SF Group, with duty as the sergeant major of the Special Operations Coordination Element, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. He has held a variety of technical and leadership positions and has served in the III Corps, the Southern European Task Force, the 7th Infantry Division and the 10th SF Group.



Notes:

¹ James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies* (New York: HarperBusiness, 1997).

² *Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* (New Jersey: Gramercy Books, 1989).

³ Collins and Porras, pp. 221-28 (paperback edition).

⁴ FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, July 1990, p. 23.

⁵ DA message, DAPE-HR-L, 080/98, subject: "Army Soldier Cards and Tags."

⁶ FM 22-100, pp. 23-24.

⁷ Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, "Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1998, p. 37.

Letters

Special Warfare

Other U.S. agencies support humanitarian demining

In the article "Humanitarian Demining Operations: Relieving Human Suffering Worldwide" (Spring 1999), Sergeant First Class Paul Clarke mentions many of the great initiatives being made in humanitarian demining. He points out the U.S. contributions of more than \$246 million in humanitarian demining assistance since 1993, and he provides well-deserved recognition of the comprehensive range of Department of Defense, or DoD, humanitarian-demining initiatives conducted over the years.

I was pleased to read such an in-depth discussion of DoD's Humanitarian Demining Program, or HDP, efforts. It is my understanding that *Special Warfare* is circulated to a diverse population who may be interested in the HDP in a broader context. I would like to complement Sergeant First Class Clarke's article by highlighting the substantial role played by other U.S. agencies in the U.S. HDP.

In FY 1999, the U.S. Department of State will provide more than \$35 million in humanitarian-demining assistance from a Congressionally-funded account called Non-proliferation, Antiterrorism Demining and Related activities, or NADR. The

NADR-funded program supports mine-action programs in 30 mine-affected countries around the world. The Department of State also manages a separate \$28-million program that provides assistance to mine-affected nations in the Balkans. This initiative is a joint endeavor with the Republic of Slovenia. In addition, we provide humanitarian demining funding from the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, which targets its assistance to demining in support of refugee repatriation. The U.S. Agency for International Development focuses on mine-victim assistance efforts through the Leahy War Victims Fund.

The U.S. Senate's action (in May 1999), giving advice and consent to ratification of the Amended Mines Protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, is also worth noting as another example of the progress the United States has made in this arena. The protocol does not ban antipersonnel land mine use, but it strengthens international restrictions on their use and transfer and establishes technical precautions designed to address the humanitarian problem caused by land mines.

An interagency working group, chartered by the National Security Council in 1993, provides coor-

dination and policy guidance for all U.S. humanitarian-demining assistance. The program's objectives are to reduce civilian casualties, allow for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their villages and homes, and enhance a nation's economic stability by establishing sustainable indigenous demining programs in mine-affected nations. The U.S. HDP seeks to relieve human suffering while promoting U.S. foreign-policy interests. We believe that reducing human suffering and permitting people everywhere to return to normal, productive lives is in the interest of America.

*Donald F. Patierno, Director
Office of Humanitarian
Demining Programs
Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs
Department of State*



Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Colombia reports growth of insurgent militias

The Colombian Administrative Department of Security, or DAS, has reported a continuing increase in so-called insurgent militias in major cities like Medellin, Cali, Barrancabermeja, Cucuta and Bogota. Formerly, the presence of both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN, in large urban areas was associated with logistics support. Now, however, the FARC and the ELN appear to have achieved coercive and military capabilities in their own right, and they are able to create disorder and extort money in some areas. According to Colombian security specialists, each guerrilla "front" in the field is represented by "an urban cell run by a zone commander and special commissions." These militias possess money-raising, intelligence, and "shock troop" components. The latter are responsible for undertaking direct armed actions against selected urban targets, including kidnappings. With the FARC and ELN cells gaining in strength, they have been able to control a number of urban neighborhoods and city areas, while financing themselves through extortion, kidnappings and other criminal activity.

Turkey cites Iranian terrorist acts

According to the Turkish media, a May 1999 assessment by Turkey's General Directorate of Security, or GDS, found deep Iranian involvement in subversive activities affecting the Ankara regime and the Ankara region. In addition to supporting Hizbullah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Organization, among others, Iran is also believed to be supporting the Kurdish Workers Party, which has been waging a war of separatism against Turkey for 15 years. GDS accuses Iran of being "directly and indirectly involved in arms and narcotics smuggling because of its regional and international support for terrorism, and its involvement with around 100 radical terrorist groups worldwide. Also, because Iran supplies arms, ammunition, and explosives to the terrorist organizations it directs or the militants of these organizations it trains."

Kashmir again center of military conflict

Kashmir, the geographic subject of two of the three wars that Pakistan and India have fought against each other, is again the center of military conflict, according to Indian, Pakistani and international sources. Pakistani insurgents destroyed an Indian Army ammunition dump at Kargil in May 1999 and occupied a number of sites in the area. At an elevation of 9,000 feet, Kargil is one of the coldest and most hostile battlegrounds in the world. It is important to the Indian Army because it protects the main supply route for the Army's forces in the high country of Kashmir, and because it overlooks a large area of northern Pakistan. The Indian Army's Northern Command headquarters advises that there is no evidence that the Pakistani Army has come across the line of control (the de facto border between the two nations in Kashmir). However, heavily armed infiltrators estimated at 100-300 had crossed into the Indian sector and occupied some of the heights and the outposts that are not manned by the Indians during the winter. Indian com-

mandos and three brigades of conventional ground forces with artillery support were able to regain control of most of the sites. Ten Indian soldiers were killed, as well as an estimated 30-40 insurgents. There have also been reports of civilian casualties. Reports indicate that approximately 48,000 civilians have been displaced from the immediate area because of the fighting. Indian sources see the current infiltrations as an attempt by Pakistan to gain a decisive advantage in Kashmir while India has a caretaker government. There are now reported to be at least 44 armed organizations involved in the insurgency in the Indian sector of Kashmir. Most of these seek the union of the sector with Pakistan. Since 1989, 24,000 people have been killed as a result of the fighting. The demonstration of nuclear-weapons capability by India and Pakistan in 1998 has created great concern about the potential consequences of any escalation of the current fighting. Pakistani sources report that nuclear capacity is a deterrent against India's overwhelming conventional-weapons capability. Notwithstanding the Kashmir dispute, the two countries have already begun negotiations regarding their nuclear and missile technology, and they are slated to consider a draft agreement to exchange information on these matters.

Haitian security concerns increase

Haitian political exiles living in France are reported by the French media to have established a committee to seek the trial of former dictator Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier for crimes against humanity during his dictatorship (1971-86). Within two weeks following the reports, Duvalier, in a French television interview, asserted that he is considering returning to Haiti. Asked about the continuing presence in Haiti of Tontons Macoutes (Duvalier's private paramilitary group), Duvalier denied such a presence, but he asserted that there are more Duvalier supporters in Haiti than most people ever could imagine. In Haiti, President Preval dissolved Parliament, mayoralties and the Departmental Community Administrative Councils nationwide on Jan. 11, 1999, creating alarm in opposition parties, labor and business sectors about the ruling party's intentions. Media sources report concerns about criminal acts and violent demonstrations that threaten the future stability of Haiti and the presidential election that is to be held within the next nine months. The Haitian National Police, or PNH, created after the return of Aristide in 1994, are at the center of these concerns. PNH statistics for April 1-8, 1999 report 20 assassinations, 12 attempted murders and 86 assaults nationwide. A series of demonstrations in Port-au-Prince resulted in heavy property damage and the interruption of business activity for weeks. Blame for this violence and disorder has been placed in different hands, depending upon the source. Haitian government sources charge that right-wing supporters of the coup of 1991 are seeking to destabilize and demoralize Haiti. On the other hand, the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industries in Haiti asserts that government authorities have not attempted to restore order; that the authorities have not prosecuted those responsible for the violence; and that the violence is a means of avoiding elections. There are other views as well: An opposition party leader from the National People's Assembly places the blame on rivalries within the domestic politics of the United States. Reported Haitian government responses to these events and criticisms include the announcement of a National Security Plan designed to ensure security for the upcoming elections. The plan recognizes some of the weaknesses of the judicial and law-enforcement system. It calls for greater efforts by concerned agencies in fighting corruption, intensifying police patrols, and securing the streets at night. The PNH's general director points to the dismissal of 500 PNH members and to the elimi-

Colombian insurgency spillover intensifies

nation of many paramilitary gangs as progress toward security. Meanwhile, the PNH has received equipment valued at \$200,000 through the United Nations Police Mission in Haiti. This equipment will help provide security measures during the election period.

The March 1999 murder of three U.S. hostages, presumably by rebels of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, or FARC, in Venezuela (near the border) has underscored the still-increasing spillover of the Colombian conflict. Colombian, Venezuelan, and U.S. authorities are investigating the murders. Overall, a whole complex of related problems has centered on Colombian insurgent activity (from FARC and the National Liberation Army, or ELN): drug and arms trafficking by guerrillas and criminal groups; extortion, kidnaping, and other criminality and violence; and illegal immigrants — all of which are affecting Colombia's border areas with Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Panama. In addition, the rise of so-called self-defense groups has added to border lawlessness and bloodshed, as group sponsors pursue their own, sometimes criminal, agendas. As a consequence, some of these countries have increased their military and police presence opposite Colombia, a strategy that the Colombian defense minister acknowledges is fully understandable. For Peru, well-experienced from its own insurgent problems, the increased border dangers from both the FARC and the ELN have precipitated the deployment of the Peruvian Army's Fifth Division to the Amazon border area. This division includes counterinsurgent units that successfully fought Peru's Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas. In deploying these forces, Peru indicated that FARC incursions have been occurring since 1993. Ecuador is also considering what measures it should take in light of the FARC activities and the violence inside Colombia.

Polish counterterrorist unit to be resubordinated

The Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration currently controls the Operational Maneuver Reaction Group, or GROM. However, this special unit will be reassigned to the Defense Ministry in the near future. "Military Unit 2305," as it is also known, has been in the news recently, with reports of some 10 GROM commandos present in the Balkans and in Kosovo, where they have been performing bodyguard duties for William Walker, chief of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo. The resubordination would be part of needed programs of military reform and modernization. Polish Deputy Defense Minister Romuald Szeremietiew judged that "in the case of uncontrolled local conflicts, special forces are gaining significance." He believes that Poland, now part of NATO, should develop light, highly capable forces like GROM that are capable of striking enemy targets precisely. Under the Defense Ministry, GROM would form the basis of a larger special-operations establishment. Elements of the special unit, said to total some 200 personnel, have been used in at least two peace operations: Haiti and East Slavonia in Croatia. In the latter, which is the sole remaining Serb enclave in Croatia, GROM forces under U.N. auspices reportedly captured a wanted war criminal.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Colonel Harold Daniels of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

CMF 37 MSG selection rate exceeds Army average

The CY 1999 CMF 37 selection rate for promotion to master sergeant was 28 percent, vs. the Army average of 16.9 percent. CMF 37 had 13 soldiers in the primary zone and 12 soldiers in the secondary zone; six were selected from the primary zone and one from the secondary zone. CMF 37 selectees were better educated and younger than the Army average. They generally had a good mix of successful field and staff assignments, and they sought out leadership positions. CMF 37 promotions are likely to be near the Army average for the next 2-3 years. For more information, telephone MSG Julius Storch, CMF 37 manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

1998 SGM selection board analysis reveals promotion pointers

The review and analysis for the 1998 sergeants major selection board revealed the following information about CMF 18 soldiers:

- *Performance and potential.* In some instances, raters, senior raters and reviewers failed to support their block checks with strong statements.
- *Utilization and assignments.* Numerous soldiers had significant time-in-grade as E8s, but they had little SF team-sergeant time. Successful SF team sergeants stood out. No other assignment equals this experience. Senior E7s and junior E8s should strive for SF team-sergeant positions and for other E8 leadership assignments. CSMs and commanders should ensure that E8s serve at least two years of SF team-sergeant time. In addition to serving as team sergeants, E8s should serve in other positions at the E8/E9 level that will afford them at least four years in leadership positions. If possible, commanders should avoid moving E8s from team-sergeant positions to first-sergeant positions prematurely. Staff and instructor positions should be filled only with senior E8s who have completed their team-sergeant and other leadership assignments.
- *Training and education.* Most of the soldiers' records reflected some civilian higher education. NCO professional development was good in most records. Soldiers should ensure that their records reflect all civilian education, as well as college credits available from NCOPD schools. Some soldiers in leadership positions have not completed the Static-line Jumpmaster Course, which is a violation of regulations.
- *Physical fitness.* The force is in good physical condition. Much of the force showed either individual APFT scores of 290 or above, or "excellent" block checks with strong comments (e.g., x-mile march with x-lb. rucksack in x hours). Raters need to put APFT scores in the block even at the "success" level and make strong, specific comments that reflect high physical conditioning. Raters also need to show how the NCO's leadership has improved unit physical readiness.

For more information, telephone MSG Bennett at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Army releases FY 2000 Command Select List

The Army has released the FY 2000 Command Select List, or CSL, for lieutenant-colonel and colonel commands. The following SF officers were selected by CSL category:

- LTC Tactical: Raymond Bateman, Kent Bolster, Max Bowers, David Fox, Joel Johnson, John MacNamara and David Maxwell
- LTC Training and Strategic Support: Stephen Boston and Mark Lowe
- LTC Institutional: James Burton, James Campbell, and Michael Warburton
- COL Tactical: David Fridovich and Mark Phelan
- COL Institutional: John Peska

For more information, see the SF branch newsletter at PERSCOM Online.

FY 99 colonel promotion- selection board to convene

The FY 1999 colonel promotion-selection board will convene July 26, 1999. The primary zone of consideration will be officers whose date of rank is July 2, 1994 to May 1, 1995. MILPER message 99-155 outlines the eligibility requirements for above-zone, in-zone, and below-zone. PERSCOM will notify officers in each zone of consideration. SF branch recommends that eligible officers check their photos, Officer Record Briefs, and microfiches. Physicals should be up-to-date, and photos should be current (within the last two years).

Army Acquisition Corps to conduct accession board

The Army Acquisition Corps will conduct its annual accession board in November 1999. YG 93 is the target year-group for this year's board, although officers from prior year-groups may still apply. Interested officers can contact Rick Yager at DSN: 221-3127, or they can call their branch for more information.

SF Accessions Board to convene in September

The annual PERSCOM Special Forces accession selection board will convene Sept. 21-23, 1999. The board will consider YG 96 and some YG 97 officers selected for promotion to captain. Interested officers should contact the Special Forces recruiters for applications, or call CPT Josh Noble at SF Branch.

PERSCOM announces CF designations for YGs 80, 86

PERSCOM has released the results of the Career Field Designation Board for YGs 80 and 86. The results bode well for the future of OPMS XXI and for the Army. No officer was designated out of the Operations Career Field who had not requested to do so. However, not every officer who asked to be designated to a career field other than operations received his request. The selection to serve in one of the other career fields is very competitive. Only those officers who had previously served in their requested functional area or who had demonstrated the potential to do so were selected. The officers who were selected will continue to serve the Army either in functional-area assignments or in officer-generalist assignments. A small number of FA 48 officers (foreign-area officers) will remain in the Operations Career Field but will still be able to serve in FA 48 billets – essentially dual-track-

ing. All FA 39 officers, whether designated branch or FA 39, will remain in the Operations Career Field, since FA 39 is the only functional area within the Operations Career Field. All FA 39-trained field-grade officers will remain eligible for FA 39 assignments. However, only officers designated as FA 39s will be eligible to compete for FA 39 command. For more information concerning career-field designation, preferences, functional areas, or board dates, officers should contact their assignment officer or check PERSCOM Online.

Four FA 39 officers selected for LTC command

The FY 2000 lieutenant-colonel command selection board considered 40 officers in FA 39 and selected four. The FA 39 officers who were selected were from YG 1982 and were on their first look.

CF designation boards set for YGs 81, 87, 90

Officers in YGs 81 and 87 will appear before a career-field designation board Oct. 5, 1999. Officers in YG 90 will have their career-field designation board immediately following their promotion board next spring (June 1-15, 2000). If you are in the window next year, ensure that your branch has your current addresses — mailing and e-mail. Eligible officers should have received their career-field designation preference packets in June; they should return their preference statements by Sept. 5.

SF Officer Branch points of contact

By the end of July, the Special Forces branch will be staffed as follows:

LTC Charlie Cleveland	Chief SF Branch — DSN 221-3173
MAJ Ed McHale	Lieutenant colonels and branch-qualified majors — DSN 221-3169
CPT Les Brown	Captains and non-branch-qualified majors — DSN 221-3175
CPT Josh Noble	Accessions and future readiness — DSN 221-3178

PERSCOM to re-establish colonels' division

PERSCOM is re-establishing a separate division for the management of colonels, regardless of their branch or career field. Within this division there will be one assignment officer for FA 39 and Branch 18 colonels. Major Steve Herczeg (18/39) will have this duty. The division should be operational around Sept. 1.

Selection boards for 4th Qtr FY 99

Board	Dates
Joint Specialty Officer Colonel (Army)	June 15-21, 1999 July 26-Aug. 16, 1999
CGSC (Army) SF Accessions	Aug. 24-Sept. 24, 1999 Sept. 21-23, 1999
Career Field Designation (YGs 81, 87) LTC Command (CA)	Oct. 5-22, 1999 Oct. 5-22, 1999
Professor of Military Science Army Acquisition Corps	Oct. 13-15, 1999 Early October 1999



Update

Special Warfare

CAPEX, AUSA symposium highlight SOF capabilities

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command held its capabilities exercise at Fort Bragg, N.C., March 1-2.

The exercise included capabilities demonstrations by soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; the 3rd Special Forces Group; and the 1st Special Warfare Training Group. There were also displays of SOF weapons, equipment, vehicles and aircraft. Members of the 4th Psychological Operations Group, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment also participated in the exercise.

The audience for the first day's exercises were the soldiers of the XVIII Airborne Corps. In attendance the second day were civilians from the Association of the United States Army's eighth annual special operations forces symposium in nearby Pinehurst, N.C. The two-day symposium was arranged by the AUSA's Industry Affairs Directorate and was held in cooperation with USASOC.

General Peter J. Schoomaker, commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, told the symposium audience that his soldiers, sailors and airmen must be able to cover the spectrum of missions because "we are without question going to see something we call war" in the future. "Our real strength is to be able to operate at the low-end, no-tech level," he said.

Retired General William Hart-



File photo

The thermal weapon sight.

zog, the former commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, told the audience: "Operations like those in Haiti and Panama may be more like what we see in the near future." In those situations, he said, SOF have an important role to play from "the day before the battle" through "the day after the battle."

"You're certainly intelligence-gathering ... often in the negotiating business," Hartzog said, and, in the case of Haiti, working with 21 other nations whose languages, customs and religions vary widely.

Using the lessons learned in Panama and Haiti, the U.S. Special Operations Command is studying the idea of establishing a standing joint task force for a variety of missions in each theater. The concept of that regional engagement force (a mixture of heavy and light

forces) is being developed in a series of experiments.

Colonel Michael Mehaffey of the Army Training and Doctrine Command said that some of the ideas that will be tested are what such a headquarters would do for other high-end, war-fighting units, and how information-age technology can be better used in specially-tailored units. He said that he expects a prototype headquarters to be operating by the fall of 2000 and that it will participate with the XVIII Airborne Corps and the U.S. Atlantic Command in a major joint exercise. — *From USASOC and AUSA press releases*

USASOC units to receive thermal weapon sight

Some units in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command will soon begin receiving a new weapon sight designed to improve target acquisition at short and long ranges.

The thermal weapon sight, or TWS, is a lightweight, self-contained, day-or-night thermal-imaging device. It can be used with a variety of weapons, including rifles, machine guns and shoulder-launched missiles. The recognition range of the TWS meets or exceeds the effective range of all the weapons systems it supports. The sight can also be used for long-range surveillance and for command-and-control operations.

The TWS consists of a common sensor body with interchangeable telescope assemblies and disposable power sources. Its advanced display provides excellent brightness with a low power consump-

tion. The new sight is designed to operate in adverse weather and to "see" through light foliage, smoke, dust and camouflage.

The TWS is constructed of advanced plastic-composite materials that provide strength while reducing weight. The sight uses a silent, thumbnail-sized thermoelectric cooler that eliminates the need for heavier mechanical coolers or gas coolant bottles.

This summer, fielding teams will deliver the TWS to the 75th Ranger Regiment, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Training teams will conduct TWS operator and maintenance training. Operator training includes the use and identification of controls and indicators, mounting and dismounting procedures, operation, zeroing and sight alignment. Maintenance training includes troubleshooting, and preventive-maintenance checks and services.

The Force Modernization Branch, Combat Development Division, USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and Integration, is responsible for planning, coordinating and managing the fielding of the TWS to USASOC units. For more information, call Johnathan James, chief of the Force Modernization Branch, at DSN 239-6144 or commercial (910) 432-6144.

SF ANCOC conducts pilot distance-learning phase

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy conducted its pilot distance-learning SF Advanced NCO Course April 12-30.

Previous resident-only classes of the SF ANCOC lasted 18 weeks, with soldiers assigned to SWCS for the duration of the course. Soldiers assigned to Fort Bragg in a temporary-duty status incurred significant costs in money and in time

away from their home station and their families.

By using computer technology, digitization, and distance-learning concepts, the NCO Academy has reduced the SF ANCOC resident course to 13 weeks. The remaining five weeks have been reduced to three weeks of distance-learning instruction at the soldier's home station. Soldiers are still placed on orders to the SWCS NCO Academy to alleviate any command-and-control issues, but they will remain at their home station during the DL portion.

The 42 students in the pilot DL course included soldiers assigned to each of the SF groups, including the reserve-component 19th and 20th SF groups.

Future courses for SF ANCOC will refine the pilot-course concept, and course material will be updated as necessary. For more information about the DL phase of SF ANCOC courses, telephone the NCOA course manager at DSN 239-3728 or commercial (910) 432-3728.

SWCS adds light-infantry POI to 18B training

The Special Warfare Center and School has added a light-infantry program of instruction, or POI, to the training for Special Forces weapons sergeants.

The POI has been added to the second phase of the Special Forces Qualification Course, during which soldiers receive training in their military occupational specialty. The light-infantry POI gives prospective SF weapons sergeants who come from non-combat-arms branches a chance to gain technical knowledge and experience.

The new POI, taught by Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, gives students two days of classroom training in troop-leading procedures, operations orders, the military decision-making process, and offensive and defensive operations. Students then

spend four days in the Special Operations Simulation Center, where they focus on company- and battalion-level tasks. Students perform detailed mission planning and input their plans into the simulation center's computer, which executes the mission as a war game during a battalion exercise.

Students then parachute into Camp Mackall, near Fort Bragg, for a three-day field-training exercise, or FTX, during which they conduct company defense, raids, ambushes and a movement to contact. The third day of the FTX is a platoon live-fire exercise.

Cambria takes command of 7th SF Group

Colonel Salvatore F. Cambria took command of the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg's Meadows Parade Field June 11.

Cambria, formerly a strategic analyst for the Army deputy chief of staff for operations at the Pentagon, has held a variety of assignments, including service as an SF detachment commander in the 10th SF Group at Bad Tölz, Germany.

Cambria replaced Colonel Ed Phillips, who has spent 20 years of his Army career in the 7th SF Group. Phillips will become the executive officer to General Peter J. Schoemaker, commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill AFB, Fla.

New PSYOP ARTEP available online

The final draft of ARTEP 33-725-60, *Mission Training Plan for the Psychological Operations Task Force*, is complete. The PSYOP MTP is available from the SWCS PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division on the ASOC internal web (<http://asociweb/swcs/dotd/PSY-page.htm>).



Book Reviews

Special Warfare


Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies. By James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. ISBN: 0-88730-739-6. \$16. 368 pages.

This analysis of what makes great companies great is one of the best business titles since *In Search of Excellence*. It has been hailed everywhere as an instant classic. The authors, James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, spent six years in research, and they freely admit that their findings devastated their preconceptions about business success.

Built to Last identifies 18 “visionary” companies and sets out to determine what’s special about them. To get on the list, a company had to be world-famous, have a stellar brand image, and be at least 50 years old.

Whatever the key to the success of the 18 companies, the key to the success of this book is that the authors didn’t waste time comparing them to business failures. Instead, they used a control group of “successful-but-second-rank” companies to highlight what’s special about their visionary picks.

The great myth about success, according to the authors, is that visionary companies must start with a great product and be pushed into the future by charismatic leaders. There are examples of that pattern, they admit: Johnson & Johnson, for one. But there are also just too many counter examples — in fact, the majority of the visionary companies, including giants like 3M, Sony and Texas Instruments —



that don’t fit the model. They were characterized by total lack of an initial business plan or key idea and by remarkably self-effacing leaders.

Collins and Porras were more impressed with something else that successful companies shared: an almost cult-like devotion to a “core ideology” or identity, and the active indoctrination of employees into “ideological commitment” to the company.

Built to Last identifies other myths about successful companies:

Talent should be hired from the outside. Visionary companies find their CEOs from within — Jack Welch of GE is a prime example of “homegrown management.”

Companies should maintain a conservative approach. Visionary companies rely more on what the authors call “big hairy audacious goals” than on con-

servative practices.

Companies should rely on tight internal controls. Visionary companies experience some of their most important changes as a result of trial and error, experimentation and luck — “try a lot of stuff and keep what works.”

Companies should focus on profits. Visionary companies do not exist primarily to maximize profits or shareholder wealth. They are guided by a sense of purpose beyond that of making money.

Companies should hold universal values. Visionary companies develop strong values, but they are not necessarily the same from company to company. It is the fact that these values exist, not their specific manifestation, that distinguishes visionary companies.

Companies should have a “great idea.” Starting a company with a great idea might be a bad idea — few visionary companies begin life with a great idea, and some begin with outright failures.

The comparison with the business “B”-team does tend to raise a significant methodological problem: Which companies are to be counted as visionary in the first place? There’s an air of circularity here, as if you achieve visionary status by ... achieving visionary status. So many roads lead to Rome that the book is less practical than it might appear. But that’s exactly the point of an eloquent chapter on 3M. This wildly successful company had no master plan, little structure, and no prima donnas. Instead it had an atmosphere in which bright people were keen on seeing the com-

pany succeed, and unafraid to “try a lot of stuff and keep what works.”

No tables, charts or obfuscatory language interfere with the presentation and development of Collins and Porras’ premise that visionary companies withstand fads and tests of time. On the basis of their research, Collins and Porras pinpoint six characteristics of the best American institutions: (1) premier in their industry, (2) widespread admiration from business people, (3) multiple generations of CEOs, (4) an indelible imprint on society, (5) multiproduct (or multi-service) cycles, and (6) pre-1950 roots. The authors’ findings confirm a few management theories but contest many others, and they include guidelines for companies that are striving for long-lasting success.

This book contains great qualitative and quantitative research, expressed in simple words. It aptly explains how complex things should be put together in order to build an organization that can transcend others. The unique emphasis that the culture of an organization is also its underlying strength is expressively relevant to the U.S. Army.

*Chaplain Thomas Murray
7th SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.*

Uncertain Fate: An Australian SAS Patrol in Vietnam. By Graham J. Brammer. St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1997. ISBN: 1-86448-793-3 (paper). 312 pages. \$14.95.

This reviewer approached the book, *Uncertain Fate*, with some skepticism that it might be just another instance of an author cashing-in on the experiences of specialized units involved in the Vietnam conflict. However, after the first few pages, the author’s credi-

bility was evident. Graham Brammer has created a vivid portrayal of dedicated professional leadership and the way that leadership style affects the inner workings of a small, elite unit conducting selected low-visibility missions.

The book describes an extremely difficult patrol conducted by a five-man reconnaissance team of the Australian Special Air Service at the height of the Vietnam conflict. The story reveals the human face of jungle warfare and vividly portrays the inner workings of the team, led by Sergeant Rowan Ashton. The account is realistic in its depiction of the team’s understanding of, and reliance on, small-unit-developed standing operating procedures, or SOPs. From the infiltration of a landing zone to the conduct of reconnaissance activities, the book continually emphasizes use of SOPs.

Brammer places great emphasis on movement techniques, signals, actions at security halts, and establishment of rest-overnight sites. His portrayal of the team’s actions is extremely graphic and


contains a wealth of tips for conducting operations in a jungle environment.

As with any writing of this nature, the book contains some faults in its depiction of some of the team’s techniques. One error particularly noticed by this reader was the characters’ practice of smoking on patrol, a no-no in virtually all situations.

Those faults aside, *Uncertain Fate* abounds with examples of every facet of the preparation for, and the conduct of, small-unit patrol activities. These include issuing the operations order, infiltration techniques, recon techniques, setting and conducting an ambush, and executing a hot exfiltration. Providing excellent food for thought, the book continually emphasizes that thinking and moving as one element is the key to patrol survival.

Uncertain Fate is a must-read for Special Forces soldiers. It would also make an excellent addition to the reading list for students attending the Special Forces Qualification Course and to all team libraries within the Special Forces Command.

*CWO 3 Thomas Rogers
USAJFKSWCS
Fort Bragg, N.C.*



Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army
JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK – DT – MDM
Fort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

BULK RATE
U.S. Postage
PAID
Niagara Falls, NY
Permit No. 28