


# Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School




**Special  
Forces  
Mission  
Focus**

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# From the Commandant



## Special Warfare

In 1994, retired Major General Sidney Shachnow wrote in *Special Warfare*: “If we are to profit in the future, we must continue to focus on what is to be rather than on what has been.”

Our current environment offers challenges unknown 10 years ago, and there is every reason to believe that the face of conflict will continue to change. Studies such as Force XXI and Army After Next are attempting to anticipate the future and to adapt our force structure and training for the missions we will encounter.

Those studies are critically important, but it is also important that SOF soldiers examine current and future operations and that they define ways by which we can improve our organization and mission performance. In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Major Ken Tovo looks at the current dual-mission focus of Special Forces and examines its appropriateness in recent SF operations. He also attempts to estimate the validity of the dual focus in the future.

Major Ed McHale suggests that regional organizations might better suit our future needs for a force capable of responding to contingencies worldwide. Although his views will not be shared by all who read them, his article presents a new point of view that can lead to productive discussion.

The role of Civil Affairs soldiers in recent and ongoing operations prompts Major Jeffrey Gowen to suggest a new CA force structure and new command-and-control relationships. Major Timothy Howle argues that changes in the international political environment and the prevalence of civilians in areas of military operations provide the rationale for adding civil-military operations to the Army’s list of battle-field operating systems.

Major Robert Werthman points out the lack of mission-planning guidance in SOF aviation doctrine and explains a SOF aviation mission-planning process that has




been proven effective in exercises and in real-world operations.

Like doctrine, policy must also be updated to provide guidance in our evolving operations. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Addicott examines the concept of human rights and its increasing importance in U.S. military operations, particularly those employing Special Forces. He explains the human-rights policy recently implemented by the Army SF Command.

General Henry Shelton’s article recounts recent examples of U.S. SOF successes and makes the point that these successes were the result of joint planning, training and operations.

If we are to continue to be effective, we must not permit ourselves to be content with our present success. We must remember to analyze, to ponder, to experiment, to debate, to learn and, as Sidney Shachnow said, “to focus on what is to be.”

  
Major General William P. Tangney

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
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# Special Forces Mission Focus for the Future

*by Major Kenneth E. Tovo*

In the unstable post Cold-War environment, the U.S. national-security strategy is committed to remaining engaged in world affairs and to enlarging the community of democratic nations.<sup>1</sup> U.S. Special Forces are particularly suited to this strategy — but that suitability has placed tremendous demands on the force.

The number of missions conducted by SF units more than quadrupled from 1991 to 1994,<sup>2</sup> and the force is beginning to show signs of wear from the increased tempo. From 1993 to 1995, retention rates for initial and mid-term SF NCOs dropped 21.2 percent and 11.1 percent, indicating that the force may be over-stressed.<sup>3</sup>

It is imperative that Special Forces be employed only on missions that require their unique skills and that provide a significant return. If we are to maintain a realistic level

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This article examines the current SF mission focus and suggests possible modifications. It has been adapted from the author's thesis in the Command and General Staff Operations Course. Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army — Editor

of readiness, the basis for SF employment and training must be sound doctrine that focuses on high-payoff missions.

Special Forces doctrine focuses on both direct operations and indirect operations. Direct operations are conducted in a unilateral or joint manner and are characterized by tight command and control, a heavy influence of technology, and rapid execution. The executor must have finely developed skills appropriate to any environment.

Indirect operations are conducted in a multinational manner and are characterized by a relatively loose command-and-control structure and by imprecise or unquantifiable effects. They require persistence rather than precision. The executor must have technical skills, but he succeeds through influence.

The division of SF missions into indirect and direct operations is not a doctrinal distinction, although Army Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, states that commanders can "Apply ... military power through indirect means or through the direct application of combat power in a specific, usually surgical, economy of force operation."<sup>4</sup>

During the Cold War, the U.S. placed a great priority on the possi-

bility of SF employment in a major conflict with the Soviet Union. SF detachments focused on special reconnaissance, or SR; on direct action, or DA; and, to a lesser extent, on unconventional warfare, or UW.

To support the national strategy of containment of communism and to enhance the capability of pro-U.S. nations to defeat communist insurgencies, SF conducted foreign internal defense, or FID, throughout the Third World. Special Forces doctrine, as reflected in FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, and FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, acknowledges other threats besides those posed by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the five basic SF missions remain unchanged from their Cold War roots.<sup>5</sup>

## Dual focus

When Special Forces were formed in 1952, their sole orientation was UW; in fact, organizers consciously fought against the incorporation of direct-action missions into SF.<sup>6</sup> FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare, 1955, does not mention Special Forces. However, by 1958, the doctrine had been rewritten. FM 31-21, Guerilla [sic] Warfare and Special Forces, included the

organization and role of Special Forces and identified SF missions:

- a. The primary mission of special forces units is to develop, organize, equip, train, support, and control guerilla forces in support of conventional operations.
- b. Secondary missions of special forces units are to:
  - (1) Engage in psychological warfare, intelligence, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states (resistance).
  - (2) Provide appropriate specialists and advisors to assist in accomplishing the above missions on a coordinated basis.
  - (3) Perform such other missions as may be directed by the theater commander.<sup>7</sup>

Shelby Stanton, in *Green Berets at War*, notes that despite the doctrinal focus of SF, the Army used SF to train various Southeast Asian allies in Ranger and unconventional-warfare techniques.<sup>8</sup> By 1961, these SF training missions had expanded, and SF were raising and advising paramilitary organizations in the outlying provinces of South Vietnam.<sup>9</sup>

FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, 1961, distinguished between SF missions in war, in limited war, and in Cold War. The SF mission in war remained unconventional war, primarily guerilla warfare, or GW. The SF role in limited war was the same, except that SF detachments might be tasked to train an indigenous force in a nondenied area but would not accompany that force into combat. The Cold War mission addressed the reality of what Special Forces had been doing:

Assist[ing] in training military personnel in combatting guerrilla and terrorist activities and subversion. In addition, they may train foreign military personnel in the techniques of guerrilla warfare, thus enhancing the defense capability of the nation concerned. When so

employed, special forces units supplement the U.S. military assistance groups and army missions.<sup>10</sup> Although SF doctrine had expanded, it remained focused on the indirect application of force.

Key events in 1964 seem to mark the point at which SF began to conduct direct operations. In October 1964, Project DELTA, composed of Special Forces and South Vietnamese personnel, was initiated to strike at Viet Cong operations deep in uncontrolled territory.<sup>11</sup> MACV-SOG was also activated in 1964, with a similar mixture of Special Forces and South Vietnamese, and began operations similar to those of Project DELTA, but with a cross-border emphasis.<sup>12</sup> Although MACV-SOG and Project DELTA used multinational formations, many of their missions were conducted unilaterally.

The training base made the first attempts to rectify the discrepancy between doctrine and operations. Retired Colonel Scot Crerar, a former member of MACV-SOG, began serving as an instructor at the Spe-

cial Warfare Center upon his return from Vietnam in 1967. He explained that direct-action training was incorporated into the basic SF training course in 1968 to reflect the reality of ongoing unilateral operations in Southeast Asia.<sup>13</sup> All that remained was to revise Special Forces doctrine to match reality.<sup>14</sup>

In 1969, FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, U.S. Army Doctrine, 1969, stated that the primary Special Forces mission was UW/GW, and that SF could train, advise and assist non-U.S. military and paramilitary forces, as well as plan and conduct deep penetrations to attack critical strategic targets and collect intelligence.<sup>15</sup> Following the Vietnam War, as SF was struggling to survive force reductions by demonstrating relevance in the European-focused Army of the 1970s and early 1980s, direct operations actually achieved primacy.

## Current doctrine

Joint Publication 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, serves as




Photo by James Ensign

*A soldier from the 5th SF Group checks the weapons of members of a Vietnamese mobile strike force. The SF role in Vietnam shifted from training and advising to more direct operations beginning in 1964.*

the keystone manual for U.S. SOF.<sup>16</sup> In discussing direct action, Joint Pub 3-05 fails to mention indigenous assistance, except as a possible aspect of SOF personnel-recovery operations. It classifies personnel recovery as a subset of DA in order to differentiate it from service combat-search-and-rescue operations, or CSAR.<sup>17</sup> Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, does not mention any possibility of SOF conducting DA with, or supported by, indigenous forces.<sup>18</sup> In fact, it stresses the importance of maintaining unit integrity, implying that DA should not be conducted in a multinational configuration.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast, FM 31-20 identifies four modes in which SF can execute DA operations:

- Unilaterally, with pure SF teams.
- Unilaterally, with a mix of SF, other SOF, and conventional forces.
- As a combined operation, with SF-led foreign teams.
- As a combined operation, with SF-trained and SF-directed foreign teams.<sup>20</sup>

FM 31-20 acknowledges that UW and DA are interrelated, but it points out that DA operations:

- Are controlled and directed by a SOF chain of command.
- Are not dependent upon the support of the indigenous population.
- Are short-term, with specific and well-defined objectives.<sup>21</sup>

Like FM 31-20, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, cites indigenous assistance as a factor that differentiates DA recovery operations from CSAR operations.<sup>22</sup> It also states that DA operations and UW operations are similar, but that they are distinguishable by their command-and-control arrangements. Significantly, it distinguishes between the roles of SF and Rangers in DA operations:

SOF conducts small-scale DA operations requiring unconventional

techniques, area orientation, language qualification, and SF skills. Ranger DA operations use conventional tactics (for example, raids and ambushes) and specialized ranger techniques in platoon or greater strength.<sup>23</sup>

The authors of FM 100-25 saw a clear difference in the way SF and Rangers should conduct DA, yet FM 31-20 states:

In the conduct of DA operations, SF teams may employ direct assault, raids, ambushes, and sniping. ... They may also perform more subtle forms of DA, such as independent clandestine sabotage.<sup>24</sup>

Only in referring to the “more subtle forms of DA” does FM 31-20 address the forms of DA that FM 100-25 implies are SF appropriate.

Joint and Army special-operations doctrine are closely aligned in their discussions of SR. Joint Pub 3-05 states that SR missions may be conducted unilaterally or that they may employ indigenous assets.<sup>25</sup> Joint Pub 3-05.3 specifies that SR techniques may include battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance, technical collection, hydrographic reconnaissance, low-level source operations, and clandestine collection.<sup>26</sup> FM 31-20 and FM 100-25 mention these same techniques, adding that while battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance use “standard patrolling tactics and techniques,” clandestine collection methods rely on “language skills, UW operational skills, and area orientation.”<sup>27</sup>

Throughout joint and Army doctrine, we find that despite SOF’s ability to operate across the spectrum of conflict and to achieve effects at all three levels of war, SOF missions “should always contribute substantially to the strategic or campaign plan being executed.”<sup>28</sup> Joint Pub 3-05 states:

SOF are limited in size and, therefore, must be judiciously applied against high-value, high-risk, or

intelligence-critical targets whose destruction, elimination, degradation, or surveillance would have significant positive and lasting effects on achieving US national objectives or on a theater campaign plan.<sup>29</sup>

In a later discussion, Joint Pub 3-05 drives the point home: “Care must be taken not to fragment the efforts of SOF against attractive but perhaps operationally or strategically irrelevant targets.”<sup>30</sup>

From this we can derive our first criterion, significance, for evaluating the appropriateness of the SF direct-mission focus.

Joint Pub 3-05 establishes “appropriateness” as one of three criteria for evaluating special-operations options.<sup>31</sup> One of the two components of appropriateness is suitability:

The target or the mission environment must have a unique aspect that requires the use of SOF and renders the mission unsuitable or less suitable for action by conventional forces or other national assets. The mere existence of a target is not justification for assignment of SOF.<sup>32</sup>

From this we can derive our second criterion, suitability, for evaluating the SF direct-mission focus.

## SF in war

The Persian Gulf War provided the first glimpse of the nature of warfare in a non-bipolar world. The majority of SF activities during the Gulf War fell into one of four categories: coalition support, combat search and rescue, special reconnaissance, or direct action.

SF coalition support had two components: training and liaison. SF training of Arab forces was essential in helping these forces overcome differences in equipment, in doctrine and in training; and in helping to incorporate Arab forces into the coalition.<sup>33</sup> Teams from the 5th SF Group trained Arab forces in small-unit tactics, minefield breaching,

control of close air support, chemical-protection measures, individual- and crew-served weapons, fire-direction control, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, staff operations, and armored and mechanized tactics.<sup>34</sup> Because the allied forces were better prepared to accomplish their assigned missions, U.S. forces could focus on the decisive operational maneuver in the west.

The second component of coalition support was liaison. When the coalition forces began the ground offensive, SF coalition-support teams, or CSTs, accompanied every battalion, brigade and division of Arab forces, providing connectivity between the Arab forces and U.S. maneuver units, higher headquarters and air support.<sup>35</sup> The CSTs also provided accurate and timely situation reports on the status of allied operations.<sup>36</sup> This information was particularly critical because the Arab forces were under the operational control of the Saudis, not CINCCENT.<sup>37</sup> SF CSTs significantly increased the interoperability of U.S. and allied forces, helped maximize the contributions of allied forces and enhanced the success of the campaign.

SF coalition support was tactically, operationally and strategically significant. The CSTs provided both a vertical and a lateral command-and-control capability within the Arab forces, which made tactical operations possible. At the operational level, the heightened readiness of the Arab forces afforded the operational commander the flexibility of using them as a fixing force, while U.S., French and British formations executed the operational envelopment in the west.<sup>38</sup> The final Desert Storm report to Congress noted, "The network of U.S. liaison officers [referring to CSTs] provided the best (and sometimes only) comprehensive command, control, and communications system among the diverse Coalition forces."<sup>39</sup>



Photo by Thomas Witham

*A U.S. Special Forces soldier trains Kuwaiti soldiers in weapons and small-unit tactics. SF coalition-support training was essential in helping to incorporate Arab forces into the coalition.*

At the strategic level, maintenance of the coalition was critical. The DoD interim report to Congress emphasized the importance of Arab forces participating in the ground campaign.<sup>40</sup> Many of the Arab forces considered Special Forces the U.S. Army's most elite force. They saw the SF teams assigned to work with them as proof that the U.S. valued the Arab forces. This perception strengthened Arab participation in the coalition.

The coalition-support mission was uniquely suited to Special Forces. Although other DoD forces possessed the technical skills required for the training mission, only the soldiers of the 5th SF Group provided the comprehensive force package of language skills, cultural sensitivity and experience in working in ambiguous intercultural situations. SF soldiers played an essential part in the success of coalition warfare in the Gulf War.

### **Special reconnaissance**

During the Gulf War, SF conducted special reconnaissance in the

direct and indirect modes. During Desert Shield, when a renewed Iraqi offensive into Saudi Arabia seemed imminent, teams from the 5th SF Group conducted indirect operations, deploying with Saudi paratroopers to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border to provide early warning of an Iraqi invasion.<sup>41</sup>

Special Forces' SR operations in denied territory were extremely limited. The USASOC historical report records only 12 cross-border SR missions, all conducted in February 1991. SR missions were constrained by two factors: concerns of the CENTCOM staff that SF teams could not accomplish their missions without compromise (because of the terrain and the density of enemy forces); and concerns of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf that the risks outweighed the gains — including the risk of precipitating a conflict before the coalition was prepared for it. This second factor continued to influence events even after the air war began — only two SR missions were conducted in early February. The remainder took place the day before the

ground offensive began.<sup>42</sup>

The overall significance of the SR operations is difficult to assess. From what has been written, it appears that they had little strategic or operational significance. The USASOC historical report suggests that only three of the 12 cross-border missions were successful.<sup>43</sup> One may also infer from Schwarzkopf's reluctance to commit SF teams to cross-border SR missions that he did not see an operational requirement for such missions.

The evaluation of SF's suitability for SR missions during the Gulf War is mixed. The multilateral border-surveillance missions conducted with the Saudis required language skills and cultural sensitivity, much like coalition-support missions. Also, the intelligence architecture was not fully developed during the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield, thereby necessitating the use of SF.

As the ground war approached, however, conventional forces used various collection systems that largely obviated the need for SOF. FM 100-25 states, "SR operations normally collect and report information beyond

the sensing capabilities of tactical collection systems."<sup>44</sup> Desert Storm demonstrated that technical capabilities within the military-intelligence community are rapidly making battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance a mission that no longer requires SF's unique skills.

### Direct action

Although the ability of "smart" munitions to destroy targets deep in enemy territory minimized the need for DA missions during the Gulf War, SF did conduct some DA missions, as both direct and indirect operations. Most of these missions, however, were conducted in Kuwait City after the end of hostilities.

The first DA mission was the seizure of the Saudi-Arabian Embassy by a multinational force consisting of 157 Saudi Arabian SF soldiers and one A-detachment from the 5th SF Group. The Joint Forces Command-East had ordered the embassy seized to prevent trapped or retreating Iraqi forces from destroying it.<sup>45</sup> The embassy was

found to be unoccupied, and the multinational team seized it by ground assault without incident.

The seizure of the U.S. Embassy by elements of the 3rd and 10th SF groups was similarly unopposed. In fact, the embassy had already been found to be empty and had been secured by U.S. forces.<sup>46</sup>

Following the occupation of Kuwait City, elements of the 3rd and 5th SF groups conducted approximately 60 direct-action missions.<sup>47</sup> Working closely with Kuwaiti resistance groups with and other Kuwaiti nationals,<sup>48</sup> the SF teams seized and cleared the Kuwaiti police headquarters, the suspected PLO headquarters, Iraqi torture sites and other locations that were believed to house potential resisters or intelligence documents.

The significance of the U.S. Embassy seizure was limited. The Saudi Embassy seizure was, militarily, no more significant than the U.S. Embassy seizure; however, executing the operation was a Saudi decision. Maintaining close relations with Saudi Arabia was, and continues to be, an extremely important aspect of U.S. Mideast foreign policy. If the Saudis felt that seizing their embassy was important, then our assistance was necessary and significant.

It is difficult to evaluate the significance of the DA missions in Kuwait City. Most of these operations focused on the seizure of intelligence documents. The only unclassified references to the value of these documents state that "SOF teams captured thousands of incriminating documents which can be used in the future against terrorists and in any ensuing war crime trials," and that the DA strikes "proved worthwhile."<sup>49</sup> But DoD's final report to Congress does not list DA missions among SOF accomplishments.<sup>50</sup>

SF were suited to all of the DA missions that they conducted during



Photo by Kit Thompson

*The U.S. ambassador to Kuwait arrives at the liberated U.S. Embassy. Because the embassy had already been secured, its seizure by U.S. Special Forces was of limited significance.*

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the Gulf War. U.S. SF assisted Saudi SF in planning and preparing for the Saudi Embassy seizure and then accompanied the Saudis on the assault.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, many of the DA missions in Kuwait City were conducted in conjunction with the Kuwaiti army. Working through their Kuwaiti counterparts, SF personnel established close contacts with the inhabitants and developed the intelligence necessary to support the various DA missions.<sup>52</sup> The U.S. Embassy seizure was also a suitable SOF mission, requiring precision, synchronization and special equipment and techniques. However, an element of SOF that focuses more on direct-action missions might have been better suited.<sup>53</sup>

### **Combat search and rescue**

CSAR, by joint doctrine a service responsibility, was assigned to SOF during the Gulf War largely because Air Force-designated SAR aircraft lacked the capability of conducting long-range infiltrations into denied territory.<sup>54</sup> Army and Air Force SOF helicopters were tasked to perform CSAR missions, while two teams from the 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group, and six teams from the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, were tasked to serve as ground-security elements.

Seven CSAR missions were launched by the services, three of which were successful.<sup>55</sup> The significance of CSAR operations was minimal because of the unexpectedly light losses suffered by coalition aircraft. Even if the loss rates had been higher, the operational significance of CSAR operations would be doubtful. However, CSAR can have psychological implications. Public support of military operations is often contingent upon minimal losses of personnel or the appearance that measures are being taken to minimize losses. For this reason, CSAR could have

assumed strategic significance.

CSAR, as performed by SF during the Gulf War, was not a suitable SF mission. While the lack of conventional aircraft might have necessitated the use of SOF aircraft, the security mission lacked any aspects that required SF-unique (or SOF-unique) skills. SF's role in CSAR was that of a standard security force, a role that an infantry squad or fire team could have executed.

Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, notes that "Clandestine specialized teams and SOF are not normally assigned CSAR missions, particularly the search role."<sup>56</sup> In discussing SF capabilities, Joint Pub 3-50.2 stresses that the ability of SF to operate in denied territory and in small elements makes them an appropriate CSAR asset "where these techniques of rescue and recovery may be preferable because of terrain, enemy air defenses, and weather or when an Army SF team is already present in the vicinity of the CSAR requirement."<sup>57</sup>

### **SF in Haiti**

Operation Uphold Democracy, the multinational effort to restore stability in Haiti, has been the most extensive commitment of Special Forces since the Gulf War. In Haiti, SF operations fell largely into two categories — coalition support and nation-building.<sup>58</sup>

SF initially provided coalition-support teams to the non-U.S. units of the multinational force, or MNF. After control of the operation was transferred from the U.S. Atlantic Command to the United Nations Mission in Haiti, or UNMIH, SF provided CSTs to each U.N. contingent.<sup>59</sup> As in the Gulf War, CSTs served as trainers and advisers, and they provided information concerning the capabilities and the activities of the multinational forces.

According to a recent assessment,

Operation Uphold Democracy had three strategic objectives: to restore democracy in Haiti; to eliminate the refugee problem; and to enhance the credibility of the U.S., the U.N. and the Organization of American States, or OAS.<sup>60</sup> SF CSTs performed a significant role in accomplishing the third objective. As in the Gulf War, building a multinational effort and avoiding the appearance of a U.S. unilateral action were critical to U.S. regional diplomatic relations. SF CSTs aided the non-U.S. MNF forces in the preparation and execution of their missions, enabling MNF forces to contribute to the overall effort and strengthening the credibility of the OAS. The CSTs also supported the goal of an early transition of the mission to U.N. control: They prepared non-U.S. forces of the UNMIH to accept the hand-off of the mission from the MNF.

### **Nation-building**

Although "nation-building" is not a doctrinal term, it is the most accurate term to describe the activities conducted by SF detachments in 33 different locations throughout Haiti.<sup>61</sup> With the removal of Haiti's military government, any semblance of governmental function collapsed. Conventional forces occupied the major cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, while teams from the 3rd SF Group occupied the smaller cities, towns and villages that represent 70 percent of the population of Haiti.<sup>62</sup>

In most of these locations, the SF detachments filled the role of local government. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, or CALL, credits Special Forces with taking the initiative to teach the principles of the Haitian constitution, and democracy in general, to a majority of the population of the rural areas.<sup>63</sup> The detachments also assisted Haitian officials and communities in improv-



U.S. Army photo

*U.S. Special Forces soldiers provided security in Haiti after the Haitian police force was dissolved. SF soldiers later included members of the Haitian interim police security force, or IPSF, in their patrols.*

ing living conditions.

In the wake of the dissolution of the Haitian police, the SFODAs also became the guarantors of security. The SF detachments initially policed areas unilaterally, but later they integrated the interim police security force, or IPSF, into their patrols, and in some areas, turned policing completely over to the IPSF, under the supervision of the international police monitors, or IPMs.<sup>64</sup> In border areas, SF detachments functioned as the border patrol, monitoring for weapons and contraband, controlling crowds at crossing sites, and interfacing with the Dominican Republic's border police.<sup>65</sup> The UNMIH identified the sustained SF presence as the key element in maintaining a secure and stable environment in the countryside.<sup>66</sup>

Special Forces' nation-building activities in Haiti directly addressed one of the strategic objectives, restoration of democracy, and indirectly addressed another, the refugee problem. By teaching the populace about its constitution and

the workings of democracy, Special Forces helped the Haitians take initial steps toward democracy. By establishing a secure environment and by improving the functioning of basic civil services, SF helped lessen the likelihood of Haitians seeking refuge in the U.S.

The nation-building mission in the Haitian countryside required soldiers who were comfortable working in a potentially volatile and politically sensitive environment; SF was the most suitable force. Using their maturity and judgment, SF officers and NCOs were able to translate broad mission guidance into appropriate actions for their areas of responsibility. SF MOS skills provided the technical competence required to operate in an austere environment. The command-and-control architecture of an SF group supported the widely dispersed elements.

A critical lesson learned from operations in Haiti is the relative insignificance of high-technology systems in military operations other than war, or MOOTW. Intelligence

collection is primarily HUMINT-dependent; technical-collection capabilities, which are critical to the support of conventional conflict, add little to the development of the overall MOOTW intelligence picture. Overwhelming firepower is ineffective in the absence of high-value targets, and struggles for influence are much more susceptible to the efforts of mature, capable and thinking individuals than they are to firepower.

Prognostication is a booming business in the post-Cold War era; scholars and authors have published a variety of views regarding what the future will bring. Most of these futurists agree that while conventional interstate warfare will remain a threat, the majority of conflicts will be of a low-intensity and unconventional nature.

## Interstate conflict

Future state-sponsored threats to U.S. interests will be largely unconventional and indirect, in order to negate the ability of the U.S. to employ overwhelming force. The role of SF in countering UW is well-established: SF, in support of other U.S. government agencies, conduct foreign internal defense by training, advising and assisting host-nation military and paramilitary forces to increase their ability to counter instability in their own countries. This role will continue to be significant.

But the future may see instances in which the U.S. would employ UW to achieve its aims. In these instances, SF could conduct UW by organizing, training and advising a resistance organization.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, is nearly futile. Between 1991 and 1994, the German government detected more than 350 attempts to smuggle nuclear mater-

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ial through the country, with 60 actual seizures of material.

When Kazakhstan asked the U.S. to store its stockpile of enriched uranium, U.S. officials found the inventory to be 4 percent larger than Kazakhstan had declared. As Senator Richard Lugar stated, "Consider the implications of a 4 percent error margin in Russian inventory accuracy."<sup>67</sup> The problem is not limited to nuclear technology. Iraq recently admitted to having developed numerous biological agents, including anthrax and botulism. Fifty-five hundred pounds of anthrax, theoretically enough to kill 50 million people, remains unaccounted for.<sup>68</sup> When unfriendly nations, such as Iran and Iraq, increase their potential to threaten essential U.S. interests, the option of weakening or toppling their governments through unconventional warfare may become more attractive.

Even if the U.S. lacks the will or the desire to exploit a resistance potential in order to overthrow a government, we might consider using an existing resistance structure to collect information regarding WMD. In limited instances, the U.S. might use the resistance as a surrogate to destroy or seize critical WMD materials, facilities or technicians. In such a scenario, SF personnel could organize, train, advise and equip the resistance forces in friendly territory for later employment in the denied area.

### **Intrastate conflict**

As our recent involvement in Haiti has demonstrated, media focus, regional interests and humanitarian concerns can lead to U.S. involvement in intrastate conflicts. Conflicts such as these are the most likely and probably the most difficult challenge of the future.

The scope and the complexity of intrastate conflicts are as diverse as the problems that create them, and those problems defy simple solu-

tions. It is difficult to identify specific missions for SF, but the nature of intrastate conflicts suggests an increased demand on SF. Certainly Special Forces are not a panacea to be injected into each area of conflict. But with operations in the Third World likely to be people-oriented, SF's maturity, regional orientation and skills will become increasingly necessary, particularly as conventional forces remain focused on high-technology warfare. Shrinking U.S. resources will compel decision-makers to place a premium on the economy of force provided by SF in the indirect role.

In many areas of the world, non-national forces wield considerable power and threaten the breakdown of the nation-state. Economic problems, environmental devastation, rapid population growth and other pressures increase the destabilizing and fragmenting effects of these non-national forces. Intrastate conflicts will generate refugees, and regional stability will be threatened because of spill-over violence.

With the U.S. National Security Strategy's emphasis on remaining engaged with other nations and on enlarging the community of democratic nations, SF will be increasingly called upon to support other U.S. government agencies in conducting foreign-internal-defense missions to help stabilize other countries. In states where government institutions have collapsed, SF could become engaged in nation-building operations, as they did in Haiti.

Technology will provide some benefit to U.S. forces in intrastate environments, but it will provide no solutions. General Wayne A. Downing, former commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, has said, "The challenges of adapting high-technology force to a low-technology environment will not be easy."<sup>69</sup>

The challenges of adaptation will be particularly acute in the area of

information-gathering. Technology will have decreasing utility in an increasingly urban-centered Third World, where HUMINT is the primary intelligence discipline required for operations. The ability of SF to provide HUMINT will become increasingly important.

### **Conclusions**

The initial years of the post-Cold War era have demonstrated that while the near-term threat of high-risk, superpower war may have disappeared, conflict at the lower end of the continuum is on the rise. Special Forces have been fully engaged, and the drop in SF NCO retention rates indicates that the force is being stretched thin. In a recent Congressionally requested assessment of SOF, John Collins, the author of the assessment, identified over-commitment as a serious concern.<sup>70</sup> Collins states, "The root cause of such problems [overcommitment and low retention] is too few SOF for too many tasks. That trend, which continues because senior leaders tend to say 'can do' when they shouldn't, accomplishes current missions at the expense of future capabilities. A greater degree of restraint perhaps could lighten loads without slighting essential tasks."<sup>71</sup>

Collins' study suggests that the problem is not solely a function of lack of restraint, but of a doctrine so broad that it expects too much of the force in terms of mission readiness.

An examination of SF doctrine reveals that it originally focused on indirect missions, specifically, unconventional warfare and training. To fill a void during the Vietnam conflict, Special Forces were tasked to conduct DA and SR, and these missions were later incorporated into SF doctrine. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Special Forces emphasized their direct capabilities to ensure survival in an Army that was

refocusing on the conventional battlefield of Europe. The dual focus has been retained in joint, Army and SF doctrine.

Our experience in the Gulf War, coupled with an evaluation of the impact of new technologies, indicates that the need for SF to perform direct missions in war is disappearing. The capabilities of conventional systems to detect, track and destroy enemy targets have increased to such an extent that only a limited number of significant targets will require SOF. Those targets that do should be well within the capabilities of Rangers and other SOF units.

SF's greatest contributions in the future will be based on their skills in indirect operations. The increasing frequency of Third World conflicts will limit the need for direct operations. Most of these conflicts will occur in low-technology environments against opponents much less susceptible to an approach based on firepower and technology.

The U.S. will increasingly operate as part of a coalition, both in war and in operations other than war. Special Forces will play a key coalition-support role by bridging cultural and technical communications barriers and by aiding in the unity of effort. SF training teams will continue to expand the capabilities of coalition partners.

Unconventional-warfare operations will become increasingly attractive to policy-makers seeking to minimize U.S. risk and commitment. SF will also be required to conduct stability operations in the Third World. Regardless of the mission, operations in the Third World will be HUMINT-dependent and will require SF skills.

The exigencies of the Cold War required SF to have both a direct and an indirect mission focus. The emerging security environment does not. It does, however, promise a multitude of opportunities for exercising

SF's indirect capabilities.

Special Forces doctrine should focus on the indirect missions of FID and UW. The definition of unconventional warfare should be broadened to subsume direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions conducted by SF-trained indigenous personnel under U.S. command and control.

Focusing SF doctrine on indirect missions would allow SF detachments to achieve and maintain the requisite readiness in the unconventional-warfare skills that differentiate Special Forces from other forces. Readiness in the UW mission would still enable SF detachments to conduct direct missions that are beyond the capabilities of Rangers and other SOF.

In our doctrine, we must avoid the temptation to which we have all succumbed when packing our rucksacks for a mission: We put in equipment for every contingency and then struggle under the load, to the detriment of the mission. By concentrating on the indirect capabilities of FID and UW, SF doctrine could pack flexibility without imposing an unbearable load on the force. ✕

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Notes:

<sup>1</sup>The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1995), 2.

<sup>2</sup>James Kitfield, "New World Warriors," Government Executive (November 1995):39. Missions rose from 252 in 1991 to 1,142 in 1994. Kitfield does not give a source for his data. Data provided by the U.S. Army SF Command showed 999 missions in 1994.

<sup>3</sup>Retention rates for initial-term CMF 18 were 94.7 percent in 1993; 90.1 percent in 1994; and 73.5 percent in 1995. The overall Army rates were 49 percent, 42.6 percent, and 42.4 percent. Midterm retention rates for CMF 18 were 96.7 percent in 1993; 90.2 percent in 1994; and 85.6 percent in 1995. The overall Army rates were 74.6 percent, 72.9 percent, and 73.2 percent. Data provided by PERSCOM CMF 18 management office.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), 1-13.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Army Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991), 1-2. The fifth mission, not mentioned, is counterterrorism.

<sup>6</sup>Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets (New York: Pocket Books, 1986), 167-76.

<sup>7</sup>U. S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla [sic] Warfare and Special Forces Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1958), 16.

<sup>8</sup>Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), 17, 36. The idea that SF were selected because of a lack of a suitable alternative is echoed by Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), 71.

<sup>9</sup>Stanton, 37-38.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1961), 12.

<sup>11</sup>Stanton, 194-95.

<sup>12</sup>Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group "executed special operations and missions under the guise of a MACV staff agency charged with the preparation of various Vietnam studies. In actuality, MACV-SOG was a joint-service, high-command unconventional-warfare task force engaged in highly classified operations throughout Southeast Asia." Ibid., 205.

<sup>13</sup>Retired Colonel Scott Crerar, telephone interview with the author, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 16 August 1995.

<sup>14</sup>The terms "direct action" and "special

reconnaissance" were not in use during the war in Southeast Asia, but they categorize the type of missions that SF were conducting.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1969), 1-2.

<sup>16</sup> Major General William F. Garrison, "A USSOCOM View of Doctrine," *Special Warfare* 8, no. 3 (July 1995):16.

<sup>17</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), II-7.

<sup>18</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), II-2,3 and IV-10,11.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, II-3.

<sup>20</sup> FM 31-20, 11-2.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-2.

<sup>22</sup> FM 100-25, 3-12.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-12.

<sup>24</sup> FM 31-20, 11-1.

<sup>25</sup> Joint Pub 3-05, II-7.

<sup>26</sup> Joint Pub 3-05.3, IV-11.

<sup>27</sup> FM 31-20, 12-1; and FM 100-25, 3-13.

<sup>28</sup> Joint Pub 3-05, p. IV-6.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, V-10.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, E-1.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-7, 8.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-7.

<sup>33</sup> Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, I-15, notes that: "As early as August (1990), with the prospect of more and more coalition forces being committed to support Operation Desert Shield using different equipment and command and control procedures, CINCCENT had recognized two important requirements: to assess their capabilities and limitations, and to ensure they were integrated at the operational and tactical level."

<sup>34</sup> Training provided by SF throughout Desert Shield is from Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 1.

<sup>35</sup> Number of CSTs is from *Ibid.*, pg. 1 of executive summary.

<sup>36</sup> Results of SF CSTs from *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>37</sup> Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, I-10.

<sup>38</sup> Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, 20-2.

<sup>39</sup> Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, I-15.

<sup>40</sup> Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, 20-2.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S) (Fort Bragg, N.C.: USASOC History Office, 1993), 16-17, 49.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 35, discusses the factors constraining SR missions. Brigadier General Robert Scales, *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Army Chief of Staff, 1993), 198, notes that eight missions were inserted on 23 February 1991.

<sup>43</sup> Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 69.

<sup>44</sup> FM 100-25, 313.

<sup>45</sup> Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 106-7.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 108-9; and Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, J-11.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 109; and U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned "DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM" (S/NF) (Fort Bragg, N.C.: JFK Special Warfare Center and School, undated), 1-1.

<sup>50</sup> Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, J-15, J-27.

<sup>51</sup> Army Special Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (S), 107.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 108-9.

<sup>53</sup> Scales, 186, discusses a single Ranger operation, a DA mission by a reinforced platoon to destroy an Iraqi communications facility near the Jordanian border. The unit would have been available for the embassy-seizure mission.

<sup>54</sup> Until designated SAR forces have the capability for long-range penetration, SOF will remain the primary force for CSAR in denied territory. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLs) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff); JULLs 51455-56740 "Special Operations Forces (SOF) Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)"; and Dr. Richard Stewart, *Roles and Missions of Special Operations in DESERT STORM: An Initial Historical Summary* (S) (Fort Bragg, N.C.: USASOC History Office, undated), 1-2.

<sup>55</sup> Scales, 195. Although Scales credits each service with a recovery, one recovery was actually performed by SEALs from a SH-60 off the frigate USS Nicholas according to Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress, J-17.

<sup>56</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), II-11.

<sup>57</sup> Joint Pub 3-50.2, F-2.

<sup>58</sup> There is not a clear doctrinal mission that covers SF activities throughout the Haitian countryside. The term "nation-building" is descriptive of the type of activities SF conducted.

<sup>59</sup> 3rd Special Forces Group, Haiti: "Unconventional Operations" (briefing slides), 21 March 1995, slide "SOF Team." Hereafter referred to as 3rd SF Group.

<sup>60</sup> Dr. John T. Fishel, "Haiti Ain't No Panama, Jack" (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: 1995), 7.

<sup>61</sup> 3rd SF Group, slide "Special Forces Employment," 12 December 1994.

<sup>62</sup> Demographic data from Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions: Haiti D-20 to D+150 (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army TRADOC, 1995), 132.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>64</sup> CALL, 133 and 3rd SF Group, slide "ODB/ODAs Became: De Facto Police," 21 March 1995.

<sup>65</sup> 3rd SF Group, slide "ODB/ODAs Became: Border Patrol," 21 March 1995.

<sup>66</sup> CALL, 131, and UNMIH slide titled "Force Operational Concept" (undated).

<sup>67</sup> From George F. Will, "Perot's allure, Lugar's alarm," *Kansas City Star*, 19 August 1995, C-7.

<sup>68</sup> Christopher Dickey, "Plagues in the Making," *Newsweek* (9 October 1995):51.

<sup>69</sup> General Wayne A. Downing, "Special Operations Aviation," *Army Aviation* 44, no. 7 (July 1995):6.

<sup>70</sup> John Collins, *Special Operations Forces: An Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 133-34.

<sup>71</sup> Collins, 134.

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# Super SOCs and JSAFs: Building a Force for 2010

*by Major Edward J. McHale*

**I**n contemplating the challenges that the United States might face in the year 2010, one must do two things. First, determine trends that will affect military operations other than war into the next century. Second, divorce oneself from current conditions that may change considerably by the year 2010.<sup>1</sup>

According to Steve Metz:

The Cold War notion of conflict short of war is obsolete. Politically and militarily, the Third World of the future will be full of danger. The future will most likely be dominated by peace enforcement in failed states, new forms of insurgency and terrorism, and “gray-area phenomena.” Many, if not most of the Third World states will fragment into smaller units. Ungovernability and instability will be the norm, with power dispersed among warlords, primal militias and well-organized politico-criminal organizations. U.S. policy in the Third World is likely to be more selective, and the U.S. homeland may no longer provide sanctuary. Renewed external support will restore the lagging proficiency of

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This article makes a suggestion for SOF regional reconfiguration for the 21st century. The author’s views do not represent established doctrine; they are intended to stimulate thought and discussion. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. — Editor

insurgents and terrorists.<sup>2</sup>

If this scenario proves to be true, the priority of the “gray-area phenomena,” that we call military operations other than war, or MOOTW, will remain high on the nation’s military agenda. In such a situation, “the maneuver of conventional forces and industrial production will remain important integers in the strategic equation, but they will no longer be pre-eminent.”<sup>3</sup> The coming decade will present us with the challenge of engaging in forms of warfare different from the force-on-force type to which we are accustomed.

The populations of Western nation-states tend to shrink from unilateral involvement in regional conflicts, preferring to influence their governments toward multilateral engagements. In fact, there is diminishing military support from publics that perceive no direct threats to their national or regional security interests. “In many cases the public seek to pay for domestic social programs — from unification costs in Germany to health-care reform in the United States — out of perceived excess defense funds.”<sup>4</sup>

## **MOOTW in 2010**

Missions in the geopolitical environment of the 1990s reinforce SOF’s role as the force of choice for regional politico-military challenges. The politically low-profile operational style of SOF has gained the continued

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support of the political leadership from the U.S. and from host nations. SOF's ability to project force in a noncoercive manner has given the U.S. great political leverage in its foreign policy. Because SOF employ cost-effective smaller forces, are politically astute, are culturally sensitive, and can be easily withdrawn, they can anticipate being the force of choice in future operations.

The heightened priority of MOOTW is new for conventional U.S. forces, but not for SOF. Since the beginning of the Cold War, SOF have honed the skills that translate effectively to MOOTW. Thus, SOF come to the table with important individual skills and an understanding of the politico-military intent behind MOOTW. Typical SOF peacetime operations include disaster relief, nation assistance, security and advisory assistance, counterdrug operations, arms control, treaty verification, support to domestic civil authorities and peacekeeping.<sup>5</sup>

SOF will be required to balance and enhance the common purpose that will bind the often divergent goals and objectives of other nations in a coalition with U.S. forces. SOF will need to bridge the doctrinal and training gap that may often exist between U.S. forces and other allied forces. SOF's maturity, cross-cultural sensitivity, language skills and expertise as negotiators will be a valuable commodity in establishing rapport with allies or in negotiating with opponents.

SOF NCOs, warrant officers and officers will face leadership challenges beyond those experienced by conventional-force leaders. Operations will be characterized by unclear end states, tactical decisions with strategic implications, and opponents who, despite their lack of technology, will try to increase the cost of American engagement beyond the limits of public and congressional tolerance.<sup>6</sup>

### **Organizational growth in 2010**

With the current downsizing of the military, avoiding any decrease of the SOF force structure by 2010 would be a mark of organizational success. Organizational changes by the year 2010 should be guided not by

restructuring, but by organizational evolution through reconfiguration, and by the empowerment of organizations that function under the rubric of joint operations in MOOTW. Growth in the number of personnel and in the number of headquarters is not the objective, nor would such growth be a feasible objective during the next decade of constrained military resources.

Engaging the national military requirements is the objective. The growth that is important is in the reconfiguration of SOF units to maximize their ability to participate in joint and combined operations, coupled with the growth in organizational vision. The goals should be the strategic positioning of SOF within their regions of

***Organizational changes by the year 2010 should be guided not by restructuring, but by organizational evolution through reconfiguration, and by the empowerment of organizations that function under the rubric of joint operations in MOOTW. Growth in the number of personnel and in the number of headquarters is not the objective.***

orientation, and flatter command structures suited to the CINC's war-fighting requirements.

In the future, SOF will need to be able to employ a wide spectrum of capabilities with which to engage regional challenges in a gradual, controlled escalation of coercive actions. SOF will also need to be able to provide small units that are capable of rapid disengagement. Given the high probability that conventional forces will also be drawn into operations other than war, the U.S. must maintain a high level of interoperability between SOF and conventional forces, in order to provide a flexible military response not restricted to the application of military firepower, but including coercive military and political actions as well. The force of choice in 2010 will be a collection of organizations that are strategically positioned, that are capable of a timely response, that

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are characterized by a wide range of capabilities, and that are able to operate with acceptable political and financial costs.

### **A conceptual model**

During the 1960s, the Kennedy administration pressured the military to develop plans for dealing with operations other than war, such as counterinsurgency, that would require a flexible response. From this planning came the concept of the Free World Liaison and Assistance Group, or FLAG, which was fielded in a modified form known as the Special Action Force, or SAF, in 1964. The characteristics and the capabilities of the SAF can offer the U.S. military the operational flexibility and the responsiveness required for regional challenges of the 1990s and beyond.

The organizational concepts of both the FLAG and the SAF, combined with current concepts of joint operations and information warfare, could produce a synergistic effect against a wide spectrum of politico-military contingencies. The organizations proposed in this article, based on the concepts of FLAG and SAF, would support SOF both in operations other than war and in the emerging missions of the 21st century.

The following conceptual model is a recommendation for the reconfiguration of SOF regional forces, in contrast to a large-grained reconfiguration of the national force. In MOOTW and in joint or combined operations, there would be some overlap between the missions of regional and national forces; however, the lion's share of engagement would be handled by the regional SOF. For this reason, most of the recommendations will focus on the regional force.

The main characteristic of this suggested reconfiguration is a divisionalized form of SOF structure to provide war-fighting CINCs with a joint SOF capability that would be forward-based and that would be tailored to CINC requirements. These joint special-action forces, or JSAFS, and enhanced regional special-operations commands, or super SOCs, could evolve into a force capable of obtaining the maximum

operational leverage out of joint operations. Through continuous exposure to its wartime regions of responsibility during operations other than war, the force would also gain intelligence which would be useful in future conflicts.

Currently, regional SOCs are evolving toward the use of more joint special-operations task forces, or JSOTFs. In this model the SOC would serve as the implementer, while the JSAF would act as a portion of the JSOTF or would form multiple temporary JSOTFs. A JSAF can best be described as a collection of temporary project teams. Regardless of the organization of JSAF forces, member units would retain their unique identities, whether SF, SEAL or PSYOP, and they would conduct missions appropriate to their lineage and doctrine.


The SOF organization would consist of permanent-core units and temporary project teams. Placing the temporary teams under the control of a permanent headquarters would provide a seamless connectivity of command, control and support systems between SOF and conventional forces. The arrangement would not hinder the flexibility or the autonomy of the project teams.

### **Super SOCs**

The figure on page 15 represents a model of SOF organization in the year 2010. It depicts a SOF structure in which the permanent core, in a divisionalized form, exists to sustain and control JSAFs at the operational level. The regional special-operations commands, or SOCs, serve specific war-fighting CINCs and contain their own functional units.

The strategic apex of the organization, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, would negotiate an operational contract with each regional CINC and his respective SOC. The SOC would have a degree of autonomy, but it would be responsible for adhering to the SOF imperatives and for achieving certain measurable results, such as operational success and politically acceptable end states.

The "super SOCs" would be empowered versions of the current regional special-operations commands. Why make this com-



mand a focal point for SOF regional employment? From an organizational perspective, a SOC is strategically positioned to serve a CINC's requirements. Each of the five regional CINCs already has a SOC, usually commanded by a brigadier general. The proposed changes would flatten the command structure between the CINC and the SOF in his joint special-operations area, or JSOA. In the super SOC, the SOC commander would be a major general, preferably with SOF experience. However, considering the limited pool of SOF general officers, that might be too much to expect.

The staff and the support personnel of selected CONUS headquarters could be redistributed to reinforce the five regional SOCs. For example, the U.S. Special Forces Command and selected parts of all the services and major subordinate commands under USSOCOM could contribute to building the super SOCs (with the exception of key CONUS logistics capabilities and staffs). The SOCs would be part of the

permanent core. They would serve all staff and command functions required by the CINCs to establish connectivity with the CINCs' conventional staff. The SOCs would shield the JSAFs from any downward flow of bureaucratic requirements that the JSAF was not staffed to support.

Each SOC would convey its CINC's politico-military policies, mission orders and desired end state to the JSAF and ensure its compliance. Each SOC commander would also ensure the proper employment of SOF and adherence to the SOF imperatives. Support requirements of the JSAF would flow through the SOC.

### JSAFs

The re-creation of the special-action-force concept into a JSAF is based on an Army organization designed to perform operations other than war. Making the JSAF an interservice joint special-operations force takes the SAF concept a step

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further, but the step is evolutionary, not revolutionary. USSOCOM is a joint organization, and SOF operate as a joint force.

Each JSAF would be commanded by a SOF-experienced O7, not necessarily an Army officer. Positions on the special staff and in the support services would be filled by SOF personnel from all the services. Each JSAF, under the direction of its respective SOC, would organize and train specifically to its region and to the requirements specified by its regional CINC and by USSOCOM.

The operational cornerstone and headquarters for the JSAF would be the Special Forces group headquarters, commanded by a SOF-experienced O6. The SF group headquarters would act as the operational hub for coordination and for command and control of all temporary project teams. The Special Forces group would accomplish this task with technological upgrades in command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, buttressed by high-quality personnel at the operator and support-service levels.

The JSAF would be most effective when forward-based, thus achieving a maximum level of immersion in the militaries of its target countries. The higher rate of low-cost deployments into target regions would facilitate the collection of human intelligence and the assessment of other sources of intelligence.

The JSAF command unit would be responsible for the command, control and support of the temporary project teams; for the allocation of project teams in the JSOA; for mission-specific training; and for the deployment and the recovery of project teams. Under mission orders and guidance from the SOC, the JSAF would maintain a battle-focused training calendar to concentrate on possible regional contingencies.

A new emphasis would be placed upon the JSAF's use of Civil Affairs liaison teams for interoperability with governmental agencies, or GOs; nongovernmental agencies, or NGOs; and private volunteer organizations, or PVOs. These teams would be organic to the JSAF headquarters company. Their purpose would be to coordinate


with other agencies in solving problems in the JSOA, and to coordinate all agencies' actions with SOF campaigns.

The JSAF special staff would also contain multiple lessons-learned teams, or LLTs. These teams would maintain a central database of pertinent operational data, a living document to be accessed by all SOF organizations. An LLT might be only one person (equipped with a computer) who would accompany each project team during its mission planning, training after-action reviews, mission, and after-action reporting. LLTs would not be operators or planners — their purpose would be to record. Most operators concentrate on operational matters, and innovative techniques are often lost after the mission because they were not recorded.

The JSAF special staff would also include interagency coordination teams, or ICTs, to provide an information link to GOs, NGOs and PVOs. The ICTs would coordinate JSAF efforts with the other agencies and, through the information-warfare squadron, the ICTs would update JSAF forces on changes affecting the JSOA.

A negation of the cookie-cutter approach to force structure, the JSAF would be an "adhocracy," designed to provide the appropriate force mix for each situation. The JSAF's strength would lie in its organizational flexibility — project teams would be configured and reconfigured based upon operational requirements, not upon organizational requirements. Whether a regional challenge escalated at a slow pace or at the speed of information warfare, the JSAF's fluid structure would ensure SOF's ability to respond to contingencies across the spectrum of conflict.

Within the JSAF there would be few rules guiding the structure and the employment of JSAF assets. A project team might comprise an SF group headquarters, two SF battalions, one engineer company, three SEAL platoons, a Civil Affairs team and a medical company. On the other hand, it might comprise one SF A-detachment and an engineer section. The project team might accompany an infantry division on an operation that



could last anywhere from one day to two years. The only organizational structures whose integrity would have to be respected are SF detachments, SEAL platoons and Ranger companies.

The standard JSAF might comprise the following assets:

- JSAF headquarters company and special staff section; GO, NGO and PVO liaison elements; and LLTs.
- SF group headquarters.
- SF battalions — number to be determined by the CINC's requirements.
- SEAL platoons — number to be deter-

mined by the CINC's requirements.

- Rangers — company or larger, based upon the CINC's requirements.
- Information-warfare squadron, containing military intelligence, communications technology, PSYOP and public affairs.
- Civil Affairs.
- Maneuver-support battalion, containing Army aviation, AFSOC-liaison staff, Navy special-boat units, transport/truck companies, engineers and military police.
- Service-and-support battalion, con-

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taining signal company, medical company, communications-support company, wheeled maintenance, aviation maintenance and medical supply.

### **Information-warfare squadron**

Much of the current discussion of warfare is directed toward increasing the lethality of weapons. This notion can be at odds with those SOF techniques that aim to manipulate rather than to obliterate the target audience. The concept of information warfare, or IW, holds some promise of usefulness for SOF in MOOTW. IW can speed up an organization's decision cycle and the development of systems to aid in population-control measures. IW could also be of some benefit in tracking economic and social events.

The projected structure of the JSAF would provide for the inclusion of an IW capability. The information-warfare squadron, or IWS, would become the headquarters and the consolidator of all public-affairs operations, military-intelligence matters, and PSYOP. The assumptions, campaign plans and products to be implemented would be cross-checked and coordinated by the IWS's intel, PSYOP and public-affairs elements in order to achieve a synergistic effect. In no way would the IWS inhibit the flow of information to the project teams; in fact, it would keep the teams informed. The IWS would also query project teams for feedback reports. The IWS would have the dual responsibility of satisfying standard unit internal intelligence activities and of keeping pace with an information-warfare battle that can travel at the speed of light.

The PSYOP element would gauge and manipulate the impact of information warfare on the target audiences. The preparation of contingency PSYOP campaign plans for the region would be continuous, and the plans would be coordinated with U.S. national objectives. The public-affairs element would conduct interviews and provide updates to the media. Its objective would be to stay ahead of the media requirements for daily news reports. Public affairs would also assist project teams by providing media portfolios advising opera-

tors on how to deal with the media. The media can rapidly influence the national will, and a soldier's refusal to speak to reporters can sometimes be damaging. The public-affairs unit would also assist the JSAF commander in keeping stateside service-member families abreast of operations from the command's perspective.

### **MEU(SOC)**

The Marine expeditionary unit (special-operations capable), or MEU(SOC), is a valuable asset that has not been used to its fullest capability. By incorporating the MEU(SOC) into their operations, SOF can sometimes achieve a more timely and more efficient application of force. The MEU(SOC) concept, which emerged in 1985, was not intended to compete with or to replace SOF, but to allow the U.S. to field a more capable forward-deployed Marine expeditionary unit.

The MEU(SOC) contains a reinforced infantry battalion, a composite helicopter squadron, a combat-service-support group and a command element led by an O6. The MEU(SOC)'s two greatest advantages are its responsiveness and its limited forcible-entry capability.

The average MEU(SOC) numbers about 2,200, including Marines and medical personnel. MEU(SOC)s are trained to execute 24 missions, including noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian assistance, amphibious raids, in extremis hostage rescue, and airfield seizures. The Navy normally deploys a MEU(SOC) into a region in which the application of force is likely to be necessary.

There is currently no early interface between the CINC and the MEU(SOC). Thus the MEU(SOC) enters the theater with few remaining opportunities for additional training in specific areas identified in briefings with the CINCs.<sup>7</sup> The MEU(SOC)'s capabilities should be used in conjunction with SOF that have current intelligence and good connectivity with the CINC. Since the MEU(SOC) may be on the scene before SOF arrive, it should become practiced at working with SOF national forces and regional JSAFs. An operation

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might unfold as follows: A MEU(SOC) located off the coast of a nation requiring the evacuation of U.S. nationals is also tasked with a personnel-recovery mission of high political importance. SOF soldiers of the national force should be able to land on a MEU(SOC) vessel with minimal coordination. The Marines and the SOF command-and-control apparatus should mesh so that they can conduct the recovery operation. The Marines would already be prepared and positioned to perform the external security tasks needed to support the recovery operation.

## Issues

Admittedly, the JSAF concept runs contrary to the current force-projection concepts geared toward the use of CONUS-based forces and toward the reduction of OCONUS forces. The forward-basing of a majority of SOF would present serious personnel issues. Unless funds could be found to cover the additional costs of accompanied tours, JSAF duty would have to be an unaccompanied tour. Some kind of short-term personnel rotation from CONUS bases to the JSAF might work, but that would not be as effective as a forward-based JSAF. Other areas for further research include: How could this reconfiguration be supported logistically? Where would the organic support units come from? Would such a force be cost-effective?

## Conclusion

In summary, the concepts of both JSAFs and super SOCs offer a SOF capability tailored to a CINC's region. The JSAF, with an organic complement of vital assets ready for employment and constantly developing the JSOA, would be easily committed in MOOTW. It would be flexible enough to adapt its structure as missions or desired end states change. The JSAF would be capable of displaying persistence and patience on long-duration missions, and it would be capable of swift disengagement when political or military objectives warranted the withdrawal of forces. The JSAF concept is not an attempt to replace conventional forces in MOOTW; rather, it is

a means of augmenting conventional forces or of freeing a portion of them from MOOTW so that they can train for critical war-fighting tasks. ✂

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### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Paul Bracken, "Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Army," Strategic Studies Institute, monograph, 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> Steven Metz, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War," Strategic Studies Institute, monograph, July 1994, V.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Michael Howard and John F. Guilmartin Jr., "Two Historians in Technology and War," Strategic Studies Institute, monograph, 39-40.

<sup>4</sup> Jacquelyn K. Davis, "Refocusing Traditional Alliances and Establishing New Ones," Strategic Studies Institute, monograph, 1993, 202.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 2-0.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>7</sup> Anthony E. Van Dyke, "MEU(SOC)s and the CINC's," Naval War College, unpublished paper, 22 February 1993, 3.

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# Employment of CA Forces: Doctrine vs. Reality

*by Major Jeffrey B. Gowen, U.S. Army (ret.)*

**I**n the current operational environment, the role of Civil Affairs forces is changing. Although they are organized and equipped to perform military-government missions, CA forces are increasingly being used to augment the staffs of maneuver commanders' civil-military operations cells.

With the expanding role of CA forces come questions about how best to use the CA commanders of the commands, brigades and battalions. Additional questions arise on which command relationship — operational control, tactical control, attachment, or direct support — is best for the employment of CA units. Questions also arise on the composition of CA units as they augment CMO cells.

This article attempts to answer those questions and to present a doctrinal basis for the employment of CA operational planning teams, the use of CA commanders, and the command relationships of CA units supporting maneuver commanders.

The nature of conflict has changed since the end of World War II, when CA forces were employed as a military government. The current CA force structure is based on

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This article is the author's recommendation for changes in the CA force structure and C<sup>2</sup> relationships. Major Gowen's proposal incorporates some concepts that are being addressed as emerging CA doctrinal issues, but it does not necessarily represent approved CA doctrine. — Editor

the assumption that CA units will be required to conduct military-government missions. However, the operational environment in which CA forces are now being employed does not call for military-government missions.

The Army uses Civil Affairs personnel in operations involving nonmilitary agencies and individuals. CA forces can provide military commanders with operational support that will minimize the effects of non-military forces on military operations.

If recent operations indicate what the future holds, U.S. forces will be involved in relatively small-scale operations conducted on a broad front. The current CA brigade structure, which is geared toward civil administration and military government, is not designed to support small-scale operations. The Army needs to adapt the CA force structure to the changing reality of mission requirements. The charts on pages 21 and 22 depict the structure and the capabilities of the proposed CA brigade. A second chart on page 22 shows the proposed personnel structure for the CA operational planning teams, or CAOPTs.

According to Joint Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, civil-military operations, or CMO, is a generic term used to denote the decisive and timely application of military capabilities to enhance the relationship between the military and civilian populace in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander's mission. CA

is an integral part of CMO, but all forces deployed in theater, not CA forces alone, should be able to practice CMO.

CMO is a function of command. It is oriented toward operations, not toward support. Like the operational planning and intelligence sections, the CMO section belongs where it can assist the military commander in developing maneuver and fire-support courses of action, or COAs.

CA's relationships of command-and-control, or C<sup>2</sup>, must protect the unique capabilities of CA forces and reflect the emerging prominence of these capabilities. In most cases, attaching CA units or personnel to the supported command produces the most efficient command relationship. In the operations of a joint task force, a CA brigade normally provides support. The JTF commander's staff must have a dedicated cell that can plan the CMO and supervise the staff personnel of all attached or assigned CA forces in the JTF. When the JTF operates at corps level or below, the G5 (principal staff officer) is responsible for planning the CMO


and for scheduling support from a CA brigade.

### Staff support

Upon deployment, the commander of a CA command becomes the CA special staff officer for the theater commander in chief. He advises the CINC or corps commander on the capabilities and the most effective employment of the tactical support teams, or TSTs, that support a maneuver brigade of a division. Through operational channels, the commander of the CA command provides technical advice to CA units in theater. He does not assign missions or move the TSTs.

Mission requirements for CA units flow through normal operational channels. The CMO cell plans the mission under the supervision of the G5; taskings are assigned through J3/G3 channels to the maneuver commanders. Attached CA units receive their mission assignments from the maneuver commanders.

A JTF headquarters should receive three CAOPTs (one each for the JTF CMO main



## CA Brigade Capabilities

CA Brigade provides:

- 2 x CAOPT to corps G5 cells (main & rear)
- 3 x CAOPT to corps brigades' CMO cells (Eng, Med, MP)
- 1 x CAOPT to corps CMOC
- 4 x CAOPT to the remaining corps brigades' CMO cells (Arty, Avn, MI, Sig)
- 1 x CAOPT to JTF headquarters
- 4 x CAOPT to JTF service-component commanders & JSOTF
- 1 x CA battalion to each of corps' divisions

## CAOPTs

### CAOPT for corps level and above

LTC	38A	Team leader
MAJ	38A	Operations officer
CPT	38A	Plans officer
MSG	38A	NCOIC
SGT	38A	CA NCO

### CAOPT for division level and below

MAJ	38A	Team leader
CPT	38A	Operations officer
CPT	38A	Plans officer
MSG	38A	NCOIC
SGT	38A	CA NCO

and rear cells and one for the civil-military operations center, or CMOC). In a JTF that does not have a CMO staff officer, the CAOPT at the main cell would provide CMO staff support and planning, and the senior officer on the CAOPT would serve as the CMO staff officer for the commander of the joint task force. Working through the G5s or S5s, the main cell exercises staff supervision over all assigned or attached CA forces in the JTF. In a JTF that has a CMO staff officer, the CAOPTs would augment the CMO cells. In either case, the CMO staff officer should be equal to the other principal JTF staff officers and should have the same direct access to the commander.

Although the skills of CA functional specialists are required in a military-government mission, CA soldiers are frequently employed as generalists when supporting the staff of a non-CA commander. The Army needs to place greater emphasis on training CA soldiers to function as generalists in order to provide round-the-clock staff support. The CAOPTs, while used primarily in generalist missions, should be staffed by CA specialists who have the ability to make a smooth transition from generalists to specialists when the need arises.

Doctrinally, CA forces are attached to other units when those units deploy. The supported units provide Army-common logistics support to the attached CA units (all classes of supply, except Class VII). Simply put, the receiving commander is responsible for feeding, fueling, fixing, moving and housing the attached CA units. Through personnel channels, the supported unit advises the CA commander on the status of attached CA personnel.

CA forces receive their mission assignments from a non-CA commander. When a CA battalion is attached to a division, the five TSTs are attached either to the division's maneuver brigades or to the division support commander, as the division commander directs. The TSTs do not report directly to the CA brigade — to do so would mean bypassing both the CA battalion and the division. All reports from the TSTs should be submitted, by the brigades they support, to the division G5.

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The division G5 should provide copies of these reports to the CA battalion commander; the G5 should also forward a consolidated CA report to the corps G5. The corps G5 should provide copies of the consolidated report (which includes the status and actions of personnel, units and equipment) to the CA brigade commander and his staff.

Once in theater, the CA brigade commander serves as a special staff officer to the CJTF, holding a position similar to that of the corps brigade commanders (aviation, military intelligence, artillery). Working through the J3 operational channels, he provides technical advice to his employed units and retains command of those elements of his brigade that are not attached to other units.

The CA brigade commander does not become the corps G5. He ensures proper employment of his forces and advises the corps G5 as to which CA unit is most capable of accomplishing an assigned mission. The CA brigade commander and some of his staff members should collocate with the corps G5 in the main cell. Additional personnel would help ensure adequate staffing of the corps CMO main cell, and the proximity would ensure prompt coordination and communication between the CA brigade commander and the corps G5.

Although CA commanders do not provide C<sup>2</sup> for detached elements, they are required to be fully informed about those detached assets. CA units and elements at all levels should immediately develop a coordination network with the staff elements of the supported units. An effective coordination network would enable the CA commander to maximize the use of CA assets, and it would enhance his awareness of all issues pertaining to those assets. Furthermore, the CA commander must know the whereabouts of all his detached elements and be aware of their personnel and logistics issues in order to provide assistance to the supported unit commander.

## Summary

Faced with the reality of current operations, CA forces need to change their organization and C<sup>2</sup> relationships. The proposed CA brigade structure would enable

CA forces to better advise maneuver commanders on the conduct of civil-military operations. CA is an operational force, not a sustainment force. CA forces are attached to other units when those units deploy, and they receive their mission requirements, logistics and administrative support from a non-CA commander. The CA battalion commander retains command over his remaining forces, assigning them missions received from the division G5.

In all cases, the CMO cell at each level of command provides staff supervision (technical advice) for its attached units.

Since the normal C<sup>2</sup> relationship of CA units is attachment, the CA commander should serve as the non-CA commander's special staff officer on CA. The CA commander, using operational channels, provides technical advice to all of his CA units. If the supported commander does not have a dedicated CMO staff officer, the senior officer on the CAOPT serves as the staff officer, and he should have a status equal to that of the other principal staff officers.

By implementing the recommended changes, CA forces will not only ensure their continued usefulness, they will also improve their ability to support military commanders. More important, they will be able to contribute to the types of operations that U.S. forces are most likely to face in the future. ✕

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School. His previous assignments include deputy G5 and G5, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Commissioned as an Infantry officer upon graduation from the Air Force Academy, Gowen is a graduate of the Engineer Officer Advanced Course and the Command and General Staff College. He holds a master's degree from Webster University. Gowen is now a consultant and lives in Rockfish, N.C.

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# Special Operations Aviation Mission Planning: Improving the Process

*by Major Robert W. Werthman*

**T**he desired outcome of any mission-planning process is the complete synchronization of combat power on the battlefield. In seeking to achieve this goal, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment uses a tactical decision-making process and troop-leading procedures tailored to the unique capabilities of Army Special Operations Aviation and Special Forces units.

Because SOA doctrine in Army Field Manual 1-108, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Aviation Forces, is limited and inconclusive regarding mission planning, it was necessary to develop an SOA mission-planning process. This article will define the SOA mission-planning process and focus on its integration with the SF battalion's mission planning.

Normally, the majority of support that the 160th SOAR provides to the U.S. Army Special Forces Command is allocated to A-detachments, not to the SF battalion. Operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center, or JRTC, bring the SF battalion and SOA together, placing

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This article is the author's explanation of a SOF aviation mission-planning process that the author and other SOF aviators have found effective at the Joint Readiness Training Center and in real-world operations. The charts and procedures do not necessarily reflect current SOA doctrine. — Editor


them under the command and control of a joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF.

## **Command and control**


Understanding the command-and-control structure is the first step in defining the SOA mission-planning process. The JSOTF has direct control of the SF battalion forward operational base, or FOB, and control of SOA assets through the joint special-operations aviation component commander, or JSOACC. The FOB has command less operational control of the SOA. The FOB commander is responsible for the SOA's force protection, messing, billeting, etc. The JSOTF controls the SOA's airframes, and the FOB commander must inform the JSOTF commander of any intent to use SOA aircraft.

In planning and coordinating aviation support, the JSOTF conducts the 96-hour special-operations mission planning process outlined in Joint Publication 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures. Although factors such as mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and time available, or METT-T, can increase or reduce the time required, 96 hours is the standard time allotted.

The JSOTF sends the mission-tasking order, or TASKORD, through the JSOACC to the SOA 96 hours prior to the earliest anticipated launch time, or EALT. The



### 96-Hour SO Mission Planning Process



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SOA begins its mission-planning process based on the EALT and, following a METT-T analysis, determines the actual launch time needed for meeting the time on target, or TOT. An important link in this process is airspace coordination: The JSOACC deconflicts fixed- and rotary-wing assets of the JSOTF; and the Joint Airspace Control Center, or JACC (located at the joint task-force level), deconflicts theater assets and produces the air tasking order and the airspace control order. The other elements in this process are explained in detail in Joint Pub 3-05.3.

### **FOB planning**

It is important that aviators understand the FOB's mission-planning process. Normally, the FOB's battle staff conducts a deliberate decision-making process that takes 12-20 hours. The SOA is linked to this process through its aviation liaison officer, or LNO, who is attached to the FOB.

The SOA and the FOB receive the TASKORD at approximately the same time, and they conduct parallel planning. The LNO inputs the aviation commander's limitations and constraints into the courses of action developed at the FOB. The LNO's contribution helps to eliminate impracticable courses of action, or COAs. The LNO war games with the FOB staff to determine the decision points and abort criteria that will be crucial to mission success. Throughout the process, the LNO ensures that the SOA S3 is informed of the FOB commander's intent and of the progress of the mission planning.

During the OPORD brief to the detachment, the LNO briefs the ODA commander on the capabilities of the aviation assets supporting his team. The LNO meets with the team later to ascertain the preliminary tactical plan and any rehearsal plan. Prior to this meeting, which usually takes place 8-12 hours after the FOB's mission brief, the detachment conducts its tactical decision-making process, or TDMP, and completes the aviation mission checklist pertaining to

such matters as infil, exfil, contingencies and communication.

The LNO submits the preliminary tactical plan, the rehearsal plan and the aviation checklist to the aviation S3, who analyzes the information and then passes it to the air mission commander, or AMC, and the flight lead, or FLT LD. (If the rehearsal is complex, the FLT LD himself will meet with the detachment to develop the rehearsal plan.)

The next meeting between the detachment and the FLT LD takes place after rehearsals and not later than the team's backbrief to the FOB commander. The FLT LD, using planned routes, finalizes the tactical plan, the escape-and-recovery plan, the communications plan and any contingencies that may require adjustment after the rehearsals. Up until the mission launch time, threat and mission updates received from the ODA are disseminated to the SOA by the LNO and the FLT LD.

### **SOA planning**


The SOA mission-planning process parallels that of the FOB. Of the three planning processes — the deliberate process, the combat process and the quick-decision process — outlined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, the SOA process is more similar to the quick-decision process.

There are good reasons to favor the quick-decision process over the more systematic approaches: The SOA's primary mission is to nurture a habitual relationship with the ground force and to support that force with as many assets as the mission requires. Because the SOA must react and adjust to the ground commander's tactical plan, the SOA's planning time and COAs are limited. The SOA mission-planning process also gives the AMC and the flight leader input into the FOB staff's decision-making process. Because the SOA input is so detailed, the FOB staff normally accepts the aviation COAs, thereby saving time. In addition, the AMC, the flight leader and the LNO are able to war game and to conduct a detailed mission analysis with the FOB staff.

## FOB Tactical Decision-Making Process

Message/Activity	Decision Point	From	To/Info	When	Duration
Mission tasking (TASKORD)		Higher	FOB/ supporting unit	H – 96 hrs	
Disseminate TASKORD		OPCEN	Centers	H – 96 hrs	0:15 hrs
Gather facts; mission analysis; initial IPB					1:45 hrs
Restated mission; commander's guidance	DP 1 Restated mission	FOB staff	CO	H – 94 hrs	0:30 hrs
COA development; staff planning					1:30 hrs
COA war gaming					1:00 hrs
COA selection & commander's guidance	DP 2 COA decision	FOB staff	CO	H – 91 hrs	0:30 hrs
Warning order (WARNORD)/ isolate team		FOB	Executing detach- ment/ISOFAC	H – 90 hrs	
OPORD approval	DP 3 OPORD approval	FOB staff	CO	H – 87 hrs	0:30 hrs
OPORD (written)		FOB	Executing detachment	H – 85 hrs	
OPORD (mission brief)		FOB	Executing detachment	H – 82 hrs	0:30 hrs
Detachment mission OPLAN	DP 4 OPLAN approval	Executing detachment	FOB	H – 74 hrs	0:30 hrs
Operation plan (OPLAN) message		FOB	Higher/supporter	H – 72 hrs	
Airlift request (AIRLIFTREQ) message		FOB	Supporter/higher	H – 72 hrs	
Mission concept approval (MCA)		Higher	FOB/supporter	H – 64 hrs	
Request confirmation (MSC)		Supporter	FOB/higher	H – 48 hrs	
Backbrief	DP 5 Readiness approval	Executing detachment	FOB	H – 24 hrs	1:00 hrs
Execute order (EXORD)		Higher	FOB/supporter	H – 24 hrs	1:00 hrs
Launch approval	DP 6 Launch approval	FOB	Executing detachment	H – 2 hrs	0:10 hrs
Launch				H – hour EALT	0:00 hrs

# Mission Process



NOTE: Dashed lines indicate that rehearsals are METT-T dependent.

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Throughout the mission-planning process, the SOA must adapt to the intent of the ground-force commander. Without the ground plan, the SOA's COAs are limited to asset availability, the capability of the forward arming and refueling point, and the scheme of maneuver. The SOA can request fire support and suppression of enemy air defenses, but the ground force must integrate those requests into its tactical plan.

The SOA war games the entire tactical plan and conducts full-mission-profile rehearsals only after the FOB commander has approved the ODA plan. Special-reconnaissance and foreign-internal-defense missions may require only static rehearsals (rock and contingency drills), because these missions usually entail straightforward infil/exfil operations. Direct-action missions, however, are normally intricate operations that require complex analysis, detailed war gaming and flying rehearsals.

After the initial TDMP, the SOA planning cell (established by the AMC and the FLT LD) develops the tactical air routes and the air scheme of maneuver. Staff elements integrate with the planning cell and provide intelligence, fires and electronic-warfare support, logistics estimates, etc. The planning cell continues to refine the mission data and to produce the necessary charts and knee-board products for the air mission brief, or AMB.

Flying rehearsals, communications checks, confirmation briefs, and weapons test fires prior to the mission enhance the readiness of assets and refine the plan.

Synchronizing the planning, focusing the key players, conducting rehearsals and performing precombat checks and precombat inspections are not only the cornerstones of the SOA mission-planning process, they are also the keys to mission success.

## Conclusion

An implied war-fighting task for all soldiers is that they know their own combat power so that they can apply appropriate force at the right time. If SOF fail to under-

stand each other's capabilities and limitations, their mission planning will be ineffective, and ineffective planning will jeopardize the mission.

Special-operations aviation requires a mission-planning process that allows its forces to perform effective and timely analysis and to meet the ground-force commander's intent. The mission-planning process discussed here gives the SOA the flexibility to adapt to the ground plan, the accessibility to provide timely input into the FOB planning process, and the opportunity to conduct detailed mission analysis with the SF FOB. Validated in exercises at the JRTC, the aviation mission-planning process promises to foster the effective integration of SOA and SF on the battlefield of the future. ✕

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Major Robert W. Werthman is the S3 for the Aviation Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, in Korea. He was previously the senior special-operations aviation observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La. From 1990 to 1994, he served with the 1st/160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment as an AH-6 attack platoon leader and as a special-mission unit liaison officer.

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# Special Forces and the Promotion of Human Rights

*by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey F. Addicott*

**T**he practice of using the United States military to promote human rights in foreign militaries has taken on a greater significance during the post-Cold War era. Emerging democracies often look to American forces for assistance in establishing law-based militaries in which the policies, rules and practices are based on the principles of human rights.

Although the term “human rights” does not immediately conjure up images of Special Forces in action, the 1990s are witnessing the use of SF in missions that clearly reflect America’s desire to inculcate human-rights values within the militaries of our friends and of our allies. SF have proven themselves to be a premier vehicle in this regard. Indeed, promoting human rights to the militaries of emerging democracies is a priority role for Special Forces — a role for which they are uniquely qualified.

The purpose of this article is to present a concept of human rights and to explain the critical role that SF can play in promoting human rights abroad.

The term human rights rolls off the tongue with great ease, but exactly what does it mean? One of the most frustrating problems associated with understanding

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This article examines the increasing importance of human rights in military operations and the contributions that Special Forces can make. — Editor

human rights is that there is no definition that conveys the meaning quickly and clearly.

## **Definition**

The legal definition of “rights” usually refers to claims recognized and enforced by law, but human rights encompass a far broader category of issues, many of which are not deemed to be legally binding in the context of either domestic or international law. In other words, a particular human right is not a right unless it is rooted in an enforceable law.

In its most comprehensive meaning, human rights encompasses all of the principles and concerns associated with ensuring respect for the inherent dignity of the individual human being. Of course, only in this sense can individuals ever be called equal, since each person, regardless of his abilities or handicaps, possesses the same right of respect for his person and property.

## **State vs. citizen**

To understand human rights, we first have to identify the affected parties. It is also important to know that human rights focus on the relationship of the individual citizen vis-à-vis the national entity. Only the state (or an agent of the state, e.g., the military) can commit a human-rights violation. One citizen, per se, cannot violate

the human rights of another citizen.

Furthermore, taking a state to task for an alleged human-rights violation is a relatively new concept. Prior to World War II, international law had little say about how a state dealt with its citizens. In general terms, a state could treat all persons within its borders in any manner it saw fit; national sovereignty was the rule.

However, since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, international law has shifted dramatically in favor of supporting the human-rights concerns of the affected citizen. Through treaty and customary law,<sup>1</sup> the international community has reached a consensus that all people have a legal entitlement to enjoy certain basic human rights. This consensus is reflected in documents such as the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,<sup>2</sup> the Charter of the Organization of American States, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on Human Rights.

The human rights that are now legally binding on all states under international law are commonly


referred to as international human rights. And at least in the context of these human rights, international law no longer recognizes the unrestricted right of a national entity to deal with its citizens or aliens in violation of these precepts.

### Human-rights law

What, then, is the current body of human rights and how much of it falls into the category of enforceable international human-rights law? Although many scholars view human rights as chronologically evolving through generations, the various types of human rights can be divided into three distinct categories.

The first category is international human rights, which protect an individual's right to be secure in the most sacred asset of all — his person. Under international treaty and customary law, this category of human rights is

*Human-rights handbooks demonstrate the increased emphasis on international human rights. The booklet on the left was developed for Ukrainian soldiers in 1995 by U.S. and Ukrainian judge advocates.*



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absolutely binding on every state in the world. When we speak of a state committing a human-rights violation, we are normally referring to international human rights.

Specifically, a state violates international human-rights law whenever, as a matter of policy, it practices, encourages or condones any of the seven actions that have gained universal recognition as “gross violations” of the internationally recognized human rights. Set out at “Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) § 702; Customary International Law of Human Rights,” these actions are as follows:

1. Genocide.
2. Slavery or slave trade.
3. The murder of, or causing the disappearance of, individuals.
4. Torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.
5. Prolonged arbitrary detention.
6. Systematic racial discrimination.
7. A consistent pattern of committing gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.

Following closely on the heels of the first category are political and civil human rights, the second category. Unlike internationally recognized human rights, political and civil human rights are legally binding on only those states that have obligated themselves by means of a specific treaty commitment.

Political and civil human rights grant an individual the right to be “free from the [S]tate in his civil and political endeavors.”<sup>3</sup> In a broader sense, the political and civil freedoms of religion, movement, peaceful assembly, association, expression, privacy, family rights, fair and public trial, and participation in government are all human-rights principles related directly to the ideals of free association.

The second category of human rights is fundamental to an individual’s maximum development, for without the basic guarantees of freedom to which these rights speak, one’s full potential could never be realized. Western democracy fully endorses these concepts. The term “democratic behavior” is often used as a synonym for

political and civil human rights.

In contrast to the second category of human rights, the third category has no international movement directed toward it. This category involves governmental obligations regarding working conditions, social security, education, health care, resource development, food, the environment, humanitarian assistance and peace. Very few states endorse the third category of human rights. In fact, many scholars do not even refer to the issues addressed in this category as human rights. Accordingly, in any discussion of human rights, one can assume that the third category of human rights is not included — unless these rights are specifically enumerated.

Third-category rights are fundamentally different from first- and second-category rights. Instead of restricting governmental behavior toward the individual, these rights mandate that the government perform numerous social and welfare actions for the individual.

### **Force multiplier**

Since the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, the world has changed drastically and with breathtaking speed. Only eight years ago, the Free World focused on containing a heavily armed and expansionist Soviet empire. Now, primarily through internal aspirations for greater human rights (first and second categories), the Soviet Union and its ideology of repression have disappeared, and the attendant winds of freedom have blown to people and nations throughout the world. Such aspirations have led other formerly repressed peoples into hurried attempts to establish democratic governments and free-market economies, the principle coins of the realm of human rights.

Accordingly, the U.S. entered the post-Cold War era with the understanding that fostering democracies was vital to its national-security interests. The reasons for this outlook are as simple as they are profound: Democracies make better neighbors, they generally do not make war on one another,<sup>4</sup> and they do not threaten one



Photo by Jeffrey Addicott

*Ukrainian soldiers attend a human-rights class in Kiev. The class was part of a course developed in 1995 by judge advocates from Ukraine and from the United States.*

another or act in aggression.

Clearly, then, the exporting of human-rights values is a powerful weapon against renegade nations that still seek to wage war (as well as those nations that still deny basic human rights to their citizens). Without question, in a shrinking U.S. military force structure, promoting human rights is a valuable force multiplier.

When we assist a new democracy in its transition from totalitarianism to democracy, the need to reshape the role of its military organization is paramount. This is just as important in Ukraine as it is in the fledgling democracies of Latin America. Ironically, under a nondemocratic system, the totalitarian-based military is usually the chief violator of international human rights. Likewise, during a country's transition period to democracy, it is the "new" military that often remains the single most influential institution.

A true democracy cannot exist unless its military establishment is dedicated to the principles of human rights. Militaries that are rooted in human-rights concerns are also apolitical, personally accountable to applicable laws, and responsive to the civilian leadership in a democratic process.

Richard Simpkin encapsulates this concept in *Race to the Swift*, his book about 21st-century warfare. Simpkin notes that the militaries of democratic governments "rest on the rule of law [of which human rights is the core] and must so rest."<sup>5</sup> While such values may be taken for granted in societies resting on stable democratic traditions, the militaries of nondemocratic states may virtually ignore them.

Because a great number of foreign armies and ministries of defense have little frame of reference as to how they should function in a democratic system, many of these organizations eagerly look to the U.S. military for assistance. Specifically, foreign militaries seek our help in developing military establishments that respect international standards of human rights and that adhere to democratic principles of behavior (political and civil human rights).

### **Role of SF**

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command concentrates on the four challenges to U.S. security outlined by the 1996 Defense Planning Guidance: (1) proliferation of nuclear weapons, (2) regional crisis,

(3) threats to democracy, and (4) threats to the economy.<sup>6</sup> In meeting the challenges of “regional crisis” and “threats to democracy,” perhaps the most effective and efficient method is to reduce the chance of such activities arising in the first place. To achieve this, we must instill within the host-nation militaries a healthy respect for human rights. This is not as difficult as it may sound, for the militaries of many emerging democracies seek specific guidance from U.S. Special Forces as to how human-rights concerns should properly function in their military establishments and, further, how their military establishments should fit into a more democratic form of government. Foreign militaries instinctively turn to SF for the following reasons:

First, SF are uniquely positioned to influence the attitudes of, and, in some cases, even the structure and function of, a host-nation military. Why? Because Special Forces can go where no other element of the U.S. military can. As noted by retired Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough: “Other than Special Forces, there is no element of the U.S. armed forces that is capable of performing across the entire

spectrum of what is labeled, for want of a better term, low-intensity conflict.”<sup>7</sup>

SF perform hundreds of missions each year in support of war-fighting CINCs and other agencies. These operations span the spectrum of conflict, including direct action, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, security-assistance training, humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics, demining and combating terrorism.

Simply put, when the U.S. is involved with host-nation forces, SF are everywhere, doing everything. The deployment figures tell the tale. In FY 1996, for instance, SF soldiers deployed on 2,325 missions to 167 countries throughout the world.

Second, SF soldiers have received specialized training in the language, culture, religion and politics of the countries in which they operate; therefore they are best qualified to foster genuine military-to-military relationships. In fact, Special Forces can operate equally as well in a geographic region as in a nation itself. SF are able to tailor each mission in order to make the maximum impression on their military counterparts regarding the importance of

*Captain Mike Newton, then-group judge advocate for the 7th SF Group, gives human-rights instruction to soldiers of the Caribbean Commonwealth coalition prior to their deployment to Haiti in 1993.*



Photo courtesy Mike Newton

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human-rights concerns.

Third, SF exemplify a professional military force's ability to maintain a superb operational record while functioning in accordance with human-rights concerns. Almost without exception, foreign soldiers are deeply impressed with the manner in which human rights and military efficiency go hand-in-hand. Foreign forces know that for SF, concern for human rights has always been the sine qua non for U.S. military operations.

Indeed, promoting international human rights and promoting democratic behavior have long been critical themes of SF, regardless of their mission at hand. President Kennedy routinely acknowledged and praised SF for their devotion and support to humanitarian causes. No one who has followed the success story of SF in Operations Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, Just Cause, Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy, and the peace-implementation force in Bosnia can doubt their value to these complex operations.

In short, U.S. Army Special Forces are universally recognized and respected as efficient, professional and humanitarian. Former USASOC commander Lieutenant General James T. Scott stressed this truism in a 1996 speech: "I can tell you that Special Forces soldiers will ... continue to serve as the conscience and the example of lesser developed nations regarding human rights [emphasis added]."<sup>8</sup>

Finally, the motto of Special Forces, "De Oppresso Liber," reflects a profound concern for the inherent dignity of those who are denied international human rights. In a profession that requires crossing all cultural and societal boundaries, SF serve as an ideal model as they train host-nation forces and assist them in alleviating many of the conditions that breed human-rights abuses.

By word and by deed, SF promote the message that a commitment to human rights is the hallmark of a professional military serving the interests of a democratic nation. This message is not lost on the host nation. For example, during the mission in Haiti, SF worked closely with local citizens, political leaders and for-

eign forces on a daily basis. Without question, the thread that underlined every action taken there was the emphasis that SF placed on respect for human rights. In the end, human-rights concerns took root because of the professionalism demonstrated by SF.

Joint and/or combined exercises for training, or JCETs, present the most common opportunity for SF to influence the human-rights practices of the soldiers of fledgling democracies. SF are often quizzed by their counterparts as to how one should respond to human-rights abuses committed within the military. Drawing on American history (to avoid unnecessary controversy), Special Forces soldiers rely on various illustrations, such as the lessons learned from My Lai,<sup>9</sup> to explain the practical necessity of abiding both by the law of war and by internationally recognized human rights.

Invariably, SF stress four important points to host-nation soldiers: (1) human-rights abuses are never tolerated by a democratic populace (e.g., the American public); (2) human-rights violations do not shorten a conflict, be it internal or external in nature, but usually have the opposite effect; (3) soldiers guilty of human-rights violations must be punished, or similar abuses will surely follow; and (4) to maintain discipline and esprit de corps, the chain of command must train soldiers to respect internationally recognized human rights and the law of war.

### **SF human-rights policy**

Shortly after assuming command of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC, Major General Kenneth Bowra implemented a policy to ensure that all SF soldiers understand their rights and responsibilities regarding human rights. The USASFC human-rights policy memorandum<sup>10</sup> directs that SF soldiers who deploy OCONUS:

(1) Receive training in the full range of human-rights issues, both generally and as they apply to the host nation to which the soldiers are deploying.

(2) Report through the chain of command

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all gross violations of human rights encountered while OCONUS.

The memorandum also requires commanders, whenever practicable, to incorporate human-rights training into the military training provided to the host-nation forces. In addition, group commanders must review all exercise/deployment after-action reports and evaluate the impact that human-rights training initiatives have had on host-nation military forces. The group commanders then submit their findings and recommendations to the commanding general of the USASFC.

### **Group judge advocates**

The adage, “You can’t teach what you don’t know,” is particularly applicable to the policy memo’s requirement to explain and to promote human-rights concerns to military personnel in developing democracies. SF soldiers and their commanders must address this challenge. Even team-level predeployment briefings should anticipate any human-rights issues that may be unique to the host nation.

Human-rights training packages may involve many sensitive issues. Therefore, planning conferences should address the issue of designing training packages tailored to the wishes and the desires of the host-nation military. Clearly, host-nation forces are receptive to discussing human-rights issues only when the issues are presented in a nonthreatening, nonde-meaning environment of instruction. If a host nation is reluctant to discuss human-rights issues, an informal approach may reap the greatest dividends. In other instances, host-nation forces may request more formal instruction on how the U.S. military approaches human-rights issues.

To this end, Special Forces have many resources available to them. A group judge advocate, or GJA, is assigned to each SF group. Other than a soldier’s own moral compass, the GJA is the most important human-rights resource available. Each GJA has received specialized training in human-rights law and brings with him an extensive collection of infor-

mation on issues related to his particular group’s area of responsibility, or AOR.<sup>11</sup> Apart from providing the mandatory pre-deployment legal briefings to all deploying soldiers, these military attorneys keep abreast of international agreements, changes in human-rights doctrine, and political and social changes in their respective regions.

The staff judge advocate for the USASFC requires that all SF GJAs maintain close contact with their military legal counterparts in as many host nations as possible in their respective AORs. Whenever possible, GJAs engage in initiatives to institutionalize human-rights training within foreign militaries. The GJAs have been extremely successful in this approach. For example, they assisted the Thai military in developing a human-rights training program for its junior military attorneys at the Royal Thai military law school in Bangkok, and they developed human-rights training handbooks for military coalition forces in Haiti.<sup>12</sup> Special Forces GJAs also worked closely with U.N. personnel in Haiti and Bosnia.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, the post-Cold War world presents new challenges to U.S. Army Special Forces. SF must maximize their opportunity to make substantial contributions toward building and strengthening human-rights concerns within the militaries of emerging democracies.

Just 10 years ago, hundreds of countries functioned under some form of nondemocratic military rule (in Latin America alone, more than 90 percent of the countries were nondemocratic). Today, the majority of these nations operate under popularly elected civilian governments. But great nations are neither created nor sustained by accident. U.S. assistance is desperately needed to help solidify, and in many cases to create, a true commitment to human rights.

Promoting human rights in the militaries of emerging democracies is a top priority for U.S. Army Special Forces. With their critical skills, their extensive

language and cultural training, and their proven military professionalism, Special Forces are ideally suited for this important task. ✕

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<sup>8</sup> Retired Lieutenant General James T. Scott, Address at the USASFC Change of Command Ceremony (May 21, 1996). (Transcript available at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, USASFC, Fort Bragg, N.C.)

<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott and William A. Hudson, "25th Anniversary of My Lai: Time to Inculcate the Lessons," *Military Law Review* 153 (1993), 139.

<sup>10</sup> USASFC(A) Policy Memorandum No. XXX, dated August 1996, "Special Forces Human Rights." Issued by Major General Kenneth Bowra, CG, USASFC.

<sup>11</sup> See, USASFC Human Rights Handbook (on file with the OSJA, USASFC, Fort Bragg, N.C.).

<sup>12</sup> Many of these initiatives have been conducted through the Center for Law and Military Operations located at the Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Va.

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> A state may express its consent to be bound by treaty in a number of fashions: (1) by ratification, (2) by accession, or (3) by a declaration of succession. Even absent consent, if a norm or standard has reached widespread acceptance in the international community, it is said to have passed into the realm of customary international law. The derivation of customary international law comes from observing past uniformity among nations.

<sup>2</sup> Prepared by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and adopted by the General Assembly in 1948 [Res 217(III), 10 Dec 1948].

<sup>3</sup> Centre for Human Rights, United Nations, Fact Sheet No. 16, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1991).

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., R. J. Rummel, *Death By Government: Genocide and Mass Murder in the Twentieth Century* (LaVergne, Tenn.: Ingram Connections, 1994); David E. Dessler, "Beyond Correlations: Toward a Causal Theory of War," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, 1991, 327-55; James Lee Ray, "Wars Between Democracies: Rare or Nonexistent," *International Transactions* 18, No. 3, 1993, 251-76.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Simpkin, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1985), 320.

<sup>6</sup> General Wayne A. Downing, "Special Operations Forces: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges Today," *Special Warfare*, January 1995, 2.

<sup>7</sup> Retired Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough, "Emerging SOF Roles and Missions: A Different Perspective," *Special Warfare*, July 1995, 10.

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# Civil-Military Operations: A New Battlefield Operating System?

by Major Timothy E. Howle

**R**ecent changes in the international political environment, coupled with the increased importance of peace operations and the proliferation of civilians within a given military area of operations, necessitate the addition of another battlefield operating system — civil-military operations, or CMO.

Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, defines a battlefield operating system, or BOS, as “a major function performed by

conspicuously absent. As a result, CMO are often ignored or included very late in the planning cycle.

Yet the need for effective CMO planning has been demonstrated in a number of recent military operations, including Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in Panama, Desert Shield/Desert Storm/Provide Comfort in Iraq, Support Hope in Somalia, Restore Hope in Rwanda, Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Provide Promise/Joint Endeavor in the Former Yugoslav Republics. In the future, the civilian dimension will continue to have a significant impact on U.S. military operations, from peace operations (support and stability operations) to major regional conflicts.

To effectively negotiate the challenges presented by civilians, commanders must prepare for all possibilities. During the initial planning phase of all operations, commanders must address dislocated-civilian operations, humanitarian-assistance operations, populace and resource control, and foreign-nation/host-nation support.

Without proper CMO planning and the effective use of the Civil-Military Operations Center, or CMOC, commanders may have to use their own personnel and resources to handle difficult situations in the civilian arena. The CMOC, which is the coordination center between the military force and civilian agencies, can

***The importance of the civilian dimension of the modern battlefield will not diminish; it will only loom larger. Senior leaders and commanders can no longer relegate CMO planning to the status of an adjunct activity. CMO should be considered as important as the other seven battlefield operating systems.***

the force on the battlefield to successfully execute Army operations in order to accomplish military objectives directed by the operational commander.”

Current BOSs include maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility and survivability, and combat service support. These seven BOSs are all represented by either primary or special-staff personnel at division and corps levels, but CMO are

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ensure a coordinated effort between the military, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, international organizations, and local governments.

The CMO staff officer, the G5, is a commander's principal planner/adviser on all aspects of CMO. The commander must ensure that the CMO staff officer is included as a principal party in all operational planning and execution.

The importance of the civilian dimension of the modern battlefield will not diminish; it will only loom larger. Senior leaders and commanders can no longer relegate CMO planning to the status of an adjunct activity. CMO should be considered as important as the other seven battlefield operating systems. In the current operational environment, civil-military operations are a major function performed by the military force in order to accomplish the commander's objective.

According to FM 100-5, the rationale for a BOS is "to enable a commander to perform a comprehensive examination in a straightforward manner that facilitates the integration, coordination, preparation, and execution of successful combined-arms operations." It should be obvious by this rationale that CMO, which are indispensable in synchronizing forces and effects on the battlefield, qualify as a battlefield operating system. The civilian dimension must be considered in all operations, and adequate CMO planning and execution are key factors in successful mission accomplishment. The inclusion of CMO as a battlefield operating system will ensure that commanders adequately address this unique and vital area in operational planning. ✕

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## When SOF Were Needed, They Were There

by General Henry H. Shelton

**I**n an attempt to describe the current state of special operations – which has reached the promise of joint operations – one word comes to mind: synergy, the combined action of disparate elements, greater in its total effect than the sum of its parts.

To illustrate my point, I can find no more vivid image than a three-week period in the life of Special Operations Command - Europe, or SOCEUR.

By the beginning of April 1996, the civil war in and around Monrovia, Liberia, had deteriorated into utter chaos, with well-armed, often drugged or intoxicated rival gangs making life extremely difficult for those who were caught in what amounted to a free-fire zone. Americans as well as citizens from scores of other countries became trapped in this highly volatile and hostile situation. Diplomats, relief workers and

*Evacuees from Monrovia gather behind an MH-53 PaveLow while awaiting their escort into the airport terminal in Dakar, Senegal. The PaveLow and its crew were from the 352nd Special Operations Group.*



Photo by Richard M. Heileman

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United Nations observers who were monitoring the political agreements that had brought the previous fighting to an end in August 1995 were among those trapped.

Meanwhile, SOCEUR units, some at home station and others deployed to several locations in Europe, were conducting unilateral, joint and combined training. SOCEUR units were also operating in the former Yugoslavia. The peace-implementation-force mission was a major focus of SOCEUR, when, on April 3, the command was tasked to assist in the search and rescue for United States Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown's aircraft near Dubrovnik, Croatia.

MH-53J helicopters from the 352nd Special Operations Group, with Air Force special-tactics troops, Navy SEALs and Army Special Forces aboard, conducted the search in such precarious weather conditions that the helicopters had to hover up and down the mountainsides to locate the crash site. Once the crash site was located, SOCEUR, which had been given command and control of the recovery effort, organized the Croat, French, British, Spanish, German and U.S. forces and assigned them the grim task of searching for and recovering the remains of the 35 passengers on the airplane.

After having completed that recovery effort, the commander of SOCEUR, Brigadier General Mike Canavan, who was aboard an aircraft en route to his home station, was notified of a noncombatant-evacuation mission. When his aircraft landed, Canavan was briefed on the details of the mission. While still aboard the aircraft, he did some initial planning and then departed for the next mission.

This time, SOCEUR's mission was to deploy critical elements into the area of operations; to establish an intermediate staging base in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, from where evacuees could be transported to a safe haven in Senegal; to secure the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia; and to evacuate American citizens and Third World nationals.

Once again demonstrating the benefits of continuous joint planning, training

and operations, SOCEUR quickly assembled a team of special-operations aircraft and Air Force, Army and Navy special operators (who were augmented by conventional elements) to accomplish the mission. This mission called for and received fixed-wing and helicopter assets from SOCEUR components and from the continental U.S. so that an air bridge could be created from Monrovia to the intermediate staging base in Freetown.

All told, the MH-53Js and the MH-47Ds tallied 354 flight hours in 65 sorties, of which more than a third were aided by the use of night-vision goggles.

***The evacuation was performed with an acumen that impressed all observers. Although I won't mention any names, a senior official in the White House told me that special-operations forces do not receive the credit they deserve because of their ability to make everything they do seem so easy.***

These sorties rescued 2,115 people from 71 countries before larger conventional forces arrived to relieve the special operators.

The professionalism demonstrated by the troops was extraordinary. In one case, a SEAL sniper was watching an armed Liberian who appeared to be leveling his rocket-propelled grenade launcher at the U.S. Embassy compound — a clear and distinct “trigger” event within the rules of engagement. Demonstrating the discipline that comes from specialized training and experience, the SEAL did not open fire. Pausing briefly, he realized that the Liberian had merely shifted his hold on the RPG in order to eat a sandwich. The Liberian will never know how close he came to becoming a statistic.

The evacuation was performed with an acumen that impressed all observers. Although I won't mention any names, a senior official in the White House told me that special-operations forces do not

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receive the credit they deserve because of their ability to make everything they do seem so easy.

When we think of the accelerated changes around us, we can be confident that our special-operations forces represent the distinction between success and failure.

Taking a look at the definition of “synergy” again, we can see that it aptly describes what we have achieved with the combination of the right organization, the best equipment and, most important, the finest men and women ever fielded in special operations.

No one asked if SOCEUR and its components were ready to go. But when they were needed, the U.S. expected them to be prepared, and in turn, they made all of us proud. ✂

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- War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (Revised and Updated); by Robert B. Asprey; Reviewed by LTC David G. Bradford; August, 57.
- War Stories of the Green Berets: The Viet Nam Experience; by Hans Halberstadt; Reviewed by Dan C. Godbee; December, 53.
- You're No Good to Me Dead: Behind Japanese Lines in the Philippines; by Bob Stahl; Reviewed by COL Scot Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); May, 48-49.



# Letters

## Special Warfare

### Retirement speech contained valuable lessons

After having had a heart transplant about a year earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Dwayne Aaron, the former commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, was honored by his old unit with a retirement ceremony on Oct. 4, 1996, on the the old JFK Plaza. Those of us who heard Lieutenant Colonel Aaron's comments were deeply affected by his words. Part of his retirement speech is reprinted here for the consideration of all SOF leaders.

I've been doing an informal after-action review of my military career, and I've come up with a short list of things I wish I had done. First, I wish I'd kept a journal or a diary — It's hard to remember everything. I wish I had learned earlier to listen more and talk less — I would have been a lot smarter a lot quicker.

I wish I had spent more time with my sergeants — Their experience and practical know-how saved me from disaster more than a few times. I wish I had spent more time in the field — That's where you learn what it is to be a soldier, and it's fun. I wish I had learned earlier that compassion and tough leadership are not mutually exclusive — I did a lot of dumb things thinking that I was being tough.

I wish I had been better with names — Fortunately, I have forgiving friends. I wish I had volunteered more — I'd probably have more interesting stories to tell. I wish I had learned earlier

the difference between things that are really important and those that are just urgent.

I wish I had taken the time to be a much better teacher and mentor — The most important job you have as a leader is to train your people. I wish I had gone SF a lot earlier — Special Forces has been very good to me. But most of all, I wish I could do it all over again.

We wish Lieutenant Colonel Aaron well in his retirement.

LTC Al Aycock  
USAJFKSWCS  
Fort Bragg, N.C.

### Sullivan neglected airborne warfare

In his article in the August 1996 edition of *Special Warfare*, Brian Sullivan forgot to mention the single most important revolution in military affairs: airborne warfare, the application of decisive ground forces by air to strike at the enemy's most critical center of gravity.

Only the speedy application of significant combined-arms forces by fixed-wing aircraft via airdrop, short takeoff and landing, or airland over strategic distances can respond in time to prevail over rapidly changing explosive events in the multipolar world. When the national command authorities require ground leverage, that force must arrive at the required spot on the globe within hours, not days, weeks or months.

If we wanted to save the Kurds

or rescue hostages in Peru, would we send men in boats to the scene at a snail's pace? The forward-deployed amphibious forces the U.S. can afford are merely a token force that can at best "show the flag" and do media-intensive evacuations — and then only if they are in the area.

This isn't 1944, it's 1997. Our world moves by air. Aircraft can be refueled en route to reach any spot on the globe. U.S. Air Force airlifters can airdrop or airland hundreds of troops, heavy and light armored fighting vehicles, and thousands of pounds of ammunition and supplies from strategic distances at 600 miles per hour.

We don't have enough ships for a second land army dedicated to an obsolete doctrine of seizing fortified islands for naval bases. And even if we did, there isn't enough time to load them and set sail for a country being overrun by an enemy with his forces already in place. The war would be over long before ships could arrive.

Grenada and Panama were both toppled by airborne forces using strategic and operational maneuver. During the latter operation, amphibious forces sat back in CONUS — a ship deployment would have alerted our enemies and given them ample time to dig in, and they could have resisted stubbornly, causing high U.S. casualties.

In a telecommunications age, surprise is fleeting: Air Force transports inbound to Haiti with thousands of U.S. Army paratroopers and Special Forces had only hours of surprise to exploit. What

would a single-dimensional attack coming only from the sea have given an enemy in warning time? Months, weeks and days to fortify and anticipate predictable beach landing sites and helicopter landing zones.

When Iraq threatened Saudi Arabia, what did we do? We flew in Air Force TacAir and the 82nd Airborne Division. When we needed a foothold for the peace-enforcement mission to flow into Bosnia, what did we do? We flew in paratroops to secure the Tuzla airfield. When the Russians wanted to seize Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, what did they do? They flew in their airborne divisions, which by their superior mobility and op-tempo, out-maneuvered and outfought their opposition. The future of war is airborne, not seaborne.

The airborne operation has made vast strides since its beginning in World War II: the German and Russian airborne forces have air-droppable light armored fighting vehicles (the former are helicopter-transportable) that make them fully maneuverable forces from the drop zone, and they carry heavy weapons to provide shock action to overcome stubborn opposition.

The "computer age" we live in is increasingly urbanized. Conflicts emanating from these areas will require forces that can land at an unexpected time and place with agile AFVs and self-reliant paratroops, not simplistic naval line infantry forces that assault a narrow selection of predictable beaches. Naval advocates brag that a

large percentage of the earth touches water, but 100 percent of the earth is covered by the air and is subject to airborne attack.

The "Revolution in Military Affairs" is not only communications and intelligence traveling through the air, it's combat forces exploiting that intelligence by airborne deployment. If we are to remain the world's superpower, we must realize that our world moves by air — overnight, not on a "slow boat to China." We should stop spending money on an amphibious force that will never fight, and instead give our airborne and special-operations forces that lead the way what they need to win and come back alive.

Sullivan needs to reflect on the dynamics of airborne warfare. I cannot understand how one can postulate the future of U.S. Army Special Forces and totally ignore the single most important means by which they deploy.

Mike Sparks  
422nd CA Battalion  
Greensboro, N.C.



Special Warfare is interested in hearing from readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare and elsewhere, or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a true forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long, but they may have to be edited for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. We will withhold an author's name upon request, but we will not print anonymous letters. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

# Enlisted Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### E7 promotions for SOF exceed Army average

The results of the 1996 sergeant first class promotion-selection board have been released, and once again, promotions for CMF 18 and CMF 37 soldiers have exceeded the Army average. The overall Army select rate was 11 percent: CMF 18 achieved 40.3 percent, and CMF 37 achieved 36.4 percent. The MOS breakdown is as follows:

	Primary Zone		Secondary Zone		Total		
	Elig.	Sel.	Elig.	Sel.	Elig.	Sel.	%
18B	129	30	106	8	235	38	16.2
18C	105	96	84	9	189	105	55.6
18D	108	78	70	6	178	84	47.2
18E	125	98	97	7	222	105	47.3
37F	7	7	37	9	44	16	36.4

### PERSCOM points of contact

Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows:

LTC Michael W. Grant	SF Enlisted Branch chief
MSG R.B. Gardner	Senior career adviser
SFC Tod Young	CMF 18 career adviser; reclassifications; ANCOG
SFC Timothy Prescott	CMF 37F career adviser
Mrs. Faye Matheny	1st, 5th and 10th SF groups; ROTC and JRTC assignments
Mrs. Franca Lockard	3rd and 7th SF groups; JFKSWCS; USASOC; USASFC
Ms. Dyna Amey	SFAS accessions; SFQC student manager

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager. Career-development questions should be directed to the senior career adviser. Students enrolled in the SF Qualification Course who have questions about assignments should contact their student PAC. Questions regarding NCOES should be directed to the SF group's schools NCO. Telephone inquiries may be made by calling DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command: Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452.



# Officer Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### **PERSCOM establishes Worldwide Web site**

The commander of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command has directed that PERSCOM Online will be the principal source of written communication between PERSCOM and the field. Branch bulletins, newsletters and information updates will no longer be sent to the field by facsimile or by e-mail. PERSCOM Online provides timely information on personnel issues, results of promotion and selection boards, concise information regarding personnel issues, monthly promotion cut-off scores, branch newsletters, and PERSCOM e-mail addresses and phone numbers. It is available 24 hours a day at <http://www-perscom.army.mil>. To access PERSCOM Online, users must have at least a 386SX computer, a modem, at-home or military Internet access, and Mosaic or Netscape browser software. For more information, phone the PERSCOM Public Affairs Office at DSN 221-8857 or commercial (703) 325-8857; address e-mail to TAPC-PAO@Hoffman-emh1.Army.mil.

### **FA 39 achieves 80 percent O6 promotion rate**

The Functional Area 39 (Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs) selection rate for the FY 96 colonel promotion-selection board was 80 percent. The Department of Army selection rate was 41.2 percent. FA 39 had one above-the-zone selection and four promotion-zone selections. All officers selected for promotion are former FA 39 battalion commanders. Three of those selected are senior-service-college graduates, and two are attending senior service colleges.

### **SF O6 selection rate highest of all branches**

The selection rate for Special Forces officers from the FY 96 colonel promotion-selection board was the highest of any branch — the SF primary-zone selection rate was 51.7 percent. This was 10.5 percentage points higher than the Army primary-zone selection rate. The relatively high in-zone select rate for SF reflects the overall file quality of the branch's year group 1975. All selected officers were former battalion commanders (10 SF, three FA 39 and two special-mission units). All selected officers were selectees for, or graduates of, senior service colleges. Fourteen of those selected for promotion to colonel have had joint experience. Nine have a JSO (3L) identifier. Four are serving in joint assignments.

In order to be fully integrated into the Army and into the joint community through branch, functional-area and branch-immaterial assignments, the Special Forces Branch needs 150 colonels. The SF Branch has 78 colonels and promotable lieutenant-colonels, including the 15 officers selected by the FY 96 colonel promotion-selection board. The FY 96 selections improved the overall colonel inventory for SF by 23.8 percent. The inventory should continue to grow as relatively larger year groups — 1976, 1977 and 1978 — enter the promotion zone over the next three years.



# Foreign SOF

## Special Warfare

### **Finland to train counter-diversionary troops**

The Finnish Ministry of Defense is reportedly preparing to train counter-diversionary troops — temporarily designated the Utti Light Infantry — at a “special forces training center” near Valkeala in southeastern Finland. Beginning in the spring of 1997, the center plans to train 160 conscripts per cycle. Most of the conscripts will go to airborne units, but about 50 will receive training for “special task-force commando” units. In addition to jump training, the commando students will receive instruction in countering enemy saboteurs, infiltrators and guerrillas. The task-force commando units, which will comprise approximately 400 soldiers, will be responsible for performing intelligence-collection missions, for stopping border infiltrators and for preventing enemy efforts to sabotage mobilization. They will deploy and operate as small groups and will be transported primarily by helicopters. The jump school and the transport-helicopter resources already present at Utti will be expanded to support the new force.

### **Germany forms new special-forces group**

Germany is forming a special-forces group, the Kommando Spezialkraefte, or KSK, to perform a range of military missions in enemy rear areas or in trouble spots abroad. Although unit missions may include operating against targets such as lines of communication or enemy headquarters, particular emphasis is being placed on ensuring the safety of German citizens in war or conflict zones, evacuating noncombatants, and rescuing hostages or downed pilots. Approximately 20 soldiers had been trained by the fall of 1996, and the unit is scheduled to be fully operational by April 1997. The unit is expected to reach its full strength of 1,000 soldiers by the year 2000. According to reports, the impetus for forming the force was the German experience during the Rwandan civil war in 1994. During that conflict, Belgian and French paratroopers were used to rescue 11 German nationals because no suitably trained German troops were available. The KSK emphasizes the usual tough selection criteria and lengthy, thorough training associated with special-operations units. The KSK commander, a brigadier, has emphasized the need for mature, reliable soldiers to man the unit. Despite the unit’s hostage-rescue capabilities, reports stress that the KSK is a military unit with military missions — not another GSG-9 counterterrorist force.

### **Chinese newspaper calls for ‘special operation corps’**

A military column in the People’s Republic of China daily Jiefangjun Bao has noted the proliferation of terrorist acts, hostage-taking and other unconventional types of conflict that increasingly threaten lives, property, and national and regional stability worldwide. The author indicated that while the consequences of these actions might be great, using conventional means against unconventional actions was like “beating a flea with a bear’s paw.” Additionally, he saw a greater need for specially trained units capable of performing reconnaissance, target location and designation, raids and ambushes, and a range of other direct and indirect actions in enemy rear areas. In reviewing the efforts of other military establishments to develop such forces — noting especially the increase in U.S. special-operations capabilities in recent years — the author called for more Chinese

## **Russian criminal groups recruit special-ops veterans**

attention to the development of a “special operation corps.” The author concluded that China should “cast away the traditional mentality of fighting large-scale decisive wars with large numbers of troops; strengthen special operation corps research; and further develop special operation corps theory.”

According to one Russian assessment, there are 15 government special-operations units in the Russian Federation that are subordinate to law-enforcement or military commands. (For an excellent Internet site addressing a number of these units, see <http://members.aol.com/spets1/spetsnaz.html>). Together with Soviet-era security organizations, these units have generated large numbers of veterans, many of whom have drifted into, or have been recruited into, criminal enterprises. There are a number of active Russian veterans’ organizations, including some based exclusively on service in the various special-operations units. The president of the “Vityaz Interregional Association for the Special Protection of Veterans of Special Units and Special Services,” judges that about half of discharged Spetsnaz soldiers, finding themselves unwanted and at loose ends after discharge, join criminal organizations where their knowledge and experience are put to use. The consequences of this infusion of specialists include a large number of unsolved contract killings and a growing number of skilled bombings. In St. Petersburg, for example, there were 48 bombings from January to November 1996, only six of which have been solved. While some veterans’ groups like the Vityaz association profess a mission of finding employment for Spetsnaz veterans, a number of groups have formed their own “security structures” that provide protection to business and financial organizations, as well as to their own members. The legality of these ventures is often unclear. The extent to which some veterans’ groups are immersed in organized crime was suggested by the remotely-detonated explosion in November 1996 at Moscow’s Kotlyakovskoye Cemetery, where members of at least three Afghan veterans’ groups, including the “Russian Afghan War Invalid’s Fund,” or RFIVA, had gathered to commemorate the assassination of a RFIVA chairman two years earlier. Fourteen people were killed by the blast, which was believed to be linked to the group’s commercial activities and controversy over the diversion of money designated for “war invalids.” In response to these developments, the Russian Federation security personnel now consider the criminal activities of discharged special-operations personnel (and veterans in general) to be an important issue.

## **Philippines establish special-ops command**

In mid-1996, the armed forces of the Philippines combined their Special Forces Regiment, First Scout Ranger Regiment, and Psychological Operations Group to form a new force designated the Special Operations Command. Comprising 5,000 men and women, the new organization serves as a rapid-deployment force, carrying out counterterrorist missions and other special small-unit actions that draw on the urban counter-subversive skills of the Special Forces Regiment, the jungle-operations expertise of the Scout Rangers, and the techniques of the psychological-warfare elements. It may also be employed in disaster-relief and rescue efforts. In November 1996, the new force was employed to provide additional security for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation conference, in support of police and other military units.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DUSA-IA, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

# Update

## Special Warfare

### 96th CA Battalion receives new commander

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Baltazar assumed command of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Michael G. Rose in a ceremony at Fort Bragg's Special Operations Forces Memorial Plaza Nov. 25.

Baltazar's previous assignments include company executive officer, 1st Engineer Training Brigade; detachment commander, 86th Engineer Diving Detachment; and engineer analyst, U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned. Baltazar, who was born in Paris, was commissioned as an Engineer officer upon graduation from the Virginia Military Institute in 1979.

Rose will remain at Fort Bragg, where he will serve at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

### Kensinger new USASOC DCG

Brigadier General Philip R. Kensinger Jr. became the deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Nov. 12.

Kensinger replaced Major General Kenneth R. Bowra, who had held the position since January 1996, and who also assumed command of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command in May.

Kensinger previously commanded Special Operations Command - Central at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. His other special-operations assignments include detachment executive officer in the 7th SF Group, battalion commander in the 5th SF Group, and commander of the 3rd SF

Group. He has served overseas assignments in Germany, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama.

A native of Pennsylvania, Kensinger received his commission from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1970.

### SOSCOM welcomes new commander

The U.S. Army Special Operations Support Command passed the reins of command in a ceremony at Fort Bragg's Special Operations Forces Memorial Plaza Nov. 15.

Colonel Brian I. Geehan, former deputy chief of staff for operations at Fort Bragg's 1st Corps Support Command, took command from Colonel Laney M. Pankey, who had commanded SOSCOM since its activation in December 1995.

"It truly has been a superb environment in which to soldier and support soldiers," Pankey said. "The 112th Signal Battalion and 528th Support Battalion are the core functional expertise of SOSCOM. Regardless of where and when they are needed, they will be there to provide assured continuous communications and logistics."

SOSCOM soldiers have participated in more than 75 exercises and have been involved in several contingency operations, including Haiti and Bosnia.

### Special Operations Council accepting members

The Special Operations Council, a nonprofit professional society that serves as an advocate for active- and reserve-component U.S. special-operations forces, is accept-

ing applications for membership.

Among the council's primary goals are to enhance its members' professional development, to serve as a special-operations information clearing house, to promote the interests and welfare of SOF personnel and their families, and to educate the public on the importance of SOF. For more information, write to the Special Operations Council, 5667 Stone Road, Suite 515, Centreville, VA 20210-1618.

### Ground broken for airborne, special-ops museum

The groundbreaking ceremony for a new museum to honor the history of airborne and special-operations forces was held at Fort Bragg Nov. 1.

The Airborne and Special Operations Museum will be the only one of its kind, providing a comprehensive history of U.S. Army airborne and special-operations forces. Located on a 20-acre tract of land, the 65,000 square-foot facility will include exhibit space, a giant-screen theater, an artifact-preservation facility, a military research library, a World War II-vintage building complex, a gift shop, a book store and administrative offices.

Scheduled to open in the spring of 1999, the museum is expected to attract more than 250,000 visitors in its first year, with an increase each year after that.

According to Anna Honeycutt, executive director of the Airborne and Special Operations Museum Foundation, "The story of the air-

borne and special-operations forces is a story that should be told. The foundation is thrilled that the museum will give people the opportunity to learn more about and appreciate the airborne and special-operations forces."

Speakers for the ceremony were Lieutenant General John M. Keane, commanding general, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg; retired General James J. Lindsay; and retired Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough.

## **20th SF Group seeks intel soldiers**

The 20th Special Forces Group is seeking soldiers who are interested in working in military intelligence.

The 20th SF Group is an Army National Guard unit headquartered in Birmingham, Ala. It is actively engaged in missions worldwide.

The group has intelligence organizations in Birmingham and Huntsville, Ala.; Jackson, Miss.; Starke, Fla.; and Louisville, Ky.

The 20th Group has openings in tactical, signals, imagery and counterintelligence disciplines of intelligence, as well as in communications.

Interested personnel must have or be able to obtain a TS/SSBI background investigation. They must also be airborne-qualified or willing to attend Airborne School.

For information on specific openings, phone Captain Steven Cush, Sergeant First Class Duane Ress or Sergeant First Class David Watkins at DSN 778-2272 or commercial (205) 951-5322.

## **SWCS updates CA Officer Advanced Course**

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has incorporated changes into the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course to teach students how to work in a paperless tactical operations center.

The CAOAC command-post exer-

cise, or CPX, is now conducted at Fort Bragg's Army Special Operations Battle Simulation Center. The three-day CPX is based on the Battle for Fayetteville, as described in the CAOAC written material and in the Pineland Area Study used in the course. Required maps and overlays are entered into an electronic database for information retrieval by the students.

Major Kenneth Emberton, course director, says that the new exercise allows students to become familiar with operations over a digital network. He also stated that student comments have been positive.

The objective of the CPX is to reinforce training with hands-on exposure to civil-operations situations encountered during actual operational deployments. The CPX marks the culmination of two weeks' training that qualifies reserve officers to work in Civil Affairs positions and to transfer into the Civil Affairs Branch. For additional information, phone Major Emberton at DSN 239-6097 or commercial (910) 432-6097.

## **Rangers looking for officers, enlisted**

The 75th Ranger Regiment is seeking top-quality, highly motivated officers and enlisted soldiers to serve in the Regiment.

The 75th Ranger Regiment routinely has openings for warrant, company and field-grade officers in the following branches: Infantry, Military Intelligence, Field Artillery, Chemical Corps, Signal Corps, Medical Corps, Chaplain Corps and Judge Advocate General's Corps. Positions exist within the regimental headquarters at Fort Benning, Ga.; and in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ranger battalions, located at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.; Fort Lewis, Wash.; and Fort Benning.

The Regiment also needs enlist-

ed soldiers in the following MOSs: 11B, 11C, 31C, 31U, 31Z, 35E, 54B, 63B, 71D, 71L, 71M, 73D, 75B, 75H, 88M, 91B, 92A, 92G, 92Y, 96B, 96D, 97B, 11B, 11C, 11Z and 13F. Soldiers must be sergeants or above and possess skill qualification identifier "V" (airborne Ranger).

Volunteers must be airborne-qualified or willing to attend Airborne School. They must also pass an orientation program prior to assignment to the 75th Ranger Regiment. Personnel assigned to the Ranger Regiment are eligible to attend the Ranger course regardless of their branch or MOS.

Enlisted personnel interested in assignment to the Ranger Regiment should send a copy of DA Form 2A, DA Form 2-1, and DA Form 4187 to Commander, PERSCOM, Attn: TAPC-EPMD-EPK-I (Ranger Team), Alexandria, VA 22331. Senior NCOs must provide additional documentation. For more information, phone the Regimental PSNCO at DSN 835-3790/5673.

Officers interested in submitting a packet should phone the Regimental Assistant Adjutant at DSN 835-5124.



# Book Reviews

## Special Warfare


**The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany.** By Clayton D. Laurie. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1996. ISBN: 0-7006-0765-X. 335 pages. \$35.

American society places great value on the open exchange of ideas and the freedom of expression. Consequently, Americans find it difficult to conceptualize information as a weapon. At times this has hindered the United States' ability to engage in political and propaganda warfare with our enemies.

In *The Propaganda Warriors*, Clayton Laurie demonstrates how the U.S.'s war of ideas against Nazi Germany reflected the plurality of ideologies within the U.S. at large. He demonstrates clearly that America's political institutions, values and beliefs shaped our propaganda efforts, and that the sheer diversity of these beliefs had a debilitating effect on our ability to wage a coordinated campaign.

Laurie, a historian at the U.S. Army Center for Military History, chronicles the origins, doctrine and operations of U.S. propaganda and psychological-warfare programs during the war. His meticulous exploitation of manuscript and archival sources provides an objective and powerful accounting of the U.S. propaganda campaign.

Laurie first presents the reader with U.S. propaganda programs before the war. He charts the initial response of private organizations to the perceived Nazi fifth-column assault on the U.S., as well as the slow response of the federal government in developing a capacity



for waging a sustained propaganda campaign. Over the next two-thirds of his book, Laurie tracks the development of the three major U.S. propaganda agencies: the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information, or OWI; the OSS Morale Operations Branch; and the U.S. Army.

Laurie's book is as much about how we made propaganda as it is about propaganda itself. Laurie focuses on the small group of professionals who developed the theories behind U.S. propaganda efforts and the policies that directed them. He argues that the influence of personal political ideologies and individual personalities had an enormous effect on the propaganda campaign abroad.

Indeed, because the propaganda campaign would so clearly "speak" for America, the leaders of the three propaganda agencies wanted

to make sure that the messages carried their particular image of the U.S. Thus, the campaigns often reflected the political beliefs of the organizations and their leaders, so that even though the agencies used similar techniques, they embodied dissimilar values, goals and messages. In this, the author believes, lay the potential for the failure of U.S. efforts.

From its inception in 1942, the Overseas Branch of the OWI remained the primary agency for waging the "white" strategic propaganda campaign in Europe. Unfortunately, infighting between director Elmer Davis and associate director Robert Sherwood plagued the OWI until early 1944. While both men agreed that a "strategy of the truth" should guide the OWI, Sherwood, an ardent New Dealer, also believed the OWI should promote the Rooseveltian vision of the world. Davis believed that the less political ideology in the propaganda the better, both for the OWI and for the overall war effort.

Less innocent propaganda operations were left to William Donovan's OSS and its MO Branch. Donovan viewed propaganda as one part of an overall psychological-warfare campaign against the Nazi state that would include not only black and gray propaganda, but a plethora of unorthodox methods as well — all designed to subvert, deceive and trick the enemy. Indeed Donovan's personal political and ideological beliefs affected the OSS campaign in much the same way that Davis' and Sherwood's affected the OWI.

For the U.S. Army, the overt war

of ideas consisted of “combat propaganda” operations designed to directly support combat units in the field. These tactical PSYWAR activities aided conventional forces by reducing the enemy’s will to fight. For the Army’s “psywarriors,” the ideological struggle came in the form of convincing the conventional-force commanders that psychological warfare was more than just “paper bullets.”

Laurie concludes that despite its shortcomings, the overall U.S. propaganda campaign succeeded. Some agencies naturally proved more successful than others. The MO Branch decidedly beat the Nazis at their own game, while the U.S. Army’s tactical campaign saved Allied lives and induced thousands of Axis defections. In Laurie’s mind, the OWI campaign was the least successful, never having fully recovered from Sherwood’s naive notion of warfare.

The U.S., however, eventually produced a diverse, yet coordinated program that enhanced the effect of an Allied conventional military assault upon Nazi Germany. Laurie’s work suggests that assessing the results of psychological warfare and propaganda campaigns remains difficult even today.

The student of contemporary psychological operations, as well as the historian, will find significance in Laurie’s work. Laurie dispels the popular misconception that psychological warfare is simply brainwashing, half-truths and lies. Furthermore, he demonstrates that U.S. propagandists have long emphasized the need to disseminate straightforward news and information “without spin.”

As Laurie suggests in his study of the Second World War, U.S. propagandists realized that for a news-hungry population, the plain facts of the war would prove more corrosive than any amount of agitational propaganda. Planners also realized that the German people were

leery of propaganda to begin with, having dealt with more than 10 years of Nazi rule. Combined information programs run by the OWI and the U.S. Army in 1944 and 1945 avoided “high pressure” messages. Instead, they emphasized straight facts and news without the sermons and ideological baggage of earlier campaigns. As Elmer Davis put it, “America should tell the truth, tell it intelligently, and tell it everywhere.” These campaigns helped create a favorable and friendly mind toward the U.S. and its armed forces.

Laurie’s book provides insight into the nature of a powerful weapon of conventional and unconventional warfare. It will help to supplement Colonel Alfred H. Paddock Jr.’s institutional history, *United States Army Special Warfare: Its Origins — Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952*. In addition, because there have been few historical studies of propaganda and psychological warfare during the Second World War, other than those written by participants, Laurie’s work provides an important new viewpoint. It is highly recommended for anyone

interested in the development of propaganda and psychological operations.

Mark R. Jacobson  
364th PSYOP Co.  
Columbus, Ohio


**War Stories of the Green Berets: The Viet Nam Experience.** By Hans Halberstadt. Osceola, Wis.: Motorbooks International, 1994. ISBN: 0-87938-955-9. 224 pages. \$19.95.

This book features a collection of personal experiences from Special Forces veterans of Vietnam. Interspersed throughout the stories are vignettes about SF history, activities, equipment and training. The book is captivating and entertaining. The personal recollections span the years of the Vietnam War and the spectrum of SF involvement. The vignettes provide background information useful in understanding the context of the veterans’ personal experiences. More than an engaging history lesson, the book is an intimate account of real people’s involvement in a significant period of SF and U.S. history.

Of particular note are the biographical sketches that tell what happened to the storytellers later and about their relationships to their comrades. It should also be noted that the storytellers, like most humans, do not agree on every aspect of their recollections.

This book serves as a valuable reference for current and former SF soldiers who seek to gain insight into SF history. Laymen will also find it useful as an interesting and informative collection of anecdotes from an aspect of the Vietnam War not previously well-documented.

Dan C. Godbee  
Macon, Ga.



# Special Warfare

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