Knowledge is power, and since ancient times knowledge about the enemy and the operational environment has been an key element of military power. As the commander’s eyes and ears, reconnaissance forces contribute directly to the commander’s battlefield intelligence. That intelligence, in turn, encourages success by permitting best use of our combat power.

It is no coincidence that the first U.S. intelligence organization, World War II’s Office of Strategic Services, was also the forerunner of our modern-day Special Forces. From the OSS through Desert Storm, reconnaissance has continued to be an important SOF mission. With the changing nature of conflict, intelligence promises to become even more important as our smaller armed forces are presented with contingency missions requiring more discriminate use of our forces.

Special reconnaissance is one of Special Forces’ five primary missions. We tend to think of SR in the traditional perspective of a small team manning an observation post in a wooded area. However, in today’s smaller force-projection Army, there are many possible scenarios. While deployed throughout the world, SF teams are often the only U.S. presence that can gather facts and answer questions for a joint-force commander deploying into the country. This reconnaissance may be conducted from the front seat of a rental car or accomplished by phone calls. On today’s highly mobile battlefield, SF teams may find themselves pinpointing resistance pockets in urban or bypassed areas where general-purpose forces are ill-suited for the mission. These missions will increase the combat effectiveness of our forces while reducing collateral damage and noncombatant casualties.

In the past, our intelligence requirements had a clear focus, for the potential enemy was clearly identified. With the disintegration of communism, we face a much more difficult task. It is not clear who the enemy is, where we will confront him, when that may occur and who our coalition partners will be. This ambiguity further complicates an already demanding mission.

In order to focus our SR experiences on the future, a new manual, FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces, has been developed for distribution to the field this spring. The first of a new series of how-to SF manuals, FM 31-20-5 will express the doctrinal concepts of SR in practical applications by defining it, identifying planning and mission procedures and furnishing specific techniques practiced by operational units. In the future, similar manuals are planned for foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism and direct-action missions.

Technology for SR is also advancing, and in the near future, soldiers can expect new equipment which will allow them to collect and report intelligence in near-real time. Technology, however, has its limitations. It may break down, and some of the most critical elements that define modern conflicts cannot be photographed or reported on by electronic means — they can only be collected face to face. Our intercultural-communications skills and military experience give us the ability to collect that type of information. Effective intercultural communications, combined with our tactical and technical training, make Special Forces soldiers a true force multiplier whatever the mission.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow
Contents

February 1993

Features

2  A Theory of Ground Reconnaissance
   by Maj. William H. Burgess III

9  Reconnaissance: Looking to the Future Through the Past
   by Lt. Col. Robert H. Huckabee

12 FM 31-20-5: New Manual Focuses on Special Reconnaissance
   by SFC Jim McGill

16 Special Reconnaissance Planning: Notes from the J RTC
   by Capt. Brian R. Vines

20 Intercultural Communication: The Need for Conceptual Skills
   by Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

23 Mission-oriented Language Training
   by CWO 2 Thomas F.D. Rogers

24 The OSS: America's First National Intelligence Organization
   by Lawrence H. McDonald

33 Interview: Lt. Col. David G. Christie, Australian SAS Regiment

   by Capt. Dan Smith

Departments

39 Enlisted Career Notes
40 Officer Career Notes
42 Foreign SOF
44 Update
46 Book Reviews

Cover: Night-vision-goggle photo copyright Leif Skoogfors/Wood Fin Camp and Associates, used with permission. Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield.
A Theory of Ground Reconnaissance

by Maj. William H. Burgess III

To be forewarned is to be forearmed, and Army commanders engage in ground reconnaissance to achieve timely forewarning. Force reductions, the concept of AirLand Operations and national military strategy are increasing the Army’s relative need for forewarning. As a consequence, the art of ground reconnaissance will undergo considerable scrutiny and discussion over the next several years. This article offers a context for discussion.

Reconnaissance is the exploratory, preliminary inspection or survey of a region to examine its terrain or determine the disposition of military forces therein.⁠¹ Derived from the Latin re (again) and cognoscere (to know), reconnaissance entails the “recognition” and gathering of pertinent information. When conducted through visual, audio and olfactory means by persons operating on the ground or in the waters or airspace in close proximity to the target, reconnaissance overlaps human-resources intelligence, or HUMINT, collection.²

Reconnaissance is a means of military geography, which has topographic, demographic, meteorologic and hydrographic components, is conducted at strategic, operational, and tactical echelons, and focuses on weather, enemy and terrain. Weather concerns are typically light conditions, visibility, wind speed and direction, and type and amount of precipitation. Enemy concerns are size, activity, location, unit or organization, time, and equipment, or SALUTE. Terrain concerns are observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach, or OCOKA.

Targets

The objectives of reconnaissance are called reconnaissance targets. The tactics, techniques and procedures employed by a reconnaissance force in relation to its target (as well as the menu of other collection assets employed against the target) are influenced by target significance, mobility and geometry.

Targets may be of tactical, operational or strategic significance. Strategic objectives are related to the attainment of long-term national goals. Operational objectives are of regional or intermediate-term value. Tactical objectives relate to the employment of forces in individual battles and engagements.

Mobility is the relative ability of the target to change position or location. Target mobilities are high, medium and low (or immobile). High mobility targets are capable of changing their location within hours or minutes, and include mobile ballistic missile units, aircraft formations and trains. Medium mobility targets are only capable of changing their positions over considerable periods of time, normally exceeding 48 hours, and include field headquarters of military units.

Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Department of the Army or other government agencies.
of corps size or greater, semi-fixed intelligence facilities and mobile bridges.

Low (or no) mobility targets normally do not change position at all, and include storehouses, airfields, fixed C³I facilities and fixed bridges. In some cases, the mobility of a target is so low, or nonexistent, that reconnaissance or surveillance of the target can be conducted months or years before any other action is undertaken.

Geometry is the relative geographic diffusion or area covered by the target. Target geometries are point, area and linear. A point target consists of one or more elements concentrated at a single place, such as radar sites, bridges and ships. Area targets are diffused, usually consisting of several elements situated within a certain area at varying distances from each other, e.g., airfields and major industrial complexes. Linear targets are long and narrow, and include railroads, highways, trails, pipelines, telecommunications lines, columns of troops on the march, long bridges (e.g., across bays), water-ways and water obstacles.

**Modes**

Principal modes of reconnaissance are the overlapping categories of battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance, overt collection, and reconnaissance by deception.

Battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance is the survey of military activity in a particular area of operations, normally done within a zone of armed conflict or war by small groups of mounted or dismounted soldiers in battle dress. It may be done passively or by force. Reconnaissance forces perform this activity in carefully selected areas to provide a picture of the battlefield or operational area by reporting timely information on weather, threat and terrain and accurately locating dangerous, high-value targets for relevant weapons systems.

Overt collection is the consented or acquiesced-in observation of selected activities in a particular area of interest or operations. It may be a primary activity, or it may be incidental to other mission activities. Overt collection may be conducted in or out of battle dress. Examples of overt collection are varied and can range from foreign-observer participation in host-nation military demonstrations to cross-border surveillance conducted from vehicles, aircraft or fixed observation posts or watchtowers located in friendly territory.

Reconnaissance by deception occurs where the existence and even the activities of the reconnaissance element may be open or known, but its true allegiance and purpose are masked. To a degree, reconnaissance by deception parallels “false flag” espionage operations. Reconnaissance by deception may be subclassified into the overlapping categories of “surrogate” and “pseudo” operations. Surrogate operations are essentially HUMINT collection-by-proxy operations, usually of very limited scope and extent. They are normally (but not always) done out of standard battle dress and can be conducted across the operational continuum. Coastwatchers in the Solomon Islands during World War II, for example, made extensive and effective use of indigenous surrogates in the execution and defense of their collection activities. Pseudo operations are exemplified by the employment in southern Lebanon of Israeli Army sayaret (reconnaissance commando) troops, capable of passing themselves off as indigenous Lebanese or Palestinians, to acquire terrorist bases and other targets for the Israeli Air Force.

**Levels**

In terms of targets and functions, ground reconnaissance partially overlaps but is distinguishable from the HUMINT collection means of espionage. Levels of ground reconnaissance are defined primarily by their planned purposes, normally correlating to the echelons undertaking the reconnaissance. Tactical reconnaissance supports maneuver and defense at echelons corps and lower. It is a normal battlefield activity in all combat-arms
organizations, oriented toward military factors of weather, enemy and terrain. Army tactical forces dedicated to ground reconnaissance normally operate within 150 kilometers of the forward line of troops at corps level and 50 kilometers forward of the FLOT at division level in linear warfare, and within similar ranges in nonlinear operations. Reconnaissance at echelons brigade and lower tends to be generalized within the relatively limited areas of interest and zones of operations of such units. At echelons division and corps, however, reconnaissance is focused on named areas of interest, or NAI, and target areas of interest, or TAI.

Operational reconnaissance is conducted to acquire information in support of planning and maneuver at echelons above corps, as where theater assets survey a country or region prior to the forced entry of contingency forces. It helps to secure friendly forces, confirm sensor intelligence and verify enemy forces. The ground component of operational reconnaissance comprises the collection capabilities of ground patrols, sensors, cavalry, fixed- and rotary-wing aviation and remotely-piloted vehicles. These complement air and naval platforms, national technical means and other assets. Ground-force reconnaissance aids in the early location, tracking, targeting and attack of critical deep enemy capabilities and thereby enhances operational flexibility and minimizes risk to friendly forces.

Operational reconnaissance normally focuses on military factors but can also address non-military factors, particularly under conditions other than war. U.S. forces employed for operational ground reconnaissance include Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance companies.

Strategic reconnaissance is undertaken for national purposes, e.g., to collect data on matters relevant to the formulation or execution of foreign policy of the national government. There is no Department of Defense definition per se of “strategic reconnaissance,” although the phrase implies the selected placement of human assets and technical surveillance platforms (satellites and aircraft) to collect information of strategic (i.e., national) significance. It is thus a term appropriately applied to espionage and other activities of national-level intelligence organizations. Ground-force strategic reconnaissance would then seem to be limited to the employment of national- or joint-level spies and the occasional special-reconnaissance mission of national significance (e.g., entering a hostile or denied port and emplacing radiation sensors and transmitters on a submarine suspected of carrying fissile material).

Army SF have long performed “special” reconnaissance in friendly, denied or contested areas. Only recently, however, reconnaissance has been embellished with a direct tie to special-operations forces to create the mission of special reconnaissance, defined as:

Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or demographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment and post-strike reconnaissance.

There are difficulties with this definition, however: Although there are exceptions, most of the business of SOF is conducted at the theater level, and so “operational reconnaissance” would in most cases be a more appropriate term applied to reconnaissance by SOF. Yet, operational reconnaissance is not the exclusive domain of SOF, and the historical employment of SOF in reconnaissance is not limited to operational activities. Arguably, “special” reconnaissance should comprise unique reconnaissance and surveillance activities that are clear exceptions to the norm or are beyond the capabilities of other reconnaissance units, irrespective of associations with SOF or other spe-
specialized organizations.

**Tasks**

Definitional problems notwithstanding, principal reconnaissance tasks for ground forces are defined as follows:

- **Target acquisition** comprises the detection, identification, location and reporting of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of organic or deep-strike weapons and other means. The purpose of target acquisition is to obtain target locations, movements, development, strength, type identification and vulnerabilities.\(^{15}\)

- **Damage assessment** is the determination of the effect of attacks on a target.\(^{16}\) Damage assessment by ground-force reconnaissance entails the far or close visual, photographic or electronic survey of a specific point or area of military significance that has been subjected to an air or missile strike, a battle between opposing forces, or the like, to measure results of such activity.

- **Topographic reconnaissance** is the specific gathering and reporting of information about the surface configuration and condition of natural and man-made terrain in an NAI or TAI. It aids in the production, correction or enhancement of maps and overlays and assessment of the present conditions of the terrain for military operations. It overlaps with meteorological and hydrographic reconnaissance. At the tactical level, topographic reconnaissance is focused on the OCOKA factors of terrain, and specifically includes locating and assessing fording sites and the reconnaissance of routes, bridges, tunnels and ferries for friendly maneuver forces. Topographic reconnaissance at operational and strategic levels differs only in scale from tactical topographic reconnaissance and is closely linked with demographic reconnaissance.

- **Demographic reconnaissance** is the specific gathering and reporting of information about the inhabitants of an area. It aids in the preparation of maps and overlays, and assessment of the condition of inhabited areas for military operations. At the tactical level, demographic reconnaissance is focused on the SALUTE factors. At operational and strategic levels, demographic reconnaissance also addresses psychological and cultural factors. Collecting data on populations in a potential zone of operational maneuver is a form of demographic reconnaissance. Demographic reconnaissance is intimately related to topographic reconnaissance.

- **Meteorological reconnaissance** is the specific gathering and reporting of information about atmospheric phenomena such as wind speed and direction, cloud cover, surface visibility, weather and obstructions to vision, and state of the ground around the observer. Meteorological reconnaissance supports theater deep-strike weapons systems, raids, and operational maneuvers by land or sea forces. It is also conducted as part of the effort to predict the operations of enemy deep-strike weapons systems and maneuver forces.

- **Hydrographic reconnaissance** is the reconnaissance of militarily significant bodies of water and marginal land areas. It is conducted to determine depths, beach gradients, the nature of the bottom, the location of obstacles and barriers, the speed of currents, the thickness of ice, defensive preparations and other military and nonmilitary characteristics of a target.

- **Nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance** is the specific detection, gathering and evaluation of information about the presence (or absence) of radiological, biological or chemical contamination from weaponry or industrial activity, of the extent of such contamination, and of specific terrain, buildings, equipment or airspace in selected areas of military significance. In this regard, detection of industrial contamination can include the search for trace compounds associ-
ated with the illegal narcotics trade.

- Direct-action collection comprises short-duration raids, ambushes and other offensive actions undertaken to seize and recover personnel, material or information of military significance for intelligence exploitation. It overlaps many of the techniques and procedures of reconnaissance with the tactics of direct action. At the tactical level, for example, it includes the activities of ambush patrols and raids by armored cavalry. At the operational level, direct-action collection includes the capture of designated military equipment or personnel in enemy rear areas by SOF.

An example of direct-action collection is Operation Tarnegol 53. On the night of Dec. 26, 1969, 70 Israeli Defense Force commandos raided the Egyptian radar base of Ras A’rab. Dressed as Egyptian soldiers, the Israelis landed by helicopter, assaulted the base, disassembled two Russian-made P-12 radar-equipment shelters from two ZIL trucks, slung-loaded the shelters beneath CH-53 helicopters, and hauled them back to Israel. 17

- Special-collection tasks are those that do not fit squarely into the forementioned task categories. They are typified by unique information requirements entailing reconnaissance and surveillance activities of extreme political or military sensitivity that are beyond the normal capabilities of most reconnaissance units, and which require special training on the part of participants and generation or sanction of the requirements from very high levels of the government. 18 Contrary to a common misconception, this category of reconnaissance does not include “special activities.” 19

**Employment**

All reconnaissance must be conducted within the four-stage operational cycle of the supported unit or force. 20 Stage I reconnaissance is conducted to protect forces and prepare them for operations. 21 At operational and strategic levels, Stage I is constant, whether forces are in garrison or in the field. It begins with the commencement of operational planning and extends through deployment to the initiation of hostilities or operational activities. At the tactical level, Stage I reconnaissance is conducted from deployment through the initiation of hostilities.

Stage II reconnaissance is conducted to help set up, or shape, the conditions for decisive employment of forces. At the operational level, critical deep enemy capabilities are acquired and tracked for targeting or attack. At the tactical level, reconnaissance assets are focused on locating and identifying maneuver forces, fire support, lines of communication and command and control. 22

Stage III ground reconnaissance supports attainment of the desired decisive result. At the operational and tactical levels, it is focused on providing information that will aid the commander in determining when conditions have been achieved for successful maneuver: e.g., the focus is on surveillance of friendly and enemy lines of communication, target acquisition and damage assessment.

Stage IV operational reconnaissance supports preparations for further follow-on or new major engagements or campaigns, and is focused on determining the condition and status of remaining enemy forces. Stage IV tactical reconnaissance supports reconstitution of friendly forces by focusing on defensive surveillance and patrolling of avenues of approach and lines of communication.

Regardless of stage, all reconnaissance must be purposeful, continuous, aggressive, timely, secure, reliable and accurate. Reconnaissance is purposeful when it is undertaken to answer well-defined, and often time-sensitive requirements that support specific missions and activities, e.g., the pre-and post-strike surveillance of a major C3I node which must be neutralized before a planned follow-on operation by theater forces can be undertaken. Reconnaissance not tied to a specific
and appropriate mission or activity is not purposeful.

Reconnaissance is continuous when it is undertaken in, and not limited by, all conditions of weather and terrain. Reconnaissance is aggressive when it is undertaken with audacity and despite threat countermeasures, e.g., the close observation of insurgent leaders such as conducted by British special forces against the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. Reconnaissance is timely when the information realized is known to the supported commander in time for that commander to act on the information provided to his benefit.

Reconnaissance is secure when it is undertaken with the knowledge of only those friendly personnel with an absolute need to know and without any awareness on the part of the target or other threat forces. Reconnaissance is reliable and accurate when it generates high-quality information about, and determines precise locations of, reconnaissance targets. Reliability is the quality factor in reconnaissance.

Conclusion

Commanders need information on which to base their decisions. Often, this information is not in pre-existing databases, or the information is changing with the fluidity of the operational environment. Reconnaissance leads to information, information yields intelligence, and intelligence fuels the generation of land power. Thus, a condition precedent to victory in the first battle in the next war or conflict will be effective ground reconnaissance. Without effective reconnaissance, Army commanders may find victory elusive.

Maj. William H. Burgess III is a Special Forces officer currently serving as a staff officer within the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. A graduate of the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, he holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Southeastern Massachusetts University, a master's degree in public administration from Clark University, and a doctor of laws degree from American University.

Notes:

1 The Department of Defense defines reconnaissance as: “A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.” Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

2 Human-resources intelligence comprises the intelligence derived from the human collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument. Joint Pub 1-02.

3 See the discussion of direct-action collection on p. 6. “Reconnaissance in force” is an offensive operation designed to discover or test the enemy's strength or to obtain other information. Joint Pub 1-02.

4 See FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.


6 The Israelis are known to use Israeli Druze, Bedouin and Circassian scouts, as well as Jews who have migrated from Arab countries, for such purposes. See Samuel M. Katz, Follow Me! A History of Israel's Military Elite (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1989); also, Soldier Spies (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press).
TRADOC Pam 525-42, U.S. Army Operational Concept for Long Range Surveillance Units; FM 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations.


NAI are points or areas where activity confirms or denies a particular course of action; TAI are engagement points or areas. Both are usually along an avenue of approach or mobility corridor. FM 34-36.

Although cavalry perform reconnaissance-in-force, they are principally used to screen the front and flanks of the main body, fix enemy positions for fire and maneuver, and other tasks that are not reconnaissance per se.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, p. 16.


FM 100-25; FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations.

Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

Joint Pub 1-02, and Joint Pub 3-05.

Ibid. p. 20.
Among the key features of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was the definition of special-operations forces and the identification of special-operations activities.

Congress identified these activities as: direct action; reconnaissance; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; civil affairs; psychological operations; counterterrorism; humanitarian assistance; theater search and rescue; and such other activities as may be directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. The second of these, reconnaissance, demands the attention of SOF planners and operators, particularly the Army’s Special Forces, because of its historical strategic implications and operational significance.

It is interesting to note that the legislators who framed the 1986 amendment stipulated that SOF were to perform reconnaissance, as opposed to intelligence, activities, which fall within the purview of other government agencies. By definition, reconnaissance is limited to seeking out information and does not involve analysis or interpretation.

History is replete with examples of how information gained through planned reconnaissance was used to great advantage by armies and nations. The earliest recorded reconnaissance is found in the 13th and 14th chapters of the Old Testament book of Numbers. Here is told the story of how Moses sent 12 specially-selected men into Canaan to: “See what the land is, and whether the people who dwell in it are strong or weak, whether they are few or many, and whether the land that they dwell in is good or bad, and whether the cities that they dwell in are camps or strongholds...” The information returned by these agents provided the basis for the Israelites’ decision to postpone their entry into the Promised Land.

In the 13th century, the legendary Mangoday forces served as the long-range eyes and ears of Genghis Khan and made significant contributions to the conquest of half the then-known world by his Mongol hordes. Led by their commander, Yasotay, and never numbering more than a few thousand, these elite volunteers underwent arduous training, seemed to relish hardship and were sworn to sacrifice their lives in service of the Kha-Khan.

At the dawn of the modern age of warfare, cavalry performed the primary reconnaissance mission and provided commanders with information on enemy troop dispositions, positions and lines of communications, as well as reporting on terrain and road nets. Few military exploits can match the color and drama of Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart’s “Ride Around McClellan” during the second year of the Civil War. This four-day reconnaissance in force—Stuart rode with 1,200 troopers—made the dashing young Rebel leader an instant celebrity and gave Gen. Robert E. Lee valuable information upon which he would base his first bold offensive against the Union army. Ironically, it may have also sown the seeds of Confederate defeat at Gettysburg a year later, when Stuart’s liberal interpretation of Lee’s orders took him off on another circuitous adventure and deprived his commander of vital combat information at the war’s most critical juncture.

The period from the end of the Civil War through World War I is practically devoid of any examples of reconnaissance other than the use of scouts on the western frontier. These men, often Indians, provided vital information to Army
posts, patrols, wagon trains and settlements regarding terrain, weather, local flora and fauna and, most importantly, the activities and mood of indigenous tribes.

It wasn’t until the early days of World War II that the genesis of the United States’ special-ops capability came into being under the auspices of the Office of Strategic Services. Based on the British model, the OSS was organized to provide a national capability to conduct intelligence gathering and, as the OSS chief, Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, labelled it, “unorthodox warfare.” The most notable successes achieved by OSS elements were those of Detachment 101 in Burma during 1943-45 and the contributions of the three-man Jedburgh teams and larger (30-man) operational groups in the European theater of operations. These units and their wartime activities are directly linked to today’s Special Forces.

After World War II, our national leadership began to consider our capability to operate at the lower end of the conflict spectrum — below the level of conventional war. From these post-war studies evolved the decision to institutionalize an “unconventional warfare” force structure and, on June 19, 1952, the Army activated the first such unit in its history — the 10th Special Forces Group, under the command of Col. Aaron Bank, a former OSS operative and one of the Army’s few special-ops experts.

During the remainder of the decade and into the 1960s, Special Forces doctrine and training focused on psychological operations, guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, with little thought given to reconnaissance. This would continue until the deepening of American involvement in Vietnam caused a shift in emphasis.

Having operated in Vietnam and throughout Southeast Asia since 1957 in a variety of roles, Army Special Forces changed character in the mid-1960s. It was during this period that the 5th Special Forces Group began conducting extensive long-range reconnaissance operations. The so-called “Greek” projects were responsible for most of these missions. The first of these special projects, Project Delta (Special Forces Operational Detachment B-52) was organized in 1964. Projects Omega (SFOD B-50) and Sigma (SFOD B-56) were formed two years later. Other reconnaissance activities were conducted by SFOD-53 and B-57 (Project Omega). Each of these units consisted of a number of 4-10 man reconnaissance teams of U.S. and South Vietnamese Special Forces and indigenous irregulars, “roadrunner” teams (indigenous soldiers disguised as Viet Cong or North Vietnamese) and a reaction-force unit.

Although not part of the 5th Special Forces Group, the joint Military Assistance Command - Vietnam’s Studies and Observations Group, or MACV-SOG, was activated in 1964 and employed Special Forces personnel to conduct ground reconnaissance and surveillance missions into North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Its operational elements were organized under launch sites known as forward operating bases and later as command-and-control sites. In 1967, three command-and-control sites had been established: Command and Control - North at Da Nang, Command and Control - Central at Kontum and Command and Control - South at Ban Me Thuot. Each location was responsible for a specific operational area and consisted of 12-man (three Special Forces and nine indigenous) Spike reconnaissance teams, Special Forces-led 35-man Hatchet strike platoons and larger exploitation units. Under such exotic code words...
names as Shining Brass, Nickel Steel and Prairie Fire, MACV-SOG ran a total of 2,675 cross-border operations from 1965 through 1972.\(^8\)

The Special Forces reconnaissance projects were closed down between 1970 and 1971 and MACV-SOG was deactivated in 1972. The accomplishments and contributions of these activities have often been overlooked or underplayed in the post-war era of introspection and criticism. Evolving from a fragmented effort to meet the expanding operational-intelligence requirements, Special Forces reconnaissance activities grew into a coordinated theater program which provided the Military Assistance Command - Vietnam approximately 50 percent of its ground-combat information.\(^9\) Even Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, whose antipathy for Special Forces was widely known, grudgingly acknowledged the effectiveness of these strategic operations.\(^10\)

From these historical examples, one can readily detect a commonality of purpose and organization of the forces charged to conduct reconnaissance missions. The objective of such activities has remained unchanged by the passage of time: It is to gather information and report it. Once distilled into intelligence, this information can be used by commanders or heads of state for planning or decision-making. Too, the strategic importance of the information demands that those undertaking reconnaissance missions be expressly selected and trained for their tasks. Both of these considerations have contemporary value.

In our present effort to advance and hone our national SO capabilities and force structure to meet future contingencies and wartime requirements, it is imperative that we pause to examine the historical record. Looking to the future through the perspective of the past provides a foundation of experience upon which we can build. This is particularly true in terms of reconnaissance, wherein the lessons learned from Special Forces and MACV-SOG activities in Southeast Asia can and should serve as a basis for future operational planning, organization and training.

Reconnaissance is nothing new. The basic methodology of gathering information has varied little since Moses dispatched that ancient mission into Canaan 1,300 years before Christ. It is an eyes-on business. Modern technology has improved and refined our ability to report and process information in a more timely and accurate manner. Satellite burst communications facilitate the rapid transfer of data to operational commanders. Futuristic high-tech equipment developments, such as a lightweight low-probability-of-detection/low-probability-of-intercept radio and an electronic filmless camera, will further enhance our capabilities to provide real-time or near-real-time combat information to multiple echelons. However, it is the still the individual soldier who remains the basic component of any effective reconnaissance system.

Today’s Special Forces soldier possesses the requisite skills to carry out the missions assigned him by Congress, including that of reconnaissance. It is, however, the burden of the Army’s leadership structures, command-and-control systems, equipment and training to ensure the success of any endeavor he undertakes on behalf of his nation.

The past holds the key to the future. \(\sim\)

Lt. Col. Robert H. Huckabee is currently chief of the Unconventional Warfare Forces Branch, Special Operations Division, Directorate of Operations, the Joint Staff. Previously, he was assigned to the Army Staff. A charter member of the Special Forces Branch, he has served as a Special Forces detachment and company commander, and successively as group S-1, executive officer and group S-3 for the 5th Special Forces Group. Prior to attending the Command and General Staff College in 1987-88, he was the J-1 of Special Operations Command - Central. His other assignments include tours with the 82nd Airborne Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam. He holds a master’s degree from Ohio University.

Notes:
5. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
10. Ibid., p. 141.
In the spring of 1993 a new Special Forces manual will be fielded by the Special Warfare Center and School. FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces, is the first field manual focused on one specific SF mission. Oriented toward SF operational units and mission planners from the SFODA through SF battalion levels, the manual is a continuation of the doctrinal processes established by Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, and FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. It defines the scope of SR, identifies planning considerations and conveys the experiences and expertise of SF units operating in various geographic regions.

The new doctrinal concept of having a TTP manual for each SF mission will continue with manuals on foreign internal defense (31-20-3), unconventional warfare (31-20-2) and counterterrorism (31-20-6), in that order. Scheduled for completion in 1994, FM 31-20-1, Special Forces Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, will contain tactics and procedures common to all SF missions, such as SF command and control, mission planning, infiltration and exfiltration and post-mission activities. Development of the TTP for direct-action missions (31-20-4) is currently on hold. Because FM 31-20-5 is the first of the series, it contains some basic SF information which will migrate into 31-20-1. Later editions of the SR manual will be even more SR-specific.

**Organization**

The SR TTP is broken down into four chapters and supporting appendixes. The chapters lay the

---

**User Applicability Guide for FM 31-20-5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicability</th>
<th>Chapter 1 Overview</th>
<th>Chapter 2 Pre-Mission Employment</th>
<th>Chapter 3 Employment</th>
<th>Chapter 4 Post-Mission Activities</th>
<th>Appendixes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SF Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOD C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOD B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOD A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*by SFC Jim McGill*
foundation of SR mission planning and provide general SR mission procedures and information. Information is ordered chronologically:

Chapter 1 provides an overview of special reconnaissance, discussing the nature and fundamentals of SR, its relationship to other missions, its history and its place in AirLand Operations.

Chapter 2 deals with pre-mission activities, including mission analysis, mission planning, mission preparation and pre-employment preparation.

Chapter 3 covers actual employment of SR. Area assessment, target acquisition, target analysis and the various types of reconnaissance, including hydrographic, meteorological, geographic and post-strike, are addressed in detail.

Chapter 4 concentrates on post-mission activities, including debriefing, follow-on missions, after-action reports and recording lessons learned.

The appendixes provide examples of specific SR techniques and procedures, including such topics as how to construct different types of fixed observation and surveillance sites, reconnaissance methods, mission-specific clothing and equipment, operational techniques and legal considerations. The order of the appendixes follows the order in which the subjects appear in the text.

The user-applicability graphic demonstrates by its shaded areas the application of the SR TTP manual to the conduct of missions at various SF operational levels. All SF units will find the overview useful, but operators at the company, battalion and group levels will find the chapters on pre-mission, employment and post-mission activities less applicable than the ODAs. Specific SR techniques listed in the appendixes will be of most benefit to soldiers at the ODA level.

**Mission**

A simplistic definition of SR is any reconnaissance mission that due to its location, mission parameters or political implications requires execution by SOF. FM 31-20 is more specific, defining SR as “Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation and other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment and post-strike reconnaissance.” With these definitions of SR, we can explore what is “special” about special reconnaissance.

Modern SR operations task SF teams to confirm, deny or refute the known information, or pass new data, for specific special-operations areas. When executed in the deliberate planning process, discussed in Chapter 2 of the SR TTP, this known information will be thoroughly researched as the plan of execution is developed. In extreme cases when time constraints do not permit deliberate mission planning, SFODs may have to execute something similar to combat patrols. In those cases, the SFOD generally will be able to gain most, but not all of the required data. Mission planners must weigh the criticality of the target against the risk of losing a unique asset that is not easily reconstituted, the SFOD.

Historically, if a target was beyond the organic capability of the corps commander because of the distance involved, then it was automatically considered to be an SR mission. Current doctrine sees distance as only one factor in determining the need for SR.

Other considerations include the need for SF skills such as extended land navigation, use of special equipment, area orientation and cultural awareness, and language. Additional training such as movement and camouflage techniques, taught during the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course, will be useful in missions against key nodes. An SF team might conduct SR in urban areas in support of units not suited for that type operation, or the mission might be to fix an enemy or find a weakness in his defenses in an area bypassed by general-purpose forces.
Under the deliberate mission-planning process, SFODs will receive training in systems identification, and when faced with a complex rail system or factory, will be prepared to identify and exploit key system nodes. Generally, the cumulative skills of the SF team and the familiarity of its members with their SOP and each other's reactions greatly increase the probability of mission success.

All reconnaissance operations gather information. Special reconnaissance is conducted to produce near-real-time information. On the modern battlefield, this type of information is key for the commander's decision-making process. Two sources of near-real-time data are satellites and reconnaissance aircraft. They can produce detailed photos quickly, often without the knowledge of the target. However, when the detail required is not available from these sources, or certainty is critical, SR operations can respond to fill in gaps in the existing data. By merging the technical data with first-hand reports, commanders will gain a complete picture of the battlefield.

Deciding which missions go to which teams will be driven by the CINC's special-operations campaign plan, the joint targeting process, the operational SOF mission criteria, and considerations of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available, or METT-T. While the targeting process is only briefly discussed in the SR TTP, Chapter 2 addresses the result of this process, the Special Operations Mission Planning Folder. A complete discussion of the nomination and targeting process is in FM 100-25 and FM 31-20.

Two common questions asked about the SR TTP are, “What is new about this FM?,” and “How can we get a copy?”

The SR TTP does not drastically change existing doctrine. It does, however, introduce new thought in the area of “follow-on” and “roll-over” tasking. SR is often conducted to fix a target or to gain information which is passed to an attacking force. Sometimes commanders are tempted to ask the deployed SFODA to “roll over” from a SR mission to a direct-action mission after the target confirmation is passed. Lightly equipped SF teams conducting SR missions employ mostly passive measures. DA missions, on the other hand, are based on violent active measures. While it is the prerogative of commanders to task subordinate units as they see fit, there is a great difference between an SFODA slipping away after conducting a SR mission and an SFODA announcing its location and intent by engaging an enemy with whatever means it has on hand.

Another new section talks about home-station activities and training of SR teams. This section expands the mission-essential task list to address SR-specific activities that are applicable to all SF missions. As the second chart depicts, the application of these activities varies with the mission. At the high end of the scale is a team employed on a pure SR mission; at the low end is an SFODA conducting a counterterrorism operation. Whatever the mission, users are encouraged to review the SR TTP and adapt its content to the tasks at hand. Tips on construction of observation and surveillance sites may prove useful to a team putting surveillance on a drop zone prior to the drop. Also, SR-styled movement techniques will be useful to the SFODA when conducting a leader’s reconnaissance during a raid.

The new TTP is also designed to cross-load unique ideas from group to group, and benefit all SF teams. For example, ideas and successful SR techniques used by the 5th SF Group in desert regions were incorporated in the manual, so soldiers from the 7th SF Group deploying to an arid region could benefit from the 5th’s expertise. Mountain SR TTPs common to teams in the 10th
SF Group could be exploited by the 1st SF Group. While these TTPs are mainly addressed in the form of planning considerations, specific information can be found in the appendixes.

Requests for FM 31-20-5 should be sent through routine publications channels by updating the unit’s DA Form 12. Each SF group should order sufficient copies to ensure that each of its SFODAs and SFODBs get copies. The SWCS Doctrine Branch has exhausted its supply of all drafts. These drafts were forwarded through SF Command to field units for comment. The same distribution list will be used for future TTPs now under development.

Users with recommendations for improving the SR TTP should send their recommendations on a DA Form 2028 to: Commander, USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-DT-DM; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Conclusion

As doctrine writers at the SWCS, we know that the SR TTP is not all-inclusive. FM 31-20-5 will never take the place of a well-written and rehearsed unit SOP. It is not designed to be a “check the block” mission-execution format. It is designed to encourage thought and promote a systematic approach to mission employment, deployment, execution and team recovery.

The days of issuing an SF team a shovel and a pair of binoculars, then dubbing it an “SR team,” are over. As laser range finders, electronic filmless cameras and global positioning systems become common, SF soldiers must gain an understanding of the new devices to aid in their missions. The future will require extensive training with new technologies. Yet while technology can do many things, it cannot replace the skilled eye of the Special Forces soldier.

SFC Jim McGill

is assigned to the Doctrine Development Branch of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, J FK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous assignments include serving with the 7th SF Group as an operations sergeant for ODA 785 during operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama, and as an operations and intelligence sergeant for ODAs 761 and 766. His military schooling includes training the Special Forces Qualification Course, SF Operations and Intelligence Course, Military Free Fall Parachutist Course, SF Advanced NCO Course, Static Line Jumpmaster Course and Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Basic and Nuclear phases. He holds a associate of arts degree from Campbell University, Buies Creek, N.C.
In almost every rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, SF teams discover the need to reacquaint themselves with current doctrine, and the area of planning and executing special-reconnaissance missions is no exception. Predominantly, officers and NCOs alike fail to apply doctrine — the command-estimate process and intelligence preparation of the battlefield — into their SR mission planning; they focus more on preparation for the briefback than for the mission. Since the aim of JRTC is to replicate combat as realistically as possible and provide feedback to soldiers on the application of doctrine, the purpose of this article is to educate Special Forces soldiers on SR for "real world" contingencies rather than to serve as a checklist for JRTC rotations.

SR is reconnaissance and surveillance conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of an actual or potential enemy. SOF may also use SR to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment and post-strike reconnaissance. It is performed at the strategic, operational or tactical level.\(^1\)

Prior to conducting SR, Special Forces soldiers should be familiar with applicable doctrinal references, including:
- FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations
- FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations
- FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance
- ARTEP 31-807-31-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Special Forces Company: Special Reconnaissance
- FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
- FM 34-2, Collection Management
- FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance
- FM 6-20, Fire Support in the Airland Battle.

Upon selection to execute a mission or plan, the ODA moves into an isolation facility, or ISOFAC, receives its operations order, or OPORD, and mission briefing, and begins mission preparation.\(^2\) To obtain the highest probability for success, an ODA must use its time efficiently during isolation. Time spent beforehand in developing area assessments, team cross training, and training in standard operating procedures can pay off during isolations.

Battalion staffs can save detachments additional time by providing them with required information “up front.” Often at JRTC, ODAs do not receive the battalion S-2’s intelligence products until they request them. ODAs need area assessments, doctrinal, situational, event, and decision-support templates in order to develop viable courses of action. Without these products, mission planning is interrupted while the team develops or requests analysis of the terrain, weather, enemy and battlefield environment.

At the end of the mission briefing, the ISOFAC commander provides the SF team with a proposed isolation schedule and a list of requirements already requested or provided for the team.\(^3\) These requirements may include:
- Ranges
- Training facilities
- Rehearsal sites
- Updated intelligence products
- Maps
- Air items
- Accompanying supplies
- Items for emergency resupply
- Mission-peculiar equipment
- Isolation expendables
- Escape-and-evasion data
- Basic load ammunition
- NBC equipment.

Decision making

After receipt of the mission briefing and OPORD, the ODA uses the tactical decision-making process to develop the commander’s estimate. The process, outlined in Chapter 5 of FM 101-5 and the Army Command and General Staff College Student Text 100-9, The Command
Estimate Process, consists of five phases:
• Mission analysis
• Course-of-action development
• Course-of-action analysis
• Course-of-action comparison
• Decision and execution.

Mission analysis is the means through which the commander obtains an understanding of the mission. It includes:
• Purpose of the higher-headquarters mission (from the missions and intents of the next two higher commanders)
• A review of the area of operations to understand the higher-headquarters mission and intent
• Identification of tasks to be performed, either specified or implied
• Determination of mission-essential tasks
• Determination of constraints, restrictions, required assets and risk trade-offs
• Construction of restated mission and commander’s intent
• Construction of a time schedule.

The detachment uses facts on current status or conditions to support its mission analysis. It fills information gaps with assumptions if information is not known. During mission analysis, the assistant operations sergeant should begin developing the intelligence estimate based on these facts and assumptions.

Upon completion of the mission analysis, the ODA commander approves the restated mission and issues his initial planning guidance, which provides a common starting point for the detachment to develop its courses of action. COAs should be developed without bias. Team members continuously exchange information and coordinate within the detachment to ensure the concurrent development of feasible COAs for consideration by the commander.

COAs are documented by statements with sketches. Each one must be significantly different from any others. Significant differences include task organization and schemes of maneuver. Detachment members should avoid the common pitfall of focusing on one good COA and developing other throwaway COAs that are only different because of infiltration or exfiltration.

The entire ODA analyzes the COAs individually to share information and discard COAs that are not feasible. They use war gaming to visualize the flow of an operation, given friendly strengths and dispositions, enemy assets and possible courses of action, and a specific operational area. Detachment members should consider a reaction and counteraction for each COA during war gaming. Detachment members should determine the strengths and weaknesses of each COA.

Once COAs are analyzed, the feasible ones are compared to identify the one with the highest probability of success. A decision matrix is an excellent technique for determining the best COA. Team members may use their own matrix for comparison of COAs within their areas of responsibility.

The last phase of the commander’s estimate is the decision. The ODA commander presents his decision brief, known as the mission-concept brief, to the mission approving authority. The detachment’s recommended COA is either approved, combined with aspects of other COAs, or given further guidance.

The approved COA becomes the concept of the operation for the team’s OPORD, and the basis for the ODA’s mission planning. Often teams will save unused COAs as possible contingency plans. The commander receiving the briefing should have his staff in attendance to ensure continuity. This is particularly important if the ODA is to become operationally or tactically controlled by a conventional unit through a Special Operations Command and Control Element, or SOCCE.

In those cases, the SOCCE is very important to an isolating ODA. It must deconflict and provide to the SFODAs a plan for com-

To obtain the highest probability for success, an ODA must use its time efficiently during isolation. Time spent beforehand in developing area assessments, team cross training, and training in standard operating procedures can pay off during isolations.
mand and control in the special-operations area, a communications plan, a link-up plan, and a force-protection plan (including fire-support planning and restricted-fire measures). The SOCCE should also coordinate the intelligence-collection efforts of the conventional force with the ODA. This allows continuity between the ODA and the intelligence requirements of the conventional force commander. The SOCCE can also integrate conventional-force and host-nation assets into the planning and execution of fire support and escape and evasion.

**IPB**

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is often a weakness of ODAs participating at J RTC. This is a result of limited guidance from the battalion S-2s, time restraints and intelligence sergeants failing to apply their education from the Operations and Intelligence Course. IPB is a dynamic approach to analyzing weather, terrain and the enemy in a specific geographical location. It continues throughout isolation and execution.

Using IPB, the ODA generates several visual aids that help to illustrate how the enemy might conduct himself in a particular situation. These templates, classed as situational, event and decision-support, are graphic portrayals of enemy force structure, deployment or capabilities, normally drawn to scale.

Situational templates are developed during the decision-making process to aid COA development. They are snapshots depicting what a threat force might do at a certain time and place on the battlefield. The situational template is the intelligence estimate in graphic form.

During comparison of COAs, the intelligence sergeant develops event and decision-support templates to assist in war gaming. Event templates identify and analyze battlefield events and enemy activities that indicate enemy courses of action. As the enemy force is visualized, critical areas, designated "named areas of interest," become apparent. An NAI is a point or area where enemy activity or lack of activity will confirm or deny a particular enemy COA. NAIs aid intelligence collection, reconnaissance and surveillance, and analysis. The event template depicts the NAIs and the relationship of events on the battlefield.

The decision-support template relates the details of event templates to decision points that are significant to the operation. Decision-support templates are the link between operations and intelligence. They provide a structured basis for using experience and judgment to reduce battlefield uncertainties.

IPB is more than a mechanical process. It provides ODAs with a means of synchronizing the intelligence system with other battlefield operating systems. Templates help in developing the collection plan, an important element of the intelligence cycle.

The intelligence cycle consists of four phases: directing, collecting, processing, and disseminating and using. The commander identifies priority intelligence requirements during the directing phase. PIRs serve as a tool to provide focus for the collecting phase. This focus forces the entire intelligence system to look for specific indicators which will answer the PIR. The ODA must restate its mandated PIRs to fit its mission. The team's PIR becomes the basis for the ODA collection plan.

**Collection plan**

The collection plan provides a framework for ODAs to determine and evaluate intelligence needs. Because of the diversity of missions, capabilities and requirements, the collection plan has no prescribed doctrinal format. An intelligence collection plan worksheet is a valuable aid in planning and directing the collection effort. An example collection worksheet can be found in FM 34-2, Collection Management, Appendix A, Figure A-1.

The final two phases of the intelligence cycle are processing, and disseminating and using. The key to these two phases is an effective ODA internal and external communications plan.

**Communications plan**

Once the ODA infiltrates the special-operations area, the communications plan is often a measure of mission success. It should include internal and external communications, communications security, SAVSER SUP 5, redundancy, contingencies and enemy direction-finding threats. It should include all of the communications assets available to the team and be thoroughly rehearsed.

In addition to the collection and communications plan, the ODA prepares numerous other plans to meet mission requirements and contingencies. To save time during isolation, routine parts of these plans can be addressed in SOPs.

**Escape and evasion plan**

At J RTC, units have habitually developed weak escape-and-evasion plans. This weakness results from poor planning and teams not receiving timely E&E guidance supplied to battalions from the joint special operations task force. Teams require timely guidance and overlays to support their development of assisted and unassisted E&E plans. Developed plans need to be disseminated so that team members can understand and rehearse them. All agencies that can assist in the E&E must also be aware of the plan. The SOCCE, for example, can possibly request conventional assets to recover an evading ODA.

**Fire-support plan**

ODAs often neglect the fire-support plan. It contains information necessary for understanding how fire support will aid the operation.
Fire support is the collective and coordinated use of indirect-fire weapons, armed aircraft and other lethal and nonlethal means in support of a battle plan.19 ODAs should develop a fire-support plan regardless of whether assets are available. This will allow quicker responses as fire-support assets become available.

**Other plans**

Infiltration and exfiltration planning is generally strong during JRTC rotations. The acronym PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency) should be a rule of thumb for planning all operations, including infiltration, exfiltration, assembly, resupply, casualty evacuation and link-up.

**Rehearsals**

The importance of rehearsals cannot be overemphasized. Isolation should focus on mission preparation, but often more time is spent rehearsing for a briefback than for actions on the objective. Rehearsals should include every aspect of the plan, under the best simulated combat environment possible, including wearing mission equipment both day and night.

**Briefback**

Once its mission planning is completed, the detachment presents a briefback to the tasking commander. The purpose of the briefback is to assure the higher commander and his staff that the ODA understands and is prepared to accomplish the given mission.20 Although many SF groups have their own briefback SOPs, the following format is effective:

1. The ODA commander introduces his team and acquaints the commander and his staff with the operational area.
2. The ODA commander gives a five-paragraph OPORD on the team’s mission.
3. The assistant operations sergeant briefs Annex A, Intelligence.
5. The ODA commander concludes with his visualization of the mission from start to finish.
6. The remainder of the detachment is prepared to discuss any annexes of the OPORD not discussed previously, if the commander or his staff have any questions.
7. Charts and sand tables help support the team’s briefing. The briefback is done from note cards rather than read to the commander.

After the briefback the team continues preparation and rehearsals for the mission. Emphasis should be placed on an effective rest plan prior to infiltration to ensure optimum performance in the operational area.

This article has focused primarily on premission activities as areas requiring improvement in SR. Most teams that participate in JRTC are proficient in individual skills and basic patrolling techniques. Many teams are familiar with applicable doctrine but often don’t realize the need to apply it at detachment level. The key to successful SR is realistic multiechelon training conducted in the most realistic conditions available. This can be enhanced by providing objective feedback to the unit on its ability to use, understand and apply current doctrine.  

---

**Notes:**

2. Ibid., see pp. 7-10 to 7-18 for the deliberate mission-planning process.
3. Ibid., p. 7-11.
5. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Student Text 100-9, The Command Estimate Process, p. 3-1.
6. Ibid., p. 3-6.
7. Ibid., p. 4-1.
8. Ibid., pp. 4-1 to 5-2.
9. FM 31-20, p. 7-16 for the MICON brief. Also see Detachment Mission Planning Guide.
10. FM 31-20, p. 5-19.
13. Ibid., pp. 2-14 to 2-18.
15. Ibid., pp. 2-20 to 2-23.
17. FM 34-2, pp. 1-3 to 1-8.
20. FM 31-20, p. 7-16 for mission briefback. Also see Detachment Mission Planning Guide.

---

Capt. Brian R. Vines is currently an SFODA observer/controller in the Special Operations Division, Joint Readiness Training Center, Little Rock Air Force Base, Ark. His previous conventional assignments include service as a rifle platoon leader and anti-armor platoon leader in the 82nd Airborne Division. He has commanded both a military-free-fall specialty detachment and an SF operational detachment in the 5th SF Group, also serving as a detachment commander during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. A graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Special Forces Qualification Course, he holds a BA degree from Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas.
Intercultural Communication: The Need for Conceptual Skills

by Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

When a Special Forces soldier begins his career he relies heavily on his technical skills. However, as he progresses in seniority and attains greater responsibility, a shift takes place as he becomes more dependent on his human and conceptual skills. I would like to focus on the human skills, or more specifically, the “intercultural communication” piece of this equation.

Within the last decade, intercultural communication has received considerable interest and attention in the special-operations community. We frequently approach this subject obliquely by discussing “coalition warfare,” “force multiplication” or “security assistance,” just to mention a few subjects. Regardless, there is considerable agreement that intercultural communication is important to our total readiness.

Intercultural communication is a very broad and complex area. It is based upon multidisciplinary fields of study which a Special Forces soldier needs to master if he is to be effective. He is exposed to these fields in institutional training, and his skills are enhanced and sustained in the unit.

Language

We expect every Special Forces soldier to be bilingual. By that we mean he has a working knowledge (speaking and comprehending) of a foreign language consistent with the regional orientation of his unit. He is first introduced to a language at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and must acquire a minimum memorized proficiency of 0+ 0+ before he is allowed to proceed to his assignment with an operational group. His organization then is responsible for sustainment and enhancement training. There is also an inherent individual responsibility to maintain proficiency. We are doing reasonably well.

Contrary to popular belief, learning a foreign language is not difficult. It is a natural process in all societies. A billion plus Chinese and Arabs learned the two hardest languages in the world. They did that under adverse weather conditions, rampant pestilence, wars, hunger, no Defense Language Institute, no assessment and selection, no bonuses and no entertaining technology. So it is not surprising that highly motivated Special Forces soldiers have been able to acquire linguistic skills with little difficulty. To date not a single Special Forces soldier has failed the initial training program at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. It is only a matter of time before language proficiency will be officially integrated into Special Forces qualification and unit readiness reporting.

Nonverbal skills

Nonverbal communication is a universal human phenomenon. It is possible to stop speaking, but it is not possible to stop behaving. From this continual behavior others make inferences concerning one’s thoughts and emotional states. These inferences are in turn acted upon by those who make them, a response just as real as if the original message had been verbal and intentional. A husband turning his back on his wife and slamming the door without a word is heralding a significant message. It is therefore not very difficult to understand what benefits a person can derive from understanding nonverbal language, since we communicate in a multiprocess manner. (It is interesting to note that studies indicate females are better receivers of nonverbal communication than males.)

The understanding of gestures...
and behavior is very difficult when the various elements are separated from their context. However, when gestures and behavior are fitted together into their composite position, a complete picture evolves. At times you may find a dichotomy between the verbal and the nonverbal meaning. In those cases the nonverbal gesture will generally prove to be more truthful.

Within a single culture, we utilize the nonverbal system almost unconsciously. A study conducted in 1970 estimates that within a single culture, only 30 percent of what is communicated in conversation is verbal. But, it is when individuals from different cultural groups begin to interact that their unconsciously assumed system of nonverbal communications ceases to function well. The gestures and behavior may actually be the same, but they may be assigned different meanings from one culture's system to the other's. Thus in a multicultural context we frequently have no alternative but to send messages blindly, not knowing how they will be received and interpreted. Unless we have been properly trained, we have thus maximized the potential for a communication failure.

For example, the gesture of forming a circle with the thumb and forefinger, the other fingers pointing up, is widely accepted as the American “okay” sign. However, in Brazil it is considered vulgar or obscene. The gesture is also considered impolite in Greece and Russia, while in Japan it signifies “money” and in southern France “zero” or “worthless.” Nevertheless, it must be noted that there are several emotions that span cultural boundaries: anger, happiness, fear, surprise and disgust are the key ones. The bottom line is that we must pay greater attention to this area than we have done to date.

**Cultural orientation**

This brings us to the field of cultural and area orientation. For Special Forces, an understanding of the objective area's people, their hopes, aspirations, religion, culture, history and economic and political dynamics is imperative. The orientation must also take into account the area's geography and climate.

On a very practical level, our increased understanding of the similarities and differences among people of different cultures will allow for messages to be more accurately sent and received. For example, a Catholic from Haiti, one from Rome and one from Los Angeles will view their religion from very different perspectives. In Japan, eye contact is key to the way you feel about someone, and the less of it the better. What a westerner considers an honest look in the eye, the Oriental takes as a lack of respect and a personal affront. Even when shaking hands or bowing, and especially when conversing, only an occasional glance into the other person's face is considered polite. The rest of the time great attention is paid to fingertips, desk tops and the floor. I imagine it is a good idea to keep one's shoes shined, for many Orientals will have their eyes on them.

On the other hand, Arabs flinch at the sight of shoe soles. Hence, feet are best kept flat on the floor, never propped up on a table or desk, or crossed over the knee. These are just a sampling of cultural differences that can obstruct effective communication when not taken into consideration.

**Interpersonal skills**

The last area that I would like to mention is interpersonal communication. Primarily, it requires the ability to maintain an open mind, the sensitivity to observe and grasp the situation, and most importantly, the ability to listen with understanding. For a Special Forces soldier it is critical that he is an effective teacher, and the ultimate negotiator and persuader. These are the skills which allow him to be a “force multiplier.” To be a good negotiator is not easy. Standard strategies often leave people dissatisfied, worn out, or alienated, and frequently all three.

Often people find themselves in a
dilemma. They see two ways to negotiate: Good Guy or Bad Guy. The good guy wants to avoid personal conflict and makes concessions readily in order to reach agreement. He wants an amicable resolution; yet he often ends up exploited and feeling bitter. The bad guy sees any situation as a contest of wills in which the side that takes the more extreme position and holds out longer fares better. He wants to win, yet many times ends up producing an equally difficult response. This exhausts both him and his resources, as well as harming his reputation and relationship with others. Other strategies used fall between the two extremes of getting along with people and getting what you want.

We advocate a strategy based on a method developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project. Issues should be decided on their merits rather than through haggling. It suggests that you look for mutual gains whenever possible and that where your interests conflict, you insist that the results be based on some fair standards independent of the will of either side. This technique is focused on merits and is gentle on people. It must be learned and flavored with knowledge of the foreign language, nonverbal communications, area and cultural understanding, and good interpersonal skills.

Like it or not, we are all negotiators. Negotiation is a fact of life. Everyone negotiates something every day. A person negotiates with his spouse, with his children and in various person-to-person relationships. Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed. Since conflict is a growth industry, more and more occasions require negotiation.

For Special Forces, the ability to effectively negotiate, persuade and teach is critical in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. Our technical competence is of little value if we are unable to get the other party to do what we think is necessary. These skills can determine the success or failure of a mission.

Special Forces takes great pride in being a force multiplier, contributing across the entire spectrum of conflict. However, our contribution will only be as effective as our ability to master technical and conceptual skills and our ability to skillfully pass information through effective intercultural communication.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow is currently the commanding general, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. During more than 30 years of commissioned service, he has served as a commander or staff officer with Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, airborne, and Special Forces units. His most recent assignments include serving as commanding general of the Army Special Forces Command and commanding general of U.S. Army-Berlin. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Special Forces Qualification Course, the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. He holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska and a master's degree from Shippensburg State College, Shippensburg, Pa.
Over the years, language training has become one of the top training priorities for Special Forces soldiers, yet language sustainment has continued to be one of the most difficult areas to maintain.

Each Special Forces group is allocated funds to conduct internal language training. These budgets allow for language labs, instructors, materials and OCONUS immersion programs. In spite of all these resources, language training is at times inefficiently conducted, when measured against an ODA’s mission-essential task list and upcoming missions. The following approach has been developed by ODA 716 to focus its language training for specific missions. The program was devised for ODAs which have a FID primary mission and an upcoming mobile training team or deployment for training into theater.

In lieu of language-enhancement training that aims to generally upgrade team proficiency, we have found that a specific, mission-oriented language training program is of greatest value to the ODA. Our program is based on developing post-site-survey programs of instruction, or POIs, and lesson plans, or LPs, which are directly focused on the requirements of upcoming missions. We base the majority of our language training — listening, writing, speaking exercises and vocabulary-grammar exercises — on the anticipated POI and its component LPs.

First, we coordinate through our Battalion S-3 training NCO to schedule a 2-3 week block at our battalion language lab with an accredited instructor. Then we schedule training time prior to the block to write LPs to support the POI, under the direction of our strongest team linguists. The strongest speaker is assigned the additional responsibility of coordinating with the contracted instructor in order to identify the needed grammar review and lessons, vocabulary and exercises needed to support the LPs.

Grammar is focused on proper verb conjugation, with emphasis on the present tense, the preterite, the periphrastic future and the imperative. We also reinforce proper sentence structure and other subjects, as needed, in accordance with our current skill level. The idea is to enable us to speak in simple, direct terms that our host-nation soldiers will understand. Then we work on developing vocabulary lists that support the lesson plans. For example, if we are discussing the construction of fighting positions, not only do we have to be able to say “parapet” in the target language, but we also have to describe a parapet in terms that recruits can understand: “Then you must construct a parapet to the front of the position. A parapet is nothing more than a low mound of dirt, which is packed down and is capable of providing protection against small-arms fire.” Without detailed, descriptive words in the LPs, the host-nation troops often get lost during the instruction.

Writing skills are addressed through the POI’s previously developed lesson plans. The instructor corrects them and provides one-on-one instruction on the salient grammar points and word usage that each individual requires. Then we rewrite the corrected LP.

After the LPs are in their final form, we begin rehearsing the classes under the supervision of the language instructor and team linguist, concentrating on proper pronunciation, diction and instructor techniques. We are able to combine both speaking and listening skills, as all team members participate in this phase. The class is then given in the target language before a murder board consisting of detachment members and the language instructor. The majority of the questions posed by the murder board are asked by those who are of native or near-native proficiency in order to better prepare the primary instructor.

Our attempts to develop effective mission-oriented language training are still evolving and changing. ODA-716’s approach is a combined effort of the entire detachment. We hope it will serve as an example of imagination and teamwork being used to accomplish the mission and that the program will be of value to other units seeking to optimize the use of their language-training resources.

CWO 2 Thomas F.D. Rogers is the detachment technician of ODA-716, Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group. With more than 15 years in Special Forces, he has served in assignments with the 10th, 11th and 7th SF Groups and the Special Warfare Center and School.
The OSS:
America’s First National Intelligence Agency

by Lawrence H. McDonald

The Office of Strategic Services was America’s first national intelligence agency, founded belatedly in the crucible of war, long after other great powers had accorded foreign intelligence and covert operations a distinct and permanent role within their political systems.

As predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency, the OSS not only passed on to the CIA its records, methods and experience, but it provided a training ground for many of the CIA’s eminent intelligence officers. Four of the CIA’s fourteen directors — Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby and William Casey — have been OSS veterans.

Officers were not simply assigned to OSS by an army personnel office; rather, the OSS selected officers from a pool. The names of those whose applications appear in the OSS Central Files but who, for one reason or another, were not appointed to serve in the OSS, make a most impressive list. When his application for the OSS was turned down, Olympic track and field star Alan Cranston, now chairman of the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee, enlisted in the Army as a private. Mystery writer Leslie Charteris was also not selected, but the OSS Counterintelligence Branch adopted the sobriquet of his detective hero, the Saint, as its code name. Asked to list his sports and hobbies, John Wayne wrote, “football, played college ball at the University of Southern California; squash and tennis, fair; deep-sea fishing, seven marlin in two years; hunting, a good field shot; horseback riding, have done falls and posse riding in pictures, not as easy as it sounds.” Wayne was also not appointed to serve in the OSS.

The courage and daring of the men and women of the OSS is legendary, making cloak and dagger a byword; OSS records document the often incredible bravery of its agents and operational teams. “Incredible” is not too strong a word — even the OSS director, Maj.
Gen. William J. Donovan, carried the OSS’s L-tablet (potassium cyanide) when in danger, to avoid capture.4

Donovan served with great distinction in World War I as an officer in the 42nd Division, the “Rainbow Division.” Awarded the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Croix de Guerre, “Wild Bill,” as he was known to the troops, returned from France one of the most highly decorated American soldiers.5 After the war, Donovan served in the Coolidge administration before founding a New York City law firm in 1929. Before America marched to war again, he was a millionaire.

Donovan’s reputation for reckless bravery followed him into World War II. He went ashore with the troops at Anzio. He met with OSS Detachment 101 guerrillas behind enemy lines in Burma. On D-Day, he and David K. E. Bruce went in with the invasion force. When he and Bruce found themselves pinned down by a German machine gun on Utah Beach, Donovan informed Bruce that they could not allow themselves to be taken alive and asked him if he was carrying his suicide pill, the L-tablet. Bruce confessed he had neglected to bring the poison tablet with him. Donovan searched his pockets for his own L-tablets but found none. “Ah well,” he said, “no matter for the pills. If the Germans take us, I’ll shoot you first as your commanding officer, then I’ll shoot myself, so there’s nothing to worry about.”6

He was, as President Eisenhower later described him, “the last hero.” He loved the excitement of war and seemed eager for American intervention in the war against the Axis. An Irish American and an interventionist Republican, Donovan made a welcome addition to the bipartisan war coalition that President Roosevelt desired.

On July 11, 1941, the President established (6 F.R. 3422) the Office of Coordinator of Information to collect, correlate and disseminate all intelligence relating to national security.7 He appointed Donovan, who served as a dollar-a-year man, as chief of this civilian agency. The U.S. Army, Navy, State Department, FBI, Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs Service and Treasury Department all had offices for foreign intelligence, and COI was to synthesize and disseminate intelligence acquired from all these agencies.8

But COI failed to win their support. J. Edgar Hoover described COI as “Roosevelt’s folly.” When COI agents made a clandestine raid on the Spanish embassy in Washington to photograph documents, Hoover, eager to protect his own territory, ordered several FBI squad cars to the embassy, sirens blaring, forcing the COI agents to take flight.9 Assistant Secretary of State
Adolf Berle disdained all espionage as “paranoid work.” Army and Navy intelligence chiefs, jealous of their own prerogatives, offered little cooperation and sometimes deliberately withheld information from COI.

COI was also divided within. The chief of COI’s Foreign Information Service was Pulitzer Prize winner Robert Sherwood. He believed that FIS should broadcast only white propaganda, the open dissemination of the truth, but Donovan wanted to make use of black propaganda as well, which deliberately falsifies its source, purporting to emanate from the enemy. In the case of the OSS, it actually originated in the OSS Morale Operations Branch, called MO, and little escaped the fertile imaginations of its officers. Their fabricated newspapers, radio programs, poison-pen letters, leaflets, pamphlets, posters, stickers, rumors, passports of surrender, and other machinations brought propaganda to the level of a science.

It is to the MO Branch that Allied propaganda owed such stratagems as cartoons drawn to foster the Italian predisposition to believe that Hitler had an “evil eye,” the sample towel marinated in itching powder and targeted especially for “Friends of Japan” in China, leaflets purportedly issued by the German Health Service Ministry warning of psychic impotence resulting from air attacks, and anti-Nazi pamphlets adorned with feminine cheesecake to distract even well-disciplined Wehrmacht personnel could not fail to notice.

In the form of gossip, MO used many variations on the theme “Where is Hitler?” MO spread rumors that Hitler was to speak at certain anniversaries, while his rumored death, disappearance, illness, psychotic condition or flight from Germany were all part of the orchestration of misinformation on his whereabouts and silence. MO “Comeback Studies” showed that these plants were reported as facts in the press of neutral countries. To counteract the effect of these rumors, German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels actually maintained that he had planted misinformation regarding Hitler’s illness to lull the Allies into complacency. Like an unmanageable form of germ warfare, however, MO’s black propaganda found its way back into American lines, where it was reported as authentic information in the press. In October 1944 the Washington Post published a United Press story of a “captured circular” composed by a German “League of Lonely War Women,” who promised free love to soldiers home on furlough. The circular was in fact MO propaganda.

When not carefully controlled, OSS black propaganda could perilously distort America’s own intelligence. In fall 1944 U.S. Army intelligence in Delhi mistakenly absorbed MO black propaganda broadcast from Chittagong indicating a weakening of the Japanese position in Southeast Asia. In June 1945 a columnist for the London Daily Express wrote that a U.S. Army colonel serving in the OSS had found that nearly half the information in the files of the OSS Secret Intelligence Branch actually originated in rumors disseminated by OSS itself. The OSS colonel was obviously exaggerating, but his observation does point up the dangers inherent in black propaganda.

Various forms of systematic deception were employed by the OSS to mislead German intelligence into thinking that the Allied landings at Normandy were only a feint calculated to draw German forces away from the main Allied attack at Pas de Calais. This “grand deception,” largely the work of the British Double-Cross System, was essential to the success of Operation Overlord. To defend his Fortress Europe against this supposed second invasion force, Hitler deployed 18 divisions to Pas de Calais and only six to Normandy. When the Germans finally discovered the deception, the Allied beachhead at Normandy was too strong to be dislodged.

The advantages of disinformation and deception notwithstanding, Sherwood wanted nothing to do with black propaganda, and he joined with Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish and Budget Director Harold Smith to heighten the chorus of those urging the President to dismantle COI. But Donovan also had advocates; he profited much from the advice and support of a British naval intelligence officer stationed in Washington, Ian Fleming, later to become the author of the James Bond espionage novels. Fleming provided Donovan with valuable information on the structure and operation of the British intelligence system and encouraged COI to develop the closest possible liaison with MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service.

Still more important to the vital connection between COI and British intelligence and covert operations was Sir William “Little Bill” Stephenson, Britain’s wartime intelligence chief in the United States, who generously supplied Donovan with highly classified information concerning the superior methods and organization of the
British Secret Intelligence Service. Little Bill made Wild Bill an indispensable channel for the exchange of top-secret information and warmly assisted his efforts to design COI/OSS under British influence and direction.

President Roosevelt resolved the matter. On June 13, 1942, he abolished COI and established by military order the Office of Strategic Services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. COI’s records and all its functions, except Sherwood’s foreign-information activities, which were assigned to the Office of War Information, were transferred to the OSS. JCS Directive No. 67, dated June 23, 1942, described and empowered the OSS to prepare intelligence studies, to plan and execute subversive activities, and to collect information through espionage. JCS 155/4/D, dated Dec. 23, 1942, further authorized the OSS to carry out psychological warfare in direct support of military operations. It defined psychological warfare to include propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, counterespionage, contact with underground groups in enemy-controlled territory, and contact with foreign-nationality groups in the United States.

From a small civilian agency composed of little more than a handful of branches and offices, by the end of the war the OSS would develop more than 40 branches and units with a well-chosen staff of almost 13,000 men and women. Modeled closely on the British systems of intelligence and covert operations, the OSS combined the functions assigned to four British organizations — MI6, Special Operations Executive, Political Warfare Executive, and the Foreign Office Research Department — into one agency. OSS not only added operational units to carry on clandestine warfare and sabotage, but as a self-sufficient agency, assumed full responsibility for the entire intelligence cycle, including direction and planning of intelligence requirements; collection of intelligence; evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation; and dissemination or distribution of the final product to appropriate offices, called customers.

The OSS assigned the collection of covert intelligence primarily to its Foreign Nationalities Branch and its Secret Intelligence Branch. FNB provided a new field of political intelligence by organizing contact with political refugees and with those important groups in the U.S. that were of recent foreign extraction and therefore retained distinctive ties with their countries of origin. Its staff was small, 40 or 50 people, but immigrant groups, eager to show their loyalty to the American war effort, voluntarily provided information concerning Europe and the Mediterranean area.

Far more important to intelligence collection was the OSS Secret Intelligence Branch. SI’s special
task was espionage, the collection of intelligence by clandestine means, primarily from human sources. Espionage is distinct from other forms of intelligence collection such as communications interception, cryptanalysis and photographic interpretation. But though the OSS Foreign Broadcast Quarterly Corporation recorded radio intercepts and the OSS London Office’s Enemy Objectives Unit employed photographic interpretation to plan strategic bombing, espionage was the main source of all OSS intelligence.  

Most of the intelligence collection for the French Riviera campaign in August 1944 was the work of the OSS, especially the OSS field offices in Caserta and Algiers, which gathered intelligence on everything, as William Casey said, “down to the location and condition of every last pillbox or pylon.” Some of the most significant intelligence gathering was the product of OSS offices in neutral capitals. The OSS Lisbon and Madrid offices were established early, and the OSS Istanbul office was located in a famous seat of intrigue. OSS Stockholm sent agents into Norway and Denmark. In Switzerland, a memorable contribution to determining the progress of German nuclear and bacteriological research was made by an OSS officer, Moe Berg, who spoke six languages. But Moe Berg will be remembered at least as well for his years in the American League as catcher for the Washington Senators and the Boston Red Sox.  

The work of Allen Dulles’s OSS Bern office was outstanding. During World War I, Dulles had served as an American espionage agent in Switzerland. As director of the OSS Bern office, he rarely failed to take advantage of sound intelligence provided by unsolicited walk-ins. At great personal risk, German anti-Nazi Fritz Kolbe, Fritz Molden, Hans Bernd Gisevius and others brought Dulles vital intelligence concerning German order-of-battle, aircraft defenses, submarine production and the V-1 and V-2 rockets. At first, British MI6 experts Harold “Kim” Philby and Sir Claude Dansey dismissed much of the intelligence collected by the OSS Bern office as the fabrications of German plants spiced with just enough truth to make it seem plausible. Time would show that Philby was a Soviet agent, and careful appraisal and analysis would establish the quality and reliability of the OSS Bern production.  

Without proper evaluation, the best intelligence collection may be dismissed as so many meaningless facts. The swarm of unprocessed information, sometimes haphazard and indiscriminate, generated by collection may lead to an intelligence glut more confusing than enlightening. Sorting out the raw data produced by SI and other OSS units, integrating it into a coherent pattern, analyzing it and preparing finished intelligence in the form of reports, studies and memorandums in response to anticipated customer requests — these were the functions of the OSS Research and Analysis.
Branch. The R&A staff selected the pertinent material from the mass of fragments and details furnished by clandestine sources and incorporated it with information drawn from overt intelligence—the periodicals, books, monographs and other publications and records available in our open society. At least 80 or 90 percent of the intelligence exploited by R&A derived from open sources available at places like the Library of Congress and the National Archives, where the OSS maintained small offices.22

Protecting the security of OSS intelligence collection, analysis and operations against enemy intelligence was the function of the OSS Counterintelligence Branch, X-2. Counterintelligence exposed and counteracted enemy espionage. Penetration, as James Jesus Angleton observed, is the essence of counterintelligence. OSS X-2 worked its way inside the Axis intelligence systems while preventing enemy penetration of OSS operations.

Before D-day, British Counterintelligence, MI5, captured practically every German spy whom the Reich had sent into Britain, some 120 agents in all, and forced them to turn against their Nazi masters. These doubled agents identified other German spies, revealed the methods of the German intelligence services, provided the Allies with German codes and ciphers, and sent carefully contrived disinformation back to Germany. This Double-Cross System, made famous by Sir John Masterman’s monograph of the same name, was the work of the Twenty Committee, to which Norman Holmes Pearson, the chief of OSS London X-2, was assigned as liaison.23

The revelation after the war of massive Soviet penetration of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service at the highest level severely weakened the credibility of all British intelligence services despite post-war efforts to recover the confidence of their allies by rigorous enforcement of the Official Secrets Act. In the wilderness of mirrors that was World War II espionage, James Angleton, known to his colleagues in the intelligence community as the Delphic Oracle, may have already discovered the treachery of Kim Philby and the Cambridge apostles Guy Burgess and Sir Anthony Blunt before the war ended. That the OSS was also the target of Soviet penetration is certain. Ardent Marxists and Communists, like the Lincoln Brigade veterans and emigré scholars, were among the most competent and dedicated antifascists, and Donovan knowingly appointed them to positions in the OSS. “I’d put Stalin on the OSS payroll if I thought it would help us defeat Hitler,” said Donovan.24

Donovan believed that the OSS’s principal contribution would be strategic intelligence, the basis for the formation of national policy. This primarily would be the final product of collection, analysis and synthesis by the FNB, SI, R&A and X-2.25 Some of the most valuable information contributed by OSS, however, was the tactical or field intelligence often provided by teams from the Special Operations Branch, or SO, working behind enemy lines with resistance groups. The foremost concern of SO teams and missions was liaison with the resistance, providing weapons and supplies to the indigenous underground forces, training them, and planning and coordinating their sabotage with Allied operations. SO teams also secured target information and assisted in the rescue of downed Allied airmen.

Outstanding among the SO missions in Europe were the Jedburgh teams. These were specially trained three-man teams parachuted into France, Belgium and Holland on and after D-day. Each team consisted of two officers and a radio operator. One officer was a native of the country to which the team was sent, and the other was British or American. Working closely with the British Special Operations Executive, SO sent 87 Jedburgh teams...
Special Forces was the famed SO operations and the predecessor of the model for successful guerrilla warfare in the China theater. Pre-eminent as members of SO Detachment 202 in the Sino-Japanese conflict, Jedburghs were transferred to the China theater, where their methods of training, organizing, supplying and leading indigenous troops were applied with the same success as in Europe. SO teams inflicted heavy losses on Japanese forces by sudden strike-and-withdraw tactics, destroying communications and transportation, and isolating units.

Vital to Japan's control of the Chinese interior was the mile-long double-track bridge that crossed the Hwang Ho (Yellow) River near Kaifeng. This bridge was the thread that joined the Japanese armies of north and south China. Against all odds, Jed veterans and a brave band of Chinese guerrillas under the command of Col. Frank Mills and Maj. Paul Cyr mined the great Hwang Ho bridge. On Aug. 9, 1945, the day Nagasaki was bombed, SO Mission Jackal blew away two large spans in the bridge just as a Japanese troop train was passing over. The entire train, carrying some 2,000 Japanese soldiers, was dragged to the bottom of the Hwang Ho.

The destruction of the Hwang Ho bridge was one of many achievements of SO Detachment 202 in the China theater. Pre-eminent as the model for successful guerrilla operations and the predecessor of Special Forces was the famed SO Detachment 101, which did much to win the war for the Burma Road. To re-establish contact with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army, the Allies had to wrest control of the Ledo-Burma Road away from Japan's 15th Army and open the highway from the Lashio railhead to Kunming.

Enlisting the support of native peoples like the Kachins, Karens and Chinese in Burma, some 1,000 officers and men of Detachment 101 formed a guerrilla army more than 10,000 strong that fought savage jungle warfare against determined Japanese troops. The monsoon rains fell upon them in sheets. Leeches crawled through the eyelets of their boots; they poured the water and blood out of them at the end of the day. Cholera, plague and typhus were a constant threat. Malaria and bacillary dysentery were unavoidable. Fighting under some of the worst combat conditions in the war, Detachment 101 perfected the art of guerrilla warfare, harassing the enemy with strike-and-evasion tactics, baiting them into reckless retaliation against the native population, and inflaming the smoldering embers of resentment into a conflagration of hate against the Japanese occupation of Burma. Before the war ended, Detachment 101 destroyed Japanese forces many times its numbers.

Less than three weeks after V-J Day, President Truman signed the order terminating OSS, effective Oct. 1, 1945. When the OSS finally closed its doors, custody of all its records was assigned to one of two agencies. One thousand cubic feet of reports and other files from the library of the Research and Analysis Branch were sent to the State Department. All other OSS records were transferred to the Strategic Services Unit, a War Department office made up of veterans drawn from the OSS Secret Intelligence and Counterintelligence branches.

Half the records acquired by SSU consisted of the files of the New York, San Francisco and Washington OSS offices; the other half comprised the records of all OSS overseas offices. Bringing together more than 6,000 cubic feet of records from the home offices and from OSS outposts all over the world, the SSU carefully arranged them according to point of origin, thereunder by OSS branch or unit, and thereunder by file type. To this day, every file folder received by SSU bears the mark of this fundamental system of arrangement. Having labeled each folder, the SSU then shelved the records alphabetically, beginning with the Algiers Office and ending with the Washington Office.

In 1947 the Central Intelligence Agency assumed custody of the OSS records so carefully arranged by the SSU. In 1980 the CIA began transferring its OSS archives to the National Archives, becoming the first national intelligence agency ever to release its once-classified records for research. The process of transferring, arranging, and describing this valuable group of records has been under way now for...
more than a decade. Though the Central Intelligence Agency continues to declassify and transfer records remaining in its OSS Archives, the National Archives has already received more than 4,000 cubic feet of OSS records and opened them for scholarly investigation. Descriptive lists are now available for most of the OSS records at the National Archives, and the lists have been computerized to improve access and control.

Researchers use these OSS records more heavily than any other 20th-century military records in the National Archives. They offer a kind of précis of the Second World War, revealing information never before available about one of the great defining moments in modern history. From the intelligence files of the OSS alone, one could write a history of the war, and writers and scholars the world over will continue to plumb the depths of OSS records for many years to come.

Lawrence H. McDonald is a projects archivist at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Since 1985 he has worked on the accessioning, arrangement and description of the records of the Office of Strategic Services. He has also served as a reviews editor for the American Archivist and has written several articles on the OSS and its records. Mr. McDonald holds bachelor's and master's degree from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. in history from the University of Maryland.

Notes:
2. Entry 92, box 156, folder 64, COI/OSS Central Files, Washington-Registry Office-Administrative Files-7, RG 226, NA.
3. Entry 92, box 362, OSS folder 22087, COI/OSS Central Files, Washington-Registry Office-Administrative Files-7, RG 226, NA.
4. Instructions for the use of the L (lethal) and K (knock-out) tablets are given in entry 110, box 38, folder 373, Stockholm Special Operations Branch-Operational Files-19, RG 226, NA.
7. Walter Karig published one of the earliest accounts of Donovan's work as Coordinator of Information in his article "The Most Mysterious Man in Washington" in Liberty magazine, Jan. 3, 1942. The article was filed in the COI/OSS Central Files, entry 92, box 65, folder 39 (8345), RG 226, NA.
9. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
10. Robert Sherwood won Pulitzer Prizes for his plays I didiot's Delight (1936), Abe Lincoln in Illinois (1938), and There Shall Be No Night (1940) and for the biography Roosevelt and Hopkins (1949).
11. MO Illustrative Material, entry 169, folder 2253, Washington Office-Morale Operations Branch-Operational Files-81, RG 226, NA.
18. Concerning FBQ, see entry 92, box 397, folder 24402, RG 226, NA. Concerning the R&A EOU, see entry 91, London War Diaries in History of the London Office of the OSS, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1623, roll 3, RG 226.
20. Moe Berg's personnel file appears in the COI/OSS Central Files, entry 92, box 313, folder 1, OSS folder 19487, RG 226, NA.
21. OSS Bern Office records in entries 125 and 190, RG 226, NA, are often annotated in Allen Dulles's own hand. Ranelagh, The CIA, pp. 72-78. The OSS Survey of Foreign Experts and the George Office also had the function of intelligence collection.
23. Winks, Cloak and Gown, pp. 280-291. Not all SI efforts to penetrate Germany were successful, as William Casey's wartime report demonstrates, entry 190, box 300, folders 82/A and 94, London-Secret Intelligence Branch - Operational Files - 9 and 21, RG 226, NA. Most of the SI agents sent into Germany were never heard from again.
25. In the perennial debate over the importance of analysis as
opposed to collection, Donovan also tended to give priority to analy-
sis. Entry 154, box 116, folder 2097, Kandy - Registry Office - Opera-
tional Files-18, RG 226, NA.

26 Entry 91, box 24, History of the OSS in London, War Diary, SO
Branch, OSS London, vol. 4, book 1, J edburghs, pp. i-xxv, RG 226,
NA. The London War Diary is the most thorough history of any OSS
overseas office, consisting of more than 14 cubic feet of records. It is
readily available on National Archives Microfilm Publication M1623.
Concerning the Special Operations Branch, see rolls 6-7; concerning
the J edburghs, see roll 8. The OSS Operational Group Command
developed out of the SO Branch. OG teams were larger than those of
SO, usually composed of about 20 to 30 men. Unlike SO teams, the
OG teams often engaged small enemy units in direct combat. The
London War Diaries describe OG operations in vol. 4-A, M1623, roll
9. The origin of the name J edburgh is uncertain. It appears as early
as July 7, 1942, in an SOE directive. It apparently derives from
British infiltration during the Boer War in South Africa. See Fabrizio
Calvi, OSS, La Guerre Secrete en France, 1942-1945: Les Services

Bradley Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 290-293.

28 Many citations for Mission Jackal, SO Detachment 202 in China
Theater, and the J edburgh missions in Europe can be found in the
Code and Project Names printout, which is based on descriptive lists
written for the OSS Archives of the Central Intelligence Agency.

29 Roger Hilsman, American Guerrilla: My War Behind Japanese

30 Researchers will note, for example, that file folders for the fourth
series of financial files created by the Secret Intelligence Branch in
the OSS Bern office, for instance, are labeled: BERN-SI-FIN-4. To
take another example, the second series of personnel files created by
the Special Operations Branch in the OSS Kunming office are

31 In 1975 and 1976 the National Archives opened 1,000 cubic feet
of OSS records received from the State Department for research. Of
the more than 6,000 cubic feet of records in the OSS Archives of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA has, since 1980, transferred
more than 3,000 cubic feet of records to the National Archives. Once
they are declared inactive, only a small part of the records generated
by federal agencies can be permanently preserved. The records of the
OSS are an exception; most of them will be assigned for permanent
retention at the National Archives. A critical survey of literature on
intelligence can be found in George C. Constantinides, Intelligence
of the OSS was prepared by the SSU History Project. This was pub-
lished in two volumes in 1976 with introductions by Kermit Roo-
sevelt: Volume 1, War Report of the OSS and Volume 2, The Overseas
Targets War Report of the OSS.

32 Computer printouts have re-established the original SSU system
of arrangement and sorted them out according to point of origin,
associated location, branch, file type, personal name, code and project
name, entry and keyword. Volunteer workers at the National
Archives have contributed significantly to the preservation of the
OSS records by refoldering, labeling, covering records in mylar, per-
forming other holdings maintenance work and by preparing records
for microfilming.
Interview:

Lt. Col. David G. Christie, Australian SAS Regiment

Lt. Col. David G. Christie is the Australian Liaison Officer for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, assigned for duty with the J FK Special Warfare Center and School. Assigned to USASOC since February 1990, he was also assigned to the former J FK Center for Military Assistance from 1972-74 as a student in various courses. An Infantry Corps Officer, most of his service has been in special operations. Since joining the Australian Army in 1967, he has had training, command and staff appointments in special operations and is a former commander of the Australian Parachute School at Nowra, Australia.

SW: What are the missions of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment?
Christie: To achieve its mission, the regiment focuses on a number of roles which are diverse in nature and include strategic and operational intelligence gathering, harassment of the enemy in depth, recovery operations, siege-hostage operations and special-warfare operations. Our special-warfare role may be likened to the U.S. unconventional-warfare role. Despite these varied roles the regiment is primarily a reconnaissance and surveillance organization, designed to conduct operations beyond the scope of conventional forces.

SW: Is it very active currently?
Christie: Elements of the regiment have remained active in training-assistance tasks throughout the Southeast Asian and southwest Pacific regions. Individually, members of the regiment participate with other members of the Australian Defense Force in United Nations peacekeeping tasks. Furthermore, the regiment maintains an extremely intense training calendar and participates in a range of bilateral training exercises with the U.S. and regional forces.

SW: What are the prerequisites for the SAS, and what kind of training do you go through?
Christie: All applicants must have completed about two years’ service. This saves the regiment resources, in that basic training has already been completed. Additionally, the two years’ service criterion is, in itself, a selection procedure, since applicants must have their commanding officers’ recommendations, and they must have performed well to achieve that recommendation. Applicants must be mentally and physically fit, they need to be able to accomplish demanding tasks, alone or as a member of a group, in conditions that are less than pleasant, and they need to continually perform to the limits of their ability and endurance. The regiment’s selection criteria are similar to the Special Forces Assessment and
Selection Course conducted by your 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

**SW:** How long is the selection course?

**Christie:** The selection course is approximately three weeks in duration. This course is not designed to teach. It is designed to identify those applicants best equipped to be able to assimilate the demanding year of training that will follow the selection procedure and then to use that training to accomplish assigned tasks. Motivation plays a very big part in success on the selection course and service in the regiment.

**SW:** How much influence did your course have on our SFAS Course?

**Christie:** I understand that your training group sent a team to observe a number of other courses, as well as the course conducted by the Special Air Service Regiment. While in Australia, your team observed closely the conduct of a full selection course and departed Australia with a full course package. The information gathered in Australia was used in the production of the SFAS Course. I don’t find the similarities surprising at all. In fact, even if the courses had been produced in total isolation, I would think there would be many similarities. Both forces, after all, require very similar performance from the selected soldiers.

**SW:** Once selected, do the soldiers go through the regular SAS training course?

**Christie:** Before posting to the Special Air Service Regiment, all applicants who have successfully completed the selection course must complete a basic parachute course and an SAS patrol course. On posting, all soldiers are required to relinquish rank and revert to the rank of trooper. In the Special Air Service Regiment, the initial rank is that of trooper, but a private is not the same as a trooper. Soldiers must then complete a series of courses, including basic demolitions, weapons handling, regimental signaller, and medical assistant. Once assigned to a troop, reinforcements undertake training in the basic skills of the troop to which they are assigned. These troop skills relate to the different environments in which the troops specialize — air operations, water operations and vehicle-mounted operations. The selection-and-reinforcement training cycle takes about 10 months, that is, from the commencement of the selection course to posting to an SAS Squadron. On posting to an SAS sabre squadron, all soldiers commence advanced training, although this is still concerned with the bread-and-butter requirements of their trade, such as shooting, fieldcraft, navigation and small-unit tactics. Soldiers also complete more advanced training in their specialist skill areas.

**SW:** Would other people in the Australian Army attend the same schools?

**Christie:** No. One of the Special Air Service Regiment subunits is a training squadron. The training squadron is manned primarily by experienced senior noncommissioned officers who have advanced skill levels in the various specialist areas. In this regard, the training squadron performs much the same function for the Special Air Service Regiment as your training group does for Special Forces. Training Squadron conducts courses specifically for the regiment, and the standards required are those set by the regiment’s commanding officer. The courses conducted by Training Squadron are not normally available to other Army members.

**SW:** What is a sabre squadron?

**Christie:** The term sabre squadron is used to describe the fighting squadrons of the regiment. The Special Air Service Regiment has three sabre squadrons. In addition, there is a regimental headquarters to provide command and control and set policy guidelines, a base squadron to provide for the administrative needs, a signal squadron and the training squadron I mentioned earlier.

**SW:** Since their main mission is reconnaissance and surveillance, what kind of reconnaissance training do they get?

**Christie:** I mentioned the basic training all soldiers receive before they are posted to a squadron and the advanced training once posted. The patrol course goes into detail in the techniques of conducting a patrol, how to best use the environment, the conduct of observation and surveillance and the reporting of information obtained. In addition, the Special Air Service Regiment spends considerable effort on teaching skills such as patrol.
debriefing, to ensure that maximum benefit is gained from each patrol. Our soldiers need to know how to pull all the reconnaissance information into a format that will describe what they've seen to someone who needs to use the information, and so they are taught to compile all this information into a reconnaissance survey, or target survey. The aim of that from the SAS Regiment's point of view is to allow a regular-army unit, or a naval or air force asset, to move against that target, should it be desired, and so the intelligence has to be well-presented. As in your Special Forces, there is a considerable amount of equipment to assist soldiers in gathering information, and the skills needed to use that equipment for maximum benefit requires good training. All of these skills are enhanced on the Patrol Commander's Course. In the specialist areas, courses teach such skills as beach reconnaissance and survey.

SW: So the reconnaissance information gained wouldn't just be for SAS use?
Christie: That is correct. In the Australian Defense Force, elements of the Special Air Service Regiment assigned to operations would be commanded at the highest level. That may well be a joint-task-force commander, or it may be directly by the headquarters of the Australian Defense Force. The information gained by the Special Air Service Regiment is for the commander of the force that SAS elements are supporting.

SW: Can you make any comparison between the reconnaissance skills that we train for in Special Forces and what you train for in SAS?
Christie: I think the reconnaissance skills needed are the same in both countries. But I think the Special Air Service Regiment spends more time learning and reinforcing the basics. The style of instruction in the Special Air Service Regiment is much more personal. From the time of allocation to a patrol, which is the basic operational element of the regiment, consisting of five men, it is the responsibility of the patrol commander to ensure that his patrol is well trained, and he spends most of his time making this happen. The skills required for reconnaissance and surveillance demand as much learning time and practice as demolitions, scuba diving, or any other advanced skill. From my observations and understanding of the missions required of U.S. Special Forces and the environments in which these missions must be achieved, there is very little time available to conduct training in something so basic as patrolling. In addition, Special Forces has available an enormous array of high-tech equipment for which training must continually be conducted.

SW: From your service here, what impressions have you formed of Special Forces?
Christie: I think Special Forces are a wonderfully skilled force with immense capabilities. I don't always agree with the methods of training, but I grew up in a different environment, so I'm probably biased toward the SAS way of doing things. I think Special Forces are being forced to become more conventional, which I think is something that your commanders are well aware of. I also think that the force is “headquartered to death.” The important thing is that U.S. Special Forces provide an immense capability to support U.S. interests. I think that capability is characterized by thoroughly competent people at all levels. I am very thankful to have been able to watch and learn, just by being here.
Army special-operations forces have a critical need for information about their operational areas in order to conduct mission analysis and planning. To provide a rapid response to potential worldwide military or humanitarian crises, commanders, staffs and soldiers need to be able to integrate information, plan, assess, rehearse and execute operations for areas with which they are unfamiliar.

No change in current planning procedure is needed. What is needed is an improvement in execution of the planning procedure, in terms of speed, planning data and methods for exchanging data between users. The answer may lie in automated mission-planning-and-rehearsal systems, which can consolidate and present visually, information that has been gathered through a comprehensive collection plan. It should be understood that an MPRS is not a substitute for the mission-planning process — it is a tool to assist planners and operators to plan their missions.

The purpose of an MPRS is to increase the accuracy and speed of mission planning and rehearsal by integrating operational, intelligence and terrain information. A system which superimposes imagery, threat and tactical-situation information onto terrain would produce an electronic sand table for use in the following:

- Familiarization — to help decision makers or operators learn about the operational area during mission preparation.
- Site/target/objective planning — to assist in the design of tactical military plans (actions at the objective area).
- Line-of-sight analysis — to determine what can be seen from various vantage points for planning observation, cover and concealment, communications, range fans for friendly and threat weapon systems.
- Route planning — to assist in the design of ground and air routes during a mission.
- Fire-support and air operations — to plan for suppression or destruction of threat capabilities.
- Decision making — to assist in development and assessment of courses of action.
- Rehearsal/navigation — to practice moving through the operational area. This can be a static or moving product used to assist the operator with navigation and other aspects of mission execution while on an operation.
- Debriefing — to assist an operator in recalling and explaining details of an operation in which he participated.
- Image analysis — to gain a better understanding of an image.
- All-source analysis — to gain a more comprehensive view of an area, facility, objective or target.
- Intelligence reporting — to communicate intelligence information to decision makers, operators or other intelligence users.

An MPRS is limited by the availability, age and accuracy of the data.
Left: A perspective view of Rattlesnake Drop Zone, produced by the Army Space Command system. Through a process called image-perspective transformation, the system combines digital terrain data with imagery from satellite photos. (Photos courtesy Army Space Command)

Below: Digital terrain map of the area surrounding Rattlesnake Drop Zone.
it uses and the time it takes to produce products. Some systems use computer graphics to cover gaps in data and to add more apparent realism. It is important to remember that some features, such as tree spacing and diameter, for example, would be different in reality from what is seen on a screen.

A system being specifically developed for SOF is the SOF Planning and Rehearsal System. SOF PARS is planned as a family of systems to provide a mission-planning-and-rehearsal capability for air, ground and maritime missions. It will be developed in three phases, with continual SOF-operator feedback during the development. Phase I is a comprehensive planning and rehearsal system for Air Force and Army special-operations-aviation units. It is designed to include threat-modeling, route planning, integrated maps and imagery, generation of 3-D perspective views and automated production of mission-planning products.

Phase II would allow Army and Navy SOF to use computers to scan digital maps and imagery from national and civil sources, and to build databases for use in planning various courses of action. Phase II would also generate 3-D perspective views and automated mission-planning products. Phase III will be a mission-rehearsal system which will let troops simulate movement through designated areas from various viewing angles. Perspective views generate a snapshot of terrain which may then be manipulated by rotation or zooming in or out. In a rehearsal system, the snapshots occur so rapidly as to be indistinguishable, and the viewer appears to be in motion.

Contracts for development of SOF PARS Phase I were awarded in 1991 for system delivery in January 1993; contracts for Phase II were awarded in June 1992 for system delivery in March 1993. Contracts for Phase III are scheduled to be let in 1995. Once the systems are delivered, they will be tested and evaluated for further development.

Another automated planning and rehearsal system, not SOF-specific, is currently being demonstrated by the Army Space Command to acquaint potential Army users with the system's capability. The system exploits digital imagery and terrain data, from both government and civil sources. Terrain data provides the elevation and other topographic information, and imagery provides information about the current state of the ground and situation.

Using these data, the Space Command MPRS produces three-dimensional perspective views through a process called image-perspective transformation. IPT is the geometric transformation of digital imagery to change the apparent camera/sensor position, creating true perspective scenes from any point of view.

Demonstrations are tailored to a requestor's requirement and can run as long as four weeks. The ARSPACE system has been used to support exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center. In one example, a SOCCE and SF ODAs used the MPRS for mission planning. then the SOCCE used it to assist the brigade staff to plan its mission and to inform the staff of ongoing SOF operations. Units interested in more information on the system or demonstrations can contact Capt. Scott Netherland, Army Space Command, at DSN 692-8773, commercial (719) 554-8773/8713.

Capt. Dan Smith is currently a detachment commander in Co. A, 2nd Battalion, 11th Special Forces Group. A former enlisted intelligence analyst and Special Forces weapons sergeant, he has served as an intelligence analyst and combat-intelligence-team member with the 5th SF Group, as a detachment executive officer and detachment commander with the 20th SF Group, and as a tactical surveillance officer and tactical intelligence officer with the 29th Infantry Division. In his civilian occupation, he is an intelligence operations specialist in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army. In addition to the Special Forces Qualification Course, he is a graduate of the Intelligence Officer Basic Course and the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. He holds a bachelor's degree in journalism from Marquette University and is a candidate for a master's degree at George Mason University.
Skill-qualification identifier “D,” Civil Affairs operations, has again been authorized for reserve-component Civil Affairs soldiers. The approval of Career Management Field 38, Civil Affairs Specialist, as an RC-unique MOS did not identify all soldiers assigned to RC Civil Affairs units or the positions which require Civil Affairs training. Future changes to RC Civil Affairs authorization documents will include the addition of the “D” qualifier to a number of MOSs throughout the structure.

Promotion competition is becoming more specialized and focused. Although speaking a language is not a requirement, proficiency could be used as a discriminator for promotions and assignments. With the high quality of soldiers competing for promotions and assignments, soldiers should keep their proficiency rating current and their records updated.

Effective Oct. 1, 1993, promotion to sergeant first class will be linked to attendance and completion of the Advanced NCO Course. Unit commanders and sergeants major are strongly encouraged to continue placing the highest priority on NCOs’ preparation and timely attendance to ANCOC. Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert reminds soldiers that ANCOC consideration lists are only that — final lists are made once all deferments are taken out.

The following points of contact may be useful to enlisted SF soldiers who need to contact the SF Branch about assignments or career development:

Maj. Christopher Allen .................. Enlisted Branch Chief  
Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert .............. Professional-development NCO  
Mrs. Faye Matheny ..................... 18 B, C and D assignments manager  
Ms. Jacqui Velasquez .................. 18 E, F, Z and ROTC assignments, ANCOC manager  
Ms. Dyna Amey .......................... SFQC accession manager  
SSgt. Therese Archambeault ........... 37F assignments, ANCOC manager  
Mrs. Loretta Spivey .................... Branch secretary

Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert asks that soldiers direct assignment-related questions to the assignment managers and career-development questions to the professional-development NCO. Students in the SF Qualification Course with assignments questions should contact their student PAC. Branch phone numbers are DSN 221-8340/6044, commercial (202) 325-8340/6044. Address correspondence to: Commander; PERSCOM; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452.
Officer Career Notes

SF Branch chief publishes standing orders

The chief of the Special Forces Branch, Lt. Col. William J. Davis III, has recently published his branch philosophy and standing orders for all Special Forces officers:

1. Be honest — Always tell the truth. In these demanding times of the drawdown, we must be totally frank with our soldiers. Integrity is non-negotiable.
2. Be factual.
3. Always do your best — No one can expect more from you, and I cannot accept less. This is what our soldiers deserve. Demonstrate this by execution and not by idle words.
5. Never predict what a board will do.
6. We are PERSCOM professionals — The red and blue books serve as our FM's and TM's. Your character, maturity, interpersonal skills and common sense will guide you to the target.
7. Be aware of your operational surroundings.
8. Never let emotionalism cloud your perspective.
9. Always remember who you are and what you represent to our families, our Army, our Department of Defense and our nation.
11. Never forget our Special Forces heritage.
12. Twelve orders and 12 men. Never forget the A-team. De Oppresso Liber! God bless America!

FY 92 SF Accession Board selects 202 from YG 89

The Special Forces Accession board met Sept. 28-30, 1992, to consider applications for Special Forces from year-group-89 officers. The board selected 202 applications for 138 YG 89 requirements in SF. The number of those officers who will successfully complete Special Forces Assessment and Selection, the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course and language school is unknown. Based on last year’s statistics, these applicants should produce approximately 131 SF officers two years from now. Additional YG 89 applications will be accepted until the fall of 1996. Prospects are good that YG 89 will eventually be filled to the authorized level of manning.

RC SF officers may be able to apply for active duty

Because of a shortage of Special Forces officers on active duty, particularly captains, an action is currently being developed that would allow reserve-component SF captains to apply for active duty. Many details have yet to be worked out, but plans call for a board to consider applications from officers who meet the still-to-be-determined screening criteria. Selected officers would be brought on active duty for a three-year tour. Based on the needs of the Army and officer performance, some officers may be allowed to apply for “career status” and compete for selection to major. For further details contact Capt. Scott Peters in the SWCS Special Operations Propensity Office, DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002.
Some 18/39 officers eligible for RSC credit

Special Forces officers with Functional Area 39 who completed the Foreign Area Officer Course prior to July 1986 are eligible to receive constructive credit for the Regional Studies Course. To update their ORBs, eligible officers should contact Maj. Ray Morales, FA 39 assignments officer at PERSCOM, DSN 221-3115. He has a roster of officers who qualify for constructive credit, but he cannot update ORBs unless officers notify him.

Some FA 39 officers reclassified

Some FA 39 officers may notice a different area-of-concentration identifier on their next ORB. According to the SWCS Proponency Office, some FA 39 officers have been reclassified from 39B, PSYOP Officer, to 39B/C, PSYOP and Civil Affairs Officer, based on their training and duty assignments. This increases the inventory of 39C officers in the functional area and the Officer Distribution Plan.

SOPO welcomes new personnel

The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office has recently gained the following personnel: Lt. Col. Dave Wildeman, chief of SOPO; Maj. Ron Fiegle, CA Branch manager; CWO 3 Schaun Driscoll, 180A manager; SFC R.B. Gardner, operations sergeant; Mrs. Jeanne Schiller, FA 39 manager; and Mrs. Mary Ann Handran, secretary. Recent losses are Lt. Col. William A. Behrens, to Office of the Defense Attaché - Lebanon; Maj. Jose Martinez, to U.S. Army - South; and CWO 3 Bobby Shireman, to the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Chaffee, Ark.

New Reserve Component Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course fielded

Reserve-component officers assigned to Civil Affairs troop program units in positions requiring Branch 38 qualification are now required to complete the new two-phase Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course. Phase I of the new course, taken by correspondence, consists of both Army common-core and Civil Affairs-specific subcourses. Phase I culminates with a writing requirement which must be completed prior to the officer attending Phase II resident training at Fort Bragg. Officers previously enrolled in the old four-phase CAOAC are authorized to complete that course for qualification, with a few conditions. First, they must have been enrolled in either the OAC Phase I common-core correspondence course offered by the Army Correspondence Course Program prior to Oct. 1, 1991, or Phase I of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School prior to Oct. 1, 1992, to meet the old common-core requirement. (Officers who have previously completed any other advanced course are exempt from this requirement.) Second, all CAOAC students must have been enrolled in the old Phase III correspondence course not later than Oct. 1, 1992. ACCP will no longer enroll students in this course. Finally, all correspondence requirements under the four-phase system must be completed by Oct. 1, 1993. Officers who cannot meet these requirements must enroll in the new two-phase advanced course, including those officers who have previously completed any of the old resident phases. Officers who enrolled in and completed the pilot Phase I of the new CAOAC are authorized to complete the course by attendance in Phase IV of the old CAOAC. No other waivers or exceptions are authorized. Phase II of the new CAOAC will be taught at Fort Bragg beginning in the first quarter of FY 94. For more information, contact Maj. Ron Fiegle in the Special Operations Proponency Office, DSN 239-6406, commercial (919) 432-6406.
Combatting enemy sabotage and diversionary units, both in the rear of deployed operational formations and in strategic rear areas as well — was a continuing concern of Soviet military planners. As a consequence, rear-area forces and employment concepts were well-developed even at tactical levels. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, however, military and internal-security forces designated to perform these tasks were initially fragmented and disorganized, and eventually allocated among the newly independent states and restructured. The requirement for dealing with enemy SOF, nevertheless, was identified as a most important mission for Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Just months after the USSR’s dissolution, a 1992 article in the premier Russian military journal Military Thought reviewed the growing importance and effectiveness of special warfare as demonstrated in the Gulf War and elsewhere. The authors judged that it was necessary to create a “unified system for combating special operations forces” throughout the depth of the country, to include “specially formed (assigned) personnel and equipment distributed by zones of responsibility and by presumed areas of combat against special operations forces.” The missions and actions of such a system were set out, to include the requirement for interaction among military forces, border troops and internal troops, National Guard units, and civil defense and territorial units. However, given the continuing disarray in Russian military and security forces, highly permeable borders and the presence of interethnic hotspots inside Russia and around its periphery, creating such a system remains a distant goal.

The creation of a new police force in El Salvador, completely civilian in its membership and command, was one of the fundamental components of the Jan. 16, 1992, peace agreement between the Government of El Salvador, or GOES, and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. In March 1992, in response to this provision of the accords, the GOES abolished the National Guard and the Treasury Police Security Corps, which were among the most active counterinsurgency forces during the 12-year war. In their place, authorities created the Brigada Especial de Seguridad Militar (Special Brigade for Military Security — BESM). Directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, the unit is composed of four battalions and includes a 456-man military-police battalion organized and structured after the U.S. Army MP doctrinal concepts model. The brigade’s mission statement, unit TO&E, and training calendar were developed in 1992 with the assistance of a U.S. military adviser. Essential training to prepare the unit for its deployment included: provost-marshal operations, criminal-investigations procedures, physical security, crime prevention, deserter apprehension, prevention of drug and alcohol abuse, leadership, small-arms skills, and counterterrorism training. The MP battalion will deploy for military-security duties sometime in 1993. The other three battalions (475 men each) guard the borders with Guatemala and Honduras. They are charged with guaranteeing national sovereignty, suppressing smuggling of drugs and other contraband, and supporting other governmental agencies in the frontier regions.
Ukraine sets up Golden Eagle units

In a number of former Soviet republics, internal-security forces are required to deal with problems having both law-enforcement and military dimensions. Responding to rising levels of criminal and random violence and other acts of “terrorism,” as well as a perceived need to maintain rapid-response units capable of dealing with natural disasters, epidemics and other emergencies, Ukraine has set up specialized paramilitary security forces throughout the state. These forces — called Berkut (Golden Eagle) detachments to symbolize their asserted mobility, combat readiness and resolve — began forming in January 1992 under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They are based on previously existing Militia Detachments of Special Designation, which in the late Soviet period dealt with particularly violent acts of terrorism and challenges to Soviet authority. Planned Golden Eagle strength was to total nearly 3,000 personnel organized into a regiment in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, with battalions or companies located in other cities. Berkut detachments are equipped and trained in ways analogous to the counterterrorist or special-weapons-and-tactics squads of large Western cities; they possess armored personnel carriers and are comparable to the Austrian “Cobra” counterterrorism force.

Multiservice unit primary Colombian hostage-rescue force

The Fuerzas Especiales Anti-terroristas Urbanas (Urban Counterterrorist Special Forces, or AFEAU) is Colombia's primary national-level hostage-rescue force. A multiservice force, it has elements from the Army, Air Force, Marines and the Colombian National Police. Created in 1985 after existing military and security forces were unable to respond to the M-19 guerrilla attack on the Palace of Justice in Bogota, it has been deployed against terrorists, insurgents and drug traffickers. Each service element provides a 15-man force (two officers and 13 enlisted personnel), all volunteers and all possessing basic and specialized military skills. It is commanded by an Army major and has a headquarters section which includes an executive officer, first sergeant and radio-telephone operator, bringing its total strength to 64 personnel. The AFEAU is under the direct control of the Comandante de las Fuerzas Armadas (Commander of the Armed Forces), and is located at the Escuela de Caballeria (Cavalry School). AFEAU equipment includes scoped 7.62mm Remington sniper rifles, Israeli Galil 7.62mm rifles, 5.56mm AR-15s, 5.56mm M16A-2s, 9mm MP-5 machine guns, 9mm Beretta pistols, Browning 9mm pistols, Remington 12-gauge shotguns, night-vision devices, M-79 40mm grenade launchers, 7.62mm M-60 machine guns, internal secure voice communication equipment, and numerous types of rappelling equipment. Training is conducted north of Bogota at Facatativa, and includes close-quarters combat; bus, train and airplane hostage-rescue operations; sniper training; explosive training; small- and long-arms marksmanship; airmobile/air-assault operations, and self-defense techniques. In February 1990 the AFEAU deployed to Cartagena during the first anti-drug summit, attended by President Bush. It secured and controlled the Cartagena airport, established sniper positions at the “Casa de Huespedes” (guest house) where the Colombian, Peruvian, Bolivian and U.S. presidents met, established control of the roadway from the airport to the Cartagena Convention Center, and raided presumed narco-guerrilla houses and farms. It should be noted that the AFEAU was the unit that captured the notorious drug trafficker Carlos Lehder Rivas in February 1987.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
3rd SF Group activates 3rd Battalion

The 3rd Special Forces Group activated its 3rd Battalion in ceremonies at Fort Bragg Oct. 16, giving the 3rd Group its full complement of battalions.

Col. Philip R. Kensinger, 3rd Group commander, presented the colors to Lt. Col. Richard W. Mills, the battalion’s first commander since its deactivation on Dec. 10, 1969. Mills’ previous assignment was with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, where he served as a military observer.

“The significance of this activation cannot be overstated,” Kensinger said. “While the rest of the Army is experiencing downsizing, Special Forces Command is standing up a new unit.”

The 3rd Group, oriented toward the Caribbean and Africa, was reactivated in June 1990; its 1st Battalion was reactivated at the same time. The 2nd Battalion was reactivated in October 1991. Soldiers from 3rd Group participated in Desert Shield/Storm and Provide Comfort in 1991 and helped Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba.

Ranger veterans dedicate memorial stones

Two organizations of Army Ranger veterans recently unveiled engraved memorial stones at Fort Bragg to the memory of Rangers who died in service to their country.

The memorials, located in the John F. Kennedy Memorial Plaza, near the headquarters of the Army Special Operations Command, were dedicated Nov. 24, 1992, to those Rangers who fell in battle and to commemorate the Ranger unit legacy, officials said. Representatives of the Ranger Regiment Association and the Merrill’s Marauders Association unveiled the Georgia granite stones engraved with the names of their organizations.

Speakers at the ceremony included Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, commanding general of the Army Special Operations Command and a former commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment; Col. David L. Grange, current commander of the 75th Ranger Regi-

new equipment will assist recon missions

Special-operations soldiers will soon have high-tech additions to their reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering capabilities. The Electronic Filmless Camera System will give SOF soldiers the ability to capture photo images in distant locations and transmit them directly to their headquarters for analysis. The system’s camera will store images on a magnetic disk, according to Gus McGrue, equipment specialist in the Combat Developments Division of the Army Special Operations Command’s Force Development and Integration Directorate. The digital image can then be transmitted over standard SOF radio systems or by military or commercial telephone.

The EFCS will consist of two sets of equipment, the out-station and base-station sets. The base-station set, the AN/USC-50, composed of a camera, monitor, digital-imaging processor, still-video reader, modem and printer, will be deployed at a rear-area site, McGrue said. It will be able to receive, store, process, edit and display photo images. The base station will be capable of selectively transmitting to and receiving from other base-station units or out-station units.

The out-station system, the AN/PSC-6, will have the same capability as the base station, McGrue said. EFCS cameras will be similar to currently available 35mm com-
commercial systems, but must be capable of functioning under adverse climatic conditions and suited for parachute and airdrop delivery. Both sets will be capable of using commercial or vehicular power, 28 volts DC.

The product of a joint study by the Army Special Operations Command and the Army Materiel Command, EFCS is scheduled for delivery to field units in fiscal year 1993.

The Improved Remotely-monitored Battlefield Sensor System will allow SOF reconnaissance forces to collect information on movement of personnel and vehicles without exposing themselves to detection.

Composed of monitors, repeater units, and infrared, seismic/acoustic and magnetic sensors, the system offers small size and light weight, important factors for SOF missions. "IREMBASS is a SOF-specific spinoff of the earlier REMBASS," said Glenn Latendresse, also an equipment specialist in the Combat Developments Division of USASOC Force Development and Integration. "REMBASS is too heavy and too big for SOF. IREMBASS offers the same capability in a smaller size." Three sensors, a repeater and a monitor, for example, have a combined weight of 22 pounds.

IREMBASS's battery-powered sensors can be buried or camouflaged and placed near likely areas of enemy traffic. When activated by a target, they transmit data in short bursts to the system monitor. Although limited to line-of-sight transmission, their range can be extended by use of the repeater units. At the receiving end, readouts on the hand-held monitor classify the target as personnel or vehicles and indicate type and direction of movement. Since the sensors operate only when activated, Latendresse said, they have a minimum battery life of 30 days.

A complete system will consist of two monitors, two repeaters, four seismic/acoustic sensors, two magnetic sensors and two infrared sensors, Latendresse said. The system is completely compatible with the REMBASS, allowing it to complement or replace items from the earlier system, as necessary.

IREMBASS will be issued on the basis of nine per SF battalion, one per support company, and six per Ranger battalion. Fielding is scheduled to begin during the first quarter of fiscal year 1994.

96th CA Battalion receives new streamer

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion recently received the Meritorious Unit streamer for its activities in the Persian Gulf war.

Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, commander of the Army Special Operations Command, hung the streamer on the unit's flag, calling the 96th "the hardest working, most often deployed unit in the United States Army." The ceremony took place during the battalion's change of command on Nov. 10, 1992.


As the only active-duty Civil Affairs unit, the 96th sent soldiers to the Virgin Islands in 1988 following Hurricane Hugo, to Panama in 1989 for Operation Just Cause, to the Persian Gulf in 1990 for Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba in 1991 to provide shelter to Haitian refugees. Members of the unit also deployed to Florida in 1992 to aid in relief efforts following Hurricane Andrew.

3rd SF Group dedicates new headquarters

The 3rd Special Forces Group has dedicated its new headquarters building to a Canadian officer in the 1st Special Service Force killed during World War II.

During ceremonies held Nov. 6, 1992, the headquarters, located on Fort Bragg's Yadkin Road, was named MacWilliam Hall in honor of Lt. Col. Thomas Cail MacWilliam, commander of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 1st Special Service Force. MacWilliam was killed in action during the offensive to seize Monte La Difensa, Italy, on Dec. 4, 1943.

The ceremony was attended by Mrs. Thomas Griffith, who was married to MacWilliam at the time of his death, and his son, Thomas A. MacWilliam. The two assisted 3rd Group commander Col. Philip R. Kensinger in unveiling a portrait of Colonel MacWilliam.

"We in Special Forces trace our lineage directly to the First Special Service Force, and it is more than appropriate to select an individual from that unit for the honor of this memorialization," Kensinger said. "Lieutenant Colonel MacWilliam personified the virtues that we value in Special Forces today, and specifically in the 3rd Special Forces Group."

The 3rd SF Group traces its lineage to the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment of the First Special Service Force. The Canadian-American unit was constituted on July 5, 1942. The mission to seize Monte La Difensa called for the 1st Battalion to attack by climbing sheer cliffs to the rear of the German position. Under heavy fire, the battalion attacked and fought hand-to-hand to overrun the German positions.

SF Regimental History Calendar available

The 1993 Special Forces Regimental History Calendar has recently been distributed to SF units by the Army Special Operations Command's Office of the Command Historian.

The weekly planning calendar commemorates dates from SF history. For information on available copies, contact Dr. Richard Stewart, USASOC command historian, at DSN 239-4720, commercial (919) 432-4720.

February 1993 45

The subject of U.S. intervention in Latin America is not really in vogue at this time. It has recently been used by the political left to decry the U.S. for its "imperialist/colonialist" policies. The right, meanwhile, dismisses it out of hand as unimportant and of no consequence. As usual, both sides miss the mark. We need to study the events covered in The Banana Wars. Not to shackle us, intellectually or politically, but to find and apply insights for the future. Good policy uses history as an asset, but is not paralyzed by it. As special-operations soldiers, we have a responsibility to be prepared to give the best advice and counsel possible. This must be informed by history, or it will always be inadequate.

The organization of this book is a good one. It is mainly chronological, but modified by country: the author covers one country or operation at a time, as much in chronological order as possible. There is some overlap with regard to time, but he finishes each subject without mixing the information. This allows the reader to use each chapter, as needed, if he wants to deal only with one discrete situation. It also allows for comparative use, without undue hunting within the text. The chapters cover, in order, the Spanish-American War (1898), Cuba (1899-1917), Panama (1885-1904), Nicaragua I (1912), Haiti (1915-1934), Dominican Republic I (1916-1924), Nicaragua II (1927-1934), Dominican Republic II (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989).

From a stylistic standpoint, some may be put off. It is a standard historical work. While much more readable than most academic works, it is nonetheless an academic book. Fortunately, it is at about the apparent "minimum acceptable" length for a history book, nearly 500 pages. The ability to use individual chapters separately, as mentioned, helps to overcome the problem of length. The author is a naval historian, and most of his sources are Navy and Marine Corps in origin, but this does not detract from the usefulness to an Army reader.

The main strength of the book is its even-handedness in analysis. Musicant blasts the U.S. when he describes the times we were wrong-minded or greedy in our motivations or policies. He is just as quick to point out the numerous times that the greed and malevolence of indigenous figures is at the heart of the issue. This refreshingly unpolemical approach is welcome. Musicant also uses an incredible number of primary sources. This adds to the zest of the prose by providing almost continuous eyewitness accounts throughout. A stylistic strength is the use of a single quotation from an actual participant at the beginning of each chapter. This device sets the tone and, in fact, summarizes each chapter.

A weakness that results from the heavy reliance on Navy and Marine Corps sources is an overemphasis on the importance of the Navy in seemingly all the "banana wars." The Navy was a key player, but the author could have shortened the book by at least 100 pages if he had left out extensive explanations of types of cruisers and steaming times. For some, Musicant's high degree of detail might be considered a weakness, but a history book without a great deal of detail is liable to be more akin to fiction than true historical writing.

The Banana Wars is well worth reading and having on your shelf as a reference work. It should be at least reviewed by all who work in Latin America, for a deeper understanding of the roots of resentment we sometimes feel there. This is a serious book that will take some time and intellectual effort to appreciate and fully utilize. It is worth the effort.

Maj. Steven Bucci
CGSC
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
Ashes To Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War

Ashes To Ashes is an examination of the American Phoenix Program and its parallel South Vietnamese program, Phung Hoang, against the Viet Cong infrastructure. As the author points out, informed discussion of Phoenix/Phung Hoang has been severely lacking over the years. Rather, the program has been so tainted with negative publicity that those persons most qualified to discuss it have, for the most part, chosen to keep quiet instead. However, Ashes To Ashes begins to fill a void in America's understanding of "the other war" in Vietnam (i.e., anti-infrastructure operations against the Viet Cong). Filling that information void is important to those American special-operations forces that have foreign-internal-defense missions, if they are to learn the lessons of that conflict.

While Ashes To Ashes is a good start toward understanding Phoenix/Phung Hoang, it is not a complete account. The book focuses primarily on operations, while inadequately examining intelligence activities. The author repeatedly stresses the importance of intelligence in anti-infrastructure operations, yet he reveals nothing about that support, other than low-level human-intelligence operations. Low-level HUMINT is the essence of effective police work — the same police work that is so important in a LIC environment. However, the author also makes several references to the importance of intelligence provided directly by the CIA — without discussing that intelligence, its sources or methods. Indeed, the author's limited discussion points to another aspect of intelligence support: what were the contributions (or lack thereof) of service intelligence organizations and the DIA? The author notes that the priority for those intelligence organizations was order-of-battle intelligence, but was that their only priority? In the author's defense, much of that information is probably still classified, and some of it may never be declassified. However, the need for further information about intelligence support to Phoenix/Phung Hoang remains.

Additionally, Ashes To Ashes suffers from three other problems. First, in an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of Phoenix/Phung Hoang, the author sometimes resorts to relying on statistics — the same statistics which he derides. (For example, "Statistics, the opiate that soothed Saigon ..."[page 129]) Second, the author makes repeated references to the "incompetent" and "corrupt" Vietnamese, while Americans are portrayed as omnipotent and benevolent. Third, the book suffers from poor editing. These relatively minor problems detract from an otherwise fine effort.

A historian by training, the author provides a variety of interesting data from various sources about Phoenix/Phung Hoang, but he nevertheless fails to provide a comprehensive analysis of what this information means. Such an analysis may have to wait until more information about the program is declassified. However, Ashes To

Ashes makes a good start toward understanding "the other war" in Vietnam, and the author deserves credit for that.

Capt. Tim M. Mather
2nd Bn., 11th SF Group
Fort A.P. Hill, Va.


Like nearly all compilations from multiple authors, the book suffers from a lack of smooth transitions from one topic to the next, but overall, Max Manwaring has done a superb job in the editorial process while attempting to "connect the dots."

February 1993 47
Essentially, the focus of the book is on the need for the United States to develop a new model (or paradigm) to address the threat posed by what has come to be known as LIC. The authors find six primary areas in which America must concentrate its efforts if it is to be successful in the often violent and emerging "new world order." They are: 1) Establishment of legitimacy; 2) Organization for unity of effort; 3) Type and consistency of external support; 4) Discipline and capabilities of armed forces; 5) Intelligence; 6) Ability to reduce outside aid to the adversary. Students of LIC will recognize each element as essential in U.S. support to counterinsurgency operations.

The work is well focused on SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility, with examinations of the Sendero Luminosa, or "Shining Path" insurgent movement of Peru; U.S. support to the legal government of El Salvador against the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front; and a strategic view of Latin America by General Woerner.

Whether or not you agree with the authors is largely irrelevant. These are thought-provoking ideas offered by people who know the business of combining the military-diplomatic means of this nation at both the practical and theoretical level. Uncomfortable Wars would be a welcome addition to any professional soldier's library. Buy it, read it, and think about it.

Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.
4th PSYOP Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.


The Phoenix Program, by Douglas Valentine, is a selectively and prejudicially researched work. It is significantly flawed by the author's predetermined conclusion that the Phoenix program was not only a deliberate instrument of terror but also the harbinger of a legacy of conspiratorial evil that pervaded, and continues to pervade, U.S. policy at home and abroad. The true villain and target of the book extends far beyond the relatively limited theme that the title indicates. That villain is the Central Intelligence Agency.

Valentine's agenda is to convince the reader that Phoenix was much more than a particular effort instigated by the CIA to better coordinate the attack on hidden Viet Cong cadres. Instead, Phoenix was a dark concept that became a way of operational life, infecting virtually every aspect of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In his concluding chapter, Valentine further expands this speculation into U.S. involvement in Central America.

If you are proponent of Big Brother-type conspiratorial themes, this is the book for you. Valentine's preconceived argument is so dominant throughout the book that the reader wonders how honest the author was regarding his intent with many of those he interviewed. It appears that the conclusion of this work was written well before the body and that all that was needed was to find what the author considered to be substantiating evidence. To strengthen his thesis, the author is selective in his uses of other research.

A case in point is Stanley Karnow's Vietnam: A History. Although Valentine quotes Karnow throughout for Vietnamese historical reference (sometimes out of context), he is strangely silent on Karnow's comments regarding Phoenix itself. A critic of the program, Karnow nevertheless honestly recounts the testimonies of former high-ranking Viet Cong officials as to the effectiveness of Phoenix in disrupting the revolutionary infrastructure. You will not find such balance in Valentine's book.

All of this is unfortunate, because there are elements of potential value within the book. Relying to a great deal on interviews with both civilian and military personnel involved to varying degrees with the Phoenix effort, the book does provide insight into the problems that afflicted the program. These problems included the terrible imprisoning, torturing and killing of innocent Vietnamese, the great difficulty in persuading the Vietnamese to commit to the concept and in convincing the myriad agencies and forces to cooperate with each other in a common goal, and the consequences that resulted from placing unqualified or unethical Americans in positions that influenced Phoenix activities. There are, too, the instances of unquestionably immoral and illegal behavior by Americans that should be identified for what they were.

Within the framework of a balanced examination and analysis of the program itself, The Phoenix Program could have been a solid contribution to the study of American attempts, both good and bad, to combat communist revolutionary warfare. Instead, the effort will be wasted on all but those already inclined to believe the absolute worst about the United States' effort to combat communism.

Military readers may well find the book difficult to read, both for
its confusing style and consistent negative interpretation of virtually all U.S. or South Vietnamese action. The chapters are topically oriented on either components of the program, characteristics of the program (such as “Covert Action”), or what the author has determined to be stages of the program’s existence. There is no continuity, however, in either time reference or subject to link the chapters, leaving the reader wondering who was doing what, to whom, and when. Valentine’s understanding of both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary warfare is poor, and much of his history is simply wrong. Special Forces readers will find it of interest, for example, that the founding of the “First Special Forces” was linked to the formation of the French counterinsurgency force Groupements de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés, the GCMA, in 1951, or that “legions of Special Forces” were rushed to Vietnam by President Kennedy.

In summary, this book is clearly one to avoid. The problems with the Phoenix program have been articulated in other works such as Blaufarbs’s The Counterinsurgency Era, Race’s War Comes to Long An, Andrade’s Ashes to Ashes, and others that offer much more to the military professional interested in the field of revolutionary warfare. Valentine’s endless accounts of the torture and killing inflicted on the acknowledged innocent victims of Phoenix provides legitimate cause for study and reflection on the absolute critical nature of moral legitimacy, properly trained personnel, and committed allies in the prosecution of counterinsurgency. Yet the piece is so thoroughly compromised and colored by the author’s passionate conviction of the corruptness of the American effort that it is impossible to obtain an even view of the reality that was Phoenix.

Maj. John F. Mulholland
7th SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.


Some things improve with age, and so it is with author Leroy Thompson. Billed in the press packet as “counterinsurgency expert and former bodyguard to Gen. William Westmoreland,” but more widely known for writings fit for unsophisticated audiences, Thompson has finally produced a decent book in Dirty Wars: Elite Forces vs. the Guerrillas.

The book begins with a brief but interesting introduction to guerrilla warfare before 1900 and covers most of the major guerrilla wars of the 20th century. The layout is, in fact, very well done. The text is interesting and readable and broken up with scores of color and black-and-white photographs. Sidebar articles are used throughout the text to highlight the history of a particular unit or otherwise emphasize a point.

Thompson identifies himself as the author but does not, however, cite a single reference or source for any of his information. Another curious aspect of the book is that sources are listed for very few of its many photographs. Such might make a reader suspect Thompson’s accuracy and originality. The book is also a bit overpriced for its content. All told, Dirty Wars is decent enough for dayroom reading but not quite worthy of the library of a serious student of military elites or guerrilla warfare.

Maj. William H. Burgess III
USSOCOM
MacDill AFB, Fla.