



Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



Preparing SOF
for the Challenges
of Tomorrow

From the Commandant



Special Warfare

I recently had an opportunity to read a study by the Rand Corporation concerning demographic patterns in the less-developed world. The implications of these patterns for SOF are significant.

While the population of the developed world will increase by 12 percent from 1990 to 2025, the population of the less-developed world will increase by 75 percent. Economically deprived countries of the less-developed world will account for most of that growth.

Not only will the world's population grow, but increasingly, it will live in cities. Urban population will increase from 2.2 billion in 1990 to 5.1 billion in 2025, with the less-developed world accounting for most of the increase. The urban growth rate will be fastest in Africa, where the urban population may double between 1985 and 2000. During the same period, the absolute growth rate will be greatest in Asia, where cities will gain about 500 million people. From 1990 to 2025, the proportion of the population living in urban areas will increase from 72 percent to 85 percent in Latin America, 30 percent to 53 percent in Asia, and from 35 percent to 58 percent in Africa.

A third trend is the increasing number of refugees throughout the world, particularly in less-developed regions. Between 1980 and 1992, the world's refugees nearly doubled. There are more than 40 million displaced people in the less-developed world. Around 20 million of them are in Africa and just over 15 million are in the Near East and South Asia.

Individually and collectively, these trends can foment domestic instability and create or exacerbate interstate tensions. This is especially true for the poorest countries — they are the least able to deal effectively with the problems posed by the changes and the most affected.

Urbanization can have a potentially destabilizing effect, especially in the poorest countries. A lack of infrastructure, social services, adequate housing and proper sanitation contribute to their poverty. Insurgent movements are often able to take advantage of these problems. Mass discontent provides an opportunity for insurgents to make headway in establishing urban support bases and even alternative "shadow" governments.

As I mentioned, these trends are significant for



the Army and the SOF community. The affected countries will typically have poorly developed infrastructures, suggesting that our Civil Affairs capabilities will be in great demand. Since we are dealing with masses of people, there will be a great need to alter attitudes and adjust behavior, indicating that there will be opportunities for PSYOP to excel.

For Special Forces and Rangers, combat operations in the less-developed world could increasingly involve the likelihood of urban warfare and its related problems. For example, they could be called upon to deal with missions in densely-populated urban areas, and there would be considerable pressure to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties. This would require us to harness our combat power, and it is conceivable that some of our most formidable weapons systems might not be used. Rules of engagement could be very restrictive and affect our doctrine and the way we fight.

It seems prudent for us in the special-operations community to monitor and study these developments to ensure that our training, modernization, organization, doctrine and leader development sustain their excellence and relevance.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Commander & Commandant


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Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield



Special Operations Forces:

Strategic Potential for the Future

by Gen. Carl W. Stiner

An Army reconnaissance team is deployed 200 miles deep behind Iraqi lines and for the five days of Operation Desert Storm's ground campaign sends back critical intelligence on Iraqi movements along a major line of communications.

Another team on a similar mission is flushed by Iraqi children and engages in a six-hour running gun battle with hundreds of Iraqi soldiers before the team is extracted by an Army helicopter, a helicopter that takes several hits from small-arms fire during the extraction.

An Army master sergeant helps the crew of an Air Force C-141 to safely traverse restricted Russian airspace, using his Russian language fluency to communicate with ground controllers.

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On the ground in Russia, this same NCO and his team help Russian spetsnaz troops unload urgently needed humanitarian supplies destined for the local population.

A team of Air Force officers and noncommissioned officers trains the Ecuadorian armed forces on the use of aviation in stability operations. This is the first time the Ecuadorians have combined Army, Air Force and civilian assets into a joint operation.

A Navy team is deployed to the Ivory Coast to train Ivory Coast military personnel in the use of riverine craft. This mission is part of an effort by the Ivory Coast to protect its environment from poachers who are depleting the country's natural resources.

An Air Force helicopter flies deep into Iraq, evading Iraqi air-defense systems and ground forces, to rescue a downed Navy pilot during Desert Storm. The flight, with refuelings, lasts more than eight hours.

A small Army team, working deep in the mountains of northern Iraq, under harsh environmental conditions, and resupplied only by air, works day and night to save 250 Kurdish children abandoned by a civilian medical team who deemed their cases hopeless. Of these 250 children with cholera, all but four are eventually saved.

All of these missions were conducted in a 19-month period from January 1991 to July 1992. They represent operations across the spectrum of conflict, from large-scale conventional war to small, forward-presence operations.

All of them, and hundreds more, were conducted by forces assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command. These are just a tiny sample of the diverse and important missions USSOCOM conducts as part of the nation's defense establishment in support of U.S. national security policies.

Special operations have been a

part of American military history since Rogers' Rangers in the French and Indian War, but modern special-operations forces trace their origin to the Office of Strategic Services in World War II; however, it was the failed hostage-rescue attempt in Iran in 1980 and problems with the employment of special-operations forces in Grenada in 1983 that resulted in congressional concern over the nation's special-operations capability.

This concern eventually resulted in the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the fiscal year 1987 Defense Authorization Act, which created the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, and USSOCOM.

USSOCOM was established as a unified command at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., on April 16, 1987, and all SOF of the Army, Navy and Air Force were assigned to it.

USSOCOM has two missions: as a supporting command, to provide trained and ready special-operations forces to regional commanders in chief, or CINCs, and, as a supported command, to plan and conduct selected special operations, if so directed by the president or the

secretary of defense.

Within the U.S. national military strategy, USSOCOM has two roles, which in turn drive its two priorities of combat readiness and maximum employment of forces in peacetime. These roles are:

- Deter or counter violence. Capable of conducting complex, precise, crisis-response operations, SOF provides the national command authorities a selective, flexible crisis-response capability falling between diplomatic initiatives and the committing of conventional forces.

The NCA is never forced to choose too much force or none at all — in itself, a powerful deterrent to aggressors. SOF units must be ready to accomplish their missions on short notice with minimal additional preparation, which requires trained and ready personnel, units and equipment. Maximizing readiness drives SOF training and procurement.

- Nation assistance. Many emerging democracies have problems that lead to insurgency if not handled effectively. SOF can provide assistance to these nations in developing successful counters to insurgency and to many of the

problems themselves.

SOF must be employed to the maximum extent possible in these peacetime activities, to help prevent small problems from developing into major problems. Concurrently, SOF units gain invaluable training for wartime missions.

All SOF commanders and staffs are expected to be active, informing those responsible for establishing U.S. policy and programs overseas of the capabilities SOF can bring to their programs.

In fulfilling these two roles, USSOCOM is charged with accomplishing the following missions:

- Unconventional warfare.
- Strategic reconnaissance.
- Direct action.
- Foreign internal defense.
- Counterterrorism.
- Psychological operations.

PSYOP is one of the most effective weapons in the arsenal of a commander. An effective PSYOP campaign can reduce casualties on both sides of the fight.

- Civil affairs. It is no longer enough to win a war. Setting up the postwar government is as important as winning the war. This is the key to postwar recovery, the establishment of a stable democracy, and the resolution of problems that caused the war. CA missions involve all aspects of the civil dimension of warfare and peacetime military operations, from coordinating host-nation support for deployed U.S. forces, to managing civilians displaced by combat, to assisting governments in restoring essential services in the aftermath of combat.

- Coalition warfare, those tasks undertaken to facilitate the interaction of coalition partners and U.S. military. This mission was added following Desert Storm and reflects the key role SOF played in integrating coalition forces into the fight.

Characteristics

A list of roles and missions does not adequately capture the uniqueness of what USSOCOM brings to U.S. security policies. The demands



U.S. Air Force photo

The AC-130 Spectre gunship is capable of applying surgical firepower important to a number of special-operations missions.

of special operations require forces with distinctive capabilities and characteristics. These characteristics and capabilities allow SOF to contribute in the diverse ways that were highlighted earlier. An examination of these characteristics will clarify what makes SOF special:

- High-quality, mature personnel. The most important characteristic is the selection and retention of high-quality personnel, enabling SOF to meet challenges across a broad spectrum of mission requirements with skill and initiative. Volunteers for SOF units first demonstrate their maturity, intelligence, combat skills and physical toughness in their parent services, and then complete an extensive, rigorous selection process. Thus, SOF personnel are usually more experienced and more mature than those in conventional units and are better able to work with local military, political and civic leaders.

- Intense training as joint teams. SOF training includes regular joint training with conventional forces, and constant joint training with all SOF components. SOF units are capable of integrating joint teams at the lowest levels. An Army Special Forces A-detachment, working with Air Force combat controllers and Navy SEALs, can put together a team to train several kinds of host-nation forces in multiple environments, or conduct complex contingency-response operations, without having to spend long train-up periods before the deployments. SOF air and maritime mobility assets can deliver SOF teams to any spot in the world on short notice and under adverse conditions.

- Regional orientation. Special Forces, PSYOP, CA and some SEAL units are regionally oriented on specific areas of the world. This allows them to develop expertise in the culture, language, traditions, geography, infrastructure, politics and environmental conditions of a particular area. As a result, these teams can be deployed rapidly, with little train-up, and be immediately



Photo by David Bass

Members of an Air Force special-operations unit use a radio during field operations as part of Operation Just Cause.

effective when they arrive.

Combine these characteristics and you have the key to SOF versatility — the ability to deploy in small, self-contained teams, with the following capabilities:

- Gain access to denied areas by numerous means, including air, land and sea.
- Provide limited security for themselves and others.
- Organic communications, capable of communicating worldwide.
- Self-contained medical support, able to take care of themselves in all except extreme emergencies.
- Live in austere, harsh environments without extensive support structures.
- Survey and assess local situations, determine what additional support is needed, and communicate this assessment to a distant post.
- Assess and control air-delivered relief and assistance.
- Work closely with local militaries and populations, with due respect for local customs.
- Organize groups of people into coherent, working teams.

These characteristics make it possible to deploy SOF teams without large overhead, far from support

infrastructures, in areas cut off from communications and medical support, and in potentially dangerous areas.

SOF teams are particularly suited to unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense and disaster relief, all of which may be conducted under adverse environmental conditions, in lesser-developed countries, and in environments of incipient insurgency or lawlessness.

SOF can make initial contacts and report back on the risks, opportunities and challenges follow-on forces might face.

The joint nature of SOF makes it particularly effective in missions such as direct action, strategic reconnaissance and counterterrorism, where ground forces, infiltration and exfiltration platforms, and firepower may come from different components and sometimes includes conventional transportation and fire-support elements.

Terrorism, in particular, requires a highly disciplined and precise response. A unit must be carefully trained for this specific mission and must have an extensive array of specialized techniques and equipment.

The rules that govern the effective use of force in a counterterrorist role are much different, more complex and far more restrictive than they are in conventional warfare. SOF is ideally suited for this mission.

Spectrum of conflict

The versatility built into SOF by its selection, training, organization and equipment translates into utility across the spectrum of conflict. SOF plays key roles from humanitarian relief through peacetime engagement, through crisis response, to large-scale regional conflict. Let's examine the more traditional role of SOF in combat first.

Special-operations forces perform their missions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to influence deep, close and rear operations. SOF must be integrated into the campaign at every stage of planning and execution, including the transition from war to peacetime stability operations.

A liaison team works directly with the operational commander to ensure SOF integration into the campaign plan.

In the preparation stage for open hostilities, SOF can be used to integrate reconnaissance and intelligence efforts for U.S. and coalition forces, set up clandestine and unconventional operations, work with coalition forces, and develop a PSYOP strategy.

Once hostilities start, SOF attacks key targets of operational or strategic significance and participates in the campaign deception plan. As the battle progresses, SOF directly supports operational maneuver forces with DA, UW and PSYOP directed at tactical centers of gravity, by providing intelligence, and through economy-of-force operations to delay, disrupt or divert enemy forces.

As the battle nears its conclusion, SOF emphasis shifts to CA, PSYOP and reconnaissance operations to exploit decisive maneuver and set the stage for postwar operations,

including refugee support and the establishment and restoration of public institutions and essential services.

Recent employment

The successes of Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm clearly demonstrate the value of SOF when employed extensively with conventional forces.

Of the 27,000 troops employed in Operation Just Cause in Panama, more than 4,000 were SOF. The plan called for 27 critical targets to be hit simultaneously the first night. SOF provided the precombat intelligence necessary for commanders to successfully neutralize these targets.

Army, Navy and Air Force SOF worked together to secure critical bridges, communication sites and terrain, eliminating enemy resistance, and preventing the Panamanian Defense Force from interfering with future operations.

Fire support for these missions consisted of Air Force SOF AC-130 Spectre gunships and AH-6 attack helicopters, and Army AH-64 Apaches.

U.S. Central Command effectively integrated SOF into every facet of

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. SOF performed in all its mission areas, including the collateral mission of combat search and rescue.

Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs were among the first to deploy to Saudi Arabia. Special Forces teams were attached to every Arab coalition unit and assisted these units with communications, liaison, training and combat support. SOF was the primary trainer for the reconstituted Kuwaiti military. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf stated that special-operations forces were the "glue that held the coalition together."

On the evening of Jan. 16, 1991, SOF MH-53J helicopters, selected for their electronic countermeasures and navigation capabilities, crossed into Iraqi airspace leading Army AH-64 Apache helicopters. These teams knocked out key Iraqi air-defense radars, successfully creating a corridor for allied air forces enroute to key targets throughout Iraq.

Just before the ground war started, Special Forces deployed deep behind Iraqi lines by SOF helicopters on special-reconnaissance missions to provide critical intelli-



Photo by Thomas Witham

U.S. Navy SEAL and Saudi Special Forces troops train on the use of claymore mines during Operation Desert Storm.

In this photo, taken through night-vision goggles, special-operations troops fast-rope from an MH-53J PaveLOW III helicopter during Operation Desert Storm.



Photo by Greg Ford

gence. Navy SEALs supported deception and maritime embargo operations, conducted area reconnaissance and supported counter-mine warfare.

PSYOP units created a multimedia campaign directed at the morale of Iraqi troops. Executed in conjunction with the bombing campaign, the results were spectacular. Interrogation of Iraqi prisoners determined that some 70 percent of the estimated 62,000 prisoners who surrendered to U.S. forces were at least in part influenced to do so by the PSYOP campaign.

Changing environment

SOF's role in today's military goes far beyond those roles in combat just related. These "nontraditional" roles are a result of the changing security environment in the world today.

In the fall of 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, and communism collapsed

in Eastern Europe. Within two years, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and Germany was unified.

Many thought that peace had broken out worldwide. The gains to world peace brought about by these momentous changes are spectacular. The threat of a catastrophic nuclear war and massive theater-wide conventional war has diminished greatly.

But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 highlighted other facets that are still shaping the post-Cold War security environment, including regional instability, the demise of Soviet influence, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

With the demise of Soviet influence, many states are now free to adopt more adventurous policies, endangering regional stability. A sober reassessment of the post-Cold War world reveals problems, long submerged during the Cold

War, that are now rising as serious challenges.

A world emerging from a bipolar confrontation will have to deal with many of the following: ethnic, tribal and religious warfare; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the rise of religious fundamentalism; disease, poverty and the population explosion; terrorism; narcotrafficking and narcoterrorism; emerging democracies and the conversion from demand to market economies and the attendant problems these processes create; and the revolution of rising expectations brought about by worldwide communications.

These factors have combined to make the world, in many ways, less stable than it was during the Cold War. Yet tremendous opportunities exist for increasing freedom, as many nations are now searching for ways to achieve democracy, a market economy and stability.

One key to world stability is providing these nations with the tools to fend off destabilizing forces while they develop democracies.

SOF's contribution

SOF can make a significant contribution to developing nations, and at the same time help shape the security environment of the United States, helping to forestall problems that might eventually result in large expenditures of American lives and treasure.

Some of the best-trained combat troops in the world, Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs and Air Force SOF crews are often known more for their training ability than their combat skills.

Many governments will accept SOF units because of this reputation, but they would not accept a conventional unit because of sovereignty issues.

The low profile of SOF units, their ability to accomplish much with few people, and their reduced support requirements make their employment in many countries possible, where the publicity and size of other units would make it prohibitive.

SOF missions overseas contribute greatly to stability. These contributions include:

- Military-to-military contacts. Successful joint and combined exercises with the militaries of developing nations significantly improve these nations' capabilities to create a stable security environment. SOF also provides an example of the role of the military in a democracy. SOF is ideally suited for training militaries to deal with insurgencies, terrorism, lawlessness and narcoterrorism.

- PSYOP. In many lesser-developed countries, getting the government's message to the population is a major challenge. Many nations do not have the money, infrastructure or capability to do this effectively. PSYOP units can be of great assistance in promoting counterdrug activities, democratic institutions, human rights, regional stability and a favorable image of the United States.

- Nation assistance. Civil Affairs units are uniquely suited to helping nations create the infrastructure and programs required to provide a wide range of services to the population. This helps create a prosperous and stable nation. Civil Affairs personnel work with other U.S. and host-nation agencies to coordinate and enhance their efforts to conduct disaster-relief operations and disaster-preparedness planning and training. They can also act as a liaison between government, military and private volunteer organizations.

- Humanitarian assistance and relief. SOF are well-suited to assist humanitarian activities in remote areas. They are often the first on the ground and are ideally suited to do an initial assessment and coordinate immediate aid. PSYOP units can communicate to a stricken people how they will get relief and how to prepare for it. CA units assist in managing refugee camps and setting up local infrastructures to help people through the disaster.

- Medical/dental/veterinary

assistance. The impact of even a small number of medical specialists in remote areas can be dramatic. Regional orientation for SOF medical assets includes additional training in regional diseases and health problems, as well as cultural idiosyncrasies affecting medical care.

SOF normally trains a core of host-nation medical personnel, focusing on the use of existing resources, so care can continue after SOF leave. Training focuses on preventive medicine, including mass immunization, maternal-care programs, and projects to ensure safe drinking water and appropriate sewage disposal.

- Direct support to the ambassador. SOF can support noncombatant-evacuation operations in both permissive and nonpermissive environments. They can assist the ambassador with early warning, organization, interface with local officials, liaison with other U.S. forces, enhanced communications, emergency medical services, and counterterrorist and hostage-rescue capabilities.

- The counterdrug war. SOF provides counterdrug training, assistance and operational support to

host-nation forces, supported CINCs and other U.S. government agencies. The primary focus is training on military skills to assist the host nation in dealing with increasingly dangerous narcotrafickers and narcoterrorists.

SOF also plans and conducts counterdrug operations in support of U.S. national security objectives when so directed by the national command authorities.

Forward presence

Special-operations forces carry out peacetime-engagement missions to assist the host nation, but they are also benefiting the United States, helping to shape the security environment to favor the long-term interests of the United States. These contributions take many forms:

- Access. The employment of SOF in areas not seen or visited by other U.S. organizations provides increased information about the geography, social infrastructure, militaries and societies of many nations.

This information might otherwise be unavailable and can be of great value in U.S. support of host-nation



U.S. Army photo

Veterinary assistance can have a dramatic impact on people in remote areas who depend heavily on livestock for transportation and agriculture.

forces in hostage-rescue or humanitarian-assistance operations. If the United States has to commit forces to protect U.S. interests, this information can be among the most detailed and up-to-date available.

- Area knowledge. Overseas SOF missions allow SOF units to develop detailed, firsthand knowledge of the culture, language, terrain, weather and infrastructure in countries where they are employed and where they might have to work during contingency operations.

- Promoting stability. Effective SOF deployments help alleviate conditions of incipient insurgency and the disastrous effects of drug trafficking. They strengthen host-nation institutions of democracy and promote the use of the military to increase stability.

By heading off problems at the lowest level, before they become full-blown insurgencies, and by helping to keep friendly, democratic governments in power, SOF can help prevent the United States from

having to commit larger forces at a later date to deal with more serious problems.

- Good will. The benefits SOF brings to developing countries build good will toward the United States. This can result in support for U.S. positions in the United Nations and for U.S. goals and interests throughout the world, commitment of forces to U.S.-led coalitions, and increased access to lines of communication for peaceful commerce, to support humanitarian-relief operations, and to support U.S. forces deployed in contingency operations around the world.

Reduced instability leads to increased wealth and economic activity, benefiting both U.S. businesses and the people of developing nations.

- Counternarcotics. By helping nations cope more effectively with drug problems, SOF CD efforts will decrease the flow of illegal drugs to the United States and help in our own drug war.

- Military-to-military contact. The contacts made by SOF units among foreign militaries facilitate combined operations in future coalitions and support for contingency or humanitarian-assistance operations within the country.

- Human rights. SOF is specifically charged to observe for and train foreign units on respect for human rights. SOF can have a significant impact on the observation of human rights by militaries that formerly paid little attention to it.

- Training benefits. Many SOF wartime missions focus on training local populations on the same skills that SOF units train host-nation militaries on during peacetime engagement. Thus, these deployments directly improve SOF wartime capabilities.

Increasing use

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the employment of special-operations forces has been steadily increasing. Employment of SOF in all kinds of missions rose 35 percent in fiscal 1992 over fiscal 1991.

SOF employment in counterdrug operations has gone up by more than 104 percent. Each of these deployments represents one mission, which could be as small as one or two specialists assisting an ambassador with language expertise, or as large as a deployment numbering in the hundreds to assist victims of a natural disaster.

SOF was employed in 103 countries in every geographical region of the world in fiscal year 1992, and during the year, the average weekly commitment of SOF, both in the United States and overseas, was 2,600 men and women, deployed on 115 missions, in more than 40 countries and 15 states.

The growth of SOF deployments reflects both the less-stable post-Cold War world and a growing awareness on the part of country teams and regional CINCs that SOF provides unique and valuable capabilities in dealing with many of the problems that exist in these

A Turkish relief worker for CARE stands with children of a Kurdish refugee camp. U.S. special-operations forces provided the initial care to thousands of such refugees during Operation Provide Comfort.



CARE photo by Nancy Blum

countries.

The utility of special-operations forces in peacetime engagement, supporting U.S. national security interests, has been demonstrated repeatedly over the the past few years.

In Cameroon, a small team of Civil Affairs medics and doctors from the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, working with the local military, inoculated 58,000 people against the deadly meningitis disease and treated an additional 1,700 people for a wide range of ailments.

The skills taught to the Cameroonian army medical personnel allowed them to continue this program and administer an additional 170,000 doses of vaccine after the SOF team left. All this took only three weeks and cost only \$86,000. According to our ambassador, nothing has been of more utility in furthering our relationship with the people and government of Cameroon.

In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group were dispatched to Turkey and northern Iraq to assess the situation and provide initial care to thousands of Kurdish refugees.

These SOF soldiers provided medical aid, provided sources of uncontaminated drinking water and arranged for the aerial delivery of needed supplies to help the Kurds establish camps in the mountains of northern Iraq. In one camp, the death rate was hovering at more than 250 a day from malnutrition, disease, exposure and wounds. SOF efforts reduced the death rate to

four or five a day within two weeks.

Trained and ready

The global interests of the United States, and the growing complexity of the international environment, demand special-operations forces be versatile, trained and ready for unprecedented challenges in the years ahead. Our nation's special-operations forces, as integral members of the joint-service team, provide the national command authorities, and the theater CINCs, with a wide range of alternatives for dealing with the challenges we are most likely to face in the future, ranging from specialized peacetime operations to equally specialized conflict and post-conflict support.

SOF represents a great value to the nation but is only 1.7 percent of Department of Defense manpower, and only 1.1 percent of the DoD budget. SOF are specialized by region and ideally suited for peacetime engagement.

They are politically acceptable where other forces are not. SOF, working with conventional forces, maximize the force potential and capability of U.S. armed forces in ways not otherwise possible.

SOF are a key and essential component of the total equation of military readiness. They stand ready to respond to contingencies worldwide, support theater peacetime-engagement activities, and act as instruments of national policy.

In Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, 31 SOF soldiers gave their lives in combat, and 100 were wounded — more, proportionately, than any service. With their continuing dedication to the ser-

vice of the United States, special-operations forces will continue to make significant contributions to our foreign policy and national security strategy.

SOF soldiers will continue to give our nation their very best, and they are ready to lay their lives on the line if that is what the nation asks of them.

There is no better investment for our future, or that of countless millions around the world who suffer from disease, poverty and oppression, and who now, more than ever, look to the United States for leadership and hope. ✂

Gen. Carl W. Stiner is the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command. Commissioned as an Infantry officer in 1958, General Stiner



has served as the chief of staff for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, as commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and as commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg. Designated the commander of Joint Task Force South, he served as operational commander of all forces employed in Operation Just Cause in Panama in December 1989. General Stiner holds a bachelor's degree from Tennessee Polytechnical Institute and a master's degree in public administration from Shippensburg State College.



Air Force Special Operations School:

An Emphasis on Education

In April 1992, a 25-year milestone in support of the special-operations community was passed by one of the most unique schools in the U.S. Air Force: The Air Force Special Operations School. Through those years, the school's reputation has grown, and now USAFSOS is recognized across the Department of Defense as a jewel in the Air Force crown.

In April 1967, the USAF Special Air Warfare School — the original name of the school — was activated at Hurlburt Field under the Special Air Warfare Center, then located at Eglin AFB, Fla. It would be a year before the school's name would change to the Special Operations School.

In the beginning the school's focus was the preparation of Air Force personnel for duty in Southeast Asia. Since then, the USAFSOS curriculum has grown from a single course of instruction to 13 courses covering the geopolitical, psychological, sociological and military considerations of special operations. The list of annual graduates has grown as well — from 300 to nearly 10,000 in-residence and off-

station students.

Those aren't the only areas of growth; in those early days, there was only one staff member with a master's degree — and he was the librarian. Today in the schoolhouse, there are 21 master's degrees and three instructors within a year of completing their Ph. Ds.

Regarding the past years, Col. Michael M. Flynt, USAFSOS commandant, stated the school's life spans "the Southeast Asia period of the 60s, the advisory period of the 70s, the revitalization of special operations in the 80s, and now the challenges of the 90s."

The school staff is typical of the newly emerging Air Force of the 90s. It consists of special-operations flyers — fixed wing and rotary — intelligence officers, geographical-area specialists, educators, clinical social workers, behavioral scientists and others. The 13 courses run the gamut of special-operations education — from an introduction to the special-operations community to revolutionary warfare, regional orientation, joint operations planning, cross-cultural communications and international terrorism, as well as a

three-day crisis-response course.

USAFSOS is one of three "schoolhouses" in USSOCOM, the other two being the Naval Special Warfare Center at Coronado, Calif., and the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C. All three schools coordinate their curricula and meet regularly to discuss training programs. USAFSOS is unique from the other two organizations in that no Air Force specialty codes or military occupational specialties are changed or awarded. USAFSOS courses are designed to complement training received elsewhere. Army JFK-SWCS personnel appear as guest lecturers for USAFSOS and frequently attend USAFSOS courses.

Flynt stresses the school's emphasis on education vis-a-vis training: "USAFSOS is an educational institution as opposed to a training organization. We don't change anyone's AFSC or MOS, we educate them." The low-threat environment of the school (no final exams) contributes to this educational process, since students can focus on learning vs. passing a test.

According to Lt. Col. Dann D.

Mattiza, USAFSOS vice-commandant, one of the objectives of the school is providing education that will act as a force enhancer in the special-operations arena. For instance, understanding “why” the indigenous personnel behave the way they do, contrasted to “what” they do, has been proven repeatedly as the smart way to conduct special-operations missions. Operation Desert Shield/Storm is an excellent example of how quickly — and effectively — USAFSOS training is used. USAFSOS Middle East experts traveled the country, briefing departing personnel as the buildup in the Gulf accelerated. In the final count, 12,000 uniformed personnel and more than 3,000 local civilians and dependents were briefed. Many of the lectures were videotaped and dispersed throughout DoD, providing USAFSOS expertise to many thousands of DoD personnel.

Organizationally, USAFSOS has two academic divisions; Special Operations and Regional Affairs. Lt. Col. James D. Lawrence, chief of the Special Operations Division, describes his courses as “curriculum designed to address all the various

aspects of special operations — from mission planning to psychological operations. Special operations is fundamentally a joint operation, and the people who deal in special operations must know how to function in the joint arena. USAFSOS helps to educate special-operations personnel in the capabilities and requirements of that arena.”

Special ops courses

The Introduction to Special Operations Course is a three-day course covering the basics of special operations and designed to introduce students to joint U.S. special-operations mission activities, organization and forces. Included in the course is a static display of USAF special-operations aircraft and combat-control-team equipment. The course also studies the Navy’s special-warfare forces, and the Army’s Special Forces and Rangers. Students get a clear understanding of special operations through case studies of Desert One — the Iran rescue attempt, the Son Tay raid in Vietnam and Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm.

The Revolutionary Warfare Course provides U.S. personnel with

a knowledge of geopolitical, sociological and cultural implications of U.S. involvement in revolutionary warfare. The five-day instruction includes insurgencies, unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. The course covers U.S. methodology in combating insurgencies and includes lectures on some CIA capabilities along with the CIA’s current and historical relationship with the military services. During this course students learn about the components of psychological operations, civil affairs, security assistance and the internal-defense-and-development strategy. A secret clearance is required.

The Joint Special Operations Planning Workshop, 10 days long, is one of the longest USAFSOS courses. It provides principles and techniques, including deception, to plan for the rapid deployment, employment and redeployment of special-operations forces under overt, clandestine or crisis guidelines. The course has four functional areas: definition and orientation, planning factors, organizational relationships, and a practicum. The three-day practicum is held in the second week of the course to reinforce the lessons learned. A top secret clearance is required.

The Joint Special Operations Staff Officer Course is a 10-day introduction to USSOCOM joint-staff activities, with special emphasis on unique functions and interrelationships peculiar to a special-operations staff. It is designed for the joint special-operations staff officer. The course provides an in-depth examination of USSOCOM mission activities, roles and working relationships with the services, USSOCOM components, sub-unified special-operations commands and U.S. government agencies. A top secret clearance is required.

The Crisis Response Management Course is a three-day course designed for officers and civilians filling or programmed for command or senior staff positions. According to Operations Division Chief Lt.



U.S. Air Force photo

An instructor in a regional-studies course refers to a map of the Middle East during a lecture at the Air Force Special Operations School.

Col. James D. Lawrence, “We have tried to tailor this course for selected U.S. senior officers and civilians to help them effectively control crisis situations. We try and take the ‘pinging’ out of crisis management.” The course provides an overview of the national structure and DoD elements of crisis-response management. It includes national-level crisis recognition, coordination and support agencies, the JOPS Vol. IV Crisis Action Procedures, and case studies of previous national-level crises. Instruction is given primarily through lectures, with ample time allowed for discussion of the subject and related issues. Case studies amplify and support major instructional areas such as proper crisis-action procedures, contingency communications, and the use of intelligence in a crisis. A top secret/SI/TK clearance is required.

The Joint Psychological Operations Course creates an awareness of PSYOP doctrine, organization, techniques, equipment and capabilities. It provides an understanding of the planning of psychological operations in support of U.S. national objectives throughout the

spectrum of conflict. This five-day course covers many areas of PSYOP operations, from U.S. military employment of PSYOP to the psychology of the insurgent. The course concludes with a PSYOP exercise in which students recommend possible solutions in a case study. A secret clearance is required.

The Joint Senior Psychological Operations Course is a 2 1/2-day course designed to provide colonels, equivalents and above an awareness of PSYOP and its contributions to U.S. national objectives during a conflict. The course covers the national policy directives, hostile PSYOP activities and DoD capabilities. A top secret clearance is required for the course.

Regional affairs courses

The Regional Affairs Division deals with the “soft” side of SOF. It provides non-technical information on intercultural communications, antiterrorism awareness and the cultural, historical and geopolitical aspects of four specific regions of the world: Latin America, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast/Northeast Asia. The

courses are designed for personnel being assigned overseas or having a professional interest in these areas and subjects.

Latin America Orientation Course — This five-day course familiarizes students with selected historical U.S. economic, political and military activities in Latin America and their effects. Narcotics in Latin America is discussed, from cultivation, processing and transport to its effect on Latin American societies, as well as U.S. counter-drug operations. The course emphasizes understanding Latin America and the varied socio-political backgrounds found in this extremely diverse area. A secret clearance is required.

Middle East Orientation Course — The five-day MEOC focuses on desert culture, Islam and the Arabic language, as well as the contrasts and similarities found across the Middle East. It specifically addresses historically volatile issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute and provides specific country briefs on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The course is taught at the unclassified level.

Africa Orientation Course — Africa is a multifaceted region with many influencing factors. AOC addresses many of them, including U.S. foreign policy and the socio-political history of the continents. Focused upon the Sub-Saharan region, AOC also provides students a complete package of regional information on Africa. This contributes to their effectiveness in support of U.S. interests and prepares them for a rewarding and safe tour in the region. Issues discussed during this four-day course range from staying healthy in Africa to understanding the wide spectrum of African cultures. A secret clearance is required.

Asia-Pacific Orientation Course — APOC provides historical, cultural, religious, social and political insight into the vast and complicated region of Southeast and Northeast Asia. Its emphasis is on the Association of



U.S. Air Force photo

Students attend a lecture at the Air Force Special Operations School. The school's 13 courses range from an introduction to special operations to joint operations planning.

How to Apply

To apply for training at the Air Force Special Operations School, contact your unit training officer or:

Army active duty and civilians:

Total Army Personnel Center

Attn: TAPC-OPB-D

200 Stovall St.

Alexandria, VA 22332-0411

Message address: CDRUSTAPC ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-OPB-D//

Phone: DSN 221-3160/4593; commercial (703) 325-3160/4593.

Army Reserve:

U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center

Attn: DARPMOT-S

9700 Page Blvd.

St. Louis, MO 63132

Message Address: CDRARPERCEN ST LOUIS MO//DARPMOT-S//

Phone: DSN 892-2336; commercial (314) 538-3362.

Army National Guard:

ARNG Operating Activity Center

Attn: NGB-ARO-E

Military Education Branch, Bldg. E-6814EA

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5420

Message Address: CNGB ARNG OAC ABERDEEN PROVING
GROUND MD//NGB-ARO-E//

Phone: DSN 584-1726; commercial (301) 671-1726.

Southeast Asian Nations, Japan and Korea, with class content weighted to allow for specific interests. The five-day, unclassified course gives student a broad look at the region and some of its most important issues.

Cross Cultural Communications Course — CCC is designed to improve the communications and problem-solving skills of DoD personnel working with personnel from the Middle Eastern, Latin Ameri-

can, Asian-Pacific or African regions. The five-day class is unclassified.

Dynamics of International Terrorism — DIT provides military and civilian personnel with a basic awareness and appreciation of the psychology, organization, techniques, operational capabilities and threat posed by terrorist groups. Strong emphasis is placed on protective measures that government personnel and their families can

employ to minimize the threat. A half-day of the course is spent at the school's specially equipped firing range, where the terrorist's tools of the trade (Molotov cocktails, letter bombs, automatic weapons, etc.) are demonstrated. The students also witness the effect of a few ounces of plastic explosive on an automobile and what a cinder-block wall won't do to protect you. A secret clearance is required for this five-day course.

On the horizon, the entire USAF-SOS staff is looking forward to moving to a new 28,700-square-foot schoolhouse in 1994. Since the bulk of the USAFSOS facilities are more than 20 years old, this is a much-needed improvement.

Also on the horizon is renewed interest in foreign internal defense, and internal defense and development. Interestingly, this brings the school full circle. After 25 years, the USAF Special Operations School is still responding to the needs of the special-operations community, still developing new courses to meet the ever-changing requirements of our rapidly changing world, and still putting the "special" in joint special-operations training. ✂

This article was written by the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.



Naval Special Warfare Center: 'Schoolhouse' for Naval Special Operations

The Naval Special Warfare Center, located at the Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado, Calif., is the Navy's special-operations "schoolhouse."

Although it is widely known for its Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training course, or BUD/S, the Center provides both basic and advanced SEAL training — in fact, three-fourths of its students attend advanced courses.

BUD/S

BUD/S itself is 25 weeks long. It takes candidates, all volunteers, from a variety of sources. Most of the enlisted applicants come from the fleet and sailors' advanced individual training following boot camp. Officer volunteers come from the fleet, the Naval Academy, NROTC units and Officer Candidate School.

Because of the inherent dangers of Naval special operations, or in Navy terms, "special warfare," prospective SEALs go through what is considered by some to be the toughest training in the world.

This intense training tests men to weed out those who will quit when they get too cold, too wet or too tired.

BUD/S training is based on the philosophy that every individual is capable of reaching physical standards much higher than he perceives his limits to be. Determination and the ability to work as a team are repeatedly tested. Success in BUD/S requires an extremely high level of personal commitment, discipline and dedication to complete the course. Teamwork is the key to SEAL success, and producing team players is the goal of BUD/S training.

BUD/S is organized into three phases, but before students begin training, they must complete seven weeks of preconditioning and indoctrination known as Fourth Phase.

Fourth Phase

All students are required to pass a physical screening test before they begin Fourth Phase. This pretraining phase introduces them to BUD/S-specific physical training,

including running, swimming and the obstacle course, to get them physically and mentally ready for BUD/S. Students who begin in the middle of a cycle may be cleared to start training without going through the entire Fourth Phase.

Students who begin late in the cycle or who have injuries or medical problems which prevent them from beginning regular classes may remain in Fourth Phase for an entire cycle. If they are not ready to begin classes at the end of that time, the School re-evaluates their suitability for BUD/S training.

Students who have begun regular training and have been held back because of medical or performance failures are "rolled back." These students follow a medically supervised program of rehabilitation until they are ready to return to training. Repetitive medical problems requiring a rollback will cause a student to be carefully evaluated to see if he can adapt to the physical rigors of the training.

To begin training, students must

pass a screening test consisting of the following:

- 500-yard swim in 11:30 or less;
- 60 push-ups in two minutes;
- 75 sit-ups in two minutes;
- 10 pull-ups (no time limit);
- Two-mile run in 14:40 or less;
- 25-meter underwater swim completion (no time limit).

The purpose of Fourth Phase is to take the cuts up front, lowering BUD/S attrition, avoiding the hazards of training men who have no chance of success and preventing unnecessary sports-related injuries to students who arrive ill-prepared. Fourth Phase also teaches discipline, nutrition, the basics of physical training and history of Naval special warfare.

First Phase

The nine-week First Phase of BUD/S training focuses on the use of SEAL equipment and physical conditioning. While students swim, run, exercise and run the obstacle course, they learn the other basic SEAL skill — teamwork. Physical exertion for extended periods tests each student's physical and mental ability. Simple tasks, such as small-boat handling under arduous conditions, teach teamwork.

First Phase reaches a peak during its sixth week, "Hell Week," when, for six days, trainees perform drills in 5-7 man boat crews with little or no sleep. They learn to endure more than they ever dreamed possible and, through sleep deprivation and physical exhaustion, learn if they have the makings of a SEAL.

Hell Week

On May 6, 1943, Adm. Ernest J. King, then-chief of naval operations, issued a directive to form the Naval Demolitions Units. Lt. Cmdr. Draper L. Kauffman, founder and commander of the Navy Bomb Disposal School, was assigned the task of training the new units and given a free hand in locating the school, recruiting men from in and out of the Navy, and in obtaining whatever

equipment they might need.

As the school was being set up, an emergency team was assembled from the Dynamiting and Demolitions School at Camp Perry, Va. This small unit received an accelerated course in underwater demolition and small-boat handling and was shipped to Sicily. After the Sicilian operation, most of the members of the new Navy Combat Demolition Unit reported to Fort Pierce, Fla., where they became instructors at the new NCDU School.

The major emphasis of NCDU training was on demolition of beach obstacles. Teams were filled with volunteers from the Navy Sea Bees, Bomb and Mine Disposal and the Navy/Marine Scouts and Raiders who were already based at Fort Pierce.

Training of the new units stressed the physical capabilities of the men. The theory behind this

level of physical demand had been developed by the Navy/Marine Scouts and Raiders. Kauffman agreed with the basic idea and ordered his instructors to design the physical training program for the NCDUs. An intense period of this program became known as "Motivation Week."

During those six days, the men were driven to their limits of endurance. They were given impossible objectives, and lack of sleep and constant harassment made them groggy and prone to mistakes. Any mistake was grounds for immediate expulsion from training, and it took fortitude and motivation to pass the course without quitting.

In fact, the grueling training did cause 40 percent of the original volunteers to quit. Those who stayed became completely confident of their abilities to endure and accomplish any task, and most later credited their training for sustaining



SEAL trainees climb cargo nets during physical training at the Naval Special Warfare Center, Coronado, Calif.

U.S. Navy photo

them during their most difficult combat operations.

Graduates of the training took part in "Operation Overlord," D-day in Europe, where the physical training at Fort Pierce paid off. NCDUs were able to stand the punishing pace when other units were unable to keep up. Split into two groups, one for Omaha Beach and the other for Utah Beach, NCDUs sustained 85-percent casualties but still accomplished their missions.

In the Pacific, the NCDUs, operating under a new name, underwater demolition teams, were pressed into action in a new role of reconnaissance. Covered under an umbrella of heavy naval bombardment, these men performed in an environment of flying fragments from a multitude of explosions. To a man, they credited the harshness of their training for sustaining them.

The lessons of the past are embodied in today's Hell Week training. The content of the course is treated as "confidential" to prevent compromise to future students. No one event is difficult; it is only when events are accomplished under the stresses of lack of sleep, the unknown and physical exertion

that Hell Week serves its intended purpose.

Tailored to the environment, Hell Week must have a different character in winter than in summer because of the differences in air and water temperature. There are several Hell Week schedules consisting of varying degrees of water exercises, land movement, physical exercises and rubber-boat work.

The objective is to cause students to use, under stress, the skills taught in the first five weeks of training. Stress is controlled and induced by a number of factors, including sleep deprivation.

Those who complete Hell Week spend the remaining three weeks of First Phase learning hydrographic reconnaissance techniques, used in beach survey and underwater mapping operations.

Second Phase

Second Phase, diving, is seven weeks long. Students learn basic diving techniques using open- and closed-circuit scuba. Academic ability is also tested as students study diving physics and medicine.

Physical conditioning continues; emphasis is placed on long-distance

compass swims, with the goal of training students to become basic combat swimmers, using swimming and diving techniques as a means of transportation from their launch site to their combat objective. Fitness standards are also increased. Students in Second Phase must complete a 5.5-nautical-mile timed swim and four-mile timed runs, and complete the obstacle course in 10 minutes or less.

Third Phase

Third phase is nine weeks long and is broken down into three curriculum blocks: tactics, weapons and demolitions. Training is conducted at Coronado and at San Clemente Island, approximately 70 miles west of San Diego.

During the first four weeks, students concentrate on land-warfare tools, equipment and terminology. Tactical patrols emphasize equipment awareness and mental discipline and are designed to gradually build students' ability to move while carrying a basic fighting load. Students also learn rudimentary skills of land navigation. Two days of classroom instruction are reinforced by three days of field work.

After the first four weeks, the students are mentally and physically prepared for the rigorous schedule at San Clemente Island. There, for five weeks, they apply their training in a practical environment, carrying their basic fighting equipment and M-16s.

Combat-conditioning courses, tactical marches up to 12 miles and nightly situation patrols emphasize the basic principles of SEAL land warfare. Each student develops into a basic rifleman. Qualification with the M-16 and the Smith & Wesson 686 revolver is mandatory. Students also learn basic SEAL squad-reaction drills, working up to night live-fire execution. The final two weeks cover UDT and SEAL demolitions.

After graduation, trainees receive three weeks of basic parachute training at Fort Benning, Ga. They are then assigned to a SEAL or



U.S. Navy photo

SEAL trainees learn there is more than one way to maneuver rubber boats during their training at Coronado, Calif.

SEAL delivery vehicle team to complete a six-month probationary period.

SEALs are made on the teams, not at the Center. The "B" in BUD/S stands for basic, and the course teaches only basic warfare techniques. The court of final judgment is in the Navy special-warfare operational commands, and it isn't until the BUD/S graduate is assigned to a team and tested by his peers that he is awarded the designation of SEAL.

Advanced training

In addition to BUD/S, the Naval Special Warfare Center conducts 11 advanced courses:

- MK 15 UBA Course. This two-week course teaches use of the MK 15 underwater breathing apparatus, a self-contained, closed-circuit, mixed-gas system and the most complex diving equipment that Naval special warfare uses.

- SEAL Delivery Vehicle Course. This course, 10 weeks long, covers all SDV systems and standard operating procedures. It is required before students are permitted to dive and operate SDVs.

- SDV Electronic Maintenance Course. Eight weeks long, this course gives Navy electronic technicians hands-on experience in troubleshooting and repair of all SDV electronic systems.

- Special Operations Technician Course. This two-week course teaches corpsmen going to NSW commands to diagnose and treat diving-related disorders.

- Diving Supervisor Course. This two-week course is designed for personnel in pay grades E-5 and higher from joint special-operations-forces commands. Students learn to give diving-supervisor briefs and inspections on open-circuit and closed-circuit diving equipment.

- Diving Maintenance Course. One week long, this course emphasizes disassembly, reassembly and maintenance of open-circuit diving rigs and the LAR V rebreather.

- Maritime Operations Course.



U.S. Navy photo

This three-week course emphasizes long-range, over-the-horizon navigation of combat rubber raiding craft, using dead reckoning, the compass and global-positioning systems.

- Military Freefall. This course, three weeks long, teaches the techniques and safety procedures of free-fall parachuting.

- Static Line Jumpmaster Course. This two-week course teaches NSW personnel to conduct static-line parachute operations.

- Ram Air Parachute Transition. This week-long course, currently taught only to explosive-ordnance-disposal personnel, teaches parachuting with the MT1-X3 parachute, using a static line.

- SEAL Weapons System Course. Two weeks long, this course teaches advanced underwater-demolition techniques and equipment.

For Navy SEALs, training is never complete. Whether assigned to a SEAL or SEAL delivery vehicle

Because of the demands of the Naval special-warfare mission, SEAL training is rigorous, testing students' ability to work as a team and their determination to complete the course.

team or a special-boat squadron, SEALs constantly train, refining their special talents and learning new skills that will better prepare them for tomorrow's missions. Regardless of their eventual assignment, the first step in that long training process comes at the Naval Special Warfare Center. ✂

This article was prepared by the Public Affairs Office, Naval Special Warfare Center.

CAC³I:

The Area Study Comes of Age

by Capt. Bill Franklin & 1st Lt. Ken MacGarrigle

FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, calls the area study “the basic intelligence document for special-operations forces.” An accurate, timely, and complete area study can provide valuable information on locales where military actions are probable.

A system called the Civil Affairs Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence System can provide the SOF community with the second-generation software tools needed to produce such area studies in the age of multimedia and X-windows capabilities. CAC³I (pronounced kak-ee) will allow SOF units to easily identify local resources, facilities and other support available for their operations.

Members of the 403rd CA Battalion, Syracuse, N.Y., developed the software, which uses a point-and-click, object-oriented X-windows graphical user interface or a laptop interface. CAC³I has various capacities, including the ability to scan maps for inclusion in reports and on-screen planning and editing.

The system can produce printed reports by city neighborhoods, by resource type or by grid-coordinate ranges. It can also produce computer-generated overlays of CA information for use with any scale Defense Mapping Agency maps. In addition to data analysis, CAC³I

can be used to guide CA and tactical teams through a city based on descriptions of their surroundings (a feature called “Where am I?”), and will soon allow battle simulations through “what if” changes to the database.

The figure shows all the government buildings (indicated by circled “2”s) of downtown Lima, Peru, plotted on a screen. The map itself came from a tourist map, and build-


ing locations were taken from a collection of tourist maps. The system will show CA resources as circled numbers, ranging from 1-17, which indicate the type of resource. If the user clicks on a number with the mouse, a pop-up window appears containing a description, notes and photograph of the resource.

Possible Uses

Lt. Col. A. Dwayne Aaron, current commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, Special Warfare Center and School, said CAC³I could provide a good alternative to meet Corps CA-related intelligence requirements.

As the G-5 of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Aaron had his staff use the system during an exercise. “The greatest advantage (of the system) would be the maintenance and updating of data on a regular basis.”

“If all CA brigades and commands are to be regionally focused, it would seem to make sense that a part of the unit’s mission and one of its most important mission-essential tasks should be to establish and maintain a database on countries in its area of responsibility. That



This diagram of the downtown section of Lima, Peru, printed from the CAC³I system, shows all government buildings marked by “2s.”

would allow a regional concentration and provide Corps units with a single point of contact," Aaron said.

One problem with area studies in the past has been the unreliability of data from various sources: CA databases, official intelligence information, the changing nature of cities (fires, construction), human error, etc.

"There is a lot of duplicated effort in researching area studies," Aaron said. "Often area studies are completed, read once, filed and never seen again. When the next person requires the study, it often can't be located or hasn't been updated in so long that it is assumed to be outdated. This system could provide a better methodology for CA information management, saving time and allowing CA operators to focus on problem solution versus basic research."

With the data-entry procedures and audit methods in CAC³I, database errors can be significantly reduced. Once an analyst types in data, it is marked "No Verify." The record goes in the database, but this mark tells the user that it has not yet been through the proper checks. It takes two editing analysts, reviewing that entry against all known information for a city, to change the original "No Verify" to a verified record. Audit features of the system also keep track of the time, date and a unique analyst ID number. It records the nature of all additions and changes to a record from its creation throughout its life cycle.

If a soldier adding records to the database does not have the capability to scan in photographs at the laptop, the system generates a unique "tag" which is then used as the name for the photograph should it be scanned and included in the database later. The soldier simply writes the tag on the back of the photograph or image and sends it to the 403rd CA Battalion, CAC³I Support Group, for scanning.

While the laptop version of CAC³I does not support the display, edit-

Reservists Create Software to Aid Refugees

As Europe's refugee problem threatens to spiral out of control, the United Nations, the U.S. State Department and possibly NATO are seeking help from two U.S. Army Civil Affairs reserve officers who have quietly developed a computerized system for tracking the delivery of emergency relief supplies.

Capt. Mark A. Wolfenberger does software equity research at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, a major Wall Street firm, and 1st Lt. Angela D. Blevins runs a women's clothing store in the Washington, D.C. area. Both are members of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command in the Bronx, N.Y.

Wolfenberger and Blevins developed the software program called DALIS (Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System) during a six-week period following Desert Storm. They had been sent to Turkey as part of a task force to aid the hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees who were at the time clinging to the mountains between Turkey and Iraq without food or water.

The response to that crisis from private emergency relief organizations had been literally overwhelming. "Supplies were pouring in from all over the world, but nobody knew exactly what was there," Blevins said. "Pallets were coming in from everywhere and just sitting there. People were screaming for blankets in one place, not knowing that half a mile down the road were all the blankets they could use." A flight manifest showed that 100 tons of medical supplies had been delivered, but no one could figure out where they were, she said.

Blevins, who arrived in Turkey before Wolfenberger, was astounded to find that there was no software for what was basically an inventory function. She called Wolfenberger, who was serving in Germany with the European Command at the time, to see if he could help. He was soon assigned to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, where he worked with Blevins to develop the DALIS software. "Mark designed the program, and I shaped it to what we needed based on conversations with volunteers in the field," Blevins said.

Blevins and others took the program into the field and worked directly with the volunteers to fine-tune it. The United Nations office in Zakho, Iraq, became the focus of the DALIS efforts. Donated goods were entered into the computer there, while city teams in other areas generally communicated with requirements by phone or paper, because they did not have computers. The volunteers in Zakho were then able to match up supply and demand.

DALIS can also provide up-to-date information on the whereabouts of donated goods, Blevins said. "We were always getting calls from donors asking what happened to their donations. With DALIS, we could generate a report telling them exactly who received their aid." DALIS also allows donors to designate a distributor through a camp code.

"It appears the military will be involved in many humanitarian-assistance missions in the future," Blevins said, and with its adaptability to any humanitarian-relief effort, she sees the possibility of a much wider application for DALIS.

— Capt. Cynthia Crosson, PAO, 353rd Civil Affairs Command

ing and manipulation of images, laptop users receive hard-copy versions of all maps and photographs associated with the databases in use on their systems.

Besides keeping the audit history in a text file attached to each database record, CAC³I has the capability to use this text for different notes about a specific record. Examples might include: quotes and references from tourist guides, books and military documents; quotes from officers who may have lived in that country; interviews with host-nation personnel regarding that record; CA and tactical comments and concerns about that resource; or information on changes in resource status.

Note files are included in the printout of any report. Audit information and information about analyst names and numbers are deleted before the report prints.

Desert Storm

During Operation Desert Storm, the 403rd and the 3rd Civil Affairs Group, USMC, produced a detailed and comprehensive neighborhood-by-neighborhood area study of Kuwait City. A group of 20 people worked around the clock to build a database for a metropolitan area with a peacetime population of more than 1 million.

Work took place in shifts, 24 hours per day, seven days a week. Finished products included a full set of universal transverse Mercator-gridded plot maps and a computer-generated civil-military-operations estimate for 64 designated Kuwait City neighborhoods. It also included a CMO estimate for additional rural areas of Kuwait.

The 403rd produced an updated product every 48 hours. During that time an average of 800 additional resource points were located, verified and added to the database.

The study became the CA reference study for the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations and a focal point for operations and intelligence activities for a number of Army and

Marine units.

"The study was disseminated to various commands and was useful in planning for operations in the city," said Lt. Col. John Butler, who was commander of the 403rd during Desert Storm.

Transition to peacetime

The 403rd now has the capability, upon request from CAPSTONE units, to perform unclassified studies in peacetime based on five increasing levels of detail: noncombatant-evacuation-operations level, terrorism-assessment level, civic-action level, command-support level and military-government level.

NEO-level city studies, which consist of identifying and verifying the roughly 50 data points of CA information per million population of a city, are helpful in conducting a NEO. "Particularly in NEO operations," Butler said, "It would be very useful to have the precise intelligence on areas of the city where evacuations may have to take place."

Terrorism-level city studies expand on the NEO studies by identifying possible host-nation, U.S., and U.S.-owned targets. They also include neighborhood narratives describing demographics, etc. This type of study would contain the kind of information needed for civic-action or command-support missions. This level targets roughly 200 data points per million inhabitants.

Civic-action-level city studies, the highest level of peacetime study, comprises roughly 1,000 data points per million inhabitants. These would be used in planning for or continuing with a civic-action program.

Command-support-level city studies are used for large-scale military operations such as Operation Desert Storm. They comprise roughly 4,000 data points per million inhabitants and cover everything needed to assess the needs of the urban population and to start repairs on essential services. The time and personnel resources required for such a level of detail

would be justified only under large-scale operations.

Military-government-level studies would be developed by CA assets in an occupied area, based on day-to-day CA activities and requirements, and might grow to as many as 20,000 data points per million inhabitants.

Butler also sees possible uses for CAC³I for relief operations. "When CA commands an operation for civilian relief, one of the important things to know is all of the resources available in a civilian community from which the people could be housed, fed, and treated for illnesses and wounds," he said.

For more information on the CAC³I system, current available studies, or the Desert Storm/Kuwait City area study, contact Commander, 403rd CA Battalion; Attn: CAC³I Project Officer; 1099 E. Malloy Rd.; Mattydale, NY 13211-1399.



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SOF Roles and Missions: Re-examining the Environment

by Terry Doherty

The goals of containment have been realized and, in fact, surpassed. The Soviet Union has not only been contained, but has self-destructed. U.S. military roles and functions so long directed toward containment now must be re-examined to address a changed and evolving global environment suddenly free of the potentially combustible Cold War.

National security policy and plans must now identify and address new opportunities, objectives, threats and strategies. Military roles and functions will flow from U.S. policy goals and strategy reflecting a changing U.S. world role in an interdependent multinational community no longer constrained by restrictive bipolar perspectives.

National security interests demand a quality military force, highly skilled, efficiently organized and properly equipped. In a period of a rapidly "downsizing" military force, it is especially critical to identify military roles and functions

accurately and to assign specific functions precisely to the most suitable and most capable military arm.

While the military will continue to fulfill its many traditional roles and functions, it must also be ready to assume emerging non-traditional roles and functions which may call for and effectively employ a multitude of military skills and expertise. For example, the future may find the military involved in a wide range of nation-assistance activities, both foreign and domestic.

A smaller military force undertaking expanding non-traditional military missions is likely to produce increased emphasis on special operations and the unique skills of special-operations forces. Military roles and missions in the post-containment era will increasingly require a highly skilled military force with significantly more skills than those customarily associated with combat operations.

Regional knowledge, including a firm appreciation of historical, polit-

ical, cultural and socio-economic realities, will be essential. Strong interpersonal skills demonstrated by an ability to work effectively with people from diverse backgrounds, both U.S. and foreign, will become imperative as the military increasingly operates in a multicultural arena, frequently without hitherto customary U.S. hegemony. Moreover, future military roles and functions are likely to be characterized more and more by interagency efforts in which the military contributes to the overall governmental effort.

Special operations are activities conducted by specially organized, trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic or psychological objectives. According to public law (10 USC 167), special operations include direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitar-

ian assistance, search and rescue (in the context of special operations) and such other activities as may be specified by the National Command Authorities. Special-operations forces are those forces specifically organized, trained and equipped to conduct special operations.

Army SOF include Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units, and units designed to support and sustain SOF. SF, PSYOP and CA units are particularly well-suited to contribute to nation-assistance operations, combatting terrorism, counterdrug operations, contingency operations and activities involving international organizations. SOF participation normally occurs as an interagency effort.

SOF provide a variety of skills especially well-suited for the likely missions of the future. Their regional orientation provides culturally attuned, specially trained personnel for activities in sensitive political-military environments. Language proficiency further enhances their unique ability to work effectively and efficiently in a cross-cultural international environment.

SOF are ideally suited to assist other nations and have a primary capability to organize, train, advise and assist security forces. SOF capabilities include extensive medical skills, a wide range of sophisticated informational activities and competence in civil-military operations.

Civil Affairs expertise encompasses such non-military functions as agriculture, animal husbandry, community development, economics and commerce, education, public health, public information, public safety and sanitation. Essentially, SOF are multitalented problem-solvers whose special talents transcend combat power to provide a valuable capability to support a broad variety of U.S. policy options.

With expertise in a multitude of civilian and military fields, including engineering, communications,

weaponry, tactics, medicine, instruction, organization and security, SOF provide a versatile and particularly flexible capability to respond to a wide range of political-military challenges and to fulfill or contribute to a number of critical military roles and functions.

The versatility, language capabilities and relatively low profile of SOF are particularly valuable if the level of U.S. involvement is a sensitive issue within a region or country. In short, special-operations forces are dependable, skilled, experienced, flexible and ready forces especially appropriate to contribute

“With expertise in a multitude of civilian and military fields, including engineering, communications, weaponry, tactics, medicine, instruction, organization and security, SOF provide a versatile and particularly flexible capability to respond to a wide range of political-military challenges.”

to most military roles and functions.

The dangerous proliferation of internecine ethnic conflicts throughout the world demonstrates a growing need to identify potential areas of conflict and to analyze regional problems long before bloody confrontations occur. Regional, area and country expertise, coupled with a thorough knowledge and understanding of indigenous military and insurgent groups, must be encouraged within the military with a view to reducing or preventing conflict or war.

Similarly, foreign-area expertise is indispensable for the military to play its essential role if called upon

to alleviate suffering or to establish or restore effective governmental operations after a conflict or war. Moreover, foreign-area expertise is critical for effective planning and operating as part of any multinational or coalition force and is essential at all levels of military command to produce success in either unilateral or multinational military operations. In short, an overall smaller military force will require substantial detailed knowledge of the global national security environment to ensure efficient and effective employment of the military arm.

The peril of rampant local and regional conflicts in a period of growing nuclear proliferation suggests a new mission for military forces in the last decade of the 20th century and beyond. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weaponry becomes increasingly relevant as opposing factions engaged in ethnic, internal or regional conflicts seek the overwhelming advantage that a nuclear capability promises. Prevention of proliferation includes the full range of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weaponry and includes, in certain extreme cases, offensive measures undertaken to eliminate a nascent or existing nuclear capability.

The military may also be called upon to play a new role and function in the refurbishing and rebuilding of the United States. Skills honed and perfected in assisting foreign nations, along with conventional military know-how, may be applied effectively to address domestic needs, with the military contributing to a domestic nation-assistance program in areas such as education, infrastructure rejuvenation, civic action, organization and leadership. The military could play a valuable role, from planning through implementation, in an interagency program undertaken to address the nation's urgent domestic problems.

Section 167 of Title 10 states that the principal function of the U.S.

Special Operations Command is “to prepare special-operations forces to carry out assigned missions,” and assigns the responsibility for training assigned forces to the commander of USSOCOM. However, DoD Directive 5100.1, section F, paragraph 6, assigns the responsibility to “train forces for the support and conduct of special operations” to each of the services. This paradox should be addressed in the review of appropriate roles and functions.

It is most fitting that we re-examine military roles and functions during this period of a rapidly changing domestic and global environment. Similarly, the unique capabilities of

special-operations forces must be fully understood, properly recognized and thoughtfully utilized to ensure an effective and efficient military capability in the century ahead. ✂

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assignments which included duty as a military attaché, serving as director of three separate departments at the JFK Center, advisory and command tours in South Vietnam, and service as assistant professor of military science at Fordham University. He has earned a BA from Providence College, an MA in political science from Villanova University and a master of technology for international development from North Carolina State University.

When Forces Work Together: Army PSYOP & the FBI in St. Croix

by Clinton R. Van Zandt

On Sept. 18-19, 1989, Hurricane Hugo, prior to causing extensive damage along the U.S. eastern seaboard, swept through the island of St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. Hundreds of businesses and private residences were either damaged or destroyed by Hugo's winds, and most, if not all vital services, including electricity and fresh water, were disrupted.

Anarchy raced through the otherwise placid streets of St. Croix even faster than Hugo's 100 mile-per-hour winds. Looters were everywhere; local police response was all but suspended, and the citizens of St. Croix took to the streets with guns to protect what little remained of their businesses and homes. The walls of the local prison were also damaged, and 150 prisoners escaped, adding to the chaos already generated by the natural disaster.

At the direction of the U.S. Attorney General, FBI agents, including the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team and two members of the FBI Academy's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, were immediately deployed to St. Croix to function as the lead federal-response agency. The FBI was given the responsibility, along with a force of military police from Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Hood, Texas, to cooperate with

the local government in restoring law and order to St. Croix. Attached to the Fort Bragg MP contingent was a detachment of soldiers from the AV Platoon, Company A, 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group.

Members of the FBI's NCAVC normally deploy with the HRT to coordinate hostage negotiations. Examples of such deployments include the 1987 federal prison riots in Oakdale, La., and Atlanta, Ga.,^{1,2} and the 1991 federal prison riot in

Talladega, Ala.³ In St. Croix, they functioned as behavioral advisers to the special-agent-in-charge of all FBI personnel deployed there, and they initiated liaison with the PSYOP detachment.

With the approval of both the FBI special-agent-in-charge and the commander of U.S. Army personnel in St. Croix, the FBI negotiators and PSYOP soldiers developed an assessment of the psychological mood of the local residents. They provided their respective commanders with proactive ways to stop the looting of local businesses. The looting had to be halted to prevent the situation from escalating into a full-scale riot.

This combined assessment revealed a strong undercurrent of animosity between the haves and the have-nots on St. Croix, aggravated by racial issues. The response from local citizens to the joint FBI/military presence varied from outright relief to obscene gestures. The negative responses were due partially to a misunderstanding of the role these forces were to play in the crisis, and partially to unfounded rumors⁴ as to the length of time the forces would be deployed to St.



Photo by Joseph Picone

This street in Christiansted on the island of St. Croix shows the damage left in the wake of Hurricane Hugo.

Croix. There was also resistance by local officials to any action that gave the appearance the U.S. was taking over local-government functions.

After a number of fact-finding patrols to record citizens' reactions and interviews with many St. Croix residents, the FBI advisers and their PSYOP counterparts made the following recommendations to the FBI and the U.S. Army on-scene commanders:

- The PSYOP detachment should obtain current information on distribution sites for food, water and medical aid from the local office of the Virgin Islands Emergency Management Agency.
- The PSYOP detachment should be authorized to disseminate that information via mobile broadcast units and leaflets and to provide taped messages for broadcast by local radio stations when they became operational.
- To ensure that the image of U.S. forces was one of providing assistance, public-service leaflets should be distributed by FBI and military personnel while on patrol throughout St. Croix.
- Perceived animosity could be reduced by having all U.S. law-enforcement and military personnel strive to create a positive, helpful image, while maintaining a professional appearance. Long weapons should not be exhibited to the local population, and combat helmets should be replaced by soft caps.

The recommendations were discussed between the FBI special-agent-in-charge and his military counterpart and subsequently implemented. FBI psychological advisers and PSYOP-detachment personnel assisted in the implementation and assessment of the recommendations' results.

Once the local citizens saw the FBI and the U.S. military forces providing information, aid and assistance, they began to view the joint operation as one of assistance, not occupation. Local residents began to provide FBI and military



Photo by Joseph Picone

A soldier makes loudspeaker broadcasts along a road overlooking Christiansted. Broadcasts informed residents of food, water and medical-aid sites.

personnel with information concerning the location of escaped prisoners and the identity of looters, and order soon returned to paradise.

Conclusion

During September 1989, a unique combination of psychological assets from the FBI and the U.S. Army's 6th PSYOP Battalion, under joint FBI/military leadership, joined to support an urgent law-enforcement and humanitarian mission to restore order to St. Croix in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. This blending of psychological thought and direct application supported the mission of U.S. government forces deployed there, and broke new ground in joint civilian law-enforcement and military operations. ✕

Clinton R. Van Zandt is a supervisory special agent at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Va. As an Army counterintelligence special agent, he served with the 524th MI Detachment in Vietnam and with the 113th MI Group in Chicago, Ill., prior to join-



ing the FBI. A 22-year FBI veteran, he is a member of the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. He holds a bachelor's degree from Southern Illinois University and a master's degree from the State University of New York. Mr. Van Zandt serves as an adjunct faculty member at the University of Virginia and is the author of a number of articles concerning crisis negotiations and crisis management.

Notes:

¹ G. Dwayne Fuselier, Clinton R. Van Zandt and Fred J. Lancely, "Negotiating the Protracted Incident: The Oakdale and Atlanta Prison Sieges," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July 1989.

² Clinton R. Van Zandt and G. Dwayne Fuselier, "Nine Days of Crisis Negotiation: The Oakdale Siege," Corrections Today, July 1989.

³ Thomas J. Fagan and Clinton R. Van Zandt, "Negotiating the Non-Negotiable Situation: The Talladega Prison Incident," Paper submitted for publication, September 1992.

⁴ Stuart E. Wahlers, "Rumors," Military Intelligence, July-September, 1991.

Advising Host-Nation Forces:

A Critical Art

by MSgt. Melchor Becena

U.S. military agencies and personnel have demonstrated their professional excellence in training foreign personnel and units in technical skills. In some cases, however, U.S. personnel have not performed up to their potential due to a lack of background and training in advising skills and techniques.

The critical skill or “art” of advising is not taught in any of the various courses currently offered within the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. A case can be made that advising skills can be learned away from the schoolhouse, “on the job.” Learning adviser skills “on the job,” however, particularly in a politically sensitive environment, can needlessly jeopardize the mission and create a situation detrimental to U.S. interests.

The purpose of this article is to provide a set of general guidelines that can be used temporarily to fill the existing doctrinal gap on the subject of adviser training and techniques. FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces, to be published later this year, is intend-

ed to provide a more permanent doctrinal fix and address the current doctrinal shortfalls in this and other areas related to foreign internal defense.

Environment

Within DoD, the principal element charged with providing advisory assistance to a foreign nation is the security-assistance organization, or SAO. The United States tailors each SAO to the needs of the host nation. For this reason, there is no typical or standard SAO organization. The SAO may be known in-country by a number of names, according to the number of persons assigned, the functions performed or the desires of the host nation.

Typical SAO designations include “joint U.S. military advisory group,” “joint U.S. military group,” “U.S. military training mission” and “military group.” The SAO is a joint organization. Its chief is essentially responsible to three authorities: the ambassador, who heads the country team and controls all U.S. civilian and military personnel in country; the commander-in-chief of the uni-

fied command; and the director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The ambassador has operational control of all matters affecting his diplomatic mission, including security-assistance programs.

Special Forces may provide advisory assistance to a host-nation military or paramilitary organization as a detachment or as individual SF soldiers. During peacetime, this assistance is provided under the operational control of the SAO chief in his role as the in-country U.S. defense representative. The U.S. adviser may often work and coordinate with civilians of other U.S. country-team agencies and, as such, must know their functions, responsibilities and capabilities. This is important, since many activities cross jurisdictional lines.

The adviser should have a full understanding of his status in the host nation. This is normally established by a status-of-forces agreement, or SOFA, between the U.S. and the host nation (primarily in NATO countries). These agreements may provide for full diplomatic immunity or very little immunity. In the absence of an agreement, the adviser is subject to local laws and customs, and to the jurisdiction of local courts. Regardless of the diplomatic immunity afforded him, the adviser is expected to observe local laws, as well as the applicable laws of war and all U.S. Army regulations and directives.

In formulating a realistic policy for the employment of advisers, the Department of Defense must carefully gauge the psychological climate of the U.S. and the host nation. The introduction of military advisers requires a thorough psychological preparation of the host-nation populace with which the advisers will be in contact. Before advisers enter a country, their mission should be carefully explained and the benefits of their presence clearly emphasized to the host nation’s citizens. A credible justification, well in advance of their arrival, will minimize the propagand-

da benefits that dissenting elements within the host nation might derive from the advisers' presence.

Rapport

Webster's New World Dictionary defines rapport as "a close or sympathetic relationship." "Good rapport" describes a relationship founded on mutual trust, understanding and respect. "Bad rapport" describes a relationship characterized by personal dislike, animosity, mistrust and other forms of friction. The need to establish rapport with the host-nation counterparts is the result of a unique military position in which the adviser has no direct authority or control over their actions. In order to execute the mission, the adviser must establish an effective rapport which will allow him to influence his counterparts' actions despite this absence of formal authority.

Psychological pressure such as threats, pressure, intimidation or the use of bribes should never be used against a counterpart. Although they may offer quick results, these methods have very negative side effects and cause the counterpart to feel alienated and possibly hostile. Psychological pressure may irreparably damage the relationship between the adviser and his counterpart.

The most effective rapport is based on shared interests or goals. This relationship is characterized by mutual trust, respect and understanding. This is achieved when each of the individuals perceives the other as competent, mature and responsible. The adviser must make it clear that he and his counterpart are both working toward a common goal. Conveying this attitude to the host-nation counterpart will establish long-lasting, effective rapport.

Techniques

Advisers must be able to sell the most indefinite commodity — themselves. The traits of an adviser encompass all the traits of leadership as well as the ability to adapt

to one's environment. An adviser must constantly bear in mind that he is an adviser, not a commander. He is not there to lead troops. The counterpart, not the adviser, is the expert in his country. The counterpart must be treated as an equal or superior and given the respect the adviser himself expects. Advising the counterpart to select a particular course of action is only effective if the counterpart perceives that the adviser is professionally competent to give sound advice.

The adviser should have a knowledge of host-nation socio-political and military organizations and interrelationships, including personalities, political movements, forces involved and social drives. Military actions are subordinate to and supportive of the economic and social actions required to remove the causes of the state of lawlessness or insurgency. In situations where the host-nation government may have been in existence only a

short time, the administrative machinery may still be developing. Money needed for programs to cure social and economic ills may instead be directed toward security needs. Advisers should be aware of such situations and not be too critical.

Advisers should ask their predecessors for the unit's files and make sure they are thoroughly debriefed, to avoid "reinventing the wheel." Try to learn what the previous adviser has attempted and has or has not accomplished. Keep an open mind and judge things for yourself. Begin preparing a folder about the advisory area and duties as soon as possible. By posting a worksheet-type folder during the tour, the adviser will gain a better understanding of the job, and follow-on advisers will have a complete file to assist them in completing important projects. An adviser must never make promises that he cannot or should not carry out. U.S. assets must never be committed



Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

A Special Forces NCO instructs Salvadoran soldiers during training in basic marksmanship. Success in such missions requires strong interpersonal skills and respect for the host-nation counterpart.



U.S. Army photo

A Special Forces NCO instructs Salvadoran soldiers in small-unit tactics. Advisers must be perceived as fully competent in order to be effective.

unless the adviser has the authority and capability to deliver them.

An adviser must be extremely flexible, patient and willing to admit mistakes. He must persevere in implementing sound advice. He must be a diplomat of the highest caliber and possess an unusual amount of tact. The adviser must also possess a thorough knowledge of the organization, equipment and tactics of the unit being advised. Possibly the greatest asset that an adviser may possess is common sense. Ultimately, this uncommon commodity separates the effective adviser from the ineffective one. With common sense, everything is possible; without it, nothing but failure can be expected.

The usual cause of an adviser's failure is his inability to maintain a good working relationship with his counterpart, normally because of cultural ignorance, and at times, even arrogance. The unsuccessful adviser often fails to understand why his counterparts do not feel the sense of urgency that he does. Advisers must also realize that Third World countries do not have the necessary assets or resources to perform to U.S. standards, nor it is

necessary for them to do so. The adviser's effort should be directed to upgrading the capability of the host nation's forces to the point where they can effectively address internal or regional threats. Advisers are transient: They must realize that their counterparts will remain and continue to face the sometimes hopeless situation long after the adviser has returned to the safety and comfort of the United States.

Adviser training

Training in adviser skills and techniques has received very little emphasis prior to and since the Vietnam War. During the Vietnam era, The Military Assistance Training Adviser course, taught at Fort Bragg, provided personnel slotted for advisory duty in Vietnam the basic skills necessary for a successful tour. The MATA course consisted of 125 hours of instruction, 37 of which were dedicated to language training. The MATA course was later modified and improved, based on input provided by returning course graduates. After Vietnam, however, formal adviser training ceased.

The current Special Forces Quali-


fication Course includes blocks of instruction on foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare and coalition-warfare missions. It is obvious that highly refined advising skills are invaluable to the accomplishment of all these missions. Yet, a substantive block of instruction on adviser skills and techniques is not offered as part of the present SFQC curriculum.

The expanding role of Special Forces, and the military in general, in humanitarian-assistance and other non-traditional roles, make adviser skills more important now than ever before. "On the job" training is no longer sufficient. The possibility of mission failure would be considerably diminished if a formal block of instruction on advising skills and techniques were included as part of Special Forces training. This block of instruction could be inserted into the language-training phase or included as part of MOS training during the SFQC. It is time to re-emphasize the importance of advising skills and techniques. These are the skills that made Special Forces "special." A look at today's headlines seems justification enough. ✕

MSgt. Melchor Becena is assigned to the Doctrine Development Branch of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous assignments include service with the 10th and 7th SF Groups and with the U.S. MILGROUP in El Salvador.



Using MILES on Foreign Weapons



by SFC Michael E. Lopez

For more than 10 years the U.S. Army has been using the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, or MILES, to enhance its training involving fire and movement. There is nothing more instrumental in fine-tuning battle drills or assessing the effectiveness of a movement to contact, a deliberate attack or an ambush.

Unfortunately, without modifications, the MILES transmitter mount accepts only U.S. weapons. Until a universal mount is designed and supplied with the transmitter, alternate methods of mounting and zeroing it to foreign weapons must be used.

Last year, SFODA-736 took 100 sets of MILES on a deployment for training to Punto de Rieles, Uruguay, to teach a light-infantry program of instruction to soldiers in the 1st Infantry "Florida" Battalion. The rifle used by the Uruguayan soldiers was the 7.62mm FN FAL, and the method which follows is the one we employed to modify the MILES for use with the FAL.

Conventional mounting is impos-

sible, since the height of the MILES transmitter exceeds that of the front sight post by 1/4 of an inch. This problem is alleviated by mounting the transmitter to the underside of the barrel, with the forward sling swivel between the two prongs which normally house the front sight post of the M-16. If the newer transmitter, which accepts either the A1 or the A2 barrel, is to be used, the sliding bar should be used in the A1 position.

The FAL barrel is slightly larger in diameter than the A1 barrel, and the fit is really snug. Care should be taken not to disfigure the mounting clamp, as it will lose its spring effect. Since some clamps may pop open while firing, put two wraps of duct tape around the transmitter and mount. Place the tape so that none of it touches the barrel, to keep it from melting or burning when the barrel is hot.

When zeroing the transmitter to the rifle, follow the process outlined in the MILES manual provided with the zero boxes. However, when firing from five, 15 and 25 meters, multiply the corrections by three, two and one, respectively. With the transmitter mounted underneath the barrel, corrections to elevation and windage will be applied in the opposite direction indicated by the zero box. Bore sighting is complete when the right and bottom correction panels both read "3" (with a tolerance of three clicks in either direction). This also compensates for the transmitter being mounted underneath the rifle. To expedite the zeroing process, request one zero box for every 40 soldiers.


Soldiers should also anticipate that some MILES sets will not work properly. Of 100 sets we deployed, 12 did not work, so add a 10-percent buffer to the number needed, to be safe. Another pitfall to watch for is the type of blanks used. Crimped ones work fine; the ones with paper

wadding do not feed well. Finally, although the training and audio-visual support center will replace lost transmitter keys, you cannot afford to lose them, since each lost key renders a transmitter inoperable. The keys no longer have a cable and clip to secure them; therefore, secure them with wire or cord.

Our deployment to Uruguay was more successful than we could ever have hoped, and we found the MILES training to be invaluable. This view was shared by the host-nation brigade commander, who expressed to the U.S. Military Group in Uruguay his desire to obtain the MILES system. In being able to shoot at someone and register a "kill," the host-nation soldiers developed a more realistic idea of how to accomplish their missions.

Getting officers to take part in training is sometimes a problem, but the MILES technology drew maximum participation from the whole unit — officers eagerly participated in the training alongside their soldiers. We attribute a good deal of the success of our deployment for training to the MILES, and we believe that soldiers from other countries may respond just as favorably. ✕

SFC Michael E. Lopez is currently serving as the senior weapons sergeant on SFODA-731, Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group. His previous assignments include serving as a machine gunner with the 1st Ranger Battalion at Hunter Army Airfield and as a scout assistant squad leader with the 3rd/327th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, Ky. SFC Lopez is a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger School, the Special Operations Weapons Course, the Static Line Jumpmaster Course, the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course and the Special Operations Training Course.



Task Force Communications: The Special Operations Paradigm

by Lt. Col. Donald Kropp

Recent special-operations experience in Panama and Southwest Asia, as well as disaster relief in Florida, all point to a requirement for a powerful roll-on, roll-off SOF communications capability.

That capability needs to deploy with the warfighter to provide a communications network. Creating that network, however, requires air transport to move its people and equipment, and often the physical size of the communications package will dictate the extent of the capability that is deployed.

The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion provides a good model of the near-term packaging of Army transportable communications support. The 112th, an Army signal battalion, is unique in that it is funded from the joint SOF budget and deployed in support of Army and joint SOF units. In fact, the 112th is the only battalion-level communications unit in the force structure totally dedicated to sup-

port of special operations.

With the mission to support a deployed joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF, and an Army special-operations task force, or ARSOTF, the 112th must be capable of packing the maximum possible communications capability into the smallest possible package. Communications support is therefore phased into theater in a "building block" fashion.

Each communications package is configured to fit on a C-130 or C-141 aircraft, making maximum use of the airframe available. The initial communications-support package is heavy in single-channel radio assets, augmented with a multi-channel capability for entry into the Defense Communications System.

Once the JSOTF is established, follow-on signal packages build up the communications infrastructure supporting the JSOTF and ARSOTF. The result is a SOF theater-communications network with transmission and switching systems connecting the JSOTF to subordi-

nate and adjacent headquarters, the conventional theater headquarters and the Defense Communications System.

The following is an overview of the rapid-deployment communications systems employed by the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion:

Single-channel

The 112th has developed and procured a unique communications-liaison system using off-the-shelf technology and standard military hardware. The equipment, called the Special Operations Communications Assemblage, provides a large capability in a very small package. Configured in transport boxes small enough to be loaded on a civilian airline, SOCA provides the following capabilities:

- HF radio with automatic link establishment
- UHF tactical-satellite radio
- Secure facsimile
- Secure teletype, compatible with all Army and joint systems

- Secure video imagery
- Scanner
- Wire-line interface
- Communications security interface with encryption devices such as the KG-84, KY-57, KYV-5 or Sunburst processor
- Commercial power interface
- Generator power

Using the SOCA, battalion communicators can deploy on the first aircraft load and provide secure communications between the JSOTF commander and subordinate units. Often the limitations of aircraft or numbers of personnel dictate that the SOCA is the only communications package deployed.

However, the JSOTF and ARSOTF cannot operate on single-channel equipment alone. Multichannel systems are required for voice and data entry into the Defense Communications System, intelligence circuits or wideband video transmissions. The 112th meets this requirement through satellite and high-frequency multichannel systems.

Satellite multichannel

One serious limitation in the deployment of the current Army satellite-communications multichannel system is the size of the equipment. The AN/TSC-93 terminal was originally configured as a shelter mounted on a five-ton truck, with a separate antenna truck and two 10-kilowatt generator trailers. Its size made it virtually non-deployable: Combat commanders are not willing to trade an entire airframe for one communications van.

Since that first configuration, several modifications have reduced the size of the TSC-93: The shelter was removed from the five-ton truck and mounted on a dual-wheel M-1028 CUCV pickup. The antenna system was replaced with a commercial-design, lightweight antenna that fits in the aisle space of the shelter. The two 10kw generators were mounted on a single trailer. The entire TSC-93 now fits on one

CUCV and one trailer, and the 112th can now deploy three SAT-COM systems in the same airframe space formerly required for one.

HF multichannel

In addition to satellite multichannel, the Special Operations Signal Battalion was the first in the Army to receive high-frequency multichannel equipment. Like the satellite equipment, the HF multichannel system can provide access to the DCS and used to link subordinate headquarters as the mission expands.

In 1989 the 112th received prototype HF multichannel radio sys-

tems. These four-channel systems were first deployed to Honduras in support of a joint special-operations training exercise. About the size of a radio-teletype rig, the system allowed easy roll-on, roll-off deployment and provided long-distance multichannel communications. Since that time, the prototype equipment has been replaced by the Army standard AN/TSC-122.

Next Generation Switch

One limitation in the capability of the Special Operations Signal Battalion is the dependence on analog voice-switching equipment. This limitation is being corrected



U.S. Army photo

Above: The Special Operations Communications Assemblage provides the 112th Signal Battalion a lightweight deployable means of providing joint-task-force communications.



Left: The Next Generation Switch provides a digital switchboard capability in a small unit that can easily be detached from its shelter.



The Lightweight Deployable Communications System, or LDC-1, provides networked or stand-alone communications capability for the 112th.

through the acquisition of a new digital switchboard, the Next Generation Switch. In FY 1994 the battalion will receive four NGS systems. The NGS has a 1,500-line capacity and can interface with commercial systems, the conventional AN/TTC-39D switchboard and the Army's mobile subscriber equipment, similar to cellular phones. Best of all, NGS comes in a 18x19x15 package that can be dismounted from the shelter.

In the interim, the battalion is planning to modify the current-issue SB-3614 switchboards to provide a digital subscriber capability. Once the NGS is fielded, the SB-3614 switchboards can be moved down to the Special Forces-group level to augment their switching capabilities.

Message switch

Currently the 112th has no automated message-switching capabili-

ty. This limitation will be corrected by the planned procurement of a small (S-280 shelter size) message-preparation and switching system that will separate classified message traffic under both the General Service and Defense Special Security Communications System. The workstation to interface with the message switch is already in operation at the 112th — the AN/GSC-59 workstation, also known as the Lightweight Deployable Communications System, or LDC-1.

The LDC-1 is a self-contained off-the-shelf item that provides a networked or stand-alone automated communications terminal. It can operate over secure HF, VHF and UHF radio systems or wire-line interface. The entire system fits in a suitcase, and its size and transportability make it likely to ride on one of the first aircraft in.

Future military operations are likely to be short-notice, short-dura-

tion missions in areas without an established communications infrastructure. Some day, commanders will have access to a global information system that will support all of their warfighting needs, but in the meantime, we must fit our current and near-term systems to the needs of the rapid-deployment model.

Initiatives taken to downsize equipment in the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion provide a blueprint for other communications assets and make the 112th truly deployable, capable of configuring support for any contingency, from a single-channel radio to wartime theater support of a joint special-operations task force. ✂

Lt. Col. Donald

Kropp is commander of the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion. A Signal Corps officer, he has served in a number of special-operations assignments, including service as a signal platoon leader, signal company commander and group CE officer in the 7th Special Forces Group; CE officer for the 4th PSYOP Group; battalion S-3 and executive officer for the 112th Signal Battalion; and tactical signal officer in the 1st Special Operations Command. His military schooling includes the Command and General Staff College, the Joint Staff Course (Phase 2), the Special Forces Qualification Course, and Airborne, Ranger and Pathfinder Schools.



Interview:

James R. Locher III,
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict



James R. Locher III became the first U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict in October 1989. A 1968 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he has more than 20 years of professional experience in both the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. From 1978 until his appointment as ASD-SO/LIC, Mr. Locher served on the staff of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. During this period, he directed the bipartisan staff effort that resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization of Act of 1986.

SW: In your opinion, what are the most significant accomplishments that ASD-SO/LIC has made since it was established in 1986?

Locher: I would say the most significant contribution of ASD-SO/LIC has been its effort to focus in the policy area, laying out policy

for low-intensity conflict, what we call the environment short of war, and also laying out policy for special-operations forces. We were created at the same time as the U.S. Special Operations Command, because the Congress felt that the Department of Defense was ignoring special operations and low-intensity conflict. Right now we're in the midst of developing a long-range policy paper for special-operations forces, which we're hoping that the Secretary of Defense will sign in the near future. In some of the low-intensity-conflict activities, SOF plays an important role, but in others, general-purpose forces can play an important role, or other government agencies get involved. In low-intensity conflict, the military plays the supporting role, so we have the diplomatic, the economic, the informational, and the judicial instruments of power of the United States government that can

be brought to bear. Another area that we have contributed to is in the interagency process. Almost everything we do in the special-operations world depends upon effective interagency planning and coordination. Given our role in Washington, we've been fairly heavily involved in interagency matters, both in various interagency groups and in bilateral relations with important departments and agencies. When I talk about interagency, I'm really talking about the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the National Security Council. ASD-SO/LIC has also played an important role in terms of getting resources for the special-operations community. We've done several analytical studies to justify the top line of our budget, and we've had a fair amount of success in get-

ting what we call fiscal guidance — the levels for our Major Force Program 11 that funds special-operations forces.

SW: What do you foresee for the special-ops budget? Does it look like it may hold steady for the next few years?

Locher: Right now (January 1993), the budget for special-operations forces is going to hold steady. It's protected against inflation, so in absolute terms, it's going to grow a little bit, but it will be zero real growth. The special-operations community is in the minority, because it's been able to hold on to both its funds, and for the most part, the majority of its force structure. As I look to the future, I think special-operations forces are going to play an increasingly important role. I think that has been recognized by the national leadership and by the Congress, which has continued to be very supportive, and I think that we will see the same degree of fiscal support in the future that we've seen so far.

SW: What are some of the highest-priority things that still need to be done?

Locher: There are a number of things I think need to be undertaken. First of all, the special-operations community is not understood well enough by the rest of the Department of Defense or the rest of the U.S. government, so we need to continue to focus on an education and information campaign. We need to work hard to integrate ourselves with general-purpose forces in training and exercises. We don't have enough attention to special-operations forces in the contingency planning by the regional CINCs and by others, so that's something that we need to focus on. If they don't include us in their contingency plans, they're not likely to effectively employ us, or at least not right away. We need better intelligence support; we've made a fair amount of progress in the intelligence area,

but special operations are very heavily dependent upon precise intelligence, so that's an area that we need to continue to work on. We've had a fair amount of cooperation from the intelligence community, but we need to work those issues. Access to technology — that's an area in which we could make some substantial improvements. We've done fairly well, but



“Our special-operations forces are the most effective special operators around the world. I am extremely pleased with how they've developed over the last six years.”

our ability to access advanced technology and field it quickly is an area that I would focus upon. I think the language and cultural training in the special-operations community is an area that we need to continue to emphasize, and because we're going to be operating in highly political environments, we need to make certain that our personnel are politically aware and that they can effectively operate with other departments and agencies. Often they're

going to be working with personnel on a country team from different departments and agencies. We've actually talked about special-operations forces becoming the interagency force for the Department of Defense, since they can easily work in that environment. Another area that I would mention is the theater special operations command. Each of the regional unified commanders has a subordinate unified command for special operations, and we call those theater SOCS. Those commands need to be strengthened. Right now they only have roughly 52 percent of their peacetime manpower and only a small portion of their operations and maintenance funding, and that's an area that we need to give some attention to.

SW: Are we going to see heavier use of SOF in the future, possibly new missions, or different interpretations of the old missions?

Locher: I think that SOF will play an increasingly important role in the Department of Defense, and overall, I'm very optimistic about the future of special-operations forces. Recently we've seen some dramatic growth in their deployments; in the past year, deployments overseas have grown by 82 percent. We are increasingly finding that the theater CINCs are very interested in having special-operations forces — they understand their utility. I think if you look at what's happening around the world right now, you have all of these ambiguous political-military threats and situations, and special-operations forces, given the kinds of skills they have, are ideally suited to countering those threats. In terms of new missions, counterproliferation is going to be a growth area for special-operations forces. The counterdrug area is one that SOF has been heavily involved in, and I think that we'll continue to be involved there and may see some additional growth. The humanitarian-assistance/foreign disaster-relief efforts are likely to grow, as is coali-

tion warfare, a new mission for SOF that was performed during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Peacekeeping and peacemaking are going to be growing mission areas for the Department of Defense. While we're not expecting SOF to be the principal peacekeeping or peacemaking force, certain SOF components will have important roles in almost all of those situations, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces in particular. In the special-operations community, we have two broad mission areas: one is the direct-action, commando area, where we do our counterterrorism and other direct-action activities. The other area is foreign internal defense/nation assistance. Direct action will continue to be important to us, and we'll need to develop advanced technology to permit us to take on those missions, but generally we've already seen a shift toward foreign internal defense, and I think that will continue.

SW: Could you clarify counterproliferation?

Locher: As we try to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the United States government is going to be involved in very broad efforts. We'll have diplomacy, we'll have arms-control agreements, and

we'll put economic pressure on people to try to prevent them from either acquiring weapons of mass destruction or the components to produce them. But there is also the possibility that in the end, the National Command Authority may decide that there has to be some sort of military effort to prevent somebody from acquiring, developing or using a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon. And given the capabilities of special-operations forces, particularly in special reconnaissance and direct action, you can see how SOF can provide the National Command Authority with a wider range of options, should the need for military activity be required.

SW: Generally, what do you think of the capabilities of our SOF forces to handle the new demands that are going to be placed on them?

Locher: I think they're highly capable. Some areas like counterproliferation are going to be very demanding, and we're going to have to look at advanced technology to assist us, but our special-operations forces are the most effective special operators around the world. I am extremely pleased with how they've developed over the last six years since the legislation created the

U.S. Special Operations Command, and I think they have the skills to take on these missions.

SW: Is there any message you'd like to address to the SOF community?

Locher: There is one thing that I would like to mention — that's the issue of integrity and credibility. For the special-operations community, which has had some image problems in the distant past, developing trust and confidence by the national leadership is extremely important, and as we do our business, I think we need to focus on our integrity and how that translates into credibility for our community. We need to have quality control and know what it is that we're doing. We need to make certain that we conduct ourselves in accordance with the guidance that we're given, because if we make a misstep, it's going to be blown way out of proportion and will damage the community for a considerable amount of time. That's a message that I think needs to be clearly understood throughout the special-operations community.



Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

SQI “S” approved for SOF support soldiers

The skill-qualification identifier “S” for special-operations support personnel has been approved by DA PERSCOM. Information regarding eligible MOSSs, prerequisites, etc., has been published in the April 1993 update of AR 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties. Questions regarding SQI “S” should be directed to unit PACs and, if necessary, to Sgt. Maj. William L. Frisbie of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Questions dealing with proposed, existing, or former SQIs and additional-skill identifiers related to CMF 18 should be directed to SFC R.B. Gardner, also in SOPO. Phone DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002 (fax -9406).

SOPO clarifies SFQC attendance by 98G, 98H

The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office has issued the following clarification on SFAS and SFQC attendance by 98G/98H soldiers assigned to Special Forces groups:

- These soldiers may apply through their respective SF groups. Each SF group has a limited number of allocations for these soldiers.
- 98G/98H soldiers who are selected will attend the SFQC, 18E track.
- Upon successful completion of the SFQC, these soldiers will be awarded the Special Forces Tab, but generally, they will remain in the Military Intelligence CMF. Soldiers in 98G who are language-qualified in Polish, German or Czech are eligible to enter CMF 18 upon graduation, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOM’s Special Forces Enlisted Branch.

ANCOC attendance important for SF NCOs

CMF 18 NCOs who have reserved seats in the SF Advanced NCO Course and are deferred from attendance twice will be removed from the attendance roster, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOM’s Special Forces Enlisted Branch. SF units receive consideration lists from the SF Branch prior to each ANCOC class. Units tell the Branch which soldiers will be available for the specific class, and Branch develops a final attendance roster and reserves seats. Exceptions from this final roster are granted only in extreme circumstances, i.e., illness or injury, operational emergency, etc. Timely attendance to ANCOC cannot be overemphasized — ANCOC will be required for promotion to sergeant first class effective Oct. 1, 1993.

Promotion board defines categories for promotion to master sergeant

CMF 18 sergeants first class should be aware of the April 1993 promotion board’s definitions of CMF 18 SFCs “fully qualified” and “exceptionally qualified” for promotion to master sergeant:

Fully Qualified:

- Successful service as an SFODA member
- Graduate of appropriate level of NCOES (ANCOC)

Exceptionally Qualified:

- Successful service above SFODA level
- SF instructor
- Graduate of one or more skill-enhancing courses
- Demonstrated maintenance of foreign-language skills

Quality of file important for soldier promotion

As competition for CMF 18 promotions becomes more competitive, the quality of an NCOs file will take on even greater importance, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOM's Special Forces Enlisted Branch. "By the end of FY 93, the aggregate SF enlisted force will exceed authorizations. What this means is that the days are over when seven out of 10 Special Forces SFCs eligible for promotion were selected to master sergeant. My personal opinion is that we have seen the low mark for selection in FY 1992, with 44 selected to master sergeant. We should continue to exceed the Army average, but only three or four out of 10 may be picked up. In this more competitive environment, the quality of a soldier's file takes on new importance. Anything you can do to enhance your record may make the difference. Remember that the object of an NCOER is to influence a board, not to make a soldier feel good. Well-written EERs with solid bullets, good AERs, military schools, credit for civilian education and a sharp DA photo will make the difference between 'qualified' and 'best-qualified.' Each board is different, but they tend to select people who have done well in a variety of jobs." From a board's point of view, four years as a weapons sergeant, followed by two years in the S-3, followed by two more years on an ODA, are better than eight years as a weapons sergeant, Allen said. Soldiers should excel in any job, but should seek the tough jobs like first sergeant, ODA team sergeant, JRTC, etc. As a rule of thumb, first sergeant or "B" team sergeant are not substitutes for ODA team sergeant. "They are great file enhancers," Allen said, "but do not think that these by themselves will ensure your promotion."

Taxiera new senior enlisted career adviser

Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert moved to the SWCS in April after three years as the SF Enlisted Branch's senior enlisted career adviser. He has been replaced by MSgt. Philip Taxiera, formerly of Company C, 3/7th SF Group.

SF Group affiliation builds on regional, language skills

Once soldiers are affiliated with an SF group, they will continue to serve with that unit throughout their careers, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOM's Special Forces Enlisted Branch. "We must improve our ability to contribute to a CINC by continually building on regional experience and language expertise rather than starting from scratch with each change of assignment," Allen said. "Changing group affiliation is done by exception to policy only and must be based on some pretty strong reasons." The SF Enlisted Branch has furnished the following chart to show the breakdown on enlisted SF positions:

							SF Jobs		
Operational			Training			Other			
3,661			629			175			
							"Other" breakdown		
SOSC	Staff	RG	ROTC	AHS	JOTC	Other			
40	39	32	26	13	8	17			

The majority of jobs are in operational units, including the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and special-management units. The second greatest job sector is in training — each soldier has a responsibility to share his group experiences with new or less-experienced soldiers to enhance the quality of the force, Allen said. The majority of jobs in the "other" category are master-sergeant positions. In general, they are filled by NCOs who have strong files with at least two years of ODA team-sergeant time.

**SF language slots
open at DLI**

In general, Special Forces does not fill all its Defense Language Institute slots. Staff sergeants or SFCs with less than two years time in grade who have two years' time on station and a Defense Language Aptitude Battery score that meets Army requirements can be scheduled for a DLI course that supports their group's target region. This applies even to 18Ds. Soldiers should count on returning to their group or one of its OCONUS elements upon completion of training, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOM's Special Forces Enlisted Branch. Soldiers who have already been to DLI should not expect to go again.

**O&I not a requirement
for promotion**

All Special Forces soldiers should have the opportunity to attend the SF O&I Course, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOM's Special Forces Enlisted Branch, because the course seems to have an impact on promotion boards. "A lot of 18Ds tell me they are not getting a fair shake at promotion to master sergeant because they cannot be reclassified to 18F until they are no longer in a shortage situation," Allen said. "Proponency researched this perception and found that over a three-year period, 26.2 percent of eligible 18Ds were promoted to master sergeant. During that same period, 18B had 22.7 percent, 18C had 27.3 percent, 18E had 22.5 percent, and 18F had 22.5 percent. O&I and other schools may have an impact on a board, but the most important factors are the jobs held and the manner of performance."

**18Bs, Cs and Es may attend
medical training**

SF Branch controls four seats per 18D class to allow suitable 18Bs, Cs, and Es to take medical training. Criteria are SSG(P) or lower with two years time in a group in current MOS and strong chain-of-command endorsement. New SFCs are granted training only as a rare exception to policy because of limited utilization potential, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOM's Special Forces Enlisted Branch. Upon completion, graduates will return to the group that sent them to training.

**SF NCOs should talk
to assignments manager**

Each NCO should initiate a dialogue with his assignment manager. "Their charter makes them move you and your family around the world in accordance with the needs of the Army," said Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOM's Special Forces Enlisted Branch. "You may be sent to other assignments or remain at your current assignment despite your input. However, if you do not let us know what your preferences are, you will be assigned where we need you." Allen encourages NCOs to write or fax information on desires or family situations. "We will put these in your files so that when your number comes up, we can at least consider your input before we move you. Each soldier gets individual consideration. As Special Forces soldiers we would rather meet the needs of the Army and the desires of the NCO, as opposed to despite the desires of the NCO." Contact the Enlisted Branch at DSN 221-8340/6044, fax 221-0524, commercial (703) 325-8340/6044/0524.



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Officers may qualify for advanced civil schooling

Although the severe shortage of captains prevents the Special Forces Branch from sending large numbers to advanced civil schooling, some officers will be afforded the opportunity to pursue a master's degree in their functional area. PERSCOM has recently completed the academic-year 1993 selections, and Special Forces will participate to the following extent: one officer each to FAs 45, 46 and 53, and two to FA 49. Approximately eight will attend the FA 39 program at Troy State University, and a number of officers will attend school to support their training in FA 48. Officers interested in the ACS program must submit DA Form 1618R, copies of undergraduate transcripts and scores for the GRE or GMAT, as appropriate. A minimum undergraduate grade-point average of 2.5 and at least 500 in each category of the GRE is required, although partial waivers may be granted if an officer's performance has been consistently outstanding. ACS programs usually run between 12 and 18 months, and officers pay the Army back with a follow-on utilization tour of three years. Most functional-area managers attempt to use graduates within the SOF community, but there are no guarantees. Applications for academic year 1994 should reach the SF Branch during August 1993. The target year-group for AY 94 will be YG 86, but YGs 85 and 87 will be considered. For more information contact Capt. Christopher Perkins, SF Branch company-grade assignments manager, at DSN 221-3175, commercial (703) 325-3175.

Attend CAS³ early if time permits

The Special Forces Branch, while continuing to endorse the policy of officers attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School prior to a staff assignment, advises officers to consider going during their ODA command time, if their situation permits. According to Capt. Christopher Perkins, company-grade assignments manager, Branch has recently encountered situations in which several officers were unable to take some excellent career opportunities because they were not CAS³ graduates.

Assignments manager gives tips for SF majors

Maj. Charles T. Cleveland, field-grade assignments manager in the SF Branch at PERSCOM, has the following tips for majors:

- Your hard-copy file gets handled a lot. Keep your ORB correct and your photo up-to-date.
- Do CSC by correspondence if you are not selected on your first look. Your MEL level is an important factor affecting your reassignment. Since majors can be expected to make a move after 24 months with troops, it will ensure you are competitive for a better assignment.
- We have a lot that we are supposed to do as Special Forces majors. For example, field-grade troop duty, JRTC or SOCORD duty, joint or CSC attendance, etc. Choose wisely what you want to do with that limited period of time.
- You live or die in the Army by your manner of performance, no matter what the job.



Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Arms trafficking serious problem in former USSR

Widespread arms trafficking in the former Soviet Union continues to fuel ethnic, national and criminal violence throughout the region. The theft and illicit sale of arms has sparked periodic countermeasures since the problems became acute in the late 1980s. Over the 1990-1991 period, for example, some 440,000 weapons were handed over to the then-Soviet Army by guard units and training facilities, with some 73,000 confiscated by the Army in centers of ethno-national conflict. What seemed remarkable two years ago, however, with the hemorrhage of weapons and explosives from Soviet units, depots and manufacturing facilities, is a commonplace problem now. Ministry of Internal Affairs figures indicate that some 2.5 million hunting weapons, mostly shotguns, are legally registered in Russia itself, but Russian estimates in the summer of 1992 put the total number of uncontrolled arms throughout the former Soviet Union at some 30 million weapons, many of them military automatic weapons. Heavier weapons, including armored vehicles and artillery, are available as well, especially in conflict areas beyond Russia. There are well-developed smuggling routes across the former Soviet Union (and Eastern Europe), and substantial weapons caches are discovered almost daily in some areas. Groznyy, the capital of the secessionist Chechen Republic on the north slope of the Caucasus in Russia, is a major step on the arms-trafficking route through the southern republics. Arms continue to flow into some Central Asian republics from Afghanistan, despite the presence of Russian border guards along the volatile Afghan-Tajikistan frontier. From May to mid-December 1992, Russian border guards detained more than 600 illegal crossers and seized 500 weapons. The uncontrolled arms trafficking promises to shape the security environment in the region for years to come. The ready availability of weapons has enabled extremist groups, whether motivated by ethnic, national, religious or criminal agendas, to pursue their goals by armed conflict, terrorism and violence.

Broadcast describes elite Guatemalan counterinsurgency unit

The Spanish-language television network Univision recently carried an extensive report, the first ever permitted, on the Guatemalan Army's rigorous counterinsurgency training at the Kaibil training center. The report depicts in graphic detail the demanding training methods said to be used for "los Kaibiles," who were described as "the most feared soldiers in Guatemala, with a high degree of combat morale and a questionable human-rights record." The school's own program of instruction refers to the Kaibiles as "killing machines." Unlike other Guatemalan Army units, the Kaibiles are tasked exclusively with engaging the communist guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, the URNG. Much of the training is familiar to special-operations forces around the world: obstacle and infiltration courses, training in camouflage, sharpshooting, ambushes, explosives and booby traps. The fatigue uniforms are patterned after those of the U.S. Army, and much U.S. equipment was evident in the report. Training is non-stop, and according to the report, the students are not given a training schedule, so that "each minute is a surprise." In garrison, the trainees are shown being fed in a mess hall, and they must complete a meal in less than three minutes. In the jungle, they are given no food or water and must for-

Soviet SOF restructured, resubordinated

age to survive. Motivation also appears to be a major ingredient in the program. One sign read: "If I advance, follow me; if I stop, grab me; if I retreat, kill me." Each barracks is named for a Kaibil who was killed in combat. The school also instills a sense of comradeship. Each student is paired with a buddy, called a guas, which in the Mayan language means "inseparable comrade." According to the report, 95 soldiers are trained in each eight-week iteration. While the training proves too demanding for some, it was not indicated what percentage drops out. The most common injuries were said to be broken bones and dehydration. After a month and a half of training, the students are sent out in six-man combat patrols for real-world training against the URNG. The last man in the patrol walks backward and erases footprints. No details were given on actual combat encounters.

Despite turmoil and force drawdowns in the former USSR, its special-operations forces have far from disappeared. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the subordination and structure of military and security service (spetsnaz) units has continued to evolve in the former USSR republics. The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, the GRU, for example, stood at the pinnacle of Soviet military intelligence. It had direct control of centrally subordinated spetsnaz units and oversight of those spetsnaz forces assigned to operational commands. With the dissolution of the USSR at the start of 1992, the GRU became for a time the principal intelligence body of the Main Command of the Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces. Following the April 1992 creation of a Russian Ministry of Defense, however, the GRU became Russia's military-intelligence arm. While most GRU spetsnaz units likely fell to Russian control, at least some elements — in Ukraine, for example — opted to swear allegiance elsewhere. As of mid-1992, GRU special-operations groups reportedly remained trained to operate in 3-7 man groups for intelligence-gathering and direct-action missions in enemy rear areas. They likely are assigned missions in interethnic conflict areas, as well. Their prominent role in the new Russian mobile force components now being planned (comprising largely airborne, naval infantry, air assault and transport aviation) seems assured. At least some of the spetsnaz units formerly assigned to the KGB are now to be subordinated to a new "T" Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Security, responsible for counterterrorism and said to have both field and analytical components. The foreign arm of Russian intelligence now is designated the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Formed from the KGB's First Chief Directorate, it may also retain those former KGB special-operations units oriented against foreign targets. Internal troop spetsnaz units fell under the control of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MVD, in 1992. They continue to be deployed from trouble spot to trouble spot and are among the most experienced and effective of all Russian forces in dealing with interethnic conflict. Activated in 1978, these forces have grown substantially and are currently organized in brigade, battalion and company increments. Paralleling these forces, but oriented more to dealing with violent criminal acts, are Russian Militia Detachments of Special Designation, or OMON, that have been retained under the Russian MVD. As of late summer 1992, there were 5,500 OMON personnel organized into 20 detachments around Russia. These units, intended principally to deal with violent criminal activities and local "terrorist" incidents, also are deployed to conflicts beyond their immediate operating areas.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Special Warfare

Butler new commander of 1st Battalion, 7th Group

The 7th Special Forces Group welcomed its newest battalion commander in a change-of-command ceremony Jan. 7 at Fort Bragg's JFK Special Warfare Memorial Plaza.

Lt. Col. Remo Butler received the group colors from Col. James G. Pulley, 7th Group commander. Previously assigned to the Armed Forces Staff College, Butler is "uniquely qualified to assume command of the 1st Battalion," Pulley said.

"This is a very proud day for me," Butler said. "First of all to be selected to command the best soldiers in the U.S. Army; and secondly, I started my Special Forces career in the 7th Group, and now I'm back."

Speaking of the outgoing commander, Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert, Pulley said, "He always led by example, going the extra mile to ensure his soldiers were prepared, trained and physically capable of overcoming all obstacles." Lambert is now deputy commander of the 7th SF Group.

11th SF Group seeks applicants for MI units

The 11th Special Forces Group is now seeking applicants to fill vacancies in its military-intelligence detachments.

Available positions, all for immediate fill, are in the military-intelligence, communications and administrative occupational specialties. Positions range in grade from sergeant to sergeant first class, although a limited number of captain positions are available, primarily at the battalion level.

Prerequisites for selection are

that applicants be fully qualified in their appropriate military occupational specialty; be airborne-qualified or willing to volunteer for airborne training; be a U.S. citizen; be able to pass a special background investigation; and attain a minimum score of 210 on the Army Physical Fitness Test.

Unit locations are at Fort Meade, Md.; Newburgh, N.Y.; Columbus, Ohio; and Perrine, Fla. For more information, contact 2nd Lt. Steven Adragna at DSN 923-3606, extension 3301; commercial (410) 672-1173, extension 3301.

4th PSYOP Group gets new commander

Col. Jeffrey B. Jones replaced Col. Layton G. Dunbar as commander of the 4th Psychological Operations Group Jan. 14 during a ceremony at Fort Bragg's JFK Special Warfare Memorial Plaza.

Jones was formerly assigned to Washington, D.C., where he was Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council at the White House. No stranger to the PSYOP community, he commanded the 4th POG's 8th PSYOP Battalion from August 1989 to July 1991, leading the unit during Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama, and Operations Desert Shield/Storm in the Persian Gulf.

"The 4th POG has a worldwide responsibility," Jones said. "I plan to exercise my expertise and use my energies to keep the unit alive."

The 4th PSYOP Group is the Army's only active-component PSYOP unit. Under Dunbar's command since December 1990, the unit participated in the Persian

Gulf War, assisted refugees in Turkey and Cuba, helped victims of Hurricane Andrew in Florida and deployed troops to U.S. relief efforts in Somalia.

CA enlisted course begins at SWCS

A new course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School recently graduated 12 soldiers into the Army Reserves' newest military occupational specialty — Civil Affairs.

The Civil Affairs Specialist Course graduated its first class at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School March 31. The 11-week course, advanced individual training for MOS 38A, focuses on preparing soldiers for roles in Civil Affairs units stationed around the U.S.

"Our goal is to graduate fully qualified Civil Affairs specialists who are area-oriented and validated to the standards of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command," said Capt. Harry K. Whittaker, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Civil Affairs personnel help to coordinate populace and resource control, rebuilding and restoration to war-torn or disaster areas.

"Wars solve immediate problems, but following the missions, we keep people from dying of starvation or disease," said MSgt. Danny R. Malone, NCOIC of the 38A AIT.

The course covers more than 100 critical tasks, each subdivided into hundreds more enabling tasks. Students learn to solve problems, conduct area studies and coordinate projects with government and legal officials in host nations. They are

introduced to computers, research techniques and communications in the Army.

Along with the Civil Affairs regimen, the course includes common-core instruction and SOF history, as well as extra requirements not found in all AITs. Students are required to march 10 kilometers with 55-pound packs in less than two hours and complete a four-point land-navigation course before graduating.

"They have to be able to read maps before they can set up a civilian dislocation plan. They have to know what it feels like for soldiers to go 10 miles or starving civilians to go on a route they plan," Whittaker said. "We want the students to stomp some ground, too."

The course is expected to run four times a year. Enrollment will gradually increase to 40 students per class.— SSgt. Keith Butler, USASOC PAO

Getty takes command of SWCS Training Group

Col. Kenneth W. Getty Jr. took command of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group from Col. Walter Chrietzberg on Feb. 11 in a ceremony at the JFK Memorial Plaza.

Formerly director of operations for the Special Operations Command - Europe, Getty participated in Operation Elusive Concept, U.S. European Command's support to Operations Desert Storm and Provide Comfort. His other SOF assignments were with the 1st and 10th Special Forces Groups.

Getty challenged the members of his new command to ensure the best training possible for special-operations soldiers. "These are turbulent times for the Army and for Army special-operations forces," he said. "Downsizing the Army and reduced resources challenge us to make maximum use of what we have."

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, presented Chrietzberg the Legion of Merit and

praised his solid performance as training group commander. Chrietzberg's new assignment is as deputy chief of staff for force development and integration with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The 1st Special Warfare Training Group, comprising three training battalions and a support battalion, teaches the Special Forces Qualification Course, specialized and advanced SF skills, psychological operations and civil affairs, regional studies and foreign language courses.



JFK Special Warfare Museum

Museum seeks to update donor files

The JFK Special Warfare Museum is looking for names of patrons who donated items to the museum between 1962 and 1981.

"We would be really interested in any papers documenting donations, loans or transfers," said Roxanne Merritt, curator for the museum. Merritt and her staff are attempting to reconstruct records of donations for historical pieces including mementos, books and military equipment.

For more information, contact Roxanne Merritt or Clenon Freeman at DSN 239-4272/1533, commercial (919) 432-4272/1533 or write the museum staff at: Com-

mander; U.S. Army Special Operations Command; Attn: AOHS-MU; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

SF ANCOC no longer required for O&I

Graduation from the Special Forces Advanced NCO Course is no longer a prerequisite for attendance in the resident or nonresident Special Forces Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeants Course, taught by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

The change, effective Dec. 11, 1992, is based on guidance from the chief of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine, according to CWO 2 Michael Last, O&I Detachment commander. A memorandum of instruction will soon be distributed to formally list the change.

Other prerequisites for SF O&I are outlined in DA Pamphlet 351-4, The Army Schools Catalog, and the SFO&IS course memorandum of instruction dated 25 August 1992, Last said. Waivers for any prerequisites must be approved prior to the class start date.

Requests for waiver should be addressed to Commander, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; Attn: AOJK-GP-ST; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. For more information, contact Company A, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, at DSN 239-4414/3823, commercial (919) 432-4414/3823.

Schools NCOs should check course prerequisites

The 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group reports numerous problems during FY 1992 of soldiers arriving at the Special Warfare Center and School who were not ready to begin training.

Problems most often encountered were students who did not meet the course prerequisites, students without physicals stamped by the Army Special Operations Command surgeon, students without proper waivers and students missing TA50 field gear. Such problems waste

training time and often require that a soldier be dropped from training and returned to his unit.

The battalion encourages SF team sergeants and unit schools NCOs to check DA Pamphlet 351-4, The Army Schools Catalog, and course memorandums of instruction, which have been distributed to all group and regimental headquarters, to ensure that soldiers meet all course prerequisites.

The 2nd Battalion conducts training in advanced Special Forces skills, including the Military Free Fall Course, the Combat Diver Qualification Course, the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course, and the Special Forces Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeants Course.

Projects offer lightweight communications equipment

New communications equipment currently being fielded and developed will provide special-operations forces with lightweight systems capable of performing a variety of functions.

The Special Operations Communications Assemblage, AN/GRC-233, is a lightweight package of terminal equipment and radios designed to provide special-operations forces the capability to transmit and receive voice, data, compressed video imagery and facsimile. Designed for use by the Special Operations Command, the Theater Army Special Operations Support Command, the Joint Special Operations Task Force and Army Special Operations Task Force, it can serve as a command-and-control, administrative and logistics, or non-SI intelligence link.

The heart of the system is a 286 computer which manages all functions, according to Capt. John Miller, project officer in the Combat Developments Division of the USASOC Force Development and Integration Directorate.

The HF subsystem, AN-PRC-133, works in 2-30 MHz frequency range

and is capable of transmitting narrowband secure voice and data up to 24 kilobytes per second. The UHF subsystem, the AN/URC-130, works in the 225-400 MHz frequency range and provides wideband secure voice, data, video and facsimile at 16 kbps and narrowband secure voice, data, video, facsimile and teletype at 2.4 kbps. The AN/CSZ-1A Sunburst processor provides the encrypting/decrypting functions for both wide and narrowband voice and data security.

The system weighs 416 pounds and comes in four transit cases,



Hand-crank generator from the SOPS

Miller said. It can be set up and operated in 30 minutes by two operators. It will serve as a replacement for the Special Operations Communications Liaison Assemblage, the SOLCA, which weighs more than 1,200 pounds.

SOCA is currently being fielded to the SF groups, the 112th Signal Battalion, the 4th PSYOP Group and the SWCS, Miller said.

The Special Operations Power Source will be a set of devices intended to supply power to various pieces of existing Army, Air Force and Navy radio and special equipment. The SOPS consists of solar panels, a small hand-cranked generator and assorted power connectors and cables.

The need for a set of small, lightweight and durable power sources, including high-energy rechargeable batteries and interconnecting devices for SOF communications equipment, was identified in the 1983 Special Operations Mission Area Analysis. SOF elements currently use the G-76 handcrank generator.

SOPS will be used to provide the required power for SOF communications devices and to recharge batteries. It will be compatible with all standard SOF communications equipment, according to MSgt. Ron Schuman, equipment specialist in the Combat Developments Division of the USASOC Force Development and Integration Directorate. The components will be lightweight and small, e.g., a one-pound solar panel or a six-pound hand-crank generator, and the components can be tailored to the mission. The system will produce power ranging from 5-50 watts to charge 12- and 24-volt batteries.

The system must be rugged enough to withstand underground caching and various infiltration means. It must also operate with the standard rechargeable batteries within the SOF communications system. The SOPS will be issued two per A-detachment. It is scheduled for fielding during the first quarter of FY95, Schuman said.

Data base preserves SOF lessons learned

A new computer data base makes it possible for special-operations soldiers to share their lessons learned and to profit from the historical and contemporary experiences of other SOF units.

The Special Operations Lessons Learned Management Information System provides a single library of lessons learned to aid special-operations units in planning their training and operational missions. Developed at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the system, called SOLLMIS, also provides

SWCS training developers a source of information to assist them in developing SOF doctrine, training, organization and materiel.

SOLLMIS is a user-friendly, fully automated library containing observations and experiences of soldiers assigned to special-operations and security-assistance missions. Users make selections from a succession of menus in order to find or enter data. They need to type data only when recording observations, lessons learned or recommendations. Since there are no codes or commands to memorize other than a password, users do not need extensive training or experience to use the data base.

A unique feature of the SOLLMIS program is its ability to "search" for previously entered lessons learned. This function allows users to search for information through the use of categories, countries, dates, keywords or record numbers that have already been entered.

SOLLMIS categorizes data according to a number of factors, including climate, terrain, geographic region, mission and SOF element involved. The extensive categories give the program more "search" capability. In addition, the data include points of contact so users can follow up on recommendations.

SOLLMIS is not the only lessons-learned data base — the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., has a system known as CALL, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System, or JULLS. However, these systems contain very little SOF-unique data.

The main sources of SOLLMIS data are special-operations active- and reserve-component units, security-assistance organizations,

mobile training teams and historical analysis. CALL and JULLS are also continuously searched for SOF-related information. This eliminates the need for SOF soldiers to search other systems for SOF data, and makes SOLLMIS the single-source, official data base for SOF operations.

Currently, there are approximately 500 unclassified lessons-learned in SOLLMIS, including lessons learned from Operation Provide Comfort. A separate, classified data base is being collected which includes lessons learned from Desert Storm. These are already being used to brief security-assistance teams whom the SWCS Security Assistance Training Management Office sends to countries throughout the world.

Eventually, SOLLMIS will be available to SOF units through a computer network as well as by telephone modem. Units with specific needs — to get more information about any of the systems or to submit lessons learned, for example — should contact Lt. Col. Frank Bush or Holly Boniek; USAJFKSWCS, Attn: AOJK-DE, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000, phone DSN 239-1548/5255, commercial (919)432-1548/5255.

SWCS courses evaluated for education credit

Twenty-two courses taught at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School were recently recommended for higher civilian education credit by an evaluation team from the American Council on Education.

For the past 50 years, ACE's Center for Adult Learning and Educational Credentials has evaluated formal military courses in terms of their equivalent civilian educational

credit, according to Paula Collins of the SWCS Individual Training Materials Management Office. Credit recommendations of the team are included in ACE's Guide to the Evaluation of Educational Experiences, published every two years. The Guide is used by civilian institutions of higher learning to award credit for military training.

The ACE team, composed of seven subject-matter experts from a variety of disciplines, visited SWCS in December 1992 and reviewed 42 programs of instruction, including the new Civil Affairs Specialist Course - RC (MOS 38A), Collins said. Of the courses evaluated, 22 were awarded a higher credit recommendation than that published in the 1990 Guide. Seventeen course recommendations remained unchanged, and three were reduced slightly, because of changes in ACE evaluation standards.

The Regional Studies Course, which replaced the Foreign Area Officer Course, received a recommendation for both baccalaureate and graduate credit. The new Civil Affairs Specialist Course was awarded 18 semester hours of recommended college credit. The results of the latest evaluation visit are expected to appear in the 1993 Guide.

During this period of downsizing, the need to transfer military training into the civilian arena has become increasingly important, Collins said. For further information, contact Paula Collins; Individual Training Materials Management Office; Attn: AOJK-DT-ITM; USAJFKSWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000, phone DSN 239-1652/7259, commercial (919) 432-1652/7259.



Special Warfare is available for private subscription through the Superintendent of Documents; Government Printing Office; Washington, DC 20402. For telephone orders, call (202) 783-3238. The current subscription price is \$8 per year. Limited back copies of some issues are still available from the Editor, Special Warfare; USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-DT-PD-B; Fort Bragg, NC 28307.

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama. Edited by Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras. Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. ISBN: 0-8133-7981-4. 245 pages. \$29.95.


This book is about an important but idiosyncratic operation, the invasion of Panama. The heavy Army and Army special-operations flavor of the action make it worth the study, and Operation Just Cause is worthwhile reading. It is well-organized, well-written and filled with good information for the military reader. Not perfect by any means, it is one of the better treatments of the subject this reviewer has seen.

The book has an adequate organization. It has four major sections, "Background" (Chapters 1-3), "Prelude" (Chapter 4), "The Operation" (Chapters 5-10), and "The Aftermath" (Chapters 11-13). Chapters 1 and 2 are redundant, both covering the historical overview of U.S.-Panamanian relations. You only need to read one of these; I recommend Chapter 2. The first is a totally slanted, anti-American diatribe. After reading this chapter, a novice would think that all the ills of Panama were deliberately caused by the U.S. The second chapter is far more balanced, and therefore of much more use. The third chapter deals with the role of drugs in the bilateral relations, and it is relevant and interesting. There is also some redundancy between the last few pages of Chapter 2 and the coverage in Chapter 3.

The fourth chapter, the only one in Section II, looks at indicators and warning factors. The strange part about this one is that the author, an

intelligence analyst, admits that the indicators were neither important nor accurate in this case, but she spends 12 pages telling you about them. She also labors for far too many pages "convincing" us that Noriega should have recognized that we were going to invade. You can skip this one unless you are an intel type.

Section III, "The Operation," is the heart of the book. However, it is actually one chapter, Chapter 5,



"The Anatomy of Just Cause," and five short articles that support it. This could (and maybe should) stand alone as a monograph. It covers all the forces, how they prepared, how they deployed and how they fought. You can buy the book just for this chapter.

The other chapters are about command, control, communications and intelligence; air power; logistics; civil affairs; and press access. These are all fairly good reading,

but none are particularly substantial. The press-access chapter looks in great detail at this "controversy," but never comes close to resolution. The author, one of the editors, admits that most Americans are willing to sacrifice a bit of "immediate need to know" if it saves American lives. The rub comes when the press and the liberal intelligentsia scream about the intrusion, something we should spend less time worrying about than we do.

The final section covers the fallout of the President's action with regard to the future of U.S. troops in Panama and the international community. It is interesting to see, two years after the book was published, how these analyses hold up: They did not do badly. The summary chapter, written by the editors, is also well-done. They note the areas of improvement made between Grenada and Panama, but they are quick to caution against forgetting that this was a unique operation, not a panacea for all future endeavors. The lessons they do point out are legitimate and worth reading. They also add a detailed chronology that is a real boon to the researcher.

The book's main strengths are the fifth chapter, the good summary and the chronology. The other chapters are all either weakly written, of no consequence, or slanted to the point of uselessness. This may sound like a negative assessment, but frankly, the strengths make the book worth having. Even the bad parts can be a source of good information, you just have to work for it.

For a member of the SOF community, this book is definitely worth having. Not the best book in the world, it is an above-average treatment of this very important subject.

There is much to be investigated so that we may learn and apply knowledge when needed. This book will provide a good base for such an investigation.

Maj. Steven Bucci
CGSC
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam.

By William Colby, with James McCargar. Chicago: Contemporary Books, Inc. 1989. ISBN: 0-8092-4509-4. 448 pages. \$22.95.

For once, here is a book whose title accurately foretells its content. The author, William Colby, was CIA station chief in Saigon, then chief of the agency's Far East Division in the 1960s, afterward deputy to the commander, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, and, finally director of central intelligence until his retirement in 1976. If not "present at the creation," Colby was deeply involved in the pacification of the South Vietnamese countryside from almost the earliest days of the republic.

Colby's account is a contribution to what might currently be termed the "revisionist" interpretation of America's involvement in the Vietnamese wars: for all of its mistakes, the United States supported the right side and, with the government of South Vietnam, had succeeded more or less by 1970 in winning the "other war" in the countryside.

Certainly it was not pajama-clad South Vietnamese peasant guerrillas who broke down the gates to the Saigon presidential palace at the final debacle in 1975, but armored divisions sent south directly by Hanoi.

And finally, whatever havoc was wrought by America's supposed insensate destruction of South Vietnam's fragile economy, the people stayed close to the bones of their ancestors. Now a united Vietnam, supposedly free from the machina-

tions of the imperialists, has suffered a massive hemorrhage of the best of its population — the boat people.

Colby goes beyond even many of the revisionists, however, when he contends that the reviled President Ngo Dinh Diem was an effective leader, and that the American-approved coup that toppled and killed him was a disaster for the fledgling nation.

But Colby also feels that Nguyen Van Thieu, who eventually succeeded Diem, ably mobilized the Republic of Vietnam and cannot be held responsible for the war-weariness, misinformation and disinformation that led Congress virtually to cut off

presented the real war-winning potential of the U.S. effort. Certainly the evidence is coming in that seems to affirm Colby's thesis, as well as his contention that Tet was a disaster for the VC "worker and peasant" cadres.


But at the time, Walter Cronkite was telling U.S. TV audiences that the "bloody experience in Vietnam was to end in a stalemate" at best. In fact, this reviewer recalls distinctly at the time hearing another newscaster assert that Americans, who had always felt that they might not win the war in Vietnam, now had to face the possibility that they might actually lose it.

Yet in the wake of Tet, most of the countryside was gradually pacified, the government commitment to land reform was serious, and the administration of President Thieu, after standing for meticulously-examined free elections, had won at least acceptance from the population.

But, as the communists had fully anticipated, this war had now to be won on the U.S. home front. All of the shortcomings of the Thieu government were exaggerated in the more influential media, and its successes buried.

Colby gives a particularly vivid example of the climate in Washington in the early 1970s. President Nixon could invite President Thieu to visit him only at his San Clemente retreat; protests inside the Washington beltway at the meeting of these two "war criminals" would have probably have reached critical mass. More tangibly, U.S. aid dropped from \$2.8 billion in 1973 to a mere \$700 million the following year. The point was not lost on either Hanoi or Saigon. One year later, the Republic of Vietnam fell to a conventional armored blitzkrieg from the north.

It was indeed, as Colby puts it, a "double defeat." Not only was an ally whom the United States had pledged to defend defeated in a war of aggression, but the painstaking and successful work of nation-build-



aid to South Vietnam. At the same time, China and the Soviet Union vied with each other to supply North Vietnam, in blatant violation of the Paris accords.

Colby is critical of the conventional U.S. war effort in the South, arguing that it was almost irrelevant in the face of the war of massive insurgency, subversion and terror launched by the communists in the south.

For Colby, such programs as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS, and the Phoenix-program attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure repre-

ing had been shattered.

Today a united Vietnam has a standard of living roughly on a par with that of Haiti. Yet, as Colby points out, Vietnam had the potential of becoming the economic “fifth tiger” of Asia. Had matters turned out differently, we might well be hearing today congresspersons complaining bitterly of “unfair competition” from South Vietnamese VCRs or even compact cars. This sobering book is a basic resource for researchers, students and instructors interested in America’s post-World War II Vietnam policy and execution.

Stanley Sandler
Office of the Historian
USASOC
Fort Bragg, N.C.


Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces. By the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 79 pages.

The recommended distribution of Joint Pub 1 includes “each officer in the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above in the U.S. Armed Forces, active and reserve ... (and) each sergeant major, master chief petty officer, and chief master sergeant in the U.S. Armed Forces, active and reserve,” and for good reason. Joint Pub 1 is the armed forces’ capstone manual detailing the philosophy for the conduct of joint warfare by all the American military services. As such, it is an extremely important booklet. And, at a mere 79 pages, it is an easy read.

Joint Pub 1 has its roots in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. This act created a more powerful chairman of the Joint Chiefs and strengthened the roles and responsibilities of the combatant and unified commands. The booklet is organized into four short chapters which discuss American military power,

values in joint warfare, fundamentals in joint warfare and the conduct of joint campaigns. These chapters capture the essence of joint warfare by using historical examples and simple, straightforward language. This is not a publication just for strategists and operational warfighters — soldiers of all ranks can benefit from a better understanding of how we, as Americans, fight.

According to Gen. Colin Powell, in his letter at the beginning of the booklet, “When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. All players try to do their very best



because every other player, the team, and the home town are counting on them to win.”

It was not always thus within the American military establishment. Interservice rivalry was one of the crippling problems that eventually led to our withdrawal from Vietnam. And, as we have seen with our lopsided victory over the tyrant Saddam Hussein, joint warfare works.

In fact, Desert Shield was the litmus test for the Goldwater-Nichols Act and joint warfare. The act gave Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf complete authority over all American

forces within his theater. His strategy for defeating the Iraqis reflected that authority. He chose to pound the Iraqi military first with U.S. air power. Then he used the very credible threat of a Marine amphibious assault across the beaches of Kuwait in a masterful deception operation. Finally, he used his ground forces to perform an “end run” around Iraqi fortified positions in the western Iraqi desert.

Additionally, Schwarzkopf’s skill as a joint commander prepared him well for the role of a coalition commander for the armies and air forces of many nations. Without the authority vested in Schwarzkopf by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the story in the Iraqi desert might have been much different.

The pub is full of pictures and maps that help illustrate points made in the text, and demonstrates that joint-warfare considerations have been important throughout the history of conflict. This is an important booklet. It is well worth your time to acquire it and read it thoroughly.

Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.
4th PSYOP Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern Wars. By Sir Robert Thompson. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1989. ISBN 0-85052-761-9. 218 pages. \$30.

Many consider Britain’s Sir Robert Thompson the world’s leading counterinsurgency expert. He earned his deserved reputation the old fashioned way — by doing it.

World War II experience in China and Burma and later in Malaya schooled him in small-unit operations, guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency planning. He eventually applied his knowledge advising the Thai, Vietnamese and U.S. governments.

Thompson’s autobiographical sixth book, *Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern Wars*, is not a

counterinsurgency manual, though it contains gems of counterinsurgency wisdom along with strategic insights. His reflections on the Vietnam War alone make the book well worth reading.


As a critic of America's continuing failure to understand insurgency, Thompson candidly assesses U.S. officials of the Vietnam era such as Kennedy, Johnson, McNamara, Nixon, Kissinger, Westmoreland and Abrams.

A member of the Malay Colonial Service, Thompson was visiting Hong Kong during the December 1941 Japanese invasion. He escaped with a small party into southern China to link up with Chinese forces. He operated behind Japanese lines in Burma as an RAF air-support coordinator with Maj. Gen. Orde Wingate's Chindits.

During the Malayan Emergency (1948-60), the 12-year campaign of British and Malayan forces against communist insurgents, Thompson performed a variety of administrative functions in the Home and Defense Ministries.

In 1961 Thompson became chief of the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam. He arrived in the middle of the Diem government's disastrous misapplication of the strategic-hamlet concept that Thompson had helped successfully administer in Malaya.

The U.S. advisory effort then fared little better. Following some U.S. advisers' briefings in the Mekong Delta, Thompson noted



that no Americans at that time had even looked at the French record in that region nor had read Mao. "The trouble with you Americans," he observed, "is whenever you double the effort you somehow manage to square the error."

Thompson correctly saw pacification and nation-building not as "the other war" secondary to the combat thrust, but properly as part of one unitary effort. He emphasized organization — a coordinated political, military and administrative endeavor — as the key to winning.

As a consultant in the Rand Corporation, a defense think tank, Thompson served as an adviser to President Nixon. He supported Vietnamization and urged a "low cost, long haul strategy" as the

British had used in Malaya.

For all their value, some of Thompson's assessments require qualification. Though sympathetic to the problems of Asian leaders, he overrates the leadership qualities of South Vietnamese presidents Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Van Thieu. Thompson glosses over how ineptitude and government by cronyism exacerbated popular disaffection with the Saigon government.

He scores America's failure of will and leadership toward the end of the war and in the immediate post-Vietnam era. The end of the Cold War has blunted many of Thompson's dire predictions. Still the results of Indochina show that Sir Robert Thompson remains more widely recognized and quoted than understood.

Lt. Col. James K. Bruton
4156th USARF School
Tulsa, Okla.



Book reviews from readers are welcome and should address subjects of interest to special-operations forces. Reviews should be about 400-500 words long (approximately two double-spaced typewritten pages). Include your full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably DSN) and your mailing address. Send review to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Special Warfare

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