



Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



From the Commandant



Special Warfare

Machiavelli noted more than 400 years ago, “There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.” This is as true today as it was then. We, the military, are a bureaucracy, and everything we know suggests that bureaucracies are hard to change and, in reality, are designed not to change. However, we know that bureaucracies and the military do innovate. The question is, what process is used? One manner in which the Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Army are influencing change and responding to immediate needs is through the initiative of battle labs.

Battle labs capitalize on the experience of soldiers, technology and emerging concepts to influence change and make advances in six areas: doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel and soldiers. The battle lab is not a “lab” per se, but an organization of thinkers and doers, who, with their combined talents, and because of their experience in the field, are able to leverage emerging technology and develop concepts that close gaps and make improvements to those six areas.

Currently, there are six TRADOC battle labs, each oriented toward a particular battle dynamic. They are: Depth and Simultaneous Attack, at Fort Sill, Okla.; Early Entry, Lethality and Survivability, at Fort Monroe, Va.; Mounted Warfighting, at Fort Knox, Ky.; Dismounted Warfighting, at Fort Benning, Ga.; Battle Command, at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.; and Combat Service Support, at Fort Lee, Va.

The focus in each battle dynamic is to test concepts and technology by experimentation, simulation and actual demonstration. The idea is to find out if a new technology or concept adds value. If it doesn’t, the idea is discarded with minimal loss of resources, and valuable time can be used to explore ideas with more merit. But if an idea does have value, the system is designed for a quick turnaround to put it into the force. The battle-lab process does not negate the need for combat developments and the concept-based requirements system; it acts to complement them.



Army special-operations forces are active players in the battle-lab system. We have participated in demonstrations and studies involving terminal-guidance operations, reduction of sensor-to-shooter time lines, and early-entry operations, all in conjunction with the TRADOC battle labs. We will now dramatically expand our efforts with the battle labs, capitalizing on our unique experiences across the full spectrum of conflict, including operations other than war.

Today’s world demands unprecedented cooperation among all services. There is a need to exploit readily available solutions to problems, develop new systems and concepts, and to do both with increasingly scarce resources. Battle labs, staffed with capable, imaginative people and supported by the Army at large, can provide an effective and timely means for determining our requirements. The Army special-operations community is part of this effort.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Commander & Commandant

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

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Headquarters, Department of the Army

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Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

Peace Operations: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Restoration-Assistance Missions

by Dr. Richard H. Shultz



With the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has undergone several important changes. This is certainly true of the nature and dimensions of crisis, conflict and war. Will these developments affect U.S. interests and opportunities abroad? How do they alter the uses of military power in general and, in particular, the roles and missions of the U.S. Army and other armed services?

These questions are addressed in former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's Report on the Bottom-Up Review, which purports to "provide the direction for shifting America's focus away from a strategy designed to meet a global Soviet threat to one oriented toward the new dangers of the post-Cold War world that threatens important U.S. national interests." What does this entail?

The Review discerns a major shift in the security paradigm from a global to a regional focus. Within this context, it envisages two categories of regional conflicts — "large-scale aggression by major regional powers" and "smaller, often internal, conflicts based on ethnic or religious animosities, state-sponsored

This article is a summary of a larger paper to be presented later this year by the Army War College.

terrorism, and subversion of governments."

According to Aspin, these conflicts will affect U.S. interests and values. Regional dangers can jeopardize specific economic, political and strategic concerns. However, he also asserts that there are core values which we have an interest in promoting abroad. These include democracy, human rights and the peaceful resolution of conflict.

Regional challenges, defined in this way, require two very different kinds of responses. With respect to aggression by major regional powers, the Review maintains that the U.S. will employ military forces to deter or defeat those that threaten our interests or allies. This involves traditional combat missions. What do these encompass?

Some have labeled them as non-traditional, others use non-combat, while they have also been designated peacetime engagements for hostilities short of war. The Review identifies peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other intervention operations as fitting into this category. It also includes post-conflict restoration and reconstruction-assistance missions. While identified in the Review's section on "Building an Overall Force Structure," nowhere are the post-

conflict uses of military power delineated or the linkages between it and other non-traditional missions specified.

Internal conflicts

The kinds of internal conflicts taking place today are not easily understood. Neither are the requirements for their resolution or for post-conflict reconstruction. A global survey of current trends in ethnic, religious and communal violence and the factors causing their escalation will bear this out. Before becoming involved in such situations, whether alone or on a multi-lateral basis, the U.S. will require a thorough understanding of the historical, cultural and political context. Answers to the following questions are necessary: Why is collective political violence occurring in a given situation? What are its specific dimensions? At what level of magnitude and intensity is it taking place? Answers to these and related issues are essential before undertaking any of the non-traditional missions identified in the Report on the Bottom-Up Review.

In order to begin an assessment, it is first necessary to locate the situation under examination on the conflict continuum. The continuum comprises five operational environ-

ments: stability, crisis, armed conflict, chaos and war. Location on the continuum will determine the specific non-traditional mission to be considered.

The situation should be assessed in terms of several generic characteristics that appear to precipitate internal conflicts today and which have to be addressed in the conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction phases. These include cultural, political, economic and security factors. They are indicative of the difficulties and challenges common to post-Cold War internal conflicts and wars.

Cultural factors today center on ethnic, religious and communal differences. The antecedents of these kinds of conflict are complex and can vary significantly from case to case. They should be understood in terms of both long-term discontent factors and short-term precipitants that ignite ethnic or religious violence. These factors can result in conflict situations that destroy many, if not all, aspects of a state's societal infrastructure.

Political factors generic to internal conflict include, in many instances, the breakdown and disintegration of the political system. The collapse of authority can result in a situation of chaos and ungovernability, marked by the emergence of increasingly militant ethnic groupings who eschew any form of compromise. Such situations are exceedingly difficult to stabilize, let alone resolve. A lack of stable political institutions ensures that the post-conflict phase will be as protracted and complicated as the actual period of fighting.

The economic conditions resulting from internal war are directly related to the cultural and political ones. Urban and rural economic infrastructures are in disarray. There is serious damage to roads, railways and shipping facilities for trade and the import of vital supplies, such as foodstuffs, medicine and other necessities. Economic arrangements

with neighboring or regional states are often severed. Access to vital energy supplies is reduced by a lack of funds or by sanctions.

Finally, there are serious security problems that have to be dealt with in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. For instance, achieving a cease-fire and disarming of those involved is difficult. Likewise, even after large-scale violence has been halted, disorder may continue by random armed bands, organized criminal groups and other disruptive elements that emerge in situations of chaos and ungovernability. The security concerns of neighboring or regional powers involved or threatened by the conflict and its possible future recurrence must also be addressed. Finally, and most importantly, the need to reorganize or disband and rebuild the security forces is a major aspect of the post-conflict reconstruction period.

Somalia is a case in point of the complexities involved in communal conflict and the ease with which they can be misunderstood. While

it was relatively uncomplicated to provide humanitarian-relief supplies, resolving the conflict among the clans and moving to a post-conflict situation have proven quite problematic for the U.N. and Washington.

Peace operations

The aftermath of the Cold War generated a great deal of interest in peace operations. As was noted above, the international environment and the causes of regional instability have undergone significant change, and this has had an important impact on the scope of peace operations. However, there also has been a lack of understanding about the complexities of these activities.

Peace operations during the Cold War were synonymous with U.N. peacekeeping missions. A prerequisite for the deployment of peacekeeping troops was the consent of the parties to the conflict and a truce or cease-fire. Among the tac-



U.S. Army photo

A U.S. Air Force plane makes a drop of PSYOP leaflets in Somalia to inform residents of food distribution points.

tics employed in peacekeeping operations were observations, separation and limited mediation to facilitate and encourage implementation of agreements between the parties to the dispute. These operations did not include the direct use of coercive military power to compel the combatants to stop fighting (although political and economic pressures could be applied for such purposes).

Peace operations, as they are emerging today, are different from those that took place during the Cold War. They are focused, more often than not, on intrastate aggression and conflict that is the result of ethnic, religious and communal differences. These situations appear exceedingly difficult to resolve. Peace operations for these internal wars bring two important international norms — national sovereignty and human rights — into conflict with one another. Many now argue that it is necessary for third parties to violate the sovereignty principle because of the serious abuse of human rights in these internal conflicts. As a result, a prerequisite for Cold War peacekeeping operations, consent of the parties involved in the conflict, is no longer regarded as essential. In fact, in these internal wars there may be no recognized political body or government to give consent. Ethnic and religious conflicts may result in situations where state authority is extremely weak, divided or nonexistent.

In addition to being more difficult to undertake, post-Cold War peace operations will involve more than traditional peacekeeping missions. This was first signaled in U.N. Agenda for Peace, by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. He called for an expansion of U.N. peace operations to include peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement. However, the dimensions and the differences among these missions were not specified by the Secretary General and have generated both confusion and disagreement. For example, are these

peace operations in the traditional sense, or do they involve third parties in armed conflict and war situations? Are some of these operations equivalent to a new form of limited war for the intervening parties? Do armed peace interventions address the factors that generate ethnic, religious and communal internal conflicts? If not, are there yet other non-traditional missions that have to be considered to deal with the post-conflict setting? Are peace operations political-military or military-political in focus? These and related questions have been raised about peace operations.

What do these post-Cold War peace operations and nontraditional military missions entail? A review of the professional literature and government documents on the subject suggests a spectrum of missions. These include peace promoting, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict restoration and reconstruction operations. Each may employ diplomatic and military means and can be conducted on a unilateral, ad hoc-coalition or international-organization basis. With respect to the latter, they can take the form of Chapter VI and VII actions. What do they include?

Peace promoting involves third-party diplomatic initiatives prior to or in the early stages of a conflict. This could also include the deployment of a peacekeeping force to prevent a confrontation from starting or escalating to armed conflict. Some propose that a standing force will be required if the U.N. or a regional organization is to be able to conduct peace-promoting operations that involve preventive peacekeeping activities. This would allow for timely preventive actions through the rapid deployment of peacekeepers to the region of potential conflict.

Peacemaking consists of diplomatic programs and initiatives to end an armed conflict and bring hostile parties to a settlement

through political means. It will either precede or take place without the deployment of a peacekeeping force. Within the context of the U.N., this falls under Chapter VI of the Charter — “Pacific Settlements of Disputes.” It identifies negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement as appropriate mechanisms for resolving disputes, and authorizes the Security Council to call upon the contending parties to settle their disputes by such means. These measures could be supplemented with the provision of aid, humanitarian assistance, election monitoring and related support, as well as the use of sanctions, blockades and other forms of coercion short of the introduction of forces.

Peacekeeping pertains to the implementation and monitoring of a cease-fire agreed to by the parties involved in a conflict. It can work only in an atmosphere in which hostilities have stopped. The parties involved in the conflict must agree to halt the fighting and accept the presence of peacekeepers. The military forces deployed for peacekeeping are, in effect, truce-keepers. They are deployed when a cease-fire is in place and serve as an early-warning mechanism for potential breaches of the peace. A PKO will succeed or fail not because of the capabilities deployed, but because of its neutrality and the consent of the combatants.

Peace enforcement, which is also known as military peacemaking and peace-imposition operations, is very different from traditional peacekeeping missions. The context is an ongoing armed conflict, with no truce or cease-fire on the horizon. Consequently, unlike peacekeepers, peace enforcers are apt to be involved in combat situations. The objective is to separate the combatants and impose a cease-fire as the first step toward conflict resolution. Peace enforcement is military intervention. It is likely to violate sovereignty, particularly if one or



Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

A U.S. soldier from the 7th SF Group assists civilian law-enforcement personnel in apprehending suspected snipers following Operation Just Cause.

more of the parties to the dispute opposes the deployment. Peace enforcers will lose the neutrality of peacekeepers because they must fight against those who oppose an outside-orchestrated cease-fire and settlement. A peace-enforcement operation cannot resolve the causes of the conflict. The problems are political and solvable only through political agreements that cannot be imposed by third parties. However, peace enforcement can lay the foundation for a settlement by breaking the cycle of violence.

The foregoing focus on armed conflict or the potential for it. Their goal is to prevent violence from occurring or to bring the fighting to a halt. They do not address the complex issue of what takes place after the termination of hostilities. Another nontraditional use of the military, particularly following peacekeeping and peace enforcement, is post-conflict restoration and reconstruction-assistance missions.

Post-conflict missions

In the future, the U.S. is likely to find itself involved in the aftermath of conflict situations where it may or may not have been one of the ini-

tial belligerents, but is part of a bilateral or multilateral effort to assist in the restoration and reconstruction of the political, security, social and economic infrastructure. This is what lies ahead in Somalia and a multilateral reconstruction-assistance mission under consideration for Haiti.

To be sure, U.S. restoration and reconstruction-assistance operations involve both civilian and military agencies of government. They are far more than a Department of Defense mission and, in addition to including several civilian agencies, may be conducted in conjunction with international or regional organizations. Nevertheless, the military has an important contribution to make.

In addition to peacekeeping and peace enforcement, two other situations may result in U.S. involvement in a restoration operation. The first follows the direct use of force, as in Operation Just Cause. In the post-Cold War world, following armed intervention, the U.S. will require a post-conflict program that contributes to stability and development. Second, it appears that the Clinton administration is developing a policy to actively promote democracy on the world scene.

It is likely to involve planning for and execution of a post-political crisis plan of support for infrastructure restoration and democratization in former dictatorial regimes (e.g., Russia).

To summarize, we have identified four post-conflict or post-political crisis situations that may result in the U.S. undertaking a restoration operation either on its own or as part of a multilateral arrangement. To reiterate, these missions would follow in the aftermath of:

- Peacekeeping
- Peace enforcement
- Direct U.S. military intervention; and
- State transition from dictatorship or authoritarian rule.

Unfortunately, U.S. policy and strategy for post-conflict missions is, at best, in a very rudimentary state. This is particularly true for the various civilian agencies that have a role to play. However, DoD is only marginally more advanced, as the case of Panama demonstrated. It lacked the appropriate doctrine, programs, force structure and training to carry out such operations in an integrated manner following Operation Just Cause.

How can active- and reserve-component military forces be used for

reconstruction and restoration-assistance missions? Which of the political, economic, security and social challenges that characterize post-conflict environments can military forces perform? What are these non-combat military tasks? Among the most important are:

- Help in restructuring and reorientation of security forces from instruments of repression to ones that serve and support elected government
- Basic infrastructure restoration
- Host-country transportation support and the distribution of resources provided as part of the reconstruction effort
- Immediate humanitarian and disaster relief
- Support for the establishment of host-country governmental administration and processes
- Communication and informational technical assistance
- Liaison arrangements with international and regional organizations, as well as private voluntary organizations.

Some of these capabilities already exist and only have to be expanded, reoriented and assigned to restoration and reconstruction-assistance missions. However, others are not part of the standard operating procedures of the armed services and will have to be developed. Each of these tasks has to be examined individually, and its specific contribution to reconstruction operations specified. Each also should be appraised in terms of how it can be configured and integrated into larger bilateral or multilateral actions. A model of military capabilities for restoration and reconstruction-assistance missions has to be developed that can be adapted for the particular context in which it is employed as a planning instrument.

In a turbulent world, escalating regional conflicts will affect critical U.S. interests. These situations cannot be overlooked. Responding to the period following conflict and crisis is as critical as those actions

taken to bring the discord to a halt. If this issue is not addressed, peace-keeping, peace enforcement and other peace operations will achieve only a pause in the hostilities. ✕

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
The Organized-Crime Dimension of Regional Conflict and 'Operations Other than War'

by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr.

As U.S. national-security planners seek to define, anticipate or react to a host of security problems around the post-Cold War world, they are faced with familiar, enduring problems as well as with security issues that, in terms of content, scale and impact, seem strikingly new. Among these many challenges is the appearance of an organized criminal dimension that increasingly shapes regional stability — particularly as separatist movements, terrorist groups and parties to ethnic conflict in Europe, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa have become more closely associated with organized crime in a variety of ways.

In security environments where state institutions have been rendered ineffective by sweeping political change, war, internal challenges or other factors, well-organized, cohesive, criminal groups with access to wealth and the latest technologies have been quick to fill vacuums or seize new opportunities. Organized crime in the form of arms and drug trafficking, the smuggling of strategic materials and other profitable contraband,

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extortion and robbery, hostage-taking for ransom, sophisticated financial crimes, and other illegal activities are increasingly an integral part of ethnic conflict, insurgency and civil war.

It is also in areas where state institutions are fragile, economic resources limited and interethnic tensions high, that criminal activity founded primarily on ethno-national linkages is particularly disruptive. The appearance of armed or paramilitary groupings acting in support of criminal agendas and organized along ethno-national lines is a phenomenon associated with a number of areas. Clearly, too, criminal charges against minorities in homelands and abroad are used also to discredit the aspirations of ethno-national groups and to justify repressive measures by governments.

Legal and illegal immigration (facilitated by "people smuggling" efforts on several continents) is taking place at an unprecedented rate, as are large refugee and population dislocations associated with internal conflict and political or economic disruption. This movement of peoples and the creation of ethnic diasporas in many areas of the world have facilitated the operation of conflict-associated organized criminal (or terrorist) activities, and provided external bases for rendering financial and other support to factions in ethno-national homelands.

Some security problems that had in the past been driven by ideological, political or other imperatives now have strong criminal motivations as well. For example, the disappearance of the USSR, the socialist bloc and regional surrogates has removed immediate sources of

financing, arms, training, safe havens and other support for client states, insurgencies and terrorist organizations. To a growing extent, organized crime is providing an alternative means of support, as well as a seductive source of personal, criminal profit that transforms ideological or political fervor and changes the ways in which factions respond to peace initiatives, incentives, coercion, successes and setbacks.

The organized-crime dimension of regional instability has implications for the U.S. military concept of operations other than war, or OOTW, which comprises support to insurgency and counterinsurgency operations and a range of contingency operations. Because of its effectiveness, success and impact — and the extent to which the illegal diversion of resources, directed criminal violence, and other criminal undertakings may undermine the effectiveness or intent of U.S. programs — organized crime is a more powerful part of the overall environment in which OOTW take place.

In this regard, organized crime is a factor for U.S. military planners evaluating the goals, motivations and financing of belligerent forces; assessing the security of U.S. military bases, deployed forces and many aspects of their operations; determining the type and quality of military, law-enforcement and other interagency planning and cooperation deemed desirable and feasible; identifying optimum levels of support and humanitarian assistance, as well as its most effective application; planning and executing post-conflict activities; and developing campaign planning for foreign secu-

rity-assistance programs. Overall, given specific examples as diverse as states of the former Yugoslavia and USSR; Turkey and Spain; Colombia and Peru; Sri Lanka and India; Lebanon and Syria; and a host of others, a careful consideration of the impact of organized crime on OOTW assumptions, planning and execution is a clear requirement in a threat environment that is still rapidly evolving.



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Ethnicity as Explanation, Ethnicity as Excuse

by Dr. Paul A. Goble

Ethnicity — or more precisely, its political expression, ethnonationalism — has become an all-purpose explanation for analysts who seek to comprehend post-Cold War conflicts under a single rubric. And it has become an all-purpose excuse for political elites who, reflecting to the wishes of populations eager to rid themselves of foreign commitments, seek to justify a retreat from the world by suggesting that ethnic conflicts are by their very nature insoluble.

Neither of these uses of the term is justified. Ethnonationalism certainly does not explain all the conflicts in the world. In many cases, it is not involved; and even where it is, it is never the only factor. And it does not excuse Western governments from action because ethnic conflicts, like all other kinds, can be ameliorated or even ended by various mechanisms that already exist.

To say this is not to argue for intervention in any particular conflict or in any particular way, but rather to suggest that until we understand both the nature of ethnicity and its role in conflicts, we will remain handicapped in both our analyses and our choices about

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actions. The purpose here is not to provide any final set of guidelines but rather to advance the discussion by focusing on three main issues: first, the nature and variety of the latest flowering of ethnonationalism; second, the kinds of ethnic conflict such ethnic assertiveness can lead to; and third, the likely outcomes of such conflicts and, in particular, the role of third parties in promoting their resolution.

A new age of nationalism?

During the Cold War, Western and Soviet analysts assumed that the world — or at least Europe — had moved beyond nationalism, that ethnicity was a “survival of the past” that would soon be overcome.¹ But the dramatic role of nationalism, both in the destruction of the Soviet monolith and in the conflicts that have followed, has led many who denied any role for ethnonationalism in the past to make the equal and opposite error that ethnonationalism is the only force worth speaking about in the current environment. To get beyond such simplistic and extreme judgments, we need to consider why there has been this new upsurge in nationalism, why it may be more limited than many people now assume, and what forms of ethnonationalism are

in fact out there now.²

Perhaps the best explanation for the new rise of nationalism — the notion that a human community defined by actual or assumed primordial ties must be recognized as deserving special treatment, autonomy or even independence — is that many of the forces which led to a rise of nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries have exact and even more powerful analogues in the current environment:

- First, nationalism, both then and now, represents an effort to replace a discredited alternative model of political integration, in this case, the collapse of Marxism.

- Second, the vast expansion of media penetration across state borders reduces the legitimacy of any stratum between the community and its participation in the international media — in the 18th century because of the rise of public education and the penny press; now, by the globalization of CNN.

- Third, the increasing importance of the state to society makes control of the state an ever more important issue to the various population groups under its control. The 18th century saw a dramatic expansion in the state sector; so did the late 20th century.

- Fourth, the increasing internationalization of economic life pro-

duces migration flows that create new minorities and greater cross-cultural awareness of differences in status and economic position. Both periods saw increasing contacts and comparisons between groups: no one wants to live in a hovel once someone else has built a palace.

- Fifth, the increasing rapidity of social change has increased the level of alienation among virtually all populations. That, in turn, has spurred the search for new communities, the most available and apparently stable of which are primordial ones that we usually group under the rubric “ethnic.”

Because these forces already affect much of the world, there has been growing concern that they and the ethnonationalism they produce will soon overwhelm the capacity of the international system to cope. But there are three good reasons to assume that this will not happen. First, most of the world’s 6,500 ethnic communities are too small or are too satisfied to engage in political life to become politicized. Second, the power of ethnicity is undercut by other group loyalties which in many cases are far stronger than ethnic ones. Thus, while my ethnic attachment may be very important to me, my political or professional identities may override it in my choice of action. And third, the place where ethnicity has exploded the most is precisely where the state manipulated ethnicity for so long, namely the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.

This last point is particularly important. The Soviets and, following their lead, the Yugoslavs, politicized, territorialized and arranged into a hierarchy the ethnic groups under their control, thus increasing the salience of ethnicity and decreasing the importance of other collective memberships of the populations under their control. Thus, it should come as no surprise that in these two regions, there is a general confusion about the difference between ethnicity and citizenship

and even between language and ethnicity.³ Consequently, we should stop blaming the victims of this policy and recognize that this peculiar pattern is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere.

Because these impulses have affected a variety of communities whose current status, size and location vary enormously, they have produced a wide variety of ethnonationalisms. Perhaps the following groupings can organize our thinking before we turn to the relationship between ethnonationalism and ethnic conflict. In the European context, there are five obvious types of ethnonationalism:

- Classical nationalism, the striving of a previously submerged community to achieve state independence;⁴
- Irredentist nationalism, the demand that borders be rectified to take into account ethnic or cultural divisions;⁵
- Unexpected nationalism, the use of ethnic symbols to build political authority in a state whose independence occurred independently of the efforts of its elites and populations;⁶
- Xenophobic nationalism, the attacks against ethnically differentiated groups who may live within a larger community in order to relieve tensions and to reinforce the psychic borders of the larger group;⁷ and
- Retrenchment nationalism, the articulation of an identity for a group that has lost its imperial possessions and is unsure of its psychological barriers. The model is post-Ottoman Turkey; the current problem is Russia.⁸

In all these cases, it should be noted, ethnicity serves as an instrumental value, as a resource used by elites and masses to advance their interests, and not simply as a source of virtual identity. And to the extent that this is true, ethnic mobilization and countermobilization should be analyzed just as other mobilization and countermobilization

tools routinely are. Unfortunately, that has seldom been the case to date.

Conflict classifications

Before attempting to classify ethnic conflicts, three preliminary observations are in order. First, not all ethnic assertiveness leads to ethnic conflict — most, but not all. Moreover, in some cases, it may even lead to the amelioration of conflicts, ethnic and otherwise, by resolving issues that had agitated society. Second, ethnicity is in no case the only issue involved in such conflicts — it may frame them, power them and even justify them, but ethnicity is about access to resources, psychic and otherwise — and it is not necessarily divorced from the state. (Indeed, much of the discussion about ethnic conflict is actually about the deterioration of state authority rather than about ethnonationalism per se. This is particularly the case in discussions about Bosnia and about several of the former Soviet republics.) In that sense, it is a filter as well as a weapon. And third, ethnic conflicts are even more varied than the kinds of ethnic groups described above.

Among the ways that ethnic conflicts can be classified are by the following criteria:⁹

- Goals of the group involved: irredentism, state independence, domestic stability through the creation or maintenance of ethnic solidarity, mobilization of populations for national efforts including war, conflicts over resources, expulsion of minorities, and assertion of a comfort level for members of the in-group;
- Kinds of participants in the conflicts: communal, individual, state vs. minority, state vs. state, and by whether outside groups are involved, either in order to use the competitors as proxies for larger goals or to end the conflict; and
- Intensity of the conflict, ranging from latest interpersonal hostility

to communal violence to interstate war.

Cutting across all these divisions is the issue of the importance of the conflict to outsiders. Sometimes a conflict may be important because of who is involved; at other times because of the potential role of other outsiders; and at still other times, because of its intensity or propensity to spill over or snowball into other, potentially more serious conflicts. In discussing any particular ethnonational conflict, we need to be extremely precise as to what we mean and what we care about — just as we would for conflicts of any other type.

Outcomes and strategies

These observations about the nature of ethnicity and the nature of ethnonational conflict allow us to confront the question of how we should react. Before doing that we need to make yet again three preliminary observations. First, ethnic conflicts are not by their nature either rational or irrational, and nonethnic conflicts are not necessarily rational. Irrational behavior can be driven by nonethnic means, and rational behaviour may be dictated by ethnic considerations. Second, ethnonational conflicts are never simply the result of “ancient ethnic animosities.” This phrase may please editorialists and pundits, but it seriously distorts reality. Anyone who asserts that a conflict is the product of these must explain why there has not always been fighting at a particular level of intensity. Once that explanation is made, it becomes obvious that ethnonational conflicts are powered by immediate as well as longstanding feelings and conclusions. Third, precisely because both ethnic and nonethnic issues are invariably involved, outsiders considering what to do should not forget all the means that have worked on past conflicts that were traditionally if not always accurately described as



United Nations photo

A United Nations patrol passes an area damaged by shelling during ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

nonethnic.

Because we can assume that we will seek to get involved only in those conflicts that we deem for our own reasons to be significant, we can usefully group them into the following four-part schema:

- Conflicts where ethnic involvement is low relative to the importance of other factors and the intensity of the conflicts is also low. In such cases, we would generally look to the local authorities to act.
- Conflicts where ethnic involvement is high relative to the importance of other factors and the intensity of the conflicts is low. In such cases, we would also tend to rely on local authorities or international human-rights organizations.
- Conflicts where ethnic involvement is low relative to the importance of other factors and the intensity of the conflicts is high. In such cases, our strategies should be chosen primarily from those used for conflicts we would describe as nonethnic.
- Finally, conflicts where ethnic involvement is high relative to other factors and the intensity of the conflict is high as well. In these

cases — which are usually the ones we are referring to when we speak of ethnonational conflicts — we must employ strategies drawn up for other kinds of conflicts and specific strategies for ethnonational conflicts.

There are five important categories of strategy that can be employed to deal with the ethnic dimension of conflicts of the last type:

- Changing international support of and tolerance for ethnic assertiveness. One of the major reasons for greater amounts of ethnic assertiveness in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is that the international community dramatically changed its approach for rewarding ethnic assertiveness. Prior to that time, the West’s approach to such conflicts was to oppose secession, as in Biafra, and that opposition by itself sent a signal that ethnic assertiveness would not pay. This observation also applies to irredentism, communal violence and other forms of ethnonational conflict. Sanctions may or may not work, but a clear statement that such actions will not be

rewarded will serve as a constraint.

- Using countermobilization techniques. This can involve providing supports for other kinds of identities in the situation or introducing a new outside threat that will dwarf existing divisions. An example is economic aid: If it is carefully targeted, it can reduce ethnic conflict; otherwise, it will only make the situation worse.

- Removing irritants or making compromises. Some conflicts can be resolved by doing one or the other. Ethnic conflicts are not forever. They emerge, intensify and disappear. All the resolutions may not be pretty, and they are certainly not what everyone would like, but the conflicts themselves will eventually disappear.

- Containing the conflict and letting the two or more sides wear themselves out. Perhaps the most important strategy in dealing with ethnic conflicts is to prevent outsiders from becoming involved, either through alliances or the supply of arms and other aid, thus making the conflicts more serious.

- Using military force. In many ethnic conflicts, this is the ultimate answer. Sometimes, as when the conflict is communal, military force must do more than end the conflict, it must engage in state-building. Other times, when the conflict is state-to-state, this need not be the case. Sometimes limited force can provide the breathing room for the other strategies outlined above to work.

Obviously, ameliorating or ending ethnic conflicts is not going to be easy, but neither is this task beyond our means. We may decide that any particular conflict is unimportant, and we may be right. But in thinking about such conflicts, especially in Europe, we should remember Winston Churchill's description of the world following World War I:

To the faithful, toil-burdened masses the victory was so complete that no further effort seemed required. Germany had fallen, and

with her the world combination that had crushed her. Authority was dispersed; the world unshackled; the weak became the strong; the sheltered became the aggressive; the contrast between victors and vanquished tended continually to diminish. A vast fatigue dominated collective action. Though every subversive element endeavored to assert itself, revolutionary rage like every other form of psychic energy burnt low. Through all its five acts the drama has run its course; the light of history is switched off, the world stage dims, the actors shrivel, the chorus sinks. The war of the giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun.¹⁰

Churchill's words were written in 1929. They capture as in a distant mirror our own mood and inclinations now. They were written only four years before Hitler came to power and a decade before the world was plunged into general war. ✂

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Notes:

¹ On these assumptions and their limitations, see Susan Olzak, "Contemporary Eth-

nic Mobilization," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9 (1983): 355-374; and Francois Nielsen, "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies," *American Sociological Review* 50 (1985):133-149.

² For a fuller discussion of the issues raised in this section, see Paul A. Goble, "A New Age of Nationalism," in Bruce Seymour II, ed., *The Access Guide to Ethnic Conflicts in Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C., 1994), pp. 1-8, and the recommended readings on pp. 9-16.

³ For an especially egregious example of this, see the report of the Gorbachev Foundation, "Russkie v 'blizhnem zarubezhi'e,'" *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 7 September 1993. Cf. the analysis of it in Paul A. Goble, "Can We Help Russia to be a Good Neighbor?" *Demokratizatsiya*, forthcoming. On the broader process of politicization of ethnicity and the creation of nationality in the Soviet case, see Paul A. Goble, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Nationality Problem," in Maurice Friedberg and Heyward Isham, eds., *Soviet Society Under Gorbachev* (Armonk, N.Y., 1987), pp. 76-100.

⁴ For a useful discussion of this kind, see Isaiah Berlin, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power," *Partisan Review* 46 (1979):337-358.

⁵ See J. Gottman, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville, Va., 1973).


⁶ See Paul A. Goble, "The 50 Million Muslim Misunderstanding," *Chanteh* 1 (1993): 36-39.

⁷ On this phenomenon, see Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, *Us and Them: The Psychology of Ethnonationalism* (New York, 1987), esp. p. 87 ff.

⁸ See Paul A. Goble, "Russia's Extreme Right," *The National Interest* 33 (Fall 1993):93-96.

⁹ See the various works of Horowitz, Rothschild and Royce for surveys of the various ways ethnic activism can be categorized.

¹⁰ Winston Churchill, *The Aftermath* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 17.



The Role of the Media in Peacekeeping Operations

by James Adams

Peacekeeping and warfare today are taking place in the world the like of which we have never seen. All the old certainties have disappeared: there is no Cold War, no superpower rivalry to provide both tension and stability. Instead a series of relatively small crises have emerged unexpectedly. These have provided some fresh challenges for the policy-makers, the politicians and the media that report on them.

But it is not just the end of the Cold War that has transformed the debate. The end of that era has heralded a new generation in the political leadership in many democratic countries and has consolidated changes that have been under way for some time in the media. Consider this: The President of the United States is 46, the Prime Minister of Britain is 50. The average age of staff working in the White House is around 33. The average age of staff on my own newspaper has fallen in the past 10 years from around 45 to 30 as we struggle to reach the younger readers we need to win the fierce battle for circulation.

This means that many of the political leaders and most of their

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advisers have no concept of the political and personal consequences of warfare. There have been no world wars such as those that so scarred our parents and grandparents. Thus there is no real conception of the horrors of wars. In the media, there are very few reporters and editors who have covered conventional conflicts. In 10 years of reporting on wars, revolutions and terrorism around the world, I have covered only two conflicts that might be considered conventional: the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein. The balance was made up by a large number of smaller wars, low-intensity conflicts and acts of terror.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the current generation that is leading the media and politics have a very limited vision of war and the capability of the armed forces. It is a view formed by their own experience, which is confined almost entirely to what they have seen on the television and in the movies, and to some extent, what they have read in the newspaper. This is a small world, where action is concentrated on human drama, the big picture writ small so that it is understandable to the average person. It is a world where attention spans are short and where casualties should be counted in single figures

to be acceptable.

It was striking in both the Falklands and the Gulf War that casualties were extraordinarily light. Even so, every single one was analyzed and agonized over and investigated in an attempt to find unrealistic certainties in the chaos of war. It is that drive to minimize loss of life that is going to be a fact of decision-making for the foreseeable future.

Reducing casualties is, of course, a laudable goal. But death and injury are unfortunate consequences of committing military forces to conflict. Soldiers are trained to kill people, and yet there seems to be a broad view that crisis management today can somehow be handled without loss of life.

The media have played a large part in developing this view. The media always demand excellence in others, and in terms of crisis management, that translates as a successful resolution with minimum cost to "our" side. In the past 10 years, the way the media form opinion has changed dramatically. CNN is everywhere, and where CNN goes, all the other media outlets swiftly follow. Censorship today is virtually impossible, with backpack satellite-broadcast systems and telephones that allow reporters to file their copy from anywhere in the world. That access gives the news an immediacy that drives the political process in ways that can be very unhealthy, particularly when so many of the decision makers have no experience of the world about which they are making decisions of life and death.

A century ago, a single incident that was deemed to impinge on national sovereignty would provoke an immediate and violent act of retribution. When General Gordon was killed in Khartoum, the British dispatched a punitive expedition

that years later punished the perpetrators of the act. Today, when the body of a single American is dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the American government reverses its foreign policy and begins a withdrawal from the country. This momentous change in the way foreign policy is handled bodes ill for the future.

With an attention span so short and a world view so limited, it is difficult to conceive how — whatever the good intentions on paper — a consistent policy for crisis management can be developed by the world's leading democracies. Is it conceivable that the American administration would send any troops to a similar environment? Under the present circumstances, the answer is "no."

War, peacekeeping and crisis management have never been about consensus and opinion polls. These may have been an influence, but they have never been paramount. The successful prosecution of any military operation is about leader-

ship, about a strength of resolve that allows principle and conviction to ride over the often ill-formed media criticism and the snapshot reporting.

But as we look around the world today, it is difficult to find the leadership qualities that successful crisis management demands. With this lack of resolve, it is difficult to see just what future peacekeeping has. The Pentagon and all the other defense ministries around the world have been war-gaming the almost infinite number of scenarios that the current unstable world can produce. There is no doubt that the military can change its tactics and train its people. But what will persuade this new generation of leaders in the media and politics to understand that peace has a price? I fear there are not enough politicians with the courage to pay the price or enough members of the media who respect the bold decisions that may cost lives. Instead, there is a drive for quick, easy solutions to complex problems, and if

those easy solutions do not work, then there appears to be no will to find the real answers. ✂

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Satellite-broadcast systems give modern news coverage an access and an immediacy that can drive the political process.



Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment

by *Cols. John P. Abizaid and John R. Wood*

The incredibly quick and decisive victory in the Gulf War vindicated the warfighting doctrine and peacetime training strategy of the United States Army. The Army, designed to fight and defeat the Soviets on the plains of Central Europe, found its tactics, equipment and organization were more than a match for a non-Soviet foe.

Yet since the war in the Gulf, the Army has found itself engaged in operations in Kurdistan and Somalia that tested not only its ability to fight but also its ability to conduct security operations in support of humanitarian-relief activities. As the world's only military superpower, the United States finds itself called upon more and more to provide a full range of combat, combat-support and combat-service-support forces to help conduct peacekeeping operations around the world.

Many Americans regard peacekeeping as a new mission for our armed forces. But in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in Lebanon in

Cols. Abizaid and Wood examined peacekeeping activities and training of the U.S. and five other countries' armed forces during 1992-1993. Their views do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

1958 and 1983, with the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai from 1981 to the present, in Kurdistan in 1991 and in Somalia today, U.S. soldiers have deployed into the highly politicized arena of peacekeeping. Often these forces, trained for war but with no enemy to defeat and no war to win, occupied ground, took casualties and maintained order in difficult, dangerous circumstances.

Defining the nature of such operations remains difficult. Continual refinements of definitions, as well as scholarly debate about their meaning,¹ point to obvious confusion about how military forces prepare and operate for an environment that has been described as "not war but like war."² Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-support operations, for the purpose of this paper, are referred to by the general term "peacekeeping."

The U.S. Army's reaction to its rapidly expanding peacekeeping role and the evolving definition of peacekeeping itself can best be described as pragmatic; professional but cautious. There is concern that Army doctrine and operational procedures determined ad hoc to suit each deployment may establish "rules of the game" different from those determined by a more deliberate analysis of missions, objectives

and force requirements.³ The Army has made considerable progress lately in gathering lessons learned and writing new doctrine to govern operations in the peacekeeping environment.

But misgivings persist. What are the costs, in men and material, of these missions and for how long will they deploy? Will peacekeeping missions dull the warfighting edge so carefully developed in the years since Vietnam? Must units be tagged as peacekeeping forces and removed from consideration from other missions?

Recent travel to Somalia, Britain, Sweden and Germany, where we met with military professionals actively engaged in or preparing for peacekeeping duties, confirmed our conviction that peacekeeping requires training and attention to restraint, civil action, force protection and multinational military and civilian coordination. Precisely because it is "not war but like war," preparing for peacekeeping is not business as usual.

Peacekeeping environment

Peacekeeping is less a specific type of military mission and more an operation conducted in a unique environment. It is an environment, just like mountain, jungle or desert,

that leaders must understand and train for. This environment can be characterized as austere, disordered, dangerous, extremely close to local populations, and politically charged. Operations tend to be multiservice and multinational, and they require much coordination with civil agencies and organizations. The use of force typically defined in the rules of engagement is tempered by restraint and caution. Most difficult for many military professionals is the concept that there are often no clearly defined enemies for the peacekeeping force.

Even in times of peace, areas such as Cambodia, Kurdistan and Somalia can be regarded as underdeveloped and austere. But when the destruction and the anarchy of civil war are added, the military problems for a peacekeeping force become both operationally and logistically complex. Adding to the problem is that peacekeeping forces tend to be small by military standards and must be prepared to operate in extremely large areas with isolated units.

While the units will be isolated in the conventional military sense from adjacent and higher units, they will most certainly not be isolated from the civilian population. In Somalia, Bosnia and Macedonia, nearly all major military activity takes place in and around the civilian community. Because of this environment, "work" is quite unlike that of combat units preparing for action during Desert Storm.

Understanding the local political and civilian situations, therefore, becomes important at even the lowest levels of leadership. Units cannot rely only on higher headquarters for intelligence about local conditions. Intelligence must be gathered from the bottom up, using all sources available to the local commander. Counterintelligence and Civil Affairs assistance must be available to task force-, company- and team level commanders.

This concept is not new. The U.S.

Army's 1965 field manual for counterinsurgency operations stressed a complete understanding "of the informal and actual civilian power structure of the area" where "actual social controls are in the hands of religious, tribal, economic or other non-governmental power structures" more than in the hands of the recognized government. The value of Civil Affairs, PSYOP and human-intelligence assets at the brigade and battalion levels was clearly recognized.⁴

Because of the unusual and uncertain threat, the first task facing leaders deployed to keep or enforce the peace is force protection. Peace agreements, even if they do exist, offer little protection from renewed factional strife, random violence, lawlessness or terrorism. Soldiers face the prospect of confronting armed belligerents who respond only to the use or threatened use of force.

In such an environment, coordination and control are crucial to success. An inappropriate response to a provocation or inattention to security details can endanger the peacekeeping force by provoking a counteraction by the local populace. Rules of engagement become especially important. The use of restraint and minimum force, thought by some to be more a concept of police than of military forces, becomes a key element in the peacekeeping environment. Soldiers trained to destroy the enemy require a changed mindset.

The peacekeeping arena requires the close cooperation of all services, and while one service may be predominant in an area, all will play at least some role in any operation. The peacekeeping arena also tends to be international, with civilian agencies playing important roles. Civilian relief agencies operating within the peacekeeping environment require constant and close coordination with military units.

The destruction and disorder so often found when peacekeeping forces arrive also force military

leaders to repair devastated infrastructure. Roads, ports and airfields usually require repair or modification for mission accomplishment. This, in turn, forces planners to provide a larger-than-normal engineer contingent with deploying forces. Since it is not unusual for local authority to be destroyed, peacekeepers often find themselves forced to participate in the policing of the area. Conducting searches, detaining criminals and seizing weapons often become key elements in the military forces' strategy for controlling its areas and protecting itself.

Peacekeeping and training

Training for peacekeeping is little different from training for any unique or demanding environment. The Army has long recognized the need to structure and conduct training which simulates the unique demands of a particular region, theater or level of lethality.

Proficiency in warfighting, in both basic soldiering and functional specialties, underlies success in peacekeeping. The necessary changes can be taught as refinements to operations, expansion of basic skills and enhancement of fundamental procedures in a relatively short period before deployment.

The design of training will vary from mission to mission, depending on the operational environment. What will not change is that predeployment training is essential. Leaders must allocate time and resources to prepare soldiers for the unique demands of peacekeeping.

Soldier training

A former chief of staff for U.N. forces deployed to Cyprus, Brigadier Michael Harbottle, aptly described the importance of the individual soldier in peacekeeping. "There is no doubt in my mind," he said, "that the success of a peacekeeping operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental

U.S. paratroopers keep a Kurdish demonstration designed to prevent U.S. withdrawal under control.



Photo courtesy John P. Abizaid

alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operations rests.”⁵

Individual soldier training must adapt the soldier to the specific conditions of the peacekeeping battlefield. Training in force protection, intelligence collection and use, use of force, and regional awareness, coupled with certification of proficiency in common tactical tasks, forms the heart of essential individual training for peacekeeping.

Soldiers must be trained how and when to use force when faced with the variety of lethal and nonlethal situations likely to occur in a peacekeeping environment. The rules of engagement will detail when to use deadly force, but the majority of confrontations a soldier will encounter will require using a lesser degree of force. He must be trained to use an array of other coercive techniques such as verbal persuasion, police support, warning blows and carefully aimed fire.

British troops getting ready for duties in Northern Ireland and Nordic soldiers preparing for deployment to Macedonia are specifically retrained to use minimum rather than maximum force to deal with the threats they face.

At one British range, soldiers were presented with numerous targets, only some of which were hostile. In Sweden, soldiers faced tough, non-lethal problems in a well-designed, simulated peacekeeping environment. In all cases, the exercises were recorded and reviewed, and lessons were immediately reinforced.

In peacekeeping, the ability of individual soldiers to hit targets quickly and accurately is closely tied to the need of commanders to employ minimum force to achieve success. Well-placed rounds against a sniper or warning shots delivered as a message to a potential foe may be just the right amount of force a patrol leader needs.

Refinement of marksmanship procedures to present different sets of targets to soldiers and to force selective engagements will better prepare soldiers for a peacekeeping environment. Soldiers will face difficult choices in the event they must use their personal weapons. They must be trained to think before they shoot.

Wearing body armor, building well-designed fighting positions and practicing proper dispersal and cover in static locations and on the move are all elements of force protection. Because of their presence mission and the poorly defined

notion of friendly and enemy territory, peacekeepers are always vulnerable to unexpected acts of violence — sniper fire, ambush and car bombings can and do occur.

British soldiers are trained in a mock village complete with civilians, terrorists and a compound which troops use as their base. We witnessed several types of terrorist attacks against the “secure” base and were impressed with the standard of individual force-protection measures taken by soldiers. Drills, signals and standard operating procedures were used to respond to threats quickly. Mutual security standards produced rapid reinforcement of defensive actions.

Whenever soldiers enter areas where others have fought earlier, they encounter large amounts of unexploded ordnance and inevitably operate in and around unmarked and uncleared mined areas. The manufacture and use of homemade ordnance is also prevalent. The need to train soldiers to recognize, mark and report such dangers is obvious. In every major peacekeeping arena from Cambodia to Bosnia, mines and fabricated explosives continue to take a toll on troops and civilians.

Peacekeeping soldiers and leaders will always have to deal with civilians. Soldiers search cars at check-

points; sentries encounter children around their areas. Patrols are approached by people asking for food, wanting to give information or just asking questions. Dealing with civilians becomes a daily occurrence for lower-ranking soldiers. On occasion, troops may have to detain civilians for questioning.

While rules of engagement detail the conditions for the use of force, other legal questions may need to be answered. For example, what rights of search, pursuit, detention and seizure do soldiers have, and at what point are they violating the legal rights of the citizens? What new agreements with civil authorities affect expected actions by soldiers? By knowing their rights, soldiers are better armed to handle diverse situations. As civil authority is re-established, updated training on the legal rights of soldiers and civilians must occur.

The ethnic diversity potential peacekeeping areas requires soldier awareness and leader understanding, and cultural predeployment training is essential. In Sweden, area experts and local nationals were brought in to acquaint troops with their new environment. Civilian relief workers, police officials, news correspondents and native experts were asked to share their recent personal perspectives.

The capacity to employ interpreters and conduct negotiations is a vital skill for leaders at all levels. The ability to enforce a U.N. mandate, for example, by discussion, mediation or insistence requires as much skill from the sergeant at his level as it does from the diplomat at his.

In Bosnia, junior British leaders often confront Serbian checkpoint commanders and must assert the right of free passage for U.N. convoys. In Kurdistan, it was not uncommon for U.S. officers to negotiate with both Iraqi and Kurdish leaders in attempts to separate warring factions and enforce boundaries. In each instance, superiors were far away, and quite junior leaders were

required to defuse numerous potentially dangerous situations.

In Sweden and Great Britain we saw junior leaders placed in such uncomfortable situations during training. Structuring training to stress junior leaders in such circumstances and familiarizing them with the use of translators will pay dividends in any peacekeeping sector.

Because the peacekeeping battlefield is extended and because activity can happen anywhere within a unit's boundaries, skill in using communications equipment and taking maximum advantage of its range are key. Careful, rehearsed reporting procedures to cover a wide range of military and nonmilitary activity are essential if commanders are to properly respond to the problems encountered. Formatted reports, operational code words and key terrain reference points permit rapid passage of information in the often nonsecure communications environment of peacekeeping.

In 1985, 24 Finnish peacekeepers were taken hostage in southern Lebanon by an armed faction.⁶ In 1988 Marine Lt. Col. William R. Higgins, the chief of Observer Group-Lebanon, was taken hostage and murdered. Both incidents show that the threat of hostage-taking remains very real given the potential impact such hostage-taking would have on world media. Given the absence of front lines and the potential presence of hostile forces throughout the area of operations, all peacekeeping soldiers face the potential of being taken hostage. Training on how to react, report, negotiate and prevent hostage situations has recently been incorporated into the training programs of Norway. Training soldiers on how to react if captured, how to avoid capture and how to report such incidents is essential.

Unit training

Many tactical techniques used by units in peacekeeping are fairly simple, easily trained and suited to

a "battle drill" approach. Such unit tasks as patrolling, manning checkpoints and observation posts, convoy escort, assembly area actions and area security are easily standardized.

Squads and platoons perform the majority of peacekeeping tasks, and the training of these units falls comfortably within the capabilities of the battalion and company. Help is needed, however, to create the unique peacekeeping environment in training so units and soldiers can train realistically.

Just as force protection is a major concern for individual soldier training, so it is a primary concern for collective training. The tragedy of the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon cannot be lost on leaders. Lax security measures, poor dispersal, unclear rules of engagement and the inability to properly and flexibly respond to a broad number of threats characterize units inadequately trained in force-protection measures.

In Britain and Sweden, force-protection measures were hammered home in routine training. In one example, we saw a civilian van used as a mortar-firing vehicle against a "secure" British base. In another instance, we saw a car bomb driven into the center of a control point. Collective lessons learned at the squad and platoon levels during these exercises would guide units once they are deployed to their peacekeeping areas of operation.

Control points, or checkpoints, are common means of controlling areas of operation in peacekeeping environments. In Somalia, we saw numerous static checkpoints manned primarily in urban areas designed to interdict weapons traffic. We also heard of various methods of mobile or "flying" checkpoints established by mobile forces at random points throughout an area of operation to gain temporary control of a particular location or situation.

While the basic concepts of building, manning and operating checkpoints seem simple enough, tech-

Course trains soldiers for peacekeeping duty

A course taught at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School prepares U.S. officers to serve as U.N. military observers.

The United Nations Peacekeeping Observer Course, or UNPKO, is a nine-day course designed to prepare U.S. officers bound for U.N. observer duty in various locations. "We've been training soldiers for 3 1/2 years in the necessary skills to stay alive on peacekeeping missions," said Maj. William Wheelehan, commander of E Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. "Primarily we center training around our Individual Terrorism Awareness Course, but we've recently expanded the course to include other training."

The Individual Terrorism Awareness Course trains students in a variety of terrorism-awareness subjects. "While serving as a U.N. observer, the soldier becomes symbolic and therefore attractive as a terrorist target," Wheelehan said. "Because observers are U.S. citizens and a symbol of the U.N., a terrorist organization may attack them to gain visibility for its cause."

Students in the UNPKO receive an introduction to terrorism which emphasizes the philosophy and doctrine of terrorism and its operations, and studies classic terrorist attacks. Later they are trained in individual protective measures, passive techniques they can employ to prevent or deter attacks, including detection of terrorist surveillance. A practical exercise then tests their ability to detect surveillance.

Course emphasis then shifts to active measures: students learn vehicle dynamics, evasive driving techniques and vehicle-barricade breaching to allow them to escape terrorist attacks. Finally, they are trained in hostage-survival techniques.

In addition to the terrorism-awareness training, UNPKO students receive area-specific training to acquaint them with the politico-military situation and the customs and cultural nuances that exist within their mission area. Emergency first aid, generator operations and maintenance, mine detection and identification, desert survival and a refresher course on radio procedures form the remainder of the course.

The UNPKO is open only to service members slated for U.N. observer missions and is normally taught twice per year. For information on the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course, contact SFC John Johnson, E Co., 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, at DSN 239-5833, commercial (910) 432-5833.

niques and actions during various types of hostile or nonhostile incidents lend themselves to a drill approach at squad, platoon and company levels.

In Somalia, as in Bosnia, the success of the relief mission depends on the movement and protection of numerous humanitarian-relief convoys. The need to clarify techniques and procedures for convoy and con-

voy-escort duties is apparent. Indeed, the need for developing drills for all types of mounted movement, from convoy protection to movements to contact, is essential. In almost every peacekeeping campaign, there is a maneuver phase which requires peacekeeping units to maneuver and take ground, often against an armed faction. This was true for U.N. troops first introduced

into Cyprus and was later true for coalition forces deployed in Kurdistan. The idea that peacekeeping is a static, observation-post business is not true, and units must expend necessary time training forces to maneuver.

Patrolling is an essential skill for all units engaged in peacekeeping duties. Unlike combat patrols, however, peacekeeping forces send out patrols to show presence and establish temporary security in areas not normally occupied. Peacekeeping patrol leaders will often be faced with unusual problems. In Somalia, patrols often came across banditry in progress. In former Yugoslavia, patrol leaders find themselves caught in cross fire between warring factions. In both cases, leaders must respond to the incidents with less firepower and more mental flexibility than normally required on the conventional battlefield.

Training techniques in both Britain and Sweden did much to prepare patrol leaders for the unexpected demands of the peacekeeping battlefield. Patrol movements were carefully coordinated, reporting was specific and mutual support was ensured. Intelligence, battlefield information and civilian reports were quickly analyzed at patrol-coordination centers, and relevant cautions, modified instructions or new missions were immediately passed to soldiers on patrol.

In Somalia, no two sectors were alike. Different clans, different political parties, different feuds and different economic difficulties all shaped the local situation. While intelligence data about the major militias proved generally reliable, local commanders were forced to divert substantial effort toward improvising means of gathering and processing information concerning their "tactical" areas of control. Training units to do this at the squad, platoon and company levels is important if commanders hope to succeed in understanding and controlling their sectors of the peacekeeping battlefield.

The U.S. Army's 1967 counterinsurgency manual stressed the need for Civil Affairs, PSYOP and counterintelligence assets to be placed at the disposal of brigade and battalion commanders.⁷ In the peacekeeping environment, such assets are crucial to success. The addition of new staff members at lower levels necessitates additional team training. These assets should be trained with the supported unit before deployment to assure success once deployed.

Staff training

Staff training deserves specific attention as units adapt operations to the peacekeeping environment. Coordination of actions in peacekeeping is especially daunting. Staffs at all levels have to coordinate actions with a more diverse set of external agencies. Joint, combined, coalition and civilian components operate in most areas and, therefore, require staff coordination with the local maneuver commander. Civil Affairs, counterintelligence, PSYOP and communications planning are key battalion combat multipliers in peacekeeping.

Information channels, operational priorities and terms of reference are different, however. For example,

engineers, not scouts, may produce the best intelligence. Logistics requirements and transportation needs may demand increased attention. And the presence of United Nations, allied and sister services generates a host of new terms, concepts and corresponding acronyms. Past peacekeeping commanders have adapted to the situation in many ways. Brigadier Harbottle formed a special "OPS E(economic)" section designed for such nontraditional roles as arbitration of land dispute, the movements of teachers and the protection and distribution of relief supplies.⁸

In Somalia, the resourcefulness of U.S. Army commanders in handling the myriad of additional staff-coordination tasks was especially noteworthy. Fire-support officers, air-defense officers, engineers and support-platoon officers were assigned new coordination and reporting responsibilities. Liaison established with coalition, civil and humanitarian organizations at great cost in scarce leader resources produced exceptional results. The preparation of liaison teams is not routine, however, and procedures must be established to meet the particularly high demands for them in the peacekeeping environment.

Besides practicing the staff-plan-

ning process, joint and combined training is the best preparation for staff officers assigned peacekeeping duties. We saw multinational operations at all levels in Somalia — U.S. soldiers supporting Australian base operations, Moroccans patrolling with the 10th Mountain Division, Pakistanis conducting security operations with U.S. Marines, and Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force logistics units sharing duties to support the entire international force.

Because peacekeeping doctrine and the understanding of combined operations with non-NATO forces are not clearly defined, we found U.S. staffs spending a great deal of time and effort defining terms, discussing procedures and conducting meetings simply to make things work. Expanding staff training to include peacekeeping scenarios with joint and multinational players is essential.

Force structure, doctrine

Force mobility in the peacekeeping efforts we observed and studied was absolutely essential. Units without the proper mix of transport and supply vehicles are quite limited in their usefulness in the typically large areas assigned to small units. While excellent use can be



Photo courtesy John P. Abizaid

U.S. paratroopers check a Kurdish guerrilla's weapon before he enters a U.S.-controlled "safe" area in northern Iraq.

made of helicopters, they should not be used to replace vehicular assets.

Civil Affairs and PSYOP teams, ad hoc unit civic-action officers, counterintelligence teams, translators and additional intelligence personnel were invaluable in peacekeeping operations in Somalia. These were precisely the type of people and units that were in short supply and frequently needed at the battalion level. Nearly every commander expressed the need for additional area experts, people with police backgrounds or an understanding of civilian-relief agencies to assist in solving the numerous daily problems of peacekeeping. The peacekeeping environment placed unique requirements on local commanders. Adopting a more aggressive approach to linking supplemental peacekeeping resources with units during peacekeeping training and staff preparation can do much to resolve this problem.

Doctrinal voids exist at every level. Common terminology for operational matters was lacking within all units and at the joint and combined levels. Trying to make battalion commanders understand a presence mission is quite difficult if the terms are unfamiliar. There are simply tactical and operational activities that take place within the peacekeeping environment which are not adequately defined or addressed by current doctrine.

We must analyze the peacekeeping environment and establish the all-important common language necessary to build the operational elements of the peacekeeping battlefield. This task, however, is not merely one for each national element to handle separately; an international military effort is required.

Any debate about the "appropriate" force to conduct peacekeeping is misguided. The factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available will decide the best force mix to do the job. While infantry skills are at a premium in the peacekeeping environment, all soldiers and specialties, along with

requisite equipment and armament, can be asked to serve. The idea that peacekeepers must be nonthreatening, and therefore lightly armed and equipped, may be inconsistent with mission demands. Peacekeeping forces must always be trained to fight and equipped to accomplish force protection.

Conclusion

There is no standard peacekeeping mission. Each operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, geographic, economic and military characteristics. While it is dangerous and even deadly at times, it presents leaders and soldiers with the difficult requirement of using armed restraint and minimum force to accomplish the mission.

The essential starting point for peacekeepers is a well-trained and highly disciplined force, well-grounded in warfighting skills. But the next step in preparing forces for peacekeeping is providing training that allows soldiers and leaders to adjust their mindset from combat to peacekeeping.

To design this training and prepare the proper force for deployment, military leaders must be guided by appropriate assessments of the environment and recognized peacekeeping doctrine. We should avoid the notion that combat-ready troops are ready for peacekeeping. Predeployment training and mission analysis are essential, and we should prescribe a minimum essential predeployment preparation and training period that allows units to adequately prepare for the complex mission ahead.

There is no need to train peacekeeping and neglect warfighting. With adequate notice and subsequent training, well-trained forces are well-prepared to accomplish peacekeeping duties. Leaders must simply recognize that there is a cost in additional resources to prepare soldiers for success in this unique environment. As the New World Order continues to challenge our

political leaders with more and more opportunities for peacekeeping, soldiers must train themselves and their units for its demands. ✕

Cols. John P. Abizaid and John R. Wood studied the U.S. military's, particularly the U.S. Army's, readiness to conduct peacekeeping activities as part of their senior service college fellowship program. Colonel Abizaid attended the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and Colonel Wood attended the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Both officers have extensive operational experience: Colonel Abizaid was operations officer for the U.N.'s Observer Group-Lebanon and was an infantry battalion commander in Kurdistan during Operation Provide Comfort. Colonel Wood has served in a variety of command positions as a Field Artillery officer and commanded the 3rd/8th Field Artillery during the Gulf War.

Notes:

¹ Donald M. Snow, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1993).

² Roger J. Spiller, *Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, January 1981).

³ Snow, p. 2.

⁴ United States Army, *Field Manual 31-16, Counterinsurgency Operations*, 1967, pp. 16-19.

⁵ Michael Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 191.

⁶ "24 Soldiers of UN Seized by Militia in South Lebanon," *New York Times*, 8 June 1985, p. 1.

⁷ FM 31-16, p. 19.

⁸ Harbottle, pp. 29-30.

USSOCOM Creates Clearinghouse for New Ideas

by Brig. Gen. William F. Kernan

The special-operations community has come a long way since USSOCOM was created by act of Congress in 1987. Our people, our units, our tactics and our equipment are some of the best in the world, but we can't rest on past successes.

What has always made special operations special is our top-notch people finding new and innovative ways to overcome incredible obstacles to get the job done. We must continue that spirit and actively seek creative solutions to daily challenges.

Change, like death and taxes, is one of the few things we can count on in this world. The difference, however, is that we have some measure of control when it comes to changes in our lives and institutions. To stimulate and manage change within the special-operations community, the U.S. Special Operations Command has established the SOF Clearinghouse for good ideas affecting all facets of special operations. Through the clearinghouse, Gen. Wayne A. Downing, the commander in chief of USSOCOM, is building an institutional climate which encourages innovation and fosters creativity.

How many times have you or your people had a better way of doing a job than current procedures dictate? How often do you or your buddies comment on the dubious lineage of whoever designed the tools and equipment you're working with? When was the last time someone in your unit said, "If I were the general for a day, I'd ..."? Well, here's your chance to change

the world.

The SOF Clearinghouse, within the Directorate of Plans, Policy, Doctrine and Combat Assessment at USSOCOM, is your entry point to the command. Although encouraged, it is not mandatory that you submit your ideas through the chain of command. An unfiltered product is sometimes more valuable than one with all the controversy removed. If your proposal is too hard to do, we'll tell you — but let us be the judge of your ideas. Topics for consideration include, but are not limited to: organizational structure, roles and missions, training programs, tactics development, standardizing procedures, command relationships and personnel management. The only limits to this process are your imagination and creativity.

This program is intended for folks in the trenches — active, reserve and alumni. Polished, fully staffed ideas are not what we're looking for. If you can scribble your idea onto a single sheet of notebook paper, we'll help you develop and refine it. Outlines or bullet statements are fine; just be complete enough for the clearinghouse staff to help you capture the essence of your idea. The only restriction is that we cannot handle classified proposals. The clearinghouse is an open forum for the free exchange and development of ideas. To be successful, the process must remain unclassified.

Once an idea is submitted to the clearinghouse, the first thing we do is acknowledge your submission. You have the right to know we have your proposal and are giving

it a fair shake. After giving your idea as objective an appraisal as we can, we will do one of three things: accept your idea as is for presentation to the CINC, help you develop your concept further, or send you an explanation why we cannot accept your suggestion. Ideas accepted by the CINC will be sent to the appropriate USSOCOM and component staff directors for their consideration.

The clearinghouse will use the service components' professional journals to provide periodic updates, listing the ideas being offered to the CINC and the current status of prior initiatives accepted for staffing or implementation. Prompt reporting of initiatives submitted, periodic status reports, and open discussion to help develop and improve good ideas is one of the best ways to keep the clearinghouse process alive.

We must, and will, prove that this process works so that those on the line will have faith in the clearinghouse and the confidence to air their ideas. We won't promise that all ideas submitted will be implemented, but we can promise that they will be given fair consideration. My staff will help you develop your thoughts, and if we use your suggestion, you will be given credit. You, the men and women of SOF, have proven you have the intelligence, problem-solving skills, creativity, flexibility and determination to make this process work. Using those skills to effect changes will keep this command at the leading edge of our nation's forces well into the next century. ✂

Brig. Gen. William F. Kernan is currently the director of plans, policy, doctrine and combat developments for the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.

ODA Planning: Tips from the JRTC

by Capt. Kevin Christie

Congratulations! Your detachment has been selected to come “play” at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Despite all the rumors and war stories, as a Special Forces observer-controller I’ve seen enough rotations to give you the real word. I’m not going to tell you how to win at JRTC: Trying to beat the system will just get you in trouble here. I will tell you about some of the systemic mistakes we observe, rotation after rotation, and how you can avoid committing them. I hope you can put this information to good use, not only at JRTC but in all your future operations.

The thing that makes or breaks most ODAs at JRTC is the quality of their mission planning. If a unit has a good isolation, it has a good chance at doing well on mission execution. A bad isolation, however, almost always leads to serious problems or mission failure.

The majority of the problems in isolation occur in three areas: the ODA command estimate, intelligence integration and rehearsals.

Command estimate process

A lot of ODA leaders seem to believe that only battalion and higher echelons conduct a formal estimate. When the ODA bypasses this process, it frequently misses identifying specified, implied and mission-essential tasks in its initial mission analysis. Teams sometimes waste hours floundering in endless brainstorming sessions and end up going into the briefback without a clear understanding of their missions. Paradoxically, ODAs use the lack of time as the excuse for not using a step-by-step process. Some units “check the

block” by following a sequence, but don’t go into the depth needed to get a good product. They usually end up with one well-developed course of action, or COA, and several “throwaways” that are of no value for comparison.

Intelligence integration

Everyone seems to know what intelligence preparation of the battlefield is, but very few know how to focus the process down to the ODA level, or how to integrate it into mission planning. Teams often infiltrate without any idea of where enemy reaction forces or likely patrol routes may be located, or where to start looking for the target. The priority intelligence requirements/intelligence requirements that the ODA receives from the forward operational base are almost invariably accepted without analysis, although they may bear little or no relation to the team mission or capabilities. Is “enemy ability to reinforce with second-echelon divisions” a valid PIR for a combat-search-and-rescue mission? Closely tied to the development of PIR and IR is the ODA reconnaissance and surveillance plan, sometimes called the collection plan. I have never seen a detailed reconnaissance and surveillance plan that focuses on specific PIRs the team needs answered in order to accomplish the mission. Inadequate intelligence integration frequently leads to mission failure at JRTC.

Rehearsals

Perhaps the area most neglected in isolation is rehearsals. Our normal time line for an isolation is 48-72 hours, but teams spend little, if any, of that time rehearsing. We have had an ODA spend four days in isolation and never do a single

Author’s note: This work is by no means a substitute for the appropriate doctrinal references; however, it may arouse some interest and provide a few helpful tips to SFODA planners. Any opinions expressed herein are solely mine and not necessarily approved by JRTC, the Special Operations Division or the Department of the Army.

rehearsal. We have had many more spend all their rehearsal time practicing loading and unloading helicopters, or walking through the woods practicing “SOPs” without ever practicing “actions at the objective.” As a result, teams have probably lost more people through the failure to practice casualty evacuation from the objective than any other area. ODAs hardly ever request realistic support for rehearsals, such as target mock-ups. The FOB support center can supply many enhancements, but ODAs use the “we’ll never get it, so why ask” excuse for not requesting.

These are some of the problems we’ve seen. Now let’s look at an “ideal” isolation, observing some techniques that have worked well over numerous rotations.

First, a few words about pre-isolation preparation:. It’s sometimes hard to try to sell an ODA on “conventional” doctrine, but most of our current planning doctrine is straight out of FM 101-5. Just dust off the book issue you used in the Advanced Course and in CAS³, and you will have the ODA planning process in the bag. The key references we use at JRTC for mission planning are:

- FM 101-5, Staff Roles and Relationships. — Describes the estimate process.
- FM 7-70, The Light Infantry Platoon and Squad. — This handy manual has a simplified estimate process aimed at junior officers and NCOs.
- ST 100-9, July 92, The Command Estimate Process. — This CGSC text provides detailed techniques for implementing doctrine in FM 101-5. You have to pick through the “Fulda Gap” stuff, but Chapters 2 and 4-7 are excellent.
- Ranger Handbook. — Invaluable reference for developing the ground tactical plan, planning



Photo by Bill E. Hyatt

and executing rehearsals and inspections.

- The 34-series FMs describe intelligence integration, in particular, FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and EW Operations; FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; and FM 34-2, Collection Management. Better yet, you can save yourself a lot of reading by getting a copy of FM 34-8, Commander’s Handbook for Intelligence. This pocket-sized guide distills the intel FMs into a user-friendly format.

Study these references now, before you deploy. Keep them at hand in isolation. The next step is to develop a detailed isolation standard operating procedure. Focus the SOP at individual positions and staff sections to make sure you cover all the bases. You can also construct some visual aids that will help quite a bit in organizing your time and facilitating the planning process. Get some poster board and write out the headings for such things as mission statement and intent (two levels up), specified and

Special Forces soldiers haul their gear to a waiting helicopter during training at the Joint Readiness Training Center.

The command-estimate schedule helps to focus the team effort on completing the planning process.

implied tasks, course-of-action sketches, etc. Develop a blank matrix for comparing courses of action. Save one board for breaking the command-estimate process down into steps, by time. This schedule will help to focus the team effort on completing the detailed planning process. Get these boards laminated so you can reuse them. Work with the charts and the SOP in a practice isolation or two before you get to JRTC. Enough about mission prep — on to isolation.

Isolation

Shortly after isolating, you should receive a warning order in some form. If time is critical, the key planners may begin working with this information while the rest of the team sets up the isolation area. Designate one man to supervise the setup, or key leaders will be pulled away to handle minor details.

Staff-section locations must facilitate the information flow. The detachment commander, team sergeant, team tech and intel NCO should all be located in a planning cell, as the most critical information is shared here. Keep wall space free for posting charts. Map boards should have ops and intel overlays precut and ready to be hung. A good technique is to have all reference materials (area study, target intel packet, OPORD, etc.) placed in clearly marked folders and laid out on a large table. Make one guy responsible for keeping track of the references and keeping this area organized — it will save time and trouble searching for information later.

COMMAND ESTIMATE			
TIME BLOCK: <u>1300-1730</u>			
WHEN	WHO	WHAT	POC
1300-1345	STAFF SECTS	REVIEW OPORD/ANNEXES	STAFF LDR
1345-1400	ALL	INTEL BRIEFING	INTEL NCO
1400-1430	ALL	ID SPEC/IMP/M.E. TASKS CONSTRAINTS/RESTRICTIONS	XO
1430-1445	ALL	BREAK	OPS NCO
1445-1500	ALL	DEVELOP/BRIEF ODA MSN	TM LDR
1500-1515	ALL	BRIEF ENEMY COA	INTEL
1515-1545	STAFF SECTS	DEVELOP COAs	STAFF LDR
1545-1600	ALL	ANALYZE COAs	XO
1600-1630	ALL	WAR-GAME COAs	XO
1630-1700	ALL	COMPARE COAs	XO
1700-1715	ALL	BREAK	OPS NCO
1715-1730	ALL	BRIEF DECISION, INTENT AND CONCEPT	TM LDR

NOTES: *INTEL NCO CONCENTRATES ON IPB 1300-1500*

Once the isolation area is set up, anyone not involved in preliminary mission planning should be involved in some sort of preparation. There is no excuse for doing routine things like making equipment lists during critical planning time when it could have been done prior to the mission brief. This is also the time to establish your relationship with your liaison officer, who will be critical to the success of your isolation. Most LNOs are eager to help the team but lack the experience to be effective. The LNO is not just a messenger boy. He needs to be aggressive and proactive in facilitating the information flow between the ODA and the staff. Sit down with the LNO

and discuss his duties; give him feedback throughout isolation as necessary.

FOB mission brief

If the FOB staff is doing its job, your team should get its operations order at least two hours prior to the mission brief. It is a good idea to separate out the annexes to the appropriate ODA staff sections at this time, while the planning cell takes the basic order and target intel packet. Give a time for everyone to get back together and get your initial planning guidance. Everyone should be highlighting specified tasks from their annexes and noting vague or conflicting

COA COMPARISON

CRITERIA	COA 1 <i>3 X R&S TM 1 X MBS 1 X LZ</i>	COA 2 <i>4 X R&S TM 1 X MBS 1 X LZ</i>	COA 3 <i>2 X R&S TM 2 X MBS 2 X LZ</i>
<i>COMMAND & CONTROL</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>MANEUVER (INFIL/EXFIL)</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>MANEUVER (AREA COVERAGE)</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>SURVIVABILITY</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>UNITY OF COMMAND</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>SOLDIER LOAD</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>SECURITY</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>RESUPPLY</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>FOLLOW-ON DA MISSION</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>
TOTALS	<i>14</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>17</i>

information. In the mission brief itself, ask the staff hard questions. If the FOB staff is having problems, good questions will bring them out. When the S-2 says "If you want the photographs of the objective, request them by RFI," tell him up front that you want everything he has. This is your chance to have the battalion commander energize the people supporting you.

The most important single piece of information you will get during the brief is the battalion commander's intent. This must be absolutely clear, or you may waste hours of planning time. If you are at all unsure about the focus or desired result of the mission, nail it down

here. This should be given to you in written form, so you can post it.

Command estimate

The team sergeant should have a time schedule ready to go after the mission brief, if not sooner. Post it prominently. One individual must be responsible for timekeeping, particularly during brainstorming sessions. These tend to deteriorate if not held to strict time limits.

Immediately after the mission brief, if you haven't already done so, give the staff sections time to go over their sections of the operations order. When you get back together, each section should have a list of specified and implied tasks, mission

The COA comparison helps in developing distinct, relevant criteria for evaluating courses of action.

constraints and restrictions ready to be discussed. Winnow out the routine implied tasks like "pack rucksacks," define the significant constraints and restrictions, and post these on your charts. Determine which tasks are mission-essential and highlight these tasks; you derive the ODA mission statement from them. Now write the mission statement. Make sure it is clear and complete; it is the basis for your subsequent planning.

IPB products such as threat and terrain templates need to be briefed to the team at this time. Products that are not delivered by the FOB S-2 must be developed by the team. The enemy reaction force you should have predicted on the threat-integration template will not be impressed by the fact that the FOB staff didn't do its job. The intel NCO has a critical function during this phase — that of predicting the most likely enemy course of action. He must be prepared to think like the enemy commander, especially when wargaming. See Chapter 7 of ST 100-9 for a complete discussion of threat integration into COA development.

At this point, you must develop ODA courses of action. There are several ways to do this. You can brainstorm. You can have sections or individuals develop COAs separately. You can dictate one or more COAs and have the team try to think up better ones. The technique should depend on the level of experience on the team and the ability of individuals to express themselves.

However you do it, make your best effort to come up with at least two supportable COAs. If a COA will not fulfill minimum mission requirements, why even put it on the board? By the way, "HALO,

Soldiers from the 7th SF Group pull rucksacks into a UH-1H Iroquois helicopter during training at the Joint Readiness Training Center.



Photo by Bill E. Hyatt

static line, air land” are not three good courses of action! Infiltration technique is important only as it facilitates the ground tactical plan. GTPs focus on task organization, scheme of maneuver, main effort, etc. Start out each COA with a distinct GTP, and then develop an infil/exfil technique which best suits it. Once the COAs are developed, take them through evaluation, comparison and war-gaming.

ST 100-9 discusses these techniques in more detail. The only area I will highlight is COA comparison. You must develop distinct, relevant criteria for comparison, or you are just wasting time. If each COA you develop is equally viable except for one criteria, rethink either the COAs or the criteria. Whichever course of action turns out to be best, post it and focus the team on it. The other COAs, if well-thought-out, should become the basis for contingency plans. You can now write your commander's intent and develop a general scheme of maneuver. You will need these to brief the mission concept, or MICON, to the battalion commander.

MICON brief

If you developed a good estimate, this meeting will give the comman-

der confidence in your ODA mission and make the briefback almost redundant. One way to conduct the MICON is to talk through your mission analysis and COA-selection process. Use the visual aids posted on the walls to show the logical sequence in your thought process. You should brief the scheme of the maneuver, infil and commo plans in general terms. This is also the time to talk about mission-essential equipment or personnel shortages and any critical information requirements that have not been answered, not at the end of the briefback! Schedule a progress review before the briefback, if necessary. It is a good idea to give the commander a schedule of key rehearsals at this time; this is your best opportunity to pump him up for rehearsal support.

Team planning

Your ODA will be working in staff sections for much of this time. Have staff leaders brief you and the team sergeant regularly on the status of their sections, or better yet, schedule staff meetings where information can be shared. The intel NCO must continually update the team on changes to the enemy situation. He also works closely with you and

the other key planners to develop the R&S plan. The plan must tie valid ODA PIRs into terrain, task organization and time to answer who, what, when and where. FM 34-8 has examples of matrixes that you can use to help focus the collection effort.

During this time, communications planning should receive some of your attention as well. Communicators almost always develop a good primary and alternate means of commo, but contingency and emergency systems are often forgotten. You must demand commo checks on all systems and with all stations if it is at all possible to do so. If commo goes down, the FOB will not be screaming for the blood of your senior commo NCO — they'll want yours. Minimize environmental factors and human error on the ground by detailed inspections and checks in isolation.

The pilots' brief is critical to your infil planning. Try to schedule it as early as possible. Give the pilots a written DZ/LZ list in addition to an overlay to minimize the chance of error. Be prepared to be somewhat flexible, as the pilots may have terrain or threat factors that limit their route options. However, always remember that it is the pilots' job to support you, not the

other way around. If the pilots cannot support your scheme of maneuver, bring it up to the FOB commander ASAP. Ensure that your LZs and DZs are tied in logically to the escape-and-evasion plan, the resupply plan and contingency plans. All of these must also be coordinated in detail with the FOB staff! Your emergency resupply may never fly if the plan is stuck in the S-2 safe.

As these plans are completed, put them in the commander's briefback folder as annexes to the ODA operations order. Don't worry about making the OPORD pretty, just make it legible. Consider using mission-specific preprinted formats to save time and improve attention to detail. Of course, a word processor will create a good-looking product, but avoid wasting time with endless rewrites.

Rehearsals

Ration your isolation time to make use of every spare minute for rehearsals. Just as important, have a plan for each rehearsal period. The few minutes you spend prioritizing and coordinating will save hours of confusion in the rehearsal area. Consider the use of OPFOR, MILES, mock-ups, pyrotechnics and anything else that will add to realism. Practicing casualty evacuation is a must. Try to use the same types of terrain and visibility conditions expected in the operational area. If time permits, move your actual infil distance on the ground with full rucks. You will realize rather quickly if you have to adjust the infil plan, or at least toss out that extra pair of socks. Don't neglect to practice inter-team commo. Whenever possible, have a competent outside observer watch your rehearsals to get an unbiased cri-

tique. That extra set of eyes will pick out the obvious flaws in a "perfect" rehearsal.

ODA briefback

If you have efficiently used your time in isolation, the briefback will be a snap. Spend only the minimum amount of time necessary on briefback rehearsals, without all the "bells and whistles." If the commander prefers a fancy show, try explaining in advance that you would rather spend your time on execution rehearsals (and then do them!). Adjust the briefback format to the type and complexity of the mission. For a 24-hour mission, is it really necessary to have the senior medical NCO talk about diseases in the indigenous population?

The five-paragraph OPORD format is logically organized and familiar to everyone. Strongly consider using it as your briefback sequence, especially for relatively simple direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions. Briefers can refer to notes, but people who read word-for-word give the impression they don't really know the material. Finally, if you discover prior to or even during the briefback that you have a potential mission stopper, tell the boss that you need a delay. Be real sure you can talk clearly about your risk assessment, though, or at best you will have to execute the mission anyway.

Conclusion

Once you get the final approval, the ODA should be able to get on the bird immediately and accomplish the mission. Any time before you actually launch should be used for conducting final inspections, sterilizing the isolation area and resting. If you've got more time, fine-tune your rehearsals. Just don't find yourself adjusting the headset for

your night-vision goggles as you run to board the aircraft.

That about covers it. If you maximize the use of your time in isolation, you will have a real good shot at a successful mission execution. I hope some of the tips I gave you help. Good luck! ✂

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The Subjective Side of Cross-Cultural Communication

by Lt. Col. James K. Bruton



Suppose you are on a mobile training team mission to a developing country. Your host-nation counterpart invites you to his home for dinner. Would you know upon arrival whether you should bow, shake hands, bring a gift, take off your shoes, greet his wife, ignore his wife, or what? During dinner what subjects would you discuss? What should you avoid talking about? How long should you stay? How would you tell when it is time to leave?

The people skills of SOF personnel often share equal importance with their technical proficiency. Regional orientation, language skills and the facility to work with people of other nationalities distinguish SOF organizations like Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP. This article outlines an approach to cross-cultural preparation, highlighting the subjective side of interpersonal communication.

In today's challenging environment, a SOF team may be alerted for an advisory or training mission that requires considerable interpersonal interaction in a somewhat unfamiliar host nation. Mission briefings and area orientation usually follow, along with an assessment of language requirements and the requisite cross-cultural communication skills.

Properly understood, cross-cultural skill entails not just learning about another people, but also developing the ability to learn from and with another people. Accordingly, one of this nation's prominent cross-cultural training teams differentiates in their presentations between what they describe as "big C" culture and "little C" culture.¹

Referring to the objective manifestations of a culture, big-C culture pertains to what a people have created and institutionalized. It may include a society's history, its arts such as music, dance, theater and literature, its artifacts, its science, sports, national heroes, holidays and the like. One can acquire at least a partial understanding of big-C culture from objective descriptions about a country readily available in encyclopedias, The Country Study series, or an area study. Big-C culture can instruct us about a society, but not necessarily about how to communicate with its people.

Little-C culture, on the other hand, relates to subjective values and behavior, such as customs and etiquette, and verbal and nonverbal communication styles. For the visitor, an understanding of little-C culture derives from an individual's personal interactions and internal experience — though it may be guided by an objective knowledge of

the host nation's predominant values, and its customs and taboos. Little-C culture configures the procedural matters of assisting, teaching, training, managing, leading, socializing with, negotiating with or otherwise influencing the host nationals.

Big-C culture makes one educated but not necessarily competent. Little-C culture makes one competent but not necessarily educated. Big-C culture and little-C culture are not so much polar opposites as part of a continuum. Each can complement the other.² This complementarity notwithstanding, it is the author's contention that SOF should give more emphasis to little-C culture in the pre-mission phase.

During Desert Shield/Storm, members of 5th Special Forces Group successfully displayed both big-C and little-C cultural understanding in working with their Arab counterparts. Through liaison and training teams with 104 maneuver elements, 5th Group personnel assisted the Joint Arab Forces and other allies in upgrading their proficiency in areas such as NBC training, close-air-support coordination, conduct of border-security operations and other aspects of tactical training.

It took the SF trainers longer with some nationalities than with

others to break the ice and to gain acceptance from their Arab counterparts. But once trust and rapport solidified, SF became what one general called "the glue that held the coalition together." Close personal relationships developed, and in several instances, Arab commanders accepted as confidants and as de facto staff members both their SF officer and NCO counterparts.³

Certain objective factors contributed to SF success. In addition to their overall professionalism and experience in desert operations, 5th Group members had the advantage of previous training with Arab forces over the years in exercises such as Bright Star. Many spoke Arabic, from survival level to minimal proficiency. In general, these men had acquired a collective familiarity with Arab cultures.

As Desert Shield/Storm showed, SF's display of technical knowledge by itself may not be enough to affect host nationals. Arabs respected American technical skill in the abstract and were impressed by the breadth of knowledge and instructional skills of their SF trainers. Yet this appreciation in and of itself did not make them receptive to individual Americans on an interpersonal level. What produced receptiveness was the patience, adaptability and flexibility that characterized the SF trainers' approach. Their use of Arabic, their deference to Arab customs and their acceptance of the gracious hospitality that Arabs traditionally show guests enabled them to immerse themselves into the daily living patterns of their Arab counterparts. Said one sergeant:

The fastest way to establish that rapport is just to live with them, to eat what they are eating, to share what they are sharing. If they are digging a hole, then you help out digging a hole. Don't just see them once a day, like for lunch. You are not going to get very far with them. ... Share, work together with your counterpart. Do these things first and other things will fall into place. There is no rehearsal for establish-

ing rapport. It is a play-by-ear situation. ... Be professional. Try not to lose your cool because they are not doing things the American way.⁴

Many in business and diplomacy, as well as the military, who operate successfully in other cultural environments attribute their competence to careful observation which informs judgment. Knowing what to observe is the key. Observation includes recognizing our own American behavior patterns and being sensitive to the presence of contrasting mindsets and alternative behavior patterns throughout our interactions. Intercultural communication skill,⁵ after all, is about dealing with differences, not with commonality.

Illuminating the right questions before entering another culture can facilitate this process. As an exer-

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cise, think about a foreign culture in which you have lived or one that you will soon enter. Can you answer the following? Or will you be able to answer these questions after a short time in the host nation?⁶

- Is it a society that uses direct verbal communication that is straightforward and to-the-point, like the U.S., or does it prefer indirect or contextual communication?

- How do the people make a refusal or tell you no?

- Does "yes" mean yes? What does "maybe" mean?

- What do the people do nonver-

bally to let you know:

- They aren't listening?
- They have a problem?
- They want to terminate the conversation?
 - What subtleties do they use in etiquette as a means of indirect communication?
 - When connecting or making a personal bond, what speaking patterns and body posture do they use?
 - Do they usually make direct eye-to-eye contact during conversation?
 - What physical distance do they maintain in conversation?
 - When they smile, what meaning (or meanings) does their smile connote?
 - To what extent do they use gestures and touching (beyond the handshake) when conversing?
 - How do you know when you have been "accepted"?
 - How do the following modes of communication differ from what we are used to in the U.S.? In the host nation how do we:⁷
 - Refuse
 - Confront
 - Take initiative
 - Give and receive compliments and criticism
 - Conduct small talk
 - Express humor
 - Express opinions
 - Negotiate

These questions serve as cuing mechanisms to broaden our perceptiveness rather than as questions that lend themselves to definitive answers. Here one can begin to see the significance of nonverbal communication. "Most Americans," says anthropologist Edward Hall, "are only dimly aware of this 'silent language' even though they use it every day. They are not conscious of the elaborate patterning of behavior which prescribes the handling of time, spatial relationships, attitudes toward work, play and learning. In addition to our verbal language, we are constantly communicating our real feelings in the language of behavior."⁸

Subjective communication considerations also come into play for SOF

teams involved in assessment and conduct of training of foreign nationals. These questions may apply to host-nation learning styles and role of teachers in the host nation.

- How do host-nation students/trainees view the teacher/trainer? Do they view him as an expert or as a facilitator? Is he expected to have all the answers? Is it permissible for the teacher to acknowledge a mistake or to admit he does not know the answer?

- Do the host-nation officers train with their soldiers (at the risk of losing face if they err), train separately or not at all? (In some traditional cultures the simple fact that one is an officer implies he has all the knowledge needed to do his job — no further training is seen as necessary.)

- How are students taught — by didactic instruction, rote memorization, participatory student-centered exercises, or hands-on practical training? How are they tested?

- Are students willing to display knowledge and skill before their peers — that is, are they individually competitive, or do they avoid standing out by deferring to the group harmony?

- Is self-critique by students (as U.S. soldiers do in after-action reviews) a viable concept? Do they critique themselves if it might reflect negatively on their leaders or their teachers?

Intercultural communication is an individual developmental process that cannot be learned in a formulaistic or cookbook manner. One learns it as one goes along, mostly by confronting and responding constructively to differences in others, or to others who are different. Since intercultural communication occurs face-to-face, it produces the experience — sometimes gratifying, sometimes discomfiting — of almost immediate feedback. We can generally assess how we are doing both in subjective and in objective terms of goal accomplishment.

Dealing with differences, howev-

Cross-cultural Resources

Cross-cultural preparation often combines generic content with country- and culture-specific information. Sometimes very few culture-specific resources on a given country may be available when needed. The good news is that certain generic cross-cultural models and concepts by themselves can go a long way toward preparing one for entry into an unfamiliar culture. These models can provide a basis for comparing and contrasting American values with those of other cultures and illustrating different mind-sets. A thorough generic orientation can hone one's ability to anticipate, readily detect and respond to behavior patterns different from our own — even in the absence of area specialists or culture-specific data. The following references contain generic models and concepts that might be useful to SOF.

Hofstede, Geert H. *Culture's Consequences*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984. This presents Hofstede's extensive study on the how national culture affects work-related values and attitudes far more than age, gender, profession, or position in an organization. Hofstede compares cultures on the basis of four dimensions: high vs. low individualism; large vs. small power distance; strong vs. weak uncertainty avoidance; and high vs. low masculinity. The book contains a wealth of insightful data but is somewhat academic and presents rather challenging reading.

Hofstede, Geert H. *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*. Berkshire, UK: McGraw-Hill Book Co. (UK) Ltd, 1991. In this more user-friendly sequel, Hofstede expands on his four dimensions contrasting work related values of fifty countries. His model and analyses can serve as a useful tool to help one identify and describe anticipated differences in a foreign culture.

Kohls, L. Robert. *Survival Kit for Overseas Living*. Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1984. An excellent handbook for international travelers and expatriates, this widely used guide focuses on adapting to living abroad and dealing with culture shock. Specifically it contains a discussion of the Kluckhohn model — a relatively value-neutral way of comparing one culture with another using five orientations: human nature orientation, man-nature orientation, time orientation, activity orientation, and social orientation.

Stewart, Edward C. and Milton J. Bennett. *American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*. Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1991. An important step in understanding other cultural values is to first understand our own American values. This work provides a succinct basis for examining the embedded American values that guide our thinking and behavior in ways of which we may be only partially conscious.

— Lt. Col. James Bruton



Photo by Thomas Witham

A U.S. soldier (right) discusses small-unit tactics with Arab counterpart soldiers during Operation Desert Shield.

er, can be psychologically threatening to some. We should not assume that special-operations schooling in and of itself prepares all its members for effective cross-cultural interaction. Intercultural communication skill depends as much on the user's willingness to cultivate personal growth through interpersonal interaction as it does on formal training in language, history, government and big-C culture.⁹

The emphasis the Army places on battle-focused collective and individual training should not eclipse the importance of subjective communication-skill development among SOF personnel. The continuous deployment abroad of SOF units in this post-Cold War era of ethnic, religious and regional conflict will elevate cross-cultural ability as a high-demand skill far into the future. ✂

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rently doing graduate work at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Notes:

¹The trainers are Dr. Milton J. Bennett and Dr. Janet M. Bennett of Portland State University. The Bennetts' 2 May 1991 presentation, "Exploring the Intercultural Perspective," at the annual congress of the International Society for Intercultural Education, Training, and Research greatly influenced the structure of this article. The Bennetts derived the concept of big-C culture and little-C culture from Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967). Also helpful to the author was Milton J. Bennett, "Foundations of Knowledge in International Educational Exchange: Intercultural Communication," in Joy Reid, ed, *Building the Professional Dimension of Educational Exchange* (Washington, D.C.: NAFSA, 1988).

²Two sources contain excellent checklists of background information about the host country that encompass big-C and little-C culture. One can use these to test one's knowledge of a culture with which one feels familiar or of a culture in which one desires more information. Some of these can serve as ice-breakers and conversational topics. See "Let's Play Fifty Questions" in Robert L. Kohls, *Survival Kit for Overseas Living* (Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, Inc., 1984); and "Suggested People-Map Coordinates" in V. Lynn Tyler, *Intercultural Interacting* (Provo, Utah: David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies Publication Services, 1987).

³James K. Bruton and Edward C. Stewart, *The Gulf War: An Analysis of American*

and Arab Cross-Cultural Encounters, an unpublished manuscript, p. 36.

⁴Ibid., pp. 32-33.

⁵Some use the terms "cross-cultural" and "intercultural" interchangeably, and the meaning often varies with the writer. Here "inter" implies between or two-way. "Cross" more commonly is one-way and suggests the one doing it. V. Lynn Tyler, "Miracles - Mysteries - Myths," (Provo, Utah: David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies Publication Services, 1988).

⁶Most of these questions came from Don Henderson of Global Selling, a New York-based training company.

⁷These suggested communication skills came from Carolyn Feuille of LanguaTech, a San Francisco-based training company.

⁸Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language* (New York: Anchor Press, 1973), p. xiii. Hall has categorized 10 separate kinds of human activity labeled the primary message systems, or PMS. "Only the first PMS involves language. All the other PMS are nonlinguistic forms of the communication process." p. 38.

⁹Intercultural communication is a growth-oriented and difference-based approach. Writes cross-cultural psychologist Edward Stewart: "With informed judgment, it is possible to abandon the idea that cultural differences are impediments to communication and cooperation and instead accept the challenge that cultural differences are resources that can be used for mutual benefit of members of the societies involved in cross-cultural cooperation." Edward C. Stewart and Milton J. Bennett, *American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1991), p. 176.

Legal Aspects of Civil Affairs

by Maj. (P) Neil Porter

Modern-day Civil Affairs units trace their roots to the Second World War, when the U.S. Army created “civil-government units” to assist combat commanders in dealing with civilians in combat zones and occupied areas.

The operations of these units reduced the number of combat troops diverted from their primary mission, cut interference by civilians in combat operations, orchestrated the creation of new political and economic infrastructures in defeated countries and ensured the continuation of CA units in the Army force structure.

Although Civil Affairs operations benefit commanders and civilians in a number of ways, the basis for those operations is not altruism, but international law, and it is important to understand the legal authorities which underlie CA operations.

Joint Pub 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, defines Civil Affairs as: “The activities of a commander which establish and maintain relations between his military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly, neutral, or occupied country or area to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil Affairs may include exercise by military forces or authorities of activities or func-

tions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency.”

Joint Pub 3-57 further states: “The nature and scope of Civil Affairs activities will be determined by many factors and variables including National Command Authority guidance and mission orders, national security objectives, U.S. foreign policy, participation of allied and friendly countries, Operational Law, and requirements of the military situation.”

According to the Operational Law Handbook, published by the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s School: “Operational Law (OPLAW) incorporates, in a single military legal discipline, substantive aspects of international law, criminal law, administrative law, and procurement-fiscal law relevant to the overseas deployment of U.S. military forces. It is a comprehensive, yet structured, approach toward resolving legal issues evolving from deployment activities.”

Operational law has been viewed as having two aspects: internal, or those issues relating strictly to military operations (primarily combat oriented); and external, or those dealing with the relationship between a deployed military force

and the civilian population. Civil Affairs units assist the commander in meeting legal obligations principally in the latter area.

Civil Affairs operations are vital to commanders in wartime. This usefulness in war has been mirrored in peacetime operations designed to support friendly foreign governments and create goodwill toward the United States. While the overall Civil Affairs mission remains the same in either situation, the legal authorities which authorize or mandate Civil Affairs operations are different depending upon where the unit’s mission is located in the spectrum of conflict.

The focus of Civil Affairs operations also differs vastly depending on the mission of the supported unit. During wartime, the focus is on military objectives. Civilians are an obstacle to combat operations, and their support is secondary to those military objectives. Minimizing civilian interference with combat operations is the primary Civil Affairs mission. In operations other than war, however, the political legitimacy of the supported group or government becomes the center of gravity.

Wartime Civil Affairs

The highly mechanized and technological nature of the modern bat-

tlefield, combined with a war-fighting doctrine which calls for the swift concentration of massed forces and firepower against enemy weak points followed by a swift drive into the enemy's rear areas, assures the complication of battle plans by the presence of civilians in the area of operations. The Civilian Convention of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides that civilians in occupied territories are "protected persons" and charges commanders of occupied territories with certain legal obligations toward them. Civil Affairs operations specifically directed at compliance with these requirements are known as civil administration. Some of the more salient points addressed by the Convention are that:

- "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice" will be respected.
- Civilians who are not nationals of the power whose territory is occupied have the right to leave the territory.
- Forcible individual or mass transfers or deportations of protected persons from one occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power or any other country are prohibited. This does not prevent evacuation of a given area on grounds of security of the population or military necessity. Such persons should be returned to their homes as soon as hostilities have ceased.
- Placement of protected persons in an area exposed to the dangers of war is prohibited.
- Deportation or transfer by the occupying power of members of its own civilian population into the occupied territory is prohibited.
- The occupying power must facilitate the care and education of children.
- The occupying power must ensure availability of adequate food

and medical supplies, providing them from its own stocks if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.

- The occupying power must ensure and maintain hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territories. Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.

Another wartime function of Civil Affairs is to assist the commander in the acquisition and control of property. Commanders are authorized to exercise control over prop-

erty in enemy and occupied territory. Such control reduces the strain on logistical trains by supplying operations with locally obtained materials and preserves assets required by the civilian population.

Property control is generally classified as follows: destruction, confiscation, seizure, requisition and control. The type of control a commander may lawfully exercise depends on whether the property is privately owned or government property and whether it has military application.

Property of any type may be destroyed when justified by military necessity, and no compensation is required. Commanders may confiscate enemy public movable property (limited generally to that having either direct or indirect military application — this includes private property being used by enemy troops). Confiscated property becomes the property of the victor;

again, no compensation is required. Seizure refers to the taking of enemy private movable property. As with confiscated property, seized property becomes the property of the capturing state. Generally, payment of compensation to the owner is required but is not made until the termination of hostilities.

Enemy private movable and immovable property may be requisitioned, for use in the occupied area only, in order to meet the needs of the occupying force. Housing, factory output, farm produce, etc., may be requisitioned. Immediate pay-

Civil Affairs operations are vital to commanders in wartime. This usefulness in war has been mirrored in peacetime operations designed to support friendly foreign governments and create goodwill toward the United States.

ment of compensation to the owner is required when property is requisitioned. Finally, commanders may exercise the degree of control necessary (including denial of access) to prevent the use or destruction of property in the occupied territory.

To maintain order in occupied territories, existing law and legal structures should be retained. Where laws are inimical to U.S. objectives, however, they should be amended or repealed. Commanders may augment or supplant existing law through Civil Affairs enactments. There are six types of enactments — proclamations, ordinances, notices, directives, laws and regulations — each of which has a different purpose and effect. Initially, Civil Affairs units, under the staff supervision of the commander's G-5, are responsible for enforcement of these enactments. Violators are prosecuted before a military tribunal or in

Members of Fort Bragg's 27th Engineer Battalion construct a school in Honduras. The U.S. often uses military forces to achieve political objectives during peacetime.




Photo by Mike Edrington

local civil courts if authorized by the commander.

The goal of civil administration is to create an effective civil government which supports U.S. objectives and to return it to local control as soon as possible. Civil Affairs personnel screen the local population and identify suitable individuals for leadership positions. Civil Affairs units identify needs and organize local inhabitants, under reliable leadership, to restore the damaged infrastructure.

Peacetime Civil Affairs

The U.S. often uses military forces to achieve political objectives during peacetime. Civil Affairs projects in these operations include construction, medical, dental and veterinary activities by military personnel. Civil Affairs units are also used extensively in contingency operations such as noncombatant evacuation operations, disaster relief and refugee operations.

Civil Affairs personnel also augment military units during overseas operations such as joint training exercises. The civil-military operations officer bears the responsibility for coordinating the Civil Affairs activities conducted by the command.

Fiscal-law considerations intrude into these operations. With minor exceptions, operations and maintenance appropriations funding, known as O&M, may not be used to conduct humanitarian and civic-assistance activities, or HCA, or to fund the activities of foreign armed forces. Commanders and CMOs must understand the parameters of their funding sources because the distinction between activities is often shaded.

Funding for HCA is appropriated annually by Congress and distributed to the regional unified commands. Each CINC validates HCA projects within his area and assigns missions to specific units. These may not duplicate social or

economic-assistance programs being administered by other U.S. agencies in the area. HCA funds may not be used, either directly or indirectly, to support foreign military or paramilitary activities. Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 401 provides the legal authority to conduct HCA and specifically authorizes:

- Medical, dental and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
- Construction of rudimentary surface-transportation systems.
- Well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

There is one exception to the prohibition against using O&M funds for small HCA projects not previously identified. Congress has recognized the unique mission of special-operations forces (defined in Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 167 and including Civil Affairs) and has authorized O&M funds to be used to pay the incremental expenses of for-

eign armed forces when the primary purpose is the training of U.S. forces. An annual report of expenses paid under this exception must be provided to Congress. This "Special Forces exception" is codified in Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2011 and authorizes payment of:

- Expenses of training special-operations forces assigned to that command in conjunction with training, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country.

- Expenses of deploying such special-operations forces for that training.

- In the case of training in conjunction with a friendly developing country, the incremental expenses incurred by that country as the direct result of such training.

The success of HCA in overseas operations has motivated Congress to authorize the use of U.S. armed forces to perform HCA in domestic operations. Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 410 provides for armed forces to engage in "civil-military cooperative action programs" to meet the domestic needs of the United States.

Although the President is commander in chief of the armed forces, Congress approves their budget. By limitations in funding appropriations and application of Title 31, U.S. Code, Section 1301a (the "purpose statute"), which prohibits any

expenditure of funds for other than the intended purpose, Congress is able to shape military operations to a certain extent.

The dichotomy between command and funding can place the military in an awkward position when there is public and congressional opposition to a president's foreign policy (as there was to President Reagan's policies regarding Central America). Military operations will be subjected to close scrutiny by Congress and the press. Fiscal-law violations could not only be embarrassing to the armed forces but also subject commanders to criminal sanctions.

Conclusion

Civil Affairs units are an indispensable tool for commanders in meeting their legal obligations. They are an important force-multiplier during wartime as well as an effective means for generating goodwill toward the United States and providing support for democratic governments in developing nations. By integrating Civil Affairs into the overall concept of operations, U.S. forces can preserve combat assets, reduce civilian interference and promote mission legitimacy in support of U.S. national policy in the area of operations. All CA operations have their basis in law, and whether they are meeting wartime obligations to civilians or fulfilling fiscal-law

responsibilities in peacetime, commanders must ensure that they remain within that legal authority.



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His other assignments include service as deputy staff judge advocate for the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command and as staff judge advocate for Joint Task Force-Guantanamo during the Haitian relief operation. He has also served as civil-military operations officer attached to the 7th SF Group during the joint training exercise Fuerzas Unidas Uruguay 93. A graduate of the Command and General Staff Officer Course and the Civil Affairs Course, he holds a bachelor's degree from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and law degrees from Gonzaga University, Spokane, Wash., and the University of Miami.

Managing Special-Operations Forces Doctrine

by Steven E. Cook

Doctrine is the groundwork for all missions of Army special-operations forces, and development of that doctrine is the job of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

As the branch proponent for Special Forces and the functional proponent for Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, the SWCS commander must implement and execute the SOF doctrinal-development responsibilities of both the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Army Training and Doctrine Command.

The Army Special Operations Command has also appointed the SWCS as its executive agent to review combined, joint, multiservice and Army doctrinal literature and publications and to develop Army SOF doctrine and training material. Within the SWCS, producing that material is the job of the Doctrine Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

Within SOF doctrinal and training publications, there is an established hierarchy to provide a structure for their design, development, integration and promulgation. The hierarchy organizes the content of the publications to be comprehen-

sive without being redundant.

The hierarchy also aligns these publications with the needs of the target audience and helps trainers and soldiers identify the publication most relevant to their needs. Thus, it serves the managers and developers of doctrinal and training literature as well as their users.

All ARSOF field manuals are linked to FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. They are oriented toward commanders, staffs and operational personnel from operational elements through the Army Special Operations Command and cover all ARSOF mission areas. Production of these manuals proceeds through two stages: the initial and final drafts. The average time for completion of these manuals from concept to distribution of the final Department of the Army-approved copy is between 18 months and two years. The title, scope and status for each ARSOF doctrinal publication is listed below:

- FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, is the integrating manual for ARSOF. It describes ARSOF roles, missions, capabilities, organization, command

and control, employment and sustainment in all operational environments and at all levels of war, across the range of military operations. It serves as the doctrinal foundation for subordinate ARSOF doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, sustainment and individual and unit training.

- FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, is the SF principles manual. It is directly linked to and must be used in conjunction with the doctrinal principles found in FM 100-25, and FM 100-5, Operations. It describes SF roles, missions, capabilities, organization, command and control, staffing, employment and sustainment across the range of military operations. It provides the authoritative foundation for SF subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education and individual and collective training. FM 31-20 is under revision with a fielding date of June 1995.

- FM 31-20-1, Special Forces Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. This manual will contain the tactics, techniques and procedures that are basic to most SF missions. It

will cover subjects such as regional threats, environments, staff procedures, training management, pre-mission activities, mission-tasking procedures, deliberate and time-sensitive planning and post-mission activities. This publication will link FM 31-20 to the five mission manuals. FM 31-20-1 is in development, with a scheduled fielding date of March 1995.

- FM 31-20-2, Unconventional Warfare Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces, will cover the principles of unconventional warfare at operational detachments A, B and C levels. Topics will include rural and urban resistance organizational concepts, infiltration, contact procedures,

resistance buildup, organization, training, operations, demobilization and exfiltration. FM 31-20-2 is in development, with a scheduled fielding date of June 1995.


- FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces. Subjects will include command and control, staff procedures, intelligence, training, adviser techniques, civil defense, pacification operations, hand-off procedures, counterinsurgency and other operational techniques. This manual is scheduled to be published and fielded in June 1994.

- FM 31-20-4, Direct Action Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces. Subjects include

rural and urban assault techniques, raid, ambush, standoff attack, terminal guidance, mining and demolition, sabotage and incendiarism. This manual is scheduled to be published and fielded in September 1995.

- FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces. This manual defines special-reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorologic, hydrographic, geographic or demographic characteris-

SWCS Doctrine Hierarchy



tics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment and post-strike reconnaissance. This manual was published and fielded in March 1993.

- FM 31-20-6, (U) Counterterrorism, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces (U). This manual will standardize doctrine on SF counterterrorism operations for regional contingencies. FM 31-20-6 (U) is in development, with a scheduled fielding date of September 1995. Distribution is restricted and controlled by the commander of the SWCS.

- FM 31-19, Military Free Fall Parachuting Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, describes proven techniques and guidelines that are essential for safe, successful military free-fall operations. The procedures contained in this publication apply to multiservice free-fall operations. This publication supersedes FM 31-19, dated February 1988, and was published and fielded in February 1993.

- TC 31-24, Special Forces Air Operations, is a guide for SF commanders, staffs and operational-detachment personnel in planning and conducting air operations across the range of military operations. It establishes a coordinated and common planning base for units participating in multiservice and joint operations. This manual will be nominated for revision as a joint publication.

- TC 31-25, Special Forces Waterborne Operations, provides a consolidated reference for training and employing SF personnel in all types of waterborne operations. It provides detailed operational planning considerations for small-boat operations, surface-swimming operations, and operations involving underwater breathing apparatuses. This manual will be nominated for revision as a joint publication.

'Doctrine' terms have different meanings

In discussing doctrine, the terms "doctrine," "tactics," "techniques," "procedures," "drills" and "tactical standing operating procedures" are sometimes used interchangeably, but they have specific meanings:

- Doctrine is composed of the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.
- Tactics are the employment of units in combat; the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to realize their full potential.
- Techniques are the general and detailed methods used by troops or commanders to perform assigned missions and functions. Specifically, they are the methods of using equipment and personnel. Techniques describe "a way," not "the only way."
- Procedures are detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task.
- Drills provide small units with standard procedures essential for building a strong, aggressive force. They provide standardized actions that link soldier and collective tasks at platoon level and below. There are two types of drills that apply to all types of units — battle drills and crew drills.
 - Battle drills are collective actions that can be rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decision-making process.
 - Crew drills are collective actions that the crew of a weapon or piece of equipment must perform to use the weapon or equipment.
- Tactical standing operating procedures are sets of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless soldiers are ordered otherwise.

— Steve Cook

- FM 31-27, Use of Pack Animals in Support of Special Forces, will describe the tactics, techniques and procedures for staffers and operators at group level and below for planning and using packing and pulling animals in all environments and SF missions. Topics to be included in the manual are rigging, employment, transporting, care and feeding of animals, veterinary medicine and use of indigenous handlers. Production of this manual is currently on hold.

- FM 33-1, Psychological Operations, describes PSYOP employment, command and control, and support across the range of military operations. It is the doctrinal guide for commanders, planners and users of PSYOP and a guide for those who must consider the psychological effect of military operations on a target audience. The manual is the basis for PSYOP force design and materiel acquisition. It was published and fielded in February 1993.

- FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, sets forth techniques and procedures for implementing U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine contained in FM 33-1. This manual was published and fielded in June 1994.

- FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, is the keystone doctrinal manual for U.S. Army CA operations. It defines the CA mission and describes roles, capabilities, organization, command and control, combat support, combat-service support and employment in all environments across the range of military operations. This manual was published and fielded in January 1993.

- FM 41-11, Civil Affairs Procedures, is the procedures manual for FM 41-10. It provides general guidance for commanders, staffs and employers of CA operations in all operational environments and across the range of military operations. This manual is scheduled to be published and released in March 1995.

To receive these publications as they are fielded, units should ensure that their publications accounts are current and that their requirements are accurately shown on DA Form 12-11-E, on file with

the AG Publications Center; 2800 Eastern Boulevard; Baltimore, MD 21220-2896. Block numbers must be included on DA Form 12. The block numbers are:

Publication	Block no.
FM 100-25	4654
FM 31-20	0531
FM 31-20-1	5281
FM 31-20-2	4870
FM 31-20-3	5096
FM 31-20-4	5097
FM 31-20-5	5098
FM 31-20-6 (U)	Restricted
FM 31-19	1110
TC 31-24	1113
TC 31-25	1114
FM 31-27	5100
FM 33-1	1116
FM 33-1-1	5177
FM 41-10	0347
FM 41-11	5180

A final point on ARSOF doctrinal publications is that they are generic guides; they do not eliminate the requirement for a well-written standard operating procedure at all levels, driven by a mission-essential-task list.

For more information on the SOF doctrinal system or status of current SOF doctrinal publications,

contact Steve Cook, Chief, Doctrine Management Branch, at DSN 239-8689, commercial (910) 432-8689.



Steven E. Cook is currently the chief of the Doctrine Management Branch of the Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine. His other Army civilian assignments include serving as an instructor on the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Committee and as a project officer in the Directorate of Combat Developments. His military service includes four tours in Southeast Asia as an NCO in airborne, infantry, pathfinder and reconnaissance units. As an officer he served in airborne and airborne-school assignments and in Special Forces as an A-detachment executive officer, detachment commander, company commander and battalion executive officer.



Interview:

William Colby,
former director,
Central Intelligence Agency



William Colby served with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II, both as a member of a Jedburgh team in France and as a member of an operational group in Norway. Following the war he earned a law degree at Columbia University and worked in the law firm of former OSS commander William Donovan. When the Korean War began in 1950, he entered the Central Intelligence Agency. From 1951-1959, he served with American embassies in Stockholm and Rome. As first secretary to the American Embassy in Saigon from 1959-1962, he helped develop the strategic-hamlet program. Returning to Saigon in 1968, he replaced Robert Komer as director of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS, the Vietnamese pacification program designed to weaken Vietcong influence. He later served as executive director-controller of the CIA and as deputy director of operations before his

appointment as director in 1973. He retired from the CIA in 1976.

SW: What made you volunteer to serve with the Office of Strategic Services?

Colby: Well, I'd say there were probably three factors. One is that I was a son of an Army officer in the interwar era, so I had some familiarity with the service. Secondly, I had decided a long time ago that the war was coming and that we should have been much more active in getting ready for it than we were, and I went into the Army in the summer of '41. And the third reason was that I'd always been interested in international affairs — I'd lived in China, spent a summer with a French family and studied the Spanish Civil War during my time in college. When I got in the Army, they first sent me to Fort Bragg to the Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, then to Fort Sill to go to the Battery Officers Course.

They kept me there teaching after I finished, and I was afraid I was going to miss the war. This was mid-'42. I saw a notice about volunteering for parachuting, and that would have to be forwarded; your commander couldn't turn it back. So I signed up. I had to cheat through the eye exam. I sat down next to the eye chart to take my clothes off for the exam, and I memorized the 20/40 line. I zipped it off, and then the doctor said, "Now do it backwards," and I was trying to do it, and he said, "You really want to be a parachutist?" and I said, "You're damn right I do." He said, "I think you'll be able to see the ground OK, go ahead." I went to jump school and came back to Fort Bragg in the parachute artillery battalion and was prepared to stay there. A guy came down from OSS recruiting people to go jump into France, and that sounded a hell of a lot more interesting than struggling around with a 75mm gun on the ground.

SW: What was your first OSS assignment?

Colby: I went through the selection and training process, and when I finished the training, I joined a Jedburgh team. The idea of the Jedburghs was to drop one American or Brit, one French officer and a radio operator of one of the three nationalities; mine was French. They'd drop them a month or two ahead of the armies. If you sent them too early and they raised too much resistance, the Germans would chop them all down. If you sent them in too late, they were incidental. So it was a very complicated process. You got in touch with the local resistance nets. The idea was to make contact with the Resistance, train the people, get them coordinated and working together, ambush the Germans, slow them down so that they couldn't get back to Germany to regroup. It was the summer of '44 in France; this was after D-Day. We were in uniform; the Germans said they'd shoot us if they caught us, whether in a uniform or not. Their theory was that any fighting outside the regular military battle lines was improper. They were wrong, but they did shoot a few. My particular position happened to be sort of on the right flank of Patton's Third Army. We did some ambushes and slowed the Germans down to a degree so that Patton could drive for the German border and not worry about his flanks, because he had ample warning if any problem arose. It was a useful operation.

SW: Didn't you have some experience on an operational group, too?

Colby: Yes. After the Jedburgh operation, my boss said he wanted me to take a group up to Norway, so I did. We blew up a railroad a couple of times, but I don't think we changed the course of the war very much. We lived as a unit up in the hills. They originally wanted to send 30-odd of us in the first batch, and we got 16 in; the rest didn't make it.

SW: Were the others captured as they were jumping in?

Colby: No. The first night we had eight Liberator B-24's, and four of them dropped people on the target, one dropped 50 kilometers away in Sweden, and the other three went home; they couldn't find it. And then a few days later they tried again with the remaining three, and one of them crashed in the Orkneys and they were all killed. They tried



“The one thing I think I did learn ... is that ... you've got to be aware of the political component of the effort. That is an absolute vital part of this kind of irregular warfare.”

again a few days later, and one of the planes hit a mountaintop near us. They were all killed, and at that point we said, “No more.”

SW: What types of missions did you perform?

Colby: Well, the mission there was that the Germans had about 400,000 troops up in northern Finland that had been pushed up there by the Russians, and they were

bringing them down through Norway to take them back to Germany. Our mission was to slow down that process. We were scattered along a railroad in northern Norway. The idea was just to interrupt it every now and then. We blew one small bridge. Another time we blew a long stretch of track, and they shot at us a few times — one of my Norwegians was wounded.

SW: What do you think are some of the most important things to remember about your OSS experience?

Colby: I think it was important that we learned the desirability of language, sort of as a precursor to the present stress that Special Forces put on it. And, of course, one of the Jedburghs was Col. Aaron Bank. He is one of the great names in Special Forces, because he came out of the World War II experience and then fought to keep the concept alive. I think the one most important thing was that the Jeds became exposed to the political aspects of the operation, the limitations — you don't raise a rebellion unless you have some way of reinforcing it. I thought the idea of not sending us too soon was very bright, very intelligent. They realized you're going to raise a lot of people up in resistance. You've got to have some reinforcements coming in very soon, or they'll be cleaned out. When you're dealing with a resistance, you've got to be aware of the political component of the effort. That is an absolute vital part of this kind of irregular warfare. Why are people doing it? They're either there with you or they're not. They can go home, it's up to them. You've got to have a political appeal. Why are they going to do it? Of course I've been interested in politics and revolutionary war for a long time. My experiences just reinforced that belief.

SW: That's part of what Special Forces training emphasizes today: an appreciation of the political and cultural aspects of a problem.

Colby: Special Forces today is so much better than we were. It's unbelievable. And I don't mean just the equipment — I mean the training, the subtlety of it. In the Jedburghs, they taught us how to sneak around and shoot and use knives. But there was absolutely no training in the politics of the problem: how to get along with people. So I read Lawrence of Arabia's book, and he had all sorts of things in there about how you get along with a strange culture, how to relate to them and handle yourself, how to defer and suggest. You don't take command, you don't boss people, you just have to work your way through it. It was good training in the basic principles of how you get along.

SW: You were later the director of the CORDS program in Vietnam. How successful do you think we were there in understanding the political aspect?

Colby: Well, I wrote a whole book about it, *Lost Victory*, which I think points out that the CIA did understand the political component of that people's war and, in its initial programs of the early '60's, got some programs going that were then taken over by the local government, particularly the strategic-hamlet program, which had its troubles, but it seized the initiative from the enemy. I always thought the military aspect was almost irrelevant because the enemy was fighting the people's war, not a soldier's war. Our previous experience was in Korea, and we approached it as a conventional struggle, except for CIA. We had some Special Forces assigned to my station when I was there. They were the first teams that came in. And we put them up in these little Montagnard villages and they taught self-defense and helped the Montagnards get organized, trained them and so forth, but essentially, the local leadership was in command. And they began to clear out substantial areas. Then we asked for more Special Forces

and they sent them, and at one point we had 400 Special Forces working under the CIA station. Once they got under the Military Assistance Command, their mission changed, and they were told to develop an offensive guerrilla force. So they took the guns away from all these people in the little villages, and they used the reinforcement forces, the so-called strike forces, to reinforce among several villages. And they took them and moved them over to the Cambodian border. That lost the entire local-defense philosophy behind the effort, and they spent their time running up and down the border town trying to find people on the Ho Chi Minh trail. They did a lot of very heroic things, but I think it just turned away from the whole base-building, defensive approach. My line has always been that you could conduct a strategic offensive through defensive tactics. And then, finally, President Johnson got impatient and said, "We've got to get after this other war," because his political background was that you've got to get an appeal to the people; you've got to help the people. So he said, "That other war has been totally passed aside when we were chasing around on search-and-destroy all the time. Let's get back to priority on that." Then this raised the problem again, how do you keep a unity of command? It took Bob Komer to straighten out how you could do that. He first kicked all the agencies in Washington to start to work together better, and then they conceived the idea that General Westmoreland would have a civilian deputy for pacification. That deputy would handle all aspects of pacification, while the rest of the military handled the other, but you had the unity of command in the single headquarters. It was a genius idea. Previous to that time, the civilian agencies had resisted the military's taking the thing over. They said the same thing will happen again: they'll go chasing off after the enemy instead of building under-

neath. But they didn't, and so Bob got it going, and I followed him, and my contention is that we essentially won the war. That's why I called it *Lost Victory*. We had a victory. The test I think was between '68 and '71. We essentially cleaned the communists out of the countryside in South Vietnam; there were practically none left, certainly not a threat to the state. We had so improved the situation that when the communists saw this all happening, they saw that they were losing. So they mounted up a soldier's war, a very conventional military attack at three points on the frontier, and they came across in the spring of '72. And we, between '69 and '72, had removed about 500 thousand American soldiers from the country. There were no more combat troops left. There were some logistics and advisory and some air, but no combat troops. But when this attack came, it was met on the ground by the Vietnamese Army, not the Americans, and it held. Some units broke, but essentially, it held. Over the course of the next month or two, the enemy was pushed back across the border. Now it wasn't without American participation, but the American participation was enormous logistics. You train a foreign army to use American weapons and American tactics, you'd better provide it with American logistics or it isn't going to work. And secondly, U.S. air power, which we used quite lavishly and very effectively, worked out very well. So here, the combination of the Vietnamese on the ground plus the enormous American support, but not participation, threw the enemy back. I call that victory, if South Vietnam could sustain itself, not with American troops but with American support. That was what we were after; that was our national objective. Of course after that, the logistics was cut way back, and by 1975, when the second major attack took place, there was no possibility of using American air power, with the Congress in the sit-

uation it was, and bingo, it fell apart, so that's the "lost" part of the "lost victory." But the lesson to me is, don't try to run it with soldiers, don't try to run it with sweetness and light, combine it. Use your intelligence, use your special operations, use your regulars where they're appropriate. But don't just use one or the other, use them all in combination.

SW: What do you think we need to remember about that experience as we look to what we call operations other than war?

Colby: I wrote a piece in the Defense Intelligence Journal here about a year ago, and it seems to me that the CORDS experience offers some good advice to us — that you don't have the military intelligence, the tactical intelligence working just by itself. Because the military, with the best will in the world, are not very political, and they are not very sensitive to political problems. The CIA is basically inclined to look upward rather than downward with where the information goes. So what do you do? You put them together. Don't think CIA does it all by itself or the Army does it all by itself. They work as a team, and they work very well. It seems to me that there really is better liaison between the agency and the military than there used to be, and that's to be praised.

SW: What is your opinion of our modern special-operations forces?

Colby: I think they're doing a fine job. I'm a great supporter. I applaud the way the military as a whole has really taken to special operations as an important element of our military structure. Granted it took the Congress to sort of force it down their throats, but nonetheless, it's there. The fact that there's a CINC, and you have the kind of structure there is and the budget that they have, apparently being reasonably protected, is a good sign. My line has always been that the most likely forces you're going to use are the

special operations. They're the ones you'll use more often, and I think that's been demonstrated.

SW: Do you think that likelihood will continue into the future?

Colby: Albert Einstein said in the late 1940s that the advent of the nuclear weapon has changed everything but the way we think. Well, I think that if he were alive today, he would say the end of the Cold War



"My line has always been that the most likely force you're going to use are the special operations, and I think that's been demonstrated."

has changed everything but the way we think. With all the benefits of the Bottom-Up Review, I think we need a better intelligence assessment as to what kinds of problems we're going to face and what we need forces for. I think there are potential savings in that. I think that special-operations forces come out very well in that assessment, because you are essentially talking about small engagements, and you're talking about an engagement which will involve a rounded

approach to a problem, not merely the application of force — the kinds of things that the special-operations people have done in Panama, and with the Kurds. The question will be, do we want to intervene in some of these faraway places? I think that there are a lot of them in which we won't. But if we want to intervene, I think special operations are some of the best ways to intervene with a modest force as part of a multilateral, multinational force. There is a question of how far the American people want to go. I don't think they are willing to go a long way, and they're not willing to go alone. I think that they would agree to participate in a multilateral force as maybe one-quarter or one-fifth of the force involved. But that means we have to figure out the whole relationship — who works for whom? It's a complicated problem. It took us 20 years to figure out the logistics and the communications and command structures in NATO, and that was in the face of the Red army, so we had to. We haven't figured out those relationships for "peacemaking," and the question is, can we do it now? The administration's partnership for peace has the elements of how to approach it: a flexible approach of different relations with different nations, bringing them into some sort of coordinated effort. That's going in the right direction, but we're a long way from home.



Letters

Special Warfare

'Trainer' term incorrect

It was with great pleasure I recently read SW's interview with Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert, Lt. Col. Frank Pedrozo and Col. J.S. Roach regarding the role of Special Forces during the course of El Salvador's 12-year civil war (October 1993). As a former SOF operator during the initial advisory training effort (1981-1984), I would only point out Lt. Col. Lambert's error in offering those Special Forces personnel working in-country "never were advisers ... They never were legally authorized to advise." In all fairness to the colonel's statement, it is my professional observation he erred in favor of being politically correct regarding an issue which is sorely misunderstood not only by the public, but the U.S. military community as a whole.

Special Forces personnel assigned to the U.S. MilGroup in El Salvador were both trainers and advisers, as is evidenced by formal MilGroup documentation as well as further documentation to this effect recently issued by a number of respected civilian and military offices.

The operative term "adviser" is used to describe U.S. military personnel assigned to fight in this conflict throughout the two most important studies published on the war in El Salvador, *American Military Policy in Small Wars. The Case of El Salvador* (Lt. Cols. A.J. Bacevich, James D. Hallums, Richard H. White, and Thomas F. Young), and *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador*, by Benjamin C. Schwarz of the RAND Institute for National Defense Research.

Contrary to Lt. Col. Lambert, SOF operators acted as combat

advisers from 1981 onward as hostile-fire pay statements signed by Col. Moody E. Hayes, COMISMILGP, El Salvador, demonstrate. Engaged in combat in the field ("high-risk areas"), in urban areas (i.e., San Salvador, 1983/84/89) and in their cuartels (i.e., San Miguel, La Union, Usulután) by often massive FMLN guerrilla forces, they served with documented honor and distinction.

As Special Forces soldiers we have much to be proud about regarding the civil/military victory of our counterparts over the Marxist forces of the FMLN. For the sake of advisers such as SFC Gregory Fronius, who died fighting alongside those Salvadoran soldiers whom he was responsible for, let's not dishonor this brilliant chapter of Special Forces history by assuming a "politically correct" stance when it is no longer necessary.

Greg Walker
Senior editor, Behind the Lines
Festus, Mo.

Sniper program result of one man's efforts

Having been there during its inception, I particularly enjoyed the article on the 10th Special Forces Group's sniper-training program (October 1993). I would like to add a couple of purely historical comments to this excellent article.

First, the start of the sniper training program was largely due to the efforts of one man, SFC Bill Amelung. He was one of those true believers that are sometimes found among the possessors of demanding skills. He believed in large-bore marksmanship and in its applica-

tion in sniping. Buoyed by this conviction, he took it upon himself to convince the Group that it should do something in this field. At that time, continuation of the then-new sniping training program at the IMA was very "iffy." It had few supporters and many opponents. SFC Amelung first convinced the Group S-3, Maj. Ken Getty, then the DCO and the CO. He was given the obvious reward for his efforts — the instruction. He did it, overcoming numerous obstacles. That the program was started, developed, survived and succeeded is largely attributable to SFC Amelung's efforts.

The other comment concerns the sniping range so well described in the article. This facility was entirely built by the 10th SFG with external help consisting mostly of permission and tolerance. Included in the shooting house were areas for weapons maintenance, storage areas and facilities for overnight guards. construction was to residential standards. It was turned over to the post only when it was completed.

Retired Col. J.H. Crerar
Vienna, Va.



Special Warfare welcomes letters from its readers but may have to edit them for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DTP-B; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

DA PAM 600-25 to contain chapters on SOF MOSS

The proposed DA PAM 600-25, Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide, has chapters covering active- and reserve-component soldiers in CMF 18 (SF), CMF 37 (PSYOP), and CMF 38 (Reserve CA). The chapters contain information about institutional training, operational assignments and self-development that SOF soldiers can use to help manage their careers. The chapters should be fielded during 1994. For further information, contact Sgt. Maj. Bill Frisbie, proponent sergeant major, or MSgt. Danny Carpinetti, CMF 18 manager, SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-9002/2415, commercial (910) 432-2415, fax -9406.

Army filling 37F slots in 4th PSYOP Group

The Army Special Operations Command needs active- and reserve-component soldiers to fill 37F slots in the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, N.C. Applicants should be airborne-qualified or airborne-volunteer privates and specialists. For more information, call SSgt. Stewart Marin, PERSCOM 37F career adviser, at DSN 221-8340/6044, commercial (703) 325-8340/6044.

Enlisted SF soldiers may apply for SF warrant officer

The Army Recruiting Command is looking for enlisted SF soldiers to apply for SF warrant-officer training. Applicants must have fewer than 12 years active federal service (waiverable with DA approval). They must also be in the grade of staff sergeant or above, have three years' ODA experience, have a DLPT rating of 1+/1+ or a DLAB score of 85, be an SF O&I graduate, have recommendations from company, battalion and group commanders, and be under 36 in the active component or under 42 in the reserve component. For more information, contact the SF warrant-officer recruiter at DSN 464-0820/0832/ 8779/8789, commercial (502) 624-0820/0832/8779/8789.

PERSCOM points of contact

The following points of contact may be useful to enlisted SOF soldiers who need information about assignments or career development:

Maj. Christopher Allen	SF Enlisted Branch chief
MSgt. Philip Taxiera	Professional-development NCO
Mrs. Faye Matheny	18 B, C and D assignments manager
Ms. Jacqui Velasquez	18 E, F, Z and ROTC assignments, ANCOC manager
Ms. Dyna Amey	SFQC accession manager
SSgt. Stewart Marin	37F assignments, ANCOC manager
Mrs. Loretta Spivey	SF Branch secretary

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the appropriate assignment managers and career-development questions to the professional-development NCO. Students attending the SF Qualification Course with assignment-related questions should contact their student PAC. Branch phone numbers are DSN 221-8340/6044, commercial (703) 325-8340/6044. Address correspondence to: Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 200 Stovall St.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452.



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SOF officers eligible for advanced degree in SO/LIC

Under a recent agreement between the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Chief of Naval Operations, qualified SOF officers will be selected for an advanced degree program at the Naval Post Graduate School leading to a master of arts in special operations and low-intensity conflict. The purpose of the program is to provide highly qualified officers, with advanced academic schooling, to SOF positions requiring extensive expertise in SO/LIC. The SF Branch at PERSCOM will select 10 officers for each course of instruction. Selected officers will be senior captains or junior majors with above-average performance fiches. The quota for attendance by branch and functional area will be six 18A54 and two 18A39 officers per course. One Ranger Regiment officer and one SOF-aviation officer will also be selected by the Infantry and Aviation branches. The academic program will last 18 months, followed by a three-year utilization tour. Positions so far identified for utilization are joint billets in theater special-operations commands. Interested officers should send a completed DA Form 1618R to Commander; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414. For more information, contact Capt. Ernie Benner at the SF Branch, phone DSN 221-3175/3178.

Warrant-officer actions have implications for SF

Several ongoing warrant-officer actions can have implications for Special Forces warrant officers:

- The revision of AR 611-112, Manual of Warrant Officer MOSs, will not only provide standards of grade for MOS 180A, but will also regulate the grade-coded assignments of all SF warrant officers. All W-1/W-2 positions are on A-detachments; two A-detachments will remain coded W-3, the company position is coded W-3, the battalion position W-4, and both group-level positions are coded W-5. AR 611-112 as a standard of grade will stipulate that all entry-level SF warrant officers will initiate a special background investigation for a top-secret security clearance to provide better assignment potential as senior and master warrant officers.
- The revision of DA Pamphlet 600-11, Warrant Officer Professional Development, will include a chapter on MOS 180A. This pamphlet will provide career guidance for SF warrant officers and promotion guidance for DA selection boards. This guidance will include the recommended minimum of 5-7 years on the operational A-detachment (and up to 14 years, if required) in the warrant ranks of WO1, CWO2, and CWO3. This guidance will also emphasize the assignments of 180As in authorized grade-coded positions and explain the possible negative connotations of an assignment in an unauthorized position. Warrant officers and their commanders should understand these important implications.
- AR 621-1 now provides partially funded degree-completion opportunities for most CWO2s and CWO3s. CWO2s will be eligible for associate-level training and CWO3s for baccalaureate-level training on Army time. These degrees have an impact on promotions to the next higher grades.
- The MOS 180A is changing its MOS title and principal duty titles to eliminate the ambiguities sometimes associated with the term "technician" and to better define the duty title of the SF warrant officer. Because SF

warrant officers frequently command A-detachments (sometimes as many as 60 percent and a substantial cumulative portion of most SF warrants' team time is in command), a more concise title was sought and found: one that includes the word "commander." The changes are: MOS 180A, "Special Forces technician," to MOS 180A "Special Forces warrant officer"; "detachment technician" to "assistant detachment commander"; "company technician" to "company operations warrant officer"; "battalion technician" to "battalion operations warrant officer"; and, at the group level, "group technician" to "group intelligence warrant officer" and "group operations warrant officer." Titles should be entered as appropriate in Part IIIa of the OER, DA Form 67-8, and on the Officer Record Brief in Section IX, Assignment History, under "Duty Title."

- Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, the commanding general of the SWCS, has instituted a policy to cap the age of SF warrant-officer applicants at 36 years. All future DA selection boards will be briefed on the desired maximum age of the MOS 180A selectee. The reserve component will use a 42-year age cap for an interim of two years, after which it will adopt the 36-year age cap. As MOS 180A accessions decrease, this qualitative measure will assist the SF community in selecting those candidates with the best physical potential required by the rigors of the A-detachment.

- MOS 180A will continue to recruit and select warrant officers even though the accession requirements will be reduced in FY 95 and FY 96. Because of the reduced accession requirements, selection into the only true combat warrant-officer MOS will become increasingly difficult. Applicants who exceed the DA-mandated active federal service of 12 years will be subject to waiver action from HQDA. The SF proponent will recommend waivers for qualified soldiers who have 12-14 years of active federal service. Applicants beyond 14 years of AFS will no longer be competitive or present adequate future-service potential. MOS 180A will be very competitive, and applicants should consider this aspect of selection when preparing their applications. Key areas of selection will include the applicant's service potential, qualifications, experience and language rating.

- Qualified NCOs applying for candidacy as SF warrant officers should ask their commanders for an interview and a letter of recommendation. These letters should be individualized and not "generic" endorsements. Applicants and their commanders must recognize the importance of the recommendations as a qualitative tool for the DA Selection Board.

- The CWO3, CWO4 and CWO5 promotion board for active-component warrant officers will convene May 31, 1994. Zones of consideration will be for:

- CWO3 — Above zone: All CWO2s with ADOR 30 Sep 88 and earlier
Primary zone: All CWO2s with ADOR 1 Oct 88 - 30 Sep 89
Title 10 does not provide for below-the-zone promotion to CWO3

- CWO4 — Above zone: All CWO3s with ADOR 30 Sep 88 and earlier
Primary zone: All CWO3s with ADOR 1 Oct 88 - 30 Sep 89
Below zone: All CWO3s with ADOR 1 Oct 89 - 30 Sep 90

- CWO5 — Above zone: All CWO4s/MWO4s with ADOR 30 Sep 87 and earlier
Primary zone: All CWO4s/MWO4s with ADOR 1 Oct 87 - 30 Sep 89
Below zone: All CWO4s/MWO4s with ADOR 1 Oct 89 - 30 Sep 90

Eligible warrant officers should update their DA photographs, Official Military Personnel Folders and Officer Record Briefs. For more information on Special Forces warrant-officer issues, contact CWO3 Shaun P. Driscoll, SF warrant-officer manager, SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.



Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

Turkey bolsters efforts against terrorist group

In August 1993 Turkey announced its intention to begin increasing police and military forces designated to conduct operations against the terrorist Kurdish Workers' Party, or PKK. Under this plan, "special teams" within the General Directorate of Police would be strengthened with personnel who will receive six months training in police schools. Some 3,000 troops will be selected from commando units for the military component. They will have served in southeastern Anatolia, be especially well-paid and be expected to "live like the PKK members live" in the mountains. While under the Special Operations Department of the Turkish armed forces, the teams will operate under the control of ground-force and gendarmerie commanders. An associated intelligence organization of military and civilian personnel will provide information on PKK bases, deployments and operations.

Czechs resume Semtex exports

The on-again, off-again export of the general-purpose plastic explosive Semtex, manufactured in Czechoslovakia during the height of the Cold War and linked to terrorist groups around the world, is scheduled to resume. The Czech Republic recently announced that exports were beginning to selected countries. The first Semtex shipment under the resumed exports will reportedly go to the British Defense Ministry. Czech reporting suggests that the British authorities intend to run experiments on the explosive that is often used by Irish Republican Army terrorists — including the October 1993 destruction of a building in Belfast. According to the 1991 international convention signed in Montreal, Semtex intended for industrial applications is to be a bright red-orange color and detectable by security-monitoring equipment. Variants of the explosive produced for civilian purposes are also less powerful than the nearly odorless version that became a favorite weapon of terrorists. Despite this and the export ban that had earlier been in place, Semtex continues to be smuggled across borders. Substantial quantities of the explosive have been stolen from industrial enterprises in the Czech and Slovak republics for sale on the black market. Shortly before the most recent ban was lifted, Czech police seized 100 kilograms of industrial Semtex from a group of Czech citizens who were planning its illegal sale abroad. In Slovakia last October, some 900 kilograms of the explosive were stolen from the warehouse of a private firm, together with more than 2,000 detonators. Czech officials candidly admit that they have no idea how much Semtex has been stolen or illegally diverted, and the continued black-market trade in the explosive seems certain.

Andean Ridge governments increase counterinsurgency resolve

In late November, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru made a dramatic rejection at the United Nations in New York of a proposal by the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas for peace negotiations. The Peruvian government has taken an "unconditional surrender" approach, although an amnesty law, the Law of Repentance, allows for individual surrender and impunity for past association with the guerrilla group. Sendero Luminoso has become synonymous with fanaticism, though there seems to be more continuity and vision to the organization than would be expected from a simple personality-based movement that had lost its top leadership. In the euphoric

aftermath of SL leader Abimail Guzman's capture last year, Fujimori promised to eliminate the group by 1995. Now the government seems to be backing off from that goal in light of SL's apparent resilience. Nevertheless, Fujimori's tough policy is both an indicator of government confidence and a morale booster for the stressed Peruvian public. Problems with armed local self-defense committees in rural areas, car bombings in Lima and criticism of the president's governance by decree are balanced by a measure of efficiency in the counterinsurgency efforts of the security forces and by generally positive economic trends. In sum, while Sendero Luminoso may be a resilient foe, the Peruvian state is more robust than it was sometimes thought to be.

In Colombia, there also appears to be a renewed commitment to overcome its leftist armed opposition. Security-force budgets continue to rise and major reforms, both of the military forces and, more importantly, of the police, are on the verge of implementation. Police reforms include short- and long-term projects to improve internal order. Higher pay scales and higher educational requirements for police personnel are tied to a new organizational structure. The police will stay under the ministry of defense to assure their apolitical professionalism, but they will have a new look and more missions. Lightly armed urban police will patrol Colombia's major cities while two other distinct subdivisions provide security services in rural areas. One of these would be given the capability and mission to counter organized internal armed groups. The hope is to eventually withdraw the Colombian Army as the primary countersubversive force in the country. Meanwhile, drug trafficking remains a challenge. New twists include the production and export of "liquid marijuana" (a more transportable marijuana extract) and an apparent reassertiveness of the ancient emerald mafia. Colombian society, however, seems to be increasingly unified in meeting the challenge. Special operations against internal enemies of the state may fall increasingly to police departments and less to military forces. Whether or not the Colombian police can develop the level of professionalism and public legitimacy necessary to assume missions now falling to the military is in great measure dependent on funding commitments by the Colombian government.

Opium poppy cultivation reported in Peru

Peruvian authorities are monitoring reports of opium-poppy cultivation in traditional Peruvian coca-growing areas. According to Peruvian assessments, limited numbers of poppies are being grown in the Amazonas and Cajamarca areas, with Colombian narco-traffickers reported to be distributing poppy seeds in Peru's Sisa River Valley, San Martin Province. Poppy cultivation in Colombia itself increased rapidly in the late 1980s, although earlier reports were sparse. Heroin laboratories soon appeared, and by the early 1990s a vigorous, profitable heroin trade with the U.S. and Europe had developed. Peruvian specialists assert their intention to prevent the establishment of significant poppy cultivation in Peru. They point out that a glut of cocaine on world markets, falling prices for the coca cultivators and high profits to be made from heroin are factors that advise early Peruvian countermeasures.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Special Warfare

Jedburgh veterans dedicate memorial stone

Members of an elite World War II unit gathered at the JFK Plaza Jan. 28 to dedicate a granite marker to the memory of their unit and fallen comrades.

Hosted by Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott, commander of the Army Special Operations Command, the dedication ceremony paid tribute to the Jedburghs, units of the Office of Strategic Services that operated behind enemy lines in three-man teams.

“This stone memorializes the courage and accomplishments of the Jedburghs and reminds us of the need for special-operations soldiers — soldiers willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for their country,” Scott said.

The OSS created 99 three-man Jedburgh teams during World War II to provide special-operations support for the allied invasion of German-occupied France and the Netherlands. The teams, normally consisting of one French officer, one American or British officer, and an enlisted radio operator, penetrated deep behind enemy lines to work with resistance groups in harassing German forces.

The Jedburghs became a tremendous combat multiplier in Europe, disrupting the movement of thousands of German troops and their supplies. The standards they set and the traditions they established live on in modern special-operations forces, Scott said.

Jedburgh team member and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency William Colby was guest speaker for the ceremony. Although technology, equipment



Photo by Keith Butler

Jedburgh veterans join modern-day USASOC soldiers in dedicating the memorial stone.

and training are better today than they were in the 1940s, Colby said, there is a direct link between the Jedburghs and modern Special Forces soldiers through the emphasis placed in both training programs on cultural preparation. — Susan Jackson, USASOC PAO

19th SF Group looking for MI soldiers

The 19th Special Forces Group is looking for NCOs qualified in military intelligence.

The unit has openings for NCOs in MOSs 96D, 96B, 97B, 97E, 98C, 98G and 98H.

The 19th SF Group has units in Utah, Colorado and West Virginia. Members will have opportunities for advanced military schooling, OCONUS deployments and real-world missions, according to Capt. James P. Dorschner, Group S-2. For more information, contact

Dorschner or SSgt. Brad Kingston at DSN 766-3737, commercial (801) 576-3737.

Soldiers must meet course prerequisites

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, reports that some students are turned away once they show up for training in military free fall, underwater operations and operations and intelligence courses because they do not meet the prerequisites.

Prerequisites for the courses are listed below:

- Military Free-Fall Parachutist Course — Open to active- or reserve-component officers, warrant officers or enlisted personnel in special-operations forces who are assigned to, or on orders for assignment to, a military free fall-coded position; or selected DoD personnel or allied personnel who are qualified military parachutists. Applicants must have passed the high-altitude, low-opening physical examination in accordance with AR 40-501, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-5, within one year prior to class date and must report with complete medical records, including original HALO examination, on day of in-processing. Applicants must have nine months remaining in service upon graduation.

- SF Combat Diver Qualification Course — Open to active- or reserve-component Army or selected DoD personnel assigned or on orders to a special-operations-forces unit. Applicants must be male commissioned officers, warrant officers or enlisted personnel. They must pass a scuba physical examination

in accordance with AR 40-501, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-8, within one year before the course completion date and must report with medical records on the day of in-processing. Applicants must pass the Army Physical Readiness Test with a minimum of 70 points in each event and an overall score of 210 or above (scored on the 17-21-year age group) and must meet height and weight standards outlined in AR 600-9.

- SF Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant Course — Applicants must be members of active- or reserve-component Special Forces units. They must be staff sergeants or above, be MOS 18-series qualified for at least three years and have served in an SF operational unit for at least three years. They must also pass the APRT within 30 days before attending the course (verified by the commander), have a current periodic SF physical in accordance with AR 40-501, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-3, and be airborne-qualified, able to participate in airborne operations and on jump status.

For more information on courses in the SWCS 2nd Battalion, contact SFC Robert De Groff at DSN 239-4420, commercial (910) 432-4420.

USSOCOM develops Civil Affairs data base

A global Civil Affairs data base is being developed under the supervision of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

The data base, which will be available to all CA soldiers via modem, will become the primary source for all Civil Affairs information, according to Pamela Dover, a Civil Affairs data base action officer in the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.

Maps, which will identify monuments, artifact locations, transportation assets and population statistics, will be quickly retrieved by telephone and then downloaded into portable lap-top computers

throughout the CA community in the future, Dover said.

A prototype of the data base was recently presented to members of USACAPOC at its headquarters at Fort Bragg. At the presentation, programmers stressed that the system being developed compiles information in a format compatible with FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

Covering the 22 CA functional areas, the data-base information is organized into a system that CA soldiers can quickly understand and retrieve, said Juergen Buehring, a computer specialist in the USSOCOM J-9 section.

Training and user manuals are now being developed for the system, Buehring said. He expects the system to be operational in about a year. — Gerard Healy, USASOC PAO

FM 100-5 package released on CD-ROM

The Army Training and Doctrine Command has released an educational package to accompany the release of the new Field Manual 100-5, Operations.

Developers say the package can be a valuable tool that will assist commanders and leaders in developing training and leader-development programs.

The package has three elements: a CD-ROM computer disk, a 35mm slide presentation with a script, and a VHS videotape.

The CD-ROM disk contains both the 1986 and 1993 versions of FM 100-5 and copies of FM 25-100, Training the Force, FM 25-1-1, Battle Focused Training, The National Security Strategy of the United States and The U.S. National Military Strategy.

Three audio-visual animations on the disk explain the concept of battle space, the dynamics between operational offense and defense, and the concept of simultaneous attack in depth. Teaching points accompany each animation.

The slide presentation and script

explain the new FM 100-5 in terms of new concepts and the strategic context in which it was developed. The videotape gives viewers historical insight into the production of Army keystone doctrine and its relevance to the Army.

Initial distribution of the training package sent 1,200 copies of the CD-ROM disk and 650 copies of the slide presentation and videotape to active- and reserve-component Army units. For more information, contact Lt. Col. Pat Ritter, TRADOC School of Advanced Military Studies, at DSN 552-2138/3345.

ACAP services ease job transition

Soldiers and civilians leaving the Army because of downsizing can make a smoother transition by planning ahead and taking advantage of the Army's program for transition assistance.

The Army Career and Alumni Program, known as ACAP, has been developed to ensure that Army personnel experience a successful transition into civilian life. It is open to Army personnel, family members over 18 and DA civilians affected by force alignment or reduction.

ACAP provides a number of services, including individual transition plans, automated career planning, quarterly job fairs, small-business counseling, workshops and benefits counseling. Personnel may attend ACAP as many as 180 days prior to their terminal leave or ETS date.

To take full advantage of the program, affected soldiers and civilians should register as early as possible. Commanders, first sergeants and unit leaders can assist by affording personnel every opportunity to participate. For more information, contact the ACAP office on your installation.



Book Reviews


Special Warfare

Getting It Right: American Military Reform After Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond. By James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia. New York: William Morrow & Company, 1993. ISBN 0-688-12096-2. 320 pages. \$23.

Everyone is getting involved in the reform business — even our Defense Department. Historically, America's military forces have had a lackluster performance, in spite of several reorganizations and inspired leadership. This has been particularly true following the first battle of a major conflict. In February, 1991, the American military did something unique. For the first time in history, U.S. troops won the first battle of a war and did it with minimal losses. The Gulf War was an unqualified success.

The recent work by James F. Dunnigan and Raymond Macedonia traces the sweep of reforms in our armed services over nearly two decades — from the painful aftermath of Vietnam to the Gulf War. The authors appear to be well-qualified to speak on the subject of military reform. Dunnigan has been designing war games for the U.S. military since 1966 and helped to re-establish war-gaming at the U.S. Army War College.

Retired Army Col. Raymond Macedonia, educated at the University of Pittsburgh, the Wharton Business School and New York University, later served on the faculty at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He also held several key assignments on the Joint Staff, including directing interagency analytical study efforts which led to negotiations with the former Soviet Union on mutual and balanced force



reductions.

Written primarily for civilians, Dunnigan and Macedonia's work focuses on their concept of a "victory disease," an affliction caught by most armies after they have fought a war. The authors summarize the symptoms of this disease by exploring the following issues:

- "It worked so well last time, let's do it again next time." — The authors contend that the victory disease tends to make winners blind to needed technological and organizational changes.

- "Congratulations, you're fired!" — According to the authors, nations, particularly democracies, do not willingly spend large amounts of money on troops in peacetime.

- "What exactly did we do in order to win?" — Losers want to dump old habits and winners are reluctant to fiddle with what is obviously a winning combination.

The book's strong suit lies in

telling the story of early visionaries whose impacts are still felt in today's military. These include Army Gen. William DePuy, of whom the authors say, "He led the way in breaking the mold by creating an Army trained and ready to win its first battles quickly, decisively, and with minimum casualties." DePuy is credited with establishing the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, which recently celebrated its 20th year of contributing doctrinal, training and force-structure enhancements to our modern Army.

Also included in this list of visionaries are Retired Army Gen. Paul F. Gorman, former commander in chief for U.S. Southern Command from 1983-84, who is praised for his efforts in helping to establish the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif.; Retired Army Gen. William R. Richardson, who is credited with establishing the AirLand Battle doctrine; and Retired Army Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman, "An extraordinary man with exceptional talent and creativity," who was instrumental in turning the volunteer Army into a quality fighting force.

If this volume has a weakness, it lies in the highly generalized "shotgun" descriptions of the condition of the Army's noncommissioned officer corps following the Vietnam War. The authors describe this group of warriors as "drifting toward booze, brawling, and (having) complicated love lives." Nothing could be further from the truth. Having benefited from the experience and wisdom of some of these outstanding individuals during his early military career, this reviewer can certainly vouch for their many contributions to

today's Army.

Getting It Right describes some of the crucial issues facing today's military. It provides the reader with plenty of material from which to develop informed opinions of our military forces and their role in a New World Order.

Maj. Michael E. Long
360th CA Brigade
Columbia, S.C.

Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power. By Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. ISBN: 0-691-00090-5 (paper). 229 pages.

Peter Paret, professor of history at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, is perhaps America's foremost expert on Karl von Clausewitz and his political-military writings. Therefore, any of Paret's thoughts and opinions need to be taken seriously.

This book is a collection of Paret's essays and speeches on Clausewitz and war in 19th-century Europe, compiled over his illustrious academic career. Paret provides dozens of insights into Clausewitz's thinking and the times in which he wrote. As such, this book is an excellent companion to Paret's and Michael Howard's translation of Clausewitz's *On War* — the best translation of Clausewitz on the market. Perhaps a better title for this latest work would be, "Understanding Clausewitz and His Times" — for this is what the book does best.

Since Clausewitz lived and fought during the Napoleonic era, Paret gives much space to the discussion of Napoleon and his war-fighting strategies and their effect on political and military figures and theorists of the day. Paret deserves congratulations for his synthetic approach to the subject. By examining the social, economic, political and military means for making war in the 19th century, he enhances our understanding of the total envi-

ronment of central Europe at that time.

As in all compilations of different works, Paret's book suffers from a lack of continuity, but this observation need not be interpreted as criticism. In fact, because of the way the book is divided into three parts, with 16 chapters, it makes superb bedtime reading. No essay is so long that it would keep you up late.

Although many of his chapters make for interesting reading, Paret's expositions on "Nationalism and the Sense of Military Obligation," and "Conscription and the End of the Ancien Regime in France and Prussia," are most thought-provoking. These two essays go to the heart of the body politic and its relationship to nationalism — which is what made Napoleon's draft of two million Frenchmen into his military possible. Many of Paret's observations about the 19th century retain value today.

For instance, he writes, "Nationalism implies a measure of sacrifice of men's immediate concerns for the greater good; but on occasion the common cause may appear to be imperfectly represented," and "However men have felt about fighting for their country — ecstatic, resentful, resigned — whatever their attitude, it has rarely been in perfect harmo-

ny with the principles and expectations of their governments."


Paret's discourse concerning the American Revolutionary War and its effect, or more correctly, its lack of effect, on European military thought is also fascinating. Of particular interest to Clausewitzian scholars will be Paret's observations in "Clausewitz: Life and Thought," and his publication, with commentary, of two of Clausewitz's previously unpublished letters concerning strategy.

A possible criticism is that the book assumes knowledge the reader may not possess. Paret's essays appear targeted at graduate-level audiences who have already read *On War* and have studied the wars of 19th-century Europe. If the reader does not have this scholastic background, then the book may be of limited utility.

Moreover, Paret's style of writing tends toward the "old academic" — his sentences are sometimes overly long and complex. Paret also assumes the reader's knowledge of 19th-century French, British and German history. This is understandable, but unfortunately, again, limits his audience to graduate students or well-read military-history buffs.

Overall, and with an understanding of their limitations, Paret's essays are illuminating and interesting. *Understanding War*, although too grand a title for a collection of any one person's essays, is enlightening reading.

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Special Warfare

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