



# Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



SOF:  
Meeting  
Tomorrow's  
Challenges

# From the Commandant



## Special Warfare

Experts tell us that the future will involve increasingly complex military operations and a change in the nature of civilization. Added to the changes and the complexities we already face, the prospect of these new developments is almost overwhelming.

As the national security focus shifts from a global one to a regional one, our forces may be required to provide two very different kinds of responses: traditional combat for aggressive actions; and non-combat activities, such as peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, for internal conflicts.

Many countries are experiencing internal warfare as a result of ethnic and nationalistic conflict. Ethnic conflict is not a new problem; it was merely suppressed during the Cold War. Our role in handling these challenges requires a thorough understanding of the historical, cultural and political contexts of the nations involved. At the same time, there will be a need to provide security and stability as nations rebuild. As we have witnessed in the last few years, these peace operations are becoming increasingly dangerous.

Noncombat operations confronting us today span a wide range and involve the employment of diplomatic and military means. Such operations can be conducted either unilaterally, as part of a coalition or as part of an international organization such as the United Nations. They call for soldiers who are skilled in joint and inter-agency operations and who are capable of handling combat and security missions as well as noncombat activities requiring cultural sensitivity.

In dealing with current and future threats, the United States is fortunate to have the advanced capabilities of Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces. Well-known for their innovation and initiative, these special-



operations forces have the training, the experience and the intelligence that make them well-suited for the complex operations that the U.S. may encounter. Army SF, CA and PSYOP forces perform various functions well because they are not only technically skilled but are also skilled in dealing with people: in understanding their culture, their customs and their language. It is these remarkable skills that enable our forces to adapt to situations in various parts of the world, whether in primitive or modern societies, and to perform as a unique military force.

At the Special Warfare Center and School, we take pride in training the soldiers of this force. While new threats and situations may require us to modify our doctrine, our force structure and our training, the one thing that will never change is our dedication to producing the best special-operations soldiers possible — soldiers who will be equal to any challenge in the present or in the future.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Wm. F. Garrison".

**Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison**

**Commander & Commandant**

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

**Editor**


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# Special Operations Forces: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges Today

*by Gen. Wayne A. Downing*

**T**he United States Special Operations Command was activated in April 1987, when the Cold War was still the defining paradigm for the defense establishment of the United States.

The Cold War can best be described as a 50-year rivalry between the free world and the Soviet Union and its client states, especially those in the Warsaw Pact. Our Cold War defense planning focused on deterring the Soviet Union and its allies and, if necessary, fighting them.

USSOCOM's mission within this defense scenario was to infiltrate the Warsaw Pact from all sides with hundreds of teams of well-trained special-operations forces. These teams were prepared to conduct strategic reconnaissance and direct action against high-value strategic and operational targets. They were also trained to conduct unconventional-warfare operations, including guerrilla warfare, sabotage, subversion and the establishment of escape-and-evasion nets. In addition to being prepared for the missions outlined above, SOF were responsible for a major part of our nation's capability to respond to low-intensity conflict, including terrorism. These missions provided SOF a fairly consistent basis for their force structure; modernization; and research, development and acquisition.

With the Cold War over, USSOCOM's defense orientation has changed. USSO-

COM now focuses on the four challenges to U.S. security outlined in the Defense Planning Guidance: the proliferation of nuclear weapons, regional crises, threats to democracy and threats to the economy. Recently, a fifth challenge has been added to this list — transnational threats, such as drug and crime cartels, international terrorists and even some commercial enterprises. These five challenges have led to a strengthened regional orientation and an increased emphasis on foreign internal defense — the measures the U.S. takes to help developing nations manage threats to their internal defense and development. As a result, geographic commanders in chief, or CINCs, and American ambassadors and their country teams are using SOF more and more to help deal with an emerging and changing world security environment.

The U.S. is at a critical period in the development of its security posture. Although we are in the midst of a period of dynamic, unprecedented change in the world, some of the changes are not in the best interests of our national security. We can depend on SOF to provide our nation with the capabilities necessary to cope with these tremendous challenges of the future.

## **Security factors**

The security environment confronting the United States today is shaped by three significant factors, all of which directly

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affect the SOF community in its efforts to defend our nation.

First, the rapid pace of technological change is redefining how we think about our lives and how we fight wars. We don't yet know the full implications of this change.

Second, some experts see the world evolving toward an end state of democratic states and free-market economies — a world of increased cooperation and peaceful solutions to many of mankind's pressing problems. A great amount of evidence supports this view, such as the growth of the economies of the Pacific-rim nations and the spread of democracy in Latin America during the last decade. In this vision of the world, viewed through the lens of Western ideals, we see the evolution of nation-states dedicated to the peaceful solution of common problems and the continued progress of mankind toward a more understanding world order: a kinder, gentler world. This is a new world order, characterized by reasonable men debating which forms of progress are best-suited to a world concerned with preserving the ecosystem and guaranteeing the rights of all people.

But a third factor is the changes we are witnessing in the international order that seem to presage a move in the opposite direction from the high-tech, information age that promises increased prosperity and opportunity. Many observers see indications of a fundamental change in the very essence of conflict and war, as illustrated by the examples listed below:

- The linkage between narcotrafficking, crime and revolutionaries in some Latin American states and in parts of Africa and the former Soviet Union.

- Events in Somalia, where human suffering, an international relief effort, clan fighting and crime have become intertwined.

- The intifadah in the occupied territories of Israel, where stone-throwing Palestinian youths accomplished what Arab armies failed to do in four major wars and 45 years of struggle — bring Israel and the PLO to the peace table. Both countries granted significant concessions.

- The ongoing civil strife in Rwanda, where colonial boundaries and the accident of birth into a particular tribe have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent people.



*A U.S. Marine talks with children gathered to receive medical examinations during a medical civic-action program in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope.*

Photo by Terry Mitchell

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- The rising crime rate in the U.S., where some slums in major cities lack the most basic government services and where shadow governments reign.

Many commentators see a world that appears to be disintegrating rather than progressing. It is a world that might someday be divided into two rival factions: a high-tech, relatively well-off faction composed of North America, Europe and the economically successful nations of the Pacific rim; and a faction in which borders would be disregarded and where Western ideas of progress, rights, duties and responsibilities would not only be rejected, but vilified. This second faction would be chaotic, with passions fueled by radical religious fundamentalism, by ethnic hatreds which have lain dormant for decades under the mantle of communism, by disease, by exploding populations, by declining natural resources and by pervasive crime that challenges the very foundations of nation-states and makes borders meaningless.

## Two views

There is evidence to support each of the contrasting views of the world — that of the high-tech road to increased prosperity and that of a world disintegrating as people revert to primitive values. Each view has significant implications for the way our nation will fight future wars, and SOF will have to be prepared to live in and deal with both worlds.

The high-tech, information-age view promises us a military with the capabilities to strike quicker, farther and more precisely, and to achieve lightning victories with few casualties, as exemplified by Operation Desert Storm. This promise may be realized if we apply technology to war as we currently understand it and if we fight nation-states with the kinds of target sets that are vulnerable to this high-tech, precision force with its increasingly accurate and technical intelligence-collection systems.

But there is a possibility that we are creating a high-tech military that will be irrelevant to future warfare — a military

appropriate for only a small portion of the nation's future threats, a military that could be the Maginot Line of the 21st century because the challenges to America's security are changing.

One of the great challenges to our nation, and in particular to the SOF community, is to adapt our high-tech forces to fight in that low-tech part of the world where the enemies are not nation-states, but rather drug cartels, crime syndicates, ideological revolutionaries, religious radicals and many other transnational groups that almost certainly don't have the kinds of infrastructure for which our precision weapons are so ideally suited. This is warfare in which the target sets of nations are replaced by enemies who do not respect boundaries, who do not mass forces and who do not have a readily identifiable army. In fact, they may not have an identifiable military center of gravity. They intermingle with the populations of large urban areas, where even our best precision weapons will create unacceptable collateral damage and where our technical intelligence systems will be largely ineffective. Some refer to this new security challenge as fourth-generation warfare. It is warfare for which many of our conventional military capabilities and high-tech weapons are not applicable.

Coming to terms with fourth-generation warfare will be especially difficult; many in the military establishment are still trying to come to grips with what is known as third-generation warfare — maneuver warfare as exemplified by the blitzkrieg and the tactics of the Gulf War. Although it will not be easy, we must break away from our Cold War mentality and seek innovative solutions. SOF are the likely force to bridge the gap between these seemingly diverse islands of high-tech and disintegrating social structures. We are both a high-tech force and a force centered on people, conversant with virtually all areas of the world and the challenges the people in those areas face.

We must strive to remain a high-tech force — one that will save the lives of and improve the performance of our operators, and one that will accomplish a mission

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faster, cheaper and more effectively. We must learn to apply technology selectively and to understand not only the possibilities it opens to us but also the limitations it imposes.

## Technology

Recent deployments have highlighted the value of technology. From the precision of our gunships during Just Cause, to our ability to penetrate deep behind Iraqi lines at night during Desert Storm, to our ability to communicate from remote areas of northern Iraq during Provide Comfort, we have used modern technology to accomplish our missions with increased effectiveness. USSOCOM's goal is to provide SOF with a technological advantage that allows them to accomplish their missions quickly, with minimum casualties and minimum collateral damage. We must continue to improve our capabilities with a thoroughly developed and carefully thought-out program that will allow us to maintain a technological edge over our adversaries.

The USSOCOM modernization program is proceeding exceptionally well. We have

made significant improvements in our fleet of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. We are re-equipping the Naval Special Warfare boat units with modern, tremendously capable boats and ships. And we have made great strides in providing our ground forces with new communications equipment and sensors.

Although the modernization process will continue, the end of the Cold War and a decrease in the overall defense budget have led to a major re-evaluation of the modernization program. As a result, we recently cancelled 42 programs and scaled back another 24. We now have a much leaner, more affordable, and better balanced modernization program that directly addresses SOF's current needs.

We will not always be on the leading edge of technology. Pursuing the latest technology is very expensive, and in this era of reduced defense resources, we must be selective and pursue a limited number of primary ventures. This will allow us to stay in front of the technology wave without risking precious dollars on low-probability-of-success developments. We must also continue to evaluate service-developed technologies and adapt service-field-



*An MH-53J Pave Low helicopter lands behind Iraqi lines during Operation Desert Storm to transport special-operations forces back to their home base.*

Photo by Greg Ford

ed equipment to SOF needs. Army special-operations aviation's fielding of the MH-60K and MH-47E helicopters is a good example of this trend.

At the same time, we do have the capability to procure small numbers of highly specialized items very quickly. Congress granted USSOCOM acquisition authority equal to that of a service chief. Because we field equipment for a relatively small force, we can shorten the acquisition cycle considerably. Purchasing off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items can further compress the cycle. This capability was evident both in Desert Storm, where we were able to rapidly upgrade our helicopters in the field, and during the deployment to Somalia, where we were able to field body armor and HMMWV armor kits in a matter of weeks.

### Human element

But while high-tech is important, there are challenges for which there are no high-tech solutions. In some parts of the world, human passions have created hatreds that are not amenable to rational solutions, and high-tech will be of no avail, because

the roots of the problems are in the minds and hearts of men. It is here that our investment in people will be important.

While all of our nation's military will have to deal with this challenge, SOF, especially Army SOF, will truly be the point men on the patrol. There are two reasons for this. First, SOF — more than any other force — deal with human problems every day at a practical level. They understand the value of dealing with these problems in the language of those with whom they are working. SOF operators understand cultural differences. They understand that not all cultures find our way of life appealing, and that to be successful in averting wars, we must understand all of the cultural complexities. For SOF, this understanding comes from nearly 50 years of deploying to and working in many of the countries of the developing world while the rest of the force focused almost solely on the central European battlefield.

Second, many of the problems in the developing world today require the unique skills and talents found only in Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units. Often these problems require the dissemination of accurate information to the pop-

*A soldier from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion visits a school in Honduras as part of a team to distribute food.*



U.S. Army photo

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ulation and establishment of the basic infrastructure of a state. Because many of the problems arise in the minds of men and pertain to basic human needs for services, our SF, PSYOP and CA forces will become increasingly important in the development of new and innovative solutions to the myriad challenges faced by peoples trying to evolve toward democracy and a free-market economy.

Because of the utility of SF, PSYOP and CA and their decades of experience in dealing with challenges in the developing world, we are in a unique position to contribute to stability in much of the world. We must seize the opportunity and take the lead within the Department of Defense.

We in the special-operations business pride ourselves on being unconventional, on seeking out nonstandard solutions, and on being able to apply innovation, initiative and forward thinking to seemingly intractable problems. We face a world with immense challenges, but a world that is also developing phenomenal technologies that may assist in developing solutions to those challenges. We have the people, the motivation and the reputation for unconventional thought and action. Now is the time to justify the faith our nation's leaders have placed in us by being in the forefront of change. Now is the time for us to develop new paradigms that will allow us to continue to make significant contributions to this nation's security.

The other reason SOF are going to be in the forefront of this change in our nation's defense paradigm is that we have earned the respect, trust and confidence of our nation's leaders. Recently, Secretary of Defense William Perry addressed a group of SOF senior officers. He said that one of the most important and demanding things he does is to sign orders for military deployments to foreign countries. Perry stated that he takes this responsibility very seriously, because committing U.S. forces, whether in peace or in war, is always an important statement of U.S. resolve and always puts the reputation of the United States on the line.

He then said that he has great confi-

dence when he signs orders to deploy SOF, because he has seen our forces training and operating in the field. Perry has spent time with us and has shared our joys and our heartbreaks. As a result, he has developed profound respect, trust and confidence in our abilities and competence. This confidence comes from the professional way in which our people have consistently performed complex, sensitive and demanding missions during the past several years.

The exceptional reputation we now enjoy did not just happen — our people made it happen through countless years of often unpublicized service and sacrifice in remote regions of the world. They made it happen because they adhered to high standards and were devoted to mission accomplishment, no matter what the cost.

This professional competence has been evident in many ways since the founding of USSOCOM. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, SOF helped our nation reassert its moral leadership throughout the world by playing key roles in our response to two ruthless dictators, Manuel Noriega in Panama and Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

But just as remarkable as this enviable wartime record is SOF's peacetime performance. We have had operators deployed around the world continuously since the end of the Vietnam War, often helping people less fortunate than we, working to alleviate conditions of incipient insurgency, disease, poverty and other instabilities that threaten emerging democracies. These are the kinds of missions we must continue to accomplish to perfection in order to cope with fourth-generation warfare.

### **Regional support**

In an unstable world, the value of SOF in support of geographic commanders in chief, other government agencies and U. S. ambassadors and their country teams has increased significantly. Geographic CINCs and U.S. ambassadors have implemented regional peacetime plans to assist many countries in coping with the new world

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environment. SOF are ideally suited to work closely with these nations as they address the challenges of internal defense and development. SOF's regional orientation has been invaluable in allowing our forces to work closely with the militaries of developing nations, and SOF serve as vivid, living examples of the role of the military in a democratic society. SOF have also been instrumental in implementing a respect for human rights in the military forces of many countries as they respond to internal challenges.

This trend in SOF employment is clearly illustrated by the increased number of SOF deployments in the wake of the Cold War. The overseas employment of SOF rose 35 percent from FY 1991 to FY 1992 and 39 percent from FY 1992 to FY 1993. In FY 1991, SOF deployed to 92 different countries. In FY 1992 that number increased to 102, and in FY 1993, it increased to 119.

- In the U.S. European Command, SOF are an integral part of the CINCEUR's military-to-military contact program. In the last year alone, SOF have been part of this program in Estonia, Belarus, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Romania and Russia. In addition, SOF have been an integral part of CINCEUR's programs that help the nations of sub-Saharan Africa deal with their many problems. SOF have been involved in projects ranging from medical inoculation programs, to biodiversity projects aimed at preserving the natural resources of the nations, to programs for strengthening the ability of a host nation to deal with lawlessness.

- In the U.S. Pacific Command, SOF are the tip of the spear in the CINCPAC's program of "cooperative engagement." SOF are often the force of choice because of their appreciation and respect for local customs and because of their ability to work with the local people in their own language. In addition, SOF often initiate military-to-military programs with a small, discreet visit that places little burden on the host nation and that can be accomplished with little publicity. Once these programs are successful, other, larg-

er exchanges and programs are easier to arrange.

- The U.S. Southern Command is deeply involved in counterdrug programs as well as programs to improve the professionalism of militaries in Central and South America. SOF are an integral part of these programs. The Support Justice counterdrug exercises are aimed at the sources of drugs. The exercises use SOF extensively to provide host nations with training that will allow them to address their problems independently. These missions often take the form of deployments for training, in which SOF train local military and paramilitary forces in skills required to combat drugs. SOF frequently provide liaison between foreign militaries and other U.S. government agencies. They also provide teams to assist host-nation militaries with the intricacies of planning complex operations against a sophisticated foe. SOF units also provide local authorities with training and expertise in psychological operations designed to help the government spread the word about the dangers of drugs and drug trafficking.

- In the U.S. Central Command, SOF peacetime deployments have increased dramatically in the wake of Operation Desert Storm. As CENTCOM assists the nations within its area in improving their self-defense capability, SOF are an important implement, and they have been employed there continuously since the end of the Gulf War. Over the past several years, the Arabic-language ability of regionally oriented SOF has improved significantly, allowing them to better communicate with host-nation forces and to provide even more effective unit training.

- The U.S. Atlantic Command is one of the most innovative users of SOF. Since USACOM assumed additional responsibilities as the joint-force integrator for CONUS-based forces, the integration of SOF into CONUS conventional-force operations has increased dramatically. The CINCACOM has initiated adaptive-joint-force-packaging exercises, which have resulted in closer relationships between SOF and conventional forces. Navy special-warfare units and forces from the

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Joint Special Operations Command, including SOF aviation, have always worked with Navy and Marine forces. Now we are also exercising SEALs, Rangers and Special Forces aboard aircraft carriers. This growing use of SOF as a standard part of tailored force packages emphasizes that SOF can provide conventional-force commanders with increased capabilities that can significantly enhance their effectiveness.

When this nation needs regional experts, when it needs language-qualified soldiers with a myriad of skills, when it needs mature soldiers who can operate on their own in harsh environments, far from the support structures of conventional units, and when it needs those difficult jobs done that no one else can comprehend, let alone accomplish, it turns to SOF. Moreover, all of these accomplishments have been superbly supported by

our Reserve, National Guard, and Air Guard comrades who provide so much of our capability in the particularly important areas of PSYOP and Civil Affairs.

### **People important**

At the heart of all these contributions are our people. Changes in the world security environment have not changed the seminal fact that people remain the most important element in USSOCOM. We must continue to recruit, train and retain those exceptional men and women who allow us to accomplish our many assigned tasks. We ask our people to do a great deal, often under harsh environmental conditions and in considerable physical danger, as was again brought home forcefully by the events in Mogadishu. We must ensure that our people have the necessary equipment, training, leadership and support to protect our



*Civil Affairs soldiers from the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command load onto a C-141 for deployment during Operation Desert Storm.*

Photo by Bob Jordan

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nation's interests. People remain our most important asset, for it is the people who accomplish the missions, and it is the people who make the sacrifices.

In a one-year period, from April 1993 to April 1994, we lost 35 special operators in combat and in training. To ensure that their sacrifice was not in vain, we must redouble our efforts to guarantee that their vision of a better world is realized. And we must remember their families.

My last point is that we must maintain our capability. To do this we must accomplish the following, and it is here that I am counting on our SOF soldiers to continue to set the example for the rest of the force.

- Continue to attract, train and retain quality people. Remember, it is quality, not quantity, that is important.

- Continue to improve our capabilities in language and cross-cultural communication. These are the critical combat multipliers of the future.

- Continue to make each overseas deployment a model one. We must live among the people we work with and establish a level of rapport that can withstand the temporary setbacks of changing political policies.

- Continue to improve our integration with conventional forces. We want conventional commanders to see us as being so valuable that they will not contemplate a mission without asking for our assistance.

- Finally, achieve unequivocal success in every mission we undertake. Our reputation demands this; our country expects it; and the security of our nation depends upon it.

Since its activation, USSOCOM has evolved in several significant ways, including a reorientation from the Cold War toward the emerging security threats of a less stable world and an increased employment of forces overseas. From its beginnings in 1987, USSOCOM has evolved steadily and has become a significant contributor to the regional and country plans of geographic CINCs and American ambassadors and, through them, to the security needs of the United States.

We are a command that has fully

embraced the changing requirements of the new world order. We have put in place a system to re-evaluate the changing world situation and to develop personnel, force structure, doctrinal and equipment solutions to the challenges that confront us. This flexible and dynamic system focuses on providing war-fighting commanders a force that can operate across the full range of military operations, from peace to war, and that can adapt rapidly as new threats and opportunities arise.

Our teams have done, are doing, and must continue to do a great job. With their unique blend of skills ideally suited to the world in which we find ourselves, SOF are truly the force of the future. ✕

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Gen. Wayne A. Downing is the commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command. Prior to assuming his present position in May 1993, he served as commanding general of the U.S.



Army Special Operations Command. He has also served as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command; deputy chief of staff for training in the Army Training and Doctrine Command; deputy commanding general of the 1st Special Operations Command; commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment; commander of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division; and secretary of the joint staff of the U.S. European Command. General Downing commanded the special-operations forces of all services during Operation Just Cause and commanded a joint special-operations task force assigned to the U.S. Central Command during Operation Desert Storm. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he also holds a master's degree from Tulane University.

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# Ethnic, Nationalist and Separatist Conflicts: Finding the Right Solutions

by Benjamin Schwarz

**T**he American national-security community is greeting the phenomenon of ethnic, nationalist and separatist conflicts, or EN&SC, in much the same way that it greeted counterinsurgency in the 1960s and low-intensity conflict in the 1980s: The U.S., it is repeatedly asserted, must come to terms with “new” types of conflict for which it is inadequately prepared.

As was the case with counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict, policy discussion of EN&SC revolves nearly exclusively around how best to implement programs and policies. There is a constant tinkering with organizational charts to achieve just the right mixture of agencies, departments and programs, and some of these agencies and departments are rushing about in an effort to claim valuable new turf. However, as they did with counterinsurgency and with low-intensity conflict, these programmatic approaches threaten to eclipse an examination of the motivations and assumptions underlying American attitudes and policy toward EN&SC and the analyses of how and if American national interests are involved in such conflicts.

## Definition

Moreover, there is a danger in defining EN&SC as a generic problem. Most of the

policy discussions of EN&SC center around quite specific concerns. For example, discussions regarding Eastern European EN&SC usually produce a small set of scenarios that directly affect American interests: a resurgent Russia taking advantage of an aggrieved Russian minority in a bordering state to reimpose control over that state; or a wave of refugees escaping EN&SC engendering political instability in Germany. (It might help to examine precisely why a nationalist Russia or a politically unstable Germany would be cause for such anxiety, but that is another matter.) In any event, it might be possible to deal with these specific concerns without the United States playing an active role in containing or quelling EN&SC in Eastern Europe. Potential geopolitical threats do not necessarily call for the United States to help protect minority rights or to build a civil society in, say, Romania.

Should the policy community define EN&SC as a generic problem — and many signs indicate that this is happening — policy-makers could be creating enormous difficulties for themselves. If the United States bases policy on the conviction that these conflicts pose a danger to America because they threaten world order, then the U.S. would be adopting the globalist doctrine that America can

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be safe only when the entire world is made stable and is very much like America. This concept would lead to an endless multiplication of security “threats” and to imperial overstretch.

Perhaps the notion of attempting to understand and define EN&SC as a “problem” should be jettisoned, and we should instead concentrate on specific regional and subregional analyses: Should the United States be concerned with region X or with conflict Z? Why? How can the U.S. safeguard and advance its specific interests in these areas? Such analyses could lead to very different policy conclusions than would be reached if America started with the premise that it should be concerned with promoting stability, mitigating EN&SC and helping to settle minority disputes.

#### **‘Reasonable’ solutions**

To examine EN&SC generically, we must first look critically at the prevailing

***If the United States bases policy on the conviction that these conflicts pose a danger to America because they threaten world order, then the U.S. would be adopting the globalist doctrine that America can be safe only when the entire world is made stable and is very much like America.***

notions of how to tame them. Discussions of how to “solve” EN&SC generally begin by acknowledging that they are complex and difficult situations and that outside intervention to control them is rarely effective. Despite such caveats, the discussions proceed to measures and techniques that the U.S. and the world community can encourage affected states to undertake. Included in these discussions is the point that societies riven by such conflicts must avoid winner-take-all politics and should instead guarantee that regardless of election results, the weaker faction will still have a voice in national

politics. To accomplish this, there should be a guaranteed division of key offices and a system of mutual vetoes to ensure that no crucial political decisions are made without all parties agreeing. The policy recommendations share the idea that coalition governments will help guard against and ameliorate ethnic, nationalist and religious divisions. And all agree that these divisions will be less likely to erupt in violent conflict if threatened societies tolerate minority groups’ desire for cultural autonomy.

All of these measures are reasonable, and they would indeed aid in ensuring that politics within divided societies is not a zero-sum game, a situation that invites and exacerbates conflict. But the measures presume that the strongest group in a society will be willing to make major concessions, concessions that would, in fact, jeopardize that group’s preponderant position. The solutions presuppose agreement and stability as much as they secure them. In other words, such solutions, which are intended to alleviate conflict, can be implemented only in the absence of conflict, and only if there is a strong desire for compromise.

#### **Historical record**

This is not, however, how ethnic, nationalist and separatist conflicts have usually been settled. As the English historian Louis Namier wrote in his discussion of nationalist conflicts in Eastern Europe in the 19th century, “States are not created or destroyed, and frontiers redrawn or obliterated, by argument and majority votes; nations are freed, united, or broken by blood and iron, and not by a generous application of liberty.”

Given the historical record, why do we place such stock in reasonable solutions? One important reason is that our ideas about settling internal conflicts have been heavily affected by an idealized view of America’s own history and politics. This is the melting-pot theory of national political development, which holds that American democracy assures a voice to each disparate group, and that



United Nations photo

*Buildings in the former Yugoslavia attest to the violence of ethnic conflict.*

from each group's competing views, compromise is reached, if not harmoniously, then at least nonviolently. This theory is a misunderstanding of America's political development. At least as much as other countries, America was formed by blood and iron, by conquest and force, not by conciliation and compromise. Forming the American state required many years of bloody Indian wars, one of the longest continuing ethnic conflicts in history. That conflict was resolved not by power-sharing but by obliteration — the only way it could be resolved.

Moreover, America's political development required that it fight a brutal nationalist-separatist conflict, the Civil War, in which one vision of America's political, economic and social development was crushed by another. The conflict was followed by military occupation to impose a new political, economic and social order in the defeated land.

The American Civil War is an apt example of how reasonable solutions to EN&SC seldom work. When the United States was established, the North and the South recognized each other as effec-

tively two distinct economic and political entities. As the country developed, these two entities grew farther apart: the North was capitalist, industrial, liberal-bourgeois and commercial, while the South was aristocratic, precapitalist and agricultural. To dampen the internal conflict, the Constitution guaranteed the South a voice — a disproportionate voice — in national politics. Yet this "guaranteed outcome," so lauded by policy analysts today as a means of forestalling internal conflict, could never have worked in the long run. The South not only wanted its view accorded respect, it also wanted to determine its own future and not to be subordinate or dependent upon an opposing ideological, economic and social system.

### **Compromise**

In general, minorities — nations within nations — do not want respect alone. They do not wish to be considered appendages to the majority's nation-state. The Sudeten Germans were provided respect and a disproportionate voice by a democratic interwar

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Czechoslovakia. The Quebecois are given the same treatment in Canadian national politics, and in many ways, the Arab minority receives the same from a democratic Israel. Nevertheless, significant numbers within these minorities are or have been unsatisfied with this arrangement. The argument that a Slobodan Milosevic is merely exploiting and exacerbating ethnic antipathies is irrelevant. Demagogic nationalist leaders can play the nationalist card only because it is so powerful.

Solutions that grant special guarantees to a minority are actually asking the minority to accept less than it wants. Another solution that is often touted — transforming nation-states into civil states in which political power is not determined by membership in the ma-

jettison its national character by agreeing to dismantle that which defines its statehood.

### **Stumbling block**

This brings us to the great stumbling block of these apparent solutions. Divided societies face a conundrum: dissatisfied minorities want, at a minimum, a real voice in determining their future, but a real voice for the minority means a real sacrifice for the majority. While the majority's long-term interest in civil peace should perhaps direct it to accept such solutions, Canada's experience illustrates the majority's reluctance to do so.

The Charlottetown Agreement was a model of reasonable techniques for handling ethnic conflict, a set of arrangements that all experts believe should work. In accordance with the guaranteed-outcomes solution, Quebec was guaranteed 25 percent of the seats in the Federal House of Commons, three of the Supreme Court's nine judges would be drawn from Quebec, and federal bills affecting the French language would require a double majority of votes by Francophone senators and the Senate as a whole. These "solutions," which might assuage the Francophone minority, were roundly rejected by Anglophone Canada for the understandable reasons that Quebec would be given too much power and that the majority would be correspondingly weakened.

If these solutions and compromises are unworkable in a Western democracy, there is no reason to assume they will work in the emerging unstable states that currently concern American policy-makers. Nor can we look to a global democratic makeover as a solution to what are truly the intractable problems of EN&SC: first, because, as John Stuart Mill observed, it is next to impossible to build a true democracy in a multiethnic society; and second, because democracy often exacerbates internal tensions and conflicts and does not, as the American ideal would have us believe, usually ameliorate them. Democracy does not immunize a society against internal conflict and

***The struggle between Colombia's liberals and conservatives finally resulted in a textbook solution of how civil difference should be settled. ... Unfortunately, the two groups reached this compromise solution only after more than 250,000 Colombians had been killed in civil war.***

majority's ethnic, nationalist or religious group — is to demand that a majority accept far less than it wants and already has. To many within the majority, such a solution means sacrificing a living, breathing national character to an abstract and bloodless notion of a single political community.

For example, Israel operates under a system of majority rule in which an Arab minority, comprising 18 percent of the population of Israel's pre-1967 territory, is granted its civil rights, but whose members are nonetheless second-class citizens, since the Israeli state is by definition a Jewish state. It is an unspoken rule of Israeli politics that no Arab or Arab-dominated party be invited to participate in a political coalition. It is unimaginable that Israel, motivated by a desire to ameliorate ethnic conflict, would

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separatism, as the 620,000 dead in America's Civil War attest.

### Logic of force

Prince Bernhard Von Bulow, a former German chancellor, wrote in 1914, "In the struggle between nationalities, one nation is the hammer, the other the anvil; one is the victor and one is the vanquished." Once internal conflicts become violent, usually only the logic of force can put civil differences to rest. The logic of force in these kinds of conflicts usually means the triumph of the stronger group.

Historically, the most stable and lasting solution to EN&SC has been ethnic cleansing and partition. The Czech Republic and Poland made ruthless decisions following World War II to cleanse themselves forcibly of the German minorities that had caused them so much trouble during the interwar years. Today the two states are far more stable, with a greater likelihood of democracy triumphing within them. Cyprus has been far more stable since its de facto partitioning by the Turkish Army in 1974, which involved the forced relocation of 200,000 people, mostly Greek Cypriots. This division is now reinforced, ironically, by United Nations peacekeeping troops.

Reasonable power-sharing solutions sometimes do emerge in divided societies, but usually only after the opposing sides have become exhausted by bloody conflict. The struggle between Colombia's liberals and conservatives finally resulted in a textbook solution of how civil difference should be settled. Both factions were assured a voice in national politics; in fact, there was a prearranged deal that the office of the presidency would alternate between the two parties. Unfortunately, the two groups reached this compromise solution only after more than 250,000 Colombians had been killed in civil war.

Although EN&SC remain latent in some societies, we must assume that the U.S. — and certainly the U.S. military — will concern itself with EN&SC only when violence is present or is likely. In advising those military forces that may be called

upon to intervene in these types of conflicts, planners must bear in mind this truism: foreign instabilities can be durably quelled only by native solutions, and these solutions can take centuries and will often be bloody. Once violence begins, probably the best course of action for the United States and the international community is to proffer their good offices, awaiting the time when combatant exhaustion or the triumph of one group over another creates an opening for intervention in a purely peacekeeping capacity.

This is not to argue that external intervention in EN&SC is ineffective. Should the U.S. have a geopolitical stake in the outcome of an ethnic conflict, we should remember that outside intervention can be effective. External forces are not effective in building civil societies or in pacifying such conflicts, but they can help one side of a conflict impose its will on the other, as demonstrated by Turkey's intervention in Cyprus. That sort of task is not exactly what would be called peacemaking, but it is what militaries do. ✂

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# 'Not Quite War': A Situation Report from the Former Yugoslavia

*by Mercer M. Dorsey Jr.*

**D**uty with the United Nations Protection Forces in the former Yugoslavia provides one with a close-up look at operations other than war. To the warring parties involved, these operations look a lot like war. To the U.N. forces, the situation is not quite war, but it's a lot closer to it than maintaining a demarcation line in the Middle East. It isn't peacekeeping, peacemaking or peace enforcement, either. Perhaps it is "confrontation control."

As chief of security for the U.N. Protection Forces, Former Republics of Yugoslavia, or UNPROFOR, I am responsible for the personal security of Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the U.N. secretary-general, and for the security of U.N. people, installations and property throughout the area. My other functions include identifying security needs; coordinating for proper security forces; and investigating incidents ranging from attacks on U.N. civilians by one of the warring parties, to car accidents and black marketeering.

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Author's note: This report represents a snapshot of the situation in the former Yugoslavia during the spring and early summer of 1994. The situation there is dynamic and may have changed since that time. The views expressed are my own and not those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense or the United Nations.

The headquarters for UNPROFOR is located in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. The UNPROFOR security section, as well as the U.N. mission itself, is still in its formative stage. The total strength of the security section is expected to be approximately 150, and the total strength of the U.N. mission around 46,000.

## **Background**

The U.N. arrived here in 1991, but the fighting had actually begun in 1989 with the demise of the Soviet Union. Marshal Tito, Yugoslavia's communist leader from 1943 to 1980, was a Serb, and the Serbs had dominated the Yugoslavian communist party. Without Tito and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia began to fall apart. Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro were the republics making up Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro formed the Republic of Yugoslavia (this entity still has not been formally recognized by the United States), but Slovenia and Croatia wanted independence. After a short confrontation, Slovenia's independence was allowed, but when Croatia asserted its independence, Serbia objected, and a war began between the two. This war later stagnated, and when Bosnia-Herzegovina became a separate nation, Croatia and Serbia began supporting their surrogate warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Croatia is shaped somewhat like a half-moon, with its upper horn pointing east and its lower horn pointing south. The eastern point of the upper horn of the moon is truncated, and its blunt north-south edge borders the Serbian province of Vojvodina. The moon's lower horn tapers into a point that touches Montenegro. Bosnia-Herzegovina sits within the inner arch of the half-moon. Croatia is bordered to the north by Hungary and Slovenia and to the west by the Adriatic.

### Sectors

Serbian ethnic populations dominate 27 percent of Croatia. Serbian ethnic-populated areas, which are separated into four sectors, are neither neatly adjacent to Serbia nor are they monoethnic. Sector East is on Croatia's eastern border adjacent to the province of Vojvodina, and Sector West is near Croatia's center. Sectors North and South are located on the lower horn of the moon, adjacent to the western border of Bosnia-Herzegovina; they cut a swath along the horn's eastern rim.

When the Croats moved to establish control of these Serbian-populated areas, the Serbs resisted and were able to stymie the Croats. The Serbian government supported the separate Serbian pockets but was not able to link them to Serbia. If the Serbian sectors are granted autonomy, Croatia's geographic area will be significantly reduced. In any event, Croatia lacks the necessary military force to take control: Its terrain is extremely rough, and the Serbian minorities are extremely stubborn. Left as is, the situation no doubt will lead to many crises; it is unlikely to change unless one side manages to dominate or unless reason and compromise prevail and the sectors are reintegrated into Croatia.

The four sectors actually represent the



## Republics of the former Yugoslavia

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geographical boundaries of the ethnic minorities. They are under U.N. protection because of the extensive fighting and the attempted “ethnic cleansing” by both Serbs and Croats. In his book *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, Misha Glenny argues that the issues in Yugoslavia are neither ethnic nor religious, but nationalistic. But the depth of the atrocities demonstrated by both sides is not usually associated with pure nationalism — it appears to be far more personal and deeper than that.

Although Croatia and Serbia maintain a war posture against each other, there is little actual fighting between the two. Most of the fighting in Croatia is concen-

***Many houses have been intentionally blown up, not by a conquering army, but rather by neighbors who are trying to get even for transgressions committed generations before them — a tragic reminder about tribalism and man’s inability to live together.***

trated in Sectors North and South, which are controlled by the Krajinian Serbs. Cease-fire violations occur regularly.

### **Conflicts**

At this time (spring 1994), Bosnia-Herzegovina is the area of greatest conflict. It is bordered on the north and west by Croatia and on the east and south by Serbia and Montenegro. Opposing factions include the Bosnian Serbs, or BSA, and the Bosnian Muslims, or BiH. The BiH are subdivided into opposing camps: the Abdic forces and the BiH 5th Corps. Both of these BiH factions are surrounded by Serbs: the BSA to the south and the Krajinian Serbs to the north in Croatia. The

Bosnian Croats, or the HVO, are the other major faction in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The HVO and the BiH appear to have formed something of an alliance against the BSA and have actually conducted coordinated operations against them. The Krajinian Serbs, however, are providing support (including artillery) to the Abdic forces of the BiH. They must also be allowing resources into the BiH 5th Corps, since the 5th Corps has been entirely surrounded for months and should have depleted its supplies a long time ago. Multiple fronts and suballiances exist, and all the factions shoot at each other from time to time.

Although there is continuous fighting in the region, most of the major offensives and counteroffensives are invisible to the Western media, since they focus on the populated areas. In late May, for example, the BiH launched a major offensive in northeast Bosnia-Herzegovina in an attempt to seize a transmitter tower on a high mountain. Apparently, major BiH attacks and BSA counterattacks have been taking place ever since. According to recent reports, the Muslims are still in possession of the key terrain. In recent fighting on an extended front in the neighborhood of Tuzla, more than 1,300 rounds of heavy artillery and mortar fire were exchanged, as recorded by U.N. military observers. The BiH seemed to be on the offensive and appeared to be doing quite well. On June 8, 1994, a “truce” was signed, and the fighting slowed down temporarily. Unfortunately, by early July, the cease-fire was no longer apparent.

### **Contrasts**

The region’s complex state of affairs can be illustrated by the contrasts one encounters while traveling in the cities and in the countryside. The chief of security’s activi-



Photo courtesy Mercer M. Dorsey

*Buildings in Vukovar, in eastern Croatia, show the effects of ethnic conflict in 1991-92.*

ties require a great deal of traveling, and most of the time U.N. personnel have freedom of movement. Zagreb, in Croatia, could be any peaceful southern European city — signs of war are invisible. Sarajevo, on the other hand, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is still somewhat under siege, with confrontation lines dividing it in a confusing manner. Entire residential areas around the airport have been destroyed and abandoned. In the modern sector of Sarajevo, skyscrapers have been so pounded upon by artillery and tank fire that they seem to have melted in on themselves. Although the situation in Sarajevo is quiet now, which means that none of the factions is launching a major attack, stray mortar, artillery and small-arms fire are an accepted norm. In one incident, a random 120mm mortar round hit a marketplace, killing 60 people and wounding more than 200. The marketplace was small and tucked between tall buildings. The fact that only one mortar round was fired and hit such a small area was a tragic act of fate, not good gunnery.

I recently traveled to the beautiful city of Split, about 200 miles southwest of Zagreb on the Adriatic coast. Split serves

as the major logistics entry point for U.N. forces and as the logistics rear area for U.N. forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The terrain, the surrounding villages and the sea remind me of Greece: Rugged limestone mountains covered by scrub brush rise sharply from the coast. After leaving Split, I drove through Sectors South and North and stopped at their headquarters in Knin and Topusko to lay the groundwork for establishing a security office in each location.

Inland, the country is mountainous and heavily forested. Deep valleys contain towns and small farms — the terrain is somewhat like that of Pennsylvania. There are areas untouched by war, with mountains and countryside as beautiful as any in the world; in other areas, every village for miles has been abandoned and destroyed. Many houses have been intentionally blown up, not by a conquering army, but rather by neighbors who are trying to get even for transgressions committed generations before them — a tragic reminder about tribalism and man's inability to live together.

During a visit to Sectors West and East, I drove the breadth of northern Croatia —

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from Zagreb to the easternmost border, which now rests on the Danube. Northern Croatia is essentially a fertile plain with occasional minor mountain masses. It is beautiful and productive and could be anywhere in Ohio, Illinois or Missouri. Again, the contrast was between the Serbian sectors, which are economically austere, and the Croatian sectors, which are bustling with activity. It is a shock to drive for miles through peaceful villages and then suddenly encounter miles of destruction, or to find destroyed villages located in perfectly peaceful settings. Within some villages, only one block may have been destroyed, or within a block, one house may have been shot to hell, while the houses on either side may not have a single scar.

While in Sector East, I had occasion to visit the city of Vukovar. Before the war between Serbia and Croatia, which actually started in Sector East, Vukovar was a major city. As the Yugoslavian Army withdrew from Croatia, it supported the local Serbian militia in seizing Vukovar. There was an extended siege, and the city was nearly destroyed. According to the Croats, it was razed. In reality, the city is badly damaged, perhaps a bit worse than Sarajevo, and the Croats still find the destruction almost unbearable.

There are thousands of Croats missing from the Vukovar region. Before the conflict began, the population was about 60 percent Croatian and 40 percent Serbian. Current data reflect that the percentages have at least reversed, and the Serb population may now be as high as 80 percent. A brick wall built in memory of Vukovar rings the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb. The wall is 13 bricks high and more than 300 yards long; each brick carries the name of one of the missing or dead from the region. Croats light candles and

lay flowers daily at the wall in memory of the lost. The site on which the wall was constructed generates a neat piece of propaganda: It naturally shifts the people's frustrations to the U.N. A more appropriate site for the wall might have been the Croatian parliament. Clearly, the problems in this region can only be solved through the efforts of the conflict's participants. The U.N. is not responsible for the prosecution or the cause of this war, and it cannot take sides.

## Needs

Despite their neutrality, U.N. peace-keeping forces do suffer casualties. Their principal threat, besides being shot at by the opposing sides, is mines. Most casualties occur when a vehicle drives into an unmarked or newly emplaced minefield. Mines are not yet being used against the U.N. to interrupt supply lines, as in Somalia. However, should peace come to the area, the mines will present a major problem, and determining where all the mine fields are will be difficult. There is a need here for a wide-area, remote mine-detection means to help locate mines and to confirm the extent of mined areas.

Most of the sniping at U.N. forces usually comes from positions along the front lines. Snipers here are not firing from crowds, but into crowds. The best deterrent is rapid response — the British do that well — but an antisniping system would be invaluable. Of course, body and vehicle armor is in great demand. In fact, the U.N. is installing armor kits on all of its civilian field vehicles.

An antimortar system would also be invaluable, not only to detect and engage weapons precisely, but also to aid in the enforcement of cease-fire agreements. The system would provide an immediate means of identifying which side was

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responsible for a cease-fire violation.

An instant voice translator would also be useful to the U.N. forces, which now include Jordanian, Egyptian, Nigerian, French, British, Danish, Swedish, Argentine and Spanish soldiers. Such an impressive array of forces is a coalition advocate's dream come true.

In June, my deputy and I traveled to Austria. We drove north through Slovenia to Kibnetz, just across the Austrian border. The economies and appearances of the towns and villages provide a striking contrast. Austria is neat, bright and booming. As one drives south, it is like turning down a dimmer switch. Slovenia appears to be progressing, but is "dimmer" than Austria. And, of course, Croatia is yet darker. Bosnia-Herzegovina is in a state of economic suspension — there is no economy. None of this has to do with the potential of the people or of the land, but only the war. Political instability does not attract capital. If a peace agreement could be reached, perhaps the country would boom.

## Impressions

As one enters this troubled environment, initial impressions nearly overwhelm the senses. A person's observations are only one perception of reality based on a brief snapshot in time, and anyone would have to be very arrogant to believe that such impressions provide real insight. My experiences have provided no blinding flashes of new wisdom. As each day goes by, my view of the U.N. and of the conflict shifts. The U.N. is a tremendously important human experiment. It has not yet matured — its organization has a long way to go before it is as effective and as professional as it should be — but its concept is not flawed. U.N. intervention gives warring parties an excuse not to fight, and

while it may not solve the problem, it slows down the killing. The U.N. or its successor is really our world's only alternative to domination of the weak by the powerful, to the rule of force of arms. Personally, I feel that my experience here is not a waste. "May we live in interesting times," someone said. I think I am.

(Mercer M. Dorsey was severely wounded in July 1994, shortly after writing this article. While on duty with the UNPROFOR, he was flying in an aircraft that was hit by ground fire. He is recovering at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C. — Editor) ✕

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Mercer M. Dorsey Jr. retired from the Army in January 1994 as a Special Forces colonel and arrived in Zagreb, Croatia, in April 1994 to serve as chief of security for the U.N. Protection Forces, Former Republics of Yugoslavia. His last Army assignment was deputy commandant of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His other special-operations assignments included service at the Special Forces detachment, company and battalion levels and service as chief of staff for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. His more than 30 years of military service included two tours in Vietnam, participation in Operation Desert Storm and service in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1958-1961. Dorsey holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Arizona and a master's degree from Clark University in Worcester, Mass.



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# Intelligence Operations and the ODA: Minimizing Risks and Maximizing Payoff

*by Maj. David B. Kneafsey*

**E**very Special Forces mission, regardless of its complexity, duration or focus, requires effective planning and resourcing, and one of the most critical resources is intelligence.

With SF's range of missions, dynamic regions and decentralized operations, demands for intelligence support are enormous. In fact, intelligence often drives operations, and to obtain the timely and tailored intelligence necessary, SF detachment commanders must understand how to identify and integrate intelligence resources into their operational planning.

## **Integration**

Effective integration of intelligence and operations often equates to mission efficiency and mission success, and integration must be accomplished before, during and after all deployments. There are three key tenets of integration:

- The earlier, the better;
- The more in-depth, the better; and
- Quality input equals quality output.

Effective integration requires in-depth mission analysis, exchanges of information between intel and operational assets, coordination and predeployment intel training. But before commanders can integrate their operations with intelli-

gence assets, they must know what assets exist.

## **Detachment assets**

At the ODA level, each team has an assistant operations and intelligence sergeant, an 18F40. The 18F is responsible for providing intelligence support during each phase of planning and executing the mission. The detachment commander must ensure that his 18F is integrated with organic SF-battalion intelligence assets and that the 18F is fully trained with regard to specific intelligence resources, constraints and procedures within his area of responsibility.

For example, most regions have theater-unique collection platforms and resources. At various times, some of these collection systems may not be available because of political constraints, poor weather conditions, changing mission priorities or asset relocation. Still other systems may require greater lead time in terms of both requesting and receiving intelligence support. The more aware the 18F is of the basic collection systems, lead-time requirements and battalion intelligence procedures, the more focused and effective his intelligence support will be.

The most successful intelligence operations in support of the A-detachment often

result from aggressive and integrated 18F/intelligence-MOS training programs. Each detachment training mission should have clearly identified intelligence-training objectives designed to meet detachment needs and to improve intelligence support to the team. These objectives might include such things as increasing intelligence-communication networks, developing collection-management skills, integrating imagery-intelligence support for forward-deployed teams, and developing focused target-intelligence packages to support team missions.

While the 18F serves as the intelligence hub, the detachment commander actually drives the intelligence train within the team. Although basic intelligence products, such as target-intelligence packages or intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield overlays, are important tools, the detachment commander must make sure that his intelligence support is focused, refined and in a format that supports the mission.

Intelligence must do two things: minimize the risks and maximize the payoff. If the intelligence support does not accomplish these two things, the detachment commander must ask himself why. Did the support provide the required level of detail? Was the support timely and tailored? Were the detachment intelligence priorities focused? Was sufficient lead time provided to integrate intelligence with operations? Was the 18F involved in providing intelligence support?

### Other assets

To assist the detachment 18F, there are two key intelligence assets at the SF battalion level: a military-intelligence detachment and an S-2 section. The military-intelligence detachment consists of organic intelligence-collection management, multisource analysis, counterintelligence and forward-deployable support-operations teams. The first two elements provide a focal point for situational and target development; the last two provide forward-deployed teams with early-warning and human-intelligence indicators that equate to force protection.

## Organic Intelligence Assets

FUNCTION	GROUP LEVEL	BATTALION LEVEL
Human intelligence	Yes (Corps)	No
Counterintelligence/ force protection	Yes (Corps)	Yes (Div)
Multidiscipline counterintelligence	Yes (Corps)	No
Electronic intelligence (non-voice)	Yes (EAC)	No
Signal intelligence	Yes (EAC)	Limited (Div)
Collection management and dissemination	Yes (Corps)	No
All source production section	Yes (Corps)	Limited (Div)
Imagery intelligence	Yes (Corps)	Limited (Div)

NOTE: Parentheses indicates level of conventional units at which asset can be found.

The S-2 section orchestrates detachment intelligence needs with higher and adjacent intelligence priorities, assets and supporting collection systems. Together, these organic battalion assets provide direct intelligence support to commanders of SF detachments, companies and forward operational bases, or FOBs.

At the SF group level, the MI detachment and the S-2 section, combined with the battalion-level assets mentioned above, expand the organic SF capability for group-level situational and target development, analysis, and collection management and production. For more information, see FM 34-36, SOF Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, which provides greater detail on intelligence and electronic-warfare support to Special Forces, Ranger, PSYOP and other SOF elements.

To put things into perspective, let's compare intelligence assets organic to SF and conventional units. First, intelligence

assets organic at the SF group level are similar in function and structure to those normally found within conventional MI units at the division, corps and echelons-above-corps levels. Second, intelligence assets organic to SF units are organized according to operational needs, with each asset having its own distinct missions, functions and limitations. This structure results in decentralized operations, making SF intelligence continuity, training and leader development even more critical. Third, SF battalion-level intelligence assets provide direct support to FOB elements and general support to subordinate SF detachments. Group-level intelligence assets provide direct support to command-group requirements and general support, as available, to subordinate elements.

### Intel resources

Because the detachment commander drives intelligence, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB, could more aptly be called the “commander’s” preparation of the battlefield. Failure to conduct IPB early on or failure to incorporate more than just intelligence input into IPB may result in a shallow and incomplete IPB process and an incomplete staff mission analysis.

While conventional-force intelligence often focuses on purely military factors,

SF intelligence products and analysis must always blend a variety of perspectives. For example, when assessing the four elements of national power, i.e., political, economical, informational and military, SF intelligence requirements deal principally with the first three elements and to a lesser degree with the military element. In order to address all four elements and still provide timely advice to the commander, SF group intel assets must task-organize. One way we can do this is to focus group-level assets on the political, economical and informational elements and to focus battalion- and ODB/ODA-level assets on the military element. Because of their mission-execution demands, battalion assets may focus on threat capabilities and intentions, while ODB/ODA-level assets focus on the immediate threat activity.

SF intelligence analysis and products must also reflect enemy, friendly and neutral (or third party) factors, and the combined elements of national power often greatly affect our mission planning and execution. For example, the saying, “People are the key terrain,” emphasizes the importance of the population with regard to intelligence in the foreign-internal-defense mission.

Priority intelligence requirements, or PIR, are the glue that binds operations, intelligence targeting and mission-analysis efforts at all levels. The importance of clearly stated and specific PIR, designated by the commander and periodically refined, cannot be overemphasized. To make a brief analogy, just as the commander’s intent focuses all subordinate units on the accomplishment of the mission, PIR focus all intelligence assets on providing the commander with intelligence to support his intent and decision-making process. Detachment commanders need to identify specific intelligence needs, goals and priorities. Don’t ask for “one over the world” requests — articulate your PIR and focus your assets.

In fact, commanders should ensure that the intel analysis and products are well-rounded and multiperspective. They can accomplish this by assessing the threat or

## Group Intelligence Production

LEVEL	SCOPE	FOCUS
Group	Political, economic and informational	Patterns and trends (Regions/country)
Battalion	Military	Threat capabilities and intentions (District/operational box)
ODB/ODA	Military	Current activity and operational impact (20 km radius)

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the operating environment using a six-step checklist represented by the acronym MISLED.

- Motivation - What motivates people, e.g., leaders, insurgents, etc., in the area of operations? (Money, wealth, power, etc.)

- Ideology - What ideological background exists in the area? To what extent have the youth been targeted?

- Sophistication - How sophisticated is the foe or the ally? Have intel or operators overestimated their comms or supply capabilities?

- Leadership - How diverse, widespread or unilateral is the leadership base? What command-and-control operating constraints exist?

- Education - What are the education levels of indigenous personnel? What special military or U.S. schools have the personnel attended?

- Direction - What is the direction of the insurgency or national movement? Is it waning or waxing? Is it becoming more violent? Is it expanding its base of operations?

Two other intelligence resources are available through computer technology. The Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System, or SODARS, is a data base that provides operational intelligence. Because of expanded intelligence involvement in both the cueing and debriefing of ODAs, SODARS is often perceived as a product solely for intelligence specialists. But the main purpose of SODARS is to support the SF detachment by collecting operational data from re-deploying teams and consolidating it into a USSOCOM-wide data base. It is a system designed by operators for operators. Prior to deployment, each detachment should tap into SODARS and assess any changes or updates reported by other ODAs. Upon redeployment, quality input into SODARS from ODAs will help other ODAs succeed in their future missions.

The Special Operations Command Research Analysis and Threat Evaluation System, or SOCRATES, is another good source of SOF-specific and general intelligence-related data. Available at battalion, group and major-command levels, it provides situational and targeting data, prede-

ployment updates and specific regional requests. The battalion S-2 can help commanders tap into this wealth of intelligence.

Whenever possible, aim for multisource and all-source intelligence products. Also ensure that received products are clearly delineated either as raw, unprocessed data or as analyzed, refined intelligence. Are you just receiving reworded facts or intelligence products based on analysis?

In order to minimize risk and maximize payoff, the detachment commander must integrate intelligence with his operations, know what intelligence assets support his team, focus the 18F and prioritize team intelligence needs. Remember:

- The commander drives intelligence.
- PIR form the hub of intelligence-asset and collection efforts.

- Plan, integrate, refine and evaluate intelligence.

- Use the MISLED checklist to analyze intel products and to apply a third-party perspective.

- Integrate 18Fs with battalion- and group-level intelligence-training programs.

- Remember the lead-time factor — intel analysis and cueing of intel systems takes focus, time and effort.

- Operational and political constraints may degrade or negate the effectiveness of collection systems.

- There's a great difference between information, history and intelligence. "If it's history, it's not intel!"

- Good intelligence analysis requires thorough integration with operators. ✕

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# Review Essay: *War and Anti-War*

by Charles Swett

War and Anti-War is the latest book written by Alvin and Heidi Toffler, arguably the best-known futurists in the world. Their previous books, *Future Shock* (1970) and *The Third Wave* (1980), were extremely influential in shaping our thinking about the future. Many expect War and Anti-War to be one of the most influential books of the 1990s on future warfare.

Oriented toward the mass audience rather than the much narrower national-security community, War and Anti-War does not include specific implications for the Department of Defense. The book, which is more descriptive than prescriptive, is intended to provoke thought rather than to chart a specific course. Perhaps the most valuable new insights the book offers DoD readers are a framework for understanding how the world is changing in general, a probable evolution of future threats to American national security, and the concepts of “war-form” and “niche warfare.”

The thoughts expressed in the book do not all follow a linear pattern of development — they are

intertwined in various ways. The main concepts are discussed here in a more organized fashion for ease of comprehension. Although Alvin and Heidi Toffler co-authored this book, for the sake of brevity they will be referred to jointly as “Toffler.”

The main message of the book appears to be Toffler’s statement: “The way we make war reflects the way we make wealth — and the way we make anti-war must reflect the way we make war.” The concept of anti-war is only described, not defined: “Anti-wars ... include actions taken by politicians, and even by warriors themselves, to create conditions that deter or limit the extent of war. In a complex world, there are times when war itself becomes an instrument needed to prevent a bigger, more terrible war. ... At the highest level, anti-wars involve strategic application of military, economic, and informational power to reduce the violence so often associated with change on the world stage.” Anti-war includes the concept of preventive war; it adds to that concept the full panoply of persuasive

and coercive measures a nation can take to achieve its security objectives.

## Third Wave

Central to the book is Toffler’s concept of the Third Wave, which roughly divides world history into three “waves”: — the agricultural revolution, the industrial revolution and the computer revolution. As Toffler explains, “In this trisected world the First Wave sector supplies agricultural and mineral resources; the Second Wave sector provides cheap labor and does the mass production; and a rapidly expanding Third Wave sector rises to dominance based on the new ways in which it creates and exploits knowledge.” The Third Wave is the most complex and the most sophisticated of the three: “Third Wave nations sell information and innovation, management, culture and pop culture, advanced technology, software, education, training, medical care, and financial and other services to the world.”

Toffler sees the changes underway in today’s world as irresistible, massive and all-encompassing, and

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the new modes of political and economic interaction they bring will erode the very concept of "nation": "In the high-tech world, the economic basis of the nation is sliding out from under it. ... What is actually happening is the shift from a global system based on nations to a three-tier system based on states. ... Transnational business firms ... are creating ... networks, which bypass the nation-state framework. ... The real decision-making powers of the future ... will be transnational companies in alliance with city-regional government."

These enormous changes are accompanied by phenomena Toffler calls "demassification" and "hyper-connectivity": "Giant corporations and government bureaucracies reorganize, break up or decline in importance. New ones arise to take their place. Small units of all kinds multiply and form temporary alliances and consortia, crisscrossing the society with plug-in, plug-out modular organizations. Markets fracture into smaller and smaller segments as the mass society demassifies. Companies, social and ethnic groups, agencies and institutions develop a vast number of varied connections with the outside world. ... They move, in short, into the stage of hyper-connectivity."

Driven partly by faster communications, events are occurring more rapidly and demand a quicker response from governments. Minor instabilities can have major effects, leading Toffler to make a rather startling assertion for a futurist: "The system is anything but rational. It is, in fact, more susceptible to chance than ever, meaning that its behavior is harder, perhaps even impossible to predict."

National leadership must make complicated decisions, yet the tangled interrelationships of countries make the ramifications of the deci-

sions more complex, so that even the brightest of politicians may not appreciate the long-term consequences of their actions. "Except in the most immediate sense, our decision-makers no longer really understand what they are doing. In turn, their ignorance in the face of enormous complexity weakens the links between goals and actions and increases the level of guesswork. Chance plays a bigger role. Risks of unanticipated consequences skyrocket. Miscalculations multiply. Interdependence,

***National leadership must make complicated decisions, yet the tangled interrelationships of countries make the ramifications of the decisions more complex, so that even the brightest of politicians may not appreciate the long-term consequences of their actions.***

in short, doesn't necessarily make the world safer. It sometimes does just the opposite."

### **Media**

Toffler recognizes the growing power of the media to set the national agenda and predicts that the media will play an increasingly powerful political role, one that will ultimately put the military in an untenable situation:

"As the media's political clout increases, ... the old two-way battle (between politicians and bureaucrats) becomes a three-way struggle for power, pitting parliamentarians, bureaucrats, and now media people against one another in

unstable combinations. In tomorrow's 'mediatized' political systems, consensus will be harder and harder to manufacture from the top. As the power struggle is played out between elected politicians, appointed bureaucrats, and media representatives who are neither elected nor appointed, the military leaders of democratic states will find themselves trapped in a double bind. The democratic principle of civilian control of the military itself may be endangered. Since military threats and crises can materialize faster than consensus can be organized, the military may be paralyzed when action is required. Or it may, conversely, plunge into war without democratic support."

Unfortunately, Toffler does not offer us a way out of that situation. He also seems to have a monolithic conception of the media, at least as reflected by the excerpt above. The media are influential in shaping public opinion, but if there really are political goals on the minds of the media's reporters and news editors, these goals are probably fluid, inconsistent and heterogeneous.

In fact, elements of the media may actually wind up fighting each other more than they do the politicians and the bureaucrats. Thus the political struggle between politicians, bureaucrats and the media would appear to be much more complex than a relatively straightforward three-way contest. Moreover, elements of the media, the politicians, and the bureaucracies can (and do) form potent alliances. It might be more accurate to say that blocs may emerge consisting of various combinations of players from these three large groups.

Although it might become increasingly difficult or impossible for government authorities to formulate a coherent policy for deal-

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ing with any particular situation, nowhere does Toffler's discussion support his speculation that the civilian control of military forces will be weakened. It might more accurately be said that our government could be paralyzed when action is required or that we could be plunged into war because of an inability to manage our political problems. Toffler misrepresents a possible future political leadership crisis as an operational military problem.

### American security goals

The change and the uncertainty in the world leave America in an awkward position as it tries to define its security needs. Lack of clarity about America's long-term interests, Toffler feels, could result either in military defeats or in excessive military budget cutting that would disrupt our lead in military capability.

It is true that many institutions are facing a crisis of relevance as a result of the end of the Cold War, and virtually all Second Wave nations are having a difficult time crystallizing their security objectives and their means of achieving them. However, most players recognize that there is some irreducible minimum annual cost of defense and that we are already near it. Moreover, the notion of a quick dissipation of the U.S. lead in military capability is generally implausible because of the vast differences of scale between our military and the militaries of our potential adversaries.

### 'War-forms'

One of the most interesting concepts Toffler proposes in *War and Anti-War* is the "war-form," a particular form of warfare characteristic of a given civilization. The new global structure trisects war as

well, presenting a diversity in the types of warfare we will face. This evolution complicates military-planning problems tremendously: "The growing heterogeneity of war will make it vastly more difficult for each country to assess the military strength of its neighbors, friends or rivals. War planners and war preventers alike face unprecedented complexity and uncertainty."

Just as the demassification of the economy produces smaller niche markets, the demassification of threats produces a multitude of niche threats. These changes in the threat and in the interconnectivity of the world bring about

***The strategic value of knowing more about your adversary than he knows about you is clear, and Toffler is impatient that there is no overall concept of military-knowledge strategy. While he admits that knowledge weapons may not prevent or limit wars, he says "the failure to develop systematic strategies for their use is inexcusable."***

corresponding changes in the militaries of the world:

"Today we see a bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and religious violence, coups d'état, border disputes, civil upheavals and terrorist attacks, pushing waves of poverty-stricken, war-ridden immigrants (and hordes of drug traffickers as well) across national boundaries. Other countries will intervene to protect themselves, to stem the drug trade, to prevent vast refugee flows from crossing a border, or to

stop the spread of racial violence across their borders. This is a world made to order for Third Wave niche warfare rather than the large-scale, total wars of the Second Wave era."

Toffler cautions that the possibility of major theater conflicts requiring massive military force will always be present, and that we will not be relieved of the expense of large forces. However, he sees a continuing trend toward the low-cost option of niche warfare and believes that smaller, smarter and lighter modular forces that can be customized to the mission would be not only less expensive but also more effective. "Thus a 'many small wars' scenario is compelling military planners in many armies to look afresh at what they call 'special operations' or 'special forces' — the niche warriors of tomorrow."

### Special operations

The book devotes considerable attention to special operations as a key means of responding to the increasingly complex international-security environment. Toffler makes some seemingly inconsistent assertions about special-operations forces. On the one hand, he says that SOF probably come closer to waging First Wave warfare than any other part of the military because their training emphasizes physical strength, unit cohesion and proficiency in hand-to-hand combat. Then he goes on to describe some extremely advanced technologies and tactics employed by SOF. These technologies and tactics are clearly not First Wave warfare; in fact, they define the leading edge of Third Wave warfare. This contradiction is somewhat confusing, but Toffler probably means to say that these forces combine the two war-forms.

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While Toffler repeatedly emphasizes the future role of SOF in waging niche warfare, he worries about the danger they can also pose: "What happens to the tens of thousands of trained special-operations soldiers released into the civilian societies of the world? Are highly trained teams of Spetsnaz troops from the semi-disintegrated former Soviet army marketing their skills to other countries? ... Special forces are military elites. But are military elites, as such, a threat to democracy itself, as some critics insist?" The specific ways in which special-operations forces can threaten democracy are not described. Although former special-operations personnel clearly can band together and become another type of regional security threat, they can threaten a dictatorship as easily as they can threaten a democracy.

### **Mass destruction**

As part of the evolving threat of niche wars, Toffler sees the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a major problem in the future:

"There are, often ignored by the arms control community, private armies in many parts of the world under the control of local business-cum-political thugs. The equivalent of warlords can be found from the Philippines to Somalia and the Caucasus, wherever central government control is weak. ... The idea of nuclear weapons under the control of these local generalissimos should send a shudder down our collective spine. ... Even if we totally ignore the mounting threat from nongovernmental groups and focus on nation-states alone, we can conclude that approximately 20 countries are either in or knocking at the door of the Nuclear Club. ... And if, instead of a nuclear club we

imagine a Mass Destruction Club, with a broader membership that includes countries with chemical and biological weapon capabilities or ambitions, that number would leap upward. We may be looking at a world in which a third to half of all countries have some hideous weapons of mass murder tucked away in their arsenals."

Toffler does not even begin to offer a solution to these problems.

### **Nonlethal weapons**

In contrast to those weapons of mass destruction are nonlethal weapons. "Nonlethality ... emerges not as a simple replacement for war or an extension of peace but as something different. ... It is a revolutionary form of military action that faithfully reflects the emerging Third Wave civilization. But it raises as many questions for anti-war as it does for war. Can one formulate not merely a war doctrine for non-lethality but an anti-war doctrine as well?"

Once again, no answer is forthcoming. One weakness of Toffler's assessment of nonlethal weapons is that it misses the critically important issue of how they can help ease domestic political constraints against intervention overseas. The growing intolerance for U.S. military and foreign-civilian fatalities is a prime roadblock to American intervention in foreign conflicts, and nonlethal weapons could provide a means of circumventing it.

### **Knowledge warfare**

Toffler is an advocate of knowledge warfare, and he explains, "As we transition from brute-force to brain-force economies, we also necessarily invent what can only be called 'brain-force war.' " The strategic value of knowing more about your adversary than he

knows about you is clear, and Toffler is impatient that there is no overall concept of military-knowledge strategy. While he admits that knowledge weapons may not prevent or limit wars, he says "the failure to develop systematic strategies for their use is inexcusable."

Psychological operations play an important role in knowledge warfare, and Toffler believes that we should be more aggressive in using them:

"Clearly, what is needed, not just by the United States but by the U.N. itself, if the U.N. is going to continue the pretense of peace-keeping, is a rapid reaction contingency broadcasting force that can go anywhere, set up, and beam news to those cut off from it — and not just on radio, but television as well. ... If U.S. psychological warfare experts in the Persian Gulf could drop 29 million leaflets on the Iraqis, could a few thousand tiny, cheap radios, tuned to a "peace frequency," be dropped over the war zone so that combatants could hear something other than their own side's lies?"

Here Toffler seems to confuse mechanics with content. Mechanically, we certainly could set up a rapid-reaction contingency broadcasting force, or drop radios in targeted civilian areas. The more challenging problem is to develop a political consensus among all concerned parties as to the themes that the messages should contain. Achieving a consensus on this matter is sometimes difficult merely within the Defense Department; it is more difficult to achieve in the U.S. government interagency environment and still more difficult to achieve internationally. When nations cannot agree generally on what basic political approach should be taken toward a particular conflict situation, it is unrealistic to expect agreement on propaganda themes.

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There may be additional policy problems with Toffler's approach. The Nairobi Convention of 1984, which the U.S. has signed, says that signatories must respect the national sovereignty of countries with regard to electronic broadcasting. Technically, a country must grant permission before radio or television broadcasts can be directed into its territory. Deliberate jamming of a country's indigenous broadcasts could be considered "hostilities" in the same sense as a military attack.

Toffler sees information processing as a partial substitute for physical force, leading to an increasing demassification of destruction similar to that forecast for economies and enemy threats. This will lead toward the dual trends of shrinking the size of military combat units and incorporating advanced-technology systems into what remains. Toffler believes that a smaller, high-tech force is superior. Here he addresses an important issue for the Department of Defense: which is more cost-effective — a larger, low-tech force, or a smaller, high-tech force? The former costs more for operations and support, while the latter costs more for research, development and procurement. In addition, the technical risks attendant to the development and acquisition of advanced technology systems must be taken into account.

Apparently, Toffler has never watched a major defense program slowly and painfully succumb to schedule slippages, cost overruns, test failures, technical flaws, poor management, inadequate contractor performance, constantly changing government requirements, budget cuts and dozens of other problems. Moreover, the military services have typically sought to keep their force structure intact even while introducing

new systems that enhance their capabilities.

### **Open-source information**

Part of knowledge warfare, to Toffler, is the use of open-source information, i.e., information freely available in unclassified channels, in intelligence assessment and policy-making. "More and more of what decision makers need to know can be found in 'open' sources," he says. "To ignore all this and base analyses on closed sources alone is not only expensive but stupid."

If properly focused and quickly available, open-source information can be extremely valuable in policy development. Particularly in an increasingly "hyper-connected" world, open-source information can illuminate possible second- and third-order consequences of various policy options. Should a conflict suddenly arise in a region that has previously received little policy attention, an open-source search for relevant, recently issued items could help policy officials obtain up-to-date information.

### **'Peace-forms'**

Another important concept discussed in the book is the "peace-form." "Just as we have invented a new war-form, we will have to invent a new 'peace-form,'" Toffler says. "Precisely as is the case with the war-form, the creation of a new peace-form doesn't do away with an older one. But a new war-form creates new threats to peace, thus calling into being, usually after a very long lag time, a new peace-form that corresponds to the new conditions and to the character of the corresponding civilization. The crisis the world faces today is the absence of a Third Wave peace-form that corresponds to the new conditions in the world

system and to the realities of the Third Wave war-form."

Although Toffler does not explicitly define peace-form or state what he thinks the Third Wave peace-form should be, he does state his opinion of what it should include: "Transparency, surveillance, weapons monitoring, the use of information technology, intelligence, interdiction of communication services, propaganda, the transition from mass lethality to low-lethal or non-lethal weapons, training, and education are all elements of a peace-form for the future." He does not offer a strategy for integrating them into a recognizable whole.

One apparent contradiction in the thoughts expounded in the book relates to the following statement: "The exchange of data, information, and knowledge (i.e., "transparency" in the previous quotation) in a world increasingly marked by regional arms races is clearly a Third Wave tool for peace." This assertion contrasts with other claims in the book regarding knowledge warfare, whereby we seek to know everything about the enemy and to have him know little about us. A free and open exchange of information during peacetime can lead us to strategic defeat should war erupt.

### **Implications**

At the public debut of *War and Anti-War*, Toffler declined to identify specific implications of the book for DoD. After restating the book's arguments as recommendations and filtering out the recommendations that seem impractical, we can derive the following actions, some of which DoD is already undertaking:

- Conduct a comprehensive, in-depth assessment of the political and military implications of niche threats and niche warfare.

- Develop explicit concepts and strategies for the military dimensions of Third Wave peace-forms.
- Emphasize, in our overall military planning and force structure, the importance of niche warfare.
- Explicitly design special forces to fight niche warfare.
- Develop an integrated strategy for information warfare and the physical means of implementing it.
- Exercise more aggressiveness in using propaganda techniques and technologies to avert conflicts.
- Offset smaller forces with advanced-technology systems.
- Acquire nonlethal weapons.
- Exploit unclassified, open-source information in policy-making and intelligence assessment.
- Anticipate all possible second- and third-order effects of the actions being contemplated in developing policy options for managing conflicts.
- Ensure that we have the most intelligent and most highly trained personnel possible in our military.

## Assessment

War and Anti-War makes some important contributions. It is perhaps strongest in providing us with a new framework for understanding the multidimensional nature of change in the world today and the threats that come along with it. Analysts have attempted to develop a rational and useful conceptual system for assessing the new security environment in the absence of the Cold War, but none of their concepts seem as compelling as Toffler's.

The recasting of the concept of Toffler's previous book, *Third Wave*, into terms of international security provides a fresh way of looking at things. His concepts of war-forms, peace-forms, hyper-connectivity, non-linearity, demassification and niche wars form a fairly coherent system that can be used to

analyze real situations.

Although the book does a good job of analyzing problems, it is weaker in offering solutions. After building up our anxieties and hopes in the course of discussions of major threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Toffler disappoints us by not providing any practical answers. His concept of a Third Wave peace-form is more a question than an answer. Although he sketches some characteristics of a Third Wave

***After building up our anxieties and hopes in the course of discussions of major threats ... Toffler disappoints us by not providing any practical answers. His concept of a Third Wave peace-form is more a question than an answer. Although he sketches some characteristics of a Third Wave peace-form, he feels that we must wait an indeterminate length of time for Third Wave civilization to develop its own.***

peace-form, he feels that we must wait an indeterminate length of time for Third Wave civilization to develop its own.

Those of us in DoD must understand that the new peace-form will have political, diplomatic, economic and psychological dimensions as well as military ones — the military cannot achieve it alone. But Toffler points us in a direction, and if he is correct, mighty intellectual and integrative efforts will be needed to bring the new peace-form to fruition.

The book is perhaps weakest in its high-tech orientation, not because its concepts for advanced-technology weaponry are infeasible, but because it ignores the myriad problems DoD experiences in developing and fielding new systems. It is actually possible that funding has been requested for either all or most of the weapon programs proposed in the book. Funding for some of them will be denied, either by the Department of Defense or by Congress. Of the programs that are funded, some will be discontinued, some will experience long periods of difficulty only to be terminated, and some will survive in much less ambitious forms than were originally envisioned. Only a few will become true success stories.

War and Anti-War almost glibly tells DoD to create things, as if a snap of the fingers could make them happen. In reality, Toffler's overall vision for the American military will be implemented in piecemeal fashion over a long period of time, with some highly advanced Third Wave systems functioning alongside some early Second Wave systems. However, the fact that Toffler's vision will probably never be achieved in the real world does not mean that we should discard it — only that we must inject some realism into his expectations and establish our own coherent set of goals.

(For another review of *War and Anti-War*, see page 52. — Editor)



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## Physical Training Programs: Preparing to Fight the Fires

*by Col. Ranger Roach*

**P**hysical fitness is the first attribute of any soldier, and a sound, long-term physical training program is the best investment a soldier can make toward dealing successfully with difficult missions and stressful conditions.

Our day-to-day life as soldiers can be deceptive. We work in a controlled environment, where sometimes we judge ourselves and others by time-honored but limited standards: close haircuts, starched uniforms and shiny boots. These are the traditional indicators that reveal a great deal about a soldier's pride, self-respect and motivation. But this is the same as judging the effectiveness of a fire department by how shiny its fire engines are.

Although no one would have much confidence in a fire department that had old, rusty fire engines, the critical issue is not how the fire engines look, but how well they perform in the middle of the night when City Hall is in flames. Our military post is our firehouse, and there's no doubt that we're shiny and proud of it. But we are not really paid for our work in garrison so much as we are paid to be ready to deploy to the remote corners of the world and help fight the fires that affect the national interests of the United States. The critical question is not whether we can function well in a controlled garrison environment, but whether we can continue to function well, make sound decisions

and exert positive leadership after we've been deployed and engaged in stressful operations for extended periods.

An experience early in my career clearly demonstrated a connection between being physically fit and operating successfully under stressful conditions. In the early 1970s I was assigned to the Ranger Department as the senior tactical officer. One of my responsibilities was to monitor the attrition rate from the Ranger Course, which averaged 35 percent. The high attrition rate in the Ranger Course has always been caused by patrol-leadership failures during the mountain and Florida phases, and it has been a continuing concern of the Infantry School. In 1974, we tried to lower the attrition rate by giving additional training to weak Ranger students during the initial phase at Fort Benning.

Our task was to determine which students would be weak in patrol leadership roles. We analyzed student records from the previous five Ranger classes and correlated patrol-leadership scores in the mountain and Florida phases with the graded events in the Benning phase, but we found nothing that would help identify the weak students.

Next we correlated the patrol-leadership scores with students' ages, ranks, time in service and GT scores, but we still were unable to find any relationship. Finally, on a hunch, we compared the students' patrol-leadership scores with their performance

on the prerequisite PT test administered on the first day of the course. The correlation was strikingly apparent. I no longer have the data, but I remember the table and have reconstructed it below. I am confident that a similar analysis today would find the same relationships.

<u>PT Score</u> <u>First Day</u>	<u>Ptrls. Passed</u> <u>During Course</u>	<u>Grad. from</u> <u>Course</u>
475-500	81%	86%
450-474	76%	82%
425-449	73%	75%
400-424	61%	71%
375-399	49%	48%
350-374	42%	44%
300-349	38%	33%
Avg. 425	65%	62%

As a result of this study we began giving additional tactical training during the Benning phase to students who scored below 425 on the PT test. Unfortunately, this initiative backfired: the weak Ranger students who received the extra training actually got lower scores, not only on patrol-leadership evaluations, but also on the other course evaluations. It was frustrating, but in retrospect the reason was obvious: Sleep deprivation is one of the greatest challenges of the Ranger Course, and those students who received extra training lost an additional hour's sleep each night. When soldiers are physically stretched thin, it doesn't take much added pressure to push them over the edge. I have observed many other examples of this relationship between fitness and lead-

ership effectiveness, but none that can be so neatly quantified. Given this direct relationship, it is obvious that PT programs contribute directly to our operational effectiveness, and that should be of interest to the entire chain of command.

### **PT guidelines**

The selection of specific activities and the scheduling and leadership of PT programs are best decentralized to the lowest practical level. Soldiers, NCOs and officers should have ownership of their PT programs. However, field-grade officers and sergeants major should ensure that everyone is involved, actively supervise the programs and serve as mentors to our officers and NCOs according to the following principles:

**Purpose.** The purpose of physical training is to build a physical base that allows us to operate effectively in highly stressful situations. When the fire-bell rings, we must be prepared to contend with physical exertion, poor diet, lack of sleep, fear and uncertainty.

**Long-term perspective.** To be effective, a PT program must be conducted frequently and continually over a number of years. When a new leader tries to "whip his unit into shape" in a month or two, it is normally a situation in which enthusiasm overcomes judgment. A successful PT program requires not only personal dedication but also a long-term perspective. Easy days and rest days are an important but often-overlooked part of a PT program.

**Injuries.** Physical training must be conducted in such a way as to prevent injuries. The purpose of PT is to help soldiers become stronger, and although minor injuries will occur, a significant number indicates that something is wrong with the PT program. Soldiers should be encouraged to "gut out" discomfort, but

(continued on p. 35)

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## Continuous Motion Exercise: Setting a Pace for Everyone

In conducting unit physical training, especially a running program, the classic problem is the different levels of conditioning among unit members. If you set a pace that keeps everyone in the formation, many will not be challenged by the session; on the other hand, if you set the pace for the stronger members, the weaker ones will fall out.

This is ironic, for the ones who fall out are the ones who need conditioning the most. If the weaker ones can be kept in the formation, peer pressure will inspire them to work harder. Our primary goal is to conduct a PT program that challenges all the members without causing the weaker ones to fall out.

To achieve this goal, one solution is continuous motion exercise — an hour of slow running, combined with faster-running intervals and calisthenics. It can be tailored to almost any small unit, regardless of its fitness level. The unit begins the exercise with a four- or five-minute slow warm-up run (8:30 pace) on its way to the first calisthenics station.

Calisthenics stations. When unit members arrive at each station, they continue double-timing while forming a large circle, with the leader in the center. The members continue double-timing while the leader announces and demonstrates each exercise. The leader then halts the unit and leads the exercise. Once the exercise is completed, unit members resume double-timing in the circle.

Normally at the first station, members perform warm-up calisthenics such as the side-straddle hop, the high jumper, the steam engine and the eight-count push-

up. At the second and fourth stations, they work on lower-body strength, performing sit-ups, hello dollies, flutter kicks, stomach curls and half-knee bends. At the third and fifth stations, they work on upper-body strength, with four- and eight-count push-ups, and chair dips (using car bumpers or bleacher seats). Side-straddle hops are thrown in to keep the arms loose. Usually no more than five minutes is spent at each station. It is important to keep the number of repetitions low in each set of exercises (15-20 reps). Some enthusiastic leaders, in excellent condition, think that if 20 reps are good, 50 must be better. As a result, the weaker members of the formation often injure themselves when pushed too far too fast. To exercise a specific muscle group at a lower risk, perform additional sets rather than more reps in a set.

Formation run. As soon as the exercises have been completed, the members double-time into a running formation. Normally, there is a five- to seven-minute run between each station. The unit formation, maintaining a slow-run pace (8:30- to 9-minute mile), performs knee highs and Indian runs between exercise stations to raise and control the intensity level.

Knee highs are performed by lifting the knees at least to waist level while maintaining the standard running pace. They can concentrate either on height or on cadence. Normally three sets are performed for 30 seconds each, with a 30-second break in between. Knee highs move the hip-girdle muscle group (the largest muscle mass in the body)

through a wider range of motion than normal running. After three sets of knee highs, the unit moves directly into Indian runs.

In performing Indian runs, the formation continues at the 8:30 pace, while the members in the first rank, upon the command of the unit leader, move out at 90 percent of their top speed for approximately 100 meters. Then they turn and run to the back of the formation and fall in at the rear. As soon as the first rank turns, the leader starts the second rank on its interval. At any given moment, as the formation is moving at an 8:30 pace, two ranks (or in the case of a platoon formation, eight soldiers) are running 90-percent intervals. Three sets of knee highs and a complete cycle of Indian runs (each rank runs one interval) can easily be accomplished in the five- to seven-minute run between stations. However, to maintain intensity, the unit continues Indian runs until it arrives at the next station.

The key element to this system is continuous motion throughout the hour. There are no "At ease, shake it out!" breaks. If the intensity level is high enough, the 8:30-mile, unit-formation run will be quickly accepted as the rest period. The leader must be attentive to the energy level of the unit and pace the exercise session so that each member experiences a good workout and completes the session with the other members of the unit. — Col. Ranger Roach

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they should also be encouraged to seek alternative exercises or activities in case of injury.

Start together, finish together. When a unit conducts physical training, the leader must pace the training so that any soldier who starts the session can finish with the unit. At the same time, the PT session must challenge all the soldiers. My solution to this paradox is constant-motion exercise (see facing page). I have found that peer pressure is more effective than confrontation in motivating Special Forces soldiers to give their best effort.

Leadership by example. Although it is an individual responsibility to maintain a high level of physical fitness, it is also an important leadership responsibility to reinforce the value of a long-term personal fitness program and to lead by example. Leadership does not mean that you have to outperform your soldiers or that you have to lead all the physical training in your organization. But it does mean that you must maintain Army standards, strive to improve your personal physical condition and participate in the organized unit PT program on a regular basis. It is more important that you participate in PT with your soldiers and allow them to see you pushing yourself than it is to “max” the PT test.

As leaders, we should focus on long-term PT programs that are structured to strengthen our soldiers rather than to break them. We have all survived PT programs that were based on the single principle, “More is better,” but we owe it to the next few generations of soldiers to be more sophisticated in our approach.

(Author’s note: This article is dedicated to my good friend, the late Joe Alderman, who helped teach me about fitness and many other things. When Joe was the team sergeant for ODA-6 at Bad Tölz in the late

1970s, his team’s PT program wore a path into the turf of the caserne football field that became known as “Alderman’s Circle.” We miss you, Joe.) ✂

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Col. Ranger Roach is currently the commander of the 7th Special Forces Group. Since his graduation from the SF Qualification Course in 1976, he has served in both the 10th and the 1st



Special Forces groups. He was also one of the 55 trainers in El Salvador and the defense attaché in Colombia. Colonel Roach was an honor graduate from the Ranger Course and the Special Forces Qualification Course. He is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute (Spanish), the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

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# SF Enlisted Personnel Management: Making It Work for You

*by Capt. Adrian A. Erckenbrack*

**I**n order to make the most of their potential for assignments, promotions and career development, Special Forces NCOs need to be aware of how personnel policies affect them and can work for them.

The SF Branch of the Total Army Personnel Command's Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate seeks to maximize personnel readiness and effectively manage NCO assignments. NCOs can assist the Enlisted SF Branch and influence their own career paths if they understand the fundamentals of personnel management in such important areas as assignments, promotions, reclassification, language training and advanced NCO training.

## **Assignments**

NCOs often wonder at the mystery of how their assignment process is handled. Actually, there is little mystery. In making assignments, the SF Branch attempts to afford each NCO, either as a senior sergeant first class or as a young master sergeant, an opportunity to serve for at least two years as an ODA team sergeant. While each NCO deserves to have a voice in this process, the soldier's desires are only one piece of the assignment puzzle.

There are three basic categories of CMF 18 assignments: operational, training and "other jobs." Approximately 82 percent of

SF authorizations are in the operational category, which includes CONUS and OCONUS elements of the SF groups, Detachment-K in Korea, and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

The training category, which includes jobs invested in sustaining and improving the force, accounts for about 15 percent of CMF 18 authorizations. This category consists of 595 positions in the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, 34 positions at the Joint Readiness Training Center, 10 positions at the Academy of Health Sciences, 20 drill-sergeant positions and 15 detailed-recruiter positions. Not everyone will have a chance to serve in this category, since Branch pulls NCOs only as needed to maintain these units above a designated level of fill. An important consideration in these training assignments is the quality of an NCO's official military personnel file. Only solid soldiers with more than three years' ODA time are allowed to serve in SWCS or in other competitive assignments. In making assignments to JRTC, Branch is even more selective: only NCOs with outstanding files are considered.

"Other jobs" is the last category of authorizations. This category accounts for about three percent of CMF 18 authorizations and refers to the small accounts that are perceived by the field as "good deals." Reserve support groups, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, the special-opera-

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tions commands, the special-operations support commands, U.S. Army Special Operations Command/U.S. Army Special Forces Command staff, and a handful of individual positions make up this category. The majority of these slots are master-sergeant authorizations and are filled by NCOs who have at least two years of rated time as team sergeants. Not all of these jobs are "paid vacations," but most of them offer an opportunity for an SF NCO to get to know his family again. The limited number of authorizations in this category forces Branch to be very strict in its selection process.

Three factors drive the assignment process: overseas returnees (six to nine months prior to date eligible for return from overseas), unit strength imbalances (units lose NCOs and Branch must back-fill), and soldier-initiated requests. With these three factors in mind, SF NCOs should initiate a dialogue with their CMF assignment managers, whose charter is to move qualified soldiers around the world in accordance with the needs of the Army and the desires of the NCO. An NCO may be assigned to another job despite his preference, but Branch attempts to operate on a soldier's request if the request can be supported by the needs of the Army and by the professional-development needs of the NCO.

Once an NCO is affiliated with a specific SF group, it is Branch policy to assign him to that group throughout his career. The point of this policy is to improve our ability to support regional commands by continually building upon regional experiences and language exposure, rather than starting from scratch with each change of assignment. An NCO's group affiliation can still be changed as an exception to policy, but the request must be based on a strong justification.

DA Form 4187 is the best tool an NCO has for communicating with Branch. The 4187 forces the administrative system to consider a request and to respond by formal endorsement. A well-written 4187 states what you want and why you consider the request justified. If a soldier requests reassignment for other than com-

passionate reasons, he must explain his situation and any extenuating circumstances. The information furnished by the soldier could be a crucial factor in whether or not his request is approved. DA Form 4187 also allows Branch to see the chain of command's rationale for recommending approval or disapproval on a personnel action. Telephone calls are an effective means of obtaining advice, but they allow too much room for misinterpretation. It is for this reason that assignment managers are not allowed to promise assignments, deletions or deferments over the phone. While Branch is not in the business of

***Once an NCO is affiliated with a specific SF group, it is Branch policy to assign him to that group throughout his career. The point of this policy is to improve our ability to support regional commands by continually building upon regional experiences and language exposure, rather than starting from scratch with each change of assignment.***

doing "end runs" on the chain of command, each NCO does receive unbiased consideration based on the overall best interest of the force.

## **Promotions**

At the end of FY93, the aggregate SF enlisted force exceeded its authorizations. This excess is advantageous for commanders, because their units will have extra personnel. But for the enlisted force, the days are over when seven out of 10 SF NCOs eligible for promotion to master sergeant made the list. We probably saw the low mark for promotion to master sergeant in FY92, when only 44 sergeants first class were selected. Although we should continue to exceed the Army average, it is likely that only three out of 10 eligible sergeants first class will be picked up for promotion. In this more competitive environment, the

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quality of a soldier's personnel file takes on added importance (even for promotion to sergeant first class). Anything you can do to further enhance your record may make a difference.

In attempting to understand the promotion process, remember that the main objective of a noncommissioned officer's evaluation report is to influence a future promotion board, not to make an NCO feel good temporarily. Well-written evaluation reports with solid bullets that explain in both qualitative and quantitative terms how soldiers measure up against their peers are absolutely essential. Good academic evaluation reports, credit for military and civilian education, and a sharp DA photo could determine whether a sol-

***Well-written evaluation reports with solid bullets that explain in both qualitative and quantitative terms how soldiers measure up against their peers are absolutely essential. Good academic evaluation reports, credit for military and civilian education, and a sharp DA photo could determine whether a soldier is placed in the "qualified" or "best qualified" category.***

dier is placed in the "qualified" or "best qualified" category. Within the next three years, language proficiency will probably become one of the major discriminators in the CMF 18 promotion process. NCOs may then be required to demonstrate some level of language proficiency consistent with their group's targeted region.

While there is a specific method applied to the promotion process, each promotion board consists of individuals who bring their own values, experiences and prejudices with them. Boards tend to select soldiers who have performed well in a variety of jobs. From a board's point of view, four years of service on an ODA, followed by two years in the S-3 and two more years in JRTC, are better than eight years on an ODA. The key is to excel in any assignment, but you should also seek those

tough jobs such as ODA team sergeant, first sergeant, or JRTC observer-controller. Instructor time is also viewed as a plus by any board. If you hide from an assignment at the Special Warfare Center and School, you may eliminate your chance of being placed in the best qualified category. As a rule of thumb, an NCO's first-sergeant or B-team-sergeant time is not a substitute for ODA team-sergeant time. Although first-sergeant or B-team-sergeant positions are great file enhancers, by themselves they cannot ensure one's promotion to sergeant major.

### **Reclassification**

SF Branch controls four slots for each iteration of the Special Forces Medical Sergeant Course (CMF 18D) to provide an opportunity for suitable soldiers in CMFs 18B, 18C and 18E to attend medical training. To qualify, a soldier must be a promotable staff sergeant or lower and must have served two years in an SF group in his current MOS. In addition, the soldier must have a strong chain-of-command endorsement that conveys his potential for success. Because less than 50 percent of the students graduate from the course, training must be reserved for soldiers who demonstrate the ability to complete this difficult curriculum. Recently promoted sergeants first class are allowed into CMF 18D training only as an exception to policy. Upon graduation from the SF Medical Sergeant Course, soldiers will be awarded the primary MOS of 18D. As a rule, soldiers return to the same units that allowed them to attend the course.

### **Language training**

In general, Branch does not fill all of its Defense Language Institute slots. If you have served more than two years' time on station, have a score on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery that meets Army requirements, and have chain-of-command endorsement, you can request a DLI course that supports your group's target region. Upon completion of the course, you can count on returning either to your

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group, to its OCONUS element, or to the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

### **ANCOC fundamentals**

Approximately two months prior to the start of an SF Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course, Branch sends each SF unit a consideration list. In turn, each unit must report to Branch those soldiers who will be available for that specific ANCOC. After all the units have submitted their data, Branch develops the class attendance roster (by MOS and date of rank) from the worldwide force and enters the appropriate number of slots into the computer system. Deletions from the roster are granted only in extreme circumstances (e.g., soldier or family illness or operational emergency). Any CMF 18 NCO who has a reserved slot in an ANCOC class and fails twice to show up or arrives unqualified for training will be removed from the attendance roster. If an NCO is ineligible to attend ANCOC because he exceeds the weight standard, his unit must send a copy of his administrative flag and a copy of his entry into the weight-control program, including a screening form showing body-fat computations. Applicable units must accomplish this requirement not later than 30 days after having received the ANCOC consideration list from Branch. Timely attendance to ANCOC cannot be overemphasized. Graduation from ANCOC has been a prerequisite for promotion to sergeant first class since October 1, 1993.

### **Communication**

One of our major responsibilities is to keep the enlisted force informed through professional-development briefings. Although we would prefer to visit each unit on a yearly basis, our annual travel budget is insufficient to support even a fraction of this expense. However, if an SF unit has the funds and the desire to provide its NCOs with a perspective on CMF 18, Capt. Adrian A. Erckenbrack, chief of the Special Forces Branch, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate; or MSgt. Terry Palmore, senior career adviser, will

visit that unit.

We are striving to make quality assignments that meet the needs of the Army and the desires of the SF NCOs. The senior career adviser makes a recommendation on every personnel action, to ensure that each NCO receives the most appropriate assignment at the most opportune time in his career. Although it is tough to influence the system to change an existing assignment, it is in your best interest to contact us periodically and let us know your preferences and any special family conditions that may have changed. Our address is U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-BPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452. Phone DSN 221-5395, fax 221-0524 or commercial (703) 325-5395, fax (703) 325-0524. ><

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Capt. Adrian A. Erckenbrack is currently chief of the Special Forces Branch of the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate of the Total Army Personnel Command in Alexandria, Va. In previous assignments he served as a detachment commander with the 5th SF Group Special Project Team, as a company commander provincial with the Syrian 9th Armored Division during Operation Desert Storm, and as commander of ODA 542 in Company A, 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group. He was a distinguished military graduate from Eastern Washington University in Cheney, Wash.

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## Officer Evaluation Reports: Advice to Senior Raters

**A**s the Army downsizes, both raters and senior raters must devote careful attention to preparation of the Officer Evaluation Report, or OER, the basic and most important document in an officer's record.

The reshaping of the Army has caused many senior raters to re-evaluate their rating philosophy, but now is not the time for senior raters to inflate their profiles in an attempt to protect all their officers. Selection-board members continue to report that credible profiles are essential in ensuring that only the best-qualified officers are selected for promotion. Leaders must make tough calls and identify the very best officers, and senior raters must be absolutely sure of their current profiles before selecting a block.

### Determining profiles

Some senior raters are still having difficulty understanding how OERs are processed. This could mean the difference between a center-of-mass report and a below-center-of-mass report. Every officer should know that OERs are batch-processed on a daily basis as they are received from the field. All OERs received free of errors on a particular day from a particular senior rater will be processed together. For example, if a new senior rater rates five captains (who may have various through dates and signature dates

on their OERs) in the second block and sends all five OERs to the Total Army Personnel Command in the same envelope (thus ensuring they are received together) and they have no errors, the profile on each OER will be the same: 0-5-0. On the other hand, if the five OERs are received separately on five consecutive days, the profile on the first OER will be 0-1-0; the second will be 0-2-0, etc. Remember, neither the signature date nor the through date on an OER affects the sequencing of an OER for processing. The senior rater's signature date is used only to determine which profile, old or new, an OER will be registered against once the rater's profile has been restarted.

### Profile restart

- A profile restart is never automatic.
- There must be personal contact (telephonic) between the senior rater and the Evaluation Systems Office at PERSCOM.
- Profile restarts can cover one or more rated grades — the choice is up to the senior rater.
- Never attempt to shift your rating philosophy without a "DA restart," because you could hurt your officers.
- A profile restart is effective the first day of the month.
- The senior rater's signature date on the OER is key in registering the OER under either the new profile or the old profile.

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- Senior raters can have three separate profiles based on the component (active, USAR, ARNG) of the rated officer. All are managed separately.

Senior raters may discuss and/or restart their profiles by contacting the applicable evaluation office listed below:

- Active component: DSN 892-9659 or commercial (703) 325-9659.
- Reserve component: DSN 892-3610 or commercial (314) 538-3610.
- National Guard: DSN 327-9123 or commercial (703) 607-9123.

### Signature date

There is still a problem with senior raters who do not enter the date they sign an OER. This can be critical if a senior rater has restarted a profile, because profile restarts are keyed to a senior rater's signature date. If, for example, a senior rater fails to date his signature on an OER and a clerk in the personnel service company enters an arbitrary date, the report may have the wrong profile applied. Always date your signature. If you don't, and the wrong profile is applied, the onus will be on the rated officer to appeal.

### Identify the best

Some senior raters justify a top-box center of mass in their profiles by claiming that they rate a "select group" of officers. These claims do not affect selection boards positively; in fact, by not spreading their ratings, senior raters lose credibility. A division commander senior rates HQDA-selected battalion and brigade commanders — the cream; but only one out of five or six battalion commanders will command a brigade, and only a few colonels will be promoted to brigadier general. Who knows better than the division commander which ones should be chosen? Senior raters must identify the

best of the best; to do otherwise is an abrogation of responsibility.

### Advice from the field

The most frequent advice from the field about senior rating is: "Plan ahead, or you will lose control of your profile." As soon as possible after assuming the role of senior rater, note on paper exactly where in your profile you would place each of the officers

***Selection-board members continue to report that credible profiles are essential in ensuring that only the best-qualified officers are selected for promotion. Leaders must make tough calls and identify the very best officers, and senior raters must be absolutely sure of their current profiles before selecting a block.***

if you had to rate them today. As you gain more knowledge, adjust the list throughout the rating period. When the time comes to senior-rate your officers, you will be in control and better able to communicate to selection boards.

### Board-member feedback

Over the past 15 years, board members have made comments and suggestions about how senior raters could better advocate their officers. Selection-board members from fiscal year 1993 expressed the following opinions:

- Senior raters should select the second block (center of mass).
- The words of senior raters must be consistent with their block choices. "Best officer I know," should not accompany a third-block (below center of mass) placement. Senior raters must be honest with

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their officers.

- Raters and senior raters must ensure that duty titles and appropriate descriptions are understandable and substantive.

- Do not play games or gamble with your profile. In determining an officer's rating, rate as though you may not have another opportunity to do so. Rate officers on the period covered and on their potential three to five years out.

- "A major difficulty occurs because of the tendency of some senior raters to overuse the first block. A disservice is done to an officer who is in a key position if the board is not able to determine how he performed."

- Rated officers should comment more about the adverse ratings they have received on their OERs. Senior raters must refer any OER that they know will have an adverse impact on an officer's career.

### **Referred reports**

All officers should know when to refer an OER. The guide for referred reports is in AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reporting System, which is clear and specific. Senior raters must be aware that an "off perfect" box check on the front side of the OER, a below-center-of-mass rating or negative comments in the narrative section usually hurt the officer. It is imperative that senior raters review every OER and refer each one that can be expected to have an adverse impact on an officer's career.

### **Focus on potential**

The senior rater's narrative should focus on the rated officer's potential for the near term (3-5 years). This evaluation should also include recommendations for promotion, schooling, assignment or command, as appropriate. Even though this may

seem like a laundry list, a senior rater's failure to address these areas could send a negative signal to board members. Enthusiasm counts!

### **Senior-rater option**

Selection board members are almost unanimous in recommending the use of the senior rater's option report whenever a rated officer's OER is due within 60 days after the senior rater's departure.

### **Rating scheme**

Be sure you have a published rating scheme. Believe it or not, there are some officers who do not know who their bosses are, let alone their senior raters. ✕

Reprinted from the 1994 Senior Rater Update, published by the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command.

# Enlisted Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### SF promotions to SFC near Army average

According to the promotion list released Sept. 22, 1994, the selection rate to sergeant first class for Career Management Field 18, Special Forces, was 26.9 percent. Slightly higher than the Army average of 23.9 percent, this SFC selection rate was the lowest that CMF 18 has ever experienced, and the trend toward lower selection rates is expected to continue. SFC promotion rates from the next board will most likely approximate the Army average. The slowdown in SFC promotions is a result of the filling of the force and the maturing of the CMF. Career Management Field 18 is structured like no other in the Army, in that there are more authorizations for E-7s than for E-6s. Over the past 10 years, the CMF has matured to the point that almost all SFC positions are now held by SFCs.

### SF staff sergeants to be considered for ANCOC

Beginning in FY 95, CMF 18 staff sergeants who are in promotion zones of consideration will be considered for the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course. During the next SFC promotion board, staff sergeants selected for promotion will automatically be given an ANCOC class date. Those not selected for advancement to SFC may still be selected to attend ANCOC. This is a significant change in the timeline for the institutional training of the CMF 18 NCO. More important, the SF soldier serving on an A-detachment will now have an opportunity to attend ANCOC earlier in his career, and the Special Forces staff sergeant will be a better trained, more versatile asset to his Special Forces detachment. A staff sergeant who has completed ANCOC will obviously be more competitive for promotion than his contemporary who has not. Commanders are strongly encouraged to allow soldiers who have been selected for ANCOC to comply with their initial class dates whenever possible. Deferment of ANCOC attendance could place a soldier at risk for timely promotion.

### 1995 promotion-board dates announced

As promotion becomes more competitive, it is increasingly important for SF soldiers to ensure that their files are complete before review by a promotion board. Tentative dates for calendar year 1995 enlisted promotion boards that will affect SF soldiers are listed below:

<u>Board</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Results released</u>
E-8	Jan. 31-March 1	mid-May 95
E-7/ANCOC	May 30-June 30	late Aug 95
E-9/Army Sgt. Maj. Course	Sept. 19-Oct. 11	mid-Dec 95



# Officer Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### **SOF officers may apply for advanced military studies**

Each year, SOF officers who have been selected for the resident Command and General Staff Officer Course may volunteer for the Advanced Military Studies Program, or AMSP, which provides an extensive education in operations at the tactical and operational levels of war. Volunteers undergo a rigorous selection process at the School of Advanced Military Studies, including an exam (multiple-choice and essay) and an interview. AMSP is a three-phase program. Phase 1 is the one-year resident CGSOC. Phase 2 is the AMSP's one-year resident course at SAMS, which culminates with two extensive independent research papers: one covering topics pertaining to the tactical level of war and the other covering topics dealing with the operational level. Small numbers of Army officers may fulfill the Phase 2 requirement by attending similar courses at the U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting at Quantico, Va., and the U.S. Air Force School of Airpower Studies at Maxwell AFB, Ala. However, only the Army program awards a master's degree in military art and science. Phase 3 of AMSP is a 12-18 month utilization assignment as an operational planner on a corps or division staff. Currently, SF officers serve their utilization tour as planners in the headquarters of either I Corps at Fort Lewis, Wash., or the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, N.C. The corps assignment is immediately followed by a branch-qualifying assignment at Fort Lewis or Fort Bragg. In some cases, officers can complete their branch-qualifying assignment prior to their tour with a corps HQ in order to remain competitive for promotion to lieutenant colonel. After Phase 3, AMSP graduates will be assigned to the highest level possible, in either their branch or functional area. In 1994, three Special Forces officers volunteered for the AMSP. This program affords an excellent professional-development opportunity for officers who have the potential for duty as operational planners in vital, high-level assignments in the Army and the joint community.

### **New policy will seat SF WO applicants into O&I**

Beginning in mid-FY 95, the Special Warfare Center and School will exercise the "otherwise qualified" policy to seat SF warrant-officer applicants in the O&I transition course, now known as ANCOC Phase II, on a case-by-case basis. "Otherwise qualified" applicants require letters of recommendation from their company, battalion or group commanders in addition to the other prerequisites. The new policy will provide additive seats to each ANCOC Phase II class to allow both active-component and National Guard 180A applicants to receive O&I training prior to candidacy. To eliminate any potential conflict with existing unit requirements and allocations, the additive seats will be provided by the SWCS and will not count against existing unit allocations, according to CWO3 Shaun Driscoll, warrant-officer manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. This latest initiative is a transitional effort designed to maintain steady-state accessions for MOS 180A under the implications of the revised SF ANCOC. Commanders recommending applicants will be responsible for providing funding, orders and administrative instructions to their applicants.

**Changes to DA PAM 600-3 affect FA 39 officers**

DA PAM 600-3, scheduled for publication during the second quarter of FY 95, will contain four changes affecting FA 39 officers:

- A new area of concentration, FA 39X, will identify FA 39 officers who have not attended area-of-concentration training. Although they may have completed the Regional Studies Course, language training and a master's program, officers will remain "X" until they complete either the Psychological Operations Officer Course or the Civil Affairs Course.
- Officers in Year Group 1988 and later will now be required to obtain a master's degree to be considered qualified in their functional area.
- The time needed to qualify in the functional area has been reduced from 24 to 12 months. This change ensures that FA 39 officers will have time to become fully qualified in both the FA and their basic branch.
- The term "exceptionally qualified" has been removed from DA PAM 600-3 to avoid creating two classes of trained officers — exceptionally qualified and fully qualified. Officers who have completed all phases of training are "fully qualified." If they receive additional training or hold positions beyond their grade level, they are "additionally qualified."

**1994 SF WO promotions exceed Army average**

Promotions for Special Forces warrant officers during FY 94 again exceeded the Army average.

	<u>% selected-SF</u>	<u>% selected-Army avg.</u>
CWO3 (primary zone)	85.7	76.8
CWO3 (above the zone)	33.3	29.4
CWO4 (primary zone)	100.0	63.0
CWO4 (below the zone)	18.7	7.1

CWO4 selectees averaged 10.5 years of warrant-officer service. They will be eligible for promotion to CWO5 below the zone with four years' time in grade, and in the primary-zone with five years' time in grade.

**Applications being accepted for FA 39 advanced schooling**

Applications for the FA 39 Advanced Civil Schooling Program are being accepted for the 1995-96 academic year, which runs from August 1995 to August 1996. Requests for attendance must include a completed DA Form 1618-R, an undergraduate transcript with raised seal, and current scores from the Graduate Record Examination. Applications should be submitted to Commander, PERSCOM; Attn: TAPC-OPB-A (Capt. Wheeler); 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0411. Applications will be ranked in order of merit, and officers will be notified of selection in March 1995. Officers who attend the FA 39 master's program are required to serve a three-year payback in an FA 39 master's-required coded position.

**Statistics released on FA 39 promotion to major**

The FY 94 promotion-selection board for majors considered 184 FA 39 officers (above the zone - 5, primary zone - 64 and below the zone - 115). The selection statistics for the Army and FA 39 are as follows:

	<u>% selected-FA 39</u>	<u>% selected-Army avg.</u>
Above the zone	20.0	16.6
Primary zone	76.5	77.7
Below the zone	4.0	3.7



# Letters

## Special Warfare

### SF warrant program changed from original intent

When the Special Forces Warrant Officer program was started, its purpose was to keep the more experienced SF guys on the A-teams. Back then you had to be an E-7, have something like five years in Special Forces, have at least three SF MOSs (which was waivable), and be an O&I graduate. Just by having to meet these criteria, applicants were relatively senior guys. Once they finished the warrant course, we had relatively senior, experienced men who could contribute a lot to an A-team because of their broad base of knowledge.

Now, an experienced SF soldier with more than 12 years of service is ineligible for the warrant program unless he gets a waiver. So what we have are not-quite-so-experienced guys with only three years of "team time." The doctrine and theory are important, but the education you get under a rucksack carries a lot more weight (no pun intended) with the team. Since a lot of our new warrants were junior before they left to become warrants, they pretty much have to prove themselves all over again to gain the team's trust and confidence. Once a new warrant spends some time on a team, gets more experience and starts to function as a vital member, he gets pulled off for a staff job at battalion or group level, rarely, if ever, to spend another day on an A-team. This defeats the purpose of having the warrants in the first place. Put the young warrants in

staff positions at battalion and group levels. Let them get "staff smart" before they come back to a team. Then let them stay. That is where we need them.

SFC Timothy W. Smith  
3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group  
Fort Campbell, Ky.

(The primary purpose and basic prerequisites for SF warrants are still true today, with one exception: the three MOSs. SF warrants provide expertise, leadership and continuity primarily at the A-detachment level, and later in staff positions as intelligence and operations officers. Today's selectees are typically all SFCs, ANCOC and O&I graduates, with 11.6 years of service and 4.9 years of team time. We recommend candidates for active-federal-service waivers to HQDA when they exceed 12 years of service but not when they exceed 14 years. We're not seeing guys who only have three years of team time. Contrary to our sometimes nostalgic images, the average team time in Special Forces is only four years, and our average warrant selectee easily exceeds this average.

Assignments of warrant officers may vary by mission and command prerogative. Because of officer shortages forcewide, commanders may elect to assign a warrant officer to a staff position sooner than the detachment or the warrant officer may prefer. This is a reality of numbers, mission priorities and increased demands for SF warrant officers in positions of greater responsibility. As for placing a warrant in a staff position

prior to a detachment assignment, we would consider this poor utilization contrary to his doctrinal role, SF organizational structure and grade-coding guidance. SF warrant officers are grade-coded for A-detachments in grades WO1, CWO2 and CWO3 as assistant detachment commanders, allowing commanders the flexibility of maintaining two senior warrants at detachment level. CWO3s are also coded to serve as company operations warrant officers. CWO4s are coded to serve as battalion operations warrant officers. CWO5s are coded as group intelligence and group operations warrant officers. This coded structure offers a sound, balanced progression that provides optimal experience at each level. Only in a perfect world would we anticipate seeing every SF warrant officer in his grade-coded, authorized position for precisely the amount of time recommended by the professional-development guidance. Unfortunately, our world is not perfect, and Special Forces must be flexible enough to respond to these imperfections. — CWO3 Shaun Driscoll, Warrant Officer Manager, Special Operations Proponency Office)

### SOF require organic direct-fire support

There is a serious flaw in the U.S. Army special-operations weapons structure that can be easily fixed. Combat in the former Yugoslavia, Grenada, Southeast Asia, Panama and Somalia has demonstrated the need for organic direct-fire support. When U.S.

Navy SEALs were inserted into Grenada to rescue Sir Paul Scoon, they were surrounded by enemy infantry and armored cars and lacked the firepower to break out. In Panama, when the SEALs were caught in the open at Punta Paitilla airport, it took a long firefight with heavy casualties to finish blocking the runway and to disable Noriega's escape jet. In Somalia, when our helicopters were being shot down, our unarmored vehicle column became blocked, and our Rangers had no shock weapon to regain fire superiority.

Combining forces and weapons is a desirable goal, but if the gunships, fighters, artillery, etc., cannot bring their weapons to bear because of poor communications, enemy action, weather or terrain, there has to be an in-hand fire-support capability at the ground level. We need organic shock weapons to quickly disengage or proceed with follow-on missions. A vehicle-mounted shock weapon is always in a ready-to-fire mode and can fire at the first sign of trouble with decisive effect,

regaining fire dominance.

The M-40A2 106mm recoilless rifle mounted on M-151 jeeps was devastatingly effective in 82nd Airborne Division combat in Vietnam. A number of our allies — Australia, Israel, Taiwan and Egypt — still use the 106mm. The Israeli Defense Force has used them, mounted on jeeps, to maul large enemy forces on numerous special operations. Fortunately, 106mm RRs are still in use by SF for foreign weapons training — all we need to do is to obtain HMMWV 106mm RR gun mounts as some of our allies have done. SF personnel already know how to fire M-40A2s, so the weapon is proven and could be operational in a matter of days with receipt of the gun-mount kits. New technologies could greatly increase the M-40A2's already impressive lethality and even reduce the backblast signature. New sighting systems can make 106mm RR gunnery functionally as accurate as missiles. Our allies may be interested in co-sponsoring such developments. Obtaining improved fire-

power for airborne and SF units to cope with battlefield realities is not without precedent: During World War II, Col. William Darby obtained "bazookas" to improve his shock action against German tanks and fortified positions encountered during the mission.

Sgt. Mike Sparks  
Army National Guard  
Raeford, N.C.



(Soldiers with suggestions are also encouraged to contact USSO-COM's SOF Clearinghouse; HQ, USSOCOM/J5-O; 7701 Tampa Point Blvd.; MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323. Phone DSN 968-4205 or commercial (813) 828-4205. Proposals must be unclassified. While chain-of-command approval is encouraged, it is not required: The Clearinghouse is meant to serve as an open forum for the free exchange and development of ideas. — Editor)

Special Warfare is interested in hearing from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare or elsewhere, or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. We intend to publish a series of short doctrinal articles in future issues, and reader comments can serve as a good source of feedback to those ideas. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a true forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long, but we may have to edit them for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Although we may withhold the author's name upon request, we will not print anonymous letters. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DTP-B; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

# Foreign SOF

## Special Warfare

### Russian Border Troops grow, diversify

While problems continue along Russian borders, the size and diversification of the Russian Border Troops continue to increase. As the troops guard Tajik frontiers and serve elsewhere in central Asia, they are involved in almost daily armed confrontations with drug traffickers, arms traffickers and insurgents. According to their current commander, 45-year-old Gen. Andrey Nikolayev, the Border Troops will increase to about 250,000 personnel. Nikolayev, a Russian general-staff officer before moving to his current command, brought a number of general-staff colleagues with him to upgrade and improve the Border Troops' high command. Coming additions to the force structure, which currently includes numerous border-post units, maneuver groups of varying compositions, and some air-assault elements, include the formation of a counterterrorist force comprising at least five groups of 15-20 personnel each stationed near border areas. A primary mission of the force will be hostage rescue, including hostage-release operations conducted on the territory of other states. Force members will be drawn from Border Troop schools and long-term service personnel, with no conscripts assigned. Training, according to some Russian reports, will be undertaken by the well-known Alfa counterterrorist unit. Other force-structure changes are rumored to involve the transfer of airborne and naval personnel to the Border Troops to create more mobile components. While the current expansion and the restructuring is going on, Nikolayev has acknowledged that the quality of the recruits has diminished and that "discipline is on the wane." These are problems that increasingly affect other security forces and regular military components as well.

### Philippine Islamic insurgents upgrade capabilities

Indonesia has sent military observers to the Philippine island of Mindanao to monitor the Philippine government's November 1993 cease-fire agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF. Indonesia, 88 percent Muslim, was chosen as overseer because it is a member of the Islamic Conference Organization, which mediates the peace talks, and is the nearest country to the Philippines and can send observers there immediately. This move comes at a time when Islamic separatists on the south Philippine island have been upgrading their arms capability. The MNLF has long advocated greater autonomy, integration of MNLF fighters into the armed forces of the Philippines and implementation of Islamic law within the region. According to the MNLF, it has been conducting training as part of the "upgrading of force." The more militant Abu Sayyaf group, founded by disenchanting MNLF members, recently released a local Catholic priest who had been held hostage for 60 days. The ransom of four million Philippine pesos demanded by Abu Sayyaf was not paid. The priest and 70 civilians were kidnapped in June. Fifteen hostages were killed, and the remainder, except for the priest, were released 15 hours after the kidnapping. The Philippine government regards the Abu Sayyaf movement as one of the most serious security threats in the country. The fundamentalist Islamic group uses tactics such as bombings, kidnapping and murder to

**'New' guerrilla groups  
reported in Mexico**

promote its campaign for the establishment of an Islamic state on the island of Balisan, located off the southwest tip of Mindanao. The Abu Sayyaf has denounced the government-MNLF cease-fire agreement. It is reported that the estimated 200 members of the Abu Sayyaf receive arms and financial support from Libya and Afghanistan. An additional separatist group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF, has repeatedly clashed with Philippine government troops in southern Mindanao, most recently when MILF forces raided a dam project and held seven Korean contractors hostage.

In the year since the Zapatista National Liberation Army, or EZLN, emerged for public view with the armed occupation of several Chiapas towns in early 1994, a number of self-proclaimed insurgent groups have announced their presence and their agendas. In late June 1994, a border post near the Guatemalan frontier in Chiapas State was attacked and burned, and two immigration officials were killed. The People's National Liberation Movement, or MPLN, claimed responsibility for the attack and murders. It is not clear whether this was indeed a new group operating some 150 kilometers from main EZLN areas, or was in fact the work of narco-traffickers or other criminals. In September 1994, another Chiapas group announced itself in a communiqué sent to the Mexican newspaper *La Hornada*. This group, the Southeastern Revolutionary Insurgent Army, or EIRS, claimed to be an "army composed of peasants, Indians, workers, students, teachers, and other vulnerable sectors of the state." While claiming to share the same "ideals and objectives" of the EZLN, the group said that its "fighters would wear dark green uniforms with a white ribbon on the left shoulder and a red ribbon on the right shoulder" to distinguish themselves. The group rejected the election of Ernesto Zedillo, called for the institution of a number of social programs, and demanded the arrest of corrupt Chiapas State individuals, including former governors. In Guerrero State, site of major insurgent activities led by Genaro Vazquez and Lucio Cabanas three decades ago, a group calling itself the Southern Army of Liberation, or ELS, claims to be the heir of that legacy. The ELS presents itself as part of a "national movement," has a membership based on armed peasants and Indians who recruit new members in mountain and coastal communities, and sees itself as forced into an armed confrontation with the government in order to emerge from poverty and persecution. In mid-September 1994, another Guerrero group — the Armed Force for the Mexican Revolution, or FARM — declared its existence and an avowed goal of struggling "for democracy and justice in this country." The self-identified leader, "Commander Chapo," indicated that the group had 1,000 well-armed men, including former Mexican Army soldiers. He also indicated that the EZLN had inspired the FARM's more intensified development over the last year. Government officials, on their part, insist that the armed groups reported in Guerrero State are narco-traffickers and other criminals — not organized guerrillas. Overall, the frequent reports of old and new insurgent groups in Mexico add to the uneasiness of those citizens close to the reported insurgent activity, as well as that of the new Mexican government.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Thomas E. Sidwell of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

# Update

## Special Warfare

### Green Beret statue moved to new home

The Special Warfare Memorial Statue at Fort Bragg, more popularly known as the “Green Beret” statue, was moved from the Special Warfare Plaza to the new U.S. Army Special Operations Command area Oct. 27.

The new USASOC area features a lighted memorial plaza where memorial stones from numerous veterans’ groups and the statue are the focal point, according to Alton Parker, deputy USASOC engineer. The statue was rededicated in December during the grand opening of the new USASOC headquarters building. USASOC ceremonies and special events are now held in the Army Special Operations Forces Memorial Plaza.

The decision to move the statue to the new area was made early in the planning process for the new special-operations complex, based on the fact that the new area is the focal point for all special-operations units and headquarters, according to Dr. Richard Stewart, USASOC command historian. In addition to all operational headquarters, units located in the area include the 3rd and 7th Special Forces groups, the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion.

A civilian contractor from Charlotte, N.C., moved the statue at an estimated cost of \$77,000, said U.S. Army Corps of Engineer officials. The cost included preparing and moving the statue and erecting it at the new location. The contract



Photo by Paul Nelson

Workers prepare the “Green Beret” statue for its move to the new USASOC complex.

included an insurance policy for \$1 million, the estimated value of the statue.

According to historical documents, the Special Warfare Memorial Statue was designed to honor all special-warfare soldiers killed in combat. In 1964, the Special Warfare Memorial Committee was formed to spearhead the project for an appropriate memorial. The committee selected the site and the design for the plaza, chose the sculptor and raised money to pay for the project. After five years and \$100,000 in donations, the memorial statue was completed and dedicated.

At the dedication ceremony on Nov. 26, 1969, 1st Lt. Drew Dix, the first enlisted Special Forces soldier to receive the Medal of Honor, unveiled the statue. Maj. Gen.

Edward M. Flanagan Jr., commander of the Center for Military Assistance (now the JFK Special Warfare Center and School), and Special Forces soldiers participated in the ceremony.

Special-warfare soldiers and veterans placed green berets from active SF groups, flashes from Army Reserve, National Guard and inactive SF units, insignia from psychological-operations units, a bust of President John F. Kennedy and a book of quotations from Kennedy’s speeches in the statue pedestal. All these artifacts remained in the statue’s base when it was moved. — USASOC PAO

### JSOFI established at Fort Bragg

A new organization at Fort Bragg has the mission of developing and integrating joint special-operations doctrine, training, education and leader development across the spectrum of joint operations.

The Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, or JSOFI, was established Aug. 1, 1994, at the direction of the commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command. Its commandant is Army Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison.

JSOFI was given an initial cadre of 12 personnel — four each from the Army, Navy and Air Force — to staff its three directorates: Training, Doctrine, and Education and Research.

The Directorate of Training will monitor the development of joint training, the participation in training exercises, and the efficient use of training facilities by

component schools. It coordinates joint special-operations simulation programs and manages quotas for joint and common courses taught by its component schools or by national agencies.

The Directorate of Doctrine is the primary review authority for joint special-operations, psychological-operations and civil-affairs doctrine, and for joint tactics, techniques and procedures, or JTTP. It is the coordinating review authority for joint doctrine and JTTP and assigns technical review authority within USSOCOM for specialized technical and administrative matters. The Directorate of Doctrine also ensures that other joint doctrine and JTTP, as well as service doctrine and JTTP, are consistent with joint special-operations doctrine and JTTP.

The Directorate of Education and Research is the proponent for USSOCOM programs for officer and senior NCO professional military education, or PME. It will integrate special-operations-unique instruction into the curricula of intermediate and senior-level joint and service PME institutions. It will establish and direct the JSOFI library and research center, pursue publication of relevant SOF articles in military and professional journals, and support USSOCOM involvement in national-security symposiums. The directorate will also oversee the USSOCOM-sponsored special-operations and low-intensity conflict curriculum and fellowships.

### **New PSYOP MTP to be fielded**

A new mission training plan for psychological-operations units could reach the field this spring.

The new mission training plan, or MTP, 33-707-30, PSYOP Regional Support Company, is scheduled for distribution to units in April 1995.

MTPs provide unit commanders with mission-oriented training programs for their units. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School began work in 1992 on a series of MTPs to reflect the new table of organizational elements for Army PSYOP units. One other PSYOP MTP, 33-708-30, PSYOP Tactical Support Company, was distributed in September 1994. The third MTP in the series, 33-706-30, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, PSYOP Group or Battalion, is in the initial-draft stage and is being reviewed by PSYOP field units.

For more information, contact SFC Donald Barton or Reba Wynn in the ARTEP Training Branch, Unit Training Division, SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine, at DSN 239-5333/3416 or commercial (910) 432-5333/3416.

### **USACAPOC links data bases with new program**

Combining several data bases, computer software programs will soon allow commanders within the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command to quickly identify soldiers of the command by specific categories, such as language, security level and passport status.

"When the general says, 'I want a French speaker on a three/three level with a top-secret clearance and a current passport,' we will have that," said Col. Joel G. Blanchette, USACAPOC deputy commander.

The expanded automation capability is being accomplished without buying new software, stressed Blanchette. Instead, a software tool links existing data bases. Data bases that have already been linked are the Center Level Application Software, or CLAS, which includes information related to pay and training requirements; the Daily Orders Ledger Financial Information System, which gener-

ates orders; and the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, which reflects whether soldiers have a quota to attend school.

By combining information, special reports can identify potential problems almost instantaneously. "We can now see who has requested orders and when they requested them," Blanchette said. "And we're able to see if they have a school seat at the same time."

Another data base being included in the link is the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System, or SIDPERS, which includes all personnel information. When both SIDPERS and a civilian-skills data base are merged, Blanchette explained, commanders will be better able to tailor Civil Affairs teams for existing operational situations.

The linking of information also provides the automatic transfer of information between data bases, said Blanchette. When someone is promoted and their grade change is annotated in CLAS, it is now automatically changed in the other linked data bases.

The required software was loaded onto computers which were sent to all USACAPOC reserve elements in November. Information on the active Army elements of the command will be included in the data base later, Blanchette said. — Gerry Healey, USASOC PAO

### **96th CA Battalion gets new commander**

Lt. Col. Michael G. Rose took command of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion in a ceremony held at the headquarters of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Nov. 23.

Rose was formerly assigned as chief of the Operations Division of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. He replaced Lt. Col. James F. Powers Jr., who commanded the 96th since November 1992.

# Book Reviews


## Special Warfare

### **War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century.**

By Alvin and Heidi Toffler. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1993. ISBN 0-316-85024-1. 302 pages. \$22.95.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler have profoundly influenced perceptions of future trends since the publication of the best-selling book *Future Shock* in the early 1970s. Since that time they have developed *Future Shock's* initial premises into a comprehensive sociological commentary on futurism, complete with inherent terminology and supporting concepts. The basic observation is that humanity is currently experiencing a social revolution of the same magnitude as the advent of the historic agricultural and industrial revolutions. This third revolution, or the Third Wave as the Tofflers refer to it, is centered in the concept that knowledge (or information management) is the new means of wealth creation. Just as the previous revolutions permanently altered civilization, we are currently in the throes of the transition from the Second Wave (industrial) civilization to the Third Wave (knowledge) revolution.

Through their numerous books and articles, the Tofflers have applied their views to various institutions including politics, technology, social traditions, education and law enforcement. In the early 1980s, at the behest of Generals Starry and Morelli, they focused on the military aspects of the Third Wave revolution. The result of their study is the highly readable work, *War and Anti-War:*



*Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century.*

As demonstrated by the title, the book is as much about war and its effects on shaping people's lives throughout history as it is about anti-war in terms of the effects of wars that were not fought. In this sense, the Tofflers use the term anti-war as a synonym for peace-making and peacekeeping operations. They see the potential for a systemic, surgical application of military power, under the auspices of international sanction, to prevent the probability of wider and more destructive conflict. They create a vision of a highly trained international force — using U.S. standard packages of communications, support, and information management technology — acting as a world police force to meet any type of crisis.

The structure of the book itself

is designed for the Third Wave personality, in that the information is packaged into short, readable segments that build into a readily digestible conceptual point. The segment titles are almost poetic, with thought-provoking one-liners such as "Ph.D. with a Rucksack," "The Heartland in Space," "The Rise of the Soft-Edged State" and "The High-Tech Archipelago."

The Tofflers have been increasingly called upon by government and military leaders to offer their analyses of some very complicated developments. They have been key speakers and participants in numerous military conferences and seminars throughout the Department of Defense. Throughout the book, the Tofflers demonstrate their empathy and support for military preparedness. In particular, they express an understanding for the potential roles of special-operations forces in the ambiguous environment of the near future.

*War and Anti-War* is essentially a conceptual documentation of the effects of the military's shift from the Second Wave to the Third Wave in doctrine, technology and leadership. Of particular interest to U.S. military readers is that the book chronicles the philosophical development of AirLand doctrine and treats the reader to a unique, civilian-intellectual's view of the evolution of core U.S. Army doctrine affecting TRADOC, AirLand Battle and peacekeeping operations.

The Tofflers see the Gulf War of 1990-91 as a historical watershed

in which Second Wave war forms met Third Wave. The focus of the Tofflers' interest, however, was not necessarily the tactical events, but the information war. They write of the unsung heroes of the Gulf War, the soldiers of the "cyberwar" manning the information net. Especially important were the soldiers who used off-the-shelf equipment, creativity and hacker skills to create the information-ware, which did not yet exist in the form required, to support the hyper-connectivity requirement to manage a Third Wave war. We see the like of such creative soldiers everyday in the SOF community. They are the self-taught computer hackers and computer-game fanatics, hobbyists living on the leading edge of software technology, who spend their free time reconfiguring hardware, upgrading systems and developing applications far beyond manufacturers' intentions.

Finally, the Tofflers take us on a trek through the near-future environment. As farfetched as these science-fiction-like ideas may seem, we must keep in mind that they are based on concepts and technology already under development. They paint a picture of possible warfare scenarios featuring cyberterror, armed space stations, mini-robots, United Nations-chartered private security forces and a "reconceptualized" soldier outfitted with a soldier-integrated protective suit, complete with matching exoskeleton. Even the political terrain of the near future gives pause for reflection. The Tofflers envision a world of "technopole" city-states linked in hyper-connections forming a Third Wave "overworld" in a trisected planet still hosting First and Second Wave civilizations.

The recurring theme throughout the book is that the Tofflers are stating a powerful case to develop a new perspective on the

waves of change sweeping the planet. The dawning of the Third Wave civilization will require new methods of managing and harnessing knowledge in terms of a comprehensive "information doctrine." There is also an implied warning for both the nation-state and the individual citizen, in that there is a distinct feeling that a technological knowledge "train" is pulling out of the station, and anyone who is not on it will be relegated to First or Second Wave status. The solution to the problem appears to be in maintaining flexibility of the organizational structure, a commitment to developing a knowledge policy and, most important, a willingness to consider the process of education to be ongoing.

Maj. Richard Varela  
USAJFKSWCS  
Fort Bragg, N.C.

**PSYOP: The Gulf Paper War.**  
By Richard D. Johnson. Murray, Utah: Privately printed, 1993. 443 pages. \$36.87.

Richard D. Johnson has personally published what may be the definitive history of PSYOP in the Gulf War. Although the work is undocumented, Johnson has reproduced most of the leaflets used in that war, and the book is well-illustrated with photos. The author has included details of leaflet reproduction and dissemination that can be found nowhere else. Also unique is a series of cartoons drawn by Iraqi prisoners of war that are poignant in their expression of gratitude for good treatment by the Americans.

The work illustrates some of the pitfalls of private printing and the need for a blue-pencil editor. The text is over-written and includes two peripheral areas — friendly fire and graves registration — that do not seem to have much to do



with PSYOP. The work concludes with the PSYOP aspects of the Provide Comfort mission of relief to the Kurds at the end of the Gulf War. The Gulf Paper War is strongly recommended for PSYOP military personnel and for anyone else who is interested in psychological operations and the Gulf War. Those interested will have to purchase this work directly from the author: 4919 S. Murray Blvd., S. 24; Murray, Utah 84123.

Dr. Stanley Sandler  
U.S. Army Special Operations  
Command  
Fort Bragg, N.C.



Book reviews from readers are welcome and should address subjects of interest to special-operations forces. Reviews should be 400-500 words long (approximately two double-spaced typewritten pages). Include your full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably DSN) and your mailing address. Send reviews to: Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DTP-B; USAJFKSWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

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