



# Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



# From the Commandant



## Special Warfare

With the proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems and the increased efficiency of intelligence-gathering and information processing, technology offers a variety of options in dealing with our current ambiguous operations spectrum.

Special-operations forces place a high premium on technology — the nature of our operations demands that we take advantage of every means to provide an immediate, effective response. In this issue, Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit discuss how emerging technology and the ensuing revolution in military affairs can be applied to conflict short of war, an area in which SOF are often involved. But through a hypothetical scenario, they also show the hidden costs that such an application of technology might entail.

While we consider the importance of technology and the need to stay abreast of it, we must not become so enamored of technology that we forget the reason behind our need for it: soldiers. We have always said that humans are more important than hardware.

We must never allow this human emphasis to diminish. Soldiers are the strength of our special-operations force. As Larry Cable points out in his article, the intercultural skills of our Special Forces continue to be an important factor in the indirect-action roles we face. Around the globe, whether on the Pacific Rim or in Latin America, the person-to-person contact of our special-operations forces allows the U.S. to protect its interests with a minimum of involvement. It also builds friendships and earns host-nation respect. Special Forces soldiers such as the late Dick Meadows, who is profiled in this issue, exemplify the self-effacing performance of duty summed up in the term “quiet professional.”

As we consider ways of dealing with our current and future conflict spectrum and what Metz and Kievit call its “frustration and indecisiveness,” we may be lured by the



siren song of technology, but we must remember that the main thing is to keep the main thing the main thing.

The main thing is best stated by General Dennis Reimer, when he says, “The idea of war in the Information Age will conjure up images of bloodless conflict, more like a computer game than the bloody wars we’ve known in the past. Nothing could be further from the truth. Warfare may change — its impact on nations, armies and soldiers will not. The fates of nations and armies will still be decided by war, perhaps more rapidly than in the past. Losers may still spend generations recovering from the consequences of defeat. Soldiers will always be the key to victory. Technology and the ability to handle it may be increasingly important, but soldiers will always win or lose wars. The battlefield will always be a dangerous, frightening and lonely place. Only soldiers of character and courage, well-trained, ably led, and properly equipped, will survive there and win — tomorrow, as they have in the past.”

**Major General William F. Garrison**

**Commander & Commandant**

Major General William F. Garrison

**Editor**

Jerry D. Steelman

**Associate Editor**

Sylvia McCarley

**Graphics & Design**

Bruce S. Barfield

**Automation Clerk**

Debra Thomas



Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

**Dennis J. Reimer***General, United States Army**Chief of Staff*

Official:

**Yvonne M. Harrison***Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army*

00686

Headquarters, Department of the Army

**Features**

- 2 The Siren Song of Technology and Conflict Short of War**  
by Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit
- 11 Straddling the Cultural Gaps: Special Forces in the Indirect Action Environment**  
by Larry Cable
- 18 Army Special Operations Forces and the 'Pacific Century'**  
by Colonel Russell D. Howard and Major Mark A. Nelson
- 28 Civil-Military Operations: Staff Support to Army Corps and Divisions**
- 36 Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role of the CMOC in Humanitarian Operations**  
by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen O. Wallace
- 42 Dick Meadows: A Quiet Professional**  
by Captain Jay Ashburner
- 45 USACAPOC's FOCUS Project: Waging the War for Information**  
by Brigadier General Joel G. Blanchette
- 50 Civil-Military Seminars: 361st CA Builds Understanding Between the Americas**  
by Captain Bethany L. Lenderman

**Departments**

- 54 Letters**
- 57 Officer Career Notes**
- 58 Enlisted Career Notes**
- 60 Foreign SOF**
- 62 Update**
- 64 Book Reviews**

---

# The Siren Song of Technology and Conflict Short of War

*by Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit*

Americans perceive conflict short of war as a difficult state of affairs, whether it involves crisis response, peace enforcement, counterinsurgency, antiterrorism or counternarcotraf-ficking.<sup>1</sup> In this environment of violent, shadowy grays and endless complexity, immense military advantage does not automatically bring strategic success. “Soft” skills such as psychological astuteness and political subtlety often have greater utility than do traditional warfighting virtues. Such a concept is counter to our nature: Americans prefer the direct, the simple, the conclusive and the decisive. As a result, we search desperately for some way to transcend the frustrations of conflict short of war.

Often, technology seems to offer just such a solution. The Gulf War provided shimmering evidence of the power and potential of modern technology, renewing American trust in the ability of military power to achieve strategically decisive results at an acceptable human cost. Today, many military strategists believe we are in the initial stages of a historic revolution in military affairs, or RMA, centered on the fusion of sophisticated remote-sensing systems with

extremely lethal, usually standoff, precision-strike weapons systems and automation-assisted systems of command, control and communications, or C<sup>3</sup>.<sup>2</sup> This fusion is expected to allow smaller military forces to produce rapid, decisive results through synchronized, near-simultaneous operations throughout the breadth and depth of a theater of war.<sup>3</sup>

The implications and possible impacts of the RMA are important to conventional and special-operations forces alike. Although most thinking about the RMA is focused on conventional, combined-arms warfare, the technology, the organization, and the techniques spawned by the RMA may also apply to conflict short of war, thus offering us the opportunity to transcend past frustrations and indecisiveness. Feasibility is always a prime factor in strategic decision-making, and the RMA appears to greatly expand the realm of feasibility.

Applying new technology as rapidly as possible is thus alluring, but “silver bullets” should always be approached with caution. It is easy to be awed by the potential of the RMA and to overlook its hidden costs and unintended side effects. Unlike the architects of the Man-

hattan Project, current American strategists are not forced to rush headlong into the development and the application of new military technology. No immediate strategic threat is forcing haste, so we can carefully weigh the benefits and the risks of applying the RMA to conflict short of war. Once this is done, hidden costs and unintended side effects will become stark.

## Benefits

At first glance, the benefits of applying emerging technology to conflict short of war seem immense. For example, when used for attacks or raids during crises, future autonomous, wide-ranging, high-speed information-collecting devices capable of on-board processing will identify precise targets. Interactive simulations and virtual-reality devices will be used to train the forces and to rehearse strikes. Automation-assisted C<sup>3</sup> systems will synchronize and control lethal, standoff, precision-guided weapons systems in near-simultaneous attacks.<sup>4</sup> In fact, information technology may conceal an intent to strike and, later, provide evidence of a successful strike.<sup>5</sup>

In noncombatant evacuation

---

operations, or NEOs, every American at risk could be equipped with an electronic individual position-locator device, or IPLD. The IPLD could also act as a form of identification, provided U.S. military personnel are equipped with appropriate challenge-and-response devices. Such a device might permit NEO notification to be performed covertly. Unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, would be able to conduct rapid reconnaissance of possible evacuation routes and identify threats during the evacuation. Via scrambled TV and radio signals, high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs could provide NEO notification to Americans on the ground.<sup>6</sup> When an NEO requires combat action, standoff, precision-strike weapons systems could allow small military teams to accomplish missions which today require companies or even battalions.<sup>7</sup>

Emerging technology may also improve antiterrorism operations. Cutting-edge sensors and robotic guard systems may make both military and commercial installations more difficult to penetrate. Advances in electronics and sensors and, even more importantly, the ability to fuse data through automation and improved organization may provide quick, precise intelligence. New computer software, according to Alvin and Heidi Toffler, could “discover and expose critical associations that would otherwise go undetected.”<sup>8</sup> If the Army develops an aerial capability of broadcasting and altering television signals, a key and essential weapon — media coverage — could be removed from the terrorist arsenal.<sup>9</sup> Finally, nonlethal weapons may make it possible to disable and capture terrorists or to “glue” incoming car bombs to the street.

At least one analyst has noted the feasibility of using “soft kill” weapons (specifically, high-energy,

radio-frequency guns and electromagnetic-pulse transformer bombs) to interdict narcotrafficking flights by damaging or destroying their avionics equipment.<sup>10</sup> Narcotraffickers tend to rely on radios, cellular telephones, fax machines and computers, all of which are vulnerable to electronic intelligence-gathering and disruption. For example, remote intrusive monitoring of financial computer networks of offshore banks could identify deposits associated with money laundering.

***Although most thinking about the RMA is focused on conventional, combined-arms warfare, the technology, the organization, and the techniques spawned by the RMA may also apply to conflict short of war, thus offering us the opportunity to transcend past frustrations and indecisiveness.***

Then such accounts could be electronically emptied.

Because interdicting narcotrafficking is similar to locating a military opponent’s reconnaissance platforms, a military that has the capability of collecting more and more data about a battlefield, knitting a finer and finer mesh to catch smaller and stealthier objects, could pinpoint intruders inside U.S. territory.<sup>11</sup> Because existing radar nets can identify aircraft attempting low-altitude entry into the U.S., a favored technique of drug smugglers is to transfer their contraband from planes to speedboats offshore.

Tracking and stopping high-speed small craft in coastal waters is difficult today, but it could become routine with projected advances in electronic sensors, directed-energy weapons and standoff, precision conventional munitions. Drugs smuggled aboard commercial carriers might be interdicted by hosts of miniaturized, remote-controlled, robotic detectors capable of rapid stem-to-stern searches.<sup>12</sup>

Destroying narcotics at the source is currently a resource-intensive activity involving search-and-destroy operations or large-scale spraying of ecologically damaging herbicides. In the future, it might be performed by miniature, self-mobile, biomechanical “bugs,” delivered by aerial dispensers, that would seek out and kill or modify narcotic-producing plants.<sup>13</sup> Alternatively, information-warfare systems might influence the behavior of populations by convincing citizens to stop buying drugs and to turn in traffickers.

Such behavior modification is a key component of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Soft-kill systems also can play a key role. For example, according to one assessment, biotechnical antimaterial agents “could disable propulsion systems (by attacking fuel and lubricants or clogging airways and critical passages), change the characteristics of soil or vegetation (to deny terrain to vehicles and troops), or degrade warfighting material (particularly those with organic components).”<sup>14</sup>

Advances in electronics and robotics could also prove useful in peace operations. Commanders would be able to separate forces by means of a no-man’s land populated by either remote-sensing devices or robotic patrols and enforced with standoff, precision-strike weapons. Such technology would reduce peacekeeper casual-

---

ties and improve the chances that the peacekeeping force would remain long enough for a political resolution of the conflict.

Emerging technologies can also assist in insurgency and counterinsurgency. Simulator training devices can contribute to force development and partially compensate for the difficulties insurgents face in performing field training. UAVs could be used for psychological operations aimed at mobilizing support and enhancing the legitimacy of the insurgents. Stealth vehicles could be used for insertions. Biotechnical antimaterial agents could be used for sabotage. And the U.S.'s extensive sensor and collector network can provide intelligence support.

Greatly improved intelligence-gathering and fusion is a primary component of the RMA, and proposed information-warfare capabilities might be ideally suited for insurgency and counterinsurgency in developing desired emotions, attitudes or behavior.<sup>15</sup> Standoff weapons could interdict outside support to insurgents without requiring a U.S. presence. Such interdiction could help a beleaguered regime maintain legitimacy.

### Hidden costs

The image of decisive, relatively low-cost American engagement in conflict short of war, brought about by technology, is alluring. It is also unrealistic. Before embarking on any attempts to apply the RMA to conflict short of war, American policy-makers and strategists must consider the dark side of technology: the hidden costs and the unintended side effects. What follows is a hypothetical scenario — a “history” of the application of the RMA to conflict short of war, written in the year 2010. It is not a prediction. It

is certainly not a preference. But it is a possibility.

The first question is, What led American leaders and national-security professionals to apply the revolution in military affairs to conflict short of war?

Most often, a revolution in military affairs occurs in response to defeat or to a perception of rising threat. Napoleon led an undrilled army stripped of most of its veteran officers against a host of enemies; the architects of the blitzkrieg all

***The image of decisive, relatively low-cost American engagement in conflict short of war, brought about by technology, is alluring. It is also unrealistic. Before embarking on any attempts to apply the RMA to conflict short of war, American policy-makers and strategists must consider the dark side of technology: the hidden costs and the unintended side effects.***

had first-hand experience of bitter military defeat. Likewise, the RMA of the 2000s was sparked by a series of fiascoes in the mid-1990s.

First was the emergence of what became known as “third-wave terrorism.” Recognizing the strategic bankruptcy of old-fashioned hijacking, kidnapping, assassination and bombing, terrorists rapidly adapted state-of-the-art technology to their sinister ends. Within Third World countries, they developed the means of identifying and

killing American businessmen, diplomats and military advisers at will, and of disrupting international air traffic and electronic communications in and out of their countries. Even more damaging was the ability of the terrorists to “carry the war to its source” in the U.S. Biotechnology and information warfare, especially sabotage of communications and computer networks, replaced AK-47s and SEMTEX as the preferred tools of terrorism. The new post-Mafia generation of silicon criminals provided models and even mentors for third-wave terrorists.

At about the same time, the U.S. military became embroiled in several horrific ethnic struggles. Our involvement usually began as a multinational peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation, but it rapidly turned violent when American forces were killed or held hostage. The usual response to the first few attacks on Americans was to send in reinforcements, thus placing U.S. prestige on the line. Since our strategy was contingent on global leadership, we were aware of the political damage that would result from our being forcibly expelled from a Third World country, and we thus doggedly “stayed the course” until domestic pressure forced withdrawal. On the ground, enemies would not fight our magnificent military forces directly, but relied instead on mines, assassinations and terror bombings.

The costs of these imbroglios were immense. In the U.S., a bitter dispute broke out between isolationists and supporters of multinational peace operations. Domestic political acrimony was not the only long-term cost of these operations: Many of our troops assigned to operations in tropical areas came home with new resilient diseases that gained a foothold in the U.S. Debate was fierce

---

over the new law requiring long-term quarantine of troops returning from Third World operations.

American efforts at counterinsurgency during the mid-1990s were no more successful. Whether facing commercial insurgents, such as narco-traffickers, or spiritual insurgents attempting to forge new systems of identity and personal meaning in their nations, we found that our allies were corrupt, penetrated by enemy agents, and unable to ameliorate the severe political, economic and social problems that had given rise to insurgency. When a number of these allied governments collapsed, we were privately relieved but nonetheless aware of the precipitous decline in our prestige. At times, the U.S. tottered dangerously close to being the “poor, pitiful giant” Richard Nixon had warned against.

In areas where the U.S. was not militarily involved, the major trends of the 1990s were the disintegration of nations, ungovernability, ecological decay and persistent conflict. Much of this had a direct impact on the U.S., whether by generating waves of desperate immigrants, by inspiring terrorists frustrated by our failure to solve their nations’ problems, by creating health and ecological problems which infiltrated the continental U.S., or by increasing divisiveness in the robustly multicultural American polity.

This series of fiascoes led a small number of American political leaders, senior military officers and national-security experts to conclude that a revolution was needed in our approach to conflict short of war. They held the Vietnam-inspired doctrine of the 1980s and 1990s directly responsible for these disasters. Only radical innovation, they concluded, could renew U.S. strategy and avoid a slide into global irrelevance. Nearly everyone

agreed that the old strategic framework that coalesced in the 1960s was bankrupt. This thinking, derived from the Marshall Plan, sought to use American aid and advice to ameliorate the “root causes” of conflict in the Third World and to build effective, legitimate governments. By the 1990s this was impossible or, at least, not worth the costs. Few, if any, Third World governments had the inherent capability to become stable and legitimate, even with outside assistance.

### **Dynamic defense**

The revolutionaries’ first task was to recruit proselytes throughout the government and the national-security community. Initially the revolutionaries, who called their new strategic concept “dynamic defense,” were opposed by isolationists who felt that new technology should be used simply to build an impenetrable electronic and physical barrier around the U.S. Following the presidential election of 2000, the revolutionaries convinced the president-elect that dynamic defense was both feasible and effective — a task made easier by the president-elect’s background as a pioneering entrepreneur in the computer-generated, computer-controlled “perception-molding” systems developed by the advertising industry. The president was thus amenable to the use of the sort of psychotechnology that formed the core of the RMA in conflict short of war.

### **Reorganization**

The first step in implementing dynamic defense was to reshape the national-security organization and its underlying attitudes and values. Technology provided opportunity; only intellectual change could consolidate it. With the full and active support of the presi-

dent, the revolutionaries reorganized the American national-security system to make maximum use of emerging technology and new ideas. This process loosely reflected the earlier revolution in the world of business and sought to make the U.S. national-security organization more flexible and capable of a quicker reaction to shifts in the global security environment.

The old Cold War structures — Department of Defense, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and others — were replaced by two organizations. The Conflict Preemption Agency controlled all U.S. actions designed to prevent conflict, including economic-assistance programs and peacetime diplomacy. The Conflict Containment Agency was responsible for containing conflict by orchestrating sanctions, quarantines and embargoes and by building multinational coalitions and dealing with conflict short of war. It integrated the military, the civilian law enforcement, the diplomatic corps, and the organizations responsible for gathering and analyzing intelligence.

Because so many of the conflicts faced by the U.S. were “gray area” threats falling somewhere between traditional military problems and traditional law-enforcement problems, the organizational division between the military and law-enforcement was abolished. Moreover, many aspects of national security were civilianized or subcontracted to save costs.<sup>16</sup>

One of the most difficult dimensions of the reorganization was altering the dominant ethos of the armed forces. As technology changed the way force was applied, traits such as personal courage, face-to-face leadership and “warfighter” mentality became irrelevant. Technological proficiency became the prime criterion for

---

advancement within the military. Meanwhile, the officer corps began to consider research universities such as Cal Tech and MIT as its breeding ground rather than the increasingly archaic institutions such as West Point and Annapolis.

The most common military career track alternated assignments in national security with ones in business and science. Since physical endurance was not particularly important, military careers no longer ended after 20 or 30 years. In fact, soldiers and officers were given few responsibilities until the 20th year of their careers. As proposed by Carl Builder, the Army was organized into highly specialized units permanently associated with a territorial franchise.<sup>17</sup> Careers were within one of these units, thus allowing all soldiers and officers to develop the sort of language and cultural abilities previously limited to Special Forces and foreign-area officers.

### **New values**

One of the turning points of the revolution came when its leaders convinced the president and key members of Congress that traditional American ethics were a major hindrance to the RMA. This was crucial — the revolutionaries and their allies then crafted the appropriate attitudinal vessel for the RMA. Through persistent efforts and sophisticated domestic consciousness-raising, old-fashioned notions of personal privacy and national sovereignty changed. This change came relatively easily, since frustration with domestic crime had already begun to alter attitudes and values. In fact, the RMA in conflict short of war was, in many ways, a spinoff of the domestic war on drugs and crime of the late 1990s, when the military, as predicted by William

Mendel in 1994, became heavily involved in supporting domestic law enforcement.<sup>18</sup> The changes in American values which accompanied that struggle were easily translated to the national-security arena. Once the norms concerning personal privacy changed, law soon followed.

Old-fashioned ideas about information control and scientific inquiry also changed. Preventing enemies (or potential enemies) from responding to our technolog-

***One of the turning points of the revolution came when its leaders convinced the president and key members of Congress that traditional American ethics were a major hindrance to the RMA. ... Through persistent efforts and sophisticated domestic consciousness-raising, old-fashioned notions of personal privacy and national sovereignty changed.***

ical advantages became a prime objective of U.S. national-security strategy. The government monitored and controlled the number of foreign students attending American universities. It also monitored and controlled exchanges of information within the global scientific and business communities and, when necessary, protected valuable information through outright deception. The national-security community co-

operated with business on counterespionage, providing training, advice and equipment.

### **Improved technology**

Once values had changed, technology then opened the door to profound innovation. Vast improvements in surveillance systems and information processing made it possible to monitor a large number of enemies and potential enemies. In the pre-RMA days, psychological operations and psychological warfare were primitive. As PSYOP and PSYWAR advanced into the electronic and bioelectronic era, we had to rethink our ethical prohibitions against manipulating the minds of enemies and potential enemies, both international and domestic.

Sometimes the revolutionaries found it necessary to stoke the development of technology designed specifically for conflict short of war. Whenever possible, profitability was used to encourage private and quasi-private enterprises to develop appropriate technology. For example, much of the lucrative technology of surveillance, intelligence-collection and attitude manipulation used to solve the domestic crime problem was easily adapted to conflict short of war. The same held for new weapons, especially nonlethal biological ones, and advanced psychotechnology. Only when there was absolutely no expectation of profit did the government directly sponsor the research of cutting-edge technology, often with funds freed by disbanding what were seen as increasingly irrelevant conventional military forces.

All of this reorganization and technological development was simply the preface to the full flowering of the RMA. American leaders popularized a new, more inclusive concept of national security. No distinction — legal or otherwise —

---

was drawn between internal and external threats. In the interdependent 21st-century world, such a differentiation was dangerously nostalgic. The new concept of security also included ecological, public-health, electronic, psychological and economic threats. Illegal immigrants carrying resistant strains of disease were considered every bit as dangerous as enemy soldiers. Actions that damaged the global ecology, even if they occurred outside the nominal borders of the U.S., were seen as security threats that should be stopped, by force if necessary. Computer hackers were enemies. Finally, external manipulation of the American public psychology was defined as a security threat.

### **Security strategy**

The actual strategy built on the RMA was divided into three tracks: The first track sought to perpetuate the revolution. Internally, it institutionalized the organizational and attitudinal changes that made the revolution possible, and it pursued future breakthroughs in conjunction with business, the scientific community and local law-enforcement agencies — the troika of 21st-century security. Externally, it actively sought to delay or prevent counterresponses by controlling information and by using well-orchestrated deception.

The second track consisted of offensive action. Our preference was pre-emption: In a dangerous world, we preferred to kill terrorists before they could damage the ecology or strike at the U.S. While Americans had long supported this idea in theory, the RMA allowed us to actually do it with minimal risk, just as the Industrial Revolution allowed 19th-century strategists to build the massive militaries they had long desired. If regional conflicts —

whether ethnic, racial, religious or economic — did not damage the global ecology or appear likely to bring disease or violence to the U.S., they were ignored. When conflicts seemed likely to generate direct challenges, the U.S. did not attempt ultimate resolution, but rather only to pre-empt and disrupt whatever aspect of the conflict seemed likely to endanger us. In the quest for strategic economy, pre-emption was the byword.

Since the RMA made pre-emption quick, covert, usually successful and politically acceptable, the U.S. gradually abandoned collective efforts. Nearly all of our allies, with their old-fashioned, pre-RMA militaries, proved more an encumbrance than a help. When pre-emption failed, the U.S. sought passive containment, which included isolation and quarantines, or active containment, in which strikes (electronic, psychological or physical) were used to limit the spread of the deleterious effects of a conflict. If opponents had the ability to harm the U.S., the military pre-emptively destroyed their capabilities.

The third track of the strategy was defensive, and it included missile defense, cyberspace defense and rigid immigration control.

### **Operation Cerberus**

By 2010, the RMA had accomplished its desired objectives. Most of the time, we prevented Third World conflict from directly touching our shores. Probably the finest hour of the new warriors was the Cuban pre-emption of 2005 — Operation Cerberus. This was so smooth, so effective, that it warrants explanation. Following the overthrow of Fidel Castro in the late 1990s by a popular revolt, an elected government of national unity quickly proved unable to engineer massive economic and eco-

logical reconstruction of the country or to build a stable democracy. Frequent seizures of emergency powers and fraudulent elections were the rule. Within a few years, nostalgia for the stability of the old regime gave rise to an armed insurgency; most of the front-line rebels were former members of Castro's military and security forces. The U.S. refused to support the corrupt and inept regime directly, but it recognized that the conflict required our attention.

The operation officially began when the president transferred the Cuban portfolio from the Conflict Pre-emption Agency to the Conflict Containment Agency. An existing contingency plan, along with its implementing software, provided the framework for quick action. Immediately, all electronic communication in and out of Cuba was surreptitiously transferred to the national security filter at Fort Meade, which could monitor, control and, when necessary, manipulate private, commercial and government signals. Potential or possible supporters of the insurgency around the world were identified through the Comprehensive Interagency Integrated Database. Supporters were categorized as "potential" or "active," and sophisticated, computerized personality simulations were used to develop, tailor and focus psychological campaigns for each category.

Individuals and organizations with active predilections to support the insurgency were targets of an elaborate global ruse using computer communications networks and appeals by a computer-generated insurgent leader. Real insurgent leaders who could be identified were left in place in order to develop a sophisticated computer analysis of their contacts. Internecine conflict within the insurgent elite was engineered using psychotech-

---

nology. Psychological operations included traditional propaganda as well as more aggressive steps such as drug-assisted subliminal conditioning. At the same time, Cubans in the U.S. and around the world were assigned maximum-surveillance status, and their physical presence and communications webs were monitored. As a result, several attempts to establish terrorist cells in the U.S. were thwarted.

Within Cuba, fighting was widespread. Several acts of industrial and ecological terrorism led to the outbreak of disease. U.S. forces under the command of the Conflict Containment Agency helped control the spread of the diseases. They lowered their own chances of becoming infected by providing standoff and robotic medical and humanitarian relief. Virtually all food supplies contained long-lasting sedatives that calmed local passions and led to an immediate decline in anti-regime activity. Where there were no direct U.S. relief efforts, cruise missiles were used to disperse sedatives. In areas thought to have high instances of insurgent activity, the inhabitants received increased dosages.

Since all Americans in Cuba had been bioelectrically tagged and monitored during the initial stages of the conflict, the NEO went smoothly, including the mandatory health screening of all those returning to the U.S. Coast Guard aircraft and hovercraft stanching the flow of illegal refugees. The attitude-shaping campaigns aimed at the American public, the global public and the Cuban people went quite well, including those which featured computer-generated broadcasts by insurgent leaders — “morphing” — in which the leaders were shown as disoriented and psychotic. Subliminal messages surreptitiously integrated into Cuban television transmissions were also helpful.<sup>19</sup> In

fact, the efforts were so successful that there were only a few instances of the need for covert, standoff military strikes when insurgent targets arose and government forces seemed on the verge of defeat. U.S. strike forces also attacked neutral targets in support of the psychological campaign, while computer-generated insurgent leaders claimed credit for the raids. At times, even the raids themselves were computer-invented “re-creations.” (These

***Information warfare and precise, standoff strikes might allow non-SOF military units to take on SOF political and strategic characteristics. If so, the nation might no longer require separate and distinct special-operations forces. Like the horse cavalry, SOF could become an honored but obsolete legacy of the past.***

were a specialty of the Army’s elite Sun Tzu Battalion.)

Eventually it all worked. The insurgents were discredited, and their war faded to a simmering conflict unlikely to threaten the U.S. directly. Even the relatively unimportant criticism from domestic political groups was stilled when the president temporarily raised the quota of Cuban orphans eligible for adoption in the U.S.

Unfortunately, there are growing signs in 2010 that the great advantages brought by the RMA might be eroding. With a decade in which to adapt, many opponents of the U.S. —

both state and nonstate actors — are themselves bending technology to their ends. While none of our enemies can match the prowess of American forces across the board, indications are that they intend to concentrate on one potential weakness of our forces. The RMA has amplified our distaste for death, a liability our enemies initially disdained but now are learning to manipulate in simple, low-tech ways. Even if they do not defeat us, our enemies might deny us success by increasing the human costs of U.S. intervention.

In 2010, a decade of constant success in counterterrorism was marred by several dramatic failures. The post-attack environmental cleanup and reconstruction of St. Louis will take decades. Many of the difficult-to-detect drugs and psychotechnology that were developed for use in conflict short of war have appeared on the domestic black market and, increasingly, in American schools and workplaces.

Perhaps most important, Americans are beginning to question the economic, human and ethical costs of our new strategy. A political movement called the New Humanitarianism is growing, especially among Americans of non-European descent, and it seems likely to play a major role in the presidential election of 2012. There are even rumblings of discontent within the national-security community as the full meaning of the revolution becomes clear. Since the distinction between the military and nonmilitary components of our national security community has eroded, many of those notionally in the military service have come to feel unbound by traditional concepts of civil-military relations. This group has founded a new political party — the Eagle Movement — which is beginning to exert great pressure on the traditional political parties for inclusion in national policy-mak-

ing. The traditional parties are, to put it lightly, intimidated by the Eagle Movement and seem inclined to accept its demands.

It will be up to the historians and the philosophers of the future to assess the consequences of applying the RMA to conflict short of war. No one can predict whether they will laud or condemn it.

## Implications

The RMA will force all segments of the U.S. Army to re-examine their organization, methods, ethos and purpose. The Army must both shape the RMA and respond to it. This certainly holds true for special-operations forces. So far, the RMA has had the greatest impact on conventional forces; the major changes for SOF are still to come.

In the broadest sense, the RMA will hold three alternatives for special-operations forces. In the first and least radical alternative, SOF missions and techniques will remain constant while new technology improves mobility, communications and sustainability. In this scenario, SOF would essentially continue to do what they are doing now, with incremental improvements in capabilities. Training and organization would thus need little change.

A second alternative entails more fundamental change. Some SOF missions such as direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare and psychological operations would continue along their present trajectories, with new technology grafted on. The required skills would not change much, but they would expand. For instance, as computers become weapons, Special Forces would need expertise in a range of computer types just as they currently master an array of traditional small arms. By contrast, missions

such as foreign internal defense could undergo substantial transformation: Instead of training friendly forces in basic military skills, Special Forces would train them in information warfare. The laptop computer, rather than the AK-47, M-16 or RPG, could become the first-line weapon for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. Special Forces would have to develop methods for teaching information warfare across cultural obstacles just as they currently do to bridge those obstacles in teaching basic military skills.

The third alternative would be the most radical. One of the reasons SOF exist is to allow the U.S. to affect the outcome of crises or conflicts with minimum political risks and costs. SOF have strategic value because they can operate with less physical and political damage than conventional Army units can. But if the prophets of the RMA prove accurate, technology might allow the U.S. to shape crises and conflicts from far away, using information warfare and standoff, precision strikes. If this comes to pass, there may be no need to have SOF on the ground. In the hypothetical Operation Cerberus, U.S. national interests were promoted without the deployment of forces to Cuba. Information warfare and standoff, precision strikes might thus allow non-SOF military units to take on SOF political and strategic characteristics. If so, the nation might no longer require separate and distinct special-operations forces. Like the horse cavalry, SOF could become an honored but obsolete legacy of the past.

It is not clear whether the revolution in military affairs will advance to that point. Certainly no one would argue that the RMA in its current state suggests that Army SOF should prepare to close shop — in the current security

environment, they are more necessary than ever before. But the fact remains that the RMA will have a tremendous impact on SOF. For this reason, it is important that SOF use their immense intellectual resources to understand the process and to master the challenges of the revolutionary change in military affairs. ✕

---

Steven Metz is the Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College. A faculty member of the college's Strategic Studies Institute since 1993, he has also served on the faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and several universities. He is the author of more than 50 articles and monographs on world politics, national security affairs and military science. He holds a B.A. and an M.A. in international studies from the University of South Carolina and a Ph.D. in political science from the Johns Hopkins University.



Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit is a strategic research analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, Kievit has served in the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Engineer Brigade and the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized). He has also served as an assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy and as a force-structure analyst and study director at the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.M.A.S. from the School of Advanced Military Studies of the



U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and an M.A. in history and an M.S.E. in construction management from the University of Michigan.

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> This essay is based on Steven Metz and James Kievit, *The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994).

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, reports of the roundtables on the revolution in military affairs held for the Army, Air Force and Navy by Science Applications International Corporation of McLean, Va.; Michael J. Mazarr et al., *The Military Technical Revolution, Final Report of a CSIS Study*, Washington, D.C.: CSIS, March 1993; and Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., "The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment," a report prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Net Assessment, July 1992.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, *Land Warfare in the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993).

<sup>4</sup> These are the capabilities identified as essential to future reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition technologies in the final draft of *Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-xx, Concept for Information Operations* (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 5 May 1994), p. 4-7.

<sup>5</sup> The Army's most recent proposed doctrine in regard to information operations merely states: "The Army supports the timely and accurate release of information to the media as well as open and independent reporting as the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations." *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-xx*, p. 2-9.

<sup>6</sup> National Research Council, *STAR 21 (Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century)*, Airborne Systems (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993), pp. 49-55. Also Chuck de Caro, "Sats, Lies, and Video-Rape: The Soft War Handbook," unpublished paper, Aerobureau Corporation, 1994.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, the discussion in National Research Council, *STAR 21, Airborne Systems*, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993), p. 157.

<sup>9</sup> De Caro, "Sats, Lies, and Video-Rape," pp. 32-34.

<sup>10</sup> Winn Schwartau, *Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway* (New York: Thunder's Mouth, 1994), pp. 171-76. Note that de Caro defines "soft war" as the hostile utilization of global television. "Soft kill" is used here in a more generic sense of any system designed to achieve its effect without causing harm to human beings. See National Research Council, *STAR 21, Technology Forecast Assessments* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993), p. 314.

<sup>11</sup> Martin C. Libicki, *The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1994), p. 24. The utility of Libicki's very interesting analysis is limited by his failure to provide supporting references.

<sup>12</sup> For a brief description of very small autonomous systems, see Richard O. Hundley and Eugene C. Gritton, *Future Technology-Driven Revolutions in Military Operations. Results of a Workshop* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, November 1993), pp. 12-37.

<sup>13</sup> Possible advances in biotechnology are outlined in *STAR 21, Technology Forecast Assessments*, pp. 314-46.

<sup>14</sup> National Research Council, *STAR 21, Technology Forecast Assessment*, p. 346.

<sup>15</sup> *Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 5 December 1990), p. 2-22.

<sup>16</sup> Michael Mazarr, an early analyst of the revolution in military affairs, considered "civilianization of war" one of the principles of the RMA. See "The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning," a paper presented at the U.S. Army War College Fifth Annual Conference on Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., April 1994, pp. 31-34.

<sup>17</sup> Carl Builder, "Information Technologies and the Future of Conflict," briefing to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 23 March 1994.

<sup>18</sup> William W. Mendel, "The Cold War Returns," *Military Review*, 74, 5 (May 1994): 69-71.

<sup>19</sup> This is described in Rod Paschall, *LIC 2010: Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1990), pp. 56-57.

---

# Straddling the Cultural Gaps: Special Forces in the Indirect Action Environment

by *Larry Cable*

**D**uring their nearly 45 years of existence, U.S. Army Special Forces have successfully undertaken a number of missions for which they were never originally intended, while never executing the mission for which they were designed. Paradoxically, the requirements of the original mission have made them successful in all others. Considering that Special Forces comprise one of the most competent assets available to U.S. decision-makers contemplating intervention in operations other than war, it is critical that we understand this apparent contradiction.

Special Forces were created in 1952 to serve as a cadre for World War II-style partisan forces operating in an area occupied by a conventional opponent — the classic unconventional-warfare mission. SF have never executed the UW mission, and they never could have, given the politico-military realities that have surrounded conventional, interstate warfare since 1945. SF continue to train for UW, even though UW remains a politico-military “mission impossible,” a fact underscored by the decision during the Persian Gulf War not to provide unconventional-warfare assistance to the Kuwaiti resistance movement.

One reason for our continued emphasis on UW is that a UW capability also provides the capability for indirect action, which allows policy-makers to pursue American interests using indigenous

assets as a multiplier of American forces. As expressed in Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, contemporary American politico-military doctrine envisions and describes a wide variety of missions in military operations other than war, or MOOTW. These missions include support to counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief operations. Many of these missions are conditional, at least implicitly, upon the use of American troops in indirect-action roles.

Implicit, although unfortunately not explicit in contemporary doctrine, is the context surrounding and joining many of these MOOTW missions: domestic political turbulence involving an armed component — or more precisely, insurgency, which we can define as the armed expression of organic, internal and political disaffiliation. Insurgency may be either offensive (revolutionary in nature) or defensive (a separatist or autonomous movement).

## **Insurgency**

An examination of the several hundred insurgencies that have occurred over the past 250 years demonstrates a number of crucial lessons regarding the nature of insurgency and the relationship between the indigenous contestants and any external interveners — a relationship of particular concern to American forces, no matter

what their specific mission or size.

First and most important, the internal contestants establish the political goals and define victory and defeat. They also establish the theory of victory, which includes the political and military components that are relevant to the cultural, social, political and historical specifics that have resulted in war. The intervening force never defines the crucial rules of the game, but rather must accept those which have already been established by the indigenous belligerents.

Second, while all warfare is political, insurgency is purely a contest of political will. Military operations are relevant only insofar as they have a direct, substantial and measurable impact upon the political will of the contestants and upon the uncommitted majority of the population. Thus, while the cliché “firepower kills” is true, it is impossible to kill one’s way to victory in an insurgent environment.

Third, the terrain that matters in internal war is the human terrain; specifically, the mind of every individual member of the society involved in the turbulence.

Fourth, every player, including any external intervener, has the same two tools at his disposal in the pursuit of authority

over the population: the enhanced popular perception of legitimacy and the credible capacity to coerce.

The popular perception of legitimacy can be used to change the beliefs, affiliations and loyalties of a people. In this context, legitimacy simply means the generally acknowledged right to exercise authority. Legitimacy has two forms: existential and functional. Existential legitimacy is based on ethnolinguistic, religious, class or historical relationships that grant the right to exercise authority over an individual or a constituency. Functional legitimacy comes from the capacity to address the fears, needs, hopes and aspirations of a people. Mechanisms that seek to enhance popular perceptions of legitimacy should be the first resort of all contestants.

The second tool of authority is the credible capacity to coerce. The nature of coercion is never defined or established by the doctrine or the intention of the inflictor, but by the perceptions and the culturally established standards of the recipient. Contestants, particularly interveners, who overlook this reality discover that their intended coercion is both provocative and counterproductive.

*Special Forces soldiers at a checkpoint during Operation Desert Storm. Although they are trained in unconventional warfare, Special Forces were not used in that role during the Gulf War.*



Photo by Doug Wisnioski

---

Insofar as the mechanisms by which popular perceptions of legitimacy become more effective, a contestant will need to rely less upon a credible capacity to coerce, and vice versa. Obviously, the specific nature and the application of each of these tools is defined culturally and historically by the society undergoing turbulence. In an internal war, the winner will be the contestant with the better cultural and historical appreciation of the nature and the character of the two tools. This is no less true for an intervener than for an indigenous belligerent.

### Intervention

The most effective and most efficient interventionary actions occur before social and political institutions have been totally disrupted, or before so many people have died that the dead are dictating policy. Fortunately, there is no such thing as a surprise insurgency: Each one is preceded by years or decades (and occasionally, generations) of evolution along a well-delineated continuum. The development process begins with latent political discontent and proceeds through clearly identifiable stages of political movement, political organization and organizational radicalization. No great power's intelligence service will fail to recognize the development of preinsurgent conditions, nor will the fundamental driving force behind the evolutionary process be improperly appreciated. As a result, the U.S. should never be unprepared for early intervention in a developing insurgency.

The best intervention is undertaken by the smallest possible forces. Small forces are less likely to contribute to further disruption and turbulence. They are less likely to reinforce the insurgents' message that the status quo is illegitimate and dependent upon foreign support for its existence. Small forces are also less likely to bring political embarrassment to a presidential administration or to the U.S. itself.

The forces of greatest utility to the U.S. are those capable of indirect action — of guiding a host government or a host entity in the development of mechanisms that

enhance the popular perceptions of legitimacy as well as the mechanisms that are credibly coercive. Such indirect action is the key to timely and effective action, and here lies the strength of Special Forces.

### Cultural gaps

What does it take to become a specialist in indirect action? Quite simply, it takes the capability to effectively cross two major cultural gaps. One of these gaps is obvious: the gap that exists between the culture of the U.S. and the culture of the host country. The other gap is less obvious but more critical: the chasm that exists between a regu-

***The forces of greatest utility to the U.S. are those capable of indirect action — of guiding a host government or a host entity in the development of mechanisms that enhance the popular perceptions of legitimacy as well as the mechanisms that are credibly coercive. Such indirect action is the key to timely and effective action, and here lies the strength of Special Forces.***

lar military force and irregular forces, whether they are guerrillas, paramilitary counterinsurgents or the standing armed force of a developing nation.

Crossing the first cultural gap requires more than simple linguistic familiarity. As our Special Forces theorized in the 1950s and confirmed explicitly in Vietnam in the 1960s, crossing the cultural gap requires a line of departure and a point of arrival. The line of departure is an understanding of what defines an American — not simply one's actions, behaviors, belief structures or values, but rather the bases for all the symptoms of the fundamental American identity. People in all societies ultimately define themselves not so much by language, ethnicity, religion, behavior, customs or values, as by something more basic and more irrational: myths. Objectively, myths are untrue, but subjectively, they are real and

*A Special Forces sergeant inspects the weapons of a platoon of Mobile Strike Force troops during the Vietnam War.*



Photo by James L. Ensign

powerful, having been passed from generation to generation through the process of enculturation.

It is therefore basic that we understand the fundamental defining mythology of Americans. Portions of our mythology have existed unchanged for more than 300 years: the “shining city on the hill” developing a perfect society and a government to be emulated by all mankind; the requirement, established by God, that we sally forth in a moral crusade to redeem mankind from evil; and the view that time is a commodity. However, some of our concepts have emerged during the last quarter century — for example, our concept of

death as an option that need not be exercised, provided that we jog, drink only mineral water and avoid cholesterol.

It is essential that we identify our American defining mythology; the mythology that exists in involuntary constituencies, such as those of a racial, gender or ethno-religious nature, within the larger society; and the mythology associated with membership in voluntary constituencies such as the Army or Special Forces. American personnel became aware of this while working in indirect-action advisory roles in the Republic of Vietnam between 1956 and 1965.

After we have established the line of

---

departure — who we are and the concepts that motivate us — we establish the point of arrival: the defining mythologies of our counterparts and the society in which they operate. Formal and informal research, ranging from the study of anthropological texts to hoisting a few drinks with a counterpart, will enable American advisers to understand the defining mythologies of their counterparts and adversaries. As a result, advisers will be able to understand the precise nature of the two tools of authority, their tactical employment and their psychological and political effectiveness.

Such thorough comprehension provides the basis by which we can creatively exploit differences and translate American ideas, techniques and tactics into forms which are effective and appropriate in the cultural and politico-psychological contexts of the target audiences, whether friendly, hostile or uncommitted. Only through our creative understanding of ourselves and of the human terrain upon which we operate will we be able to harmonize U.S. policy dictates and interests with the political imperatives that have driven the host country to or over the brink of insurgent warfare.

The second cultural gap exists between members of a regular military service, as perceived by Americans, and irregular counterparts, whether they are guerrillas, counterinsurgent paramilitary forces, or members of a regular national force. From an American perspective, regular military forces have three salient characteristics:

- They are rigorously apolitical, with a total separation between political policy formulation and nonpolitical policy implementation.
- Chains of command are fixed, rigid and genuinely hierarchical, with well-understood, specified and firm areas of authority, responsibility and accountability.
- The actions of military personnel are governed and controlled by external, enforceable legal codes of conduct and behavior.

Although we expect counterpart forces to reflect these three characteristics, the reality may be quite different. The overwhelm-

ing majority of counterparts with whom Americans have functioned do not reflect or accept these characteristics. Irregulars, including national forces in new or developing nations, are predominantly political in nature. Insurgents and paramilitary forces are politicians first, psychological operators second, and fighters only as a distant third. The active-duty regular armies of many new or developing nations are pre-eminently political institutions with their own agendas, which may or may not be connected with the political imperatives of the overall status quo.

Chains of command, especially those in guerrilla forces and in irregular paramilitary forces, are loose, flexible and dynamic. They are driven solely by the political relationships within their organization. This is also often true when a country has a new or developing national force, to the extent that a nominal subordinate may in fact be the superior because of the political relationships within and surrounding the country's army. Finally, external legal codes that are enforceable without regard to political imperatives or dynamics are conspicuously absent within guerrilla forces, irregular paramilitary forces and regular military forces.

The fact that American forces rarely work with counterparts who match our expectations of regular military forces presents a cultural gap of extraordinary dimensions. In order to be mission-effective and successful, American forces may have to ignore seemingly wholesale violations of the basic values of the American military — such as civilian supremacy, apolitical soldiers and the majesty of the law.

Special Forces personnel operating in Tibet in the late 1950s and in Vietnam a few years later recognized this basic cultural schism and suggested various ways by which it might effectively be overcome. One suggestion was that Americans resist imposing their ideas of chain-of-command integrity and legal accountability upon counterpart forces, regardless of the potential political embarrassment in the event of inappropriate host-force behavior. Another suggestion was that Ameri-

---

cans should understand and manipulate the fundamentally political nature of host forces.

### **Capabilities**

To achieve success in an indirect-action environment, Special Forces must therefore be able to do all of the following:

- Understand the fundamental American mythology.
- Understand the defining mythologies of the target society.
- Recognize the fundamentally political nature of the conflict and of the combatant forces.
- Refrain from imposing American

***From the Special Forces Qualification Course forward, SF training should focus more upon cultural, political, psychological and manipulative skills than upon small-unit tactics, MOS qualification and advanced technical skills. Training and doctrine must reject the traditional, conventional American understanding of war ... in favor of terms more relevant to the environment — presence, persistence and patience.***

expectations of appropriate military organizations and behavior upon the counterpart forces.

- Manipulate the cultural, political, social and military myths and realities of the human terrain, in the pursuit of U.S. policy goals.

- Straddle a set of cultural gaps in order to think and understand within an indigent cultural context, while never forgetting their American character and goals.

To achieve these capabilities, Special Forces training and doctrine must recognize the nature of the indirect-action environment. Such recognition implies several distinct requirements: First, we should exploit the most potent intellectual force multiplier available to Americans — our history.

SF soldiers should study the extensive American experience in insurgency, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping, particularly those aspects which have involved indirect-action forces. During the War of Independence, the War Between the States, the numerous Indian wars of the 19th century, the acquisition of the Philippines, the decades of intervention in the Caribbean, and the several successful Cold War interventionary operations, our nation developed all the fundamental concepts, principles and tactics of insurgency as well as every major successful counterinsurgent strategy. We wrote the book on the insurgent environment on five different occasions between the 1750s and the 1960s. During the 20th century, the U.S. has had extensive success using indirect-action forces in nation-building, in foreign internal defense and in peacekeeping. Even during the Vietnam War, U.S. counterinsurgent and indirect-action activities enjoyed significant successes, a fact often overlooked by those who dismiss Vietnam as a morass of failure.

Special Forces soldiers should be taught the importance of understanding their own defining mythologies as Americans, as members of involuntary constituencies within the heterogeneous American society, and as members of a voluntary constituency — the Army. In the process, they will understand the defining mythologies of the host country in which they will be operating.

Special Forces training must concentrate on the nature of insurgency and indirect action, both of which emphasize the political and psychological aspects while deemphasizing the purely military aspect. It may be difficult for soldiers with conventional skills to understand this shift in emphasis. But to develop an understanding of actions in an insurgent environment, whether we are countering the insurgent, assisting the insurgent or keeping peace in a society wracked by insurgency, our soldiers must think like criminals, con men and politicians.

Although these terms are not normally thought of with approval by American Army personnel, they best describe the mindset of

---

the successful unconventional warrior. From the Special Forces Qualification Course forward, SF training should focus more upon cultural, political, psychological and manipulative skills than upon small-unit tactics, MOS qualification and advanced technical skills. Training and doctrine must reject the traditional, conventional American understanding of war — which emphasizes high lethality, high fire power, high mobility, and technological sophistication — in favor of terms more relevant to the environment — presence, persistence and patience.

- Presence. The nature of the environment, the nature of the forces and the nature of the tools of legitimacy and coercion all require that Special Forces be present on the ground.

- Persistence. Special Forces must also be present over time, to develop not only the requisite intelligence and rapport but also the utterly essential perceived legitimacy.

- Patience. Finally, Special Forces must be patient with the inherent ambiguity, the frustrations and the contradictions between our cultural and military concepts and those of our counterparts and of the human terrain upon which we must operate.

SF senior leadership must be able to provide appropriate guidance to unified commands and to the national command authority regarding the strengths and the limitations of indirect action. The strengths of indirect action are low visibility and a high likelihood of success; its limitations are the requirements for patience, the acceptance of the ambiguity of the end state, and an understanding of the process leading to the end state.

SF success in future indirect actions will not require increased firepower or the promise of technology, but a reliance on the strengths of the past: SF doctrine, selection and training that emphasize a capacity to operate across cultural divides in an unconventional environment. Ironically, the success that Special Forces have enjoyed in the pursuit of missions that were never originally envisioned, at the expense of originally envisioned missions that could never have been executed, has been the flexibility, adaptability and inge-

nuity of men who saw themselves as unconventional warriors. These were warriors who could simultaneously exist in two cultures and who could harmonize the necessity of being con men, diplomats and politicians with the necessity of being elite military forces in the most challenging missions of the Cold War. ✕

---

Larry Cable is an associate professor of history at the University of North Carolina-Wilmington. Prior to his teaching career, he served 17 years with military and civilian components of the national-security community, including 63 months in a variety of unconventional-warfare assignments in Southeast Asia. Cable is also an adjunct professor of history at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, where he received the 1995 General James Doolittle Award as educator of the year. Cable regularly lectures at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School; the Marine Corps Command and Staff College; and the Marine War College, where he was the 1995 visiting professor of military affairs. He completed a Ph.D. with distinction at the University of Houston in 1984. Cable is the author of three books: *Conflict of Myths: The Development of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*; *Unholy Grail: The U.S. and the Wars in Vietnam, 1965-1968*; and *Self-Inflicted Wound: The U.S., Indochina and Global Policy, 1940-1975*.



---

# Army Special Operations Forces and the 'Pacific Century'

*by Colonel Russell D. Howard and Major Mark A. Nelson*

**F**or nearly five decades, U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific region were a subset of the greater East-West confrontation. Now that bipolar politics and Cold War tensions are a distant memory, the U.S. still has a vital economic interest in the region.

While the stability of Asia-Pacific states and the drawdown of U.S. forces worldwide have brought about a reduction of U.S. military forces in the region, U.S. Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, which include Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, offer capabilities that are ideally suited to current and future Asia-Pacific operations. ARSOF missions in the region may actually be increasing.

That the region is vitally important to U.S. interests is clear. The region now accounts for nearly a quarter of the gross world product, or GWP. By the end of the century, it will account for almost as much of the GWP as Europe and North America combined.<sup>1</sup> U.S. trade with the Asia-Pacific region was \$344 billion in 1992, 51 percent greater than our trade with Western

Europe (\$228 billion) and three times greater than our trade with Latin America.<sup>2</sup> In fact, more than 40 percent of all U.S. trade is with Pacific Rim nations.

## Concerns

Still, it may be too soon to feel confident that a "Pacific Century" is truly under way.<sup>3</sup> Of some concern is the fact that defense spending in the region has increased — several nations are using increased revenues to upgrade their existing arms systems with new and second-hand arms that are being aggressively marketed by the U.S. and former Eastern-bloc states.<sup>4</sup> Flash points remain, and the resolution of long-standing rivalries, territorial disputes and mutual suspicions may be a long time in coming.<sup>5</sup> And while the recent landmark agreement between the U.S. and North Korea on the future of Pyongyang's nuclear program gives hope, optimists concede that North Korea will pose a risk for much of the next decade.

Possibly the major uncertainty in the region is the People's Republic of China. Home to one-fifth of the world's population and second only to Russia in territory, the PRC could have the world's largest economy within a generation.<sup>6</sup> Increased defense spending, large military-force levels (three million) and saber rattling over the Spratly Islands have China's neigh-

---

This article was originally presented at a 1994 conference hosted by Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and USSOCOM. Papers from that conference have been collected and published by the Fletcher School and USSOCOM as *Roles and Missions of Special Operations Forces in the Aftermath of the Cold War*.

bors understandably nervous.<sup>7</sup>

Other threats negatively affecting the Pacific Century include nuclear proliferation (India, Pakistan, North Korea) and combinations of political, ethnic, economic and religious strife in Myanmar, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia.<sup>8</sup> A flourishing drug trade also has regional implications that bode ill for the U.S. Grown and processed in the Golden Triangle countries of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, a new form of potent, smokable heroin called China White is being transhipped via Thailand, India, China and Hong Kong to the United States.<sup>9</sup> Other potential destabilizing factors include rampant AIDS proliferation, pollution and rapid resource depletion in the form of poaching and strip harvesting.

In the absence of a viable regional security architecture like NATO, the U.S. has worked bilaterally with individual countries in the Asia-Pacific region to address security and stability issues. While some movement toward regional security arrangements is ongoing, notably among the states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, bilateral security relationships will be the norm in the

future. A forward-deployed military presence throughout the Asia-Pacific theater has been key to our ability to positively influence bilateral relationships. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the closing of U.S. bases in the Philippines, our ability to influence events in the region will decline as a result of the drawdown of U.S. forces worldwide.

### Doctrinal missions

The capabilities of ARSOF are ideally suited to doctrinal, emerging and new missions in the Asia-Pacific region.

While ARSOF can operate throughout the spectrum of conflict, their most important doctrinal mission is that of force multiplier. ARSOF will continue to execute doctrinal force-multiplier missions in support of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, or CINCPAC, and for deployed conventional forces. During the current period of retrenchment, language-qualified, regionally oriented and culturally aware ARSOF can also contribute to regional stability by amplifying their traditional doctrinal roles. At relatively low cost and with low force levels, ARSOF can continue a U.S. presence,



*Captain (Dr.) Mark Nelson, surgeon for the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, prepares to give medical examinations to monks at Tonle Bati, Cambodia, as part of a medical civic-action program.*

Photo by Mark Martello

*A U.S. Army veterinarian treats an animal during Exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand.*



Photo by Keith Butler

maintain military-to-military contacts and help develop professional military forces in emerging democracies.

Special Forces plan, conduct and support special operations in all operational environments in peace, conflict and war. They perform five primary missions worldwide: unconventional warfare, or UW; foreign internal defense, or FID; direct action, or DA; special reconnaissance, or SR; and counterterrorism, or CT. Special Forces also perform collateral activities that include, but are not limited to, security assistance, humanitarian assistance, combat search and rescue, and counterdrug operations.<sup>10</sup>

Civil Affairs supports the commander's relationship with civil authorities and with the civilian populace; promotes mission legitimacy; enhances military effectiveness; and supports other special-operations forces during UW, FID, civil administration and civil-military operations. Civil administration, or CIVADMIN, is the direct involvement of the military in the executive, legislative or judicial areas of civilian government. A government or host nation can

request CIVADMIN assistance to provide basic services until normal operations can be resumed or, in the absence of a legitimate government, until a temporary civil administration can be established. Civil-military operations are primarily designed to reduce the adverse impact of military operations on civilian personnel and to reduce civilian interference with military operations.<sup>11</sup>

Psychological Operations units derive their mission from the unit they are supporting. They can function in peace, conflict and war. PSYOP units use various forms of persuasion to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of selected audiences. PSYOP products are designed to convince audiences to cease resistance or to take actions favorable to friendly forces. PSYOP activities serve as a major force multiplier for the supported commander.<sup>12</sup>

ARSOF units continually participate in joint and combined exercises to refine their ability to accomplish doctrinal missions. Annual exercises such as Cobra Gold in Thailand and Foal Eagle in Korea are but two of these. ARSOF units also train, especially for FID, in events known as joint-combined exercise training, or JCET. In 1993 alone, JCET events were conducted in 27 Asia-Pacific nations and territories. In 1994, the JCET program was expanded to include Russia. China may soon be an additional venue.

## Emerging missions

ARSOF could expand into a number of less traditional or emerging missions in support of CINCPAC taskings. These missions include coalition-support-team operations, humanitarian/civil assistance, humanitarian mine clearance,<sup>13</sup> counterdrug operations and peace-support operations. While not specifically trained to undertake these operations, ARSOF could support them by using the capabilities inherent in their doctrinal missions. These inherent capabilities may make ARSOF, especially integrated ARSOF, the possible force of choice to preclude future economic and resource-related threats.

Coalition-support teams, or CSTs, pro-

---

vide a direct liaison and establish a vital communications link among U.S., allied and coalition forces. These teams work to deconflict joint and combined operations and to ensure the smooth integration of available combat support (close air support, indirect fire and naval gunfire) to U.S. and coalition forces. The CST concept has special utility in peace-support operations, as was demonstrated by successes in Desert Shield/Storm, Somalia and Haiti. In Haiti, elements of the 1st Special Forces Group deployed as CSTs in support of a 1,000-man force from Bangladesh. Given the number of Asia-Pacific nations that participate in U.N.-sponsored peace-support operations, it is likely that the CST concept will expand in the future.

#### *Humanitarian/civil assistance*

Humanitarian/civil assistance, or H/CA, programs often employ military personnel, but they are principally designed to promote nonmilitary objectives within a foreign civilian community. These objectives include disaster relief; medical, veterinary and dental assistance; limited construction; water and sanitation assistance; and expedient communications. By definition, disasters may be natural (flood, drought, hurricane, earthquake or epidemic) or man-made (riot, coup or civil strife). Assistance may or may not be associated with larger military operations, depending upon which agency has the lead.

Owing to the geophysical characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region, natural disasters are more common there than in other regions. Typical examples include the yearly flooding of the deltaic plains in Bangladesh and India, and the devastation throughout Asia from earthquakes and seasonal typhoons.

While the Department of State has overall responsibility for foreign disaster relief (the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance are the lead U.S. agencies), the U.S. military plays a vital and expanding role.<sup>14</sup> Because of their language capability, their regional expertise and their ability to respond quickly to a disaster area, ARSOF

have been in the forefront of recent humanitarian operations. By deploying tailored force packages (communications, medical and logistics) and disaster-assistance response teams on short notice, SF can assist U.S.-sponsored H/CA operations in those countries unable to marshal sufficient internal resources.

Historically, SF disaster-relief missions in the Asia-Pacific region have assessed and reported on the magnitude of the disaster, provided immediate relief for disaster victims and assisted in establishing remote-site distribution points. CA objectives in H/CA operations are to determine and re-establish, where possible, the basic economic and social needs of the people. PSYOP units, in conjunction with SF and CA, further enhance H/CA missions by conveying important lifesaving information to indigenous populations. On-the-shelf PSYOP studies and CA assessments can also offer expedient, area-related databases for personnel involved in H/CA missions.

Recent H/CA actions in which SOF assisted include Operation Sea Angel, in response to massive floods that paralyzed Bangladesh; and Operation Fiery Vigil, following the volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines.

#### *Mine clearance*

According to the U.S. State Department, there are more than 85 million uncleared land mines in 62 countries around the world.<sup>15</sup> These uncleared mines pose a serious and enduring problem not only to local civilian populations but also to international relief workers and peace-support forces. Because land mines are cheap, easy to manufacture and use, difficult to detect, and expensive and dangerous to remove, they have become the weapon of choice for many governments and insurgent groups. Further complicating the problem is that they are used indiscriminately — often, there are no records, maps or warning signs — and they are left behind after hostilities end.<sup>16</sup>

The impact of these uncleared minefields both on human lives and on developing economies is staggering. Worldwide, there



Photo by Mark Martello

*Co-ministers of defense for Cambodia view a mine-awareness display set up by the 4th PSYOP Group.*

are more than 150 deaths or injuries each week from mines. In Cambodia alone, injuries from mines have been responsible for 30,000 amputations. Equally high are the costs associated with mine removal, estimated to be between \$300 and \$1,000 per mine. In Cambodia, the estimated total cost of mine removal is equivalent to every dollar of income to be earned by Cambodians for the next 5-7 years.<sup>17</sup>

Fortunately, many nations, including Australia, Bangladesh, France, India, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, are providing money, equipment and demining expertise in support of Cambodian relief efforts.<sup>18</sup> The West is also developing new methods of detection and neutralization, and it has even proposed a moratorium on new mine production. Experts agree, however, that the problem is likely to become worse unless bold steps are taken.<sup>19</sup>

Since 1993, U.S. Army PSYOP units have complemented Cambodian demining operations by waging an awareness campaign to inform the indigenous population about the dangers of unexploded land mines and munitions. PSYOP units researched Cambodian cultural aspects and produced posters, stickers, schoolbooks, and even skits choreographed in conjunction with their Cambodian counterparts to ensure the widest possible dissemination of information on the location of mines, minefields and other hazardous areas, thereby saving life and limb.<sup>20</sup>

PSYOP products also directed the people to government and nongovernment agencies that provided medical assistance and other humanitarian-relief support. By highlighting the success of demining activities, PSYOP efforts also helped promote the host nation's civilian government.

Since July 1994, Special Forces soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, have assisted PSYOP personnel in the demining effort. Capitalizing on their language training, cultural awareness and new expertise in demining operations, the SF soldiers instructed Cambodian military personnel in mine clearing. Until new technologies can be developed to reliably counter hidden mines, ARSOF offer one of the best and most cost-effective solutions to an otherwise hopeless situation.

### *Counterdrug operations*

More than 25 million Americans buy and use illicit drugs. Illicit drugs degrade our nation's health and productivity, account for an increasing crime rate, and require billions of dollars each year for the counterdrug effort. At least four-fifths of all illicit drugs consumed in the U.S. are of foreign origin, including virtually all cocaine, opium and heroin. The Golden Triangle, located in Asia along the borders of Burma, Thailand and Laos, accounts for 60 percent of the world's supply of illegal opiates and for 88 percent of the world's heroin supply. Seventy-five percent of the world heroin supply ultimately makes its way to the U.S.<sup>21</sup>

While the economic future of the Asia-Pacific region is quite promising, the economic disparity between the developed and lesser-developed countries of Southeast Asia is increasing. If this gap is not closed legitimately, illegal drug trafficking may provide the covert revenues needed to fill the void of the economically deprived. The cash generated by illegal trafficking often provides the means for lesser-developed nations and insurgent groups to purchase arms and modern high-tech weapon systems, increasing the possibility of regional instability.<sup>22</sup>

Currently, developed nations focus their counterdrug efforts on attempts to make the governments of drug-producing

---

nations enforce accepted international laws. This approach ignores the fact that the basic impetus for drug trafficking is the lure of enormous profits, based on a continuously increasing world demand.

Though their current involvement is not significant, ARSOF could become an integral part of the expanding counterdrug effort in the Asia-Pacific region. While any single ARSOF asset could help in the fight against illicit drugs, integrated ARSOF are a symbiotic alternative to singular, stovepiped actions. SF are organized to work with indigenous personnel, regardless of the indigenous population's level of economic development or geographic location. SF could also support counterdrug efforts through short-term, unit-oriented operations designed to advise, train and assist host-nation military and paramilitary forces.<sup>23</sup>

CA and PSYOP assets could be part of an attack on illegal drug trafficking while reinforcing ongoing humanitarian and civic-action programs. CA support could evaluate the political, economic, social-cultural and ideological development of the nation, and could provide technical assistance aimed at developing the local infrastructure in remote areas. PSYOP campaigns could illustrate the dangers of drug use, undermining the traffickers' credibility and minimizing their successes. PSYOP could also build support for the host nation's institutions and programs and could analyze the propaganda used by drug traffickers. PSYOP could then provide the host nation with insight into the traffickers' thoughts, reasoning and perception of government counteractions.

All of the emerging missions just described are ongoing in the Asia-Pacific theater. As other military assets decline because of the drawdown, the likelihood of ARSOF performing these missions will increase.

### **Future missions**

There is an old Chinese saying, "A rising tide floats all boats." As long as the rising economic tide in the Asia-Pacific region continues, opportunities for conflict will probably decline. But resources are finite,

and the unparalleled growth in the region, especially in China, coupled with explosive population growth rates, will eventually focus attention on the region's endangered resources. Poaching, air pollution, water pollution, overmining and deforestation pose clear, long-term threats to future economic expansion and regional security. As Pacific Rim resources become more scarce and pollution becomes more prevalent, opportunities for economic terrorism and general conflict could increase as nations in the region try to protect their resources.

In 15-20 years, it may be appropriate for ARSOF to assist in promoting regional environmental policies that support U.S. foreign-policy objectives. In theory, SF units could develop and train government forces to enforce local, regional and international environmental laws and to protect valuable natural resources. PSYOP assets could develop, implement and sustain environmental-awareness programs. These programs might inspire current and future generations to adopt a more eco-conscious attitude. CA assets could reinforce SF and PSYOP efforts by providing technical assistance from a pool of reserve-component soldiers who have compatible civilian experience.

Advocating the use of ARSOF in an environmental police role may seem to be "pushing the envelope." However, if environmental degradation causes economic instability in the Asia-Pacific region and if U.S. interests are at risk, ARSOF may have a role. ARSOF-led counterpoaching and remote-site environmental assessment teams are two new concepts that may prove useful in reducing resource-related economic problems.

### *Counterpoaching*

In an attempt to restore endangered animal populations and to halt the wholesale slaughter of wild animals for profit, industrialized nations are increasing the pressure on some Asia-Pacific countries to "take control." On April 11, 1994, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers explained that the Clinton administration "recognizes that threats to endangered

The rhinoceros is one of many animals in jeopardy of extinction in Asia. Over the last 23 years, the world's rhino population has declined by 90 percent.



File photo

species are of critical importance.” The administration authorized placing trade sanctions against Taiwan until its government enforces international laws and stops condoning the killing of endangered species and the importation of their byproducts.<sup>24</sup>

In Asia the tiger, panda, pangolin, gibbon and Indian rhinoceros are among the animals in jeopardy of extinction. Over the last 23 years, the world's rhino population has declined by 90 percent; the tiger population by 95 percent.<sup>25</sup> This dramatic decline is largely the result of poachers who have become more aggressive and who have modernized their techniques.

Poaching thrives partly because of the popularity of folk medicine in Asia. Remedies often call for the use of expensive body parts from many of the endangered animals. This demand, coupled with the nominal local enforcement of laws designed to protect wildlife, makes poaching an attractive livelihood. While international laws have been promulgated to protect wildlife, critics charge that the laws don't impose harsh enough penalties to stop or even slow illegal poaching. Moreover, the potential profits from selling rare animal skins, meat or parts attract new criminals to replace those who are caught. For example, just 10 grams of rhino horn sells for \$900 (U.S. currency). A mixture that includes 70 grams of tiger shinbone, thought to cure pain, brings \$410.<sup>26</sup>

Although the situation presents a rather gloomy picture, there have been successful counterpoaching efforts. In 1993, the 3rd Special Forces Group sent detachments to Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe to instruct counterpoaching units in

light-infantry tactics, reconnaissance and tracking. The methods and practices that SF used are natural extensions of FID, SR and DA missions. The success of this training has positively affected the political and economic conditions within all the assisted countries. Increased law enforcement and a campaign of aggressive prosecution against poachers have inspired confidence in the government's ability to maintain law and order, while the subsequent increase in tourism has provided additional revenues.

SF units could be employed throughout Asia to teach the same tactics, techniques and procedures that worked for the 3rd SF Group in Africa. PSYOP and CA assets could complement SF efforts by educating indigenous populations on the impact of continued uncontrolled poaching and by helping to promote national policies.

### *Environmental assessment*

Asia's phenomenal economic growth has focused attention on an escalating environmental crisis. Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are rapidly cutting down their forests, both legally and illegally, with no perceptible management or re-growth plan. Also at risk is their most important resource — water. Several Asian states show little or no concern about dumping industrial, human and animal waste into the region's water supplies. If allowed to continue at the present rate, this environmental damage will undercut regional economic growth. Unfortunately, no one country or international body has a clear understanding of the extent of the damage or of the ramifications of continued deterioration.

To minimize the cost and impact of potential environmental damage, nations need access to accurate and timely information on the status of threatened areas. Alternatives should be developed to alter the behavior of those who are creating the problem. In the future, ARSOF, in the form of remote-site environmental assessment teams, or RSEAT, could assist local and international authorities in correcting the problem.

Taking the lead role, CA and PSYOP units could assist emerging nations in the

development of environmentally friendly policies. After a preliminary assessment, CA units could provide governments with a critical analysis of selected sectors of the economy, identify problem areas, and recommend eco-friendly alternatives. CA could also assist in the implementation of government-adopted alternatives. They could provide instruction on the following: measuring the impact of continued deforestation; assessing the impact of acid rain on crops and vegetation; evaluating the impact of strip-mining techniques; reporting the improper use of fertilizers and pesticides; and monitoring water resources at the point of origin and along the water's route into populated areas. CA teams could educate people in remote areas on viable, government-supported alternatives to traditional agricultural practices that damage the environment.

PSYOP assets could develop multimedia products by which to target the population with necessary information on environmental damage and approved alternatives. SF teams could train host-nation military and paramilitary forces how to protect valuable resources and to enforce laws, especially in remote and contested areas.

## Constraints

Although ARSOF will frequently be the organization of choice for a variety of traditional, emerging, and new missions, there are a number of constraints that limit their ability to participate.

**Limited resources.** ARSOF's funding and manpower resources are limited. To maintain their special skills and to prepare for their primary missions, ARSOF require extensive, uninterrupted training time. With a full schedule of training exercises and worldwide contingency operations, their operations tempo is already high. Whether ARSOF could absorb many new undertakings is questionable.

**Current force structure.** The majority of CA (96 percent) and PSYOP (78 percent) forces are in the reserve components. Reserve units can be called to active duty only by presidential order, usually during the execution of a war or a contingency

plan. Although volunteers often fill out the force during operations other than war, civilian employers are reluctant to release reservists for extended periods. This limits the availability of reservists for deployments of long duration.

**Legal constraints.** Current laws and defense policies restrict ARSOF from working with civilian police agencies in many instances. In the U.S., the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits direct military involvement in law-enforcement activities. Policies are less restrictive outside the U.S.; however, there are limitations regarding ARSOF's ability to train civilian police. In many Asia-Pacific countries, there is no clear line of demarcation between military and civilian law-enforcement agencies, which severely restricts ARSOF's ability to train indigenous assets.

**Fiscal constraints.** Every year Congress appropriates funds to DoD in five categories. The largest appropriation goes to operational and maintenance, or O&M, accounts. O&M funds may be expended only on training and operations conducted by U.S. forces; they may not be used in sup-



File photo

*Asian-Pacific crops, vegetation and water resources are threatened by an escalating environmental crisis. ARSOF could assist local and international authorities in correcting environmental problems.*

port of foreign forces. However, Congress has provided a few exceptions to this rule. The first exception is commonly referred to as the "Special Forces exception." Recognizing that one of the primary missions of ARSOF is to train foreign forces in "alien" environments, Congress has authorized SOF to spend O&M funds on the training of foreign forces if U.S. forces are to receive the primary benefit of such training. Another exception allows O&M funds to be expended on H/CA projects overseas. These include medical and veterinary assistance, limited engineering projects and disaster assistance. However, using these funds on military or paramilitary organizations is strictly prohibited.

These limitations, coupled with the fact that military budgets are developed five years in advance, create a system that often is not flexible enough to keep up with changing world events. New, unforecast missions may require canceling other planned operations or identifying alternative sources of funding.

Political constraints. While ARSOF has tried to establish its identity within the military and with the public, many false perceptions still exist. Misconceptions have isolated ARSOF in the past and continue to hinder their appropriate use today.

## Conclusion

In a recent speech, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said the Asia-Pacific region is characterized by "a growing network of constructive relations among most of the region's key states; explosive growth; expanding human freedom; and new efforts to foster cooperation on economic and security issues."<sup>27</sup> The Asia-Pacific region is important to U.S. interests for a number of economic, political and security reasons. One of four non-governmental jobs in the U.S. is tied to the Pacific Rim.

Despite the current calm and the promise of a "Pacific Century," opportunities for conflict remain. Situations in Korea, China and other countries have been articulated, but there is another facet that needs to be analyzed — the long-term effect of the U.S.

drawdown. Which countries might attempt to fill the power vacuum? When?

As the drawdown of U.S. forces continues, opportunities for using ARSOF will increase. However, despite opportunities to perform doctrinal, emerging and new missions, there are constraints that limit ARSOF. Lack of available forces and a robust operations tempo are immediate limitations. Legal, political and fiscal constraints must also be considered.

The U.S. must pursue innovative ways by which to secure its national security interests in the post-Cold War world. ARSOF, out of all proportion to their size and cost, can and will be a useful instrument in protecting U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. ❧

---

Colonel Russell D. Howard is commander of the 1st SF Group. His previous assignments include service as assistant to the special representative to the Secretary General during UNOSOM II in Somalia; as deputy chief of staff for I Corps; as chief of staff and deputy commander for the Combined Joint Task Force, Haiti/Haitian Advisory Group; and as commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He holds a bachelor's degree from San Jose State University, a bachelor of arts in Asian studies from the University of Maryland, a master of arts in international management from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a master's in public administration from Harvard University.



Major Mark A. Nelson is adjutant for the 1st SF Group. In previous Special Forces assignments he served with the 1st SF Group as the group Civil Affairs officer, as a company executive officer and as commander of a combat-dive detachment; and with the 5th SF Group as commander of a combat-dive detachment.



Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Richard H. Holomon, "Asian Architecture — The U.S. in the Asia-Pacific Community," *Harvard International Review*, Spring 1994, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Russell D. Howard and Kelly Hicks, "U.S. Security Interests in the Pacific Rim," *Military Review*, September 1994, p. 42.

<sup>4</sup> "Power Game," *Asia - 1994 Yearbook*, December 1993, pp. 18, 19.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> William C. Triplett II, "Time to Wake Up to the Real Threat That China Presents," *Army Times*, 21 November 1994, p. 39.

<sup>8</sup> Howard and Hicks, pp. 43, 45.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 47.

<sup>10</sup> FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1990), pp. 3-1 to 3-7.

<sup>11</sup> FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 11 January 1993), p. 8-4.

<sup>12</sup> FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 5 May 1994), pp. 2-1, 1-5.

<sup>13</sup> "Humanitarian mine clearance" is the term used by the U.N., the largest agency involved in demining activities. Other names used for demining are "humanitarian demining assistance" and "demining operations."

<sup>14</sup> USCINCPAC Command Center (J323), *Smart Book on Disaster Relief*, 13 August 1990, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> "Fact Sheet: U.S. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine Control," 30 May 1994, p. 362. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that there are more than 30,000 amputees in Cambodia, of which most are victims of land mines. The ICRC provided nearly 8,000 artificial limbs and 11,000 orthopedic appliances to mine victims in 14 countries.

<sup>16</sup> Paul Jefferson, "An Overview of Demining Including Mine Detection Equipment in ICRC," *Montreal Symposium*, 1993, p. 125.

<sup>17</sup> "Fact Sheet: U.S. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine Control," p. 362.

<sup>18</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Land mines: A Deadly Legacy," 1993, p. 252.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 236-37. Unlike wartime military mine clearing (breaching) in which a clearance rate of 80 percent is considered acceptable, humanitarian mine clearing requires a clearance rate of 99.9 percent, with the ultimate goal of removing every land mine. To achieve this rate, almost all humanitarian mine clearing must be performed by hand because mechanical clearance equipment is not capable of clearing such a high percentage of land mines. Obviously, hand clearance is extremely dangerous, very slow and very expensive. Deminers maintain, however, that when carried out by experienced, well-trained and well-equipped operators, this technique will usually prove to be the most efficient and most reliable.

<sup>20</sup> Phone interview with Major Wayne Deneff, 8th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, Fort Bragg,

N.C., 24 October 1994. Because of the extent of human suffering, the U.N. and the U.S., through the U.S. Embassy in Cambodia, agreed to provide support to the Cambodian government in its demining operations. The initial support was a 12-man team from B Company, 8th PSYOP Bn. The PSYOP team instructed the Cambodian Mine Action Center on how to produce a product that would warn Cambodians of the dangers of unexploded mines and other munitions. Because of the success of that mission, in 1994, the 8th PSYOP sent a follow-on team to conduct a similar mission but also included the training of selected personnel from the Royal Cambodian Army's G-5 section. The PSYOP team produced more than 30 products, including posters, warning signs, T-shirts, stickers, schoolbooks, videos and skits put on by the Royal Cambodian Army.

<sup>21</sup> Bertil Lintner, "Opium War," *Far East Economic Review*, 20 January 1994, p. 22.

<sup>22</sup> Lintner, pp. 12-13.

<sup>23</sup> FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D. C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 12 December 1991), pp. 3-20, 3-21.

<sup>24</sup> Dee Dee Myers, "Sanctions Announced Against Taiwan for Trade in Endangered Species," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, 18 April 1994, 222. This is the first time trade sanctions have been placed on a country to protect an endangered species under the authority of the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967. The trade sanctions are to be reviewed at the end of every year.

<sup>25</sup> Nancy Nash, "The Horn's Dilemma," *Far East Economic Review*, 19 August 1993, p. 27. Currently, rhinos are in 14 African countries, India and Southeast Asia. The one-horned Indian rhino population is down to 1,600 and its cousin in Nepal numbers only 400. The Sumatran and Javan rhinos are estimated to be 800 and 250, respectively.

<sup>26</sup> Julian Baum and Carl Goldstein, "Asia's Untamed Business," *Far East Economic Review*, 19 August 1993, pp. 22-25.

<sup>27</sup> Warren Christopher, "America and the Asia-Pacific Future," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, pp. 348-50. Excerpt from Secretary Christopher's address to the Asia Society in New York City on 27 May 1994.

---

## Civil-Military Operations: Staff Support to Army Corps and Divisions

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. Army underwent many conceptual and structural changes in preparation for a European contingency or war. One major change that occurred was the reduction of the Army's key corps- and division-level tactical, main and rear command posts, or CPs.

With the European theater as the priority, the Army focused on civil-military cooperation and its inherent and implied combat-service-support, or CSS, relationships with other allied armies. As a result, the assistant chief of staff G5, the civil-military operations officer, became a part of the rear CP. This arrangement worked well, since emerging Army doctrine continued to anticipate a fast-paced armor and mechanized infantry confrontation with Warsaw Pact forces.

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, however, the perspectives of the U.S. armed forces and of the unified command plan have changed. An East-West confrontation of armor and mechanized forces on the central plains of Europe no longer seems likely. Much more likely is U.S. involvement in small-scale, regional conflicts and humanitarian-assistance operations.

This is one of a series of white papers to be published by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The series is intended to stimulate thought and discussion on SOF doctrinal issues. — Editor.

Army doctrine writers continue to develop new doctrine to keep pace with the many perceived contingencies. Among the most significant proposed changes to corps and division FMs, such as FM 100-15, Corps Operations, and FM 71-100, Division Operations, are the manning and structure of the G5 civil-military operations section, or CMO section, and the field-operating locations of its subelements.


For the most part, the G5 still plans for and orchestrates activities that support the commander's intent, in accordance with FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. This officer's main concern, however, is with the civilians within the commander's area of responsibility, or AOR. The G5, like operations and intelligence officers, focuses outward on the operational area; like personnel and logistics officers, he focuses inward on combat-support and CSS issues, particularly in regard to foreign nation support, or FNS, and the care of dislocated civilians.

In order to plan for and orchestrate unit operations, whether in war or in military operations other than war, the operations officer must rely heavily on both the intelligence officer and the G5 for the following:

- Situational and planning maps.
- Overlays of movement routes of dislocated civilians; sources of FNS; national, religious and cultural monuments; hospitals; and power plants.
- The intent and views of the commander.

---

## Civil-Military Operations Cell at Corps and Division TOCs



In turn, because the unit operations officer is responsible for planning and integrating the overall operations effort, the unit G5 plans, coordinates and provides staff oversight of civil-military activities and issues only through direct coordination with the unit operations officer.

The G5, like other coordinating staff officers, is authorized personnel according to a table of organization and equipment. However, current corps and division authorization documents do not provide the G5 with sufficient personnel and equipment to adequately perform all assigned functions. For this reason, augmentation from regionally aligned active- and reserve-component Army Civil Affairs units has become the *modus operandi*.<sup>1</sup> This augmentation, which originated during World War II, provides the unit G5 with enough personnel to perform the assigned tasks and plays an integral part in the execution of the G5's duties.

Augmentation by Civil Affairs units also provides the G5 the needed manpower, equipment and flexibility to establish and sustain a key presence at the main CP, at the rear CP and at the civil-military operations center, or CMOC. Operating from the CMO cell within the corps or division tactical operations center, or CTOC/DTOC, the G5 usually task-organizes his section to support 24-hour operations at the main CP, rear CP and CMOC locations.

At the main CP, the G5 provides, when needed:

- A tailored CMO cell to the CTOC/DTOC. This cell also provides representatives to the plans, current operations, intelligence and CSS cells to help monitor the operation's effects on the civilian populace and to assist in developing courses of action.
- The remainder of the task-organized and tailored CMO section, located outside the CTOC/DTOC but within the main CP area.

At the rear CP, the G5 provides a tailored CMO cell to monitor main-battle and rear-area activities. This cell also plans for and coordinates any required FNS, as well as the flow and disposition of dislocated civilians. This cell includes representatives to both the operations and CSS cells.


At the CMOC, the G5 section provides the nucleus for a tailored cell that gives the unit commander a 24-hour capability to handle requests for assistance, or RFAs, from participating or interested government, international, nongovernment and private volunteer organizations, or GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs.

### CMO section

The CMO section, when sufficiently augmented, performs the area assessment and the day-to-day, detailed analysis of the

---

## Civil-Military Operations Section



\*Specialists from required functional areas, e.g., public health, legal, dislocated civilians, etc.

CMO situation. This section also provides the CMO officer with sufficient data to plan for and monitor all unit operations that may affect civilians.

In addition, the CMO section is tailored to provide support to CMO cells at the main CP, rear CP and CMOC. Generally, the CMO section includes at least an administrative and logistics section and an operations section. These sections help to plan, coordinate and execute civil-military operations and to monitor civil-administration support directed by the national command authority.

The administrative and logistics section provides general and specific support to the elements and cells of the CMO section. General support includes:

- Maintaining the staff journal.
- Maintaining the document-control register.
- Maintaining key files and records.
- Providing required interpreter and translator support.
- Monitoring and maintaining section equipment.

Specific support includes:

- Collating and maintaining detailed

CMO-related data obtained from assessments and CMO activities.

- Capturing CMO-related data for historical purposes.
- Providing clerical support for briefings, charts and CMO-related documents.

The operations section provides operations-related support to the CMO officer. This section usually comprises at least a current-operations subsection, a plans subsection and a technical-support subsection.

The current-operations subsection:

- Monitors the current operational and CMO situations.
- Maintains the CMO estimate.
- Prepares either the CMO (Army) or CA (Joint) annexes to contingency plans, operation plans and operation orders.
- Recommends CA force-allocation changes.
- Develops the CMO periodic report.
- Maintains and updates overlays and data for use by the operations, intelligence, fire-support and CSS cells. The overlays and data depict locations of foreign-nation resources, key public facilities, key monuments, and cultural and religious shrines that need protection.

- Provides background data and input for fragmentary orders, or FRAGOs, in conjunction with the CMO cell at the main CP. The subsection also recommends and prepares CA force-allocation changes in the form of FRAGOs.
- Develops required reports and receives, analyzes, coordinates, disseminates and monitors CA-related reports from subordinate corps and division units.
- Coordinates with the CMOC to oversee both the validation of CMOC-coordinated RFAs and the staff coordination needed to support those requests.
- Coordinates with the CMOC to disseminate data on the planned activities of the various GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs operating either within the corps and division AORs or within their areas of interest.

The plans subsection:

- Works closely with corps or division plans officers and sections. It analyzes data and the commander's intent, forecasts requirements, and integrates all CMO into both corps and division plans. Although the CMO plans officer may operate from the main CP, he continually coordinates with his counterparts at


the rear CP, the CMOC, and the American Embassy, as required.

- Closely monitors progress toward the desired CMO-related end state.
- The technical-support subsection:
- Provides CA functional experts who advise the CMO officer.
  - Provides contracted civilians when operations require expertise beyond the scope of the military force.

### Civil-military cells

As previously mentioned, the G5 task-organizes his section to provide support cells at the main and rear CPs. The CMO cell (main) provides interface with corps and division staff officers within the CTOC/DTOC. Because the CTOC/DTOC is generally restricted in size, space and mobility, the G5 provides a CMO cell with an immediate operations and plans capability. He may also provide representatives to the plans, current operations, intelligence and CSS cells of the CTOC/DTOC. The CMO cell (main), which maintains a 24-hour capability, consists of a minimum of five personnel per shift: the G5, a CMO officer, a CMO


## Civil-Military Operations Cell (Main)



\*Current operations, intelligence, plans and CSS.

---

## Civil-Military Operations Cell (Rear)



plans officer, a CMO NCO and an administrative specialist.

After conducting their mission analysis, corps and division commanders will decide where to place the CMO cell (main). The G5 should be placed where he can coordinate all CMO and be appropriately responsive to the commander's guidance and to the need for staff integration. If CMO is central to the mission, the G5 will be close to plans, intelligence and current operations. Higher-intensity combat operations may not require the G5's immediate presence.

The G5 also task-organizes his section to provide a CMO cell (rear) to monitor and plan for CMO activities and to integrate them into all aspects of the rear operations. Similar to the CMO cell (main) in duties and functions, the CMO cell (rear) focuses on rear operations, FNS issues and CSS issues that do not occur within the main battle area. A CA unit could be allocated as a command-and-control headquarters for uncommitted CA assets. If that happens, the G5 may recommend that the CA unit be tasked to man and operate the CMO cell (rear). The CMO cell (rear) requires a 24-hour capability whether it is task-organized and supported from the G5 section or from the allocated CA unit. This cell should consist of at least five personnel: the chief of the CMO cell (rear), a CMO officer, a CMO logistics

plans officer, a CMO NCO and an administrative specialist.

### CMOC

For nearly 20 years, the term CMOC, although not promulgated in Army doctrine, has been widely, though somewhat indiscriminately, used throughout the CA community and the Army. The term has posed no dilemmas to commanders and staffs of either general-purpose or special-operations forces. Sometimes the term has been used to refer to the fully augmented unit G5 section. In other instances the term has been used to refer to the tactical operations centers of supporting CA units, whether commands, brigades or battalions. The roles and functions of a CMOC, whether or not the term was applied correctly, remained the same: To assist the G5 in anticipating, coordinating and orchestrating those CMO functions pertaining to the civil population, government and economy in areas where armed forces are employed.

After-action reports from recent contingency operations worldwide have prompted a review of the roles and functions of the CMO officer from every perspective. Reports from Operation Provide Comfort emphasized and validated the requirement for a regionally aligned augmentation detachment and a CMOC. As the operation matured, many GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs

participated independently in both relief and humanitarian efforts. Eventually, those organizations, hoping to coordinate their efforts and to reduce the possibility of redundancy within the AOR, sought access to the joint task force's CMOC. The CMOC, composed of an augmentation element from the Army's 353rd CA Command, operated under the staff supervision of the JTF's CMO officer, Brigadier General Don Campbell, who was also the commanding general of the 353rd. To develop CMO-related plans in support of JTF objectives, the JTF CMOC received data from the JTF's joint operations center, GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs.

In Somalia, Operation Restore/Continue Hope brought about the establishment of more than one location where GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs operating throughout the country could coordinate their activities. These "coordination centers," or mini-CMOCs as they were called, served as focal points for CMO priorities within Somalia.

Until Operation Support Hope in Rwanda, the use of an augmentation detachment and the roles and functions of the CMOC were thought to have been well-understood by the conventional and SOF commanders


who habitually used such assets in their operations and training. Military operations had generally been of a combative nature — the unit G3 planned and directed the defeat of the enemy; the G5 planned and directed CMO activities as they applied to the terms of surrender. However, the CMO nature of Operation Support Hope changed that notion. U.S. forces were not sent to Rwanda to conduct combat operations. From the outset, Operation Support Hope was deemed an HA operation, leading to a twofold review:

- General-purpose and special-operations forces reviewed their way of tailoring staff sections for specific CMO.
- The JFK Special Warfare Center and School reviewed SOF-related CMOC doctrine and terminology.

Even though the Army had been ambivalent about the term CMOC, the need for a new doctrinal analysis was evident. For all operations, there should be only one staff officer responsible for the unit operations — the operations officer — and there should be only one operations center.

The G5 and his section will continue to perform those tasks and functions assigned in FM 101-5. There is no need to

## Civil-Military Operations Center



\*Participating or interested representatives from both military (e.g., PSYOP) and nonmilitary organizations (e.g., GO, IO, NGO and PVO).

---

declare a name or term for this staff section. The hundreds of GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs operating worldwide understand that their interface with a military unit engaged in an operation is through the CMOC. The term itself implies that civilian and military agencies work together; it sends a clear message that this is the focal point for requesting and coordinating military support.

But the lessons learned from Operations Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, Support Hope and Uphold Democracy do need to be developed into doctrine. Now the CMOC can be defined as a coordination center

***Whether the operations are Army or joint, the commander's obligation to consider civilians within the area of operations will never diminish. Also undiminished will be the need for a trained CMO officer skilled in the tactics, techniques and procedures required to execute national objectives successfully as they apply to civilians.***

established and tailored to assist the G5 in anticipating, facilitating, coordinating and orchestrating those civil-military functions and activities pertaining to the civil population, government and economy in areas where armed forces, GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs are employed.

The CMOC is neither a unit nor an organization. Its purpose is to coordinate the operations of U.S. and multinational forces with those of GOs, IOs, NGOs, PVOs and host-nation agencies and authorities. The CMOC allows nonmilitary agencies to seek help and coordination from the military force. It is an extension of the CMO cell that provides CA-related information from and to nonmilitary agencies operating away from the military headquarters.

The major functions of the CMOC include:

- Providing GOs, IOs, NGOs, PVOs and other relief agencies with a focal point for activities and matters relating to the civilian populace. It serves as a coordina-

tion center for processing agencies' requests for military assistance. Thus, the CMOC serves as a de facto clearinghouse for coordinating distribution; exchanging information; identifying GO-, IO-, NGO- and PVO-related problems; and developing synergy among the combined assets of the relief agencies.

- Coordinating relief efforts with U.S. and allied commands.
- Coordinating with GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs.
- Providing interface with the U.S. Information Service, U.S. Agency for International Development and the American Embassy.
- Assisting in the transfer of authority and handoff of operations from military forces to host nations, GOs, IOs, NGOs, PVOs, U.N. agencies or other agencies.

As the commander's focal point for nonmilitary organizations and agencies, the CMOC should also be used when the synergy of these organizations is required to enhance planned military activities. In this capacity, the CMOC would assume a more active role and process requests for assistance from the military commander to interested and participating GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs.

CMOCs should be flexible in size and composition. They may be composed of, or augmented by, military or civilian representatives from many different agencies. The CMOC should, at a minimum, consist of a director, an operations officer, an administrative and logistics NCO, and organizational representatives. Mission requirements, command directives, operational security, workload and accessibility to nonmilitary agencies will affect the specific organization of a CMOC.

The number of CMOCs supporting a given operation will depend on the mission analysis and the distance to the headquarters serving the particular geographic or tactical area. CMOCs may be established:

- In operations where the joint-force commander's headquarters and the majority of subordinate units are located close to the civilian or host-nation diplomatic center and the GO, IO, NGO and PVO representatives.

- In operations where the joint-force headquarters is located in one locale and the subordinate units are spread throughout the AOR.
- At every level of command, from unified down to brigade, depending on the tactical control measures and the geographic area.

Thus, it is conceivable, based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available and civilians, or METT-T-C,<sup>2</sup> to have more than one CMOC in an AOR. Commanders will usually establish a CMOC after an initial situation assessment shows that coordination with various agencies is needed, or when operational security requirements prohibit those agencies' access to the main headquarters.

The security situation and the force-protection posture will dictate the general location of the CMOC. In a permissive environment,<sup>3</sup> where hostilities are unlikely and the operation is purely civil-military in nature, the CMOC may be located near the military-force operations center. In a semipermissive or nonpermissive environment,<sup>4</sup> where the possibility for hostilities is unknown and the nature of operations will require limited access to the military unit, the military-force commander may locate the CMOC away from the unit in order not to impede GO, IO, NGO and PVO coordination.

## Conclusion

As Army and joint-level doctrine writers continue to analyze anticipated requirements for the military and to develop supporting doctrine to keep pace with the many perceived contingencies, the services will eventually undergo close scrutiny. For the most part, the corps and division G5 still plans for and orchestrates activities that support the commander's intent. His main concern, however, is with the civilians within the commander's AOR.

Whether the operations are Army or joint, the commander's obligation to consider civilians within the area of operations will never diminish. Also undiminished will be the need for a trained CMO officer skilled in the tactics, techniques and

procedures required to execute national objectives successfully as they apply to civilians. Future contingency operations may also draw the participation of numerous nonmilitary organizations. The need to coordinate and meet with these organizations is obvious.

Emerging doctrine will inevitably stimulate the research and analysis of more efficient means of supporting the multifaceted requirements of civil-military operations, while reshaping our force structure to support Force XXI, the Army in the 21st century. ✕

### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> All CONUS-based Army CA units, both active- and reserve-component, are under the command of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. The U.S. Marine Corps Reserve maintains two CA units, the 3rd Civil Affairs Group and the 4th Civil Affairs Group.

<sup>2</sup> The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has proposed to the Army Training and Doctrine Command that the Army term "METT-T" be amended to read "METT-T-C" to incorporate civilians as a planning consideration during mission analysis.

<sup>3</sup> No hostilities; host nation can generally guarantee the safety of employed forces.

<sup>4</sup> Possible hostilities; host nation cannot guarantee safety of employed forces.

---

# Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role of the CMOC in Humanitarian Operations

*by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen O. Wallace*

**D**uring the summer of 1994, U.S. Joint Task Force Support Hope assisted the United Nations and world-relief agencies in aiding the victims of ethnic violence in Rwanda. The operation set new standards for U.S. humanitarian operations, particularly in the role of the civil-military operations center.

Although the concept of a civil-military operations center, or CMOC, is not new, very little doctrine exists concerning CMOC establishment and operations. The experience of Joint Task Force Support Hope shows that the CMOC can be the key to successful humanitarian-assistance operations.

## **Background**

On April 6, 1994, Rwanda's President Juvenal Habyarimana died in an airplane crash, the cause of which remains a mystery. This crash also claimed the life of Burundi's President Cyprien Ntaryamira.

Both Habyarimana and Ntaryamira were members of the Hutu majority ethnic group. Some Hutus blamed the minority Tutsi population for the crash, and many Hutus feared that the Tutsis would take advantage of the civil turmoil following Habyarimana's death to seize control of the nation.

Through state-controlled radio broadcasts, the Hutu government exploited ethnic hatred against the Tutsis. These broadcasts led to unrestrained violence and genocide against the Tutsi population. What resulted

struck even the most hardened observers as horrendous. During the three weeks following the plane crash, more than 200,000 people were believed killed. By the end of June 1994, an estimated 500,000 Rwandans had been killed, eclipsing the three-year death toll in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>1</sup>

These massacres did not go unavenged. The Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, or RPF, under the leadership of Major General Paul Kagame, moved into the Rwandan capital city of Kigali from positions in northern Rwanda. By mid-July, the RPF had effectively seized control of the country, driving Hutu forces into exile in neighboring Zaire and Burundi. The fighting did not end until late July, when a fragile cease-fire emerged. Of Rwanda's 8 million people, between 500,000 and 1 million were dead, most of them Tutsis.

More than 2 million other people, mostly Hutus, were left homeless. Fearing Tutsi retribution, they fled Rwanda, moving toward Zaire in a wretched procession that extended for several miles. Large numbers of these refugees died en route of starvation and disease. Once the refugees reached camps around Goma, Zaire, the death toll continued to climb as a result of epidemic cholera and dysentery.

## **JTF Support Hope**

On July 22, 1994, President Bill Clinton directed the commander in chief of the U.S. European Command to assist humanitari-

an efforts in Zaire and Rwanda. In response, USEUCOM activated Joint Task Force Support Hope, or JTF SH, to aid the U.N. and the world relief community in providing humanitarian assistance to the Rwandan refugees.

The stated USEUCOM mission was to “provide assistance to humanitarian agencies and third-nation forces conducting theater relief operations intended to alleviate the suffering of Rwandan refugees.” The JTF’s priority mission tasks were: provide water purification and water distribution; establish an air bridge and a materiel-distribution capability at Entebbe, Uganda; provide 24-hour airfield-support services to Goma, Kigali, and other airfields as necessary; and above all, ensure protection of the force. In effect, the JTF was chartered to establish overall management of logistics for humanitarian assistance, or HA, in support of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, and other relief organizations.<sup>2</sup> To accomplish its tasks, the JTF SH would have to coordinate military and civilian efforts throughout the crisis area. This meant establishing and maintaining coordination with the following:

- Other governmental agencies and organizations; for example, the Disaster Assistance Response Team, or DART, from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, or OFDA, which is part of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

- U.N. agencies and organizations, such as the UNHCR, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda, the U.N. Rwanda Emergency Office, or UNREO, the U.N. Development Program, the World Food Program, and the World Health Organization.

- International relief organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- More than 80 nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and private voluntary organizations, or PVOs. These were registered with the U.N. and were operating in Rwanda and Zaire.

The tasks for which JTF SH was organized were complex and involved a wide geographic area. The organizational structure of the JTF was tailored accordingly —

in addition to the JTF Main, two sub-task forces were formed: JTF A to conduct operations in Goma, Zaire; and JTF B to conduct operations in Rwanda. The complexity of the operations was compounded by the demands of establishing and maintaining coordination with the diverse relief organizations. The civil-military operations center, or CMOC, was the primary organization used by JTF SH to coordinate and synchronize the humanitarian-relief operations.<sup>3</sup>

The CMOC receives, validates and coordinates support requests; identifies available resources; and monitors the status of ongoing relief operations. The CMOC concept evolved during Operation Provide Relief, when support requests from the international relief community were initially presented directly to the military commander, who juggled those requests with other missions. The CMOC was developed as a staff element that would serve as the primary interface between the JTF and relief agencies.

## Command and control

JTF Support Hope’s operations were divided into five phases:

- Phase 1: Stabilize the situation in Goma.
- Phase 2: Move refugees back toward Rwanda.
- Phase 3: Support stability in Rwanda.


*An aircraft delivers relief supplies to the airport at Entebbe, Uganda.*



Photo by Stephen Wallace

---

## Command and Control of JTF SUPPORT HOPE CMOCs



- Phase 4: Turn operations over to the UNHCR.
- Phase 5: Redeploy the force.

The JTF SH commander divided the operational area into four geographic support areas: Entebbe, Uganda; Goma, Zaire; Kigali, Rwanda; and Mombassa, Kenya.<sup>4</sup> A CMOC was established at each location except Mombassa — U.S. forces there did not need a CMOC, since their operations were essentially restricted to airlift and port activities. JTF SH used its mission analysis to configure the CMOCs into the command-and-control structure depicted above.<sup>5</sup>

CMOC Entebbe coordinated with the international relief community throughout the JTF SH operational area. It provided interface between the other CMOCs and the JTF, assisting the CMOCs in coordinating JTF support. The JTF commander provided direct oversight for each CMOC except the one in Goma, which he assigned to the commander of JTF A. The JTF B commander organized a separate Civil Affairs cell to maintain liaison with local officials and to coordinate projects in Kigali. The chiefs of CMOC Entebbe and CMOC Kigali were colonels, and the chief

of CMOC Goma was a major. The primary mission for each CMOC, regardless of its location, was the same: Ensure effective coordination of military and civilian efforts in HA operations by providing a forum for cooperation between all the principal agencies involved.

### Structure and operations

There is no precise formula or method used in determining the size and the structure of a CMOC; these are entirely mission-dependent. In JTF Support Hope, the size and the capabilities of each CMOC varied according to its mission. Dynamic changes enabled the commanders to meet varying mission demands. A thorough mission analysis and a needs assessment of each operational area served as the basis for the structural development and the personnel assignment process for each CMOC. The JTF commander then tailored each CMOC according to specific mission requirements.

The following tasks were common to all the CMOCs:

- Promulgate and explain JTF policies to U.N. agencies, NGOs and PVOs.

- Provide information to U.N. agencies, NGOs and PVOs regarding JTF operations and general security operations.
- Receive and process requests for military support from U.N. agencies, NGOs and PVOs.
- Convene and host mission-planning groups for complex military-support requests involving multiple military elements and groups of NGOs and PVOs.
- Represent the JTF in various meetings and forums hosted by the U.N.
- Maintain coordination with lateral CMOCs.<sup>6</sup>

The international airport at Entebbe served as the theater's transportation hub. Accordingly, it served as the intermediate staging base for logistics delivery and as the entry point for all U.S. military personnel as well as the majority of U.N., NGO and PVO personnel. CMOC Entebbe assumed responsibility for transportation and remained a primary focal point throughout the operation.

### CMOC Entebbe

CMOC Entebbe began operations on July 28, 1994, and initially functioned with four military personnel and one OFDA/DART civilian. By Aug. 25, CMOC Entebbe had expanded its staff to eight military personnel and three OFDA/DART representatives to meet ongoing taskings. Placing the DART reps and CMOC Entebbe personnel in the same location allowed them to better orchestrate the movement of aid from U.S. government civilian agencies. Their proximity and coordination proved essential to CMOC Entebbe's success.

CMOC Entebbe's most important function was to coordinate and prioritize movement of relief aircraft into the humanitarian-crisis areas of Kigali and Goma. To increase the effectiveness of relief airlift operations, CMOC Entebbe and the UNHCR cell established a combined logistics cell. This cell processed and screened in-theater requests for air support and provided prioritized lists to the UNHCR movements cell in Geneva, Switzerland. It also ensured that critical relief materiel allocat-

ed for Kigali and Goma was handled as priority cargo and that it was expedited on inter-theater aircraft. CMOC Entebbe also assumed responsibility for many current-operations functions, including data tracking and analysis, that were essential to the JTF commander's decision-making.<sup>7</sup>

### CMOC Kigali

CMOC Kigali, consisting of two military members and one OFDA/DART representative, commenced operations on Aug. 7. This CMOC conducted a major portion of its operations in coordination with the On Site Operations Coordination Center, or



Photo by Stephen Wallace

*Soldiers from CMOC Kigali examine a map at the On Site Operations Coordination Center in Kigali.*

OSOCC, created by the UNREO to help coordinate the international response to the crisis in Rwanda.

Modeled after the CMOC structure, the OSOCC evolved into the focal point for U.N.-led operations in Rwanda and Zaire. Personnel from CMOC Kigali attended all OSOCC meetings and worked within a special logistics cell in the OSOCC, primarily preparing contingency plans to support anticipated refugee movements.

To assist the World Food Program in Kigali, CMOC Kigali obtained additional personnel from CMOC Entebbe and a six-person movements control team from EUCOM. These additional personnel provided expertise in logistics management, inventory control and movements control.



Photo by Stephen Wallace

*Rwandan refugees in Goma, Zaire. Water distribution and sanitation in the refugee camps were the greatest priorities for members of CMOC Goma.*

They helped establish efficient warehouse management and put into service more than 400 trucks belonging to the U.N. and assorted NGOs and PVOs. As the focus shifted from Entebbe to Kigali in late August, the CMOC senior officer moved from Entebbe to Kigali to better direct operations. Charged with coordinating all CMOC activities with the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, this officer also served as a member of the ambassador's country team.<sup>8</sup>

### **CMOC Goma**

CMOC Goma began operations on July 30, with three military members assigned. Its primary function was to coordinate water distribution to the refugee camps around Goma. The U.N. baseline water standard for each refugee was five liters per day for survival and 10 liters per day for health maintenance. According to the estimated refugee population in the Goma area, the daily water requirement was 3.2 million liters. By Aug. 13, the UNHCR reported that the U.S., U.N., French and German efforts were providing enough water to support between 600,000 and 800,000 refugees.

CMOC Goma also coordinated and prioritized engineer projects within its operational area. Initially, CMOC Goma's priority was sanitation and burial services. This priority later shifted to road repair, which was essential for improving the distribu-

tion of both water and relief supplies.

Although the humanitarian conditions remained tragic by any standard, estimated deaths in the Goma camps decreased from 3,000 per day at the end of July to fewer than 500 per day by mid-August. CMOC Goma ceased operations on Aug. 23; its civil-military responsibilities were assumed by CMOC Entebbe.<sup>9</sup>

### **Future challenges**

Other than Civil Affairs personnel, there are few DoD military and civilian personnel who have the training and experience necessary to establish and operate a CMOC. The increasing number of humanitarian-assistance operations in which DoD is involved highlights the need for an extensive understanding of the CMOC, its organization and the problems likely to be encountered by the force.

The CMOC can be the key to successful humanitarian-assistance operations, providing open interface and coordination with all host-nation and U.N. agencies, NGOs and PVOs. Its objective is to achieve a thorough understanding of each organization's particular "culture." Emerging joint and service doctrine is making significant strides in promoting this understanding; however, we should place a high premium on practical experience. Valuable experience and understanding can be acquired from a number of sources:

- Interagency, NGO and PVO training incorporated into service training programs.
- NGO, PVO and U.N. personnel invited to participate in collective training programs, training-center rotations and exercises.
- HA symposiums sponsored as part of a larger effort to exchange knowledge of U.N. and interagency operations and procedures.
- Utilization of Civil Affairs personnel in selected U.N. billets.

A key CMOC function in any HA operation is that it serves as the central clearinghouse for humanitarian-relief information and coordination. Such a service is essential in using military resources effec-

tively to support relief agencies and in reducing duplication of effort between military and nonmilitary resources.

While most NGOs and PVOs willingly accept guidance from the UNHCR as the lead coordinating agency, some do not. The CMOC offers those organizations unwilling or unable to follow the UNHCR's lead a forum through which they can coordinate their efforts with military support operations. A training program between the military and the civilian relief community offers a significant potential for developing and refining the operating procedures and the databases that are essential in coordinated operations.

Selection of personnel for the CMOC staff presents another challenge to HA planners and force commanders. During JTF Support Hope, the JTF commander selected an ad hoc team of personnel based on their experience in peace operations and on their expertise as regional foreign-area officers. This group performed superbly until Civil Affairs personnel from the 353rd Civil Affairs Command and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion could be deployed into theater. However, personnel of that caliber and experience may not always be available for a given mission.

Civil Affairs personnel are likely to be the best choice for the core staff of a CMOC. Their unique training and mission orientation enable them to provide a clear focus on the organization's tasks. The integration of CA direct-support teams, civic-action teams and other support teams provides a combination of skills essential in assessing and conducting core CMOC tasks during an HA operation.<sup>10</sup> Delayed deployment of these key CA players can significantly inhibit the military's contribution to HA efforts.

## Success

JTF Support Hope can be considered a successful HA operation by any measure. Innumerable lives were saved because of EUCOM's quick response to the crisis. JTF Support Hope also demonstrated that the U.S. can remain strategically engaged in world affairs without the unnecessary cost

and "mission creep" that have previously hindered the success of similar operations.

In an operation that spanned 77 days, JTF Support Hope set a new standard for future U.S. humanitarian operations. Its actions incorporated every essential element associated with successful HA operations: a quick humanitarian response; assistance to the relief community in developing a long-term capability; an effective transition of operations without degradation of support; and a rapid redeployment of the force.<sup>11</sup> ✕

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen O. Wallace is chief of the Doctrine and Education Division of the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, Va. An Engineer officer, he has held command positions in both Engineer and Psychological Operations units. His previous assignments include tours in Germany and in the South Pacific. Wallace holds a master's degree from the University of Oklahoma.



### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> John Garabedian, "Terrorism Kills Over 500,000 in Rwanda: Violence and Combatting Terrorism Update" (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September 1994), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Task Force Support Hope, Operations Plan 94-004 (U), Stuttgart, Germany, 6 August 1994, pp. 7-8.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel Karl Farris, Operation SUPPORT HOPE CMOC Operations, After-Action Report, 1 September 1994, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> JTF SH, OPLAN 94-004, pp. 9-11.

<sup>5</sup> Farris, JTF SH CMOC Operations AAR, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Colonel Paul R. Monacelli, After-Action Report, Operation Support Hope, 23 September 1994, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Colonel Paul R. Monacelli, CMOC Summary, Operation Support Hope, Mission Highlights, 12 September 1994, pp. 2-3.

<sup>9</sup> Farris, JTF SH, CMOC Operations AAR, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Monacelli, After-Action Report, Operation Support Hope, p. 19.

<sup>11</sup> USCINCEUR Message, Subj: CINCEUR Assessment of Humanitarian Operations in Rwanda, Remarks 18-19.

---

## Dick Meadows: A Quiet Professional

*by Captain Jay Ashburner*

**O**n July 29, 1995, the special-operations community lost a true legend with the passing of retired Major Richard J. “Dick” Meadows. His extraordinary exploits spanned more than three decades and included the most widely known and defining missions in the history of U.S. special operations. Dick Meadows exemplified devotion to duty, serving as a noncommissioned officer, as a commissioned officer, and after his retirement, as a civilian special consultant (read operator) to U.S. Army Special Forces and the joint SOF community.

Meadows was born June 16, 1931, in rural Virginia, and enlisted in the Army in August 1947, at the age of 16. His first

service was with the 456th Field Artillery Battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division.

In early 1951 Meadows volunteered for assignment to the 674th Field Artillery Battalion, 187th Regimental Combat Team, Korea. There he served with distinction and become the youngest master sergeant in the war, at age 20. After serving in Korea, Meadows volunteered for Special Forces, and in March of 1953 he was assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group. For the next 24 years, Meadows served in the SOF community, with assignments to both Ranger and Special Forces units.

In 1960, Meadows was selected to participate in an exchange program between the 7th Special Forces Group and the British 22 Special Air Service Regiment, or SAS. He was the first NCO to be selected for the program, and his performance with the SAS was distinguished by several milestones: He completed the SAS selection course; he was the first of two foreign soldiers to be awarded SAS wings; and he served for 12 months as a troop commander, a position normally held by a British captain. While serving with the SAS, Meadows was selected to participate in a real-world mission in Oman against terrorists and gun smugglers.

Meadows’ first experience in the Southeast Asian theater came with an assignment to Operation White Star in Laos. White Star was a foreign-internal-defense mission, conducted to advise, assist, equip and train Laotian government forces in counterinsur-

*Captain Dick Meadows receiving the Silver Star.*



*Photo courtesy Mark Meadows*

gency operations against the North Vietnamese-backed Pathet Lao forces. The intent of White Star was to secure the sovereignty of Laos and to provide a buffer between friendly Thailand and communist North Vietnam. Meadows not only assisted in establishing and organizing Royal Lao Army regular forces but also participated in an unconventional-warfare mission with tribal guerrilla fighters. It was while he was in Laos that Meadows met Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. "Bull" Simons and worked with him on a program to organize and arm the Kha tribal groups.

After returning from Laos, Meadows spent the next three years in Panama, where he helped establish the 8th Special Forces Group in the Canal Zone. There, he was a standout in Operation Black Palm, a training exercise using U.S. Special Forces and members of the Panamanian Defense Force to test the existing security of the Panama Canal. During one 48-hour period in the operation, Meadows and his team, playing the part of soldiers captured by the PDF, escaped from jail and, without being detected, planted simulated demolition charges on one of the Canal's most heavily guarded locks.

In 1965 Meadows volunteered for a second tour in Southeast Asia. This tour took him to Vietnam and to one of the most secretive and elite units of the war, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam/Studies and Observation Group, or MACV/SOG. Operational detachments of this unit conducted what were arguably the most dangerous missions of the Vietnam War. SOG personnel operated beyond the constraints of territorial borders, performing a myriad of covert missions throughout Southeast Asia. They specialized in intelligence-gathering and direct action in the heart of areas either controlled or dominated by the enemy. Once again, Meadows excelled.

During one of Meadows' first cross-border reconnaissance missions into Laos, his team captured a battery of Russian-made 75 mm howitzers, still packed in Cosmo-line, being shipped south from North Vietnam. As proof of their find, Meadows' team returned from the mission with the Russian-made fire-control equipment. This



Photo courtesy Mark Meadows

*Captain Dick Meadows (right) on the radio directing operations somewhere in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War.*

was the first concrete evidence to support President Lyndon Johnson's claim that the Vietnam conflict was more than an internal revolutionary war. This proof of external sponsorship was of such importance that General William C. Westmoreland, the senior U.S. commander in Vietnam, personally debriefed Meadows and his team.

Meadows completed more than two dozen missions into North Vietnam and Laos. Westmoreland recommended him for a battlefield commission, the first of the Vietnam War and one of only two that Westmoreland would make during his four years as commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Upon completion of this tour, Meadows was assigned to Fort Benning, Ga., where on April 14, 1967, he received a direct appointment to captain.

Meadows subsequently returned to Vietnam, for a second MACV/SOG tour, and once again returned to Fort Benning, where he served with the Ranger Department.

In 1970, Meadows was chosen by two of his former commanders to participate in perhaps the most famous mission of the Vietnam War, Operation Ivory Coast. Brigadier General Donald Blackburn, the former commanding officer of MACV/SOG,

---

and now-Colonel “Bull” Simons, who had served under Blackburn in SOG, selected Meadows as the assault-element leader for the raid on the Son Tay prison camp, 23 miles from Hanoi. Meadows’ 14-man team intentionally crash-landed its helicopter inside the camp walls, and seized and held the compound for 27 minutes in an attempt to rescue approximately 70 U.S. POWs.

No POWs were found in the camp — they had been moved several months earlier — and controversy still surrounds the Son Tay mission. Some have called the effort futile, yet the meticulous planning and preparation; the monumental efforts to coordinate Army, Air Force and Navy assets; and the almost total secrecy protecting the operation have become a model for strategic surgical-strike missions. What has never been disputed is the degree of dedication and valor exhibited by those men who volunteered for the mission. Also beyond dispute is the mission’s impact on the world and on North Vietnam in particular, demonstrating the national resolve and the determination of the United States to recover its POWs.

Following the raid at Son Tay, Meadows was promoted to major and served a tour in the 10th Special Forces Group. He concluded his military career in 1977 as the training officer and deputy commander for the jungle phase of Ranger School at Camp Rudder, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

Having retired with 30 years of service, 24 of them in special operations, Meadows continued to serve U.S. national interests as a special consultant for the organization and the establishment of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, which was under the command of Colonel Charlie Beckwith.

Again, Dick Meadows was the right man, in the right place, at exactly the right time. He was instrumental in the planning, the preparation and the execution of Operation Eagle Claw. On April 24, 1980, nearly 200 members of a U.S. joint special-operations task force infiltrated Iran by air in an attempt to rescue 53 Americans held hostage in the American Embassy in Tehran. For more than a week prior to the rescue attempt, Dick Meadows had been on the ground, conducting clandestine mission-

support activities in and around Tehran. Again a volunteer, he was operating undercover as an Irish citizen working for a European auto company.

At the time, Eagle Claw was the largest and most audacious response by any world power to the emerging threat of terrorism. Regrettably, a disastrous aircraft collision at Desert One claimed the lives of eight U.S. personnel, forcing the mission to be aborted. Although the mission failed, the courage and the commitment of Meadows and his fellow rescuers did not.

After the aborted hostage-rescue mission, Meadows broke off official employment with the military, but he continued to help organize other special-mission units and served as a consultant in U.S. efforts to thwart criminal drug trafficking. He worked for a short period for H. Ross Perot, advising and assisting him on security matters.

More recently, Meadows had worked in Central and South American countries, training security personnel in everything from basic security procedures to antiterrorist precautions.

The resumé of Dick Meadows’ remarkable career captures the highlights of recent special-operations history. But what it cannot capture are his depth and strength of character: Despite his consummate achievements, Meadows remained a modest individual who was more interested in his next mission than in his past accomplishments. While others in the special-operations community sought fame, Dick Meadows, who contributed greatly to the legacy of U.S. special operations, religiously maintained a low profile and avoided the press. Because of his humbleness, his dedication and his accomplishments, Dick Meadows will endure as a personification of the “Quiet Professional.”



---

Captain Jay Ashburner is assigned to the Special Forces Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. A graduate of the University of Alaska-Fairbanks, he has served in the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and in the 10th SF Group as a detachment commander.

---

# USACAPOC's FOCUS Project: Waging the War for Information

*by Brigadier General Joel G. Blanchette*

**F**rom World War II-era barracks on distant Army posts to the carpeted headquarters of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, an information war is being waged daily in Army administration sections. It involves every administrative clerk, every unit and every command. At stake are readiness, efficient training plans, soldier development, school allocations, and assignment opportunities. Although this information war may never end, one command — the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command — won a silent but impressive battle in 1995.

The Army has made numerous advances in information management over the last few years with the creation of diverse databases that provide vast amounts of information. The problem, however, has been the Army's inability to bring the various databases together to maximize the use of that information.

Information on soldiers exists at each unit level and in several forms: Some information is stored in manual systems, such as DA 201 files and medical records. Other data, such as SOF certification information, exists in automated databases. Personnel information is contained in both manual and computerized versions of the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System, or SIDPERS. Some personnel information is also maintained at intermediate and higher headquarters and at each

major subordinate unit.

Because there is no central data bank in which to store personnel information, higher headquarters inundate subordinate units with phone and fax inquiries and requests for recurring and one-time reports. Recipients may have two hours or less to respond to these requests. It is impossible for any one individual to know all of the military and civilian skills of the soldiers in a unit. Rather than searching through hundreds of DA 201 files, medical files, mobilization files and several databases, the person responsible for answering the queries might guess at the answers, causing subsequent decisions to be based on inaccurate information and creating an administrative fog of war.

## **Challenges**

For any command to be able to make well-informed decisions, it must have up-to-date information on all its soldiers. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, or USACAPOC, comprises 69 active- and reserve-component units, spread among 26 states and the District of Columbia. Approximately 85 percent of USACAPOC's soldiers are in the Army Reserve.

USACAPOC units are continually barraged by requests for information: How many of your soldiers can speak French at the 3/3 level? Of those, who can deploy?

---

How many have passed the PT test? Do they all meet height and weight standards? When did they take their last physical? Are they MOS-qualified? How many electrical engineers, city planners, farmers or veterinarians are there in your unit? To obtain the answers, commanders and staffs must struggle to collect information from a variety of sources.

Because of the operations tempo of our Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, leaders need to be able to ask questions about their personnel inventory and receive correct answers in seconds rather than days. In May 1994, USACAPOC established the FOCUS project, bringing together a team of information-management specialists to develop a means that would link together all the necessary databases in order to provide immediate data. The project derived its name from the commercial software application FOCUS, which the Army uses to access various databases, and from the idea that the project would merge information from a variety of databases into one resource.

### **Merging databases**

Over the last few decades, the Army has developed a number of databases that operate using FOCUS. The three most commonly used by USACAPOC and the Army Reserve are the Center Level Applications System, or CLAS; the Daily Orders and Ledgers Finance System, or DOLFINS; and the Army Training Resource Requirement System, or ATRRS. The personnel module within the CLAS is used to update the current SIDPERS database. The CLAS database also has the request for orders (DA Form 1058) system and the pay system for Army Reserve soldiers, both of which are critical in routine administrative operations. The DOLFINS database is used to publish orders for every tour of duty a reservist performs; it is also used for managing funds. The ATRRS database is used to reserve school slots in most of the Army's training courses. Together, these three databases contain the data needed to meet peacetime and wartime information requirements.

Prior to 1994, CLAS and DOLFINS were the only command-wide centralized databases in USACAPOC. Since requests for orders and the orders themselves contain substantial data on each soldier, certain types of information about the soldier inventory could be requested and retrieved from the two systems. For example, a list of all the soldiers who had requested a Civil Affairs course could be obtained from the CLAS database prior to the start date shown on DA Form 1058, Request for Orders. A list of soldiers who had received orders to attend the course could be generated from the DOLFINS database. However, by merging the two systems, we could get a printout showing soldiers who had orders to attend and soldiers for whom orders had not yet been cut. A staff officer or a commander could then use the list to ensure that those soldiers who had not received their orders would do so in time to attend the course. This capability was developed by the FOCUS project team during the summer of 1994.

Because the ATRRS database was not integrated with the other two systems, one unknown remained: We could not determine whether all the soldiers who had a reserved slot in ATRRS had requested orders or whether they had received them. For that information, we had to link ATRRS to the FOCUS database already containing CLAS and DOLFINS information. The newly created database, which merged all three systems, enabled USAR units to better manage the entire school-request and order-generating process.

Even after the CLAS, DOLFINS and ATRRS databases had been centralized, vital personnel information was still missing. Unless a soldier had requested or received orders via DA Form 1058 or had requested a school slot, none of the three systems was aware of his existence. The entry-level information is located in the SIDPERS database. This database comprises 211 separate fields on each soldier and is the only system with all the required personnel information. In January 1995, SIDPERS information from all

USACAPOC subordinate units was linked to the master FOCUS database. With the addition of SIDPERS, the current database contains crucial information, as it exists in each unit's CLAS computer, on all USACAPOC reserve soldiers.

## Examples

The information in the chart below was extracted from a report generated by the FOCUS database. The purpose of the report was to identify USACAPOC soldiers who had school slots reserved between 1 April 1995 and 30 September 1995 in the ATRRS database and to identify those who had submitted a request for orders but had not received them. The report is sorted into categories by MSU and subordinate-unit designation. Names are listed alphabetically. The unit name, soldier's name, rank and SSN come from the personnel file within the CLAS database, which is used to update the SIDPERS database. The 1058 report date and the control number come from the centralized 1058 (request for orders) database in the USASOC resource-management section. The information on the ATRRS course, ATRRS report date and

ATRRS residence status come from the ATRRS database in the Pentagon's main-frame computer. The DOLFINS order number comes from the DOLFINS (orders) database in the USASOC resource-management section. If there is a control number, there is also a DA Form 1058. The example indicates that orders have been requested on all the soldiers, but that orders have been published for only the first seven; the last five soldiers have no orders. With a slight modification to the program, a report could be produced listing only those soldiers who are without orders or who have not yet requested them via CLAS.

Upon receiving a "heads up" to identify 15 military lawyers for deployment to Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy, the commander of USACAPOC, Major General Donald Campbell, asked for a list of all the lawyers in the command. The database was queried for soldiers with 55A as their primary specialty, and within two minutes, it generated an alphabetical list of 61 lawyers, along with their ranks, Social Security numbers, units of assignment and home and work phone numbers. During an earlier test to retrieve data on all medical doctors in USACAPOC, the computer

USASOC Sample Report of Combined Databases									
UNIT NAME:	SIDPERS NAME:	SIDPERS RANK:	SIDPERS SSN:	1058 RPTDTE:	ATRRS CRS:	1058 CONTROL NO:	DOLFINS ORDER#:	ATRRS RPTDTE:	ATRRS RES. STAT:
2ND PSYOP GROUP									
1ST POC (TSC)	ZIMMERMAN THOMAS Z.	SSG	000-00-0000	95/06/29	243-37F40-RC	WTLCAA9S0001	047007	950629	R
362ND POC (TSC)	SMITH JOHNATHON	SGT	000-00-0000	95/07/16	331-37F10	WSQWAA950018	080722	950730	R
362ND POC (TSC)	TAYLOR DANIEL A.	SPC	000-00-0000	95/07/30	331-37F10	WSQWAA950049	091024	950730	R
39TH POC (EPW)	SMITH SAMUEL B.	SGT	000-00-0000	95/07/16	331-37F30	WRV4AA950016	061032	950716	R
39TH POC (EPW)	TAYLOR MARK	SGT	000-00-0000	95/07/16	331-37F10	WRV4AA950005	061027	950716	R
7TH PSYOP GROUP									
305 POC	SMITH JOHN R.	SSG	000-00-0000	95/06/29	243-37F40-RC	WSQZAA950025	061059	950629	R
HHC 7TH PSYOP	MASON DANIEL P.	SGT	000-00-0000	95/08/05	331-37F30	WTMFAA950039	087044	950805	R
351ST CA CMD									
351ST CA CMD	SMALL DAN T.	SSG	000-00-0000	95/07/22	331-38A10	WYBKAA950031		950722	R
364TH CA BDE	MILES STEVEN M.	MSG	000-00-0000	95/07/22	331-38A10	WYBSAA950034		950722	R
364TH CA BDE	RUDOLPH ANTHONY D.	SSG	000-00-0000	95/07/22	331-38A10	WYBSAA950030		950722	R
364TH CA BDE	TURNER CAROL N.	SSG	000-00-0000	95/07/09	331-38A40	WYBSAA950111		950729	R
353RD CA CMD									
404 CA BN GP DET	SPERRY RANDAL P.	MSG	000-00-0000	95/07/09	331-38A10	WRTEA0950015		950729	R

---

## Soldiers may carry records embedded in ID cards

It is conceivable that in the future, every soldier will have an ID card with an embedded microchip containing all of his or her personal, medical, training and finance information. Upon deployment, the soldier would insert the ID card into a home-station computer, and the computer would download all mobilization-related information. Once the soldier arrived at the maneuver unit of assignment in theater, he would insert his card into a computer there for an instant update of all relevant information. Upon demobilization, the soldier would follow the same procedures, in reverse.

This system, or a similar one, could be in place within the next decade — the technology is already available. In order to help establish such a system, commanders and leaders at all levels must ensure that the information in their unit computers is complete, current and accurate. — Brigadier General Joel G. Blanchette

researched the master FOCUS database and printed the requested list in 45 seconds. These examples demonstrate the information power that unit commanders and staffs in USACAPOC now have at their fingertips.

### Future

While an enormous amount of work has been completed on the FOCUS database, more remains. USACAPOC is working to add data regarding the civilian skills of our reserve-component soldiers (especially those in Civil Affairs) and data on our active-component soldiers from both the 4th PSYOP Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. Information on active-duty soldiers will be obtained from the active-component SIDPERS databases and downloaded as ASCII files to the FOCUS database. The FOCUS software will easily allow importation of these files.

The civilian-skills database will include the professional and unique qualifications of the soldier and will list civilian education and degrees. Unlike the SIDPERS database, which limits the number of entries for languages a soldier has mastered, the new system will handle an

unlimited number of entries. It will contain all foreign travel and all overseas experience for each soldier. It will also include a list of any articles a soldier has published. The civilian-skills database will be stored in the CLAS, and as CLAS information moves up the chain nightly, the civilian-skills database will be included.

With the addition of the civilian skills and the active-component information, the FOCUS project will be complete, and the master FOCUS database will be available in each USACAPOC unit headquarters. Each night, computers in the higher headquarters will automatically call subordinate-unit computers to exchange information. By daybreak, computers from company level through USACAPOC headquarters will have received updated information available through the CLAS, DOLFINS, ATRRS, SIDPERS and Active Army databases.

Any questions pertaining to personnel and training across the command will be answered instantaneously with near-real-time information. The information can be formatted into any style the requester prefers. Columns of information can be generated from any of the several hundred data fields within the master FOCUS database. If a specific field does not exist, one can be created and automatically passed down the chain for each unit's input. From that point, this field's information will be rolled up, along with all the other fields, to the master FOCUS database. Fields could be created to include the date a soldier received his last DNA test, or to name soldiers who can deploy on short notice and how long they can be deployed without creating undue hardship or losing their civilian employment. Although such fields have not existed in previous databases used by the command, they could prove extremely valuable.

To maximize the potential of this information power, it is critical that units maintain current and accurate databases. Outdated or incomplete databases will degrade the system's otherwise potent capabilities. Maintaining the databases is not as difficult as it may seem. Once all the fields in a soldier's records have been

---

completed, approximately 20 fields will require annual or occasional updating. Fields that will require updating include scores on the Army Physical Fitness Test, the latest physical-exam dates, promotion data, and weapons-firing dates with scores. Units that successfully manage these changes will contribute to their own effectiveness and to that of USACAPOC as a whole. Any questions or suggestions on how to improve this process should be directed to members of the FOCUS Project Team at DSN 239-3022 or commercial (910) 432-3022. ✕

---

Brigadier General Joel G. Blanchette is deputy commander of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. His previous assignment was commander of the 354th



Civil Affairs Brigade. Since 1972 he has held a variety of command and staff assignments in the Army Reserve, including commander of the 5th PSYOP Group; commander of the 428th Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic); deputy chief of staff for operations with the headquarters, 97th Army Reserve Command; and various staff positions in the 462nd Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic). He is a graduate of the National War College and has completed the Symposium of Strategic Intelligence at the Defense Intelligence College, the Foreign Area Officer Course and the Civil Affairs Officer Course (Phase II). He holds a bachelor's degree in French from the University of Maine and a master's degree in business management from Central Michigan University, Washington, D.C.

---

## Civil-Military Seminars: 361st CA Builds Understanding Between the Americas

*by Captain Bethany L. Lenderman*

**W**hile the world focuses on contingency operations in areas like Bosnia and Haiti, the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade has an ongoing program in Latin America that allows soldiers to foster professional relationships with our neighbors to the south.

The 361st's Professional Development Program, or PDP, is making great strides in its efforts to promote the value of civil-military operations to Central and South American militaries. At the same time, the program provides real-world training opportunities for reserve- and active-component personnel.

The PDP is actually a series of seminars tailored to various Latin American countries. Officers and NCOs travel to host nations to discuss Civil Affairs topics with foreign military officers and government officials. During conferences that average five days, participants exchange information on topics such as public service, military professionalism and community relations.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Winston Cover, chief of the Plans Division at U.S. Army South, the PDP's roots can be traced to 1983, when Colonel Charles Stone, commander of the U.S. Military Group in Panama, sought to enhance rapport with the Panamanian National Guard. In March of that year, reservists from the 361st conducted Civil Affairs seminars in Panama. Attendees included mili-

tary and government officials from the U.S. and from Panama. Discussions centered on military civic actions in areas such as education, agriculture and health. The initial seminars were well-attended and resulted in the creation of two significant activities.

In 1983, the first medical, dental, veterinary and engineering exercise, or MEDRETE, was conducted in Panama as a joint and combined humanitarian/civic-action mission. U.S. and Panamanian Navy vessels transported U.S. military medical personnel and Panamanian military and government medical and dental personnel to the Veraguas Province. During the exercise, more than 500 patients received treatment, proving that a MEDRETE exercise could be performed in a Latin American country not known for its cooperative attitude toward the U.S.

The second offshoot of the initial seminars was the engineering readiness training exercise, or ENRETE. The first ENRETE, Blazing Trails, began in Panama in 1984. Between January and May, 80 kilometers of road were built in the Azuero Peninsula, which opened markets for farmers and merchants. Thousands of Army Reserve and National Guard troops now deploy to Latin America each year to participate in similar projects.

In the same way that the MEDRETE and the ENRETE took on lives of their own, the seminar program itself grew. Word of the seminars' success spread swiftly throughout

the region. Soon Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras requested civic-action seminars. By 1985, the attempt to increase rapport with the Panamanian National Guard had expanded into a program that reached across Latin America.

The 361st's PDP, known in other units as military-to-military operations, has been requested by 15 Latin American countries. U.S. Embassies and their military groups make nations aware of the program and emphasize that the seminars are available. Through the U.S. Embassy, countries request seminars and specify topics. Once a request goes through the chain of command and reaches the 361st, it is reviewed by officers who write a mission concept to cover the topic, tailoring it to the host nation. Once the concept has been completed and reviewed, a seminar is scheduled. Basic PDP topics include CA organization and training; CA in support of combat operations; reserve-component concepts, force structure and development; CA support in a peacekeeping-operations environment; and disaster preparedness and CA support.

The 361st has about 20 officers and NCOs who are active in the program, including

some active-duty soldiers from the 96th CA Battalion. Colonel Dan Dull, 361st PDP program manager, insists on several qualities in PDP candidates. They must be Civil Affairs subject-matter experts, fluent in Spanish, personable and flexible. "Language is important, but without the other characteristics, the person is not qualified," Dull said. Individuals must also be positive role models, since they'll be representing the U.S. government.

"The biggest stressor for me is the language," said Colonel Reid Jaffe, a long-time member of the PDP pool. "The key is not only speaking the language, but to be comfortable speaking the language," he explains. Every day, soldiers are immersed in situations in which they must be able to speak Spanish. Preparing for a seminar can also be intense. Besides gathering and creating presentation materials, soldiers must complete research into the history, the geography and the current events of the host country. "Prep time is expanded considerably if it's the first time we've been to a country," Jaffe added.

Being well-versed in the subject matter aids flexibility and helps eliminate potential stress for those involved. Schedules



U.S. Army photo

*U.S. and Uruguayan soldiers work together on a peacekeeping-operations exercise during a seminar presented through the 361st PDP.*



U.S. Army photo

*Sergeant First Class Stephen Wilshire of Co. A, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, works with Uruguayan officers during a civil-military seminar.*

can be grueling: Teams typically leave the U.S. on a Friday-night flight and arrive in country on Saturday, only to find that new topics have been added to their agenda. The teams spend the remainder of the weekend preparing presentation materials. Seminars are scheduled to begin on Mondays; sessions start early each morning and generally end between 2 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. Teams typically spend their evenings preparing and rehearsing for the next day's sessions. Seminars last 4-5 days, and teams may depart the host country a few hours after the final session.

While some of the seminar topics may be the same, no two trips are alike. Paraguay recently joined the program, requesting a seminar on military support to civilian agencies during disasters. Comparable in size to New Jersey, Paraguay is plagued annually by floods from the world's largest watershed, which is located to the north in Brazil.

Two annual seminars were planned for Paraguay, with the goal of having a disaster operations order completed by the end of the second seminar. The 361st's team brought various disaster-related plans, but decided to use the State of Florida's Mil-

tary Response to Disaster Plan. The seminar fostered a meeting between Paraguayan military forces and civilian-government agencies. The National Emergency Committee (similar to the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency) and operations officers from all the Paraguayan military services cooperated in a joint effort. This was significant, since the country elected its first civilian government in 1989, and the military is still learning to work with civilian leadership.

After identifying the flood hazard, the group set to work. During the first seminar, the team was able to get only three paragraphs of the operations order written, but that was to be a springboard for the following year's seminar, said Lieutenant Colonel Howard Stillwell, a member of the PDP team. Upon the team's arrival for the second seminar, Stillwell saw few familiar faces. Officers in Latin America are commonly reassigned every year, Stillwell said, but there were so few present from the first meeting that a new operations order had to be conceived. With a dedicated effort, the group was able to put together the basic annex to the national plan before the second seminar ended.

---

There are many measures of the PDP's success. After receiving a briefing on the U.S. Army Reserve in 1989, the Venezuelan Army formed a reserve force based on U.S. reserve-force structure. Subsequently, one reserve battalion triumphed over active-duty Venezuelan units in 1992, rescuing the state governor from rebel hands. Venezuela believes so strongly in the value of civil-affairs concepts (concepts which aided them in defeating the communists in the 1960s) that they requested U.S. Civil Affairs concepts be added to the curriculum of their version of the Command and General Staff College. In Argentina, following a disaster-preparedness seminar attended by members of various civilian agencies, the government's response to floods from the annual southeastern storms was much more effective.

There are benefits to the U.S. as well. In two separate PDP seminars on peacekeeping operations, officers from Honduras and Venezuela told members of the 361st about their experiences while serving as members of U.N. missions in North Africa and Bosnia. "The biggest benefit we gain is the experienced, trained officer or NCO," Dull said. Readiness is another benefit. Should a contingency operation arise, even if it occurs in a country that has not hosted a seminar,

the 361st officers are fully trained to deal with foreign governments.

It is difficult to discern the direction the PDP will take in the future. The 361st has received several requests for seminars in FY96. The brigade already has environmental engineers collecting information and preparing presentation materials for a new area of interest that has been requested: environmental concerns.

Each year, themes change and countries either join or quit the program. But there is one certainty: The PDP will continue to provide a forum for developing a better understanding between the Americas. ✕

---

Captain Bethany I. Lenderman is adjutant for the 445th Civil Affairs Battalion, Mountain View, Calif. In previous assignments, she served as the public affairs officer for the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade, and as the intelligence officer and the Civil Affairs officer for Troop Command (SF), Rhode Island Army National Guard. During Operation Desert Storm, she served as port-security officer for the port of Dammam, Saudi Arabia.



# Letters

## Special Warfare

### Crossed-arrows article deserves comment

The article on the crossed-arrows insignia by Lieutenant Colonel Charles King (July 1995) was informative and enjoyable. The author found considerably more reference material on the Indian Scouts than I have previously encountered. I would like to add a couple of comments for the amusement of any readers who have a fixation with military trivia.

A hasty reading of the article might suggest a clear and continuous migration of the crossed arrows from the Indian Scouts to Special Forces. It was neither; it was pretty irregular. Prior to 1960 the crossed arrows were probably rarely, if ever, thought of in connection with Special Forces. SF members probably thought of themselves as belonging to a completely new type of unit consisting of an amalgam of the OSS OG, Jedburgh and Philippine guerrilla experiences, with possibly some admixture of experience from the U.N. Partisan Forces Korea. These were the backgrounds of a number of the founding and early members. When unit flags and guidons were authorized, they were teal blue, the color the Army used to designate "branch immaterial" organizations: the military-insignia equivalent of "miscellaneous." The color lives on in the shoulder patch. There was no evidence of the crossed arrows, which continued to exist almost exclusively within the First Special Service Force Association.

When the Army established the Combat Arms Regimental System

in 1960, it listed Special Forces as one of the Army's 60 permanent regiments and included the World War II 1st Special Service Force in the SF lineage. The crossed arrows soon appeared as an element in the new SF crest, which replaced the separate insignia of the three existing groups. The fact that the crossed arrows had been worn as a collar insignia soon had its impact. At an indeterminate date (about 1963), the crossed arrows appeared at Fort Bragg as unauthorized officers' collar insignia. As SF officers of the time came from all branches, this may have been instituted as a unifying morale element. It is at least equally likely that it was SF bravado. Senior commanders apparently tolerated it or, with Nelsonian vision, did not see it as long as it stayed in the Fort Bragg area. Not only were metal insignia worn, but embroidered gold-on-OD insignia were worn on fatigues. Although it is unprovable at this late date, it is believed that some exceptionally courageous or misguided soul wore the insignia when visiting the Pentagon. The inevitable stern prohibition followed. The crossed arrows disappeared for more than 20 years. At least one of the banned pairs reappeared in 1987 when an officer who had given most of his career to SF wore his 1963 crossed arrows on his mess jacket as the insignia of his new branch.

In 1981 two officers were about to brief the Army Chief of Staff, General E.C. 'Shy' Meyer, on their proposals for an SF enlisted career management field, an SF officer specialty code and, most revolu-

tionary, the creation of an SF warrant-officer specialty. Their briefing charts, hand-lettered butcher paper, were covered with a blank sheet. One of the officers grabbed a felt-tip pen and drew large crossed arrows on the cover sheet. When the briefing started, the CSA smiled for a second at the cover, but he said nothing.

When the branch was established in 1987, retired General P.D. Adams, who had been a 1st Special Service Force officer, sent kind words and a pair of his crossed arrows to the ceremony at Fort Bragg. Although the famously outspoken Adams had often cited his 1st SSF experience when speaking against the Army's having elite or specialized units, he apparently recognized that a Special Forces branch represented continuity and professionalism not maintainable in a single unit over an extended period.

COL Scot Crerar  
U.S. Army (ret.)  
Vienna, Va.

### Taking the 'O' out of SOF

I am writing to endorse the comments of retired Lieutenant General William Yarborough in the July 1995 issue of *Special Warfare*, which took issue with Christopher Lamb's article "Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions." The fact that the two articles were published in the aftermath of the Commission on Roles and Missions report to Congress is probably not coincidental. The CORM studied a number of issues

---

involving all services, including whether the U.S. Special Operations Command should be dissolved. In an era of uncertainty about the nature of future threats to the nation's security and continued pressure on defense budgets, this will probably not be the last time SOf's viability will be questioned. It is for these reasons that Yarborough's comments should be heeded.

He made one point that I refer to as "taking the 'O' out of SOf." He opposes "submerging the identity of the U.S. Army's Special Forces within the general category of special-operations forces." Army Special Forces represent a combination of skills and experience configured in an organizational structure that provides capabilities unique among the services. It is the job of SOf's thinkers to carve out the roles and missions that best utilize those capabilities and not just settle for being another direct-action force.

The process of carving out proper roles and missions for Special Forces can be called strategic positioning. It requires an accurate assessment of SOf's core competencies combined with a little bit of luck, gazing into the crystal ball to anticipate threats and then taking proactive measures to prepare the force to meet those threats. The process is not an easy one, but it can be done.

How do you know when you've done it right? Apply the Ghostbusters test. Just ask the question "Who ya gonna call?" If the only answer is you, then you've gotten yourself strategically positioned.

In fact, SOf already gets the call for some missions that it is in our best interests to keep. The MTT program properly positions SOf as the military instrument of peacetime foreign policy. The coalition support teams of Desert Shield/Desert Storm opened a door that

SOf should keep open. Coordination of combined forces will be a challenging and essential job when American leadership, and limitations on ground troops, are called for — something like a SOCOORD operating with foreign corps. These are but a few of the possibilities.

The bottom line is that in order to be ready for the next round of the "roles and missions" debate, and there will be one, SOf must "take the O out of SOf" and start strategically positioning the force. SOf cannot afford to settle for Christopher Lamb's simple definition that SOf "are what conventional forces are not." When the question "Who we gonna call?" is asked, the only answer should be SOf.

COL Page Duffy  
U.S. Army Reserve (ret.)  
Andover, Md.

### **CMF 18 NCOs need degree program**

As the role of Special Forces NCOs expands, consideration must be given to a degree-completion program that prepares them for the future.

Although our Army does not have a requirement for its enlisted force to possess any post-high school education, the future of Special Forces demands a highly educated NCO.

In the AUSA's 1995 Green Book, Sergeant Major of the Army McKinney states, "The goal of every enlisted soldier should be a college degree, while maintaining his or her primary focus of mission accomplishment, and leading and caring for soldiers." Currently all soldiers are encouraged to further their education by attending college courses at night with the help of tuition assistance and with guidance from education counselors.

This is great for those stabilized at home station for a full semester who have the time to attend. The operations tempo of a Special Forces group makes it very hard for our soldiers to take advantage of this course of action.

I propose we develop a degree program for all CMF 18 NCOs that would guarantee them a bachelor's degree upon graduation from the Army Sergeants Major Academy. The program would start upon completion of the SFQC and would require some help from our NCO Education System and an accredited university.

Let's look at some possibilities, using the New York State Regents external degree program as the model. A bachelor of science degree requires 120 credit hours. Sixty of these may be electives and 60 may be in the arts and sciences. Assuming he gets credit for military schools as recommended by the American Council on Education, an 18C NCO who completes the SFQC, ANCOC and the Sergeants Major Course could get 43 elective credits and 34 credits in the arts and sciences, based on his military experience. This would leave him 43 credits short of a degree, without him ever sitting in a college classroom.

How can he complete the remaining 43 hours, and what should he study? I suggest we make some minor schedule changes in the SF ANCOC and allow the students to attend college courses during duty hours twice a week. This is already the standard in the Sergeants Major Course. Assuming the SF NCO takes two courses during ANCOC (12 quarter hours) and enrolls in two courses each quarter (18 quarter hours possible) at the Sergeants Major Academy, he has put himself within striking distance of the degree. By taking CLEP/DANTES subject examina-

---

tions and enrolling in DANTEs independent-study courses, the NCO could easily rack up the remaining 13 credits and would fulfill the requirements. Independent study is ideal for Special Forces soldiers because it allows them to complete assignments on their own schedule. After completing his studies, the soldier takes a test at the education center on post. If he passes, he receives a transcript identical to the one he would have received had he attended class.

Courses that will enhance the SF soldier's capabilities should include the history of his group's geographical area of responsibility, political science, international politics, international law, sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology, English, geography, biology, mechanical engineering, communications, information management and human-resource management. He can also use vocational courses that directly affect his MOS skills such as gunsmithing, radio operation, carpentry, plumbing, electrician and paramedic courses.

College courses thrown into an SF NCO's rucksack will not deter the NCO from focusing on warfighting. They are enhancers of warfighting skills, not distractors. There is enough down-time between and during deployments to accommodate study. We must remain mission-oriented, but with a little effort, we can train to fight while we complete a degree.

Finally, imagine the recruitment

and retention incentive a guaranteed degree would have for Special Forces. We could get and keep those highly skilled soldiers who leave the service every year to pursue their education. After retirement, our NCOs would hit the streets with an unbelievable life experience and a degree. This would allow them to be more competitive for the better-paying jobs and would increase the number of friends to SF in positions of power and policy-making.

No one can deny the benefits of an education; it pays for itself many times over, especially in our business. The opportunity to implement this program should not be wasted. How can we lose?

CSM Michael W. Jefferson  
3rd SF Group  
Fort Bragg, N.C.



Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare and elsewhere, or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a true forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long, but we may have to edit them for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. We will withhold the author's name upon request, but we will not print anonymous letters. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-PBM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

# Officer Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### Senior warrant advisers provide valuable assistance

Through the Special Forces senior warrant-officer adviser program, SF senior warrant officers serve as subject-matter experts to advise and assist their commanders on the professional development, assignments, utilization, mentorship, training and recruiting of SF warrant officers. An excellent source of sound advice and experience, SF senior warrant-officer advisers, or SWOAs, can assist commanders at all levels from major command to company.

In the SF group, the senior warrant officer is responsible for implementing and managing the SWOA program. He is the point of contact for warrant-officer information, serves as a member of Department of the Army warrant-officer selection boards and represents the SF group at SWOA functions. The group-, battalion- and company-level SWOAs advise their commanders on warrant-officer professional development, or WOPD. They provide WOPD briefings, recommend intra-unit assignments, recommend and prioritize warrant-officer training requirements and serve as mentors to newly assigned warrant officers. SWOAs also identify, groom and recruit prospective warrant-officer candidates. They interview prospective applicants, facilitate interviews between applicants and their unit commanders, and assist applicants with their WO applications.

The intent of the SWOA program is to provide a means by which commanders can better manage the selection, quality control and utilization of SF warrant officers. Unit commanders should formally appoint SWOAs to make their additional duties official. The information presented here can be used as a guide in establishing a SWOA program. For additional information, contact CW3 Wayne Searcy, 180A Manager at the SWCS Propensity Office, at DSN 239-2415/8423 or commercial (910) 432-2415/8423.

### SF promotion rates compare favorably with Army averages

The chart below depicts 1995 DA board selection rates for the SF Branch, compared to overall Army selection rates. The figures show that SF officers continue to be highly competitive for promotion and professional military education.

Board	SF Selection Rate*	Army Selection Rate
MAJ Promotion	78.4%	73.2%
LTC Promotion	65.9%	60.9%
COL Promotion	40.9%	44.4%
CSC	18.7%	17.1%
SSC	8.6%	6.4%

\* Promotion board figures are for primary zone only.



# Enlisted Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### **PERSCOM makes it easier to communicate with career managers**

The U.S. Total Army Personnel Command has implemented new procedures to increase soldiers' participation in managing their careers. To help soldiers better communicate with their career managers, PERSCOM's Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, or EPMD, has developed the following: an interactive voice-response telephone system, or IVRS; expanded E-mail capabilities; high-speed fax machines; mailgrams; and a pocket reference information card.

The cornerstone system is the IVRS, an automated telephone system that provides soldiers with career information 24 hours a day. To use the IVRS, soldiers must enter their Social Security number to access menu options that will allow them to find out if they are on assignment or are scheduled to attend an Army school. They can also obtain information on retention; compassionate reassignments; the exceptional family member program; separations; or volunteering for recruiting, drill sergeant, Rangers and Special Forces. Soldiers can activate the IVRS by dialing DSN 221-EPMD or commercial 1-800-FYI-EPMD.

EPMD also encourages the use of E-mail. E-mail exchanges can be conducted 24 hours a day to inquire about the status of personnel actions, future schooling or assignments. Soldiers can also correspond with their career managers by faxing communications directly to their EPMD career branch. Another new development is the DA PERSGRAM, a mailgram designed to supplement the chain of command in keeping soldiers informed of career or assignment information.

To communicate with the SF Enlisted Branch, soldiers may use the E-mail address [epsf@hoffman-emh1.army.mil](mailto:epsf@hoffman-emh1.army.mil) or phone DSN 221-8899 or commercial (703) 325-8899, fax -4510.

### **SF Enlisted Branch develops ANCOC Management System**

The SF Enlisted Branch has developed a new system to give SF units flexibility in scheduling their soldiers for attendance in the SF Advanced NCO Course. Under the new ANCOC management system, promotion boards will select soldiers for promotion and ANCOC attendance, developing an alternate ANCOC list from the soldiers considered but not promoted. The SF Enlisted Branch will first screen the promotion list for soldiers who are on assignment and place them in a TDY status to attend ANCOC en route to their gaining units. Soldiers on assignment from OCONUS units will have their date eligible to return from overseas adjusted. The SF Enlisted Branch will then allocate ANCOC slots to units based on the number each unit needs per MOS. Branch will fax ANCOC schedules and lists of promotable and alternate soldiers to each command. Units will screen the lists and, based on their mission requirements, submit names for specific classes throughout the fiscal year. As a rule, priority will go to soldiers who are in a promotable status, with no alternates placed in class until the primary list has been exhausted. Units may, however, submit alternates before primaries if they can provide appropriate justification for approval. The SF Enlisted Branch will resolve any problems and place the soldiers in the ATRRS sys-

tem for ANOC. Class rosters will be sent to the schools NCO in each SF group. Soldiers who are assigned outside normal group command lines will be notified by phone. In the past, operational demands and deployments have made it difficult to notify soldiers as to when they will attend ANCOC. By giving units the responsibility to select personnel for ANCOC courses, the new system is expected to reduce the number of "no shows" and cancellations and to allow soldiers more time to prepare for ANCOC.

### **45 SF E-8s selected for promotion**

Forty-five SF master sergeants were recently selected for promotion to sergeant major (MOS 18Z), and 10 more were selected for appointment to command sergeant major (MOS 00Z). Most of those NCOs selected had served at least one tour of duty at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, indicating that varied assignments are important in order to enhance soldiers' promotion potential.

### **NCOs need basic duty positions to be competitive**

SF NCOs must perform satisfactorily in each of four basic NCO leadership assignments to be competitive for the next level of responsibility. The basic assignments are team member (junior, senior or assistant operations sergeant); team sergeant; company sergeant major; and battalion command sergeant major. Enhancing duty assignments include, but are not limited to, serving on staff at company, battalion and group level or above; and assignment at USAJFKSWCS, JRTC, JOTB or School of the Americas. First-sergeant duty is viewed as an enhancing duty assignment when a soldier is being considered for appointment to command sergeant major. First-sergeant duty is not a substitute for duty as a company sergeant major. Drill-sergeant duty and detailed recruiting duty are viewed as excellent NCO leadership-development assignments. Two key points to remember are that soldiers should always return to a basic assignment after completing an enhancing duty assignment; and that from a realistic standpoint, an NCO may be able to serve only one or two enhancing duty assignments during his career. It is vitally important that an NCO serve as a company sergeant major prior to being selected for appointment to CSM. Similar basic and enhancing duty assignments are available for NCOs assigned to special-mission units.

### **Recruiting, drill-sergeant assignments build essential SF skills**

CMF 18 currently has 30 authorizations for drill sergeant duty and 20 for recruiting duty. Drill-sergeant duty is one of the best leadership-development assignments in the Army; recruiting duty is an ideal assignment for developing interpersonal skills. SF soldiers normally do well in these assignments and return to their units with enhanced skills that are good for the CMF. By increasing soldiers' promotion potential, drill-sergeant and recruiting assignments also increase the SF promotion base.

### **SRBs reinstated for 18B, 18C and 18E**

Selective re-enlistment bonuses have recently been reinstated for MOSs 18B, 18C and 18E. Reinstatement occurred at a time when the Army has reduced its SRB budget by 40 percent and is \$400 million short in its overall FY 96 personnel budget. For information on eligibility, soldiers should consult MilPer Message No. 96-057 or contact their unit re-enlistment NCO.



# Foreign SOF

## Special Warfare

### **Reorganization of Mexican army emphasizes 'special operations forces'**

Mexican army force-modernization programs that were outlined in 1995 envision highly mobile units, including "special forces" components, based in each of the country's 10 military regions. According to Mexican military and media reporting, a coordinating headquarters for these Ranger-like, company-sized units is to be established, as are "special forces" schools, with the Grupo Aerotransportado de Fuerzas Especiales (Airborne Group of the Special Forces), or GAFE, and with the First Army Corps special-operations unit. Special-operations training programs in desert, mountain and jungle environments will also be developed, with some units receiving training in urban operations. A particularly heavy emphasis is being placed on those forces that will be located in the states of Chiapas and Guerrero, where "special regional airborne forces" will be set up. The Mexican army largely destroyed insurgent groups in Guerrero in the mid-1970s, though the violence attributed variously to guerrillas, drug traffickers and criminals has recently become more visible there. The current Mexican Defense Secretary-General, Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, was chief of staff of the 27th Military Zone (Acapulco, Guerrero) during the 1970s, and his counterinsurgency experiences will no doubt influence the development of contemporary special-forces programs. In addition, the establishment of a regular military intelligence service — also envisioned in the overall force-development efforts outlined in 1995 — is expected to enhance special-operations capabilities. Concurrent with these and broader Mexican force-modernization programs, some Mexican and foreign critics have attacked what they assert to be the growing direct U.S. support for Mexican military development plans. Other observers have hailed the professional-development process and what they hope will be an open and closer U.S.-Mexican military relationship that promotes cooperation in dealing with common security problems.

### **Internal critics emphasize Russian lack of UW preparedness**

The Russian war in Chechnya has generated familiar internal military criticism regarding Russian preparations and training for counter guerrilla operations. Internal critics have said that if Russian plans for dealing with counterinsurgency exist, they are the exclusive province of intelligence specialists who do not share their knowledge. This lack of Russian unconventional-warfare preparation has been judged to be a major contributor to continuing Chechen rebel successes. The Russian-described success of Chechen mining and explosive devices has been particularly noteworthy. By the summer of 1995, the Chechen mining of transportation routes, buildings and other targets was said to be "acquiring a massive character," that left no one safe. The use of mines and ambushes in combination is exploited effectively by Chechen fighters, as is the use of mines and explosives to target leaders and facilities. In the fall of 1995, the Russian commander in Chechnya, General Anatoliy Romanov, was critically injured by a Chechen bomb. A subsequent bomb detonation near a Russian administrative headquarters in Grozny killed at least 11 people and injured scores more.

## **Guatemalan military forces target crime wave**

During the last year, intensifying criminal activity in a number of countries has led to the unconventional employment of military forces aimed at curbing violent crime by armed and organized groups. In Brazil, rising crime in urban areas brought about a joint military-police action called "Operation Rio" under the control of a Brazilian army general and involving the heavy use of airborne and special-operations forces. The operation spanned a three-month period during 1994-1995 and was aimed at halting the growing links between drug-traffickers and other criminal groups in Rio and the surrounding area. More recently, in Central America, Guatemalan army forces were deployed in Guatemala City and other areas to deal with the violent crime. Rising crime has alarmed Guatemalan security officials for some time, as the country has sought to end, through peace accords, the 35-year-old insurgency of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. A 1994 Guatemalan military intelligence assessment of current and developing security problems identified narco-trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and other crimes as growing threats to the Guatemalan state. The December 1995 surge in these kinds of activities — and a growing number of fatalities — resulted in deployment of military units to conduct patrols in centers of urban and rural criminal activity and to set up checkpoints along major roads. It was hoped that Army units — supported by Air Force helicopters for mobility — could reduce the number of murders and kidnappings, break up armed criminal groups, and offset the alleged inefficiencies and corruption of Guatemalan police by supporting and reinforcing them. The use of Guatemalan military forces in this role is clearly controversial, given the continuing allegations of human-rights abuses committed by the military in internal-security roles. However, it reflects the kind of unconventional security challenges being posed by armed criminal groups in many areas of the world, and the difficult decisions that states must make to deal with them.

## **Russian officer admits concerns over nuclear theft**

Russian military and civilian leaders have generally minimized the threat of nuclear weapons theft or diversion. Colonel General Yevgeniy P. Maslin, chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, or 12th GUMO, which is responsible for "nuclear munitions," similarly characterized theft from 12th GUMO nuclear-weapons facilities as "impossible." However, he qualified that reassurance when he identified vulnerabilities posed by criminal and terrorist groups, principally the theft of nuclear weapons during transport. In addition, he indicated that exercises conducted to assess the potential theft of nuclear weapons from 12th GUMO facilities identified a particular concern that had not been considered before: namely, "What if such acts were to be undertaken by people who have worked with nuclear weapons in the past? For example, by people dismissed from our structures, social malcontents, embittered individuals?" The results — unspecified but evidently alarming to the general — were delivered in a special report to the Russian Security Council. In a country filled with embittered, desperate active-duty and former servicemen — some of them veterans of Soviet/Russian nuclear-weapons programs — Maslin's concerns seem well-considered and suggest enduring future proliferation dangers.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DCSOPS, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

# Update

## Special Warfare

### Army Special Operations Support Command activated

The U.S. Army Special Operations Support Command unfurled its colors during an activation ceremony held at Fort Bragg Dec. 8.

Lieutenant General J.T. Scott, commander of the Army Special Operations Command, assisted as Colonel Laney M. Pankey, commander of SOSCOM, uncased the colors.

The newly activated command realigns the command-and-control organizational structure of the 112th Signal Battalion, 528th Support Battalion and the USASOC Material Management Center.

“One of the organizational deficiencies discovered when we reviewed who and what we were in 1993 was that we did not have an entity to coordinate support for our deployed special-operations forces,” Scott said. “We had two great battalions, equally good at providing all aspects of signal and combat-service support to our units, but we had no overarching headquarters to plan, coordinate and determine what our priorities might be for that support.

“What we hope to gain by this organization today is a coordinated effort worldwide, prioritizing our limited assets, and most importantly, supporting our special-operations soldiers wherever they are deployed,” Scott said.

“Our mission focus will always be the special-operations-forces soldiers and their mission,” Pankey said following the activation.

The 112th Signal Battalion was originally created during World



Photo by Mike Brantley  
LTG J.T. Scott passes the colors of the U.S. Army SOSCOM to COL Laney M. Pankey.

War II and later participated in the Battle of the Bulge, the defense of Bastogne and the Rhine Campaign. By the time of its deactivation at the end of the war, the 112th had earned five battle streamers. The unit was reactivated in 1986 as the 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne) and later was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) for its actions in Southwest Asia. In August 1995, the 112th received the Army Superior Unit Award for its actions in 1994 during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

The 528th Special Operations Support Battalion was activated Dec. 15, 1942, at Camp McCain, Miss., as the 528th Quartermaster Service Battalion. During World War II, the battalion provided combat-service support to European theater forces, including the First

Special Service Force. The unit earned six battle streamers during World War II and four campaign streamers in Vietnam. Returning from Vietnam, the unit was inactivated in 1971. On May 16, 1987, the battalion was activated and redesignated as the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (Airborne). It was awarded additional streamers for its role in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, including the Valorous Unit Award. — SFC Mike Brantley, USASOC PAO

### Five SF soldiers earn Soldier's Medal

Five U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers received the Soldier's Medal on Dec. 1 for their actions in subduing a man suspected of firing on other Fort Bragg soldiers.

Lieutenant General J.T. Scott, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, presented the awards to Sergeants First Class Elwood Johnson, Paul Rogers and Edward Mongold; and Staff Sergeants Anthony Minor and Robert Howes. The ceremony took place at the Army Special Operations Memorial Plaza at Fort Bragg. The Soldier's Medal is the Army's highest award for peacetime heroism.

The soldiers' actions occurred Oct. 27, 1995, when a gunman fired on soldiers taking physical training in Fort Bragg's 82nd Airborne Division area. One soldier was killed and 19 others were wounded in the attack. The SF NCOs, conducting a squad run nearby, subdued and disarmed the suspect and provided medical treatment to sol-

---

diers who were wounded during the incident. Howes was wounded while subduing the suspect.

The five soldiers were attending the SF Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Johnson is assigned to the SWCS 1st Special Warfare Training Group; Rogers and Mongold are assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Carson, Colo.; and Minor and Howes are assigned to the 3rd Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg.

### **SF group commanders have authority to revoke SF Tab**

The commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, as chief of the Special Forces Branch, recently signed a memorandum authorizing Special Forces group-level commanders the authority to revoke the SF tab from soldiers within their units.

The SF Tab may now be removed from soldiers who fail to meet or maintain the standards outlined in Army regulations. Army Regulation 600-8-22 is being updated to reflect the change. For more information, contact Master Sergeant Michael Lawler in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office at DSN 239-8423/9002 or commercial (910) 432-8423/9002.

### **Videotape teaches use of recovery devices**

A new videotape titled "Helicopter Recovery Devices-Personnel" provides instructional techniques in the use of several basic and field-expedient recovery devices, recovery systems and a universal point of attachment (the Navy hook) that may be used with numerous other devices.

Produced by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the videotape teaches the correct pro-

cedure for preparation and use of several basic recovery systems and devices: the Fast Rope Infiltration/Exfiltration System, or FRIES; stabilized body operations, or STABO; the Special Patrol Infiltration/Exfiltration System, or SPIES; forest or jungle penetrator (with and without floatation collar); horse collar; and troop ladder. Field expedients such as the Hansen, Palmer and McGuire rigs are also discussed, as is the Navy (or rescue) hook.

Although these devices can be simple to use, the new videotape urges soldiers to become familiar with them, advising that "As a survivor, in a passive low- to medium-threat environment, you would most likely be rescued with one of these helicopter-recovery devices."

Soldiers may request the videotape through their local Training Audiovisual Support Center by using the title: "Helicopter Recovery Devices-Personnel," TVT Number 31-7, and product-identification number 70976DA.

### **Air Force '2025' study needs input from soldiers**

The Air Force is looking for information or ideas from all the services to help Air Force operations in the future.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force has directed the Air University to undertake a study, called "2025," on air and space capabilities required to support national and international security in the future. As part of 2025, the Air University is seeking ideas on new capabilities, systems, concepts of operation and uses of high-leverage emerging technology.

The Air University has set up a home page on the Worldwide Web to take suggestions. The home page has an in-depth explanation of the study and allows anyone to submit

an idea as either a "concept" or a "technology." The home page address is: <http://www.au.af.mil/2025/2025home.html>.

Soldiers who do not have access to the Worldwide Web or who need more information may contact Air Force Captain Matthew B. Ash at DSN 579-2402 or commercial (904) 884-2402.

### **SOMTC slated to begin classes in July 1996**

The Special Operations Medical Training Center, designed to train both the special-operations combat medic and the Special Forces medical sergeant, is scheduled to begin its first classes in July 1996.

The special-operations combat medic will attend the first 24 weeks of training to learn advanced trauma lifesaving and to attain EMT-paramedic qualification. The SF-medical-sergeant candidates will continue for 20 more weeks of training in SF-unique medical skills. All training will be conducted at Fort Bragg in a state-of-the-art medical training facility that is currently under construction.

### **USASOC gets new deputy commander**

Brigadier General Kenneth R. Bowra assumed the position of deputy commander of the Army Special Operations Command Jan. 30.

Bowra, former commander of Special Operations Command (South), U.S. Army Southern Command, Panama, replaced Maj. Gen. William P. Tangney, who assumed command of the Army Special Forces Command Nov. 1.



# Book Reviews


## Special Warfare

**Treatise on Partisan Warfare.** By Johann Ewald. Translated by Robert A. Selig and David C. Skaggs. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991. ISBN: 0-313-27350-2 (cloth). 178 pages. \$45.

Johann Ewald was an 18th-century Hessian officer who served in professional military service from the age of 16 until his death. From 1776 until the end of the American Revolutionary War, Ewald served as an officer of one of two jager companies, the Hessian elite. He and his men participated in every major battle from New York to Yorktown, as well as in countless minor engagements and skirmishes. Eventually joining the service of Denmark, he rose to the rank of lieutenant general and the position of commanding general of the Duchy of Holstein.

Johann Ewald wrote of his experience, publishing a classic manual on the employment of light forces against other light or irregular forces. It is a well-written and enlightening work, and the editors have produced a translation that is highly readable and impressive for its scholarship. More than two years in the writing and exceedingly well-documented, this relatively short volume is a welcome addition to the body of literature concerning light infantry and its employment.

This translation is divided into three sections. The first, eight pages long, contains a biography of Ewald, background information on his original writings and the editors' apology regarding their translation of Ewald's original term *kleiner krieg* as "partisan warfare." The editors



have clearly wrestled with the semantics of the term "partisan" and argue that it is contextually consistent with usage from the 17th through the 20th centuries. The use of "partisan" here will be disagreeable to some readers, incorporating as it does both the more familiar modern connotation of an irregular force operating against a larger, regular force (usually invaders) and one describing formations of special but regular, well-trained light infantry or cavalry.

A literal English translation of *kleiner krieg* into "small wars" would have more accurately captured the operational environment familiar to both Ewald and the modern reader, an environment characterized by vast, unforgiving terrain and climate favorable to the defender. Eighteenth-century America, for example, often comprised a hostile population within which were hid-

den sympathizers who assisted an enemy force that included guerrillas and regular formations.

Ewald's treatise also incorporated his experience with operations that ranged from protecting friendly indigenous populations to conducting unilateral, almost "special operations" on his own, to operating with the larger, more conventional forces of his day.

The second portion of the book is the editors' introductory essay, a 30-page history and analysis of the small-wars concept in the 18th century. The editors have superbly placed Ewald's thought in both historical and modern military context. They highlight the fact that Ewald recognized that he was posing few new ideas and that he acknowledged the earlier writings of other military writers.

Nevertheless, against a dominant military predisposition for regimentation, Ewald and like-minded leaders were formulating a new chemistry for waging war. They were also beginning to recognize a political component of warfare that was different from feudal and peasant uprisings. The population was now an integral part of the war-winning equation, a fact that Ewald did not believe his British counterparts recognized, to their misfortune.

The third portion is the translated treatise. It is very much a how-to piece, illustrated throughout with telling examples to make the point in each particular chapter. Ewald is clearly trying to impart the benefit of hard-earned lessons, and the reader is reminded of a well-written Fort Benning student text on patrolling.

Throughout the treatise, the American soldier-reader will sense an immediate familiarity. Ewald hews to the same principles that guide our tactical thought and leadership today. In the field of combat leadership, Ewald appears to have been at the leading and lonely edge of his time. Leadership by example and shared hardships could not have been popular in an era marked for its class distinctions. Ewald's recognition of the impact of situational dynamics, what we now call the analysis of METT-T, and his encouragement of initiative are taken for granted as leadership traits today.

Selig and Skaggs' translation and commentary of Ewald's *Treatise on Partisan Warfare* were done to add to the history and to the understanding of the American Revolutionary War. Their work completely satisfies that objective with a broader collateral benefit. It is an exemplary resource for anyone interested in the development and history of light infantry and irregular warfare. Every light infantryman, Ranger and Special Forces soldier who reads it will be nodding his head in agreement with Ewald's concepts, thoughts and standards. The editors have done a masterful job of bringing to life the historical figure and the ideas of Johann Ewald.

LTC John F. Mulholland  
Fort Bragg, N.C.


**Losing Mogadishu — Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia.** By Jonathan Stevenson. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. ISBN 1-55750-788-0. 183 pages. \$24.95.

Soldiers and politicians are still talking about it — it seems that nearly everyone has a different perspective on what went wrong.

Forty-three Americans died in Somalia — 18 of them in one now-famous combat action for which two special-operations soldiers were posthumously awarded Medals of Honor.

While there may be much to criticize about U.S. and U.N. operations in Somalia, Jonathan Stevenson seems to forget that President George Bush, a politician, made the ill-advised decision to enter the quicksand that was Somalia. After that, the American military was stuck with a tar baby that it had never wanted and had advised against.

Stevenson's primary background is in journalism. When he discusses military operations, he is clearly out of his depth. He does not fully understand the American military nor the inherent difficulty of military operations conducted under the auspices of the U.N. What Stevenson fails to comprehend is that the American military is a very blunt instrument of national policy. Marines are not diplomats, nor should they be confused with diplomats. We would never ask a foreign-service officer to conduct a ground assault on an enemy posi-



tion, but American policy-makers appear more than willing to ask a 19-year-old Marine to act the role of cross-cultural facilitator between feuding Somali factions in the streets of Mogadishu.

This reviewer would even take the author to task over the title of the book, *Losing Mogadishu — Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia*, for two reasons. First, Mogadishu was never America's to win or lose. It is not worthwhile to think of post-Cold War issues in this light. Mogadishu gratefully belongs to Somalis alone. Second, our actions in Somalia reflect no U.S. policy of which I am aware. What "test" is the author speaking about?

Fortunately, Stevenson's book is more focused on the politics surrounding the Somalia debacle, and he provides a very credible chronology of significant events throughout his narrative. But I am at odds with Stevenson's view of the world. He finds endless fault with American policies, views the U.N. as an American puppet, and concerns himself with the "image" of the U.N.

Despite these many criticisms, Stevenson's work is enjoyable reading. Stevenson apparently spent much time in Somalia, and his insights into Somali clan warfare are excellent. The fact that he knows many of the major players in the region also gives his analysis greater credibility.

If you will view this book for what it is — one idealistic journalist's attempt to capture the truth of Somalia, the book is worth reading. If you expect a trenchant, in-depth and objective military-political analysis, look elsewhere.

LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr.  
Joint Special Operations Cmd.  
Fort Bragg, N.C.



# Special Warfare

---

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

---

Department of the Army  
JFK Special Warfare Center and School  
ATTN: AOJK – DT – PBM  
Fort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

THIRD CLASS U.S. Postage PAID Southern, MD Permit No. 1968
------------------------------------------------------------------------