



# Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School



# From the Commandant



## Special Warfare

There is much ongoing discussion of the revolution in military affairs and the impact it will have on our military forces and on our decisions about how we will wage war.

Certainly, advances in technology will have profound effects on our operations, effects which we are only partially able to appreciate at this time. Other factors to consider are the effects that world political developments will have on United States interests and how the U.S. will respond. The numerous ongoing and potential changes present a bewildering array of variables to policy-makers and military planners.

In this issue, Brian Sullivan compares the current situation to someone moving backward into the future, able to see clearly only what has past, incompletely aware of what is happening, and altogether unable to see into the future. He suggests that the best one can do is to analyze current trends and draw analogies from history. Regarding the current revolution in military affairs, Sullivan says that history contains many RMAs that have produced new theories, new weapons and new ways of waging war. Although the current RMA promises to greatly increase commanders' awareness, history is also replete with examples of defeated commanders who were well-supplied with information that they failed to understand.


The articles in this issue of Special Warfare can increase readers' understanding of a variety of current issues and potential developments. In addition to discussing the history of revolutions in military affairs, Sullivan examines potential RMAs, including economic developments in the Far East that could give rise to a more powerful and more influential China. Ambassador David Passage discusses issues in Latin America, such as the growth of democracy and the increasing expectations of the lower classes, that could have a dramatic impact on the U.S. Louis Beres shows how worldwide unrest, coupled with an increased availability of nuclear materials, could lead to



a deadlier form of terrorism.

Should these developments require some form of U.S. military operations, typically they will involve small-unit training, person-to-person contact, cultural awareness, intelligence collection or information dissemination — the specialties that have always made SOF valuable.

As we anticipate developments and operations, we must ensure that our special-operations doctrine and structure are up-to-date. Steven Cook's article explains how the ARSOF capstone manual, FM 100-25, is being revised to include the latest evolutions in SOF doctrine. But we must also remember that some factors endure revolutions in military affairs. Major Antulio Echevarria argues that Clausewitz's theories are durable and adaptable to a changing environment. As we move into the future, our understanding of events and the versatility of SOF will allow us to find new ways of employing their unique capabilities.

  
Major General William P. Tangney

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# The Future National Security Environment: Possible Consequences for Army SOF

*by Brian R. Sullivan*

Predicting the national security environment can be little more than educated guessing. It is an environment influenced by developments abroad, as well as by domestic politics, the state of the United States economy, and changes in American society. It is difficult to understand such an enormously complicated set of interrelated factors, and to accurately predict how they will evolve into a different state is impossible. About the best anyone can do is to guess which trends will continue and at what rates, to make analogies with events from history, and to rely on intuition.

We are taught to think of the future as being in front of us and the past as being behind us, and we

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This article is based on the paper presented by the author at the 1996 Special Forces Conference, held at Fort Bragg in April 1996. It examines past and future revolutions in military affairs and possible roles that U.S. SOF could fill in the 21st century. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States government, the Department of Defense or the National Defense University. — Editor

picture ourselves walking into the future. But Marine Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper recently presented a view of the future which may help us conceptualize it a bit better. He said that the ancient Greeks thought of the future as behind them and pictured themselves backing into it. One cannot see directly behind, of course, and the future is unseen. The Greeks imagined the immediate past before them and the rest of the past in the background, growing more hazy with increasing distance. They thought of the present as being around them, and the immediate future as the vague shapes perceptible in one's peripheral vision. They believed that people could best predict the future by attempting to ascertain its outlines in the shapes of present events. What follows are the author's predictions based on the shapes in the present world.

Even though some sovereign states are growing weaker, the most powerful actors in the future security environment are going to be countries, not transnational forces. Many of these states will be clustered in East Asia and South Asia. The economic growth rates of China, Korea, Taiwan, some of the

Southeast Asian countries and, most recently, India, are quite impressive — some have been in the double digits for a decade or longer. While such economic growth may eventually slow down — as it has in Japan — it seems likely that it will continue for a good number of years for these “Asian tigers.” Meanwhile, the annual growth of the gross domestic product, or GDP, of the U.S. has stayed in the 2-3 percent range for more than 20 years. In other words, the relative balance of economic power is altering at a rapid rate in favor of East Asia and against the U.S.

We need to stress the adjective rapid. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the U.S. and Germany enjoyed higher economic growth rates than did Britain. Those higher growth rates allowed the Germans to challenge the British for domination of Europe in World War I and allowed the U.S. to replace Britain as the leader of the Western democracies. But the difference in those growth rates was minuscule by contemporary standards. From 1870 to 1914, the British economy grew at a rate of about 2 percent per year, while the American and German economies grew at 3 per-

cent. It was this 1 percent annual difference, compounded, of course, that enabled the Germans and the Americans to pull ahead of the British.

Our sense of the rate of historical change has been shaped by those events. It is difficult for us to comprehend that the balance of power could be quickly overturned if the growth rate of a major power's economy surpassed our economy's growth rate by 6, 7, 8 or 9 percent. But that may be happening. The economy of the People's Republic of China has been growing at 10-12 percent per year for the past 15 years or so. South Korea and Taiwan are doing almost as well. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and even Vietnam may soon be doing the same.

### Economic implications

Even if the Chinese economic growth rate slows to an average annual rate of 7-9 percent, the PRC could challenge the U.S. in economic and military terms, and much sooner than most of us might imagine. True, Chinese wealth would be divided among more people than ours is — the average Chinese is unlikely to have a standard of living equal to that of the average American for a century or more. But what if the PRC economy continues to grow at a rapid rate and Beijing devotes 5 or 6 percent of its GDP to arms while we continue to spend 3 percent or less on defense?

Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union never had a GDP that was more than 40-50 percent of the GDP of the U.S., but by devoting a far larger percentage of their national wealth to armaments, they were able to challenge our very survival. By 1939, Hitler was putting about 25 percent of the German economy into war preparations. In the 1970s and

1980s, the USSR was devoting 15-18 percent — perhaps even more — to its military.

This is not to say that we are doomed to an arms race with the Chinese. Nor am I predicting that the PRC will follow a militaristic path. The point is that sovereign states will remain the primary actors on the world stage and their interrelationships will change at a speed far greater than that for which we are psychologically prepared.

### Domestic realities

Not all Americans are attuned to the security implications of international economics, but the majority are acutely conscious of economic realities at home. Perhaps most important is the growing divide between the richest 20 percent of the American population and the other 80 percent. The latter have had a stagnant or declining standard of living since the early 1970s. For the so-called working poor, working class and

lower middle class, life has become increasingly difficult, even grim. Their understandable economic discontent is beginning to translate into social and political difficulties for the entire country. Our political system, our domestic racial and ethnic relations, our foreign and national-security policies, and our outlook on the world have been shaped by the ever-rising prosperity that most Americans have enjoyed since the founding of our republic. There have been exceptions, of course. But even the Great Depression lasted only 10 years. American history has had no precedent of a prolonged income stagnation or reduction stretching more than 25 years.

How long can this continue until social and political pathologies even worse than those we have been witnessing begin to convulse the U.S.? What political form might the economic and social miseries of the majority of American citizens assume? Unless the average American soon begins to enjoy



Photo by Terry Mitchell

*U.S. forces conduct a patrol in Somalia. American economic problems and reduced military budgets could lead to a policy of isolationism that would make operations such as the one in Somalia less likely.*

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real improvement in his or her standard of living, the unhappiness produced by prolonged economic stasis or decline will begin to affect our political system in unhealthy ways. We could witness far worse demagogues than we have seen before. And demagogues have a poor record of keeping the peace — at home or abroad. Conversely, we might see the return to isolationism and protectionism as an apparent solution to our economic problems.

### **Technology's effects**

Technology is transforming our lives at an increasingly rapid rate. Our personal lives have

***The outlines of the past — those of centuries ago and those of the last 100 years — indicate that the notion that we are entering an information-based RMA whose basic concepts are within the grasp of the U.S. military is dangerously wrong-headed.***

been improved and disturbed by the electronic devices that have become commonplace in our homes. Appliances invented to make our lives easier and to increase the pleasure of our leisure time seem paradoxically to be adding to our anxiety. In particular, television has come to rule our lives in a way that people in our grandparents' day would have found astonishing. Fewer and fewer of us seem to read or to think. Instead, we are passively bombarded by the frightening facts and fictions projected electronically into our homes. Objectively, we are far more secure since the collapse of the Soviet empire, but many of us feel more vulnerable as we witness turmoil and distress in

much of the world around us.

Our fears have been augmented by intensified economic competition between domestic businesses and between American and foreign companies. Here, too, we have turned to technology for help, but the technology that was supposed to have increased productivity, incomes and the numbers of jobs has often done the opposite. This is not meant to read like a diatribe by the Unabomber, but the pressures of the unprecedentedly rapid change caused by technology do appear to be having seriously negative influences on American society. Increasing cases of obesi-

ty, alcoholism, drug abuse, depression and hypertension are some of the results.

### **Force reductions**

These influences on American society pose a number of likely consequences for our military. The dangers the U.S. may face in 15-20 years are invisible to most Americans. On the other hand, current problems are not. Given the need to reduce the national debt and to live within our national income, the resulting pressures on social and welfare programs at a time when many Americans are in distress, the absence of a major military threat, and the sense of military security brought about by the end of the Cold War and our victo-

ry in the Gulf War, another round of reductions in defense spending and force levels — possibly more than one — is likely.

Already, Americans who can hardly be described as enemies of the U.S. armed forces are privately advocating such cuts. Richard Perle has created a bipartisan group (including Richard Cheney, retired Admiral William Owens and James Woolsey) that will soon call for a modest reduction in defense spending and a less modest reduction in the size of the armed forces. If the group's recommendations were accepted, the U.S. military would drop to 1.2 million men and women — and the U.S. Army to 400,000 or so — over the next five years. The money saved as a result of personnel cuts would be devoted to acquiring the fantastic but expensive equipment associated with the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA, based on the concept of information-based warfare. Without discussing the details of the proposal, let's consider the notion of the RMA and how the concept relates to our concerns.

Let us, like the Greeks, look in front of us in order to peer into the past, before we back into the future of the RMA. The outlines of the past — those of centuries ago and those of the last 100 years — indicate that the notion that we are entering an information-based RMA whose basic concepts are within the grasp of the U.S. military is dangerously wrong-headed. First, let us consider the RMAs that most military historians agree occurred between the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the 20th century. While there is no complete agreement on such matters, the following list is

within the general historical consensus.

### 1350-1900

1. Mid-14th century to early 15th century: English-Welsh, Swiss and Burgundian infantry use long bows, pikes and compact tactical formations to end the 1,000-year dominance of armored cavalry. This helps bring about the collapse of the feudal system.

2. Mid-15th to mid-16th centuries: Sail-powered warships with broadside artillery deployed in line-ahead formations end the 2,000-year dominance of galleys. As a result, European explorers and conquerors dominate the world's coastal regions.

3. Early-to-mid-16th century: The introduction of the arquebus, field and siege artillery, regimental infantry formation and artillery fortress begins the age of gunpowder warfare. So armed, European armies defeat non-European armies in almost every instance.

4. Early to late 17th century: Linear infantry formations, lighter field artillery, the socket bayonet and Vauban fortresses lead to modern armies under bureaucratic control and allow creation of the modern sovereign state.

5. Mid-17th to mid-18th centuries: Improved navigation, ship-building and naval ordnance allow the development of world-ranging naval fleets and mercantile commerce, and the creation of modern capitalist colonial empires.

6. Late 18th century: The citizen soldier, levée en masse, mobile operations, skirmisher and column tactics, and army corps create modern land war and introduce ideology into war. Clausewitz observes these developments and conceives of war as the continuation of politics by violent means. Modern war is born.



Courtesy Special Warfare Museum

*The U.S. involvement in Vietnam was part of the "People's War" RMA that began in the 1930s and continued into the 1970s.*

7. Mid-to-late 19th century: Rifled repeating shoulder arms and artillery, shells, machine guns, railroads, telegraphy, improved explosives, barbed wire and food preservation, all based on industrial mass production, make it possible to create armies of unprecedented size and power, creating total war. Civilians again become acceptable targets of warfare. The defense gains the upper hand.

8. Mid-to-late 19th century: Coal-driven, steam-powered, all-steel armored warships, armed with turret-mounted, shell-firing rifled cannon; torpedoes and torpedo boats; reciprocating engines; and screw propellers combine to create "the Mahanian revolution" in naval warfare. Europeans acquire complete world dominance as a result.

Thus, over the course of some 550 years, there were eight RMAs.

### 1905-96

1. 1905-13: The all-big-gun dreadnought battleship, employing

indirect fire, gunnery control and ranging optics, increased main battery range, wireless communications and oil-burning turbine engines, sets off worldwide naval armaments race. War between Germany and Britain becomes highly likely.

2. 1910-18, 1935-43: Ocean-going submarines reintroduce the possibility of effective *guerre de course*. Britain is nearly defeated by such weapons in both world wars.

3. 1915-18: Indirect artillery fire, field telephones, wireless radios, tanks, motor vehicles, poison gas, submachine guns, hand grenades, trench mortars, infiltration tactics and new training techniques return advantage to the offensive in land warfare.

4. 1917-44: The development of long-range, heavy-load-bearing aircraft, incendiary bombs, navigation and aiming devices, aerial radar, combined with the ideas of Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell, leads to effective strategic bombing. Attacks on cities become routine.

5. 1917-42: Carrier-based naval

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aviation transforms warfare at sea. The U.S. is able to dominate the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.

6. 1925-44: Effective amphibious warfare and assault techniques allow massive invasions from the sea. As a result, the U.S. rises to pre-eminent world military and economic power.

7. 1933-43: Using World War I infantry tactical and operational methods supplemented by tanks, motor vehicles, close air support and wireless radio, the Germans develop the Blitzkrieg. The concept is adopted and improved by Soviets and Americans, who add modern artillery and base their systems on massive industrial production. After the defeat of Germany, U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Europe results.

8. 1930s-1970s. "People's War" allows colonial subjects and revolutionary forces with mass bases to overthrow European rule by defeating conventional armies through guerrilla warfare. Most of the Third World regains its independence, ending 400 years of European dominance; U.S. is defeated in Vietnam.

9. 1941-49: The U.S. and the USSR create nuclear weapons to be delivered by long-range bombers. The concept of nuclear deterrence takes a central place in the Cold War.

10. 1942-1960s: Strategic land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles, eventually tipped by nuclear warheads; high-performance jet aircraft; powerful modern computers; satellite reconnaissance; space-based global communications; and manned space missions lead to the concept of mutual assured destruction. Total war becomes virtually impossible.

11. 1950s-1980s: Nuclear-powered attack submarines, then nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines, transform naval and

strategic warfare.

12. 1970s-1990s: Precision-guided munitions; improved space systems; improved communications and navigation techniques; highly effective helicopters; improved artillery and support systems; improved air-ground cooperation; computers of great power and reduced size; silicon chips; new sensor systems; new operational ground-warfare concepts all lead to a "military technical revolution" and suggest a coming information and information-based RMA. U.S. achieves dominance in conventional warfare and gains world semi-hegemony.

***The technology that has emerged and that is emerging in these fields is and will be highly useful to the American military. ... But the present worship of information is mistaken because it confuses 'information' with knowledge and 'knowledge' with understanding.***

Thus, over the course of the past 90 years there have been 12 RMAs.

And yet today, we hear talk of the RMA, meaning the one in point 12. Considering the foregoing list, does it make sense to expect only one? The pattern of history points not to one but to several RMAs over the next two or three decades. Geometric increases in the rate of technological innovation, combined with truly revolutionary social, economic and political changes, may mean that RMAs will occur not over a century, as was the case in the late Middle Ages and during the

Renaissance, but possibly several times in a generation. Are we prepared for such stunning and continual changes in warfare?

Assuming we have the psychological and organizational ability to deal with such frequent seismic shifts in the way we make war, what might we expect over the next 20 to 30 years? Also, are the conjectures at all correct with regard to a current RMA based on information technologies?

Let's answer the second question first: The idea of an RMA based on information processing is profoundly wrong-headed. The technology that has emerged and that is emerging in these fields is and will be highly useful to the American military. We should try to maintain our lead in these areas and take full advantage of all the technological advances. But the present worship of information is mistaken because it confuses "information" with knowledge and "knowledge" with understanding.



### **Battlefield awareness**

For example, consider the concept of "dominant battlefield awareness." Let us concede, for argument's sake, that this RMA will provide the kind of information that its proponents contend that it will. Now let us gaze at the past in front of us and imagine that the losers of the battles of Cannae, Austerlitz and Chancellorsville had such information. What good would it have done them?

At Cannae in 216 B.C., Hannibal and his Carthaginian army of 40,000 not only defeated a Roman army of 60,000, they annihilated it. Virtually no Romans survived the battle: It was the greatest defeat in Roman history. Perhaps the most extraordinary feature of the battle is that the Roman consuls had complete information on Hannibal's


## The Battle of Cannae, 216 BC

- The Romans attack the Carthaginian center with a vastly superior force.
- Hannibal and his allies slowly withdraw, absorbing the Roman advance.



- Striking to the rear, the Carthaginian cavalry charges the flanks and rear of the Roman force.
- The Carthaginian infantry on the wings advances toward the approaching Romans.

- Advancing along the Roman flanks, the Carthaginian infantry, together with the cavalry, encircles the stalled Roman advance.
- With the Roman infantry surrounded, the Carthaginian cavalry pursues fleeing Roman cavalry.



peculiar convex battle formation.

The nature of ancient warfare required both sides to array on a flat field in full view of each other. The Roman commanders had time to carefully observe Hannibal's deployment and to note his strengths and the particular placement of his various units. They had what we call dominant battlefield awareness, as well as an army 50 percent larger and far better armed and equipped than Hannibal's. But the Roman army was slaughtered. Why? Because the Romans did not understand what they saw. They marched into a trap with their eyes wide open but with their minds baffled by the genius of one of the greatest tactical commanders of all time. Dominant battlefield awareness is useless against an enemy that knows what you expect and uses his understanding against you.

Let us now look at a part of the past that lies closer before us: the battlefield of Austerlitz, where on Dec. 2, 1805, Napoleon's outnumbered army faced a combined Austrian-Russian force. Thanks to their telescopes, the Austrian and Russian commanders were able to observe the French army even more carefully than the Roman consuls could observe their enemies at Cannae. But while the Austrians and Russians had all the information that one could gather, they did not understand the meaning of Napoleon's deployment.

Only when the French Imperial Guard smashed through the center of their lines did the Austrians and Russians begin to understand Napoleon's maneuver. At the end of that bitterly cold day, as the defeated emperors and their staffs were fleeing over the frozen swamp at the edge of the field, they finally

realized what had happened. But it was too late for the troops behind them: As the routed Austrian and Russian forces fell back in panic, the French gunners opened fire on the ice covering the swamp, plunging thousands of men to a miserable death. Even though he fought nearly 200 years ago, Bonaparte still has a great deal to teach us about the difference between information and understanding.

Finally, let's consider the events of May 1863 at Chancellorsville. "Fighting Joe" Hooker, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, had a great deal of information about his opponents, the Army of Northern Virginia. Hooker knew that he greatly out-

numbered the Confederates. He also knew that his forces occupied a favorable position. In fact, all of Hooker's information suggested that the only good option available to Robert E. Lee was to retreat. So when Hooker learned that Jackson's corps was passing in front of the Union army on the road that led to Richmond, he reasonably assumed that the Rebels had begun to withdraw. After all, why else would a badly outnumbered Lee divide his forces in the face of a superior foe?

Of course, we know that Jackson was not retreating. He and Lee had taken the psychological measure of Hooker. They guessed correctly that Hooker would mis-

understand the information he had about the Confederates. So Jackson's corps was in fact marching to strike Hooker's army on the flank. When the Confederates came whooping and hollering out of the woods, they caught Hooker and his whole army by surprise. The right flank of the Union army was driven in, and it was Hooker who retreated in disorder. So much for Hooker's dominant battlefield awareness.

### Human element

While information is essential to winning battles and wars, it is not enough. We must always keep in mind the human element — deception, surprise, uncertainty, fear, what Clausewitz calls "friction" and the "fog of war," and the cultural and psychological factors that separate our thinking from that of our enemy. Understanding the human element is what true military intelligence is all about. It is in this area that Army special-operations forces have an extremely important role to play in the future of war. Their specialized training, experiences, knowledge of foreign languages and cultures, and contacts with foreign militaries and peoples give SOF a critical understanding of the human element. It is SOF's responsibility to provide that intelligence to those American commanders who must truly understand their opponents. We cannot afford to suffer a Cannae or an Austerlitz.

The current worship of information and information-based warfare will cease only when the harsh reality of war shows how mistaken its proponents are. Until then, we must do our best to provide the understanding that information alone cannot give, and to constantly stress that people, not smoothly



*Information is essential to warfare, but true military intelligence requires an understanding of the human element.*

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functioning machines, make war.

My other question was “What other RMAs might we expect over the next 20-30 years?” Efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile technologies seem to be a distinct failure. Many mid-sized powers may acquire such weapons in a decade or so, and such arms could be widely available in 20-30 years. If this does happen, unless and until a truly impervious defense against ballistic missiles is devised, total war will be virtually impossible. Such a development would represent a true RMA, even though it would be based on 40-year-old technology. Any attempt to overthrow a nuclear-armed state — even by the use of purely conventional regular forces — would run the risk of prompting a nuclear exchange. Limited war, perhaps very limited, would be the only viable option for armed conflict between states.

### **SOF advantages**

In such warfare, special-operations forces could play a major role. Special Forces were created in the 1950s to engage Soviet-bloc forces in limited, unconventional war when total war was no longer feasible. In a world of many nuclear powers, Special Forces, along with Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs forces, would continue to offer some of the few safe options for the U.S. to battle its foes. While SOF cannot win wars on their own, they can provide a valuable force multiplier to conventional armed forces. In a security environment in which the U.S. may have few choices about how to wage war, such an advantage would be extremely useful.

Information technologies could produce an RMA, but one with effects that its proponents do not

anticipate. One effect might be a return to an age of defense-dominant warfare. If whatever moved could be observed, targeted, hit and destroyed, then our various weapons platforms would become obsolete. But without these platforms, how could the U.S. project large conventional forces overseas, with acceptable casualty levels?

How might we fight during such a period? If we retained our dominance in the military applications of space, we might be able to strike opponents from that dimension. But who would guide such weapons to their destinations and report on their effects? To some extent, this

***While SOF cannot win wars on their own, they can provide a valuable force multiplier to conventional armed forces. In a security environment in which the U.S. may have few choices about how to wage war, such an advantage would be extremely useful.***

could be performed by “national means of reconnaissance.” But such warfare also would present a major role for Special Forces. Small SF teams might be inserted overseas, and with their links to precision-strike and space systems, they could serve as forward observers on a strategic scale. Of course, in an age of platform vulnerability, we would have to invent new means of inserting such teams safely.

Another effect of information-technology developments might be an RMA in psychological warfare. Television is increasingly dominating world consciousness and could be used by PSYOP units against an enemy population. New broadcasting techniques, combined with advanced computer-generated video and audio, might be used to project black propaganda on a target audience’s televisions. Such propaganda might show leaders of a hostile gov-

ernment engaging in the most loathsome activities and making remarks about those foolish enough to fight and die for them. Especially in countries with state-controlled broadcasting, black-propaganda programs could have a devastating effect on morale.

The U.S. is party to treaties that ban such interference in foreign broadcasting, and U.S. statutes prohibit our government from engaging in some forms of information distortion, but wartime necessity could override such considerations. However, we could not broadcast invasive programs without first removing regular

enemy broadcasts from the air. Eliminating that enemy potential could be a task for Special Forces, in conjunction with PSYOP teams.

### **Ideological RMAs**

So far we have discussed RMAs in the context of technological innovation. But an RMA is not necessarily dependent upon technology. “People’s War,” one of the most important RMAs in the 20th century, was based on ideas, not on technology. It is not coincidental that two Chinese thinkers, Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, played a major role in developing that new form of warfare.

The French Revolution also unleashed an RMA based entirely on ideology. By replacing the idea that the French were subjects of the king with the idea that they were citizens, the revolution created the

concept of the citizen soldier. The citizen soldier did not fight as an unwilling conscript or as a mercenary. He went into combat as a politicized volunteer defending his homeland and his new rights, and spreading the revolution to his fellow Europeans enslaved by their tyrant kings.

The French government took advantage of these new ideas and of the huge population of France, then the largest country in Europe, with 25 million people. France built huge armies that totaled more than 1 million men. With large forces motivated by revolutionary zeal, French commanders could afford to use new tactics and to conduct new types of operations. From this came the RMA of the late 18th century, which we described previously as the birth of modern war.

Without fear of desertions, French armies could march or fight at night, deploy skirmishers and snipers, and send out scouts. French commanders, certain that their men would return after the enemy was routed, could send out their cavalry and light infantry in pursuit of fleeing enemies. French generals could hurl huge battering-ram columns against an enemy line without regard for casualties and with a full reliance on the élan of the assaulting infantry. These revolutionary warriors actually chanted “La Marseillaise” or “Ça Ira” as they marched into enemy fire.

This RMA, especially when wielded by Napoleon, broke the armies of the old regimes and conquered all of Europe. Only when the enemies of imperial France adopted similar methods of raising, motivating and deploying armies was Napoleon defeated.

## Democratic China

We might see another non-technological RMA in our lifetime,



Photo copyright American Databankers Corp.

*Many Chinese believe the countries that border China lie within its sphere of influence. A democratic and powerful China could prove to be a threat to its neighbors and to the U.S.*

and it could come from China. There are those who believe that if China does become a democratic country, it might also become a peaceful nation. A democratic China might prove instead to be a danger to its neighbors and even to the U.S. It would take a revolution for China to become a democracy, and out of that revolutionary upheaval a great military power might be born. A rich, militarily powerful and democratic China would not necessarily be peaceful.

How might China behave if the Chinese people were finally the masters of their own destinies and filled with a sense of immense pride at what they had accomplished? Already, observers note a tremendous increase in nationalist feeling among the mainlanders. Indeed, even those threatened by the upsurge in the power of the PRC (for example, the residents of Taiwan and Hong Kong) display enormous satisfaction with the return of China to the role of a great power.

For all Chinese, the last 150

years seem a shameful parenthesis in their nation's history. But that brief period in the 2,000-year history of united China has ended. The Chinese will no longer endure the humiliations or insults of the past. Today's Chinese, whether they live in Beijing, Taipei or Singapore, consider Tibet, Mongolia and all the countries on the borders of China to lie within the rightful Chinese sphere of influence. If these Chinese attitudes endure, a clash between Chinese interests and the interests of the Japanese, the Russians, the Indonesians and even the Americans may be inevitable.

The Chinese people could even pressure their own government into war to defend what they consider their rights or to advance their interests, as the American people pressured President James Madison in 1812. Some of the issues over which the Chinese continue to nurture resentments or feel injured pride include reunification with Taiwan; access to oil in the South China Sea;

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political predominance in Indochina or Korea; showing the Indians who is the real master in Asia; and taking back from Russia the territories the Czars extorted from the Chinese emperors in the 19th century. (We, too, would sense deep national outrage if we had been subjected to the kinds of injustices suffered by the Chinese people over the last 200 years.)

### **Dynamic force**

In any case, a country of 1.2 to 1.4 billion people, enriched by a modern economy and strengthened by access to the latest technology — and we may very well see such a China in 20 years or less — might prove as dynamic a force as the France of the 1790s. Such a China might draw upon the genius of its people to devise revolutionary tactical and operational approaches to war. Such a China could build armed forces large enough to endure casualties of enormous magnitude by American standards. It is doubtful that Russia, Japan, India or Indonesia could stand up to such a power, and any of these countries might turn to the U.S. for protection. If we sensed our interests threatened, we might find ourselves in a confrontation, perhaps a war, with a democratic but very aggressive China.

In such a case, the U.S. Special Forces might be called upon to foster insurgency in Tibet, Sinkiang or Inner Mongolia; to train guerrilla resistance fighters in Southeast Asia (again), Central Asia or Siberia; to gather intelligence inside China; or to conduct sabotage against Chinese forces throughout Eurasia. There are few precedents for such operations by U.S. forces. (The U.S. Office of Strategic Services operated fairly successfully in China against the Japanese in World War II. The

CIA carried out insurgency operations in Tibet in the 1950s, but with very little success. It might be wise to study and learn as much as we can from these experiences.) Such operations take place in extremely forbidding terrain; they would also require knowledge of languages quite remote to us. We should begin studying Nepali, Mongolian and Mandarin now — not when a crisis breaks in 10-15 years.

Another motivation for studying the attitudes, languages and history of East Asia is that Americans have a poor record of anticipating strategic events in that

***We could see as many as three or four RMAs over the next several decades, but they may be produced by other countries. ... In many ways, they could offer SOF even greater challenges than U.S.-developed RMAs would: Waging war from a position of technological inferiority requires a greater emphasis on the human element in war. That human emphasis is a SOF forte.***

region. Consider Pearl Harbor, the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the crossing of the Yalu by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Sino-Soviet split, the Tet offensive and a host of smaller shocks. We cannot afford to continue being taken by surprise in East Asia. Reorienting SOF to concentrate on that region could help us anticipate events there.

Even if these apocalyptic scenarios never take place, it seems reasonable that East Asia will be the focus of American security concerns over the next few decades. Knowledge of its languages and cultures will likely be essential for SOF success. It also seems wise for the Army to recruit Americans of ethnic East Asian extraction into

special operations. As we have learned from our experiences in Korea and in Vietnam, it is quite difficult for European Americans or African Americans to go unnoticed in East Asia. The presence of larger numbers of Asian Americans in SOF could prove a valuable national asset in coming decades.

### **Popular support**

We have discussed the possible consequences of different RMAs, but let's return to the question of specific RMAs that may or may not emerge in light of American domestic concerns. Whatever

valid reasons exist for us to pursue radically new methods of conducting war, we will not be able to do so without the support of the American people. They will have to pay the taxes to support the cost of such developments. But before they will be willing to do so, they will have to be convinced that a threat exists.

Furthermore, the nation's leadership will have to formulate a strategy for dealing with the threat. And finally, the military will have to develop the strategy and the operational concepts to put the products of an RMA to effective use. There is no reason to believe that all of these steps will occur. Propo-

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nents of what is called the RMA seem to think that technological feasibility alone will lead to the RMA's development, but they overlook the fact that an RMA will require a political and a strategic basis. Whether both these elements will fall into place remains to be seen.

We could see as many as three or four RMAs over the next several decades, but they may be produced by other countries. Obviously, as was the case with the German development of the Blitzkrieg, the early Russian lead in space or the Maoist challenge of "People's War," these RMAs could present the U.S. with enormous dangers. In many ways, they could offer SOF even greater challenges than U.S.-developed RMAs would: Waging war from a position of technological inferiority requires a greater emphasis on the human element in war. That human emphasis is a SOF forte.

## Implications

In summary, what are the implications for SOF? In the short run, say in the next 10 years or so, we may have to place more emphasis on people-to-people activities; training for low-intensity-conflicts; and dealing with humanitarian emergencies in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Central Asia and possibly the Pacific Islands. But during this same period, we must not lose sight of a danger looming beyond: possible confrontation with a peer competitor beginning about 2010. If such a threat should arise, it might be in the form of a powerful, expansionist China.

SOF must begin now to stress the learning of east- and central-Asian languages, preparing to operate in such miserable terrain as that of the Gobi Desert, the Tibetan Plateau, the Pamirs and the

Burmese jungle. Because of the increasing urbanization of the world population, SOF should prepare for extensive urban combat and non-combat operations, both for the near term and for the long term.

We must seriously consider that we might have to fight from a position of technological inferiority, at least in regard to some aspects of warfare. We should study the circumstances under which forces with low levels of military technology have defeated technologically superior forces. We could learn much by analyzing the war in Vietnam from the enemy's perspective. But, above all, we should realize that such an approach to warfare runs counter to our military heritage and cannot be mastered quickly by Americans — it is a process that requires decades of study, training and experience. Nevertheless, it is clearly a type of warfare at which Special Forces might excel.

PSYOP units should be prepared for the possibility of American forces becoming targets of sophisticated PSYOP. Although we are used to engaging in such warfare, we are not so well-prepared to counter PSYOP when it is aimed at our own forces.

Finally, a few parting warnings:

- Prepare for change that takes place at unprecedented speed — the economic growth of other countries, the emergence of a peer competitor, technological developments;
- Emphasize thinking, imagination and creativity as well as SOF's traditional excellence in combat skills and physical fitness;
- Expect to deal with an ongoing series of RMAs;
- Study China, learn its strengths and weaknesses. Hope for the best, prepare for the worst.

As Americans, we hold the view that we are the best, the most pow-

erful and the richest. But the Chinese have also enjoyed all those attributes — and for more than 1,000 years. China was a civilized country when all of our European, African and Middle Eastern ancestors were wholly illiterate. The Chinese believe that a hierarchical relationship between China and other countries is the natural order of things. They expect a return to that order. But when Americans and Chinese think of themselves as rightfully number one, we can expect a collision. Let us do our best to be prepared. ✂

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# A New Approach to Latin America: The Role of SOF

*by Ambassador David Passage*

The end of the East-West confrontation — the defining characteristic of the Cold War — has particular meaning for the relationship between the United States and its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

In Europe, in the southern-tier countries of the Middle East and south Asia, in Southeast Asia and in the northwest Pacific, the challenge posed by an expansionist Soviet Union and its former ally, the People's Republic of China, was sufficient to warrant a series of regional mutual security arrangements. Hence, the cre-

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This article discusses issues in Latin America and possible SOF roles in protecting U.S. interests. Views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect policies of the U.S. government, the Department of State or the Department of Defense. The article was originally presented at a conference hosted by Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Papers from that conference have been collected and published by the Fletcher School and USSOCOM as *Roles and Missions of Special Operations Forces in the Aftermath of the Cold War*. — Editor

ation of NATO; the Baghdad Pact (renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, in 1956); the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO; the bilateral security agreements that the U.S. has with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan; and the Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty, or ANZUS.

NATO, the strongest of these, bound its members to regard "an attack on one [as] an attack on all." In the event of an attack on one member, the other members were pledged, by treaty, to respond. The CENTO and SEATO treaties required "consultation" and agreement on appropriate responses; the bilateral arrangements with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan varied, but the guiding principle was that the U.S. and each of the other signatories regarded the Soviet and communist Chinese menace to be sufficiently direct and grave as to almost certainly require an armed response.

In the Western Hemisphere, the Rio Treaty, signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, addressed the same issues. However, the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between the Soviet

Union and countries in the Western Hemisphere south of the U.S. seemed sufficiently remote so as not to require the organizational apparatus of the other mutual security agreements. Consultations, accompanied by steps that members could take in concert with each other (to the extent that individual national interests so dictated), were agreed to be sufficient.

Although the Rio Treaty's consultative processes were exercised from time to time in response to various perceived threats, Cuba was the only country in the Western Hemisphere to fall under Moscow's sway. However, Cuba's alignment with the Soviet Union occurred under circumstances that didn't lend themselves to the consultative and reactive processes envisioned by the Rio Treaty.

For unlike Eastern European countries that fell to a combination of political, economic and military pressure from the USSR, Caribbean, Central and South American countries did not receive direct external military pressure from the Soviet Union. The greatest threat to stability in this hemisphere was internal

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upheaval: popular reactions against self-centered ruling oligarchies that had no interest in improving the economic conditions and political participation of the campesinos and the working classes. Revolutionary pressures in this hemisphere were occasionally aided and abetted by the Soviet Union and its allies and proxies. But the conclusion drawn from any objective review of the past 50 years in the Western Hemisphere would be that the Soviet Union did not instigate a successful communist revolution anywhere in this region (including Cuba). In fact, every

peace (although numerous bilateral irritants and border squabbles remain). Rivalries between the larger regional powers are subsiding rather than growing, and traditional historical tensions and problems between some of the smaller countries are being dealt with through diplomatic means. Even armed clashes along disputed borders (e.g., the current spat between Ecuador and Peru) seldom last more than a few weeks before the parties begin negotiations. Particularly important for stability in the southern-cone countries is the movement by Argentina and

worst, they offer palliatives with no apparent intention of implementing the serious, even radical, changes that are needed in political, economic and social governance.

And while the potential targets of these upheavals are Latin America's reactionary (albeit civilian and ostensibly "democratic") governments, the ultimate likely victim is the U.S., to whom the dispossessed in Latin America turn for support or, ultimately, for refuge.

That is why the U.S. had no choice but to intervene in Haiti. The U.S. has no intrinsic strategic, economic or political interest in that tortured country. But when internal circumstances so threaten our southern neighbors that a significant percentage of their people feel their only alternative is to try to reach our shores, the U.S. has no option but to act.

The intervention in Haiti was not a course of action from which the U.S. should have shrunk (as it did for almost two years while our economic embargo increasingly impoverished an already-crippled people and their economy). Nor should the U.S. feel defensive about having intervened, with or without U.N. Security Council resolutions or "other flags" willing to join us. The U.S. should, in fact, emphasize in its policy pronouncements what it represents: As Latin America heads toward the next century, the U.S. should place Latin American governments and the ruling structures of Latin American countries on notice that if their refusal to confront the need for change in their own societies results in their problems arriving on our shores, the U.S. may conclude that it has to intervene. In fact, public pressure in the

***Although the specter of an externally supported military threat is absent, and democratic governments are theoretically in charge in every country in the hemisphere but one, many of the underlying factors that foment instability ... are not only still with us, they are increasing.***

upheaval in the Western Hemisphere has been an unmistakable and undeniable reaction to home-grown causes.

### **Prevailing circumstances**

With the end of the Cold War, what circumstances prevail as the troubled countries of Latin America approach the dawn of the next century?

First, no credible external threat exists to regional peace. Whatever Cuba may be or might have been, it is not now a threat that necessitates conventional security or military measures. Furthermore, it is not likely to become one in the future.

Second, we have a hemisphere without the threat of serious armed conflict between states capable of upsetting the wider

Brazil to dismantle their nuclear-weapons development programs.

And third, the Western Hemisphere is populated by democratically elected, civilian-run governments, void of military dictatorships (except for Cuba).

If all of these observations are encouraging, we need to look again. Although the specter of an externally supported military threat is absent, and democratic governments are theoretically in charge in every country in the hemisphere but one, many of the underlying factors that foment instability (including bloody, violent, revolutionary upheavals) are not only still with us, they are increasing. Moreover, the responses of the democratic civilian governments to these problems are not encouraging. At best, they are inadequate; at

U.S. would likely force any American administration to do so.

### Root of the problem

Although all countries in the Western Hemisphere, including the U.S., can be described as being governed by “elites” (even a populist like the late Huey Long or a determined democrat like President Harry Truman is still, by definition, part of an elite rul-

that burst into open flame in Chiapas only two years ago, to the Sendero Luminoso insurgency in Peru, to internal insurrections of various sizes and dimensions in Guatemala, Colombia and Bolivia, and potential problems in other countries — is enough for us to conclude that true democracy and economic prosperity haven't yet gained a foothold. When we proudly note that every

tant popular protests against them, denial will be insufficient to get us through the next several decades.

The information revolution that has taken TV into the remotest village in the Andes (and even into the valleys of central Haiti) means that Marshall McLuhan's “global village” is upon us. The campesino (however he is defined, whatever he is called) knows, as he never did before, what he and his family are missing. Although the streets of Los Angeles, Miami, New York, or Washington, D.C., may be more strewn with garbage than paved with gold, try explaining that to the campesino who has given up hope for meaningful change in his own government and society. His despair will ultimately lead to his departure.

Virtually uniformly within the Western Hemisphere, campesinos and laborers are aware that the U.S. is unwilling or unable to enforce its own immigration laws — a circumstance that is expected to persist for the foreseeable future. If the dispossessed are given the following choices — to continue to endure deprivations and indignities; to experience violent revolution; or to seek to remove oneself and one's family from an unsatisfactory environment — they will quite likely select the third option. (INS, please take note.)

### Democratic phenomenon

Democracy, notwithstanding American expressions of belief to the contrary, is not for everyone: It is mostly a middle-class phenomenon; its principal beneficiary is the middle class.

Democracy is not for the rich. Typically, the rich are asked to bear the cost of social and eco-



Photo by Alexander C. Hicks Jr.

*The refusal of Latin American countries to confront the need for change in their own societies can result in their problems arriving on U.S. shores.*

ing stratum), the segment of society that controls governments in most countries in the developing world is far narrower than that same segment of society in industrialized democracies. Indeed, many of the countries in this hemisphere to the south of the U.S. have very small ruling elites — ones that have historically been, and largely remain, resistant to pressures for change emanating from the dispossessed within their own societies.

A simple survey of the hemisphere — from the wake-up call

country in the hemisphere (except, of course, our permanent *bête noire*) is a “democracy,” what we see is a paper-thin veneer created by the semblance of a popularly elected government chosen through elections contested for the most part by traditional entrenched elites from a narrow spectrum within the body politic. Elections alone do not democracies make; we ignore this dictum at our peril.

And while in recent years one could plausibly have dismissed these discrepancies between fact and fiction, along with the resul-



Photo by Alejandro Cabello

*Haitians at a garbage dump in Port-au-Prince. Even under the best of circumstances, Haiti will still be the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere 20 years from now.*

conomic programs for the poor, who seek to dethrone the rich.

Nor is democracy, as a political, social and economic system, especially attractive to the poor. The people at the bottom of the socioeconomic stratum frequently see democracy as a diversion perpetrated against them by others seeking to perpetuate the status quo — in other words, a distraction from their real needs, which are food for their families, jobs, housing, education and medical care.

When one lives at the bare subsistence level yet sees how the upper classes live, one's interests can be easily attracted to revolutionary efforts to seize power — not because of any attraction to the principles of democracy, but simply because of the chance to radically alter the status quo.

Democracy will appeal to the poor only when it demonstrates the likelihood of improving their wretched conditions — and within a reasonable length of time. But even in the best-case sce-

nario, democracy offers hope for betterment only in the long term. Democracy may be a viable political process, provided the campesinos and the laborer classes haven't yet given up on their countries. But once internal economic, social and political conditions have reached the boiling point, democracy isn't particularly attractive.

Consider the situation in Haiti: Even under the best of circumstances, Haiti will still be the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere 20 years from now. It will still have the lowest per capita income, the greatest spread between the rich and the poor, the fewest number of telephones per head, the fewest number of paved roads per square kilometer, the smallest daily caloric intake per head, and so on. So what does "democracy" mean to the common people of Haiti? We know that the return of Aristide meant a great deal to the Haitians, and many of them felt that his return to leadership would end the bestiality

inflicted upon them by the former thugs in charge of the military and police forces. However, Aristide had the task of providing the more tangible fruits of democracy: jobs, housing, education, and medical care. Will Haitians wait for the supposed fruits of democracy to catch up with their reality? My intent here is not to belittle democracy. It is simply to say that democratization is a long-term process, with only long-term practical prospects.

### **Guilt by association**

The unfortunate reality in the Western Hemisphere is that while the U.S. may represent hope to those aspiring to reap the benefits of democracy and economic development, we remain, in their eyes, largely associated with the ruling elites who have resolutely prevented the poor from making progress toward their sought-after goals.

The reasons are historical. At the political level, elites have traditionally controlled governments and politics in their own countries (especially where we have helped install them). Thus they are the ones with whom we have always dealt.

At the economic and commercial levels, we have always conducted business with the elites. They have the franchises and the distributorships for U.S. goods and services. They speak English; they take their vacations in the U.S.; they shop here; they send their children here to be educated; they keep their money in U.S. banks; and they purchase retirement condos here. They think and talk the language of capitalism. And for the benefit of U.S. companies that conduct business with them, their governments have enacted few of the curbs,

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restraints, regulatory legislations and other restrictions that have cluttered the economic and commercial landscape in the U.S. and Western Europe. These elites, however, don't think much of democracy, especially if it threatens their lifestyle and their vast wealth and land holdings.

For the past two centuries, the threat to the U.S. from countries south of its borders has been perceived by Americans as being "extra-hemispheric encroachment," or trouble-making from without. For the next quarter century, the problem the U.S. will face is the disparity between what the populations living to the south of us perceive they can gain by coming here, and what they think they may have to endure if they remain in their own countries. The challenge for the U.S. is to help these countries effect the desperately needed changes (especially economic progress) in time to stave off violent revolution or massive migratory movements toward our borders.

### **SOF roles**

Much more could be said about social, economic and political reform, but this article is not a political, social or economic analysis. It is an attempt to identify some areas where U.S. SOF might be useful in helping our southern neighbors bring about change in their own societies, including their military institutions. The foregoing analysis is intended to clarify fundamental issues and to set the stage for a discussion of possible courses of action.

If one had to identify the most important near-term need for continued development of democracy and economic progress south of the Rio Grande, the response

would have to be honest government, as free as possible of graft and corruption. Citizens, particularly those from the lower classes, expect their authorities to address the economic problems of their societies. They also expect to be treated with a modicum of decency and respect for their human, civil and political rights.

Without replowing already well-furrowed ground, we might point out one incontestable fact regarding the U.S. effort to bolster a South Vietnamese government in the 1960s and early

***For the next quarter century, the problem the U.S. will face is the disparity between what the populations living to the south of us perceive they can gain by coming here, and what they think they may have to endure if they remain in their own countries.***

1970s: Of the many governments in Saigon during that epoch, not one could honestly have been said to enjoy the active support of the majority of its own people. The same could be said about the imperial government of the late Shah of Iran as well as other governments the U.S. has supported. A sine qua non for the defense of any government is that it must garner the active support of the majority of its people.

This is where SOF can be particularly useful, for in addition to the broader processes of inter-

nal change, there are several specific areas in which SOF can contribute:

- Training police forces to be competent, respectable and respected. In the countries and islands of Central and South America and the Caribbean, there is, arguably, no greater need than for honest and competent law enforcement and government administration.

Unlike the U.S., whose judicial system was founded upon Anglo-Saxon common law, most of the countries of Latin America (though not of the English-speaking Caribbean) base their legal systems on "code law," stemming from the Napoleonic era. A corollary is that virtually all Latin American countries have national police forces who are typically under the direction of (and sometimes under the control of) military officers who often are under the authority of defense ministries. Even when the police answer to a minister of the interior, the latter is not infrequently a military officer.

The U.S., on the other hand, does not have a national police force or a national police system (nor does it permit its military forces to perform domestic law-enforcement functions). There are strong and deliberate, although possibly archaic, legislative prohibitions against U.S. military personnel training foreign police forces. U.S. civilian agencies, such as the Agency for International Development, are also under legal proscriptions against helping to train Latin American police forces. But while the U.S. is legislatively incapable of assisting its southern neighbors in building responsive and civilly responsible national law-enforcement services, the U.S. military has legislative authority to train

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Latin American militaries in tactics and techniques that they can employ in their own countries. Our government would never permit U.S. military forces to employ the same tactics and techniques in this country. It is time to ask whether the U.S. should continue to encourage the use of Latin American military forces as domestic internal law-enforcement agents, to the exclusion or the diminution of civil police forces.

If the U.S. hopes to help its southern neighbors accelerate the process of democratic internal reform, it should make a vastly

***The U.S. Army's Special Forces, having been selected through a rigorous screening process, extensively exposed to and trained to deal with foreign cultures, required to learn foreign languages, and indoctrinated to respect human and civil rights, are ideally equipped to provide police training.***

greater effort to help Latin American countries conduct training programs aimed at raising their police forces' minimal standards of honesty, decency and competence. To accomplish this, the U.S. should remove the legislative prohibitions and other restraints that prevent it from helping Latin American democracies improve their police forces.

U.S. SOF would make excellent trainers for Latin American police forces. The U.S. Army's Special Forces, having been selected through a rigorous screening process, extensively exposed to and trained to deal with foreign cultures, required to learn foreign languages, and indoctrinated to respect human and civil rights, are ideally

equipped to provide police training, something no other U.S. national governmental institution is capable of doing. The relatively recently established International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, composed largely of short-term contract personnel who have no permanent corporate memory or competence, is simply an ad hoc means of offering assistance to specific countries that U.S. policy-makers have determined merit such help.

The fundamental skills, techniques and principles that SOF could teach the police forces are

precisely the ones so lacking in the Latin American countries: collection and assessment of information; valid and acceptable interrogation techniques designed to elicit information from human sources; methods of persuading citizens to cooperate by convincing them that their own interests lie in helping the police to bring criminal elements under control; and proper respect for human and civil rights.

• Border protection/countering smuggling. Latin American borders are truly permeable; no one is hemmed in who doesn't wish to be. The illegal cross-border activity of greatest concern to Latin America is the smuggling of arms, ammunition, contraband and narcotics. Virtually every

study of Latin American police and military forces points up the absence of proactive patrolling as well as the need for better equipment and training. SOF are proficient in teaching the specialized techniques necessary for a nation to control its own borders and to prevent encroachments: night operations, the use of stealth, small-unit patrols, close-quarters combat, and the use of technically sophisticated equipment such as night-vision devices and appropriate intelligence-gathering equipment.

• Riverine and coastal patrol. The U.S. should encourage Latin America to forgo blue-water navies and to seek effective coastal and riverine patrol forces. The Argentine navy's heavy cruiser, *Almirante Belgrano*, which was sunk during the Falklands War, was World War I vintage. Had Argentina not had a blue-water navy with heavy surface and undersea combatants, it might not have been tempted to deal with the Falklands/Malvinas issue by force, to its regret.

In most South American countries, naval forces are ill-equipped for the threats they face. In a world of unconstrained resources, aircraft carriers might be a valuable asset to South America's maritime nations. But resources aren't unconstrained, and issues of national pride and naval tradition often handicap attempts to acquire more practical forces. The U.S. is planning to replace its Vietnam-era riverine craft with newer and more modern rigid-hull inflatable craft. These craft, powered by inexpensive and easy-to-maintain outboard motors, and durably constructed for use in shallow rivers and estuaries, would be ideal for the anti-smuggling patrols that Latin American countries should

be conducting to protect their borders. SOF are ideally trained and equipped to help our neighbors in this effort.

• Aviation. In much the same way that they have insufficiently equipped their navies, Latin American countries have traditionally laden their air forces with second-hand, visibly aging and, frequently, only marginally airworthy fighter and bomber aircraft whose purchase price they can ill afford and whose operation and maintenance they cannot sustain. These aircraft are useful mainly for independence-day flypasts. In conjunction with developing more functional police and military forces targeted at legitimate objectives, such as performing border patrols and combating smuggling and narcotics traffickers, Latin American countries should focus on acquiring mobility and transport aircraft that can be used in nation-building, in civil-engineering projects and in border patrols. Helicopters, light observation aircraft and utility transports would prove more useful than the squadrons of elderly Buccaneers, Skyhawks, Mirage IIIs, F-5s and other aircraft of similar vintage that Latin American countries are using to counter the threats they face.

• Civil Affairs, civil engineering and information activities. If Latin American military forces hope to change the image they evoke in the minds of their own

citizens, they will have to begin by proving their relevance to the needs of their own societies. There is much these military forces could do by way of nation-building that would help them establish rapport with the people, whom they urgently need to support military and police counter-smuggling efforts and, potentially, to combat insurgencies. Military forces could also form or enhance engineering brigades to construct or maintain secondary roads; to build rudimentary culverts, drainage systems and small bridges; to dig wells; to con-

struct or improve sanitation systems; to erect village clinics and other civil and civic facilities and infrastructure. If these efforts are successful, the Latin American military forces could improve their standing with the people and perhaps form the basis for cooperation in strengthening national security. SOF forces are well-equipped to train Latin American military forces in nation-building skills, including vital information-dissemination activities.

• Counternarcotics activities. No discussion of contemporary U.S. relations with Latin America would be complete without touching on the issue of counternarcotics activities, the “war against drugs,” because it plays such a prominent, if unfortunate, role in the overall relationship.

At the outset, let this author say that he considers the policy of attempting to choke off the flow of drugs into the U.S. from the producer countries to be an utter and undiluted failure, and that any such effort is doomed to fail.

The vegetation that forms the starting point for cocaine and heroin can now be grown at virtually all elevations and in many climatic and topographic regions hitherto impossible. Given the relative ease of cultivation, production and transshipment, any effort to curb or squeeze production in one area leads more or less immediately to another area’s picking



Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt

*Honduran soldiers learn small-unit tactics under the guidance of Special Forces instructors.*

up the effort.

The test of the efficacy of the U.S. effort is not how many hectares of vegetation have been destroyed, how many barrels of chemicals have been poured into tributaries of the Amazon, how many kingpins have been arrested, how many financial transactions have been disrupted, or how many laboratories have been destroyed. The only valid test of a counterdrug strategy is its impact at the street-corner level in the U.S. And by any test or standard, drugs of choice have never been more freely available, cheaper in price, or purer and stronger in quality on that street corner. Daily, weekly, monthly or yearly variations in consumption in the U.S. are clearly and exclusively based on changes in consumer tastes and preferences, not on changes in supply and availability.

However, the U.S. remains officially committed to combating illicit narcotics production and trafficking. The point of this article is not to argue for a sensible national drug policy, but to suggest a potential SOF contribution to the execution of our chosen policy.

Although neither U.S. nor Latin American counternarcotics efforts have had any statistically significant impact on the availability of illicit narcotics in the U.S., these efforts have had some spillover effects that make them of limited value. We must expand our efforts to teach Latin America the importance of actively patrolling its countryside and national frontiers, the importance of intelligence-gathering (developing human sources and building technical systems for collecting and assessing information), and the importance of acquiring skills in the use of advanced technical equipment such as night-vision devices and



Photo by Mike Edrington

*The participation of U.S. forces in nation-building efforts, such as road-construction projects, helps countries in Latin America to improve their standard of living.*

other monitoring and communications equipment.

Latin American nations clearly are not in control of their own borders, of the airstrips within them, or of the aircraft in their national registry. Improving the monitoring of their airspace and developing a means of challenging aircraft which fly through it are some of the activities that Latin American countries should undertake in the name of their own national sovereignty. SOF forces could make a powerful contribution to these efforts, particularly in the training of Latin American law-enforcement, intelligence and military personnel in more effective information-gathering, assimilation, assessment and dissemination procedures.

### **Challenges, opportunities**

Despite a veneer of technological sophistication at top levels (both political and commercial) in many capitals throughout Latin America, many of this region's

societies, economies and political practices lie deeply mired in the semi-feudal attitudes of a century ago. At the level of popular consciousness, more Latin Americans are now aware of what they're missing; they are also aware that there are alternatives to the monotonous sameness and unresponsiveness of their governments. The fundamental issue increasingly at stake is that of the legitimacy of national governments in the region.

This would be a nice theoretical problem if not for the fact that if the U.S. does not increasingly press for economic, political and social change among our southern neighbors, increasing numbers of Latin American citizens will simply opt to vote with their feet. And by now, there should be no doubt as to which direction their feet will be pointed.

In the quest for those changes, American policy-makers possess a unique tool in U.S. SOF. More than a simple substitute for diminishing economic assistance,

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SOF can bolster a country's nation-building efforts using the country's own military forces, thereby salving the host country's national pride. This military cooperation is a symbiotic process that can benefit Latin American countries and provide a training spin-off for U.S. SOF. That training spin-off can be invaluable when the U.S. military is called upon to execute a national contingency (such as the intervention in Haiti) or to contribute to a multinational or international peacekeeping effort (such as that along the Ecuador-Peru border).

As the U.S. moves into the 21st century, one of its foremost challenges will be to assist its Latin American neighbors in breaking out of the political and social environment of the 18th. SOF will be an increasingly valuable resource in helping to meet that challenge. ✂

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# Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States: 10 Vital Questions

*by Louis René Beres*

Despite the steadily expanding literature on counterterrorism, little of real value has been produced for the benefit of policy-makers who must create the foundations of a strategy for dealing with nuclear terrorism.<sup>1</sup>

Like all other adversarial groups, terrorists acquire a repertoire of behavior according to the particular contingencies of reinforcement to which they are exposed. The task for policy-makers now is to understand this repertoire and to use it to inform pertinent preventive action.

In preparing for their task, policy-makers must understand that terror has an impact beyond its incidence. Terror has a distinct quality, a potentially decisive combination of venue and destructiveness, that must be analyzed and anticipated. Linked to a particular species of fear, this quality of terror represents a crucial variable in conceptualizing the war against terrorism.

Writing about the fear that arises from tragedy, Aristotle emphasized that such fear “demands a person who suffers undeservedly” and that the suffering must be felt by “one of ourselves.” This fear has little or nothing to do with our concern for an impending misfortune to others, but rather with our perceived resemblance to the vic-

tim: We feel terror on our own behalf.


Terror, in other words, is fear referred back to ourselves. Therefore, the quality of terror is at its highest point when fear is especially acute and when acute suffering is especially likely. What could possibly create more acute fear of probable victimization than the threat of nuclear terrorism?

Let us consider, in this connection, the qualitative difference between the bombing that occurred in Oklahoma City and the potential lethal irradiation of tens of thousands of Oklahomans, either by “small” nuclear explosions or by radiological contamination. Although it is certainly conceivable that higher-order nuclear destruction could prove to be counterproductive to the aims of the terrorists who would employ it, this does not necessarily suggest a corresponding reluctance on their part to undertake such an escalation. After all, if terrorists are strictly logical, they might not foresee such counterproductiveness, and if they are strictly “passionate,” they might not care.

The pain occasioned by terrorism, a pain that confers power upon the terrorist, begins within the private body and spills out into the body politic. Wanting the two realms to become indistinguishable, the terrorist generally understands that it is not enough that the victims feel pain. Rather, the pain must also be felt, vicariously but palpably, by all those who might still become victims in the future. The

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Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect policies of the Department of the Army or of the Department of Defense.



intent of terrorism is to change a prospective victim's general awareness that "All persons must die" to a more specific awareness that "I must die — and maybe soon." Resorting to more destructive forms of terrorism can increase the quality of terror and hasten this change. When the pain has its origins in nuclear explosives or radioactivity, it is apt to be "felt" with special intensity. Such a prospect should be taken very seriously in the United States.

To undertake acts of nuclear terror, insurgent groups would require access to nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants, or nuclear waste-storage facilities. Should such groups seek to manufacture their own nuclear weapons, they would require strategic special nuclear materials and the expertise to convert these materials into bombs or radiological weapons. Both requirements are well within the reach of certain terrorist organizations, especially since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

### 10 vital questions

Effective strategies for prevention of nuclear terror must be extrapolated from more generic strategies of counterterrorism. The development of these more general strategies is itself contingent upon a willingness and a capacity to ask the right questions.

Until we can understand the particular

terrorist stance on situational risk-taking and the vital differences between terrorist groups on this stance, we will not be able to identify a policy for the prevention and control of nuclear terrorism, nor will we be able to fashion an effective U.S. strategy to counter nuclear terrorism.<sup>2</sup> By asking 10 vital questions, scholars and policy-makers can achieve a fuller understanding of the risk calculations made by terrorist organizations and the factors most likely to affect those calculations.

1. Is there a particular ordering of preferences common to many or to all terrorist groups, or is there significant variation from one group to another? If it can be determined that many or all terrorist groups actually share a basic hierarchy of preferences, we can begin to shape a general strategy of operations to counter nuclear terrorism. Alternatively, if significant variations in preference orderings can be detected between terrorist groups, we will have to identify myriad strategies of an individually tailored nature, including the use of proactive measures, known in law as expressions of anticipatory self-defense.<sup>3</sup>

2. Are there particular preferences that tend to occupy the highest positions in the preference hierarchies of terrorist groups, and how might these preferences be effectively obstructed? In this connection, it is especially important to exam-

ine the widely held assumption that terrorists, like states and countries, are most anxious to avoid negative physical sanctions. In fact, large amounts of sophisticated conceptual analysis and experimental evidence now indicate that in certain circumstances, such sanctions are apt to be ineffective and may even prove counterproductive.

3. Would the obstruction of terrorist-group preferences prove offensive to some of our principal national values? We must be concerned about the possibility that effective measures to counter nuclear terrorism might be starkly injurious to social justice and civil liberties. The U.S. government and the American people must decide whether the anticipated benefits of antiterrorist legislation or activity would be great enough to outweigh the prospective costs.<sup>4</sup>

4. Would the implementation of effective measures to counter nuclear terrorism require special patterns of international cooperation,<sup>5</sup> and how might such patterns be created? In principle, the surest path to

success in averting nuclear terrorism against the U.S. lies in a unified opposition to terrorism by all states.<sup>6</sup> Yet for the foreseeable future, such opposition is assuredly not in the cards. We must therefore ask ourselves what cooperative patterns between particular states can help cope with the threat.<sup>7</sup>

5. Might the decisional calculi of terrorist groups be receptive to positive cues or sanctions, as opposed to negative ones, and which rewards seem to warrant serious consideration? This is a most sensitive question, as we don't wish to violate the long-standing peremptory<sup>8</sup> principle of law known formally as *Nullum crimen sine poena*, "No crime without a punishment."<sup>9</sup> At the same time, we should weigh the value of this principle<sup>10</sup> against that of saving lives, perhaps even tens of thousands of lives. It will not be an easy equilibrium to reach.

6. Are the risk calculations made by terrorist groups affected by their geographic dispersion and intermingling with other states, including those states friendly and

*Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, some Soviet war materials have become available to terrorist groups, including nuclear materials.*



Soviet Military Power

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those hostile to this country? Because terrorist groups do not occupy territory in the manner that states (countries) do, they are normally not susceptible to the usual threats of deterrence. How, then, might effective measures to counter nuclear terrorism be reconciled with the reality of terrorist geographic dispersion?

7. Are the risk calculations made by terrorist groups affected by their particular relations with host states? Because terrorist groups necessarily operate within the framework of states, the relationship between visitor and host will affect the viability of measures to counter nuclear terrorism. How, then, might our government exploit what is known about such relationships in curbing the threat of nuclear terrorism?

8. Are the risk calculations made by terrorist groups affected by their alignments with states or with other terrorist groups? How can we use what we know about these effects to devise a productive program to counter nuclear terrorism? The U.S. must pay special attention to prevailing alignments between radical Islamic groups and various Arab/Islamic states, and between radical Islamic groups themselves. Regarding inter-terrorist alignments in the Middle East, things are not always what they seem. The PLO and Hamas, for example, are not adversaries in any meaningful sense (this notion is a fiction surrounding the so-called Middle East Peace Process); they are distinct allies in all matters of consequence.<sup>11</sup>

9. Are the risk calculations made by terrorist groups affected by their patterns of random and suicidal violence? In asking this question, we acknowledge that terrorism is a crime of passion and of logic. We should also acknowledge that a terrorist group's orientation toward death can play a decisive role in the group's preferred form of operation.<sup>12</sup>

10. Are the risk calculations made by terrorist groups affected by the degree to which their policies evoke sympathy and support from others? Because almost all acts of terror are essentially propagandistic, we must seek to understand the terrorist's desired effects on selected publics in

order to prevent the escalation of terrorism to a nuclear option.<sup>13</sup>

### **Legal considerations**

Normally, questions relating to the prevention of domestic terrorism would be directed toward pertinent law-enforcement agencies. U.S. military forces conduct combat or conflict operations on foreign territory and in foreign air and sea space. Because civilian rule is at the heart of the U.S. government, there is a long-standing interest in limiting military involvement within the country. This interest has been expressed in

***U.S. military forces conduct combat or conflict operations on foreign territory and in foreign air and sea space. Because civilian rule is at the heart of the U.S. government, there is a long-standing interest in limiting military involvement within the country.***

the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, certain acts of Congress and certain decisions of the Supreme Court. It is essentially determined by law in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1385).

The literal meaning of the Latin term posse comitatus is "power or authority of the county." It brings to mind a body of persons summoned by a sheriff to help preserve the peace or to help enforce the law. These persons might be civilian or military. The Posse Comitatus Act provides: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

Yet five insurrection statutes comprise an important exception to the Posse Comitatus authority. Codified at 10 U.S.C., Secs. 331-35 (1988), the statutes authorize the president to provide military assistance to state governments upon request, or to use the armed forces or the federalized militia upon his own initiative to suppress any

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rebellion that makes it “impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States ... by ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” Sec. 333 also permits military intervention when the constitutional rights of any state’s citizens are threatened by insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy. Another exception to the Posse Comitatus authority is found in H.R.J. Res. 1292, Pub. L. No. 90-331, 82 Stat. 170 (1968), which directs federal

***One of SOF’s less obvious strengths is the ability to support domestic authorities. ... SOF could play an extremely important role in coordinated pre-emption operations here and abroad.***

agencies, including the Department of Defense, to assist the Secret Service in the performance of its protective duties.

In fact, the domestic use of armed forces has been a feature of our government since George Washington called out the militia in 1794 to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion. Express constitutional authority for such use is found in Article 1, Sec. 8, which states: “The Congress shall have the power ... to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” Additional authority is found in Article IV, Sec. 4, which imposes on the federal government the obligation to protect each state “against Invasion, and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” Authority is also found for the president in his Article II powers to faithfully execute the laws and to act as commander in chief of the armed forces.

There are, therefore, well-established bases in law for intranational military operations to counter nuclear terrorism. Indeed, the Department of Justice has stated that domestic use of military forces is unlikely “except in extreme cases of highly sophisticated, paramilitary terrorist operations” that lie beyond the capabilities of nonmilitary federal personnel.<sup>14</sup>

In an age of possible nuclear terrorism against the U.S., such cases may well be plausible.

### **SOF role**

What about a specific role for special-operations forces, or SOF, in preventing nuclear terrorism? In the U.S. military operations in foreign territories mentioned earlier, one of SOF’s missions is to conduct rear-area operations, to collect intelligence, and to conduct reconnaissance, including the identification of targets for subsequent attack. In the July 1995 issue of *Special Warfare*,<sup>15</sup> Christopher Lamb identified SOF’s strengths: unorthodox approaches; unconventional training and equipment; political context and implications; and special intelligence requirements.

Clearly, all of these strengths would have advantages, but one of SOF’s less obvious strengths is the ability to support domestic authorities.<sup>16</sup> At times, the lines between foreign and domestic operations may be blurred; for example, SOF could play an extremely important role in coordinated pre-emption operations here and abroad. (According to Lamb, the Secretary of Defense “has refused to rule out pre-emption as a counterproliferation option, and potential SOF missions in a pre-emption scenario would be most demanding.”)

During the 1970s and 1980s, NATO countries added counterterrorism to the missions of their special-operations forces. Although this addition resulted in various misgivings, given that terrorism is largely a criminal activity — and one that is generally believed more appropriately assigned to civilian police agencies — the prospect of chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism lent credibility to SOF’s participation in counterterrorism operations. Terrorism is expected to dominate a significant portion of the spectrum of conflict at least until the end of the millennium. It is a threat against which SOF operations could prove formidable and necessary (currently, such operations include inducement and support of resistance in conflict situations; intelligence collection and reconnais-

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sance; rescue operations; certain command, control and communications countermeasures; counterinsurgency; counterrevolution; and counterterrorism.

### Terrorist aims

In seeking answers to the 10 vital questions that have been presented, policy-makers should ask themselves an antecedent question: What does the terrorist hope to achieve? Here is a partial answer: Above all, the terrorist hopes to transform pain into power. That transformation is not always easy, as the correlation is not always proportionate. In some situations, it is possible that by inflicting the most excruciating and far-reaching pain (the sort of pain that would be generated by nuclear terrorism), terrorists could actually inhibit their power, while inflicting less overwhelming pain could enhance their power.

The terrorist who seeks to transform pain into power has already learned from the torturer. He understands that pain, in order to be purposeful, must point fixedly toward death but not actually result in death. This is not to suggest that terrorists do not sometimes seek to produce as many corpses as possible, but leaving witnesses — American witnesses, in our particular range of concern — is an essential part of the drama.

In the fashion of the torturer, the terrorist takes what is usually private and incommunicable, the pain contained within the boundaries of the sufferer's own body, and uses it to affect the behavior of others. A grotesque form of theater that draws political power from the depths of privacy, terrorism manipulates and amplifies pain within the individual's body to influence others living outside that body. Violating the inviolable, terrorism declares with unspeakable cruelty not only that no one is immune, but also that everyone's most private horror can be made public.

The terrorist and his victims experience pain and power as opposites. As the suffering of the victims grows, so does the power of the terrorist. And as the power of the terrorist grows, so does the pain of the victims. For the bystanders — and this includes all

Americans who are not directly involved in a particular terrorist attack — each infliction of pain represents a mock execution, a reminder of American vulnerability and a denial of absolute government power.<sup>17</sup>

There is one last point. Policy-makers should be aware that terrorists' selection of "quality" will be determined not only by the expected effects upon the victims but also by the expected effects upon the perpetrators. From the start, all terrorists have accepted the idea of violence as purposeful, in part because of its effect upon themselves.

"Violence," says Franz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*, "is a purifying force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from despair and inaction. It makes him fearless and restores his self-respect." Galvanized by what they have long described as a "battle of vengeance" (a term used frequently by Yassir Arafat's Fatah), terrorists have seen in their cowardly attacks not merely a way to influence victim populations, but also the Fanonian logic of "purifying" the victimizer. In the Middle East, the idea of purification has long been at the heart of Fatah doctrine and is now very much in fashion among Hamas activists. An early Fatah pamphlet, "The Revolution and Violence: The Road to Victory," informed the reader that violence serves not only to injure the opposition but, just as important, to "transform the revolutionary." It is, according to the pamphlet, "a healing medicine for all our people's diseases."

How much more "healing," we must ask, and how much better for the "self-respect" of the terrorists, if they kill thousands or even tens of thousands of civilian "enemies" rather than dozens? Such underlying queries must be kept carefully in mind as scholars and policy-makers attempt to answer the 10 vital questions. ✕

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rorism. His 1980 book, *Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat* (second edition, 1987), was the featured main selection of the Macmillan Library of Public and International Affairs. He has lectured on nuclear terrorism at the Nuclear Control Institute, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> See, however, Louis René Beres, "Confronting Nuclear Terrorism," *The Hastings International and Comparative Law Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Fall 1990, pp. 129-54; Louis René Beres, "The United States and Nuclear Terrorism in a Changing World: A Jurisprudential View," *Dickinson Journal of International Law*, Vol. 12, No. 2, Winter 1994, pp. 327-66; and Louis René Beres, "On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism," *Georgia Journal of International And Comparative Law*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1-36. For policy-oriented scholarship by this author, see Louis René Beres, "The Meaning of Terrorism — Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 28, No. 2, March 1995, pp. 239-49; and Louis René Beres, "The Meaning of Terrorism for the Military Commander," *Comparative Strategy: An International Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 3, July-September 1995, pp. 287-99. Here, counterterrorism is linked analytically to irregular warfare, which is sometimes called low-intensity conflict, or LIC, a term covering a broad area of military and nonmilitary operations below the level of conventional combat between regular military forces. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff include terrorism in their operational definition of LIC (U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1985).

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that such a strategy would be entirely consistent with the expectations of international law. From the standpoint of these particular expectations, any use of nuclear explosives or radiation by a terrorist group would represent a serious violation of the laws of war. These laws have now been brought to bear upon nonstate actors in world politics by Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and by the two protocols to the conventions. Protocol I makes the law concerning international conflicts applicable to conflicts fought for self-determination against alien occupation and against colonialist and racist regimes. A product of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts that ended on June 10, 1977, the protocol brings irregular forces within the full scope of the law of armed conflict. Protocol II, also additional to the Geneva Conventions, concerns protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Hence, this protocol applies to all armed conflicts that are not covered by Protocol I and that take place within the territory of a state between its armed forces and dissident armed forces.

<sup>3</sup> Such measures would be rooted jurisprudentially in the 1837 Caroline incident, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion in Upper Canada against British rule. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require actual attack. Military response to a threat could be judged permissible so long as the danger posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." See 2 J. Moore, *Digest Of International Law* (1906): pp. 409-14.

<sup>4</sup> This sort of decision is already current concerning controversy over the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995. See Calendar No. 102, 104th Congress, 1st Session, S. 735, U.S. Senate, April/May 1995.

<sup>5</sup> Such patterns, under the direction of international law, are enforceable in the domestic courts of individual states. In this connection, the U.S. has already reserved the right to enforce international law within its own courts. See U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8. Here, acknowledging the decentralized/Westphalian system of international law, the Constitution confers upon Congress the power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations."

<sup>6</sup> In principle, such unified opposition flows, inter alia, from the expectations of international law. Under the Supremacy Clause (Art. 6) of the U.S. Constitution, these expectations form part of the law of the U.S. This incorporation is reaffirmed and broadened by various U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See *The Paquete Habana*, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, 726 F. 2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir., 1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J. concurring) (dismissing the action, but making several references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses) (cert. denied, 470, U.S. 1003 (1985); *Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R.*, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C., 1985) (stating that the "concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant international standards has also been embodied in the principle of 'universal violations of international law'").

<sup>7</sup> A counterterrorism regime exists in international law, but this regime is decidedly unpromising for reasons of Realpolitik. For those who might be interested in the authoritative sources of criminalization under international law, see European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Done at Strasbourg, Nov. 10, 1976. Entered into force Aug. 4, 1978. *Europ. T.S.* No. 90, reprinted in 15 *I.L.M.* 1272 (1976).

<sup>8</sup> According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties: "A peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, Art. 53, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second Sessions, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968; and Apr. 9-May 22, 1969. U.N. Doc. A/CONF., 39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 *I.L.M.* 679 (1969).

<sup>9</sup> The earliest expressions of *Nullum crimen sine poena* can be found in the Code of Hammurabi (c.

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1728-1686 B.C.), the Laws of Eshnunna (c. 2000 B.C.), the even earlier Code of Ur-Nammu (c. 2100 B.C.) and, of course, the Lex Talionis or law of exact retaliation, presented in three separate passages of the Jewish Torah, or Biblical Pentateuch. At Nuremberg, the words used by the Court, "So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished," represented an emphatic contemporary reaffirmation of *Nullum crimen sine poena*.

<sup>10</sup> The generic imperative to punish crimes was reaffirmed at Principle I of the Nuremberg Principles (1946): "Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." This obligation applies especially to crimes of terrorism.

<sup>11</sup> According to the Egyptian daily, *Al-Ahram* (9/20/95), PLO and Hamas have concluded a number of understandings. Similarly, *Yediot Achronot*, an Israeli newspaper, reports (10/10/95) that PLO and Hamas are currently engaged in a variety of inter-Palestinian confidence-building measures.

<sup>12</sup> Consider, for example, a recent statement by Jamal Abdel Hamid Yussef, explaining operations of the *Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades*, military wing of Hamas, Gaza: "Our suicide operations are a message ... that our people love death. Our goal is to die for the sake of God, and if we live we want to humiliate Jews and trample on their necks." (Cited in published debate between Professor Louis René Beres and Maj. Gen. [IDF/Res.] Shlomo Gazit, "The Security and Future of Israel: An Exchange," *Midstream* June/July, 1995, p. 15). Combined with access to nuclear weapons, such an orientation to death must be examined closely.

<sup>13</sup> Public authorities must also seek to prevent terrorist escalation to other "higher-order" forms of violence in which chemical and/or biological weapons are used. Just as the prospect of nuclear terrorism is linked to the spread of nuclear weapons and technology among

states, so is the risk of chemical/biological terrorism linked, *inter alia*, to the spread of CBW weapons and technology among states. There already exists a regime of international treaties, declarations and agreements designed to control chemical and biological weapons. See Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Jan. 11, 1989, Department Of State Bulletin, March 1989, at 9, 28 I.L.M. 1020 (adopted by the Conference on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972), 26 U.S.T. 583, 111 I.L.M. 310 (entered into force Mar. 26, 1975); and Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 14 I.L.M. 49 (entered into force Feb. 8, 1928).

<sup>14</sup> See U.S. Department of Justice, *The Use of Military Force Under Federal Law to Deal with Civil Disorders and Domestic Violence* 28 (1980).

<sup>15</sup> See Christopher Lamb, "Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions," *Special Warfare*, July 1995, pp. 2-9.

<sup>16</sup> Lamb offers a contrary view arguing, "Any military organization, including SOF, that assumes a major role in support of domestic authorities risks its readiness to participate in other missions." (p. 6.)

<sup>17</sup> Over time, a government's lack of power to control terrorism can rob it of authority. This is because the very essence of any government's authority lies in its assurance of protection for the citizenry. "The obligation of subjects to the sovereign," says Thomas Hobbes in Chapter XXI of *Leviathan*, "is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them." The political philosophers Bodin and Leibniz expressed similar views. Where government can no longer provide security, it can no longer expect obedience.

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# A Wake for Clausewitz? Not Yet !

*by Major Antulio J. Echevarria II*

In October 1995, *Special Warfare* published a review essay by Steven Metz entitled, "A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare."<sup>1</sup> Echoing the opinions of John Keegan and Martin van Creveld, Metz argued that future war "will be fought not to pursue national interests, but to kill enemy leaders, to convert opponents to one's religion, to obtain booty, or, sometimes, for simple entertainment. Thus the core of Clausewitz's philosophy of war — that states wage wars using armies in pursuit of political objectives — will disappear."<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, other writers have maintained that nuclear weaponry, transnational constabulary warfare, counterterrorism, counternarcotrafficking and the increased compartmentalization of political and military leadership evident in modern states have rendered obsolete Clausewitz's definition of war as an act of policy, and with it his tripartite conception of war.<sup>3</sup> Still other authors argue that the value of Clausewitz's masterwork, *On War*, is diminished because of its failure to address war as a cultural phenomenon: It not only fails to

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This article is a continuation of a discussion of military doctrine that has included Steven Metz's "A Wake for Clausewitz," in the October 1995 issue of *Special Warfare*, and Lieutenant Colonel William Jacobs' "The Human Element of Battle," in the May 1996 issue. — Editor

explain why wars occur, it views war from only a single perspective, from within the Western nation-state paradigm.<sup>4</sup>

This essay will argue two points: 1) The above arguments are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what Clausewitz meant by politics; and 2) Despite the technological changes now under way as a result of the current revolution in military affairs, and those already in place because of the advent of nuclear weapons, Clausewitz's tripartite conception of war remains valid.

## **War and 'Politik'**

Clausewitz's description of war as a "continuation of politics (Politik) by other means" is well-known. Unfortunately, his description is interpreted to mean that war is merely an act of state policy brought forth to achieve a political aim. At least part of the confusion surrounding this misunderstanding stems from the ambiguity of the German term *Politik*, for it means both policy and politics. But Clausewitz also deserves some blame, for he neglected to define in simple language how he wanted this multivalent term to be understood. Indeed, German scholars and soldiers alike have puzzled over his use of the term since the late 19th century. Some have postulated that Clausewitz's *Politik* consisted of subjective and objective elements. Subjective elements concern decisions regarding the type

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of war (limited or unlimited) to wage and the war's specific aims. Objective elements involve the ideas, emotions and political interrelationships unique to a given time and place that affect those decisions to wage war.<sup>5</sup>

In fact, Clausewitz's use of the term implied three things: First, Politik meant policy, the extension of the will of the state, the decision to pursue a goal, whether purely political or otherwise. Second, Politik referred to politics as a physical state of affairs — the strengths and the weaknesses afforded to a state by its geopolitical position, its resources, its alliances and its treaties — and as an ongoing process of internal interaction between a state's key decision-making institutions and the personalities of the state's policy-makers. Last, Politik functioned as a historically causative force for Clausewitz, providing an explanatory pattern or framework for coherently viewing the various manifestations of war over time.

We find the first of these definitions in Chapter 1, Book I, of *On War*, which discusses the nature of war. Because Clausewitz's undated prefatory note (presumably written in 1830) indicates that he considered only this chapter to be in final form, we are tempted not to read further. Although we would like to grasp the essence of Clausewitz's philosophy of war at the cost of reading 15 pages rather than 600 (or more than 800 in the latest German edition), this is not possible.

In fact, strong (though circumstantial) evidence exists that *On War* is closer to completion than Clausewitzian scholars previously believed.<sup>6</sup> In any case, one would do well to read beyond *On War*, to include as many of Clausewitz's other writings as possible. His notes on history and politics and his essay on "Agitation" (Umtriebe), for example, show that his thought was continually evolving, and the hefty tome *On War* represents barely a third of it.<sup>7</sup> Although Clausewitz is often clearer when we read him in his native language, the primary prerequisites for understanding this great thinker are really patience and the will to reflect.

In the last three books of *On War* —

Defense, Attack, and War Plans — Clausewitz gives mature ideas regarding the influence of politics on war. In these chapters his thought becomes more historicist, interpreting historical eras on their own terms. He sees individuals as governed by institutions, values, beliefs and customs unique to a specific time and place.

In particular, in Book VIII, Chapter 3B, "The Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort to be Made," Clausewitz broadens his conception of Politik to encompass the second definition mentioned above. He refers to policy-making as being more than a mere act of intelligence or a product of pure reason: It is "an art in the broadest meaning of the term — the faculty of using judgment to detect the most important and

***Despite the technological changes now under way as a result of the current revolution in military affairs, and those already in place because of the advent of nuclear weapons, Clausewitz's tripartite conception of war remains valid.***

decisive elements in the vast array of facts and situations."<sup>8</sup> Clausewitz recognizes "judgment" itself as highly subjective, influenced by the "qualities of mind and character of the men making the decision — of the rulers, statesmen, and commanders, whether these roles are united in a single individual or not."<sup>9</sup>

States, and societies too, were not limited in form to the monarchies (whether constitutional or absolutist) or to the semi-rigid social hierarchies characteristic of Clausewitz's day, but were "determined by their times and prevailing conditions." States, for example, could be united, sovereign entities, a "personified intelligence acting according to simple and logical rules," or merely "an agglomeration of loosely associated forces."<sup>10</sup> Hence, Clausewitz's definition applies equally well to feudal lords, drug lords or terrorist groups. Even Europe's numerous military institutions (e.g., its armies and command structures), he explained, have "differed in the various

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periods” of history.<sup>11</sup> In fact, in his later books Clausewitz refers to the “military” as a living body of institutions, procedures, philosophies and values, not as a static regimental corpus, as Keegan maintains.

### **Historical examples**

Clausewitz used several historical examples to illustrate how policy and political forces have shaped war from antiquity to the modern age. His discussions in “The Scale of the Objective” address the vastly different yet profoundly similar wars of conquest and plunder carried out by the semi-nomadic Tartars (or Tatars) and wars of expansion prosecuted by Napoleon. Clausewitz’s selection of the Tartars to demonstrate how politics direct war is sig-

***Advances in technology will not alter Clausewitz’s framework of war, because such advances affect war’s grammar, not its logic. In other words, new technologies change only the form, not the nature, of war.***

nificant, for according to Keegan and van Creveld, Tartar “tribal societies” fall outside the Western nation-state paradigm.<sup>12</sup>

The Tartar tribes, along with other Turkic peoples, originated in Central Asia. In the 12th and 13th centuries they were overtaken by the Mongols. The Tartars participated in the Mongol invasions into eastern Europe and the Middle East.<sup>13</sup> They also converted to Islam and participated in the Ottoman Jihads, or holy wars of conversion, against the West. Tartar bands even raided Prussia in 1656-57, burning hundreds of villages, killing more than 23,000 people and taking 34,000 to serve as slaves.<sup>14</sup> They thus fought for booty, for religious conversion, and for simple entertainment — all motives for future war, according to Metz and van Creveld.

Yet these motives, all of which fell under the rubric of political forces in Clausewitz’s eyes, developed from resources available to the Tartars, from their geopolitical position as a composite of Turkish and Mongol nations located in Central Asia, from their

nomadic culture and traditions, and from the religious influence of Islam.

While the systems that the Tartars used to formulate policy might seem less sophisticated than those of Frederick the Great or Napoleon Bonaparte, they proved no less effective in terms of their ability to develop strategies and to direct military force in pursuit of political objectives. “The aims a belligerent adopts, and the resources he employs, will be governed by the particular characteristics of his own [geo-political] position; but they will also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character.”<sup>15</sup>

Clausewitz’s use of Politik thus gave him a perspective on war that was both trans-historical and trans-cultural. A view that, although integrative, respected both historical and cultural uniqueness. Hence, Clausewitz saw the elements that shape policy both as situational and cultural, and as objective and subjective, which accords well with the rational, nonrational and irrational factors used by current political-scientific models.<sup>16</sup>

In short, Clausewitz’s mature thought does not insist that warfare serve a purely rational political aim. In any case, the definition of a rational political aim is largely subjective. Terrorist groups employ suicide bombings, which they consider completely rational. With this understanding of what Clausewitz meant by the term Politik, we can now turn to a more detailed consideration of his tripartite conception of war.

### **‘Remarkable trinity’**

Clausewitz’s “remarkable or paradoxical trinity,” as it is sometimes called, constitutes his framework, or model, for understanding war’s changeable and diverse nature. It comprises three forces, or tendencies: blind emotional force, chance and politics. “These three tendencies,” he wrote, “are like three different codes of law, deeply rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another.”<sup>17</sup> They, in turn, correspond to three representative bodies — the character and disposition of the populace, the skill and prowess of the military, and the wisdom and intelligence

of the government.

Despite revolutionary advances in technology, this trinity will continue to be relevant to future war. Advances in technology will not alter Clausewitz's framework of war, because such advances affect war's grammar, not its logic. In other words, new technologies change only the form, not the nature, of war. Clausewitz saw war as a multidimensional and "chameleon-like" phenomenon, composed of subjective and objective natures. The subjective nature consists of war's means, since they vary according to time and place. The objective nature, on the other hand, encompasses the elements of violence, uncertainty, chance and friction; and while they embody numerous varieties and intensities, they remain a constant part of war regardless of time and place. Moreover, because war is not an autonomous activity, but a social

and human event, it possesses two tendencies, escalation and reciprocation, which, without the moderating influence of policy and the debilitating force of friction, tend to push warfighting itself toward a violent extreme. Thus for Clausewitz, war might change its color like a chameleon, but its essential nature remains constant — violent, unpredictable and prone to escalation.

### Information technology

The continually evolving information and communication technologies of the current revolution in military affairs will merely expand the immediacy — by shortening the response time and heightening the sensitivity — of each component in the trinity as it interacts with the others.<sup>18</sup> Information technology will require an increase in the intelligence level of soldiers


and civilians, or at least require that they process more information in less time. But information technology will not change the fact that ruling bodies, whether recognized governments, revolutionary cells, terrorist leaders or drug lords, will make or attempt to make decisions regarding when, where, how and why to apply military power. Politik, in the form of alliances and treaties (whether perceived or real); the efficacy of institutions involved in the decision-making process; and the general assumptions,

beliefs and expectations of policy-makers, will continue to influence these decisions.

Evidence concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War shows that even in the modern age, misperceptions continue to create or exacerbate crisis situations.<sup>19</sup> Technology will speed the delivery of information (which is already approaching real time); it will

even provide information in new forms (e.g., satellite imagery); and it may, depending on the scenario, reduce or expand the time available to make a decision. But decision-makers will continue to receive that vast quantity of information through subjective filters. Consequently, their decisions will remain largely a matter of subjective judgment, and that judgment will in turn be shaped by political forces.

Paradoxically, new military technology can increase and decrease violence, chance, uncertainty and friction in unforeseen and uneven ways. New weapons systems make it possible for antagonists to observe and to strike simultaneously throughout the depth of the battlefield, thus eliminating "safe" areas. The multidimensional battlefield means that commanders must consider defeating an attack or a counterattack



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from any number of directions and at any time. A general lack of immunity will prevail as units at all echelons of command and control face greater risk.<sup>20</sup>

Precision-guided weapons systems and munitions increase the certainty of a hit or a kill, but the weak link in their effectiveness is the difficulty in obtaining reliable and timely target data.<sup>21</sup> Enemies will continue to take measures and countermeasures to interrupt that data, and as a result, our tactics will continue to change. Hence, new technology alone will not prove decisive in future war. We will require a harness of sorts — a flexible and comprehensive doctrine that fully integrates the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Thus, Clausewitz's concept of the objective nature of war will remain relevant in the future.

Even the development of nuclear weaponry, the so-called absolute weapon, has not caused the “death” of Clausewitz, as some have claimed.<sup>22</sup> The evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response” during the Cold War clearly reveals that Politik retained its influence even in a nuclear environment.<sup>23</sup> Policy-makers responded to the changing political situations, to the growing strike and counterstrike capabilities, and to the general will of the populace in determining that nuclear war did not suit U.S. political objectives. Consequently, other more conventional forms of war received greater attention while nuclear weaponry assumed a deterrence role.

Although phenomena like “superconductivity” — the elimination of friction by reducing the chain of events that must occur between the decision to launch and the actual launch of a nuclear strike — and runaway escalation might reduce or negate entirely the influence that policy-makers have on the conduct of a nuclear war, these realities are merely products of the times.<sup>24</sup> They constitute what Clausewitz in his historicist approach would have called the subjective elements of war — the means selected for its prosecution — and would serve to distinguish nuclear war from other forms of war. In fact, far from limiting the influence that Politik has

exerted over military action, the Cold War actually increased it.

Moreover, nuclear weapons have not rendered irrelevant the intelligence of the government, the skill of the military and the emotive force of the populace, as some authors believe. Rather, each of the corresponding components of the trinity has changed over time, adapting to an evolving environment. Diplomacy has become more aware that military action of any sort might generate unintended consequences and runaway escalation, and it has developed systemic checks and precautions to limit them. Indeed, in a world order in which a limited nuclear exchange might occur between states or groups possessing relatively small arsenals, political influence has increased.<sup>25</sup>

For its part, the military has gradually altered its age-old warrior ethos and now prizes rather than eschews intelligence and technical expertise. The populace, too, has changed, becoming more educated and more politicized, and growing increasingly sensitive to the fact that its future rests in the hands of a chosen few. Such developments do not invalidate Clausewitz's trinity, but speak instead to its lasting durability and intrinsic dynamism.

Of course, not all of Clausewitz's military thought has remained relevant. His vision of war, for example, did not include economic, air, sea and space dimensions. But his conception of war, his remarkable trinity, and his grasp of the relationship between Politik and war will remain valid as long as states, drug lords, warrior clans and terrorist groups have a mind to wage war. ✂

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Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Steven Metz, "A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare," *Special Warfare* (October 1995): 22-28. The essay, which also appeared in *Parameters* 24, No. 4 (Winter 1994-95): 126-32, reviewed Alvin and Heidi Toffler's *War and Anti-War*, John Keegan's *A History of Warfare*, and Martin van Creveld's *The Transformation of War*.

<sup>2</sup> Metz, "Wake for Clausewitz," 26.

<sup>3</sup> John E. Sheppard, Jr., "On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?" *Parameters* (September 1990): 85-99; Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), esp. 33-62.

<sup>4</sup> John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 11ff.

<sup>5</sup> E. Kessel, "Zur Genesis der modernen Kriegslehren," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 3, No. 9 (July 1953): 405-23, esp. 410-17. See also: Hnn.c Rothfels, *Carl von Clausewitz. Politik und Krieg. Eine ideengeschichtliche Studie* (Berlin: Dümmler, 1920). In its polemics with Hans Delbrück, the German Great General Staff argued that war was indeed subordinate to politics, but that political forces had changed since Clausewitz's day. They saw politics as a Social-Darwinistic struggle for national existence that demanded war waged to the utmost.

<sup>6</sup> Azar Gat, "Clausewitz's Final Notes," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* (1/89): 45-50. The essay also appears in Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 255-63.

<sup>7</sup> These and other essays can be found in English translation in Carl von Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings*, ed. and trans. by Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

<sup>8</sup> On War, VIII, 3B, 585.

<sup>9</sup> On War, VIII, 3B, 586.

<sup>10</sup> On War, VIII, 3B, pp. 586 and 588.

<sup>11</sup> On War, VIII, 3B, 588.

<sup>12</sup> Keegan, esp. 11-40; and Creveld, esp. 33-62.

<sup>13</sup> Douglas S. Benson, *The Tartar War* (Chicago: Maverick Publishing, 1981).

<sup>14</sup> F.L. Carsten, *The Origins of Prussia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 208.

<sup>15</sup> On War, VIII, 3B, 594.

<sup>16</sup> See the discussion by Christopher Bassford in *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22-24; and his essay, "John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic," *War in History* I, No. 3 (1994), 319-36.

<sup>17</sup> On War, I, 1, 89.

<sup>18</sup> See also Jablonsky, 34.

<sup>19</sup> Robert B. McCalla, *Uncertain Perceptions: U.S. Cold War Crisis Decision Making* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

<sup>20</sup> Avraham Rotem, "The Land Battle of the 1990s," in *Technology and Strategy: Future Trends*, ed. Shai Feldman (Jerusalem: The Jaffee Center for Strategic

Studies, 1989), 56.

<sup>21</sup> Shai Feldman, "Technology and Strategy: Concluding Remarks," in *Technology and Strategy*, 130.

<sup>22</sup> Sheppard, 88-91; and Martin van Creveld, *Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), esp. 43-64.

<sup>23</sup> Of course, the development of U.S. nuclear strategy does not end there. The strategies of the early 1960s eventually gave rise to mutual-assured destruction, mutual-agreed assured destruction, Carter's countervailing strategy, Reagan's strategic defense initiative, etc. Donald M. Snow, *National Security: Enduring Problems in a Changing Defense Environment*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Henry S. Rowen, "The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine," in *Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age*, ed. Laurence Martin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 131-56; and Fan Zhen Jiang, "Is War Obsolete? A Chinese Perspective," in *Essays on Strategy VI*, ed. Thomas C. Gill (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 189-201.

<sup>24</sup> Stephen J. Cimbala, *Force and Diplomacy in the Future* (New York: Praeger, 1992); and Richard N. Lebow, "Clausewitz and Crisis Stability," *Political Science Quarterly* 1 (Spring 1988): 81-110.

<sup>25</sup> Jerome Kahan, *Nuclear Threats from Small States* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994).

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# Field Manual 100-25: Updating Army SOF Doctrine

*by Steven E. Cook*

Army Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, is being revised and is tentatively scheduled for publication in 1997. The capstone publication for Army special operations, FM 100-25 contains the fundamental principles, the concepts and the theory of Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF. It focuses on the nature of Army special operations and on the role of ARSOF in conducting and supporting the full range of SOF missions.

The revised edition will also address the role of ARSOF as part of a joint, combined, United Nations, or interagency task force whose mission is to conduct sophisticated, often sensitive, operations across the spectrum of conflict. It will be consistent with United States national policy and strategy as well as with other joint publications and Army 100-series doctrinal manuals.

In 1994, the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, reorganized into functional areas and re-evaluated its doctrinal publications structure. The chief of DOTD's Joint and Army Doctrine Division was designated primary author and executive agent for the revised publication of FM 100-25.

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This article explains the procedures involved in planning, writing and approving the content of the updated FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. — Editor

The concept and production schedule for the manual were approved in September 1995. Authors from the JFKSWCS and the Army Special Operations Command formed assessment, evaluation and writing teams. Traveling to various ARSOF units and meeting with headquarters and staff personnel, these teams assessed the units, addressed doctrinal issues, and drafted resolutions. Upon returning to Fort Bragg, the authors began writing a series of white papers that would become the nucleus of the revision to FM 100-25.

The white papers covered a variety of topics: ARSOF missions; logistics; command, control, communications and computers, or C4; Psychological Operations, or PSYOP; Civil Affairs, or CA; Special Forces, or SF; and Intelligence, Signal, Aviation, and Ranger operations. After the director of DOTD had approved the white papers, the Joint and Army Doctrine Division hosted a conference at the JFKSWCS in January 1996 to promote discussion of the papers among key operational commanders, staffs, and subject-matter experts.

After the authors had briefed their white papers, conference participants formed into working groups to identify and resolve ARSOF issues. Each group consisted of a mix of SF, PSYOP, CA, Intelligence, Signal, Logistics, Ranger and Aviation action officers, enabling the participants to share information from their various areas of expertise. Issues that could not be resolved

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were briefed back to the consolidated conference attendees and submitted to DOTD for resolution.

Guided by feedback from field commanders and subject-matter experts who had attended the conference, the authors revised the white papers. The papers were staffed to JFKSWCS and operational units in February 1996. In March, staffing comments were integrated into the white papers. Once the white papers were collated and standardized, the authors began the process of revising FM 100-25.

The revised edition of FM 100-25 will contain eight chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction and a conceptual strategic landscape for the next seven years.

Chapter 2: ARSOF fundamentals.

Chapter 3: ARSOF missions and collateral activities.

Chapter 4: ARSOF command and control; ARSOF support to U.S. Ambassadors and unified combatant commanders; overview of USSOCOM, theater special-operations commands, USASOC and various task forces.

Chapter 5: Army special-operations forces.

Chapter 6: ARSOF intelligence-support activities.

Chapter 7: ARSOF C<sup>4</sup> support.

Chapter 8: ARSOF sustainment.

Capstone and FM 100-series publications describe the Army's warfighting and training principles that apply to the execution of Army missions in support of the national military strategy, and they provide the foundation for all doctrinal and training publications. Because FM 100-25 is a capstone manual and a 100-series publication, it must be evaluated by TRADOC's Doctrine and Approval Group, or DRAG, process. During the DRAG process, which is tentatively scheduled for March 1997, the TRADOC commander and his staff, as well as the majority of Army service-school and center commanders, will be able to review FM 100-25. The chief of the Joint and Army Doctrine Division will present an overview of each chapter in the manual and discuss any unresolved issues.

On March 4, 1983, in a speech titled, "The Role of Special Operations in United States Strategy for the 1980s," then-Secretary of

the Army John O. Marsh Jr. stated:

"The development of doctrine is the cornerstone upon which a special-operations-forces capability can be erected. It is my personal view that our failure in the past to link special operations with national strategy through the defense guidance — and thereby to develop doctrine — has prevented special operations in the Army from gaining permanence and acceptability within the ranks of the military."

The revised FM 100-25 will assist SOF in gaining that permanence and acceptability by complementing joint doctrine and by providing the bridge from joint special-operations doctrine to Army special-operations doctrine. It will provide the foundation for Army service-school curricula and serve as the basis for the development of ARSOF doctrine, training, force structure and materiel. It will offer operational, planning and functional guidance to commanders, staffs and trainers at the operational level. But most important, the new FM 100-25 will incorporate evolving doctrine and will lead ARSOF into the 21st century. ✕

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# Logistics for Deployed Army Special Operations Forces: A Pathway to Support

*By Lieutenant Colonel Philip E. Bradford, U.S. Army (ret.); Major David C. Lawson; Chief Warrant Officer 4 John W. Fulcher; and Sergeant Major Alvin Lester*

Since the creation of the Theater Army Special Operations Support Command, or TASOSC, in the mid-1980s, there has been confusion over the purposes, capabilities and operating procedures of the regional elements that support special-operations forces in theater.

Differences among the various regional support elements, as well as a variety of acronyms — TASOSC, SOTSE and SOSCOM, for example — have only added to the confusion. And the lack of understanding is not limited to conventional commands: The SOF community itself shares different opinions about the functions that SOF support elements should accomplish and the means by which those functions should be executed.

It is imperative that we identify the specific functions that the ARSOF support structure should accomplish, that we organize it to perform those functions effectively, and that we allocate enough skilled personnel to perform the assigned tasks.

What follows is an attempt to describe and quantify what has worked for ARSOF operators and supporters in the U.S. Central Command, or USCENTCOM. The observations presented are based on the experience of personnel who have been performing the support planning and the coordinating tasks for the past five years. While it is not necessarily a prescription for all theaters, the

information may serve as a model for the unification of direction and effort necessary to properly support deployed ARSOF around the world.

## **Background**

Prior to the creation of the TASOSC, support for deployed ARSOF was coordinated directly by the deploying ARSOF element, whether it was a task force, an operational detachment or a section. The TASOSC was needed to address the lack of support from the conventional Army support structure within the various theaters.

The European theater provided the framework in which the TASOSC evolved. The mission of the U.S. Army Europe's 7th TASOSC was to plan, to coordinate and to monitor support and sustainment of personnel, intelligence, communications, and logistics resources for ARSOF. Since USAREUR was responsible for a forward-deployed Special Forces battalion in Germany, the 7th TASOSC, which was authorized 99 personnel, assumed additional responsibilities for command (less operational control) and support of the battalion.

By 1990, every theater had a TASOSC, either assigned or attached. The TASOSCs ensured coordination of support for ARSOF and provided a the-

ater-level point of contact for ARSOF support issues. The TASOSCs made significant improvements in identifying support requirements and in eliciting support from the conventional support structure.

The TASOSC was designed to focus on administrative and logistics support issues and to execute “command less OPCON” guidance and oversight for in-theater ARSOF. Those theaters with forward-based Special Forces units or detachments soon became involved in direct command-and-control issues, which eventually escalated to the general-officer level for resolution. In certain theaters, Army personnel from the TASOSC were directly controlled by the regional Special Operations Command, or SOC. Because the TASOSC often lost control of its personnel to SOC requirements, its effectiveness in dealing with Army support issues diminished. In other theaters, TASOSC operations were perceived by the supported ARSOF elements as bureaucratic, unresponsive and not worth the diversion of ARSOF personnel into a dedicated support role.

These conditions were not ignored by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC. In 1995, USASOC activated the Fort Bragg-based Special Operations Support Command, or SOSCOM. SOSCOM, focusing on logistics issues and providing command and control for the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and for the 112th Signal Battalion, became the support headquarters for USASOC.

At the same time, the TASOSCs were inactivated and replaced by special-operations theater-support elements, or SOTSEs, attached to either the theater Army or the Army service component command, or ASCC. The SOTSEs represent ARSOF’s logistics interests as an integral part of the G3 or G4 staffs of the theater Army or of the ASCC. SOTSEs were designed to focus strictly on logistics-support issues and to be free of command

responsibilities and administrative and intelligence functions.

## ARCENT SOTSE

The SOTSE for the Army component of USCENTCOM, or ARCENT, was established in 1995 from the former 5th Theater Army Special Operations Support Command, which had been established in 1990.

Although the ARCENT SOTSE is limited in its logistics planning and coordination capability, its manning level is organized to provide a definite support structure to deployed ARSOF in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, or AOR. The ARCENT SOTSE can adequately support all JCS-level and SOCCENT-sponsored exercises involving the regionally aligned Special Forces group, and it can support all ARCENT training exercises and contingency operations in the AOR. However, the ARCENT SOTSE routinely finds itself unable to provide simultaneous support planning and coordina-



Photo by Keith Butler

*While the 112th Signal Battalion and the 528th Support Battalion focus on logistics and command-and-control issues, SOTSEs represent ARSOF logistics interests as part of the theater Army or Army service component command.*

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tion to other ARSOF (Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs and/or PSYOP) exercising or operating in the CENTCOM AOR.

### **Functions**

The ARCENT SOTSE is integrated into the ARCENT staff and operates as a separate division within the G4. One of its functions is to develop theater support plans. The SOTSE combines the ARSOF support requirements in SOCCENT and CENTCOM concept plans and operations plans. The SOTSE then incorporates those support requirements into ARCENT support plans and develops ARSOF support appendixes for the logistics annexes to each supporting war plan.

***To plan effectively, the SOTSE must become involved in the early stages of the exercise planning process, conduct detailed support planning in conjunction with ARSOF detachment planners, and conduct thorough logistics coordination.***

These appendixes define the specific responsibilities and relationships with regard to the support of ARSOF designated to participate in each war plan. The appendixes also provide information on the support structure, ARSOF unit flow into theater, and the type and capabilities of each supporting unit.

ARCENT is responsible for the support and sustainment of deployed ARSOF in the CENTCOM AOR. The ARCENT SOTSE coordinates ARSOF statements of requirements, or SORs, through the ARCENT G4. However, because of the lack of an Army support structure in all but two of the countries in the AOR, the SOTSE must often plan for support from host-nation sources and then coordinate and monitor that support. In the countries where Army support is available, the

SOTSE coordinates for logistics support through the existing ASCC support structure.

The ARCENT SOTSE must maintain a keen awareness of the current and future JCS-level and SOCCENT-sponsored exercises and operations in the AOR to perform its logistics-support planning and coordination role. The ARCENT SOTSE maintains regular and close coordination with the SOCCENT J3/J4 staffs, the ARCENT Exercises and Training Division/G3, the SOSCOM Logistical Operations Division, and the ARSOF unit S3s and S4s. The SOTSE focuses primarily on the regionally aligned SF group, since the SF group is the largest user of SOTSE assets and support.

When required to participate in exercises and operations within the AOR, detachments or task forces of the regionally aligned SF group formally request the assistance of the ARCENT SOTSE. The ARCENT SOTSE also supports missions at the SF B-detachment level and higher. Personnel limitations have prevented SOTSE support to the missions of individual A-detachments or of Joint Combined Exchange Training, or JCET.

To ensure the timeliness of its support to deployed ARSOF, the SOTSE continually updates, reconciles and revises the exercise calendar, using information it receives from ARSOF units, ARCENT and SOCCENT.

For each company-level operation, the ARCENT SOTSE assigns one of its members as the primary point of contact. The POC is either a special-operations officer, a logistics officer, or a senior NCO. The POC is teamed with another member of the SOTSE or with a member of the SOSCOM, depending on the regional optempo and personnel constraints. The team performs the support planning and the logistics coordination functions so that ARSOF can conduct their designated mission.

The ARCENT SOTSE POC coordinates with the ARSOF support POC to provide country-clearance information and to synchronize deployment sched-

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ules. He forwards the information to the SOC for validation and consolidation before the SOTSE's support team enters the AOR. SOTSE personnel obtain any required visas and prepare travel orders. Continual communication between the SOTSE support team and the ARSOF support POC is vital.

Before each deployment, the SOTSE support team presents the SOTSE chief with a detailed briefback on its planning and coordination efforts. The briefback information is used by the ARSOF detachment or task force in preparing comprehensive support plans. Upon returning from a mission, the SOTSE support team debriefs the SOTSE chief and prepares an after-action review, or AAR. The AAR will serve as a record of lessons learned for future exercises and operations.

### **Mission planning**

To plan effectively, the SOTSE must become involved in the early stages of the exercise planning process, conduct detailed support planning in conjunction with ARSOF detachment planners, and conduct thorough logistics coordination. Early deployment to the operation site enables SOTSE personnel to conduct proper ARSOF reception, staging, onward movement and integration functions when other theater assets are absent. The SOTSE provides a smooth transition into the AOR for the advance party of the ARSOF element. This allows the advance party to focus on preparation and operational activities.

About 120 to 150 days before an exercise, the SOTSE POC, the ARSOF detachment, the SOCCENT POCs, the host-nation counterparts, and U.S. Embassy personnel perform the initial support-planning functions. The SOTSE POC initiates contact with all participants at this time. Also, the SOTSE support team assists the ARSOF element in formulating support plans and in drafting an SOR.

Approximately 90 days before the exercise, the participants conduct a mid-

planning conference/pre-deployment site survey. The SOTSE support team's main function at this point is to help the ARSOF element confirm its requirements and to identify sources of support. Participants discuss the details of support necessary for the exercise and complete critical host-nation and embassy coordination. Through the process, they gain an understanding of how the event's support requirements will be carried out; they also view the locations of training and support facilities.


The final planning conference is usually held within 30 days of the exercise. For the participants, this is the last opportunity to resolve any remaining support issues and to effect final coordination. The SOTSE makes sure that the detachment's support requirements are fully coordinated among all the supporting agencies. The SOTSE also assists the detachment in completing all support agreements and support documentation. The SOTSE POC confirms all deployment timetables and synchronizes the support schedule with the ARSOF element POC.

### **Exercise/Operation support**

The ARCENT SOTSE operation-support role revolves around the SOR consolidation and coordination process. The SOTSE ensures that each ARSOF unit compiles a comprehensive and valid SOR early in the planning cycle. This task usually requires the assistance and involvement of a SOTSE support team. The ARSOF element formulates a list of requirements, which is coordinated through its higher-headquarters logistics staff and is then passed to the USASOC DCSLOG for tasking out. The SOTSE conducts simultaneous coordination with the SOSCOM and the ASCC.

The ARCENT SOTSE and the ARCENT G4 supply and services branch coordinate an ARSOF element's requirements with the Army CENTCOM support structure. Unfortunately, in the CENTCOM AOR there are only two countries that have a support system in

## SOR Process



place; in all the other countries, ARSOF must rely heavily upon host-nation and contractual support.

Unfulfilled support requirements are forwarded to the SOC for validation. SOCCENT passes the validated requirements to CENTCOM, which ascertains whether support is available through the host nation or whether further contract acquisition is necessary. Ideally, the ARSOF element's requirements are resolved before the final planning conference. Final support plans will then accurately identify logistics responsibilities and the sources and levels of support.

Once the ARCENT SOTSE has deployed in theater, the surrounding conditions and circumstances dictate its actions. Supported exercises and operations require that the SOTSE support team deploy to the operational area as much as a week before the arrival of the ARSOF element's advance party. The support team facilitates the arrival of the advance party and helps integrate it into Army, host-

nation or contractual support. The support team also assists the advance party in preparing to receive the main body; it identifies the locations of all coordinated support services and systems; and it provides any other assistance that time allows.

Once the main body arrives, the SOTSE assists the advance party and ensures that the ARSOF element has logistics support. The SOTSE ensures that all transportation requirements for passengers and equipment are fully coordinated. ARCENT SOTSE personnel are licensed to operate many different military and commercial vehicles and can assist in the actual movement process in emergency situations.

The SOTSE support team also interfaces with the SOC staff or with the staff of a Joint Special Operations Task Force, or JSOTF. In some rare instances, it has performed the role of the J4/Director of Logistics, monitoring all host-nation support, including the flow of goods and services contracted through the contracting officer or

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through contracts established by the U.S. Embassy. The support team monitors and assists in the coordination of requirements associated with all support operations. The close working relationship that the support team fosters and maintains with the JSOTF or SOC staff, embassy support personnel, ARSOF task force and host-nation support representatives plays a valuable role in the success of the SOTSE's logistics planning and coordination functions.

The SOTSE support team also assists the ARSOF element in its preparation for redeployment and in its integration into the appropriate return transportation system. The support team maintains coordination with the host nation, U.S. Embassy personnel and any existing support structure to ensure that redeployment is smooth and effective.

The SOTSE support team redeploys to its home station after it has completed all departure activities. The team then compiles a detailed debriefing, based on the experiences gained during the operation, and presents it to the chief and other members of the SOTSE. The ARCENT and SOSCOM staffs also have access to the debriefing.

## Summary

Support to deployed ARSOF is the responsibility of the ASCC. Concerted efforts should be made to avoid duplication of the conventional support structure provided by the ASCC. Several well-placed and technically proficient personnel with the ability to perform effective coordination and liaison functions between ARSOF and conventional support planners and providers can ensure that essential support is provided in a timely manner and at significantly less expense than establishing and operating a separate support system.

As it performs its planning and coordination mission, the ARCENT SOTSE must keep ARSOF operators and

ARSOF support requirements foremost in mind. Over the past three years, the 5th TASOSC/ARCENT SOTSE has received positive feedback for every mission it has coordinated. This feedback has come from the SOC, the task force commander, and staff members. The ability of the ARCENT SOTSE to satisfy the needs of ARSOF in theater has been directly affected by three factors: a specified method of operation that the supported ARSOF element could understand; an adequate number of trained personnel to conduct the requisite liaison; and effective coordination and communication between the supported element and the supporting elements. Although the required/authorized strength level of the ARCENT SOTSE remains a point of discussion, the process by which ARSOF requirements have been coordinated within established theater-support procedures clearly works. This success is a testament to the close cooperation and teamwork (at various command and staff levels) between the supported units and elements and the supporting units and elements. ARCENT SOTSE operations serve as a pathway to effective support. ✕

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Lieutenant Colonel Philip E. Bradford recently retired from the Army as chief of the Army Forces Central Command Special Operations Theater Support Element, assigned to the Special Operations Support Command, USASOC. He



He has served in the 10th Special Forces Group as commander of ODA 045 and of ODB 070 and as executive officer of the support battalion. At the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, he served as the executive officer both for the 1st Special Warfare Training Group and for 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. He also commanded the 5th Special Operations Support Command at Fort McPherson, Ga. Bradford graduated from Michigan State University in 1974 and has

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a master's degree in management from Webster University.

Major David C. Lawson is the support operations officer for the ARCENT SOTSE. He has served as the S3 and as the S4 for the 5th Special Operations Support Command; as an armored cavalry platoon leader, troop XO and squadron S3 in the 1st Cavalry Division; and as a multi-functional logistics officer in a variety of command and staff positions in Germany and at Fort McPherson, Ga. Lawson graduated from Louisiana State University.



Chief Warrant Officer 4 John W. Fulcher is the maintenance officer for the ARCENT SOTSE. He has served as the property-book officer for the forward support team, 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group; HQ, 7th Special Forces Group; and the 5th Special Operations Support Command. He has an associate's degree in electronics from Fayetteville Technical Community College, Fayetteville, N.C.



Sergeant Major Alvin Lester is assigned to the ARCENT SOTSE, Fort McPherson, Ga. He has served in logistics assignments in Korea; and completed two tours in Germany with the 3rd Infantry Division, MMC, and with HHC, 2nd Area Support Group. Lester has also served in the Property Book Office, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C. He graduated from the Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, in 1994.



# Letters

## Special Warfare

### Cable correct about FID

Dr. Larry Cable's article on Special Forces and the indirect-action environment (January 1996) was excellent. I have been a great fan of his since I heard his presentation at the Special Forces Conference in 1994. Over the past decade, Special Forces efforts have often been focused on missions in direct support of the big Army, but I agree with Cable's assessment that Special Forces plays its most valuable role in the indirect environment, working with indigenous forces. More importantly, many of our senior military and civilian leaders are also starting to understand that reality. Cable's observations on the two cultural gaps that Special Forces have to bridge in FID missions are right on the money, and I would like to add the following comments from my experience:

During the 19-year span that I served in Special Forces groups, I studied the cultures of Europe, Asia and Latin America. But I think that the focus of those studies, the history, the customs, the religion, the food and the clothing, while they are very tangible examples, are actually side issues of culture. We often overlook the central and intangible issue that each culture also represents a unique world view. Culture is a perceptual prism through which each society of human beings experiences and responds to the world. This

means that people with different cultural backgrounds will understand the same events in remarkably different ways. For instance, we like to think of the United States as a peaceful country, but many of our neighbors in Latin America, considering Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause, see this country as an unpredictable behemoth that is very willing to use its military power to achieve its national goals. Some would even argue that the U.S. is a warlike country.

Therefore I am convinced that we should not study foreign cultures in an attempt to become full-fledged members of those cultures. That is not an attainable goal, and we risk alienating our counterparts by trying to explain their culture and their problems to them. Americans aren't the only ones guilty of this. I have seen Spaniards suffer from their "expertise" in explaining the problems in Latin America to Latin Americans, and I have watched Russians alienate the Serbs with the explanation: "Russians and Serbs are all Slavs, and therefore Russians understand the problems in the former Yugoslavia better than anyone else." No matter how much you know, let your counterpart be the cultural expert. You can win just by being interested and being willing to listen.

But more important, when Special Forces are sent on FID missions, we are there to help host countries effect change. We

normally focus on the tangible aspects of change, but the most important and long-lasting aspects of change have to do with values, which are the defining element of each culture. It is important that we represent our culture and our values, since they are important catalysts for change in the third world.

Colonel John Waghelstein, who was commander of the 7th Special Forces Group from 1985 to 1987, often talked of the three long-term phases of cultural orientation. When first exposed to a different society and culture, we are often enamored, and enjoy a "honeymoon," during which all we can see are the positive aspects of the culture. As time goes by, we start to see some hidden problems, and we enter the "disillusionment" phase. But with the passage of years, some of us achieve a "clear vision" in which we can see the strengths and the weaknesses of the other society and its culture.

Our purpose in studying culture should be to attain a clear vision, so that we can see the validity of the other society's perceptual prism without losing our own. Success in FID has repeatedly been found in compromise between the in-country status quo and the alternative perspective that we represent. Therefore we must identify the central issues, and we must be ready to compromise with host-country forces on the small issues in order to get the cen-

tral issues accepted (and you often don't win on the central issues the first time you introduce them). We also have to understand the rate of change that can be supported in-country. Although the pace may feel like slow motion to us, when it is accelerated too much, the society can fragment, as it did in Iran in the 1970s. Therefore, intelligent compromise and patience are critical virtues in FID.

Although I agree with Cable's points about the difference between regular and irregular forces, I think the most important issue for Special Forces in FID operations is establishing trust with our indigenous counterparts. Cable refers to the possibility of being able to use cultural knowledge, specifically knowledge of the defining mythologies of the two cultures, to pursue U.S. policy goals. But host-country officers are often hypersensitive about being manipulated by the gringos, so we need to go slowly. If you are going to be effective in influencing your counterpart, you must build trust, and the starting point lies in helping him to achieve the goals on his agenda. This process of influencing your counterpart is like judo — find some momentum (organizational) that is going in a direction that makes sense and take advantage of it by offering to help him achieve success.

Effectiveness in FID, or as Cable refers to it, indirect-action environments, is much more an art than a science. What I have described above are not my inventions, but what I have been taught by other Special Forces soldiers over the last two decades. I don't know how or where they learned all of this, but they are amazing artisans and I am proud to have

been their student and to have been one of them.

COL Ranger Roach  
U.S. Army (ret.)

### **Military confuses CMO, CA**

There appears to be a great deal of confusion throughout the military concerning civil-military operations, or CMO, and Civil Affairs, or CA. This confusion has been promulgated in doctrine and through incorrect use throughout the military. CMO is a generic term that covers all areas of the civilian dimension which may affect military operations directly or indirectly. CMO is a function of command; it is the responsibility of the commander and is delegated to the CMO staff officer (G-5/S-5). The CMO staff officer has the responsibility for planning and executing civil-military operations that support overall mission accomplishment. CMO is defined in Joint Pub 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, as "the decisive and timely application of military capabilities to enhance the relationship between the military and civilian populace in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander's mission."

CA is a tool the commander may use in accomplishing CMO in support of the overall mission. CA forces are normally attached to the supported unit to assist in ensuring that civilian interference is minimized and that the commander meets his legal and moral obligations to the civilian populace in his area of operations. CA support may be in the form of CA generalists working at the tactical and operational levels, or CA functional specialists operating as the mission dictates. The CA force can greatly

reduce the burden that may be placed on military forces in dealing with situations concerning the civilian dimension.

CMO and CA are not synonymous — they are separate and distinct entities. Unfortunately, in most joint and Army publications, they appear to be the same and are used interchangeably. CMO is a command responsibility, as are operations, intelligence, personnel administration, and logistics. Future operations will inherently include a significant civilian dimension. The commander's efforts to recognize and plan for these scenarios may mean the difference between mission success and failure. Commanders must be aware of the significant drain the civilian populace could place on his available resources because of poor planning. CMO will play a vital role in all future operations. CA forces can be a valuable resource to the commander in successfully navigating the civilian dimension and accomplishing the mission.

Commanders are responsible for CMO and can utilize CA forces to meet that responsibility. Doctrine must be clear and concise. It is imperative that doctrine developers at the joint and Army levels understand the difference between CMO and CA.

MAJ Tim Howle  
USAJFKSWCS  
Fort Bragg, N.C.

### **Sullivan article short on strategies**

Brian Sullivan's article, "Special Operations and LIC in the 21st Century: The Joint Strategic Perspective" (May 1996) entices readers, but it quickly leaves us hanging.

From the beginning of the article, the reader is bombarded

with apocalyptic doom. Sullivan asserts that the U.S. will not become involved in a major regional conflict, but that is not realistic. Current military planning envisions two MRCs. Given the world situation today (Korea, China, etc.) and past history of recurring major conflicts, it is a safe assumption that the U.S. will be involved in a major conflict within the next 10-15 years.

Sullivan's assertion that organized crime poses a threat to the security of the U.S. and to the stability of international order is not based on the situation as it exists. While drug trafficking has posed a domestic threat to the U.S., it is improbable that a nation-state might be taken over by criminal gangs. Even in a country like Colombia, whose government was threatened by the Medellín cartel, that scenario did not occur. If U.S. interests are involved, then the U.S. will take action, as it did in Panama.

Sullivan speaks of a number of ways in which SOF can be utilized; he speaks very highly of SOF's individual skills, but he finishes by stating that SOF "still require enhancement and restructuring to deal with likely future challenges more effectively." He doesn't tell us what that enhancement and restructuring should be, except to mention the need for more Civil Affairs units. Unfortunately, USSOCOM planning calls for

cuts in the current Civil Affairs structure.

These are only some examples of cases in which Sullivan's thoughts are subject to debate. After reading the article, I was left wondering what special operations will do in the 21st century, because he never really gives us a strategy.

MAJ Caesar A. Jaime  
USAJFKSWCS  
Fort Bragg, N.C.



Special Warfare is interested in hearing from readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare and elsewhere, or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the "Letters" section could become a true forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long, but they may have to be edited for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. We will withhold an author's name upon request, but we will not print anonymous letters. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

# Enlisted Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### E8 promotion board gives analysis of CMF 18 records

The CY 96 master-sergeant promotion selection board has produced the following analysis of the records of 1,309 CMF 18 SFCs who were considered for promotion:

- The NCOER is critical for measuring soldiers' performance and potential.
- Vague senior-rater comments detracted from evaluations' effectiveness. Recommendations on the soldier's potential for greater responsibility were important.
- Concise bullets justifying "success" ratings gave a clearer picture and carried more weight than did the "excellence" comments that were general.
- Raters missed opportunities for dynamic and forceful bullets when they wrote comments such as "participated in OCONUS MTT," without further elaborating on the contribution of the soldier.
- Ethical shortfalls were considered major deficiencies.
- All primary-zone SFCs were working in their primary MOS and had served as SFODA or SMU team members. Almost no soldiers were assigned away from an operational group for more than four years. Lengthy assignments to one SF group or SMU were not viewed negatively.
- All primary-zone SFCs had attended ANCOC. Nearly all had attended jumpmaster school. All had attended some type of professionally enhancing courses. Demanding courses such as Ranger School, Combat Diver and MFF were viewed as indicators of drive and determination. Language qualification was very important. Academic failure or removal from a course for disciplinary reasons had a negative impact on the panel.
- Nearly 80 percent of the SFCs had one or more years of college.
- Bullet comments showed many soldiers consistently scoring 300 on the APFT. These, along with comments on completion of endurance events, were helpful to CMF 11 panel members not familiar with the USASFC certification program or CMF 18 environmental training.
- NCOERs for secondary-zone SFCs were very high overall. As a group, secondary-zone SFCs received above-average ratings before and after entering CMF 18.
- Most secondary-zone SFCs were on their initial tour with an operational group. Detachment time varied by as much as two years.
- Overall, CMF 18 is doing a good job of ensuring that SFCs have the opportunity to serve in the proper assignments and that they receive the appropriate schooling for selection to master sergeant. NCOs are seeking challenging jobs, meeting NCOES milestones and enhancing their civilian education.
- Outdated photos displaying SSG rank detracted from the overall quality of the file. Some records contained photos showing undocumented awards; other records contained documentation for awards that were not shown in the photos.
- College credits, awards, military education and assignments become discriminators when all other factors are equal. Every soldier should ensure that his DA Form 2-1 is readable and accurate.

## E8 promotion board praises quality of CMF 37 NCOs

The CY 96 master-sergeant promotion selection reviewed records for CMF37 SFCs recommended for promotion and provided the following analysis:

- The quality of CMF 37 NCOs was exceptional. More than 80 percent of the SFCs in the zone of consideration were considered qualified for promotion.
- NCOs in the primary zone had very high marks, but they tended not to have all the key leadership positions they will need to remain competitive in the future.
- CMF 37 secondary-zone NCOs in leadership positions tended to have high marks on performance and strong senior-rater comments recommending immediate selection for promotion. Secondary-zone NCOs in jobs such as staff and SWCS also tended to have high marks for performance and potential, but they lacked the leadership experience that board members weighed heavily.
- Inflated NCOERs were easily identified; vague bullets conveyed a negative message. "Excellence" marks with weak comments were considered "success." Senior-rater bullets on potential carried a lot of weight.
- Primary- and secondary-zone NCOs appeared to have either all tactical or all regional experience. The board viewed jobs outside the 4th PSYOP Group positively as long as the NCOs returned to the 4th Group at the end of their tour. The board looked favorably on SFCs who had successfully held first-sergeant positions.
- Approximately 60 percent of the primary- and secondary-zone NCOs had one or more years of college. More than 50 percent had completed the Jumpmaster Course; less than 10 percent had completed the First Sergeant Course.
- The overall fitness of the 37 CMF is extremely good. All personnel considered had a current APFT and met the height/weight standards IAW AR 600-9. More than 60 percent had scores above 275 on the APFT.
- Photos were current, demonstrating that PSYOP NCOs wished to present themselves with their most current awards and decorations. A small percentage had photos showing an incorrect display of awards and decorations, missing awards, or improperly fitting uniforms.
- Overall, records are being maintained in an exceptional manner.
- CMF 37 is doing a marginal job of ensuring that all SFCs considered for promotion have served in key positions. The overall quality of the personnel is excellent; it appears that quality soldiers are being retained.
- With promotions extremely competitive, raters and senior raters should reserve "among the best" and "1" blocks for the very best in the field.
- All NCOs in the primary zone should examine their records and evaluate their assignments against those of their junior peers. They should continue to compete for the few tough leadership positions.
- Senior leaders and the branch manager should continue to place quality soldiers in strategic and tactical assignments, and to ensure that NCOs being assigned outside the 4th Group first spend at least 18 months in a key PSYOP leadership position such as senior PSYOP sergeant.
- Promotions within CMF 37 are very competitive and will continue to be so. The review of records showed that the best-qualified NCOs were selected for promotion. Unfortunately NCOs in the secondary zone who were considered "ready for promotion" could not be promoted because of the limited number of promotions available.



# Officer Career Notes

## Special Warfare

### PERSCOM adds, revises CA skill identifiers

The Total Army Personnel Command has approved both the addition of six new skill identifiers, or SIs, for the Civil Affairs Branch and the revision of the five current CA SIs. Update 12-7 to AR 611-101, Commissioned Officer Classification System, will reflect these changes. Personnel actions to award these SIs should cite Notice of Future Change, HQ, USTAPC, 14 Nov 95, as the authority, according to Major Ron Fiegle, Civil Affairs Branch manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. The CA SIs and qualifications are as follows:

Civil defense officer, SI 5Y (revision) — Completion of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's nonresident instruction course HS-1, Emergency Program Manager; HS-2, Emergency Preparedness, USA; HS-3, Radiological Emergency Management; HS-4, Preparedness Planning for a Nuclear Crisis; HS-5, Hazardous Materials: A Citizen's Orientation; and HS-7, A Citizen's Guide to Disaster Assistance; or equivalent experience as a regional civil-defense director; or certification as a Red Cross disaster-relief manager.

Economist, SI 6C (revision) — A master's degree in economics, finance, international business or business administration; or five years' experience in economics, banking, public finance, foreign or domestic development, or a related field.

Agricultural officer, SI 6U (revision) — A bachelor's degree in an agricultural discipline; or five years' experience in an agricultural-related profession, preferably in a county or state agricultural-extension position or with the Department of Agriculture.

Archivist, SI 6W (revision) — A bachelor's degree in library science, political science or history; or five years' equivalent training in one of those fields.

Cultural affairs officer, SI 6V (revision) — Requires professional knowledge or experience with the ethnography, culture sociology, institutions and religious heritage of the people of the areas of assignment or potential assignment.

Public education officer, SI 6D (new) — A master's degree in education or education administration (with an emphasis on public-school administration or vocational education), or five years' experience in school-district administration or in state or national department-of-education activities.

Civil supply officer, SI 6E (new) — A bachelor's degree in economics or business administration (with an emphasis on supply management and distribution), or five years' experience in the management of food or product-distribution systems.

Public transportation officer, SI 6F (new) — A bachelor's degree in civil engineering or transportation or equivalent experience in the management or design of public or private transportation systems; or three years' experience in the development of plans and policy at the state or national department-of-transportation level.

Public facilities officer, SI 6G (new) — A bachelor's degree in civil, electrical, mechanical, waste or water-management engineering; or five years' experience in the management, design or operation of public or private works and utilities. Officers holding a professional engineering license in any discipline are considered highly qualified.

**SF major promotions exceed Army average**

Public safety officer, SI 6H (new) — A bachelor's degree in criminology, fire science, police science, corrections management or public administration; or three years' experience in a supervisory or management position in a government-related public-safety field or in an equivalent private-industry position. Public communications officer, SI 6R (new) — A bachelor's degree in electronic or electrical engineering, communications management or computer science; or five years' experience in engineering or management in a related communications position.

During the FY96 major promotion board, the Special Forces selection rate was 88.2 percent, versus 80.1 percent for the Army. The low number of SF captains selected for major (67) is the result of an understrength year group (1986). The SF Branch needs to maintain a population of 580 majors and promotable captains. The current inventory is 375. As larger year groups of SF captains enter the zone of consideration for promotion, the number promoted will increase, hastening the growth of the officer population.

**Board selects 80 FA 39s for promotion to major**

The FY96 major selection board considered 252 FA 39 captains, of which 80 were selected. The board selected 26 FA 39Bs, 21 FA 39Cs and 33 FA 39Xs — officers who have not completed an area-of-concentration course. The selection rate for FA 39 was 78 percent; the overall Army selection rate was 80.1 percent.

**SF warrants provide technical expertise**

The Special Forces Warrant Officer, MOS 180A, provides tactical and technical expertise necessary for effectively conducting SF missions worldwide. An applicant for 180A must:

- Be serving as a staff sergeant or above.
- Possess a Career Management Field 18 MOS.
- Be a graduate of the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Sergeant Course (nonresident or resident) or be a graduate of SF ANCOC after Oct. 1, 1994.
- Have a minimum of three years' experience at the SF-ODA level.
- Have a current 1+/1+ language proficiency, or have a score of at least 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery.
- Meet the medical-fitness standards for SF duty and for the SERE Level-C Course according to AR 40-501.
- Pass the Army Physical Readiness Test by completing a minimum of 50 pushups and 60 situps within two minutes and a two-mile run in 14:54 or less, regardless of age.
- Have at least a secret security clearance.
- Have recommendations of company commander and battalion commander.
- Have an endorsement by his servicing personnel office verifying that he is not under a suspension of favorable action or a bar to re-enlistment.

The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office also requires letters of recommendation from the applicant's SF group commander and a senior SF warrant officer. An applicant who is not currently assigned to an SF group must furnish two letters of recommendation from his former SF company chain of command. Active-duty applicants can be no older than 36; National Guard applicants can be no older than 42. For more information, contact CW4 Wayne Searcy, 180A manager in SOPO, at DSN 239-2415/8423 or commercial (910) 432-2415/8423.



# Foreign SOF

## Special Warfare

### South African mercenary firm extends influence in Africa

Executive Outcomes, the mercenary firm based in Pretoria, South Africa, and manned mostly by former members of the South African Defense Force, has proven to be a decisive factor in the outcome of some civil wars in Africa. Involved most recently in forcing rebels to the negotiating table in Sierra Leone and more well-known for contributing to the Angolan government's success in forcing UNITA to accept the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, Executive Outcomes reportedly has a web of influence in Uganda, Botswana, Zambia, Ethiopia, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa. Even though the firm's expertise lies in fighting bush wars, it has diversified and reportedly operates 32 companies, whose interests range from computer software to adult education. The firm's tactic of quickly regaining control of a client country's mineral-rich regions is well-documented. Within a month of Sierra Leone's hiring of Executive Outcomes in May 1995, government forces had regained control of the diamond-rich Kono district, which produces two-thirds of Sierra Leone's diamonds. In Angola, oil- and diamond-producing regions were the first areas secured by government forces trained by Executive Outcomes. The firm also reportedly mines gold in Uganda, drills boreholes in Ethiopia and has a variety of interests in the other countries noted above. Executive Outcomes claims that its sole purpose is to bring stability to the region by supporting legitimate governments in their defense against armed rebels. Nevertheless, rumors persist that the firm is connected to either the South African DeBeers Diamond Corporation or the South African government. These claims are denied by all parties, and the South African government has tried to restrict Executive Outcomes' business ventures. The intermixing of paramilitary and commercial ventures makes it difficult to determine the number of mercenaries involved in various countries. Most reports indicate there were between 150 and 200 in Sierra Leone, while reports from Angola vary, indicating between 500 and 4,000 members in that country. At any rate, Executive Outcomes has proven to be a sound investment for the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone. Those successes may help to persuade other countries in the region to employ the firm's services. Increased involvement in regional security problems and an expanded portfolio of affiliated businesses suggest that Executive Outcomes will play a periodically visible role in sub-Saharan African affairs.

### Russia specialists perceive 'Islamic propaganda' targeting

Long-standing Russian concerns about an Islamic threat from the south have sharpened in the post-Cold War period. Some Russian security specialists believe that the drug trade, arms trafficking and simmering conflict along Russia's southern borders and in Central Asia are intended to serve Muslim extremist agendas. Others perceive also a heightened struggle for the minds of heretofore peaceful Muslim populations in the region. Determined "ideological recruitment" and "psychological warfare" by Islamic extremists are increasingly judged to be

a threat to Russian interests and the integrity of the state. The lost war in Afghanistan, the continuing conflict in Tajikistan and the embarrassing defeats of Chechnya — the first self-declared Muslim state to essentially leave Russian control — are asserted to be instances in which Russia has struggled with dimensions of Islamic extremism. Some Russians identify Saudi Arabia and Iran as sources of Islamic militancy in Russian Shiite and Sunni variants. They judge that efforts to radicalize their largely Sunni populations are aimed at incorporating Central Asian and Russian Muslim populations into the greater Islamic world. Many religious and educational organizations working openly in Central Asia and Russia are asserted to be nothing more than elaborately organized and heavily financed disseminators of militant Islam — some of these reportedly provide out-of-country training for individuals who then return to Russia to serve as militant recruiting cadre and as agitators.

### **Indonesia reorganizes special forces**

It was announced this summer that the Indonesian Army's Special Forces Command, KOPASSUS, would reorganize and increase in size, and that its commander, the son-in-law of the Indonesian president, would be promoted to two-star rank. With its headquarters in Cijantung, East Jakarta, KOPASSUS is considered to be an elite force that has traditionally emphasized its small size and its quick-strike potential. It has been involved in numerous military actions in response to internal Indonesian unrest. In an interview, the KOPASSUS commander downplayed the extent of the force's expansion, emphasizing instead improvements in training and expected increases in professionalism. The reorganization of KOPASSUS, he stressed, would be small compared with Indonesia's population, the area that has to be defended, and the security challenges in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor. In addition, the commander noted that neighboring Thailand has special forces numbering 10,000 men, and that in the post-Cold War period, other countries, including the U.S. and some NATO nations, have reduced their heavier forces significantly while retaining their special forces. Because of the kinds of threats that are appearing around the world, the general anticipates greater needs for Indonesia's special forces in the future; he expressed the view that these special forces must operate jointly with other military components.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Major Mark Mills of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DUSA-IA, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

# Update

## Special Warfare

### Schoomaker takes command of USASOC

Lieutenant General Peter J. Schoomaker became the fourth commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command in a change-of-command ceremony held at Fort Bragg's Special Operations Memorial Plaza Aug. 29.

Schoomaker received the command from Lieutenant General J.T. Scott, who retired from the Army with more than 30 years of service. Scott had commanded USASOC since May 1993.

Schoomaker relinquished command of the Joint Special Operations Command to Major General Michael A. Canavan Aug. 28.

Schoomaker's special-operations assignments include command at the Special Forces detachment, company, battalion and group levels. He also served as operations officer for the Joint Special Operations Command.

In his other general-officer assignments, Schoomaker served as assistant division commander, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and as deputy director for operations, readiness and mobilization, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, the Command and General Staff College and the National War College.

### USASOC NCO, Soldier of the Year selected

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command announced the winners in its NCO and Soldier of the Year competition Aug. 23.



Photo by Mike Brantley

Lieutenant General Peter J. Schoomaker (center) accepts the USASOC colors from General Dennis J. Reimer, the chief of staff of the Army.

The NCO of the Year is Staff Sergeant Seth T. Lucente of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. The Soldier of the Year is Specialist William D. Dixon II of Headquarters Support Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group.

Runners-up were Staff Sergeant Gregory J. Green of Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group; and Specialist Rodney H. Hastings of Company B, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

Other competitors were Staff Sergeant Felicia M. Alvarez of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; Staff Sergeant Jared M. Zick of Company A, 9th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group; Sergeant Samuel Rivera of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regi-

ment; Corporal Christopher R. Shonk of Company C, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; Specialist James T. Bear of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR; and Private First Class David M. Cade of Company C, 9th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group.

### Three SF groups receive new commanders

Three active-duty Special Forces groups have recently held change-of-command ceremonies.

Colonel Leslie L. Fuller took command of the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Carson, Colo., Aug. 1, replacing Colonel Geoffrey C. Lambert.

Fuller was previously the senior special-operations observer/controller for the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He has also served as a detachment commander in Company A, 3rd/7th SF Group; as the executive officer for the 10th SF Group; and as commander of the 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. McMillan took command of the 1st Special Forces Group at Fort Lewis, Wash., July 30, replacing Colonel Russell D. Howard.

Howard is now assigned to Harvard University's Center for International Affairs as the Chief of Staff of the Army fellow.

McMillan was formerly at Harvard on a U.S. Army War College senior service fellowship. His other Special Forces assignments were in the 10th SF Group, where he served as a detachment commander and as executive officer in Com-

pany C, 3rd Battalion; as commander of Company B, 2nd Battalion; and as commander of the 1st Battalion.

Lieutenant Colonel David E. McCracken accepted the colors of the 3rd Special Forces Group from the outgoing commander, Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, in a ceremony at Fort Bragg's Special Operations Forces Memorial Plaza July 19.

McCracken, a native of Connessville, Pa., was formerly chief of the Special Forces Branch, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command in Alexandria, Va. He has served in numerous Special Forces assignments, including two in Panama with the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group; two in the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School; and two in the National Capital Region.

Boyatt is now the deputy chief of staff for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

### **PSYOP specialist receives Soldier's Medal**

A soldier from the 4th PSYOP Group has received the Soldier's Medal for his lifesaving efforts during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

Corporal Robert E. Pelc Jr. received the medal from Lieutenant General J.T. Scott July 17. Pelc, a PSYOP specialist assigned to the 1st PSYOP Battalion, saved the life of a Haitian child Aug. 15, 1995.

The Soldier's Medal is the highest medal awarded during peacetime.

Pelc, who was assigned to a remote site near Port-au-Prince, noticed three children playing near a road. The youngest, about 18 months old, wandered into the road. "I started to walk toward the child to make sure he'd get out of the road," Pelc said. "About then I heard ... a truck engine revving up.

I looked up and the truck was coming around the corner. The kid ... suddenly decided to sit down in the middle of the road. That's when I really started to run. As I got to the kid, I kind of scooped him up in one arm, put the other hand on the hood of the truck and leaped out of the way."

Pelc and the child were unhurt in the incident.

"This is the level of performance ... that we have come to expect from our fellow special-operations soldiers," Scott said. "We're all prepared to risk our lives or even to die for our fellow soldiers. ... But there's an uncommon part of valor that deals with risking your life for someone you do not know." — SPC Daniel L. Savoliskis, USASOC PAO

### **Support battalions change commanders**

Lieutenant Colonel Albert E. Ballard Jr. took command of the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Burmood in a ceremony at Fort Bragg's Special Operations Forces Memorial Plaza July 18.

Ballard's previous assignments include parachute rigger platoon leader, 612th Quartermaster Company, 1st Corps Support Command; chief of resource management, U.S. Army Chemical School; and senior U.S. military observer and force-operations officer for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

Burmood is now assigned as branch chief, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The 528th traces its lineage to the 528th Quartermaster Service Battalion, activated Dec. 15, 1942, at Camp McCain, Miss. During World War II, the battalion provided combat service support to European theater forces, including the 1st Special Service Force. The battalion, which underwent several

redesignations, inactivations and activations in the 1950s and 1960s, deployed to the Republic of Vietnam Sept. 25, 1969. Upon returning from Vietnam, the battalion was inactivated April 15, 1971. Following its consolidation with the 13th Support Battalion May 16, 1987, the battalion was activated and redesignated the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (Airborne). The 528th provided support to special-operations forces during Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama, and during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia.

Lieutenant Colonel Howard I. Cohen took command of the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion from Lieutenant Colonel William E. (Bronco) Lane July 12.

Cohen has held assignments as deputy inspector general, XVIII Airborne Corps; detachment commander and operations officer, Joint Communications Unit; and company commander, 112th Signal Battalion. He is a graduate of Lafayette College.

Lane's new assignment is at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

The 112th provides operational and tactical communications for commanders of joint special-operations task forces, in support of deliberate and crisis-action operations of the regional commanders in chief. Soldiers of the 112th continue to provide communications in support of Operation Provide Comfort II and Operation Joint Endeavor. In the past year the 112th has participated in such contingency operations as Uphold Democracy in Cuba/Haiti; Assured Response in Sierra Leone/Liberia; and in a demining mission in Rwanda.



# Book Reviews

## Special Warfare

**Chinese Intelligence Operations.** By Nicholas Eftimiades. Annapolis, Md.: The Naval Institute Press, 1994. ISBN 1-55750-214-5 (hardback). 169 pages. \$31.95.

Much has been written on almost every aspect of the ongoing relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. However, precious little has been written on the topic of China's intelligence operations or capabilities. The most recent addition to this limited body of work is *Chinese Intelligence Operations*, by Nicholas Eftimiades.

Eftimiades describes his book as an attempt "to identify China's national intelligence structure, objectives, and collection operations ... focusing primarily on human-source intelligence operations." But perhaps more important is his explanation of what the book is not: He cautions the reader not to "interpret this work as some kind of call to arms to prevent waves of Chinese spies from subverting the Western world."

Using a crisp, uncluttered style of writing, Eftimiades succeeds in his intent. A former analyst with several intelligence agencies located in the Washington, D.C., area, Eftimiades outlines his arguments with the clarity of purpose and focus of a veteran analyst. In a straightforward manner, he describes China's foreign and domestic intelligence objectives and operations.

Outlining the working infrastructure and the interaction



between China's military and political intelligence agencies, Eftimiades examines the trade-craft and the methodology utilized by the various departments. Charts and schematics help the reader to more fully understand the departments' mutual dependency. Relating real-life examples, the author describes how Chinese intelligence operatives persuade and at times coerce fellow Chinese citizens either at home or abroad to assist in intelligence-gathering activities. He also details how China's intelligence services target foreigners and foreign businesses located in China. His use of examples, which for the most part provide an accurate description in illustrating how China's intelligence services operate, can also lead to certain generalizations that are not necessarily correct.

As stated previously, Chinese

Intelligence Operations is the most current and so far the best publication on China's intelligence services. Fully realizing the inherent difficulties faced by Eftimiades in attempting such a book, this reviewer must reluctantly criticize the author on two points. The first criticism concerns Eftimiades' description of the monitoring of foreign journalists by Chinese intelligence. This reviewer's personal experiences with Chinese intelligence while he worked as a journalist in China in the mid-to-late 1980s and in 1996 were quite different from what Eftimiades describes.

The second criticism concerns the author's use of sources. While he cites (and should be commended for) his personal effort at attribution of secondary sources, there are many instances (both referred to and footnoted in the book) that did not happen exactly as written or that were used out of context. It should come as no surprise that since much of the best material on Chinese intelligence services is still classified, authors of unclassified publications must depend solely on data that has previously been cited and vetted.

In spite of these criticisms, Nicholas Eftimiades' *Chinese Intelligence Operations* is still the best and most current publication regarding this very important topic.

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**War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History** (Revised and Updated). By Robert B. Asprey. New York: William Morrow & Company, 1994. ISBN: 0-688-12815-7. 1,279 pages. \$40.

Nineteen years have elapsed since Robert Asprey wrote the first *War in the Shadows*. Persuaded by his editors to revise the book, Asprey has spent four years updating and abridging his earlier work. The latest version (now one volume) includes the period 1973-1993.

When the original *War in the Shadows* was published, Asprey came under intense criticism for his denunciation of the conduct of high-ranking American officers in the Vietnam War. Asprey claims that they lost the war because of their total ignorance of unconventional and guerrilla warfare. Though blackballed by military schools for almost a decade, Asprey refused to retract his accusations, citing 2,000 years of guerrilla warfare tactics, operations and strategy as proof that the United States violated most of the principles of unconventional warfare, if not all of them.

The revised version, still the most definitive study of guerrilla warfare available, continues to remind the military of the requirement to understand fully the capabilities and limitations of unconventional warfare. Asprey updated his book for three reasons. First, to complete the story of the Indochina nightmare as best he could, even though millions of documents still await declassification. Second, to bring readers up to date on the status of 20 additional years of ongoing and new guerrilla wars. Third, to warn the American people about the dangers of military "revisionists" rewriting the history of the Vietnam War. He does not want Americans to forget "The 57,000 dead, the 380,000 wounded and the veterans' children who are afflicted by defoliant-responsible birth defects." Even more important,

Asprey does not want us to forget guerrilla wars, period. "So long as Western governments fail to work with less democratically minded governments in trying to eradicate in whole or in part the basic reasons for regional insurgencies," he warns, "these will continue to burst forth." As with the first *War in the Shadows*, Asprey does not trust conventionally trained military commanders to meet the challenges presented by guerrillas. His 2,000-year history demonstrates repeatedly that guerrilla warfare is different, requiring the skills, techniques and perseverance that only trained special forces possess.


Of immediate and particular relevance are the chapters regarding the Balkans. The chapters on the history of Balkan guerrilla warfare are particularly instructive, since the inhabitants of that region have been masters of unconventional warfare since the 14th century. Guerrilla leader Tito used UW to successfully keep nine Wehrmacht, 10 Italian and numerous Bulgarian divisions pinned down in Yugoslavia, preventing them from fighting on the Allied and Russian fronts. In conducting his research for the Balkans chapters, Asprey made a staff ride to the Balkans and wrote a METT-T analysis that is relevant

today. Commanders and future commanders of American forces in Bosnia should read these chapters closely, since involvement in the Balkans "always turns out to be longer than expected and a whole lot bloodier than imagined."

For Vietnam war researchers and scholars, *War in the Shadows* is an important source of information, since approximately one-fifth of the book is about U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and our doctrinal, organizational and leadership failures there. As an aid to understanding the Viet Minh's guerrilla-warfare theories, readers should consult Chapter 59, one of the most superb summaries of the National Liberation Front's political and military aims in print. Asprey's work shows a clear and superior understanding of the interconnectivity among military, political and diplomatic struggles. Let readers with thin skins be forewarned — his words about our "criminal military-political strategy" are even more vitriolic than those in his earlier edition.

Overall, Asprey's work is edifying. His 30 years of research brilliantly impart lessons of guerrilla warfare, its causes and effects, and its victories and defeats. His reminders to the military about going off to an unconventional war half-cocked contain some of the most valuable military thinking of our time. *War in the Shadows* is far more than just a history book. It is a useable doctrinal text of historical events that continue to speak to the contemporary experience of unconventional warfare. Every unconventional warrior should have *War in the Shadows* on his bedside table.

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# Special Warfare

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