


Special Warfare

November-December 2010 | Volume 23 | Issue 6



**OPERATIONAL
CONNECTIVITY**

— UNITY OF EFFORT IN IRAQ —



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Operational Connectivity

Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all units, commands and other governmental agencies toward a commonly documented objective, even though they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. That unity prevents organizations from working at cross-purposes, reduces duplication of effort and concentrates the elements of national power at the place and time that best advance the pursuit of the common objective.

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**U.S. Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School**

MISSION: Recruit, assess, select, train and educate the U.S. Army Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces Soldiers by providing superior training and education, relevant doctrine, effective career management and an integrated force-development capability.

VISION: As a world-class special-operations training center and school, we will build a well-educated and professionally trained force with the intuitive abilities to work through or with indigenous partner forces. We will develop innovative, relevant doctrine, informed by insightful future concepts, to produce an agile, adaptive force. We will ensure that our country has a full-spectrum special-operations force prepared to address the diverse range of threats posed by an uncertain 21st-century environment.

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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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FROM THE COMMANDANT



The environment in which Army special-operations forces operate today is uncertain, challenging and varied. ARSOF Soldiers may find themselves using marketing and information-sharing techniques to collaborate with foreign security forces, performing sensitive-site-exploitation operations, influencing the attitudes and opinions of foreign audiences or helping to rebuild the infrastructure of a country torn apart by insurgency.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has a critical job. The future of our Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations and Special Forces regiments is predicated upon our ability to produce adaptive ARSOF leaders whose leadership qualities are based upon humility, critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity, acceptance of prudent but calculated risks and the ability to make rapid adjustments based upon a continuous assessment of the situation. These leaders must be highly trained in warrior skills and highly educated.

To meet the challenge of training ARSOF Soldiers for the current and future environment, our selection and training must emphasize the eight ARSOF core attributes, and we must take advantage of the latest technology, include up-to-date lessons learned in current operations and find seasoned Soldiers to serve as instructors. Because the level of instructor proficiency affects student achievement more than any other measurable attribute, the most effective way to produce a more capable operator is to improve instruction. The quality of an education system cannot exceed the quality of its instructors, and ultimately, the best way to create a better curriculum is to find the best available instructors and give them the space to debate, decide and teach.

Our vision is that SWCS will be the world's finest training center and school. As part of that vision, we are striving to create an environment to which the best, the brightest and the most creative Soldiers and civilians will be attracted, will be retained and will be empowered. As we build the world's best training center, field commanders need to send us their very best Soldiers to serve as the trainers and ensure the continued excellence of all three ARSOF regiments.


Brigadier General Bennet S. Sacolick

ARSOF Core Attributes

In April, then-SWCS Deputy Commanding General Bennet Sacolick created a survey listing attributes that were desirable by the force. Members of the force, by completing the survey, in essence voted for what they considered to be the most important attributes for those in the force to possess.

The attributes will be used as a benchmark in the selection of Soldiers to fill the force. All Soldiers entering training at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School will be briefed on the attributes. Their initial counseling will be based on the attributes, and the attributes importance will be stressed throughout training.

Integrity

Being trustworthy and honest; acting with honor and unwavering adherence to ethical standards

Courage

Acts on own convictions despite consequences; is willing to sacrifice for a larger cause; not paralyzed by fear of failure

Perseverance

Works toward an end; has commitment; physical or mental resolve; motivated; gives effort to the cause; does not quit

Personal Responsibility

Is self-motivated and an autonomous self-starter; anticipates tasks and acts accordingly; takes accountability for his actions

Professionalism

Is a standard-bearer for the regiment; has a professional image, to include a level of maturity and judgment mixed with confidence and humility; forms sound opinions and makes own decisions; stands behind his sensible decisions based on his experiences

Adaptability

The ability to maintain composure while responding to or adjusting one's own thinking and actions to fit a changing environment; the ability to think and solve problems in unconventional ways; the ability to recognize, understand and navigate within multiple social networks; the ability to proactively shape the environment or circumstances in anticipation of desired outcomes

Team Player

Able to work on a team for a greater purpose than himself; dependable and loyal; works selflessly with a sense of duty; respects others and recognizes diversity

Capability

Has physical fitness, to include strength and agility; has operational knowledge, able to plan and communicate effectively

SWCS seeks distinguished members of regiments

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is seeking nominations for current or former Soldiers to be made distinguished members of the Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations or Special Forces regiments.

Nominees may be active, retired or former officers, warrant officers or enlisted Soldiers who have graduated from the Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations or Special Forces qualification courses (or been awarded the SF Tab) and have served in their respective regiment. Nominees must have made significant contributions to the success of their regiment on the battlefield and/or to the training and qualification of new members of the regiment. Following retirement or discharge, nominees must have continued to make contributions to the regiment or the local community. Continued service to the regiment after separation from the military, either through formal or informal activities, is particularly important as a criterion for selection. Nominations can be made posthumously.

Nominations must include:

- A letter of recommendation that includes name, address, phone number and, if possible, e-mail address for the person being nominated. Posthumous nominations should provide contact information for the next of kin.
- A single-spaced nominee biography of two pages or less that includes assignments and accomplishments in chronological order, as well as awards earned.
- A good-quality, 8-by-10 photo (preferably head and shoulders). Original photos will be returned.

The next DMOR selection board will meet Jan. 19. Nominations are due by Dec. 10. Submit nominations by e-mail to rayd@ahqb.soc.mil, or mail them to: Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-CG; 2175 Reilly Road, Stop A; Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610.

SOF TRUTHS

Humans are more important than hardware.

Quality is better than quantity.

Special-operations forces cannot be mass-produced.

Competent special-operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.

A Few Good Men: Support Soldier Selection and Training

BY MAJOR MATTHEW N. BUTLER

An organization's performance is the sum of the knowledge, skills and abilities of its members. In other words, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. This is reflected in our SOF truths.

The last SOF truth emphasizes that the "chain" in this case should not be applied exclusively to 18-series Soldiers. It must apply to every Soldier assigned to a Special Forces group, including support Soldiers. This concept is not unique; other units of the U.S. Special Operations Command, such as the Ranger Regiment and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, or SOAR, require support Soldiers to meet high standards as a condition for assignment. The standard of each of these units reflects an emphasis on the role that quality human performance plays in mission success.

Ironically, SF groups accept support Soldiers without any criteria or standards for assignment. Considering their vital function and the amount of support they provide, why wouldn't an SF group want the very best support Soldier available, vs. whomever "Big Army" sends us? Lieutenant General John Mulholland Jr., commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, states in *ARSOF Capstone Concept 2010*, "We must maintain our emphasis on recruiting, selecting, training and retaining the right personnel with the ability to deal with complex issues and situations, tolerate ambiguity, maintain situational awareness and make sound decisions."¹

Without a support-Soldier selection process, SF will waste time and effort retraining, rehabilitating and replacing non-suitable Soldiers. This is not a criticism of support Soldiers in the group support battalions, or GSBs, but an observation of fact. In fact, as the former commander of the 3rd SF Group's group support company, the author stands in awe of the tremendous amount of support the GSB's Soldiers provide and echoes the words of former 3rd Group Command Sergeant Major Terry L. Peters, "Without support Soldiers, we (18s) would all be running around the battlefield cold, hungry and naked."

Historical perspective

Prior to 2005, the 528th Sustainment Brigade and the 112th Signal Battalion provided the SF groups combat support and combat service support externally. With the requirement for organic support Soldiers created by the war on terror, in 2005, the requirement was filled by combining elements of the organizations listed above to create the GSB. The GSB satisfied the need for enduring sustainment but added an entire battalion to the SF group modified table of organization and equipment overnight, without applying a standard or screening process for the Soldiers assigned to the GSB.

Problems created without selection

Immaturity. The operations tempo, or OPTEMPO, in an SF group is fast-paced, highly demanding and decentralized. The environment requires assigned Soldiers to be capable of deploying upon assignment to the group and perform beyond the standards of their peers in conventional units. Many support Soldiers assigned to groups, such as mechanics, radio operators and engineers, are commonly under the operational control, or OPCON, of advanced operating bases and SF A-detachments on remote forward operating bases serving in decentralized roles. Support Soldiers in a conventional unit would never find themselves in similar situations, far from their NCO chain of command.

A-detachments do not have the luxuries of time, resources or awareness to help a GSB support Soldier who has trouble with things like the government credit card, family emergencies or violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Additionally, many of the GSB support Soldiers are thrust into mounted and dismounted patrols over extended distances and periods of time. A seasoned support Soldier who has previous combat deployments with conventional units, experience and more than two years' time in service would be better prepared for the demands, OPTEMPO, OPCON relationship and missions associated with the decentralized nature of SF deployments.

Mediocre performers stay in SOF. Support Soldiers assigned to an SF group are eligible to receive the "S" Additional skill identifier, or ASI. The criteria for the ASI "S" are:

1. Assigned for two years.
2. Deploy with the group for a combat tour.
3. Not in an excess position.
4. Submit a 4187.

The ASI is a factor in the decision-making process of the Army Human Resources Command for continued assignments within SOF. Support Soldiers who are assigned to an SF group and have the ASI of "S" will be primarily considered for assignments in SOF units, without consideration of their performance, potential or capabilities.² If that Soldier is a substandard performer — not requiring to be put out of the unit, but not of the caliber required for special operations — he still keeps his "S" ASI. The result is that we perpetuate mediocrity within the groups.



TOP NOTCH Support Soldiers play a key role in the success of Special Forces operations. To that end, they must be among the best in their respective skills. *U.S. Army photo.*

Group has less say in the process. As a GSC commander, the author occasionally received newly assigned Soldiers who were completely unable to perform because they didn't meet the standards of an SF unit. For example, one E6 reported to the 3rd SF Group GSC without a security clearance, was later twice denied a clearance, was on profile, hadn't taken the Army Physical Fitness Test in more than a year, and was not airborne-qualified. The choice then became "Do we spend time attempting to rehabilitate this Soldier to the level required for him to be value-added, or do we begin the administrative process of removing him from the unit?" Either way, we wouldn't receive a replacement until the Soldier was reassigned or was rehabilitated. In the meantime, we would be left with a Soldier who was taking a position on our modified table of operational elements, or MTOE, and was unable to provide a return on investment. At the time of this writing, he has been fired twice, given punishment under the UCMJ, is still on our books, is still not deployable and awaiting orders out — amounting to two years' worth of lost time and capability.

Current practices

75th Ranger Regiment - The 75th Ranger Regiment applies a form of selection to all incoming Soldiers, of all military occupational specialties and all ranks. The Ranger Indoctrination Program, or RIP, is for lower enlisted, and the Ranger Orientation Program, or ROP (pronounced "rope"), is for NCOs and officers. RIP is a comprehensive four-week program that serves a threefold purpose:

1. Screens for suitability through physically and mentally demanding tests.
2. Teaches Ranger-specific tactics, techniques and procedures, including, but not limited

to, fast-rope training, Ranger-specific tactics and patrolling.

3. Completes the administrative requirements essential for serving in the regiment, such as certifications, driver training and combat lifesaver training.³

Step three is a key element in producing a Soldier who is capable and ready to deploy. It allows all units within the Ranger Regiment to meet the demanding deployment standard.

160th SOAR - The 160th SOAR requires all incoming Soldiers to graduate from the “Green Platoon.” Green Platoon training lasts five weeks for enlisted support Soldiers and focuses on skill development, building self-confidence and establishing the principles of teamwork. Basic fundamentals of Green Platoon training include:⁴

1. Unit history
2. 160th philosophy
3. The five basic combat skills:
 - a. First responder
 - b. Land navigation
 - c. Combatives
 - d. Weapons
 - e. Teamwork

Proposed SSST

The process for selecting support Soldiers for assignment to SF groups through the proposed Support Soldier Selection and Training, or SSST, could be similar to that used in other SOF units: Recruiting and completion of the SSST application; SSST cadre screens applicants’ packets for suitability and eligibility; temporary duty attendance attendance at SSST, Camp Mackall, N.C.; PCS to one of the five active-duty SF groups.

Phase 1 - The proposed SSST application and recruiting process would require all support Soldiers, including those assigned to the battalions, not only to the GSB, to complete the application and submit it to the SSST cadre. The application should include the following:

1. Copy of the applicant’s Enlisted Record Brief or Officer Record Brief.
2. Copies of the last three NCO Evaluation Reports or Officer Evaluation Reports (does not apply to E4s and below).
3. Letters of recommendation from current company commander.
4. Proof of security clearance (secret or interim secret).
5. Jump-school graduation certificate.

6. Army Physical Fitness Test within 90 days of application (score at least 210 and meet height and weight standards).

Phase 2 - The SSST cadre would screen application packets for completeness, applicants’ ability to follow instructions and compliance with standards. Additional standards might include:

1. At least 20 years old.
2. Time remaining on current enlistment exceeds that of potential orders.
3. No credit problems.
4. No history of abuse of government credit card.
5. Records not flagged for adverse actions.

Applicants whose packets do not meet the standards would not be permitted to attend SSST. The SSST application requirement would also eliminate the possibility of Soldiers being assigned to groups as their initial-entry assignment. That would ensure that all assigned support Soldiers would have knowledge and experience with conventional units prior to their assignment to the SF group.

Phase 3 - SSST should include the following:

Phase	Event	Details	Length
1	In-processing and testing	Physical, mental and physiological testing	2 days
2	Physical training	APFT, runs up to five miles, rucksack marches up to 12 miles, airborne operations, combatives, swim test and daily PT	Daily as schedule permits and in conjunction with other phases
3	Classroom instruction	Regimental history, history of each group, nature of operations the group performs when deployed, support-specific TTPs, familiarization with group-specific equipment and TTPs	Daily as schedule permits and in conjunction with other phases
4	Pre-mission training	Special Forces Basic Combat Course-Support, map reading, land navigation and combat lifesaver training	12 days
5	Administrative	Review of SGLI, medical, dental, issue driver’s license, record APFT	2 days
6	Board	All Soldiers remaining on the last day would be boarded by senior enlisted and officers, 18-series and non-18 series, representing each SF group	1 day
Total			17 days

Although the proposed SSST looks and sounds similar to Special Forces Assessment and Selection, there are several key differences. Removed would be team events, long-range land navigation and long-distance endurance events. Additions would include physical training, classroom instruction and the SF Basic Combat Course-Support, or SFBCC-S. The intent of SSST would not be to replicate every aspect of SFAS but rather to apply a minimum standard for all support Soldiers, determine their suitability for assignment within the SF community, instruct common SF techniques and ensure that support Soldiers are equally as capable of immediate deployment as 18-series Soldiers.

Phase 4 - Following the board, all Soldiers selected would be given their orders and group assignments. Additional consideration could be given to spoken languages, regional experience and current station of assignment. Including a senior enlisted preference would allow command sergeants major to continue to recruit and have a say in the careers of enlisted Soldiers as they do now.

Facilitation and proponent

The SSST cadre could be assigned to the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Propensity, or DSOP. Support soldiers with the ASI "S" would give back to the community by serving in the cadre, as 18-series Soldiers do. SSST would be a sister program to SFAS, with both feeding quality Soldiers into the SF groups. The relationship would help foster even stronger bonds between 18-series Soldiers and their support counterparts.

Difficulty in recruiting

Some leaders suggest that SSST would increase the challenges that SF already faces with recruiting support Soldiers to serve in the groups. But a principle in human resources states that the greater the organization's achievements, the greater its capacity to draw future higher-quality employees. By increasing the quality of support Soldiers, the unit would increase its achievements and its reputation for excellence, which would draw more Soldiers to the unit. The SOF truth "Quality is better than quantity" supports this theory.

Reluctance of support Soldiers to attend SSST

Another argument against SSST is that support Soldiers who are already assigned to an SF group, with several deployments and years of service there, would be reluctant to attend a selection course for a position to which they are already assigned. SSST is meant to put in place a formal process for applying standards for selecting future support Soldiers. The majority of support Soldiers assigned to SF groups already meet the standards and should be "grandfathered" in and credited with having earned the ASI "S." Again, the SOF truth "Quality is better than quantity" applies and supports the theory.

Difficulty filling low-density MOSs

Another argument often expressed is that even without SSST, SF groups already have enough difficulty filling critical MOSs. That may be true; however, SSST could be waiverable for critical MOSs, as military-intelligence MOSs already are. However, waivers should be considered on a case-by-case basis. In fact, military-intelligence MOSs are the most probable to which that situation would apply. The majority of MOSs, such as engineers, chemical, riggers, mechanics, cooks, personnel clerks, medical and military police, would not require a waiver. MPs will be added to the SF groups in 2015 with the creation of the special troops battalion, or STB.

The creation of STBs will bring an influx of support Soldiers overnight, as when the GSBs were formed, and the number of support Soldiers will nearly quadruple between now and 2015. The creation of SSST before the influx of support Soldiers begins would allow SF to capitalize on the opportunity and be proactive. That would ensure that the majority of support Soldiers added to the groups between now and 2015 would meet the required standard. The SOF truth, "Special-operations forces cannot be mass-produced," suggests that the SF community should begin to build the supply ahead of the demand.

SF priority for support

The biggest challenge facing SF in respect to filling support MOSs is the low priority SF has in respect to other SOF units. SF units are not tiered units, and therefore all SF units are filled on the same priority as a brigade combat team, or BCT. The Army has 48 active-duty BCTs, making the five SF groups a comparatively small customer for the Army Human Resources Command, or HRC. Other units of the USASOC, such as the 160th SOAR and the Ranger Regiment, are much smaller than the SF groups and have a much easier time recruiting because of their size. With the current emphasis on drawing down the overall number of troops deployed to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, an increased burden will be placed on SOF units. That situation calls for SOF leaders to lobby HRC for emphasis on filling the slots for support Soldiers in the SOF community. The SOF

truth, "Competent special-operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur," supports the creation of SSST.

Summary

Creating SSST would help eliminate any resentment on the part of 18-series Soldiers against support Soldiers by applying a similar standard to all personnel in the SF groups. Support Soldiers would earn the respect of their 18-series counterparts by paying a similar physically, emotionally and mentally demanding price to belong to the unit. The result of creating SSST would be support Soldiers who have the requisite mental, physical and emotional capacity to meet the demands of an assignment within the SF community and its environment. Graduates of SSST would also be available for deployment immediately upon reporting to an SF group, having completed SFBCC-S, Combat Lifesaver and all PMT and administrative requirements. SSST would yield a better-quality Soldier who could provide the best support for SF missions worldwide and could help make stronger, more productive units.

If SF groups want to increase their capability, quality and performance, there must be a standard applied to their assigned Soldiers, including their support Soldiers. SSST will allow SF to join other USASOC elements who apply assignment standards. That would allow the groups to dedicate their efforts to training, deploying and engaging in operations with the best support Soldiers available. SSST would make SF better overall and increase its reputation, attracting exceptional Soldiers whose knowledge, skills and abilities are equal to the tasks and responsibilities of being assigned to an SF group. **SW**

Notes:

1. Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland Jr. "ARSOF Capstone Concept 2010," 11.
2. U.S. Army, DA Pam 611-1, The Army Interview.
3. U.S. Army, Go Army, 2010. <http://www.goarmy.com/ranger/> (accessed 10 May 2010).
4. Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, <http://www.bragg.army.mil/sorb/text/egp%20Packet.doc> (accessed 10 May 2010).

Major Matthew Butler, a 20-year veteran of the U.S. Army and a 12-year veteran of Special Forces, is currently assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command as an exercise planner. He was formerly the commander of the Group Support Company, 3rd SF Group. Major Butler holds a bachelor's in history from Weber State University and a master's in human resources from Central Michigan University. He is a graduate of Army Intermediate Level Education.

Special Forces Air Operations

February 2009

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A PERSPECTIVE ON SPECIAL FORCES DOCTRINE

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRISTIAN M. KARSNER

The *Collins English Dictionary* defines doctrine as “a creed or body of a religious, political, or philosophical group presented for acceptance or belief; dogma; a principle or body of principles that is taught or advocated.”¹

Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines doctrine for the Department of Defense as, “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”²

As a rule of thumb, military doctrine is what a military branch or organization believes to be its foundation or reason for being. It consists chiefly of the principles, foundations, tenets, core truths and interpretations that the leadership has established and the collective members hold as a guide by which to operate.

Doctrine must also include an attempt to define what is meant by means of a common language when spoken, printed or illustrated. In some cases, it may also include capabilities or resources that are generally held as a minimum requirement for success. In any case, changes in true doctrine should be deliberate, evolutionary in nature and occur slowly, after carefully measured analysis.

Doctrine is not the way a military organization operates. How a military organization operates or does things is spelled out in tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs; policies; customs; and unit standard operating procedures, or SOPs.

When a military organization includes how it operates within doctrine, that inclusion can have several effects. How-to doctrine, if read and followed, can create a common way of doing things throughout the organization. However, depending on the way the organization emphasizes following the doctrinal, how-to solution, such a regimented approach can limit the tools or options at the organization's disposal with regard to the way it acts under a given set of conditions. If an organization is accustomed to being told how to act via doctrinal publications, that lock-step approach can make it more difficult to change the adopted group-think and integrate new, outside-the-box ideas. Of equal importance is the fact that a regimented approach to operations most assuredly makes our actions quite predictable to our adversaries.

In addition, relying on published doctrine to change how things are done can produce an organization that is slow, if not altogether

resistant, to change the way it operates. That is a result of the conflict between the necessity to constantly change how-to doctrine in order to maintain relevance, and the reality that doctrine cannot change with the frequency required.

How-to doctrine must change frequently, or it will cease to provide any semblance of utility. But doctrinal changes are made in predetermined cycles, over extended periods, which means that the numerous changes that have occurred during the intervening period will demand a major overhaul in how-to doctrine. Those kinds of change are laborious and time-consuming, as well as problematic, when we are attempting to incorporate them in a large, decentralized organization such as the Special Forces Regiment.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has produced volumes of doctrine for Special Forces that include a great deal of instruction regarding how subordinate units and Soldiers should do things. Despite exhaustive efforts by doctrine analysts and writers, the fact is that new or updated doctrinal how-to manuals are generally based on information provided by the force, and they reflect the reality of how things are already being done in the field at the time the manual is written.

Changes in the way our force operates on the ground, primarily TTPs, are generally a result of new or emerging technology, new threats, a new operational environment, or in some cases, just an ingenious new idea. These changes occur at the speed of thought — thought by our special operators. Our SF operators are incredibly smart, they can and do figure out how to attain the effect they are tasked with achieving, and they routinely do that based on their advanced level of experience and the simple utility of what currently works in the field.

How-to doctrine is reactive to changes in TTPs received from the force, but those changes are usually long overdue before they can be published. TTPs change rapidly, and because doctrine production timelines are measured in terms of years, a new or updated how-to doctrinal manual will often be out-of-date before it is fielded.³ Maintaining a familiarity with volumes of outdated how-to doctrine is a difficult, time-consuming and counterproductive use of the little discretionary time our special operators have.

The constant “catch-up” by SF how-to doctrine points out that, contrary to any delusions on the part of its proponents, it is always a step behind the reality on the ground. The certainty that our how-to doctrinal manuals are habitually outdated in describing the way things are done in the field actually makes them limiting rather than enabling.


If we excluded how-to from our doctrine, however, the independence that would foster would allow us to harness the most important weapon that the SF Regiment possesses — the mind and ingenuity of our SF Soldiers. When local commanders, staff and small, decentralized units on the ground have the flexibility to modify what should be easily changed TTPs, we unleash our force’s potential. That would allow, and even encourage, incremental changes based on the situation and what works. It would also nurture an organization that truly accepts thinking outside the box and that would certainly be much less predictable to any potential adversary.

This is not to say that TTPs that have worked in the past, examples of what right could look like, or potentially even emerging TTPs should not be readily shared within our force. A digital database for posting doctrinally sound SF TTPs that have been successful in a given situation and operating environment (similar in nature to the Vietnam-era “B-52 Tips,” but greatly expanded in content and capability) would be of immense value to our regiment. To be truly timely and relevant, the TTPs would have to be incorporated within an accessible, searchable system that would allow easy retrieval and provide an input/review mechanism from the force for continuous updating.

Imagine the ensuing increase in knowledge and capabilities if we harnessed the diverse input from all our after-action reports, or AARs, with various lessons-learned mechanisms into a single accessible database and combined those with real-time input from our operators in the field. Visualize the immense, searchable database of “how to” tips, TTPs and SOPs being categorized, cross-referenced and indexed in detailed, highly organized and searchable files. Then picture that database being maintained by SF doctrine and training specialists who evaluate proposed input from the field for relevance and doctrinal inconsistencies prior to incorporating the new input into our shared database.

That incredible how-to tool would harvest good ideas from all of our force and make them accessible to all our SF operators — a shared network of ideas. That would be a huge move away from the legacy analog-era doctrine publication cycle and toward the age of digital technology. With the exception of perhaps only special texts, or STs; Soldier training plans, or STPs; and training circulars, or TCs, harnessing the potential of a collaborative 21st-century database would obviate any need for most of our habitually outdated how-to publications or products. That would also properly distill

How-to doctrine
must change
frequently, or it
will cease to provide
any semblance
of utility.



DIGITAL AGE Doctrine production has always been a long process, but with the quickness that the battlefield is changing, a means of harnessing lessons learned must be captured to get doctrine to the force in a more timely manner. *U.S. Army photo.*

what we do publish as doctrine down to our fundamental principles, enduring foundations and core truths.

In addition to an accessible digital database of SF TTPs, other essential elements of our force's information requirements include mission letters, annual training guidance and lists of current operational priorities. Annually delineating the required capabilities or desired effects we need our force to be able to achieve would allow the force to make a frequent azimuth check and alleviate much of the temptation to blur our enduring doctrine with how to operate on the ground. **SW**

Notes:

1. *Collins English Dictionary – Complete & Unabridged*, 10th Edition. HarperCollins Publishers. 01 Sep. 2010. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/doctrinehttp://dictionary.reference.com>. Accessed: 1 September 2010
2. United States Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, amended April 2010.
3. USAJFKSWCS Literature Management Cycle, U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C., 24 February 2009; TRADOC Regulation 25-30, "Preparation, Production and Processing of Armywide Doctrinal and Training Literature," Department of the Army Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va., 30 March 1990, 5, 8-9, 12-13.

Lieutenant Colonel Christian M. Karsner, currently serving in Operation Enduring Freedom, is the former chief of the SF Doctrine Division in the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine. His other SF assignments include commander, 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group; S3, 1st SF Group; S3, 2nd Battalion, 1st SF Group; company commander, 2nd Battalion, 1st SF Group; staff officer, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; small-group instructor in the 1st Special Warfare Training Group; and detachment commander, assistant S3 and headquarters-service-company commander in the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group. He also served in the 82nd Airborne Division as a scout platoon leader and as executive officer of the long-range surveillance detachment. Before receiving his commission through Officer Candidate School, Karsner served more than eight years as an SF NCO.

OPERATIONAL CONNECTIVITY

BY COLONEL SEAN P. SWINDELL, LIEUTENANT COLONEL ERIK M. BROWN, MAJOR SEAN C. WILLIAMS, MAJOR RYAN M. MCCABE, MAJOR CHRISTOPHER L. HOWSDEN, MAJOR STEPHEN G. SCHNELL, MAJOR DAVID L. WAKEFIELD AND COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR BRIAN D. EDWARDS

Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all units, commands and other governmental agencies toward a commonly documented objective, even though they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. That unity prevents organizations from working at cross-purposes, reduces duplication of effort and concentrates the elements of national power at the place and time that best advance the pursuit of the common objective.

Unity of effort and unity of command are similar but not identical concepts. While unity of command implies clearly defined command-and-control structures among military organizations, unity of effort usually relates to coordinating units or agencies from a multitude of different organizations, military or nonmilitary, as during special operations, counterinsurgency operations, stability-and-support operations and interagency operations. While both principles are straightforward in theory, they have proven to be extremely difficult in application and implementation. Before 2009, our attempts to achieve unity of effort and unity of command within the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula, or CJSOTF-AP, can best be described as achieving only general strategic direction and compartmented execution.

**COVER
STORY**



An integrated organizational approach is required to achieve unity of effort and focus. Organizational unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all commands, agencies and units in the operational environment, or OE, toward a commonly recognized objective. During the 10th Special Forces Group's recent rotation to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom VII, the CJSOTF-AP developed an integrated organizational approach to achieving unity of effort from the level of the Multinational Force-Iraq to that of the SF detachment. This article shows the way the 10th SF Group achieved unity of effort through a campaign plan; nested lines of operations, or LOO; shared battlefield visualization; transparency; and liaison officers. In the end, the single most important factor that allowed CJSOTF-AP to achieve operational success was the relationships that the commanders and staffs of the CJSOTF-AP and Special Operations Task Force, or SOTF, established and maintained with their counterparts in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, or MNC-I; the Multi-National Division, or MND; and at lower levels.

Some of the more valuable lessons learned during the deployment are related to the way CJSOTF-AP overcame obstacles to interaction and collaboration between special-operations forces, or SOF, and conventional forces, or CF, operating in Iraq. At no time during the eight-year history of the war in Iraq was cooperation between SOF and CF more critical. As the senior military headquarters in Iraq, United States Forces-Iraq, or USF-I, begins to draw down force levels and bring OIF to a close, and as the government of Iraq assumes more control of its country and the security within, the forces of CJSOTF-AP are increasingly the main asset that USF-I looks to in order to combat terrorist and insurgent groups that continue to compete for influence in Iraq. Likewise, only through a close relationship and shared visualization of the operating environment with all USF-I elements and the Iraqi Security Forces is the CJSOTF-AP able to apply the necessary influence to gain mission approvals and ensure freedom of movement.

This article will describe three keys — effective marketing, information sharing and operational interaction — that the 10th SF Group, as the core of the CJSOTF-AP headquarters, used in collaborating with CF and with partnered Iraqi Security Forces across the Iraqi theater of operations. Through those techniques, the CJSOTF-AP was able to establish relationships built on transparency and common understanding that challenged many long-held perceptions of SOF in Iraq.

Situation

In mid-2009, the 10th SF Group relieved the 5th SF Group as the core of the CJSOTF-AP headquarters. Task-organized into three special-operations task forces and a logistics task force, the CJSOTF-AP employed special-operations elements across Iraq to partner with local, provincial and national-level ISF in support of stability and security.

Lines of operation define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. As a means of connecting tactical action to strategic effect, CJSOTF-AP constructed an operational design along four LOOs: foreign internal defense,

or FID; combined offensive operations; targeting enemy networks; and developing networks of influence. The LOOs were completely nested within the lines of operation of the USF-I and the CJSOTF-AP's higher SOF headquarters, Special Operations Command Central, or SOCCENT.

The LOOs formed an operational model that retained the targeting processes of the CJSOTF-AP and its partnered ISFs. The FID LOO focused on building the capacity and capability of CJSOTF-AP-partnered ISF to secure the population, conduct combat operations and train and teach "graduate-level" tasks, such as logistics, sensitive-site exploitation or legal processing. The combined-offensive-operations LOO consisted of combat operations by partner forces, advised and enabled by U.S. SOF, conducted to disrupt threats to the Iraqi population and elections in a transparent and accountable manner. The targeting-enemy-networks LOO described the myriad tasks the CJSOTF-AP and its partners conducted not only to find the enemy and expose undue influence but also to freely share information critical to enabling Iraqi unilateral operations and intelligence-gathering.

The three LOOs discussed above complemented each other and produced a cyclic effect that resulted in an effective training and operational model for conducting effective, Iraqi-led operations. Training ISF (FID) is the foundation of the model and creates competent ISF who can conduct basic counterinsurgency or other security tasks. In concert with daily and continuous contact between U.S. SOF and ISF, training helps to build relationships that foster trust and camaraderie. That trust leads to increased information-sharing that can be channeled into the second LOO, targeting enemy networks. With targetable information and competent ISF, U.S. SOF can then conduct precision, intelligence-driven, combined offensive operations (third LOO).

Effective operations that eliminate or decrease the threat on the streets to the local populace and their families not only produced more confident and competent ISF, but it led to more willingness for locals, family and friends of ISF, and others to provide additional information, leading to more targeting and more combined offensive operations. The training cycle continues throughout and grows to include more advanced tasks such as the integration and use of assets such as aviation; information- and intelligence-gathering; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR. In time, ISF will be able to conduct an increasing number of these tasks unilaterally, with minimal oversight from U.S. SOF.

The three LOOs discussed above rested on and were supported by the fourth LOO: developing networks of influence. Through continuous interaction and key-leader engagement between all levels of Iraqi military and civilian leadership and adjacent U.S. forces, U.S. SOF first gained and then maintained freedom of movement and action, facilitated mission approval and consequence-management, and provided situational awareness and understanding across the OE. The successful implementation of this training and operational model was a critical part of enabling an Iraqi-led, complete targeting cycle: finding, fixing and finishing/capturing the enemy, exploiting them for additional information, analyzing the information and producing additional targetable intelligence, and disseminating the information to continue the cycle.

The bulk of CJSOTF-AP operations, actions and activities were focused on USF-I's near-term objective of setting the conditions for successful Iraqi national parliamentary elections in early 2010. Over the course of the combat rotation, the CJSOTF-AP was able to advance, if not accomplish, each of the effects that anchored the operational design. Many of the tasks changed as the operational environment transitioned and the level of emphasis on the various lines of effort shifted in accordance with the commander's guidance, but the construct endured. It proved to be extremely useful and laid the foundation for mission success. Those effects were:

1. National, provincial and local leaders employ CJSOTF-AP partners as an integral part of election security.
2. Iraqi government and populace view national-security forces; the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, or ISOF; the Emergency Response Brigade, or ERB; and other select partnered ISF as legitimate, capable and stabilizing forces.

3. ISOF, ERB and select partnered ISF lead efforts in consequence management and information operations.
4. ISOF, ERB and select partnered ISF continue to develop and utilize a transparent and accountable targeting process.
5. Threat groups in Iraq are unable to conduct lethal operations against or exert undue influence on the national elections.

In order to synchronize and integrate SOF's contribution to the fight in Iraq, the CJSOTF-AP commander developed battlefield visualization as a means of graphically and geospatially depicting his intent. The product eventually represented the broad range of effects that the CJSOTF-AP was able to achieve across Iraq. Given the geographical dispersion of CJSOTF-AP forces, the focus of effort varied from region to region, based on the local situation, the local threat and the priorities of local, provincial and national Iraqi officials. By nesting this battlefield visualization with USF-I leadership, CJSOTF-AP was able to seamlessly synchronize SOF operations nationwide, generating unity of effort and ensuring that all subordinate units were nested with the commander's targeting priorities and operational objectives.

An additional benefit of the commander's battlefield visualization concept was the ability to create common understanding and



ON POINT Special Forces Soldiers train Iraqi soldiers. *U.S. Army photo.*

shared awareness with partnered ISF. The CJSOTF-AP commander distributed copies of the battlefield visualization (translated into Arabic) to partnered ISF leaders and helped them to appreciate the value of executing nonsectarian operations in support of the Iraqi government.

Based on guidance from the USF-I general-officer leaders, as well as feedback from the leaders of partner ISFs, the visualization evolved. For example, one significant modification was the emphasis on information operations as the MNC-I commander sought to expose and disrupt Iranian influence in Iraq. Another was the addition of a requirement to mitigate "Ba'athist influence" in northern Iraq, as suggested by the director of the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service. As the visualization evolved, it became the centerpiece of collaboration between CJSOTF-AP, MNC-I and partnered ISF.

With an effective operational design and shared battlefield visualization, CJSOTF-AP was able to restore an operational tempo, or OPTEMPO, of detention operations that had significantly decreased following the implementation of the security agreement on Jan. 1, 2009, and the June 30, 2009, Out of the Cities directive for combat forces. As combat advisers to the ISF, CJSOTF-AP forces were able to remain with partnered ISF in the cities and, in many locations, were the sole American presence after the direc-



PAYING RESPECTS As key leaders in the community watch, a Special Forces Soldier with Special Operations Task Force-Central talks to Sheik Farhan, the head of the council, during a visit to deliver three tractors to the council members of the agricultural district of Ain al-Tamur in Karbala, Iraq. *U.S. Army photo.*

tives went into effect. Months of focused key-leader engagement by military and civilian leaders at all levels with Iraqi civilian, political, security, religious, tribal and other influential personalities, coupled with continuous pressure on threat networks through non-sectarian partnered operations, allowed CJSOTF-AP to sustain an OPTEMPO higher than that prior to the implementation of the security agreement. Despite the significant increase in OPTEMPO, CJSOTF-AP continued to spend the majority of its time and effort training ISF on various levels of individual and collective tasks, exploitation, etc., all to facilitate an Iraqi-led targeting cycle. Training ISF remained the cornerstone of the operational design and comprised 61 percent of all operations.

Marketing strategy

Strategic communications played a critical role in CJSOTF-AP's mission during OIF VII. Command messages — derived from USF-I guidance, the commander's battlefield visualization, intent and operational design — became an integral component of every tactical operation, key-leader engagement, distinguished-visitor event or partner-force encounter.

The CJSOTF-AP commander collected and refined the command themes and messages into a clear “marketing strategy” early in the deployment in order to influence decision makers and protect operational freedom of action and agility. By highlighting

CJSOTF-AP's unique contribution to OIF and proven operational successes among the senior USF-I leadership in Baghdad and other senior commanders across the OE, CJSOTF-AP was allocated additional ISR platforms and other mission-critical resources for combined operations with partnered ISF.

As the senior communicator for the CJSOTF-AP, the commander travelled throughout Iraq to shape the mindset of senior ISF leadership, educate senior U.S. leaders and influence decision-making at the operational level. This offensive approach to marketing supported the CJSOTF-AP mission, increased operational effectiveness, and garnered maximum material and moral support across Iraq. Through regular interaction and engagement with leaders at all levels, the commander was able to gain mission approvals and maintain freedom of action.

The centerpiece of the marketing strategy hinged on maintaining a continuous dialogue between USF-I leaders and the leaders of CJSOTF-AP's ISF partners in order to help them “know themselves” (i.e., all friendly forces) as well as the threat. U.S. and Iraqi leaders alike needed to understand CJSOTF-AP's capabilities and methods — including the operational design and battlefield visualization (within appropriate classification and operational requirements) — as well as how those elements were nested within their own designs and plans, in order to take full advantage of them. The key to maintaining that dialogue was putting the vehicles in place

to make the most of the face-to-face collaboration necessary for gaining trust, understanding and efficiency. These vehicles took some of the best officers away from the CJSOTF-AP staff in order to fill positions for liaison officers, or LNOs, but the initial impact on the staff was alleviated once the benefit of the marketing strategy took hold. Battlefield circulation and key-leader engagement by the CJSOTF-AP commander, LNOs and an SF liaison element, or SFLE, at the Iraqi Counter Terror Service, or CTS, accomplished the lion's share of marketing the CJSOTF-AP to U.S. and Iraqi leaders.

On a periodic basis, based on battlefield conditions and emerging initiatives, the CJSOTF-AP commander conducted office calls with the commanders of MNC-I and MND. The CJSOTF-AP commander also provided monthly face-to-face updates on operations and intelligence to the USF-I headquarters monthly and received division-level commanders at the CJSOTF-AP headquarters for office calls, command briefings and orientations on the operations of the CJSOTF-AP Joint Operations Center, or JOC. The CJSOTF-AP

and coordinated aviation, ISR and other technical assets in support of CTS and ISOF missions. The SFLE expanded the CJSOTF-AP commander's network of influence into the highest levels of the Iraqi counterterrorist structure and laid the foundations for a strategic, enduring partnership with CTS and the ISOF brigades.

Information sharing

CJSOTF-AP and USF-I have made significant strides in the use of information technology and knowledge-management in Iraq to help streamline command and staff functions. In fact, the capability built in theater is quickly becoming the model for a collaborative information environment in garrison for many units by establishing portals, online collaboration tools, command-and-control software and video teleconference suites. CJSOTF-AP recognized and seized the opportunity to supplement its marketing strategy and become more transparent by leveraging technology and allowing unrestricted access to the CJSOTF-AP information environment.

This offensive approach to marketing supported the CJSOTF-AP mission, increased operational effectiveness and garnered maximum material and moral support across Iraq.

commander took every available opportunity to engage Iraqi military and civilian leaders in order to break down any walls between them, the CJSOTF-AP and U.S. SOF personnel located in their areas, and to reinforce the messages and themes already presented from subordinate commanders.

CJSOTF-AP positioned LNOs at all levels within CF commands. LNOs at MNC-I and MND headquarters attended daily updates and were immediately available to the CF commander to serve as a two-way conduit for information between commands. At USF-I, the CJSOTF-AP LNO briefed (for approval) all sensitive missions to the DCG-O nightly and briefed CJSOTF-AP missions at the division level, as well. USD LNOs provided operations summaries and other post-mission reporting products to the USD and participated in target working groups and intelligence-fusion meetings. USD intelligence and targeting cells also attended weekly working groups at the SOTFs. Often the presence of the LNOs facilitated rapid communication and coordination during high-priority and emerging operations, greatly shortening communication and reaction time between CF commanders and CJSOTF-AP. That same type of interaction, information sharing and notification occurred with senior Iraqi leaders through the Iraqi Operations Coordination Group and at lower levels through partnered ISF and provincial operations centers.

Finally, the CJSOTF-AP deployed an SFLE to the headquarters of the Iraqi CTS in Baghdad as a means of enhancing the working relationship and trust between senior Iraqi CTS officials and the CJSOTF-AP. The SFLE not only facilitated targeting and mission approval but also provided intelligence assessments and updates

CJSOTF-AP participated in weekly secure video teleconference sessions with the MNF-I commander, as well as with adjacent CF commands. During these sessions, CJSOTF-AP often provided a perspective not otherwise available to CF commands because of the restrictions on the presence and use of U.S. forces within populated areas, which varied according to time and location. Similarly, the CJSOTF-AP commander participated in command-post-of-the-future virtual meetings, whether scheduled weekly or convened ad-hoc, to respond to immediate threats and opportunities. The chief of staff, J2, J3 and other staff elements regularly participated in teleconferences with their counterparts in the USF-I and other CF.

CJSOTF-AP established and updated a SharePoint portal on the secure Internet protocol router, or SIPR, network. Requests for intelligence, or RFIs, from higher headquarters decreased significantly after the establishment of the portal at CJSOTF-AP headquarters. The portal was open to the SIPR world, requiring no login account or special access privileges to gain access to intelligence and operational information the headquarters possessed. The portal became the CJSOTF-AP's primary platform for dissemination and collaboration. That collaborative approach enabled SF A-detachments to access information previously encased behind firewalls or stashed off-line in shared drives. During the relief in place/transfer of authority, or RIP/TOA, at the end of the rotation, the 5th SF Group, as the returning core of the CJSOTF-AP headquarters, had already gained situational awareness while at home station by accessing the CJSOTF-AP portal. The "virtual JOC" section of the portal provided a near-real-time picture of current operations and

was accessible to anyone with a SIPR account. The openness of the portal also helped mitigate the perception within USF-I, the USDs, other national SOF and other governmental agencies, or OGAs, that SOF does not share information.

From mission planning through execution and detainee operations, products and information were uploaded in real time onto the CJSOTF-AP portal. That valuable post-mission information, which could be uploaded from subordinate unit locations, was accessible not only to the detaining SF detachment, but also to all CF and OGAs. In fact, all CJSOTF-AP reporting, briefing products, etc., were available to the entire SIPR community, because the CJSOTF-AP completely eliminated all traditional internal shared drives that typically confuse, stove-pipe and hide useful information. The third-order effect of the collaborative processes was that the staff workload at CJSOTF-AP was reduced, which in turn reduced the requirement for large numbers of staff officers. Ultimately, shared access to shared information generated unity of effort between SOF and CF headquarters deployed within theater.

CJSOTF-AP not only allowed CF into their portal, they also actively participated in the USF-I portal and databases to answer RFIs, provide input to planning products and share intelligence developed by U.S. SOF. The best examples are the daily contributions from analysts at CJSOTF-AP to the Combined Information Data Network Exchange database maintained by USF-I. The data and summaries entered were generated by operations conducted at the SOTF; advanced operational base, or AOB; and SF A-detachment level, and they often were the only sources of information on specific events or locations within the USF-I area of operations.

OEO interaction

U.S. forces no longer “own” their areas of operation in Iraq. The Iraqi ministries of defense or interior are now the owners of the operational environment, which creates additional complexity in notifying, gaining approval and deconflicting operations. CJSOTF-AP interaction in the operating environment with U.S. CF and the Iraqi national and provincial operations centers proved crucial to effectively enabling and employing offensive forces in Iraq. The higher OPTEMPO that resulted from that interaction and the CJSOTF-AP marketing strategy led the CJSOTF-AP to assist in the development of mechanisms within the Iraqi legal system to lawfully detain, arrest and try suspected insurgents and terrorists.

CJSOTF-AP carefully navigated and influenced the multiple notification and approval processes that emerged as Iraqi leaders at the local, provincial and national levels gradually assumed more control of their particular areas. That ultimately became one of the three focuses for all key-leader engagements — mission approvals. The processes differed across localities and ministries, and each required a tailored approach. Prior to offensive operations, the CJSOTF-AP and SOTF operations sections took meticulous steps to obtain the concurrence or approval of the owner of the operational environment. From the tactical to the national level, CJSOTF-AP units sought mission approval and ensured deconfliction with all U.S. and Iraqi units in the area.

The CJSOTF-AP and SOTF operations sections, in conjunction with CF asset and collection managers, from the USD level to the

USF-I level, worked daily to posture assets throughout the theater to enable offensive operations. Through multiple fragmentary orders, the CJSOTF-AP and each USD were allocated ISR assets from USF-I. However, prioritization of offensive operations and collection for those operations forced all units and collection managers to work together to re-task assets on a daily basis. Whether it was pushing or pulling assets, personal relationships, coupled with constant communication and information flow enhanced by CJSOTF-AP portal access and distribution of pre-mission products, streamlined staging assets across the theater.

CJSOTF-AP units worked daily to maintain relationships with CF units at all levels. ODAs worked daily with CF battalions, AOBs worked with CF brigades, and SOTFs worked with U.S. divisions, while CJSOTF-AP interacted with the USF-I headquarters. That habitual relationship ensured that CJSOTF-AP seamlessly processed pre-mission requests for enabler support, post-mission information dissemination and consequence management. In addition to providing each CF unit with a SOF counterpart that had similar goals and interests, this partnering provided timely information management that allowed units to react to or pre-empt situations that had to be addressed.

The CJSOTF-AP legal team recognized a definite emphasis on Iraqi sovereignty and desire by Iraqi authorities to prosecute their own captured detainees rather than cede prosecution to U.S. forces. In order to facilitate the move toward legal self-sufficiency, the CJSOTF-AP legal team developed a “legal FID” initiative to pursue key-leader engagements with the primary Iraqi military and civilian legal advisers. During the rotation, the legal foreign internal defense team focused its efforts on identifying key legal advisers and processes for the ISOF. The legal teams from CJSOTF-AP, the CJSOTF-AP holding facility and SOTF-Central, along with CJSOTF-AP law-enforcement personnel, worked closely with the ISOF legal advisers and were able to obtain critical knowledge about legal processing of ISOF detainees through the Iraqi Counter Terror Command, or CTC. The establishment of the legal FID initiative led to monthly legal meetings between all key detainee legal advisers for CJSOTF-AP, CTC and ISOF. The results of these meetings and the effects they generated were available to all CF legal elements.

Conclusion

CJSOTF-AP adopted an integrated organizational approach to command and control and other staff processes that was both collaborative and transparent. Recognizing that what CJSOTF-AP knew about itself was not as important as what all the other units, agencies and partner forces in Iraq understood about it, CJSOTF-AP set out to become the most collaborative headquarters in Iraq. By anchoring CJSOTF-AP themes and messages into a marketing strategy, removing the obstacles to transparency in the virtual-information environment and reaching out to adjacent headquarters at all levels, CJSOTF-AP was able to achieve operational success across Iraq far beyond what could have been attained unilaterally.

Following the implementation of the security agreement and the Iraqi Out of the Cities policy, CJSOTF-AP immediately became the go-to force for USF-I senior leaders throughout Iraq. As the sole American presence in many areas of the country, SF A-



BREAKING BREAD A small gathering of Special Operations Task Force-Central Soldiers, Iraqi army soldiers, Iraqi police officers and local leaders eat fresh fruit and vegetables, baked fish and chicken and warm bread during a visit to deliver three tractors to the council members of the agricultural district of Ain al-Tamur in Karbala, Iraq. U.S. Army photo.

detachments, AOBs and SOTFs gleaned, processed and forwarded information on atmospheric and other local conditions to the CJSOTF-AP, which then integrated that information into area-specific estimates for USF-I and the USDs. When USF-I sought traction for emerging operational initiatives to respond to enemy trends and opportunities, they most often looked to CJSOTF-AP to provide the means to influence and achieve effects. That attests to the level of understanding and confidence vested in the efficacy of U.S. SOF by the top CF leaders. The events speak highly not only of CJSOTF-AP but also of the level of integration achieved during the OIF rotation. It seems that in Iraq, CJSOTF-AP and CF finally “know themselves” as one team in one fight with nested operational objectives and a shared vision of the way ahead for U.S. forces in Iraq. **SW**

Notes:

1. MNC-I and MNF-I merged into a single headquarters, USF-I, on Jan. 1, 2010. Multinational divisions also changed to U.S. divisions, or USD. As these changes occurred during the 10th SF Group’s rotation, USF-I and USD will be used throughout the rest of this paper.
2. The MNC-I commander became the USF-I deputy commanding general for operations upon the merger of MNF-I and MNC-I.

Colonel Sean P. Swindell is the commander of the 10th SF Group and was commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula during Operation Iraqi Freedom VII.

Lieutenant Colonel Erik M. Brown is commander of the 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group, and was the J3 of CJSOTF-AP during OIF VII.

Major Sean C. Williams is the S3 of the 10th SF Group, and was the deputy J3 of CJSOTF-AP during OIF VII.

Major Ryan M. McCabe is the S2 of the 10th SF Group, and was the J2 of CJSOTF-AP during OIF VII.

Major Christopher L. Howsden is commander of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group, and was the J35 director for CJSOTF-AP during OIF VII.

Major Stephen G. Schnell is commander of Company C, 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group, and was the ISOF planner for CJSOTF-AP during OIF VII.

Major David L. Wakefield is the commander of Company B, 4th Battalion, 10th SF Group, and was the officer in charge of the SF liaison element to the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service during OIF VII.

Command Sergeant Major Brian D. Edwards is the command sergeant major of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School’s 1st Special Warfare Training Group and was the command sergeant major of CJSOTF-AP during OIF VII.

OFFICER Board to consider applicants for NPS, ISP

The board to consider Soldiers in Army special-operations forces for attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School, or NPS, and the Interagency Studies Program, or ISP, will be held at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School Feb. 17.

NPS is an 18-month program open to officers and NCOs in Military Information Support Operations, or MISO, and officers, warrant officers and NCOs in Special Forces, or SF. The school, located in Monterey, Calif., conducts two cycles: winter (January start) and summer (June start). Applicants must indicate that they are applying for a June 2011 start.

ISP is open to commissioned officers in Civil Affairs, MISO and SF. The program, taught at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., runs concurrently with Intermediate Level Education and ends in late July or early August so that personnel will arrive at their new assignments in late summer.

Target groups this year for both programs are eligible CA and MISO officers in year groups 1999, 2000 and 2001; SF officers in YGs 1998, 1999 and 2000; SF warrant officers in grades CWO 3 and CWO 4; and CA, MISO and SF NCOs in the grade of master sergeant and sergeant major, or sergeant first class with a waiver.

NPS application requirements are:

- Obtain an academic profile code from NPS.
- Have an undergraduate grade-point average of 2.5 or higher.
- Obtain transcripts from all educational institutions.
- Complete DA Form 1618-R.

- Submit a copy of the latest enlisted or officer record brief.
- Submit up to three letters of recommendation. (These cannot be written by the commander or deputy commander of SWCS or the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC; or by the commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.)
- Submit copies of the applicant's last three evaluation reports.

MISO officers assigned to the 4th Military Information Support Group must have a letter of endorsement from the group commander or his representative. CA officers assigned to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade must have a letter of endorsement from the brigade commander or his representative. Applications from officers in Military Intelligence must have a letter of recommendation from the USASOC G2.

There are some additional considerations for ARSOF NCOs:

- Must be on active duty.
- Must have completed the NCO educational programs appropriate for grade and years of service.
- Must not have more than 22 years of active federal service, as of the report date to the academic institution.
- Must possess a bachelor's degree from an accredited institution.
- Master-sergeant applicants must have completed 24 months as a team sergeant.
- Sergeant-major applicants must have completed 12 months as a company sergeant major.

- Must have remaining enlistment equal to or greater than three times the length of the requested schooling.
 - NCOs will incur a three-year additional service obligation and will be slated by the USASOC command sergeant major to serve in a key utilization billet following graduation.
 - Applications from NCOs must include a letter of recommendation from the applicant's group command sergeant major.
- ISP application requirements are:

- Obtain transcripts from all educational institutions.
- Submit a copy of the latest officer record brief.
- Submit letters of recommendation.
- Submit copies of the last three evaluation reports.
- Submit an essay of up to 500 words titled, "How Interagency Studies Will Contribute to My Career Goals and Strengthen SOF's Defense Contributions."

Officer application packets for both programs must be submitted to the applicant's assignments officer at the Army Human Resources Command by Jan. 19; no late packets will be accepted. HRC will screen the packets for eligibility and forward qualifying packets to the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency for boarding. Enlisted application packets must be submitted to SWCS DSOP directly.

For additional information, Soldiers should contact their assignments officer at HRC or telephone Jeanne Goldmann, SWCS DSOP, at DSN 239-6922 or commercial (910) 432-6922.

ENLISTED FY 2011 Sergeant First Class promotion board set for February

The FY 2011 Sergeant First Class Promotion Selection Board will be conducted from Feb. 3-28, 2011. To obtain official guidance for the board, refer to the most current MILPER message or contact SGM Edward Morrell at DSN 239-7594 or commercial (910) 432-7594. Eligible staff sergeants should begin reviewing their records to ensure that they accurately represent the NCO's service and include a current DA photo. For additional information, visit <https://www.hrc.army.mil>.

WARRANT OFFICER FY 2011 WO promotion board set for January

The FY 2011 Warrant Officer Promotion Selection Board will be conducted from Jan. 19 to Feb. 20, 2011. Official guidance for the board is scheduled for release by MILPER message in early to mid-September. Eligible warrant officers should begin reviewing their records to ensure that they accurately represent the officer's service and include a current DA photo. For additional information, visit <https://www.hrc.army.mil> or contact the 180A career manager, CWO 4 Terry Baltimore, by sending e-mail to: terry.baltimore@us.army.mil.

COOPERATION IN CHANGE: An Anthropological Approach to Community Development

Even when planned and conducted with the best of intentions, United States security and humanitarian-assistance efforts often conflict with deeply held cultural values and are resisted by the very communities they are meant to assist. Too often, development projects provide little value to the community or are accomplished only at great cost. *Cooperation in Change* offers an approach to operations of security-force assistance and security, stabilization, transition and reconstruction that focuses on the human component of the community, a facet too often overlooked by U.S. assistance planners.


Despite having been published 46 years ago, *Cooperation in Change* describes the problems encountered during community development that still plague commanders, government officials and members of nongovernmental organizations today, as shown in the report by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, as well as in after-action reviews, news reports and editorials.

While Ward Goodenough's description of developmental problems has proven to be correct, his recommended approach for dealing with those problems has yet to be implemented. As communities and critics have seen in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, the Philippines and too many other countries to mention, officials base their development efforts on addressing what they evaluate the needs of the community to be, without evaluating what the community feels its own needs to be. Because "culture" is hard to define and harder to describe, assessment teams are

prone to focus on more easily described and reported conditions, such as population demographics or infrastructure features, like wells and clinics. Officials, in turn, prefer to base their plans on discrete factors, such as the numbers of police or schools, instead of on "fuzzy" variables, such as the community's willingness to talk to the police or send its children to school.

Though offering a comprehensive and well-referenced anthropological approach to community development, *Cooperation in Change* is eminently readable. The author uses a logical outline and plain language, and he uses examples and illustrations drawn from his fieldwork in Truk, Oceania, Micronesia and Papua, New Guinea, that will resonate with military commanders and Department of State officials who have worked overseas. Readers with experience in security-force assistance or stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations will recall situations in which an anthropological approach could have better focused their efforts, and they will be able to imagine how such an approach could guide future planning to ensure that the community being assisted will take ownership of assistance efforts instead of resisting them.

In addition to presenting an approach for assessment of community needs and the cultural factors that affect assistance efforts, Goodenough provides criteria for selection, essential training and operational employment of change agents. He also describes operational requirements that change agents must meet to be effective. He also provides an outline for identifying potential conflicts in community development and predicting how cultural



DETAILS

By Ward Hunt Goodenough

New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1963

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Reviewed by:

CW03 Chad Machiela
Naval Postgraduate School

factors will interact with operations that will allow commanders to estimate and plan for second- and third-order effects. Additionally, Goodenough describes methods to measure real success of assistance efforts — not by the number of wells dug or village elders met with, but by the extent to which community members undertake for themselves to change the way they live.

Drawn from academic study and extensive overseas experience in underdeveloped communities, well-organized and easy to read, *Cooperation in Change* is highly recommended for commanders or policy officials whose duties require the planning of operations or policy that will affect host-nation communities. **SW**

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