

TF Arctic Wolves  
SFAT 1, 3, 5, 6, 7

# Security & Stability

## ANSF Development



- How to grow ANP capacity during Eid
- Organizing your Training
- Culturally considerate while continuing to train

### Inside this issue:

<i>Organizing and Preparing for Success</i>	2
<i>Working Through Ramadan</i>	8
<i>AUP Organization at the District Level</i>	10
<i>Limited Academy slots create untrained Police</i>	12
<i>Combined Checkpoints</i>	16

## Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Organizing and Preparing for Success

By Col. Thomas P. Weikert, Maj. Carson E. Davis, Maj. Graham M. Fishburn, and Sgt. Maj. William N. Montgomery

ANP in Kandahar Province stand in formation to receive graduation certificates.



### Introduction

As the U.S. Army expands its Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission in Afghanistan and considers options for developing a force and capability to execute future missions, it is instructive to take a close look at the current state of SFA Team (SFAT) fielding under the MB-SFA concept. Contained in the following pages is a detailed account of 1-25 SBCT’s planning and preparation for their MB-SFA mission, lessons learned, and a recommended way ahead for a BCT organizing and preparing for the SFA mission.

### Mission Analysis

As the initial step in its SFA mission preparation, 1-25 SBCT conducted a thorough mission analysis. Conducting mission analysis for SFA has unique considerations. It includes analyzing the environment, population, enemy, and the Foreign Security Force (FSF) to be advised. As the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) looks deep into its own formation for SFA capabilities and resources it must answer the following questions:

- 1) Which of the BCT’s leaders and Soldiers are best suited to be organized into advising teams? This requires individuals with personalities and skills compatible with SFA.
- 2) What standard resources will come with augmentation packages (equipment / capabilities)?
- 3) What types of FSF units will the advisory teams support?

*“...arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.”*

*-Sec. of Def. Robert Gates to the AUSA, Oct. 2007*

There is no right way a BCT task organizes itself for the SFA mission, but there are several principles, founded on the Army’s recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, which influence task organization. BCTs should organize into two distinct elements, streamlined through one chain of command: the partnering force and the advising force. BCTs should carefully consider each leader and Soldier assigned to the advising force. Rank is not the only indicator of competence to conduct advisory missions. Some Soldiers are better suited, based on experience and maturity, to handle the unique challenges of advising FSF. Regardless of how a Brigade task organizes their SFA teams, it should be consistent with the BCT Commander’s COIN and SFA guidance.

As a Modular Brigade, Commanders will receive additional senior NCOs and Officers to support the SFA mission. These Officers and NCOs, sourced from throughout the Army, should form the core group of SFA leaders who are augmented with Soldiers from across the Brigade and battalions. The augmenters will provide the SFA teams with the necessary MOS specialty skills to be successful in the Brigade’s SFA mission. BCTs should build these teams as early as possible in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle for cohesion, trust, and esprit-de-corps.

The key advantage of having a BCT execute the SFA mission is that advisor teams fall under the command and control of a BCT commander. This ensures unity of effort at the lowest possible level.

When the senior SFA leaders join the BCT, best practice requires them to PCS to the BCT's home station as early in the BCT's regeneration cycle as possible. This provides maximum stability for families and provides adequate time for integration, SFA mission analysis, and training. The BCT commander then has the flexibility and time to build a cohesive, trained, and trusted team of advisors.

Once the task organization is established for the SFA mission, BCTs develop training plans that address the unique skill sets required for the SFA mission. Soldiers and leaders who serve as advisors require significantly different skill sets than Soldiers who partner with FSF units, or conduct combat operations. Prior to individual training, commanders must identify two different training paths for their Soldiers. The first will be for Soldiers selected to serve as advisors, and the second for Soldiers who will partner with FSF.

SFA teams must be formed and trained similarly to Special Forces A-teams. Team training should focus on language, culture, and translator training, foreign weapons and equipment training. Additionally, using the 'train-the-trainer' model, teams should receive training on the specific military tasks that they will likely train the FSF on. Finally, they must conduct cross-training among all members of the advisory team to compensate for reduced combat power. Examples of skills requiring cross-training include communication, close air support skills, and medical training.

### ***1-25 SBCT SFA Planning***

During the mission analysis phase of their planning, 1-25 SBCT considered the optimal way to organize the SFA teams for deployment to Afghanistan and then task organized them prior to its Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE). This ensured maximum training value for both the teams and their supporting battalions. In positioning the 1-25 SBCT for success, the Brigade developed a plan approximately 6 months prior to the SFA team members' arrival and then executed the plan. In addition to the aforementioned analysis, the plan took into account the following factors:


- The majority of team members would arrive with fewer than 4 weeks remaining before the BCT's MRE.
- Five of the assigned LTC/05s were selected from the Battalion Command Select List (CSL) to be SFA Team Leaders. Per the CSA's guidance, these 5 officers would need to be assigned SFA teams.

***“Regardless of how a Brigade task organizes their SFA teams, it should be consistent with the BCT Commander’s COIN and SFA guidance.”***





*“The key advantage of having a BCT execute the SFA mission is that the advisor teams fall under the command and control of a BCT commander. This ensures unity of effort at the lowest possible level.”*



- The Brigade would need to ensure an equitable distribution of ranks, MOSs, and Afghanistan experience across the teams.
- Consistent with theater force protection guidelines, teams would require a security element in order to operate independently and securely in theater during the deployment; they would need to train together during the MRE.
- Team would need to be equipped for both mobility and survivability on the battlefield.
- Teams would need to complete all USFORSCOM Southwest Asia (SWA) Training Guidance pre-deployment tasks prior to deployment.
- Teams would need to complete all SFA training to include the following:
  - Block A (Advisor Academy)
  - Block B (Mission Rehearsal Exercise at NTC)
  - Block D (Culmination Exercise)
- The Brigade would need to create a sixth team, or Fusion Cell, to provide C2 of the SFA teams prior to the MRE and to manage administrative in-processing and other SFA related issues. In addition, the Fusion Cell would serve as a single point of contact for the Brigade staff and the various on-post support agencies at the BCT’s home station, Fort Wainwright, Alaska. Subsequent to the brigade’s deployment to Afghanistan, the Fusion Cell would also need to drive the ANSF Development effort for the BCT.

*Note: The Fusion Cell ultimately took on the responsibility for the Brigade SFAT’s assuming a Unit Identification Code (UIC) which allowed them to obtain TDA equipment. They appointed a primary hand receipt holder and identified a senior NCO to assume the role of Supply Sergeant. This NCO had responsibility for handling many of the purchase requests and equipment acquisition. Equipment per the TDA consisted mostly of individual weapons, protective masks, bayonets, and laptop computers that were purchased. At this point, all equipment requests were for individual equipment and did not address SFA teams’ requirements for mobility, survivability, and communications. In addition to the Brigade staff proponent for the SFA mission, the Brigade would need an Advance Party to pursue much of the coordination at Fort Wainwright and to ensure a smooth RSOI for the team members.*



**Pre-MRE Planning and Coordination**

The Brigade Fire Support and Effects (FSE) Cell was tasked with initial coordination for the SFA teams to include training conducted by the 162<sup>d</sup> Infantry Brigade. In concert with the Brigade S3, members of the FSE coordinated Blocks A and D training for the team beginning 6 months out. The Brigade XO then led a series of monthly IPRs beginning approximately 4 months out. Additionally, the FSE Cell reached out to the SFA team members to welcome them to the Brigade and to begin early preparation for the team members’ arrival. The Bri-


gade S4 was tasked with ordering individual equipment team members would need for the MRE.

At 3 months out, members of the SFAT Advance Party arrived and took over SFA mission planning from the Brigade staff. This Advance Party was responsible for organizing teams, and integrating them into the Brigade. They began intensive planning and coordination in anticipation of the team’s arrival. Additionally, this two-man team assumed responsibility for the following tasks:

- Assisting the BCT Commander develop his SFA guidance
- Organizing the SFAT into teams
- Communicating with inbound team members to begin the RSOI process
- Final coordination of SFA training to be conducted at Fort Wainwright (Blocks A and D)
- Tracking equipment requisitions to include those for weapons, optics, and NVGs
- Implementing a sponsorship program for arriving members
- Coordinating for billeting and other support (e.g., Finance, G8 accounting classification for orders) for the SFAT’s TDY members
- Scheduling a series of social functions to facilitate integration of team members into the Brigade

*“It was the BCT Commander’s intent that during the MRE the battalions would get used to supporting an SFA team.”*

Upon the SFA team members’ arrival at Fort Wainwright and with approximately 4 weeks remaining before the MRE, the Advance Party organized the SFAT members into teams, gave them an orientation brief, and decentralized administrative processes and training. SFA Team Leaders immediately assumed responsibility for ensuring their teams in-processed, trained, and equipped for the MRE and deployment. Enabled by the Fusion Cell, SFA Team Leaders immediately began to plan and conduct training with their teams. Their maneuver battalion partners provided them access to ranges, training resources, equipment, and office and classroom space.




*“The 1-25 SBCT Commander insisted that SFA Team Leaders participate in the weekly Brigade Command and Staff and Training meetings along with their maneuver battalion commander counterparts.”*

**MRE**

Prior to the MRE and during the Leader Training Program (LTP), the BCT ensured each maneuver battalion planned for an SFA team operating in their battle space. The SFA team would be responsible for supporting Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) development efforts in the battalion’s battle space and mentoring their Afghan partners. Missions would be either division-level or Brigade-level ANSF Command and Control (C2) nodes in each battalion’s AO consistent with what the Brigade expected in theater. If the battalion was not tasked with

either of those, then the maneuver battalion commander would decide how to best deploy their SFA team against mock ANSF operating in his battle space.



*“Establishing the Fusion Cell (Team 6) proved invaluable in creating a fusion capability for both the MRE and the OEF deployment.”*

For purposes of the exercise as well as for the OEF deployment, the BCT Commander elected to place the SFA team under the battalion’s Operational Control (OPCON). Additionally, the maneuver battalion would be in direct support (DS) of the SFA team. The BCT tasked each maneuver battalion with providing a platoon (-) to support their OPCON SFA team. In addition to men, the platoon (-) would come complete with vehicles, crew-served weapons, and other organic equipment. It was the BCT Commander’s intent that during the MRE the battalions would get used to supporting an SFA team. Additionally, when the battalions deployed to Afghanistan, the command and support relationships would endure.

With the creation of the Fusion Cell (Team 6) the Brigade further supported the SFA mission. Team 6’s support to the other SFA teams and the BCT included:

- Tracking and reporting Afghan National Security Force Development (ANSF DEV) efforts
- Commanders Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) reporting
- Key Leader Engagement (KLE) reporting
- Resourcing SFA teams to include equipping and contracting support



*Note: Most of the additional equipment needed for an SFA team was fielded through the maneuver battalion aligned with that team. The teams interacted directly with the battalion staffs in order to fulfill requirements for supply, intelligence, communication, and mobility during the MRE. If a team was unable to obtain needed supplies from their supporting battalion, the team would communicate this requirement to the Fusion Cell (Team 6). The Fusion Cell (Team 6) would in turn coordinate with the BDE staff for the needed support.*

Ensuring a cross-talk capability so that SFA teams could share lessons learned and tips from working with their ANSF counterparts

**Lessons Learned**

The 1-25 SBCT’s SFAT fielding for the MRE was highly effective, and teams successfully deployed to Afghanistan with their supporting battalions. The Brigade validated the SFA concept for the BCT and battalion commanders during the MRE and according to the NTC Observer-Controllers (OCs) evaluating both the maneuver battalions and the SFAT, 1-25 SBCT ‘set a new standard’ for the MB-SFA concept.



Essential to the BCT’s success in integrating the teams on a short timeline and ensuring a successful MRE were the following:

**Command emphasis.** The importance of command emphasis to the success of

the SFA mission cannot be overstated. The 1-25 SBCT Commander insisted that SFA Team Leaders participate in the weekly Brigade Command and Staff and Training meetings along with their maneuver battalion commander counterparts. Team Leaders occupied seats next to the battalion commanders during these meetings until the BCT deployed. Additionally, the BCT Commander empowered the SFA Team Leaders to determine their left and right limits. For instance, whether they should establish separate Derivative UICs (DUICs) for the purpose of laterally transferring equipment, setting up FRG (Family Readiness Groups) websites, or accessing ASFF funds during the deployment. This approach conveyed the BCT Commander's belief in the SFA mission. It also communicated his confidence in the SFA Team Leaders' abilities and guaranteed a close working relationship between the maneuver battalion commanders and SFA Team Leaders during the MRE and subsequent deployment.

**Social events.** A series of social events was planned and coordinated involving all SFA team members including a 'meet and greet' conducted shortly after the SFA team members' arrival at Fort Wainwright. In addition, a NCAA National Championship football party was scheduled involving Team Leaders and Team NCOICs, maneuver battalions' leadership teams – battalion commanders and command sergeants major – and key members of the Brigade staff. These events enabled the SFA team members to bond early and assisted the Team Leaders in building their organizations. Equally important, the SFA leadership and their maneuver battalion counterparts were able to bond and develop a close working relationship prior to the MRE.

**SFA Team OPCON.** As discussed and consistent with the Brigade Commander's intent, the Brigade task organized an SFA team to each of the 5 land-owning battalions and placed the teams under the land owner's OPCON for the MRE. This ensured unity of command and provided the battalion commander a strategic capability in his battle space. The battalion commander gained valuable experience during the MRE leveraging his SFA asset in operations involving his mock Afghan Security Force (ANSF) partners. SFA Team Leaders successfully performed as senior advisors to their counterpart Battalion Commanders on all SFA and ANSF Development matters. The commanders all viewed the SFA teams as value added.

**Resourcing ANSF Development.** During the MRE, each SFA team determined minimal resources (manning and equipping) required to accomplish their mission during the upcoming deployment. Key lessons learned: Which skill sets are essential for advisors working with the ANSF at Corps or Brigade level? What technology and systems are essential in a Combined TOC to support ANSF C2 vice Advisor Situational Awareness, i.e., what do the ANSF need vice what does the SFA team need? How do we enable ANSF with tools that are sustainable? How do we assist them become better at C2 and battle tracking using their methods and not our systems, processes, and technologies?

**Fusion Cell.** The Fusion Cell (Team 6) ensured C2 and effective resourcing for the teams during the pre-MRE period and minimized friction while integrating

*“As the Army expands the SFA concept in Afghanistan and fields more SFA teams, it will be essential to ensure detailed policy is provided to the BCT commander and staff to assist them in integrating SFA team members.”*

teams into the BCT. The Fusion Cell (Team 6) also provided the Brigade with a single point of contact for communications and coordination with the SFA teams until they could be task organized to their respective battalions. Establishing the Fusion Cell (Team 6) proved invaluable in creating a fusion capability for both the MRE and the OEF deployment. Resourcing and reporting processes were established, and the Brigade Staff was able to access and leverage the SFA teams to support operations.



*Note: Establishing the Fusion Cell (Team 6) created some problems with dual reporting, e.g., personnel reporting and equipment status. Often, teams reported to their supporting battalion, Brigade Troops Battalion (BTB) HHC, and the Fusion Cell (Team 6). The proper reporting lines should be outlined clearly from the beginning. Command relationships should be outlined early in the SFA mission analysis. Additionally, the Fusion Cell (Team 6) can be staffed with members outside the SFA, i.e., LNOs and specialty areas. A fully integrated ANSF Development effort would bring much needed expertise to the Brigade's ANSF Development Line of Effort (LOE). This would afford the Brigade staff and the maneuver battalions better visibility and buy-in with the SFA/ANSF DEV effort. This would also permit more advisors to work with the ANSF.*

**Equipping.** The Brigade SFA team was provided a TDA which authorized equipment for newly assigned SFA personnel. This new hand receipt is temporary in nature for deployment purposes only and will not remain with the BCT. The equipment consisted primarily of M4 and M9 weapons, optics, protective masks, NVGs, and bayonets. We ordered and added 25 laptop computers to this hand receipt. The equipment list addresses only a fraction of the SFA team requirement. We have determined through experience that SFA teams need the capability to operate their own operations center and require their own mobility. The additional critical equipment SFA teams need includes vehicles (mobility), communications, and crew-served weapons. It would be helpful to establish a standard equipment set to meet these requirements and to task the necessary logistics agencies to provide the equipment for both the MRE and the deployment.



*“Strategy and tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of military operations, logistics the means therefore.”*

*-- Lieutenant Colonel  
George C. Thorpe, USMC*

**Property accountability.** Although hand receipted equipment is minimal, taking on the additional burden of primary hand receipt holder duties has an impact on mission. This is analogous to the responsibility of a company commander with no supply sergeant, 1SG or XO. This created an added burden for members of the SFAT and prevented maximization of mentorship roles. Different courses of action could address the problems associated with supply, equipping, and property accountability.

COA1: The Army could provide a Captain (CPT) for an SFA team who could serve as a detachment OIC or commander and a 92Y NCOIC who would serve as a supply sergeant, similar to those who serve in a SOF Operational Detachment - Bravo (OD-B) Team. This would greatly enhance the mentorship capability of the team and provide the command authority to manage and account for property.



COA 2: Another option is to add the equipment to the BTB HHC hand receipt, thus allowing the HHC commander and supply personnel to manage the SFAT equipment requirements. SFA personnel would assist both pre-MRE and during the MRE and prior to deployment, but this would promote increased time for advisors to work with their counterparts during both the MRE and deployment.

### ***Conclusion and Way Ahead***

Much of 1-25 SBCT's success can be attributed to thorough analysis, planning, and preparation. As discussed it is critical to SFA mission accomplishment that the BCT conduct a thorough mission analysis. This includes analyzing the environment, population, enemy, and the Foreign Security Force (FSF) to be advised. Equally important are a detailed analysis of personnel and equipment requirements and an assessment of the BCT's ability to fulfill those requirements. From a manning perspective, this includes resourcing both the advising and partnering forces supporting the ANSF Development effort in the BCT's battle space. Ultimately, effective task organization results in mission success.

SFA fielding for a BCT can be significantly enhanced through earlier assignment of SFAT members. In particular, facilitating assignment of CSL 05 Team Leaders as early as 90-120 days in advance of the MRE would ensure adequate time for planning and preparing for the MRE. Moreover, SFA Team Leaders could participate in LTP along with their maneuver battalion commander counterparts, have greater understanding of the exercise, and contribute more to a successful MRE. Additionally, they would be better able to organize and support their teams, plan team training, and assist with their team's proper equipping.

Secondly, the MB-SFA concept would benefit from more clearly defined Army doctrine and guidance. This includes policy with respect to organizing teams, scope of responsibility and authority for SFA Team Leaders, and issuing of authorized equipment.

As the Army expands the SFA concept in Afghanistan and fields more SFA teams, it will be essential to ensure detailed policy is provided to the BCT Commander and Staff to assist them in integrating SFA team members. For example, the Army needs to establish policy regarding how to properly process the TDY SFAT members to the gaining BCT's installation and subsequent deployment. This would ensure Soldiers and families are taken care of throughout the life cycle of their assignment.


Additionally, successful execution of the MB-SFA concept depends heavily on empowering SFA Team Leaders and ensuring their teams are fully supported. Organizing SFA teams using the OD-A and OD-B construct would assist toward this end. Finally, more education and training of Brigade personnel around the SFA mission down to Platoon Leader level is essential to gaining buy-in for the SFA mission.

Considering the number of officers and senior NCOs being assigned to SFA teams now with significant Afghanistan deployment experience, training for the SFA

***“Much of 1-25 SBCT's success can be attributed to thorough analysis, planning, and preparation.”***



team members needs to be at the “graduate” level. Under the current model, team members travel TDY, arrive on station, attend a basic advisory course for 2 weeks, and then deploy to the MRE with the rest of the Brigade. During the limited time remaining post-MRE, team members conduct mandatory USFOR-SCOM pre-deployment training.



Team members need to arrive on station with enough time to conduct more advanced training which could include the following:

- 2 weeks of DLI training (Dari or Pashto depending on the area of Afghanistan to which the BCT is deploying)
- 4 weeks of in depth, area-specific cultural training hosted by a local university or a mobile training team and led by a cultural advisor or academic
- 2-4 week internship with federal or state law enforcement agency
- Advisor seminar or roundtable hosted by former advisors from previous conflicts, i.e., Vietnam, Central America
- The type and scope of training would be based on the BCT’s mission analysis.



*“The soldier must be rooted in the past to understand the present so that he may project himself into the future.”*

*-DA PAM 200–20 1956*



## Working Through Ramadan to Establish a Starting Point with the ANP- Daman

By Maj. Shane Little, Security Forces Assistance Team 3, Daman District in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.



Upon arriving at the Daman District Headquarters back in August 2011, one of several priorities Security Forces Assistance Team 3(SFAT 3) had to do was identify the Afghanistan National Police's capabilities based on their enablers; shoot, move and communicate. The easiest place to start was looking at the previous Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). Here we could get a basic understanding of where the local ANP stood and where we needed to focus our logistical and administrative efforts.

The next move was to verify what the previous SFAT had reported. This also gave the SFAT an opportunity to interact and begin building relationships with our ANP counterparts. The team chief began with the district chief of police (DCoP) and the logistics non-commissioned officer in charge and the team executive officer engaged the administrative officer. Unfortunately for us this time period fell right in the middle of Ramadan (pronounced *Ramazan* in Afghanistan). Ramadan falls in the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, lasting for 29 to 30 days. During this month the Islamic population will refrain from eating, drinking, smoking and also sex during the hours of daylight. This practice is intended to teach or remind Muslims about spirituality, patients and submissiveness to Allah. Following Ramadan is a celebratory period called Eid usually lasting three to five days. Due to this religious period the SFAT had very limited time and participation from the ANP leadership. Our first impression was the ANP were stand offish and resisting the recent change we recently presented

Ramadan or *Ramazān* is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, which lasts 29 or 30 days. It is the Islamic month of fasting, in which participating Muslims refrain from eating, drinking, smoking and sex during daylight hours and is intended to teach Muslims about patience, spirituality, humility and submissiveness to God. Muslims fast for the sake of Allah and to offer more prayer than usual. Compared to the solar calendar, the dates of Ramadan vary, moving backwards by about eleven days each year depending on the moon...

—Wikipedia.org

them with. However, having cultural awareness training prior to the deployment we understood the situation and going against our ‘Go, Fight, Win’ instincts we had to be patient. Our key leadership engagements had to be carefully planned as to not interfere with rest time. Also taking into account the tiredness and irritability the fasting had caused over several weeks.

Eid Al-Fitr marks the end of the fasting period of Ramadan and the first day of the following month, after another new moon has been sighted. The Eid falls after 29 or 30 days of fasting, per the lunar sighting. Eid Al-Fitr means the back to the fitrah; usually a special celebration is made.

—Wikipedia.org

During this time the opportunity to plan ahead was evident and the SFAT took full advantage. We studied the Tashkil, which is the ANP’s Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and compared it to the July 2011 CUAT looking for any discrepancies. Then we began our battlefield circulation to each of our designated check points establishing an informal personnel and equipment assessment and inventory. Taking into account the accountability of personnel would be difficult, we focused on the equipment verifying serial numbers and operational status. When ANP personnel were present we kept our conversations minimal, establishing basic relationships. At the district center we were able to walk around and take note of equipment and materials present. Together with battlefield circulations and local observation we could establish a baseline for future engagements with the ANP leadership.

Once Ramadan and Eid were complete, it was back to work. The first stop was the administration officer. Normally, an AUP would consist of a logistics officer, administrative officer, training officer, intelligence officer and so on. Daman District ANP do have these designated personnel, however, the administration officer, being clearly the most educated and respected officer at headquarters, was the best man to engage first. Establishing formal greetings and gestures of respect we asked to talk about the Tashkil and what was authorized as opposed to what was on hand and fully operational. Using notes collected during Ramadan and the previous CUAT our questions were already predetermined. Keeping the conversation minimal, usually 20 to 40 minutes, we covered the basic numbers and inquired about issues pertaining to their enablers. Prior to concluding the first real productive engagement a follow up engagement to scrub numbers line by line was established. Here we were able to translate our initial objectives and plan to move ahead further building the ANP’s ability to become independent.



## AUP Organization At The District Level – Panjwa’i

By Maj. Graham Fishburn, Security Forces Assistance Team 6, Panjwa’i District in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan

In order to effectively run organizations, there are common themes that apply to organizations that are military in nature. Effective organizational structure includes a clear chain of command, delegation of authority, areas of responsibility, depth, communication, accountability and flexibility. As mentors we must first seek to understand the organization, cultural considerations, and what the Ministry of Interior (MoI) Tashkil has proscribed. After this we can begin to mentor our organization based off of the situation on the ground.

The district chief of police (DCoP) recently changed out. The district the incoming DCoP inherited had 19 check points with check point commanders. He had a logistics and personnel officer who worked at police headquarters (PHQ) and were rarely seen at the district center. They relied heavily on coalition forces for fuel. This district had gone from 60 police officers to over 450 within half a year. Literacy rates and lack of non-commissioned officer training caused an overall lack of discipline. In spite of this, the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) could conduct mission planning and participate in combined operations with some level of success.

When the DCoP changed out, many key personnel left the district to include the second- in-command. PHQ replaced the logistics officer and appointed a new second- in-command. Check point commanders rotated out, some stayed and some either quit or were relieved. Because of the critical fuel issue, the DCoP appointed a fuel officer with an assistant. The personnel officer began working at the district headquarters (DHQ) instead of at the PHQ. The PHQ supported the DCoP by allowing him to bring some personnel from PHQ, enabling him to establish the basic building blocks of a staff and chain of command.

The Panjwa’i District tashkil is considered a large district command with threat. This includes headquarters of a commander with the rank of colonel, five captains, four 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenants, and one 1<sup>st</sup> lieutenants with 203 personnel. It also calls for five large platoons (91 each) with each platoon being led by a Major and composed of a total 455 personnel. Also included is a small platoon of 45 policemen led by a 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant. This gives a total of 703 personnel.

Reality on the ground is that the DCoP is a 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant, his second- in-command is a non-commissioned officer and his logistics officer is a captain. Instead of being organized into platoons, they have checkpoints and designated checkpoint commanders. Checkpoint commanders may or may not be an NCO, but are trusted by the DCoP. Rank is not as important as what position you hold, and rank does not entitle you to a certain job. His current total strength is around



*“As mentors we must first seek to understand the organization, cultural considerations, and what the Ministry of Interior has proscribed.”*



450 personnel.

The SFAT mentors are working with the DCoP on his organization structure. This includes convincing him to build up his staff in providing assistants for the staff functions. For example, the SFA TM recognized supply and logistics required additional staff leadership. After discussion with the logistics officer, he agreed he needed someone to help him, but did not want to call the person his assistant. He thought this would be an official appointment and must come from PHQ. Recognizing this would be difficult to do and having identified a capable policeman, we changed the term from “logistics assistant” to the logistics officer “helper”. The logistics officer agreed to this plan and his “helper” has been able to make logistics work more effectively.

*"The police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence."*

*- Robert Peel*

The SFA mentors are also involved in helping the DCoP understand he must delegate authority. Their organizational culture is displayed by their reluctance for lower level leaders to make decisions. We term this as a “Soviet” style mentality where the commander makes all decisions. We’ve seen progress in this as the 2IC has had to make some decisions on his own when the DCoP is not in the area. For example, our DCoP takes Friday off and leaves his 2IC in charge. One Friday, it was reported that an IED was found in the town adjacent to the DHQ-P, Bazaar E Panjwa’I (B-e-P), the 2IC quickly reacted and went to the site himself. He did this on his own without seeking the permission of the DCoP and demonstrated he is capable of taking charge in the DCoP’s absence.

***“Building effective organizations and structure is as important to their long term sustainability as is any other resources the SFA mentors can provide.”***

The SFA TM 6 plans on continuing to mentor the DCoP on his organizational structure and how his staff operates to improve their effectiveness. It’s also in the plans to organize the 20+ checkpoints into 4 substations. This way the span of control is shortened and provides better reaction to checkpoints. Panjwa’i is a highly hostile area and has a mix of AUP, ANCOP and ANA controlling the security. Having the substations will be necessary when the security is stabilized and AUP become responsible for the security for the entire district.

Building effective organizations and structure is as important to their long term sustainability as is any other resources the SFA mentors can provide. It’s important not to impose our beliefs on how organizations should run based off of our U.S. Army experience. Instead use the basic principles of effective organizations and incorporate it into what they are able to do on their own. It’s essential that SFA teams make this part of their training plan in order for them to become independent.

## Limited Academy Slots Create Untrained Police

By Lt. Col. David Abrahams, Security Forces Assistance Team 5 in Dand District Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.

### Multi-echelon Training in Combat to Professionalize the Afghan Uniformed Police

Developing a professional Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) force capable of securing its home district is an important goal in the campaign to establish a viable government in Afghanistan. Small groups of Afghan Police established in local communities are a visible sign of government presence and often the police are the only representatives of the government for many Kilometers in any direction. In order to represent the government in a positive light the Afghan Police must act professionally and demonstrate competence in basic police and security tasks. To create a police force that meets these requirements mentors and partners must foster a training culture among the District Police leadership. This will help them to develop and execute a throughput schedule for attendance at Ministry of Interior (MOI) approved schools, execute individual basic skills training for untrained police awaiting attendance at MOI courses, and conduct small unit collective training with the small groups of police that man checkpoints and police sub-stations. By executing these tasks simultaneously, the battle space owning units can rapidly build police professionalism while ensuring police are able to perform their most basic security and community policing functions in the field.

#### Developing a Training Culture in Afghan Leadership.

The AUP are generated as a fighting organization in a manner unlike most branches of the Afghan National Security Forces. As an example, Afghan National Army soldiers are recruited, trained, and then shipped to Army units across Afghanistan to perform their duties. Police on the other hand are generated locally, recruited, and put to work in the District immediately with a promise that they will one day attend the six week long MOI approved Basic Patrolman Academy. Due to many factors these untrained policemen may spend up to a year working in the AUP before they attend the course.

One factor is a relatively low number of basic academy training slots across the region based on need. As an example, Dand District in southern Kandahar Province has approximately 160 policemen of 409 assigned that require attendance at the basic patrolman’s course. If we take this as typical and multiply by 17 districts there are more than 2,000 untrained policemen in Kandahar Province alone waiting for Academy attendance. The block nine basic patrolman’s course has 285 slots in the upcoming cycle. As a result only 10 - 15% of the AUP basic



training requirement is met every six weeks at the Regional Command Level.



Another important factor is the requirement to maintain enough police in the district to execute the security and policing tasks required of the district police. As an example, in Dand District there are 27 police sub-stations or checkpoints, with an average of 12 patrolmen per checkpoint. If MOI was to offer 100 training slots to the Dand AUP at one time, an average of 3 police per checkpoint would be absent for a six week period. When AWOL rates, leave, and other absenteeism are factored into the numbers in this scenario the AUP would have on average 7 patrolmen occupying each piece of police infrastructure – barely enough to guard the post and not enough to conduct basic patrolling and other tasks required of the AUP.

Taking into account the difficulties associated with generating academy trained police, it follows that the AUP must develop a culture of training within their organization. AUP leadership must seek out and support implementation of training events that provide basic and specialty skills to a police force generated out of the civilian population. In Dand District the AUP have begun this process by assigning a motivated training non-commissioned officer and with the assistance of the Security Forces Assistance Team (SFAT) mentors establishing a weekly training meeting.

Maj. Rahmatullah, the Dand Chief of Police, is a professionally trained police officer with 26 years of experience. He attended a three year police academy during the Soviet backed Afghan regime. Over the course of his career he has attended such diverse professional education course as a Russian Mortar Leaders Course, Afghan Criminal Investigators Course, Afghan Intelligence Course, and the United States Drug Enforcement Agency Intelligence Course for foreign police.

His background highlights his understanding of the need for training and professional development. Upon arriving as the



ANP in Dand conduct a PKM range to increase proficiency among policemen.

Chief of Police a few months ago, he realized that he needed a well-trained professional policeman to fill the role of training officer in order to plan and supervise

*"In keeping people straight, principle is not as powerful as a policeman."*

*- Abel Hermant, Le Bourgeois, 1906*

training for his police. After a few months of working through Afghan police channels, he was able to secure the assignment of a trusted and experienced colleague to Dand District to work as his senior sergeant as well as his training officer. Senior Sgt. Hajji Niamatullah has over 20 years of service in ANSF, including ten years in the Afghan Army during the Soviet backed regime. He has served the last three years as a policeman in the volatile Zharay District and understands the need to have competent and well-trained policemen to maintain security.

Hajji Niamatullah has taken to the job with relish, and is constantly looking for additional training opportunities for his soldiers. As an example, with some resourcing and planning assistance from coalition forces, Hajji Niamatullah ran the first ever PKM machine gunners course for the Dand AUP. The idea from this course was generated after a soldier had a negligent discharge with a PKM at the District Center. Upon investigation the SFAT discovered that although the district headquarters (DHQ) has over 50 PKM machine guns authorized on its Tashkiel neither the basic police academy nor the NCO academy train personnel on the basics of using the weapon. Presented with this information, Hajji Niamatullah worked diligently with SFAT mentors to rectify the situation by developing and executing a local PKM training course.

To mitigate the risk associated with having high numbers of untrained police conducting the community policing and security functions across the district, SFAT mentors in conjunction with Hajji Niamatullah developed a basic police skills course to be taught at the Dand District Police Headquarters (PHQ) over a three day period. The course is taught once every three weeks, and includes the basic skills and knowledge required to ensure the AUP can operate safely. The course includes basic police ethics, search techniques, basic weapons handling, basic first aid, and IED awareness. Upon graduation the students are provided a certificate with their picture that identifies them as graduates of the Basic Police Skills Course. While this course is no substitute for the six week academy, it is a source of motivation and pride for the AUP that they have a basic understanding of the requirements of their job. The Basic Police Skills Course fills the gap in competence created by the system of hiring police off the streets to work while they wait for attendance at the academy.

Training deficiencies in special skills such as machine guns and other courses coupled with the high number of untrained police create an environment where training must be managed. Training managers must prioritize tasks, allocate resources, and finalize schedules. To assist Hajji Niamatullah with this task, the SFAT has begun to execute a weekly combined training meeting. The first few iterations of this meeting will simply consist of setting the training calendar, agreeing on tasks to be trained and confirming the “5Ws” of upcoming training

ANP in Dand reload PKM belts for the next iteration on the range



*“The Basic Police Skills Course fills the gap in competence created by the system of hiring police off the streets to work while they wait for attendance at the academy.”*

events. As the meeting matures, we will introduce an Afghan-relevant version of the Army's 8-step training model. The model will be used to help the Afghans develop a longer perspective on how to plan and resource training. More importantly, it will be used to put the Afghans in the driver's seat, with a goal of Afghan Police identifying their requirements and resourcing their own training by Spring of 2012. One of the first tasks to be coordinated in this training meeting is the upcoming push to send large numbers of police to the MOI approved training academies.



SFAT mentors worked with all of the police headquarters leadership to develop a throughput plan for academy attendance. The plan sets an objective to have 80% of the Dand Afghan National Police trained in the Basic Patrolman Course before the next spring fighting season. In order to accomplish that feat, more than 100 untrained police will have to be cycled through the upcoming course. To mitigate the risk associated with high numbers of police attending the academy, Maj. Rahmatullah has kept a reserve of trained police at the district center. For police stations whose total number of present for duty police drop below 10 due to high volume of police attending the academy, the district chief of police (DCoP) will assign police from the district center to augment the checkpoints. Based on lessons learned from previous academy classes, the AUP will implement a formation and pre-combat inspections (PCI) of the academy recruits prior to bringing them to be in-processed.

***“Based on lessons learned from previous academy classes, the AUP will implement a formation and pre-combat inspections (PCI) of the academy recruits prior to bringing them to be in-processed.”***

The final part of the training strategy for the AUP is collective training at the checkpoints. The small numbers of police at each checkpoint reduces the scope of collective training that can be accomplished but does not reduce its importance. These small groups of police living in remote and austere conditions must be ready to operate and fight as a team. When developing the collective training strategy for the checkpoints, the SFAT mentors and AUP leadership wanted to focus on tasks most relevant to their missions. The tasks to be trained are selected from the MOI approved task list and support the AUP Mission Essential Task List (METL) that was developed by the Task Force Arctic Wolves ANSF development cell. The SFAT and the AUP chose six collective tasks relevant to small groups of police to be trained at the checkpoints. The training will be executed in modules by the platoons from the battle space owning units who are partnered with the AUP. During the module, each checkpoint will get at least one full day of training from the partnered unit. Each module is three weeks long, in order to allow enough time for the partnered units to conduct the training at every police station they are responsible for. The six modules together make one full collective training cycle for the AUP.

SFAT mentors, battle space owning partners and AUP leadership will push hard over the next few months to rapidly improve the AUP capability in Dand District. Developing systems for training management in the PHQ will help establish the AUP in the driver's seat for training. Pushing untrained policemen through the ba-

## Combined Checkpoint Operations and Training

By Lt. Col. Alberto Garnica, Security Forces Assistance Team 3, Daman District

Commander Kamal, the Bypass Checkpoint Commander for the Daman ANP, requested training on vehicle and personnel search techniques for his policemen and invited the SFA Team to conduct combined checkpoint operations with his personnel. The checkpoint is located at a key intersection along the highly travelled Highway 1 leading into and out of Kandahar City. His policemen man the key intersection and provide over watch from a security tower.

The SFA Team arrived at the checkpoint at approximately nine in the morning to find eight policemen manning the intersection conducting random vehicle and personnel searches. We linked up with the deputy commander as Commander Kamal was in Kandahar City picking up some new recruits. After setting up local security, the team linked up with the patrolmen on duty and coordinated for the training and combined operations.

After initial link up, the deputy commander pulled six of the policemen to the side in order to conduct vehicle and personnel search training with the SFA Team. SFC Echevarria, the Team Training NCO, was in the lead and started out by assessing the policemen’s current knowledge base on the tasks.

All the policemen were very knowledgeable and willing to share their experience with the group and the team. SFC Echevarria initially began the block of instruction but the policemen quickly grasped the task at hand and took the lead in the training, displaying excellent knowledge on the tasks.

After completing the block of instruction, the SFA Team joined

the policemen in their positions and executed combined checkpoint operations. The policemen pulled over several vehicles at random in order to conduct their searches. They were courteous and treated all the occupants with respect as they searched the vehicles and the personnel. They demonstrated very good procedures and techniques in the conduct of their operations.

After completing the training and combined operations, the SFA Team found that the ANP were very willing to participate in training and very knowledgeable



*“Allowing the ANP to lead the training and discussion allowed them to take ownership of the training event and share techniques and experience among themselves and the SFA Team.”*



in the tasks. A quick assessment served to identify the amount of detail and level of training that the SFA Team would execute during the training. Additionally, allowing the ANP to lead the training and discussion allowed them to take ownership of the training event and share techniques and experience among themselves and the SFA Team.

Other considerations include prior coordination and choosing the venue for training at the site. Even though the commander requested and coordinated the training, he was not available and we had to coordinate directly with the Deputy Commander on the ground. A good observation by a bystander (Ministry of Transportation representative) was selection of the training site. We conducted the training off the intersection in full view of all traffic, to include personnel search using the ANP as volunteers. This could have looked suspicious to people driving by to see the policemen searched by fellow policemen and SFA Team trainers.



**TF Arctic Wolves**

Col. Todd Wood, Commander  
Command Sgt. Maj. Bernie Knight



**ANSF Development**

Col. Thomas Weikert, OIC  
Sgt. Maj. William Montgomery, NCOIC

**SFAT 1:**

Lt. Col. Kelso Horne, FOB Lindsey,  
Partnered with 4/205 Afghan National Army Corps (MP)

**SFAT 3:**

Lt. Col. Alberto Garnica, Daman District Center  
Partnered with the Daman DCoP

**SFAT 5:**

Lt. Col. David Abrahams, Dand District Center  
Partnered with the Dand DCoP

**SFAT 6:**

Lt. Col. Mick Braun, Panjwa'i District Center  
Partnered with the Panjwa'i DCoP

**SFAT 7:**

Col. James Scott, FOB Lindsey  
Partnered with 1/205th Afghan National Army Corps

**Journal Editor:**

Maj. David Mattox, 1-25 SBCT PAO

**Layout & Design:**

Sgt. Michael Blalack, 1-25 SBCT Public Affairs

