

Special Warfare

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THE ROAD AHEAD



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**U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL**

MISSION: The JFK Special Warfare Center and School invests in the development of human capital to produce Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations and Special Forces Soldiers from recruitment to retirement in order to provide our regiments with a professionally trained and well-educated force.

VISION: Professionalism starts here. We are an adaptive institution characterized by agility, collaboration, accountability and integrity. We promote life-long learning and transformation. We are THE Special Operations Center of Learning whose credibility in producing the world's finest special operators is recognized and sustained by every single member of our three regiments.

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Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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FROM THE COMMANDANT



We are making a number of changes at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, and pursuing initiatives designed to allow us to operate more efficiently and to professionalize the force, but none are more important than the ones we're undertaking to develop our training cadre.

We are, and must be, an adaptive organization characterized by agility, collaboration, accountability and integrity. We are *the* special-operations center of learning, and our credibility in producing the world's finest special operators is recognized and sustained by every single member of our three regiments. We are less concerned with the quantity of SWCS graduates than we are with the quality of our instruction. It is our mission to provide Army special-operations forces regiments with professionally trained and well-educated Civil Affairs, Military Information Support and Special Forces Soldiers and to train and develop those Soldiers from recruitment to retirement. As part of that mission, we promote life-long learning and transformation.

But the quality of our instruction cannot exceed the quality of our instructors. The professionalism of the force starts here, literally the first day a Soldier arrives at SWCS, with the first person he sees. For that reason, our cadre is our center of gravity. And just as we seek to professionalize the force, we must ensure that we are professionalizing our cadre.

As in our training of ARSOF Soldiers, the first requirement is to assess and select Soldiers who are appropriate for the mission. We are implementing a preferred-placement concept that will work within the Army Human Resources Command's levy process. The concept is designed to identify key skills and attributes of incoming instructor personnel and place instructors in positions that capitalize on their talents, education, experience and motivation.

At the heart of our cadre-development plan is the creation of the Special Operations Instructor Course, or SOIC, which will replace the current Instructor Training Course. SOIC will focus on contemporary instructional and learning models informed by our work with other military and civilian educational institutions. Then throughout their SWCS tour, instructors will receive continuing instructor professional development that will be monitored by their instructional leadership teams. An expanded instructor feedback mechanism will round out our cadre-development plan. The plan aligns course-developer and instructor efforts within a system of enhanced instructor feedback to ensure continuous instructor improvement.

The increased emphasis on the placement and development of our instructor talent will not only increase the quality of instruction for our students but also enhance the quality of the NCOs we return to the force after they complete their assignment as a SWCS instructor.

It is our intent to create an agile, adaptive organization where the best, the brightest and the most intellectually curious instructors are attracted, retained and empowered. We will encourage our cadre, our center of gravity, to actively reflect upon their profession, to develop experience-based improvements in curriculum, to embrace constant personal development, and always to use their initiative in producing America's finest special operators.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "B. Sacolick". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Major General Bennet S. Sacolick



SHAPING Mechelle Winder, widow of Sergeant First Class Nathan Winder, cuts the ceremonial red tape at the Winder Family Clinic's dedication ceremony with the help of Col. Dallas Homas, commander of Madigan Healthcare System, and Col. Robert C. Shakespeare, Joint Base Lewis-McChord Dental Activity commander June 27. U.S. Army photo by Sergeant James Hale

State-of-the-art clinic named after fallen Soldier

A fallen Special Forces medic's legacy of helping soldiers and their families was continued when the first Leed Gold Army clinic, Winder Family Clinic, was dedicated in his name at Joint Base Lewis-McChord on June 27.

Sergeant First Class Nathan L. Winder, a Special Forces medical sergeant with Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, was killed in action June 26, 2007, from small-arms fire north of Dinwaniyah, Iraq. His team was assisting another U.S. Army element as a member of a Special Forces quick-reaction force.

"He was one of the most caring guys I had," said Dale Betz, marketing manager at the clinic. "He was like the kid brother who always wants to help out."

While out on a patrol, Winder noticed an Iraqi girl with a large gash on her cheek who was being refused treatment at an Iraqi clinic. Even though it wasn't his responsibility, Winder decided he was going to treat the girl and asked his team to secure a perimeter around him. Once secure, he stitched the girl's cheek and cleaned the wound.

"As a Soldier, he was like the athlete who was calm and collected enough to make the game-winning impossible shot, and he did it while actually being shot at," said Betz. "He did amazing things time and time again. He did things that made you say, 'That could never be repeated,' but he did them again and again."

The new Army clinic dedicated to Winder is the first clinic on Joint Base Lewis-McChord to be awarded Leed Gold, an award given to environmentally friendly structures. It is also the first Army clinic to combine medical and dental capabilities into one facility.

The Winder Family Clinic uses new technologies, such as its solar-powered water heating system, to do its part to meet the Army's goal of completely moving away from fossil fuels, which improves the care of Soldiers and their families by giving them the most up-to-date care available while helping the environment for the future. — *USASOC News Service*

SWCS seeks distinguished members of regiments

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is seeking nominations for current or former Soldiers to be made distinguished members of the Civil Affairs, Military Information Support or Special Forces regiments.

Nominees may be active, retired or former officers, warrant officers or enlisted Soldiers who have graduated from the Civil Affairs, Military Information Support or Special Forces qualification courses (or been awarded the SF Tab) and have served in their respective regiment. Nominees must have made significant contributions to the success of their regiment on the battlefield and/or to the training and qualification of new members of the regiment. Following retirement or discharge, nominees must have continued to make contributions to the regiment or the local community. Continued service to the regiment after separation from the military, either through formal or informal activities, is particularly important as a criterion for selection. Nominations can be made posthumously.

Nominations must include:

- A letter of recommendation that includes name, address, phone number and, if possible, e-mail address for the person being nominated. Posthumous nominations should provide contact information for the next of kin.
- A single-spaced nominee biography of two pages or less that includes assignments and accomplishments in chronological order, as well as awards earned.
- A good-quality, 8-by-10 photo (preferably head and shoulders). Original photos will be returned.

Nominations for the next selection board are due by Nov. 7. Submit nominations by e-mail to rayd@ahqb.soc.mil or dee.ray@us.army.mil, or mail them to: Commanding General, USAJFK-SWCS; Attn: AOJK-SGS; 3004 Ardennes St., Stop A; Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610.



USSOCOM welcomes new commander

Admiral William H. McRaven assumed command of the U.S. Special Operations Command from Admiral Eric T. Olson during a change of command ceremony at the Davis Conference Center, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., Aug. 8.

Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta presided over the ceremony, praising Olson for the work he and the command have accomplished.

“Eric is beloved by those under his command,” said Panetta. “As he says, humans are more important than hardware, and quality is more important than quantity. And that’s exactly where his focus has been here at SOCOM — finding, caring for and keeping the highest-quality people.

“As a result of his hard work, we now have the best-trained, the best-equipped and the most experienced special-operations force in the history of the United States.”

Panetta also acknowledged Olson’s operational contributions.

“Eric is a true legend in the special-operations community,” Panetta said. “He was the first four-star Navy SEAL. One of the more impressive chapters of Eric’s story — at least from the section that can be spoken about in an unclassified setting — unfolded during the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” battle in Mogadishu.

“It was then-Commander Olson who led a ground convoy to rescue his comrades fighting for their lives against hundreds of enemy fighters who had them surrounded. That mission showed Eric’s extraordinary courage, his warrior spirit, his inspired leadership and the overwhelming care and concern he has for his comrades-in-arms. All traits that he

has demonstrated again and again throughout his storied career.”

During the ceremony, a moment of silence was observed to honor the U.S. service members and Afghan National Army Commandos killed during recent events in Afghanistan.

“We will honor the fallen by showing the world our unyielding determination to press ahead, to move forward with the hard work that must be done to protect our country,” said Panetta.

McRaven becomes the ninth commander of USSOCOM and responsible for all Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps special-operations forces. USSOCOM is the Department of Defense’s lead command for planning and synchronizing the global war against violent extremist organizations.

“I can’t think of anyone better suited to help succeed Admiral Olson in this tough job and manage the continued growth of SOCOM than another Navy SEAL, Admiral Bill McRaven,” Panetta said.

“Over his impressive — and again mostly classified — career, Bill has commanded at every level in the special-operations community — of course most recently as commander of Joint Special Operations Command. He is one of the military’s outstanding strategic thinkers and leaders, who has always kept faith with those serving downrange.”

McRaven thanked Secretary Panetta and reminded everyone of the importance of USSOCOM’s mission.

“The world today is as unpredictable as ever,” said McRaven. “And as such, the American people will expect us to be prepared for every contingency, to answer every call to arms, to venture where other forces cannot and to win every fight no matter how tough or how long.



NEW COMMANDER Admiral William H. McRaven, former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, assumed command of the U.S. Special Operations Command Aug. 8. DoD photo by Mike Bottoms

“They will expect it because we are the nation’s special-operations force, and Mr. Secretary, we will not let them down,” McRaven concluded.

McRaven most recently served as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C. He has also commanded at every level within the special-operations community, including assignments as the commander of Special Operations Command Europe, director of the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre, deputy commanding general for operations at JSOC, commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group 1, commander of SEAL Team 3, task-group commander in the Central Command area of responsibility, task-unit commander during Desert Storm and Desert Shield, squadron commander at the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, and SEAL platoon commander at Underwater Demolition Team 21/ SEAL Team 4.

McRaven’s professional education includes assignment to the Naval Postgraduate School, where he helped establish and was the first graduate from the special operations/low-intensity conflict curriculum.

Olson, the first Navy SEAL to be promoted to three- and later four-star rank, retired in August after 38 years of service to the nation.

“To serve as commander has been the highest of honors,” Olson said. “This is a force of which America can and should be immensely proud. And it is a force that America surely needs,” Olson said. — *by Tech. Sgt. Heather Kelly, USSOCOM Public Affairs*

New UJTL Special Reconnaissance Task

The Readiness and Programs Branch of the Army Special Operations Command’s G35 spearheaded the effort for a new Universal Joint Task List, or UJTL, task for special reconnaissance. The effort began after a review of special-operations forces’ core tasks showed special reconnaissance did not have an UJTL task that could be used for an assessment of a unit’s readiness.

The task, “OP 2.7.4 Conduct Special Reconnaissance,” has now been approved, and its description, references and measures are available for viewing on the UJTL Task Development Tool at <http://utdt.js.smil.mil/utdt.jsp>.

The new task will be added to the JDEIS UJTL database when the current version (October 2010) is updated. Until then, units that need to use OP 2.7.4 to assess their readiness must access the task via the task-development tool.

For more information contact Jeff Gowen at DSN 239-6592, commercial (910) 432-6592, or send e-mail to: jeff.gowen@soc.mil.

Bostick takes command of 4th MISG(A)

Colonel Carl E. Phillips handed command of the 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne) to Col. Reginald J. Bostick in a ceremony Aug. 3 at Meadows Field at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command headquarters.

Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland Jr., the commanding general of USASOC, presided over the ceremony. He praised Phillips, noting, "Changes of command are bittersweet events that call us to recall what was and now is."

"The inherent challenge of command is to take an already superb command and make it even better," Mulholland said. "But Phillips did that through his leadership, personal courage and perseverance. You have taken what was the already outstanding MIS Group and made it even better."

Mulholland noted that the 4th MISG provided relevant and vital support to special-operations and conventional forces, in addition to working with our ambassadors on the battlefields in which the nation is engaged.

"The group has never been better, stronger or more capable than today. You have accomplished your mission, which is a clear and true testament to your leadership," said Mulholland.

In his farewell remarks to the group and guests, Phillips thanked his Soldiers for their support over the last two years, during which approximately 600 MIS Soldiers were deployed daily to 30 countries around the world.

"It's been an honor serving with you;

you've accomplished some truly amazing things over the past two years," Phillips said. "Your work often does not offer the immediate feedback and results to gauge your effectiveness, because changing attitudes and behavior takes time, sometimes a full generation, and often these changes are intangible."

He thanked everyone for doing a great job serving Army special operations and the nation.

Phillips said that the incoming commander was destined for great success with the group, based on his experience when they served together in the 9th MIS Battalion.

In his initial remarks as commander of the 4th Group, Bostick said, "I am well aware of the great gift that command gives me. Command is a great privilege."

"Command in a time of war is a distinct honor," Phillips said.

Bostick thanked Phillips for his mentorship in the past.

"We will build on your legacy," he said. "I know that our organization will increase its ability to affect the human cognitive domain with a level of sophistication never before seen."

Bostick's previous assignment was as an Army War College Fellow at the Institute of World Politics and as the deputy commander of the 4th MISG.

Phillips will be the Chief, J39 at the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla. — *USASOC News Service*



CHANGE OF COMMAND Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland Jr. (right) passes the colors of the 4th Military Information Support Group to Colonel Reginald J. Bostick during the 4th MISG change-of-command ceremony. *U.S. Army photo*

For more information, contact FSTCOadmin@nshq.nato.int

The FSTCO website, NSHQ new tool

The NATO Special Operations Headquarters, or NSHQ, is hosting a unique website designed to facilitate joint training opportunities throughout the worldwide special-operations community.

The Federation of SOF Training Centers and Opportunities, or FSTCO, website is a valuable tool for use by special-operations community. The site is designed to foster the sharing of information and best practices, and to coordinate formal offers for all allied members to communicate on SOF training opportunities. However, the federation does not subordinate national training policy and prerogatives; instead, it expands the opportunity for training, coordination and interoperability among member nations.

AIM: The federation coordinates and optimizes national and international SOF training opportunities. Further it promotes standardized training and increases NATO SOF capabilities and enhances their interoperability by bringing together unique NATO-wide SOF training opportunities and facilities.

THE CONCEPT: NSHQ collect training and education requirements and offers from contributing nations and international NATO institutions. The FSTCO website lists all training opportunities.

In order for the site to be successful, the SOF community must share its training opportunities.

LET'S START: To access the site, visit www.nshq.nato.int. You must create a secure log-in.

Interagency Studies Program graduates second class



On July 28, 20 special-operations students from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., graduated from the University of Kansas Interagency Studies Program, or ISP. This year's class was composed of nine students in Special Forces, five in Civil Affairs, three in Psychological Operations, one Navy SEAL and two civilian interagency students.

ISP is a SOF-funded master's-degree program available to resident SOF and interagency students taking Intermediate Level Education at CGSC. ISP requires 33 credit hours for completion — six granted by the University of Kansas, or KU, for the student's ILE courses, and 27 from nine courses taken in conjunction with ILE. Students earn the first 12 hours during evening classes from August to March. They earn the last 15 hours taking classes on the KU campus from April through July.

The program is conducted under the direction of the KU Center for Global and International Studies, or CGIS. Dr. Thomas Heilke and Dr. Eric Hanley, the CGIS director and associate director, respectively, and the Special Operations Leader Development and Education team at Fort Leavenworth jointly tailored the curriculum to account for the unique demands of the complex operational environment.

This year's ISP graduates have already returned to their operational groups, conventional brigades or theater special-operations commands, or TSOCs, to fill positions such as operations officer, executive officer, company commander, TSOC planner, or civil-military officer of a brigade combat team. The July graduates are the ISP's second graduating class. During the program's two years, 35 SOF officers have earned master's degrees. Another 21 students began their ISP coursework in August.

Brig. Gen. Ferdinand Irizarry, the deputy commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, said at the graduation ceremony, "This is a model partnership between a world-class university and our nation's absolute best Soldiers and civilians. This is exactly how we need to educate our force for the complex challenges of the next 20 years."

Interested applicants can obtain information from their CA, PSYOP or SF branch managers, or by telephoning Lt. Col. Joe Cieslo, the ISP adviser at Fort Leavenworth, at (933) 684-3485.

Program provides language refresher in ARSOF ILE

Foreign-language abilities are highly perishable, and mastery of those skills requires a training life-cycle that integrates formal and informal language training. Soldiers in Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, who are taking Intermediate Level Education at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., recently participated in a pilot program designed to allow them to maintain their language proficiency during their academic year in ILE.

"Language proficiency is critical to continued success within SOF," said Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit, director of the ILE SOF Leader Development and Education Cell. "Operational requirements often remove us from exposure to our trained languages, making it difficult to maintain proficiency."

The ILE Language Proficiency Sustainment Program provides formal instruction and computer-based, self-study opportunities previously unavailable to ILE students. Largely a self-paced, decentralized program, it does, however, include 15 hours of in-class instruction with instructors from the Defense Language Institute, or DLI, in Arabic, Spanish, French, Chinese, Dari and Pashtu. It also offers periodic DLI mentoring to supplement the self-paced programs in other languages: Farsi, Portuguese, Korean, Russian, Tagalog, Thai, Indonesian, Urdu and Uzbek.

The intent of the program is to allow ARSOF ILE students to sustain language training they received at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, measure their long-term language retention and reinforce career-long language sustainment. "This is an extremely valuable opportunity for students, and it leverages available elective time, as opposed to adding more requirements," said Lt. Col. Paul Schmidt, an instructor in SOF Leader Development and Education.

Upon completion of the computer-based modules and the Defense Language Proficiency Test, students receive elective credit. Future ARSOF ILE students at Fort Leavenworth will conduct language refresher throughout the academic year to sustain that critical SOF skill.

Tactical combat casualty care, or TCCC

Tactical combat casualty care, or TCCC, first introduced in special operations in the mid-1990s, has become the pre-hospital battlefield trauma-management standard for all services in the United States military. TCCC concepts are taught during the Special Operations Combat Medic Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center, or JSOMTC. The objectives of TCCC are to treat the casualty, prevent additional casualties and complete the mission.

There are three phases of TCCC: care under fire, tactical field care and tactical evacuation care.

Care under fire is the care rendered by the first responder or combatant at the scene of the injury, while he and the casualty are still under hostile fire. Available medical equipment is limited to that carried by the individual or by the medical provider in his aid bag.

Tactical field care is the care rendered by the first responder or combatant once he and the casualty are no longer under hostile fire. The term also applies to situations in which an injury has occurred but there has been no hostile fire. Available medical equipment is still limited to that carried into the field by unit personnel. The time for evacuation to a medical-treatment facility may vary considerably.

Tactical evacuation care is the care rendered once the casualty has been picked up by an aircraft, vehicle or boat. Additional medical person-

nel and equipment that may have been pre-staged should be available during this phase of casualty management.

The Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care, or CoTCCC, was established in 2001 and is currently part of the Defense Health Board, or DHB, the senior medical advisory body for the Secretary of Defense. The CoTCCC is composed of 42 members from all services in the DoD and civilian sector and includes trauma surgeons, emergency-room and critical-care physicians, operational physicians, medical educators, combat medics and corpsmen.

TCCC guidelines were first published in 1996 with the intent of providing the combatant with the optimal methods for identifying and treating the three most common causes of preventable death on the battlefield: hemorrhage from extremity wounds, tension pneumothorax and loss of airway due to maxillofacial trauma. Additions or revisions to the TCCC guidelines, based on published literature, direct input from the battlefield and current research, are considered during the CoTCCC's quarterly meetings.

Prior to 1996, combat medical training was modeled on civilian courses and did not address factors that can affect the management of a casualty on the battlefield: hostile fire, darkness, environmental extremes, different wounding epidemiology, limited equipment, need for tactical maneuver and long delays to advanced care.

One of the best examples of the way TCCC changed the pre-hospital care on the battlefield is the use of a tourniquet for initial treatment of a

Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course

With the activation of the 6th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, in June, the capability and capacity of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, to provide Special Forces intelligence-related education and training has grown by the creation of four courses and the significant transformation of several others.

The four new courses, the Advanced Special Operations Manager's Course, the Special Operations Analytics and Intelligence Course and two courses related to unconventional warfare, the Network Development Course and the Operational Design Course, are all in final prototype testing, which is scheduled to be complete during fiscal year 2012. The Technical Surveillance Course, created this year, continues to undergo scheduling and course improvements that will ensure its relevance in FY 2012 and beyond.

One of the most noteworthy changes implemented by the new operations-and-intelligence battalion is the enhancement of the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant's Course, or SFISC. With the start of SFISC class 001-12 in January, the course will implement the most significant modifications since it was designed and launched almost a decade ago. The modified curriculum, coupled with unique interagency access and instruction, is designed to provide the Special Forces intelligence sergeant — military occupational specialty, or MOS, 18F — with the education and training required to integrate national intelligence capabilities in support of special-operations missions at the SF A-detachment level and above. The curriculum will ensure that the 18F provides increasing value to the SF Regiment, and it clearly exemplifies the fifth SOF Truth: "Most special operations require non-SOF assistance." In the 6th Battalion, that truth is the backbone of their advanced-skills courses focused on operations and intelligence.

As an SF MOS-producing course, the SFISC educates and qualifies senior SF NCOs into the 18F MOS. The new program of instruction, or POI, will elevate the existing curriculum from the secret level to the level of top secret — sensitive, compartmented. Already an advanced and mentally demanding course, SFISC will now introduce advanced strategic-intelligence tradecraft and analytics, national-intelligence-agency instruction, and training formerly unique to industry and academia.

As one of the most experienced members of the detachment, the 18F has responsibilities similar to those of the intelligence officer and is the team member responsible for all aspects of intelligence and force protection. In garrison, he plans, coordinates and conducts continuous intelligence analysis and intelligence-collection planning in support of the detachment's intelligence preparation of the environment, prior to deployment. During mission planning, he evaluates the political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure characteristics of the operational environment and their effects on the accomplishment of the unit's mission. While the detachment is deployed, he continually updates its intelligence estimate and advises the detachment commander on significant changes in the security environment, as well as on the host-nation military and civilian populations. He also conducts intelligence liaison with the host-nation military, police and government officials. The intelligence sergeant also provides intelligence reports and summaries to higher headquarters and assists the detachment team sergeant in preparing operational plans, operations orders and concepts of operations.

To accomplish the myriad of tasks in the post-9/11 environment, the intelligence sergeant must be able to perform in isolated regions, with little or no reach-back or access to national intelligence-community resources and, when they are available, to understand the capabilities of national- and theater-level intelligence assets and be capable of requesting and leveraging those assets.

With the guidance and continued support from the SWCS commanding general, Maj. Gen. Bennet Sacolick, trainers at SWCS took a close look at 18F NCOs' extensive experience in joint intelligence and interagency partnerships during the last 10 years of conflict vs. the tasks being covered in the SFISC. Their analysis revealed gaps in the SFISC instruction that needed to be corrected in order to make the SFISC relevant for the post-Afghanistan and -Iraq theaters.

A critical-task selection board hosted at SWCS in December 2010 was attended by SF intelligence sergeants from each of the SF groups. As a result of the board, the 18F committee, in conjunction with the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine and the Directorate of

Special Operations Proponency, modified and increased the critical tasks that an 18F is required to perform in support of SF missions worldwide. Twenty-seven new tasks were added to the existing 94; the new tasks are integrated with the intelligence and interagency community in order to provide the sensitive capabilities increasingly required of the 18F.

Over the last eight months, the SFISC cadre has worked diligently to redesign the course POI to ensure that it trains the critical tasks needed to produce an 18F who brings unmatched capability and value to the SF Regiment. The result has been a two-phase curriculum. Beginning in January, SFISC students will take the 11-week Phase 1 at Fort Bragg and the three-week Phase 2 in Washington, D.C. Phase 2 will consist of intensive on-site training at national intelligence agencies including the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Counterterrorism Center, Joint Warfare Analysis Center and Department of Homeland Security. During Phase 2, students will also receive academic instruction on irregular-warfare analytics at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

To prepare for the top-secret-level instruction of Phase 1, SWCS is constructing a sensitive compartmented information facility, or SCIF, in Kennedy Hall. Scheduled for completion during the second quarter of fiscal year 2012, the SCIF will provide students access to national intelligence-information resources through its connectivity with the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Community System.

While attending SFISC, students will produce real-world intelligence products based on their SF group's area of responsibility and priority intelligence requirements. The products will make use of national-level intelligence to answer current information requirements. Two examples of that type of effort would be producing a supporting analysis for village-stability operations and special-operations forces in Afghanistan and developing intelligence products for the Defense Attaché Office in Lebanon. When final, the intelligence products developed will be provided to the intended units as well as the intelligence community. — *Maj. Bryan G. Kirk, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Henry M. Torres, Master Sgt. Victor L. Rodgers, Sgt. 1st Class Sheldon I. Cherry*

continued from page 08

life-threatening extremity hemorrhage. Before TCCC, the tourniquet was used a last resort for that type of injury, a practice that led many times to unnecessary blood loss and death. Studies show that in Vietnam, 2,500 deaths occurred among casualties from hemorrhage in extremity injuries. Many of those likely could have been prevented by the early application of an effective tourniquet.

TCCC is one of the most successful initiatives since the beginning of the war on terror. An article published in *Archives of Surgery* in August 2011 demonstrated that training both medics and nonmedics on TCCC concepts in the 75th Ranger Regiment had significantly reduced the "died

of wounds" rate, which is 5.8 percent among all ground combat troops, to 1.7 percent in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Although JSOMTC is teaching TCCC concepts to special-operations medics, training medics is only part of the solution. Since 2005, the United States Special Operations Command has required TCCC training for all deploying combatants — not just medics. For more information on the training, contact your unit surgeon. All Soldiers, medics and nonmedics alike, need to be familiar with TCCC concepts and trained on the simple interventions (such as tourniquet application) that have proven to be effective in the treatment of combat casualties. — *Col. Robert H. Lutz, commander, Special Warfare Medical Group*

CMSEs Engage Vulnerable Populations in West Africa to Counter Influence of Violent Extremist Organizations

One of the legs of the Army special-operations-forces triad, Civil Affairs, continues to deploy persistent elements into austere environments throughout the world and to operate in, around and near the operational ecosystem of violent extremist organizations, or VEOs.

The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade sends civil-military support elements, or CMSEs, to identify vulnerabilities that can lead to the propagation of extremist groups in the Sahara. A company of linguistically and regionally trained Francophone specialists of the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion are currently deployed to West Africa. These four-Soldier Civil Affairs teams, or CATs, are culturally and linguistically attuned to the environment in which they operate. They meet with key influential leaders and groups of people who are susceptible to VEOs and their ideology. CMSEs are a critical component of the indirect, through-and-with methodology that helps create networks and encourages the vulnerable populations to trust their own government, rather than the VEOs, to take care of their needs.

The CMSEs engage the traditional seats of power in these key communities and groups. They understand the human terrain and are able to physically map the people's location, understand their migratory routes and get an intimate understanding of their needs and wants. CMSEs also understand what groups operate in the area: nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs; intergovernmental organizations, or IGOs; religious groups; business people; social groups; tribes; military leaders and government employees of the state. Using their understanding of the groups, they also have the ability to pinpoint gaps in the state's ability to deliver services

or security in an area. By understanding these shortfalls and by understanding the capabilities of groups like NGOs or IGOs, the CMSEs can coordinate services to bolster the capabilities of the state to counter the VEOs' attempts to lure people away from the state.

Operational environment

As part of Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara, or OEF-TS, the U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, provides military support to the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, or TSCTP. OEF-TS engagement in TSCTP focuses on overall security and cooperation rather than on counterterrorism alone. The OEF-TS partnership comprises the United States and 10 African countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. A CMSE assesses partner-nation capacities to develop and sustain government and local institutions, including infrastructure development, that address the population's basic humanitarian needs.¹ The overall goals of the TSCTP are to enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the Pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the region.²

Initial efforts under what eventually became Concept Plan, or CONPLAN, 7500 were largely lethal activities directed against the al-Qaeda network and its affiliates.³ Joseph Nye describes a nonlethal or indirect approach when he describes the concept of soft power. Soft power is the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want. It is the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion.⁴ The current version of Department

of Defense CONPLAN 7500 mirrors that mindset. It reflects the primacy of indirect approaches, both to deter active and tacit support for VEOs and to erode extremist support for VEO ideology.⁵ Our efforts are designed to deter, prevent and disrupt violent extremists.⁶ The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, or JOC, states, "Irregular warfare, or IW, is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our nation and our strategic partners."⁷

The questions at hand are: Can Army SOF Civil Affairs elements influence lower-level networks with indirect links to VEOs? Can CMSEs use the indirect approach to deter and disrupt transnational VEO operations? Can CMSEs help coordinate actions of the U.S. government interagency community in countering transnational VEOs?

Networks

The term "terrorist networks" is a quick way to describe VEOs that do not organize hierarchically. "Netwars" is a concept developed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, the editors of *Networks and Netwar: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*. Under this concept, numerous dispersed small groups using the latest communications technologies could act conjointly across great distances.⁸ A network as an organizational structure lends itself to flexibility and the ability for the central core to maintain a "buffer zone" by using a cut-out who will not



OUT OF AFRICA

BY MAJOR JOHN P. WISHART

know what other elements of the network are doing. Additionally, the network can compartmentalize the cells, themselves, insulating their functions, such as logistics, finance or communications, so that other cells will know nothing about them. One key aspect needed for success of the network is the social basis for cooperation among network members. When social ties are strong, and mutual trust and identity exists, a network's effectiveness is greatly enhanced. That can be seen most clearly in ethnically based terror, crime and insurgent groups, in which clan ties bind together even the most dispersed organization.⁹


Kathleen Carley, a noted social scientist and the developer of dynamic network analysis, notes that terrorist networks are distinct from those in typical hierarchical organizations — they are cellular and distributed.¹⁰ Sean Everton and Nancy Roberts, researchers associated with the Naval Postgraduate School, observe in their article, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” in the *Journal of Social Structure*, that despite the interest devoted to collecting information on dark networks, so little attention is being paid to exploring strategies for disrupting them.¹¹ The authors describe ways for disrupting networks, listing four methods for nonlethal disruption of dark networks: institution-building, psychological operations, information operations and rehabilitation.¹²

The majority of discussion seems to center on the operational level of terrorist

disruption. This article describes a method of building trust between elements of the CMSE and key communicators and influencers in or near key geographic areas. By influencing key individuals within communities and engaging vulnerable populations, we can induce the people to gravitate toward the influence of the state. The state, however, must make tangible and concrete reforms to address the vulnerable populations' grievances. The ability of the CMSEs to move within the population allows them to use DoD's lines of effort and operations to work by, through and with common-minded groups as directed by CONPLAN 7500 for the use of both a direct and indirect approach to fighting terrorist networks.¹³

The enduring results come from indirect approaches — those in which we enable partners to combat extremist organizations themselves by contributing to their capabilities through advising, training and — when authorized and funded — equipping. That includes efforts to deter active and tacit support for VEOs in areas where the existing government is either unwilling or unable to remove terrorist sanctuaries.¹⁴

The CMSEs' modus operandi is to meet with key leaders and influencers within a specific geographic area, focusing on a group relevant to the interests of the U.S. government. CA operations are inherently



NETWORKS By working to strengthen the relationship of the population to the partner-nation government and local security forces, CMSEs can disrupt the people's connection to the dark networks of violent extremist organizations.

people-centric, and CMSEs interact with as many groups as possible. CMSEs cultivate relationships and create their own light networks within each country. The CMSE establishes itself as a hub by developing additional nodes with like-minded groups such as NGOs, partner-nation military forces or civic leaders. Those ad-hoc collaborative networks work along the CMSEs' common lines of effort, supporting JSOTF-TS operational objectives and lines of operation. The networks created by the teams can be either enduring or short-lived, based on the operational requirements.

CMO training of partner-nation forces is another component of network disruption. CMSEs across the Sahel engage with elite, partner-nation special-operations troops. The CMSEs train the leaders of security forces to

listen to grievances, treat people humanely and provide tangible benefits for those who cooperate with the partner-nation government.

A method of validating grievances is to analyze the partner-nation's ability to provide key services, such as medical care. One can quickly ascertain where groups predominantly stay. The CMSE may provide that information pictographically in a GeoPDF to the mayor, the local minister of health, an NGO or the U.S. Agency for International Development, to move resources around within the city to provide care to vulnerable populations. The CMSE may also expand into the area by extending the capability of the state through local medical engagements by bringing doctors from more populated areas to augment the existing healthcare in the area.

Teams observe and analyze their operational environment from a variety of different perspectives: relationally, geographically and temporally. Through those relationships, teams will form ad-hoc networks. Those networks may have humanitarian aid or assistance as a shared common factor. Geographic relationships are important, as well. If an individual or node has a relationship with a VEO logistics facilitator in country X but is currently operating in country Y, they still maintain a relationship. Finally, the CMSEs consider the temporal component. If a nomadic group comes through an area only once every few months to sell its animals or every few weeks to draw water at specific oasis in the Sahara, the CMSE will be unable to engage that particular group. Growing seasons and rain have a major im-

pact on the movement of the CMSE and its ability to engage key groups. The relational, geographical and temporal perspectives are important in historical analysis and in developing a predictive or pattern-of-life element.

There is a secondary benefit to creating networks with the partner-nation government: Those networks may occur in the same geographic area that VEO networks use for the sustainment of their operations. These lower-level networks, if one were to imagine them in a terrorist organization, would be the nexus between drug traffickers, weapons traffickers, corrupt officials, illicit-business operators, criminal groups and bandits. Some of those groups or individuals may not even be aware that they could be dealing with a VEO. These groups or individuals are the necessary connection between the dark, illicit terrorist network and the licit environment.

Engagement in the operational environment

The CMSE, through continuous contact with the civil population and persistent presence in key areas, gains an understanding of the security environment in the local area. It will learn if the state's taxation is not transparent, which companies are legitimate and which corrupt, which tribes are in the area, when the growing and rainy seasons are, and whether there is friction between herders and irrigation farmers. They will also determine through contact with the local population and the local security services which groups are alienated from the local and national government.

The 95th CA Brigade's CA teams conduct a diverse set of activities, promoting development and goodwill through the building of infrastructure, training in job skills and the provision of medical, dental and veterinary care in areas where existing government structures are unable or unwilling to provide those services. As with security-force assistance, the focus of special-operations CA teams is on long-term capacity-building within local and national structures.¹⁵

Dark networks

According to the State Department's 2008 *Country Reports on Terrorism*, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, maintained training camps and support networks in the

isolated and remote areas of Algeria and the Sahel.¹⁶ In western Africa, the VEO that exists is AQIM, which began in Algeria as the GSPC, or Group for Salafist Preaching and Combat, but allied with al-Qaeda in 2006. Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a "blessed union" between the groups, declaring France an enemy and indicating that they would fight against French and American interests. In January 2007, the group announced that it had changed its name to reflect its alliance with al-Qaeda, from which it receives material and financial support.¹⁷

In "Dark Networks as Organizational Problems," H. Brinton Milward and Jorg Raab offer a short description of a cocaine network. Even though decentralized, the traffickers began to be the target of much greater control efforts by the U.S. That encouraged them to substitute technology for structure and buy more sophisticated communications equipment, which allowed the separate parts of the network to coordinate their activities much better without being in close proximity to one another. That allowed various groups to come together quickly, make a shipment happen and then disperse.¹⁸

The Internet, worldwide fund transfers, data transmissions, cheap encrypted cell phones and television can all be used to create a terrorist community without propinquity or proximity. In addition to physical space and technology, finances are clearly a resource that dark networks must have to continue to operate. Linkages between the nodes in a network are facilitated by trust between the actors, based on reciprocity and the ability to reward cooperation by transferring resources to the complying party.¹⁹

In the attempt to pull vulnerable populations away from the central government, AQIM will provide medicines, food and money to key populations they are trying to influence. A local Malian website, maliweb.net, notes that AQIM regularly courts the local population by providing goodwill items. Local people no longer see AQIM as evil because it has provided services that the state does not. Imagine a village where there is no infirmary and AQIM brings drugs: People would see AQIM militants as generous, peaceful and religious.²⁰ Hezbollah also established a civilian framework that supports Lebanese Shi'ites in the fields of education, healthcare and religion and

provides various social services. Hezbollah, like other terrorist organizations, is fully aware of the importance of the battle for hearts and minds; its objective is to influence the insights and perceptions of various target audiences in Lebanon and abroad.²¹

VEOs in West Africa also use smuggling networks and groups to provide necessary sustainment: weapons, foodstuffs, vehicle parts, fuel and other logistics support. In northern Mali, the Tuareg nation is made up of a variety of tribes and subtribes, not all of which are involved with VEOs; however, there are opportunists within that group of people who take advantage of the ungoverned space in northern Mali, southern Algeria, Niger, Chad and southern Libya. Those people may be opportunistic, as the amount of money that has been funneled into VEO networks runs into the tens of millions of dollars. The AQIM terrorist group has sustained itself since 2003 primarily through revenues derived from the business of taking Westerners hostage. It also engages in drug trafficking and receives some donations. The Maghreb group's kidnap-for-ransom business, especially in North Africa, generates many millions of dollars.²²

USG interagency coordination?

CMSEs play an important role in interagency coordination in west Africa. The CMSE, in particular, operates in conjunction with key members of the country team, including the office for security cooperation, the defense attache, the deputy chief of mission, the regional security officer, USAID country directors, and the ambassador or chief of mission. Depending on the footprint of U.S. government agencies within the country team, the team could have members from the Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Agriculture and Department of Justice. The CMSEs create informal, ad-hoc relationships that appear and dissolve, based on the needs of the environment.

The CMSE's core competency, however, is working outside of the embassy, coordinating with IOs, NGOs and the partner-nation governments. It can be inordinately difficult to coordinate the operational objectives of so many disparate partners with a variety of different goals that are sometimes diametrically opposed.

The CMSE must conduct rapid stakeholder analysis of the key personnel in its



HUMAN TERRAIN CMSEs work with the local populace to gain an understanding of their needs and wants. *U.S. Army photo*

operational environment. For example, in one west African country, the country team was supportive of an initiative to spend more time in rural areas and establish a de facto soft-power American presence that would be “just like the Peace Corps.” While socializing the concept, an operations officer in our deployed higher headquarters casually quipped, “As long as the CMSE is not just like the Peace Corps.”

The various viewpoints of key personnel toward a CMSE goal can still have common elements, and the CMSE must be able to analyze the main points of each party’s position and market the concept in which they are willing to invest. Finding the right balance between self-interests and domain interests is a delicate maneuver, however, as each organization seeks mechanisms that enable it to coordinate *with* others and yet not be coordinated *by* others.²³

CMSE coordination with IOs and NGOs can be quite fruitful, as well. NGOs and IOs will provide aid to peoples whose governments cannot provide that support. CMSEs map the capabilities and geographic locations of NGOs, understand their goals, and encourage appropriate organizations to go to

areas that are of concern to the Department of Defense. In Dr. Nancy Roberts’ article in the March-April 2010 *Public Administration Review*, she states that increasing linkages between and among organizations have their advantages in enhancing collaboration toward a commonly defined problem.²⁴

Capacity building

The CMSE conducts operations using a variety of mechanisms to legitimize the partner-nation government, build the capacity of military forces and determine civil vulnerabilities that can be exploited by VEOs. CMSEs engage different levels of the partner-nation government, from national-level ministries to a mayor’s staff in a town of 200 people. The CMSE will also conduct capacity-building operations of partner-nation special forces. Those forces are the tools by which the government will extend its reach into contested areas. However, the quality of the training those forces receive will determine how professionally they will treat their fellow countrymen. If they treat them poorly, they will drive them into the waiting arms of the VEO. If they treat them with respect and genuinely care for their

protection, however, that vulnerable population will trust them for their security.

CMSEs in west Africa have executed numerous classes on civil-military operations and have conducted medical and veterinary civic-action programs, building up the reputation of the government. These partner-nation forces also conduct key-leader engagements with the same people with whom CMSEs meet, including civic leaders, NGOs and business people, to determine any areas that are being threatened by VEOs.

In one of the author’s engagements with a local hospital administrator in eastern Mauritania, a VEO safe haven and an un-governed area, the administrator described the process the Mauritanian government undertakes to fix medical equipment. The hospital has to send the equipment back to the capital, Nouakchott, and do without that capability until the item is fixed or a replacement is delivered. The resulting gaps in capability can be exploited by VEOs in their attempt to lure key populations away from supporting the partner-nation government.

In the same vein, the CMSE in Mali was able to help the Ministry of Health by delivering vaccines to an area of interest to the JSOTF-TS that was beyond the reach of the partner-nation’s vaccine logistics distribution system. The delivery provided access for the CMSE to positively engage with key members of the population, provide humanitarian assistance, and enhance the relationship between the government of Mali and the U.S. Embassy. These types of operations enable trust to be built between these population and the government.

CMSEs throughout the OEF-TS countries have been mapping the countries’ capabilities in order to identify shortfalls and provide support to the partner-nation government. That not only improves the health of the population but also strengthens ties between the people and their government. If the government cannot or will not care for its people, another group could step in to provide the support to a key population.

Conclusion

The author has provided a short review of networks and demonstrated how CMSEs create networks for a specific purpose, time and area. The CMSE’s flexibility allows it to increase its reach and effectiveness exponentially. CMSEs do not engage directly with

VEO facilitators or with VEOs themselves, but they do interact with indigenous groups who operate in the VEO's operational ecosystem. The soft-power, positive engagements that occur between the CMSEs and the local population may negatively affect the VEO network's capability by pulling individuals away from supporting them. While deployed, the CMSEs, as a hub in a greater network of purpose, can create networks within U.S. government agencies. They can coordinate the activities of the country team and other U.S. interagency partners by giving each element a "felt need to collaborate" and sharing a common goal and purpose.²⁵ The CMSE regularly conducts stakeholder analysis and will survey key decision-makers and groups to bring them together in a whole-of-government approach to combat violent extremism.

Professor John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School provides a scathing rebuke of current U.S. military operations in a *Foreign Policy* article, "New Rules of War." He states that what is missing from America's military arsenal is a deep understanding of networking, the loose but lively interconnection between people that creates and brings to bear a new kind of collective intelligence, power and purpose. Quite small units, he says, can wield great power when connected to others, especially friendly indigenous forces.²⁶

The CMSE's operational effect is enhanced by creating networks of purpose that counteract the influence of VEOs. By working through and with partners, CMSEs can deter or disrupt VEO operations for a minuscule amount of money. The cost of CA company deployment, including training and operational funds, is far less than the cost of an M1A2 Abrams tank.²⁷ **SW**

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
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GAME CHANGERS

ANA SPECIAL FORCES IMPACT THE COURSE OF AFGHANISTAN

BY JANICE BURTON



U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY STAFF SERGEANT RUSSELL L. KLIIKA



Some would say that Brigadier General Dadan Lawang, the commander of the Afghan National Army's Special Operations Command, has the most important job in Afghanistan today. Lawang, along with his fellow officers, is charged with building the nation's special-operations forces – the forces many Army leaders say will be “game changers” in Afghanistan.

“Our Commandos and Special Forces have a great history with U.S. Special Forces,” said Lawang, during a visit to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, in June.

Lawang and a contingent from his command were at the school to observe training, discuss doctrine and explore the building of an NCO corps within the command.

“We have worked a long time together training,” Lawang said. “Our hope is to learn the lessons that I can take back home for my own forces in the training and doctrine arena and incorporate them in our training.”

Lawang's visit to the schoolhouse comes at a critical time in the development of the Afghan special-operations forces. While most American forces are familiar with the Afghan Commandos, the Afghan Special Forces are in their infancy, having graduated only a handful of classes from its qualification course since the inception of the force. The creation of the Special Forces will build on the achievements of the Commandos, a direct-action force. The Afghan Special Forces, like their American counterparts, are trained to act in the indirect realm and have already begun building relationships and long-term commitments in villages throughout Afghanistan.

“In the Afghanistan Special Operations Command, we have a long-term commitment with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command,” said Lawang. “They have always helped and supported us. Lt. Gen. John Mulholland (commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command) and Brig. Gen. Ed Reeder (commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command) recognize this commitment and have promised that they will be here with us for a long time.”

The commitment Lawang speaks of extends to the sharing of lessons learned and helping establish and create a professional force in Afghanistan.

“Our main responsibilities are policy, doctrine, training and equipping the force,” explained Lawang. “As we move forward, we are providing better command and control for our force, and our goal is to go out and be operational.”

To meet that goal, the Afghan command has established a school similar to SWCS, the training center and proponent of Army special-operation forces.

“It is a school of excellence where we are teaching our commandos and our SF candidates,” said Lawang.



THE PLAYERS Top left, Brigadier General Dadan Lawang observes training at Camp Morehead in Afghanistan. Lawan’s special-operations forces are considered game changers in the conflict in Afghanistan. U.S. Army photos by Staff Sergeant Russell L. Klika



Lawang hopes to take some of the things he saw while visiting SWCS back to his country and implement them within his command and training.

The Afghan special-operations leaders spent time at the SWCS NCO Academy, Directorate of Regional Studies and Education and Directorate of Training and Doctrine, and they see these activities’ missions as integral to the creation of a professional force.

Lawang was particularly impressed by the training conducted at the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center.

“This is the most comprehensive training I have seen. It is most amazing,” said Lawang. “I haven’t seen such training in my life and would like to see one day this kind of training for my forces.”

Growth of the Force

There are currently nine active commando battalions and one SF battalion operating under the auspices of the Afghan Special Operations Command. Lawang and his staff are planning for the growth of the forces to two Commando brigades, one SF brigade, one training brigade, one support brigade and one strategic battalion.

The growth will include the establishment of a civil-affairs and military-information-support force, which will have the specific task of engaging the Afghan populace.

Lawang says that in the past several years, the Commandos have made inroads in winning the support of the population, but he acknowledges that he needs the expertise of Special Forces to succeed.

“The Commando achievement is based on training, equipment and hard work,” he said. “Now we must build the force that can take that further.”

In order to create his special forces, Lawang picked the best of the best commandos to fill leadership roles within the new force.

“They are very well-trained,” he said.

While the Commandos will continue to be trained in direct-action techniques and skills by American Special Forces teams, it is to the Afghan Special Forces that the U.S. forces will pass on some of their most important lessons: how to think outside the box; how to deal with conflict as a diplomat rather than as a warrior; and how to engage the population in order to gain their loyalty and trust.

“Our SF troops are engaging the people directly. So far, everyone is satisfied, and we have very good achievements so far,” said Lawang. “Our SF troops are working daily with the people. They are listening to their problems. They are conducting shuras. The people have started trusting the SF and Commandos more than before. They are turning to them. This is a big achievement.”



Lawang ties those achievements to the training provided by U.S. Special Forces and the partnership that they have developed with the Afghan forces over the past 10 years.

He explained that while U.S. Special Forces are training his new troops, his troops are training other soldiers.

“One of our SF teams is training soldiers — more than 300, while another trains 200 local policemen,” he said.

He noted that his force is actively engaged in village-stability operations.

“The people in a village had a dispute over water, so the 1st Battalion cut ditches to bring water into the village. By doing this, the SF soldiers helped settle the dispute and settled the village down,” he explained. “In another village, the problem was the roads. The roads were not asphalted, so working together, the Commandos and the special forces made a proposal to the government to get the roads asphalted. These roads help the villagers, but it also gives us greater access to the village.”

While Lawang and the Afghan government seem to support the concept of village stability, they do have some concerns.

“It is a successful mission. We have good achievements. Our only concern is that we do not want people who had power in the past to take over and build their own militias again and control the countryside,” he explained. “We want the local council to select the leaders.

“Over the next two years, we will have a lot of changes in training and equipment. Right now, we have hopes for my soldiers. Once they are fully capable, they will make a history in our country,” he continued. “Two years is a long time, but we will have a much more professional Commando and Special Forces.”

Lawang expects the relationship between his command and the American Special Forces will be key in the growth and professionalization of his force.

“We listen to each other, and we respect each other,” he said of the American forces. “When we go out into the field, our U.S. counterparts listen to us, because they know we know the culture and traditions. They accept what we say, and this results in no casualties, which has made a place for all of us in the hearts of our people.

“Our people are now confident that our force can protect them from the Taliban and terrorism,” he continued. “They know that this force will take care of them.”

While American Special Forces have long been referred to as “brotherhood,” Lawang sees the growth of a different brotherhood.

“Our partnership has changed to brotherhood between our forces,” he explained. “We work together, train together, eat together, and we spend time together. When we go into the field and shed our blood — we do it together.” **SW**

Q&A BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWARD M. REEDER JR.

SW: We understand that you were charged with creating the new Afghan Special Forces. Tell us how that charge came about.

Reeder: In the winter of 2006, while serving as the commander, Combined Joint Special-Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, we received a tasking for then-Brigadier General Frank Kearney, commander, Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command, to conduct the feasibility of establishing an Afghan Special Forces unit. After careful consideration and analysis, we concluded that the Afghan National Security Forces, specifically the Afghan Army, simply did not have the core capability to develop, task-organize, equip, train and sustain a special forces-capable unit. Furthermore, we decided during that time frame that the Afghan Army did not need a special-forces capability, as they were still in the early stages of building an Army and confronted with the enduring challenges of sustaining that force.

Brigadier General Kearney then directed that we design, train, equip and sustain a Commando force. The intent of the Commandos was to build a well-organized, well-trained and well-led infantry fighting force. The concept was developed by the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan at Bagram Airfield, the Afghan training cadre was trained in 2006 in Jordan, and the first two *kandaks*, or battalions, were trained in 2007 at Camp Morehead in Kabul. There are currently nine Commando kandaks, and they remain the most effective fighting force in the Afghan Army.

During 2009, the Combined Forces Special Operations Command-Afghanistan looked at various ways to complement the U. S. Special Forces A-detachments, or ODAs, as the concept of the local defense initiative, also referred to as LDI (later as the community defense initiative, and later as village-stability operations) was developed. The concept was to build a Special Forces-capable Afghan ODA that would be assigned to every location where we had a U.S. Special Forces ODA supporting the LDI. The idea was that the Afghan ODA would have better access and placement in the local communities and local tribes. We wanted the Afghan Special Forces to be capable of recruiting and training the local participants in the LDI as well as being the lead for promoting local governance. The Combined Forces Special

Operation Component Command- Afghanistan approached the concept of developing an Afghan Special Forces with the Afghan Minister of Defense and the Afghan chief of the Army staff in 2009. Both were enthusiastic supporters of building an Afghan Special Forces. The concept was briefed to then-Maj. Gen. Dick Formica, commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, who approved the concept in 2009. The plan was approved for a Special Forces brigade headquarters, four battalions and 72 ODAs. A U.S. Special Forces advanced operating base was assigned the task of training the Afghan ODAs, and the first Afghan ODAs began their training in 2010.

SW: Can you describe for us some of the challenges you faced in designing the new force?

Reeder: Essential to all Special Forces engagements with foreign forces are built-in elements of sustainability and host-nation support. We knew from the beginning that we had to build a system that the Afghan National Security Force could take over and maintain. In Afghanistan, as in so many other locations where Green Berets are operating around the globe, we must have the support of the people if our efforts are to produce lasting effects.

The initial concept that was briefed to the Afghan Minister of Defense was to develop a force that leveraged the local ethnicity and tribal affiliations. As each U.S. Special Forces group has a geographic orientation, and each Green Beret is language-trained in that particular focus area, we envisioned an Afghan Special Forces ODA recruited, trained and developed from the geographic regions of Afghanistan. Soldiers who were of the same tribal affiliations would serve in the same area. The idea was that the Afghan ODAs would know the people well, understand the regional cultures, and have instant placement and access. However, that concept proved difficult to execute, and it was abandoned in favor of a multiethnic Afghan Special Forces.

We needed an indigenous force that could go out and live among the populace and provide a continuous presence. That is one of the missions Green Berets are specifically designed, trained and equipped to do — to work through and with locals. In two years, the capability has increased ten-fold.

SW: Tell us about the training program and its similarities to Special Forces training in the United States.

Reeder: The program of instruction for the Afghan Special Forces is similar to that for training U.S. Special Forces. The same structure is in place for the teams, with the U.S. Special Forces ODA being the blueprint. There is officer and NCO leadership, with weapons, medical, military intelligence and engineer skill sets represented on the teams. The difference in the force structure was that instead of a 12-man ODA, we built a 15-man ODA, adding an additional intelligence sergeant, an explosive-ordnance-disposal sergeant and a religious officer.

What is different is the scope. Our U.S. Special Forces are trained over a multi-year training pipeline for worldwide employment of all core missions, but the training of Afghan Special Forces is focused on internal-defense tasks and counterinsurgency tasks within Afghanistan only. For example, the weapons training focuses on Soviet weapons systems common in the region rather than on systems found worldwide. The reduction in scope allows for an accelerated training program that is producing competent Afghan forces who can execute missions and train their own forces.

SW: How has the course developed since its implementation?

Reeder: The selection process has not changed, but recruiting has expanded. The recruiting pool now includes the entire Afghan National Army, which reduces attrition on the Commandos. Some expected adjustments have been made in order to compensate for the fact that armywide recruits do not have the same level of experience or elite training as Commandos, who made up the initial teams. Another change is an increase in sustainment training. Many of the soldiers trained earlier are returning for further training, such as driving skills and leadership courses.

SW: Are American SF Soldiers still actively engaged in the training?

Reeder: U.S. Green Berets are still engaged in a reduced capacity. We are serving in an assist mode rather than as primary trainers, in most instances. U.S. medical sergeants still lead medical training, based on their expertise and the complexity of the subject matter. We still take the



BROTHERHOOD Brigadier Gen. Edward Reeder, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, presents an award to Lt. Gen. Shir Mohammad Karimi, General Staff Chief of Operations, Afghan National Army. U.S. Army photo

lead on demolitions training. For the most part, they are training their own troops. The first order of business was to train the best of the initial Commando classes to serve as cadre, so they could train using situational-based training.

SW: What impact is the new force having in the villages throughout Afghanistan?

Reeder: These teams provide immediate rapport with the local populace and at times have ties with the locals. The ANA SF teams take the lead in the villages, and they add legitimacy to the mission. They are prepared to engage the populace the Afghan way, to be present for shuras with tribal elders and local leaders.

Having trained, competent Afghan Special Forces ODAs increases the capacity on the ground, enables them to stand up the ALP quicker and reduces the reliance on local national interpreters.

SW: We understand that some of the best leaders of the Afghan Commandos were pulled to help form the new Special Forces. How has the creation of the force affected the performance of the Commandos?

Reeder: There was some initial concern that it would deplete the Commandos of their best

and brightest, but we've been able to mitigate this by getting the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command involved in the process, which was one of the initial goals of the program. With a leadership course at Camp Morehead, the Commandos have been able to produce sufficient numbers to maintain their capabilities.

SW: Has the division into Commandos and SF caused any ill-will among the force?

Reeder: The Commandos and the Afghan Special Forces work together, but they have different missions.

There was a deliberate decision to keep the same patch for both units, to build camaraderie. There was already an awareness of the patch, which is recognized on the battlefield and associated with certain capabilities and professionalism.

SW: How do their roles differ?

Reeder: The Afghan National Army Commandos are an infantry-based force conducting direct-action-type missions, but they have the capability for multi-day operations in support of village-stability operations.

The Afghan Special Forces are trained and educated to go out in the populace for extended

periods of time. They live with the locals and engage in longer-term internal-development operations and counterinsurgency operations.

SW: Can you comment on the performance of the new Afghan Special Forces?

Reeder: I'm pleased with what I've seen from the Afghan Special Forces teams and their contributions on the ground. As designed, they are able to train the local forces and expand to the next village, which supports VSO.

With the Special Warfare Center of Excellence, the ANASOC is taking the lead in training and serving as a proponent for their Special Forces. They take ownership of it, run it and are ultimately responsible for maintaining the capabilities for which we established the infrastructure.

In order for anything to work in Afghanistan, there has to be a local solution. It sounds cliché now, but every single location in Afghanistan is different. Each Afghan Special Forces ODA has a completely different problem set. Our Green Berets are working with the ANASOC and the Afghan Special Forces ODAs to identify the problems and find solutions. That is exactly what Special Forces ODAs are designed to do, both U.S. and Afghan, and they are doing it brilliantly. **SW**

FORECASTING—

**COVER
STORY**



U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY STAFF SERGEANT RUSSELL L. KLIKA

THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN

BY COLONEL DONALD C. BOLDUC

This is a critical time in Afghanistan for the United States, and we must maintain our focus and momentum by holding what we have secured and expanding and layering the Afghan local police, or ALP. Crucial to success will be our ability to hold and build, facilitated by the ALP, to prevent the insurgents from returning. We need to ensure that we are set for an insurgent surge and in a position to repel it without loss of the secured areas, or white space...

Our primary focus should be on the tactical plan that supports the operational direction and guidance of Brig. Gen. Austin Miller, commander of the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan, or CFSOCC-A. Successful implementation of that plan will set the conditions for coalition-forces gains and allow us to accomplish our tactical task of neutralizing the insurgents by the winter and spring of 2012.

We must ensure that Soldiers at all levels understand and put into practice Brig. Gen. Miller's intent that we effectively train our partners in the Afghan national-security forces, or ANSF, to operate unilaterally, neutralize the insurgency and mobilize the members of the populace to stand up for themselves. Our course is simple: Embed and establish village-stability platforms, or VSPs; grow the ALP to increase security; integrate with the battlespace owners, or BSOs; and expand and connect the white space.

To assist Soldiers in sustaining our momentum and setting conditions for the transition of incoming units, we have directives and operational priorities of the commanders of the CFSOCC-A and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, or CJSOTF-A, established methodologies for the ALP Panel and villisage-stability operations and published orders that clearly nest all lines of operation and articulate our operational and tactical direction.

Azimuth check

At this time it's necessary to review where the CJSOTF-A was at the beginning of April 2010 and what we are currently doing. That needs to be framed in a larger context that incorporates the operational plans of the Regional Command, or RC; operational plan OP OMID 1390 of the International Security Assistance Force's, or ISAF's) Joint Command, or IJC; and the 2011 campaign plan of the ISAF commander. Then we should apply that context in looking at where the CJSOTF-A needs to be in the future. In the author's assessment, we have been in the strategic shaping phase since July 2009, and the time between now and next summer will be decisive. The summer of 2012 will see us move into the build-and-transition phase, when we should see significant gains in Afghan governance and the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF.

In July 2009, Gen. Stanley McChrystal assumed command and developed a strategy for a population-centric counterinsurgency, or COIN, that would change the strategic direction of operations in Afghanistan. He developed a number of directives to support the strategy; developed the IJC, a three-star command headquarters under Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez; and altered the prior authority of the RC, re-designating its headquarters as a division-level headquarters in command of all forces in the area of responsibility. That established the necessary authority for all RC commanders to synchronize, develop and coordinate an operational framework in support of the COIN strategy.

Gen. McChrystal also reorganized the way that special-operations forces, or SOF, layer and support each other in conducting COIN operations. In January 2009, CFSOCC-A was established under Brig. Gen. Ed Reeder, the commander the U.S. Special Forces Command, who began to organize the headquarters to support the commanders of ISAF and IJC and to nest into the COIN strategy and IJC's operational plan to provide the link for SOF support through the

CJSOTF-A tactical headquarters and subordinate special-operations task forces, or SOTFs. What emerged were two primary lines of operations: CJSOTF-A tactical operations, which were initially called the community defense initiative, or CDI, then became the local defense initiative, or LDI, and in May 2010 became VSO; and a foreign internal defense, or FID, mission with partnered ANSF.

VSO became the CJSOTF-A's first tactical priority. The second would be the FID training mission at Camp Morehead and our partnerships with the Afghan National Army, or ANA, Commandos and ANA Special Forces, as well as our temporary partnerships with two ANA battalions, or kandaks, and one informal partnership with the Afghan National Civil Order Police. At the CJSOTF-A level, Col. Jim Kraft and Col. Gus Benton set in motion tactical plans to support the CFSOCC-A operational programs and directives. Brig. Gen. Miller assumed command of CFSOCC-A in March 2010 and continued Brig. Gen. Reeder's critical work, taking the command to the next level by working through Gen. David Petraeus and Lt. Gen. Rodriguez in getting the VSO and ALP initiatives codified in a presidential decree signed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai in September 2010.

Recognizing the critical need to link the district and provincial governance to critical national leaders and ministries, Brig. Gen. Miller established village-stability coordination centers, or VSCC, and district augmentation teams, or DAT. It was at this point that we recognized not only our role as knowledge brokers but also the importance of nesting our collective efforts through key leader engagements, or KLEs, at all levels to help us understand the political networks and human terrain. Brig. Gen. Miller also directed the transition from vertical communications to flat communications. That change was necessary to increase situational awareness, ensure investment in problem-solving at all levels, increase information flow and reduce the degrees of separation between a problem and its resolution. The new communications architecture proved essential to ensuring effective support, flexibility in decision-making and command and control in our distributive and decentralized force array.

On April 1, 2010, operational control, or OPCON, of CFSOCC-A was changed from Special Operations Command-Central to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. The CJSOTF-A was still commanded by CFSOCC-A but worked in direct support of COMIJC, and the subordinate SOTFs directly supported the RCs. That arrangement makes it possible to accomplish two things: It provides a framework for CJSOTF-A as a special-operations force, or SOF, to be nested with the regional commanders' plans, and it retains a separate SOF chain of command that ensures proper command and control, resourcing and employment of SOF consistent with their capabilities and mission requirements.

In addition, CJSOTF-A synchronizes and coordinates with TF-535, TF 3-10 and ISAF SOF in order to layer, complement and synchronize SOF operations across the battlespace to achieve the desired effects against the insurgent networks and infrastructure. CJSOTF-A also conducts VSO to improve security with ALP, connect to governance and facilitate the delivery of goods, services and infrastructure development in order to conduct bottom-up COIN operations in support of the SOTFs' respective RCs.



GROUND TRUTH Col. Donald Bolduc (third from left), the former CJSOTF commander charged with implementing village-stability operations visits a village to observe his forces in action. *U.S. Army photo*

Back to the Future

Also in April 2010, the CJSOTF-A reorganized to focus on VSO (our partnership with the populace) and FID (our partnership with the ANSF) as our primary missions. To accomplish that, the CJSOTF-A developed guidance and methodologies for VSO and its partnerships and conducted a series of commander's conferences to establish a CJSOTF-A tactical framework for supporting CFSOCC-A's operational priorities and nesting into the IJC operational plan and the ISAF campaign plan. SOTFs were directed to develop bottom-up tactical-support plans that were nested with the RCs' operational plans. The CJSOTF-A also streamlined the approval process for concepts of operations, or CONOPs, by decentralizing maximum authority to the SOTF level and below to allow units to operate effectively in support of the BSOs. Ninety-two percent of all CONOPs are now approved at the SOTF level or below. Only nighttime raids have to be approved at the CJSOTF-A level, with CFSOCC-A provided copies of the CONOP for situational awareness. The resulting "expanded operational boxes" allow SOF teams conducting VSO to move at the speed of the populace and the insurgents. That agility and flexibility are necessary to enhance force-protection in a village-stability site, or VSS, and to achieve positive effects with the populace against the insurgents.

As part of the CJSOTF-A tactical framework, the SOTF commanders were directed to conduct VSO in key rural areas through-

out Afghanistan. The analysis that went into determining the key rural areas was conducted between August 2009 and February 2010. Numerous interviews were conducted with Afghan government officials, previous government officials from different provinces and members of academia. The informal study focused specifically on the work of author Seth Jones in *Graveyard of Empires*, particularly the chapter that focuses on how the Taliban took over Afghanistan from 1994-98.

Members of CJSOTF-A briefed the plan to Brig. Gen. Miller, and he approved it for implementation in May 2010. CJSOTF-A initially organized its forces to conduct VSO in the same areas the Taliban occupied. That would support the RCs and BSOs in the key rural areas and gaps and seams associated with the key and focused districts and would eventually connect both top-down and bottom-up COIN operations through the establishment of VSCC and DAT by CFSOCC-A. On Jan. 1, 2011, CJSOTF-A published OPORD *Mustaqbilana* (meaning 'Afghans standing up for themselves'), which was designed to link CJSOTF-A's lines of operations to CFSOCC-A's operational priorities nested within COMIJC Operation OMID 1390.

Our contribution to the strategy revolves around U.S. SOF living among the people in rural villages (surrounded by the insurgents and the populace), building relationships and assisting the populace to stand up against insurgents. The strategy re-empowers their traditional local governance structures



SEEKING APPROVAL Members of a U.S. Special Forces team, along with their Afghan counterparts, seek approval from village elders to place an Afghan Local Police checkpoint in their village. *U.S. Army photo by Specialist Simon Lee*

within the village through the shura, and it establishes ALP to create a local “security bubble” around the village. When local stability is achieved and expanded to other villages, the SOF element then arranges the delivery of goods and services to facilitate infrastructure development and connect the village leadership to the Afghan government. To date, that bottom-up approach has contributed to stabilizing rural areas that had served the insurgents as safe havens, transition points and command-and-control hubs for projecting violence into larger urban areas. Stability created by SF’s actions is localized, fragile and reversible if not properly consolidated.

Additionally, when coordinated and nested into the BSOs’ plans and woven together and amplified with a coherent information-operations plan (tactical to strategic), localized actions combine to assist in achieving strategic effects. VSPs will report local actions and accomplishments related to security, development, governance and reintegration across the RCs. Those actions will be amplified by the narrative of “Afghans standing up for themselves with a connection to the Afghan government” embodied in the CJSOTF-A OPOD *Mustaqbilana*. Those tactical actions, coupled with strategic IO effects, have established VSO and ALP as an essential component in achieving both the IJC commander’s operational objectives and the ISAF commander’s strategic goals.

The Plan

In 1994, the Taliban, in small elements, started in Kandahar City and moved clockwise around the country to key areas in the Helmand, Herat, Bahgdis, Faryab, Masar-e Sharif and Konduz

provinces, then continued back around to the east in Konar, Paktiya, Nangahar, Parwan, Kabul, Khowst, Paktika, Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul and Uruzgan provinces. It took them four years to take over Afghanistan, pushing Ahmed Shah Masoud and his Northern Alliance into the northern portion of the country and isolating them to the northeast area of Konduz Province. During that time, the government of Afghanistan was ineffective and could not overcome the influences of the extremist version of Islam being enforced by the Taliban, whose members use murder and intimidation tactics to compel the people of Afghanistan to submit to their will and governance.

At the same time, the Taliban attempted to receive international recognition for its status as the sovereign government in Afghanistan. Never able to achieve that, the group ultimately

aligned with Osama bin Laden, and their association culminated in the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban’s refusal to turn over bin Laden resulted in the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 by SOF and other government agencies, initiating a conflict with the Taliban and other insurgent groups that has been continuous for the past 10 years.

It is important that readers understand that piece of history, so that they will be able to conceptualize how and why we are operating in Afghanistan to support the overall COIN strategy. We have been directed to operate in key rural areas, secure them, hold them, expand VSO and develop the ALP to facilitate the hold phase of the strategy so that we may progress into the build phase. That will further stabilize rural areas by mobilizing the populace to push out the insurgents, thereby improving security, bringing in development and connecting key rural areas to district governance. That will facilitate the connection of district government to provincial government, making a national connection that begins to set the conditions for reintegration and creation of an Afghan preference for nationalism over tribalism that legitimizes the Afghan government. Over time, that will result in the improvement of governance, including the building of the ANSF, who are able to neutralize and control the insurgency, allowing us to expand our areas of control and then set the conditions for transitioning those areas over to the Afghan state.

CJSOTF-A initiated the current tactical plan in May 2010, then set the conditions through the fall of that year in order to achieve the desired effects during the winter. The effects include securing key rural areas, holding them and expanding security

in order to prevent the insurgent leadership, facilitators and supporters from returning the next spring and preparing to conduct their summer fight. If we can disrupt the insurgents' summer fight, they will be off-balance the rest of the year. More specifically, in the fall they will not be able to reconsolidate and reinitiate their fight after Eid al-Fitr, the three-day festival of fast-breaking at the end of Ramadan, prior to the winter lull. If we are successful, we can produce the kind of disruption that the insurgency has not experienced in many years, forcing them to react to us, rather than us reacting to them.

It is important to note that we are a key part of the COIN strategy that Gen. Petraeus put in place when he was commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, of Lt. Gen. Rodriguez's operational plan, of Brig. Gen. Miller's operational directives and of the RCs' plans. We nest our tactical plan within the plans of the designated BSO, which are nested within the plans of the RCs. We layer with other SOF units to effectively disable the insurgent infrastructure and support the populace. TF-310 and ISAF SOF work on the head (insurgent leadership), and we work on the body (denying time and space to

43rd sustainment brigades in accordance with USFOR-A Fragmentary Order 10-002.

The IO message

It is important to discuss our information operations, or IO, efforts, which are embedded in everything we do. Our VSS put us in key rural areas to compete with the insurgents' messaging and propaganda. We followed three lines of messaging: inoculation (communicating to the populace the intentions of the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban), fortitude (Afghans standing up for themselves) and empowerment (Afghans doing it themselves). By embedding in the villages, we place ourselves into the community in such a way that it prevents the insurgents from effectively using word-of-mouth dissemination of propaganda against the Afghan state and conventional forces. We further compete against and control that propaganda by establishing a tactical radio-broadcast system consisting of radio in a box, or RIAB, to increase our contact with the populace, complementing our own word-of-mouth messaging. Those two forms of communication with the populace have proven

“To date, that bottom-up approach has contributed to stabilizing rural areas that had served the insurgents as safe havens, transition points and command-and-control hubs for projecting violence into larger urban areas.”

the facilitators and supporters) of the insurgent infrastructure. That complementary combination and layering of tactical operations has proved effective against the insurgents.

To provide increased capability to CFSOCC-A VSO, in November 2010, Gen. Petraeus requested that the Secretary of Defense approve the deployment of an infantry battalion to be under the OPCON of CFSOCC-A. That request was approved, and the 1-16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, from Fort Riley, Kan., was designated to deploy in January to be under the tactical control, or TACON, of CJSOTF-A in support of VSO. In addition, Admiral Eric Olson initiated the staffing of a request for forces for 13 SOF teams and critical Civil Affairs and Military Information Support teams to further support CJSOTF-A VSO. In March, Gen. Petraeus again requested that the Secretary of Defense approve the deployment of a second infantry battalion to be OPCON to CFSOCC-A. The request was approved, and the 1-505th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, was designated to deploy in June to be under the TACON of CJSOTF-A in support of VSO.

The CJSOTF-A has expanded the number of VSO sites from five in April 2010 to 46 in March 2011 and increased personnel during the same period from 2,900 to 5,400. The additional force structure provides CJSOTF-A the ability to expand to support all RC commanders. The decentralized and distributed command and control creates challenges with logistical sustainment, but because of the expeditionary nature of SOF logistical units, the additional force structure and footprint are both operationally and logistically supportable by CJSOTF-A, with additional support by the 101st and

to be most effective in rural Afghanistan. We currently have multiple RIABs in Afghanistan that cover more than 95,000 square kilometers of key rural areas to complement VSO.

Our narrative is more effective than the insurgents'. Ours is one of hope, while the insurgency's is one that leads to despair. We counter by using the Afghan government's messaging to compete with the insurgent message. Without imposing a democratic government, we bring democratic principles that appeal to Afghan culture in the rural areas. The principles reflect traditional Afghan and Islamic values associated with prosperity for their families. We bring those principles to them on behalf of the Afghan government in the form of improved security, enhanced infrastructure development and a connection to governance. The insurgent message tells the populace that if they fail to cooperate with the insurgency, they face the prospect of murder, subjugation of their women, little or no education for their children, oppression, an extremist version of Islam, no opportunity for development and no connection to a legitimate government.

What works against our narrative is that the emerging Afghan government is not capable of securing and governing itself, creating instability and an opportunity for the insurgents to influence the populace. The root cause of the insurgency is an ineffective Afghan government; however, there are proximate causes that empower the insurgency, disenfranchise the populace and contribute to an ineffective government.

The first of these proximate causes is corruption, manifesting itself in corrupt Afghan officials, ANSF members, and power brokers who operate at the expense of the population. The patronage

network is inherently Afghan, but it has reached criminal and counterproductive proportions. It is our job to confront corruption and mitigate it to the extent that corrupt officials change their behavior toward favoring the populace (51 percent on behalf of the populace and 49 percent in self-interest). We are not there to rid Afghanistan of corruption, but rather to get things “just about right,” which in appearances looks like an Afghan official who supports the Afghan state and does more for the people than for himself.

The second proximate cause is the government’s inability to deliver goods and services. We are there to improve security in order to facilitate a connection with the government and to introduce goods and services to the populace, thus improving infrastructure development.

The third proximate cause is the Afghan state’s inability to provide security and safety to the populace. We are there to facilitate that by developing a capable ANSF, layering that force with ALP to protect the Afghan people from the insurgents.

The fourth proximate cause is the inability of the government to provide stable economic conditions. By conducting VSO with bottom-up COIN operations that connect to top-down COIN operations, improving security that opens roads, connecting to governance to bring in job opportunities and improving infrastructure development to improve quality of life; we should see stabilization in the economic conditions that will allow some measure of prosperity in the rural communities of Afghanistan.

That stability will set the conditions for transition. The transition and ultimate Afghan state victory will be community-based by connecting key rural areas and neutralizing and controlling insurgent activity to prevent resurgence. By that time, the security situation will not be localized, fragile or easily reversible. There will be no significant strategic event that leads to the capitulation of the insurgent groups; instead, it will be an anticlimactic,



INCREASED SECURITY An Afghan local policeman monitors the corner of a village while locals watch the progress on a provincial construction project. U.S. Army photo by Specialist George Hunt

gradual and steady transition of districts and provinces to Afghan government control, based on the ANSF being able to stabilize the security situation and the populace being mobilized and supportive of the Afghan state.

Bottom line

To recap, we must maintain our focus and momentum. VSO/ALP and our partnerships with ANSF play to the strength of the CJSOTF-A organization, and, at this time, nested within the ISAF campaign plan, are the most effective use of CJSOTF-A force structure. VSO sets the condition for the ALP. The ALP will allow us to increase security, expand our security bubbles and create the opportunity for a connection to governance that will eventually facilitate development, thus leading to the stabilization of villages within key rural areas. That will allow us to achieve the desired effect in support of the populace and against the insurgency. **SW**

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STRATEGIC MESSAGE A member of a Military Information Support company talks with local Afghan citizens. MIS Soldiers play a key role in understanding and communicating with foreign populations. U.S. Army photo by Specialist George Hunt

Thinking MISO: Linking Strategy to Selection

BY COLONEL REGINALD J. BOSTICK

Today's operational environment has become increasingly more complicated, and the pervasiveness of information affects all aspects of society. Most military organizations have attempted to react and adopt innovative means of addressing information operations, but a significant gap continues to exist between their capabilities and information operations' potential.¹

In an environment that is both interconnected and unpredictable, there is a persistent struggle between the application of power and the application of influence. The United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, has identified both "credible influence" and "the operator" as keys to success in today's geostrategic environment.²

Beyond that recognition, the command has actually drawn a direct correlation between influence and the operator — a real innovation that marks the dawn of a

new era in SOF's ability to change undesired behaviors while investing in the intellectual capacity required to translate information into meaningful action.

USSOCOM's informational influence platform is its capability for Military Information Support Operations, or MISO (Soldiers and units themselves are called Military Information Support, or MIS). The purpose of MISO (formerly known as Psychological Operations) is to influence the behavior of selected foreign target audiences by disseminating messages that are consistent with national objectives.³

The evolution of MIS began in 2006 when former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld realigned all MIS groups. The Army Reserve MIS groups were placed under the operational control of the Army Reserve Command, and the active component group was directed to exclusively

execute and support special operations.⁴ This paradigm shift demanded that MIS be reinvented. Changes in doctrine, organization and training would be required to ensure that the active-component MIS group could fully conduct special missions and appropriately support SOF.

As USSOCOM continues to wield influence in the global environment, the command's leaders have also turned their attention to developing a new, expanded understanding of what sort of unique attributes are required of a modern SOF MIS Soldier — and new methods to identify, select and train him. The strategic environment clearly requires a more adaptive, flexible and intellectually sophisticated SOF MIS force than in the past.

This article will link USSOCOM's Command Strategy 2010 with the selection of MIS candidates and describe a suite of



SELECT FORCE The process for selecting and qualifying MIS Soldiers tests Soldiers' adaptability and mental toughness to ensure they can meet the demands of the modern MIS force. *U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Russell L. Klika*

cognitive attributes that should be included in their assessment.

The Strategy and MISO

*The environments in USSOCOM's assigned missions are predominately focused on addressing nonstate or transnational violent extremist threats. Future threats are emerging more from the complex convergence of crime, migration and extremism and less from traditional national-state adversaries. This "new normal" can best be described as "irregular" in nature, and as such requires more than military activities alone to address.*⁵

— Admiral Eric Olson, USSOCOM commander

USSOCOM's strategic outlook begins by analyzing the realities that special operations face today: "nonstate actors, acting in state-like ways that challenge nation-states in competition for sovereignty and influence over the population."⁶ Given the mandate to respond effectively in this irregular environment, USSOCOM has made the population its strategic focus, rather than the threat itself.⁷

To secure victory in a globally unpredictable environment, USSOCOM systematically maps out a triad of ways, means and ends. For "ways," read "the operator"; "means," read "capabilities, authorities and capacity"; and "ends," read "credible influence."⁸

Defining the endstate as "credible influence" makes sense of what could otherwise be chaos.

USSOCOM aims to foster credible influence to "build the foundation for change, one which promotes ideologies that reject extremist affiliation, action and undercut recruitment efforts."⁹ And MISO is USSOCOM's primary means to counter violent extremist ideologies.¹⁰

In acknowledging the reality of acquiring credible influence, USSOCOM devotes special clarity to its "ways" — the operator. SOF operators are the focus of all efforts to develop, field and employ a special-operations force. In the end, we can never forget that the force we field must remain the most competent, respected, effective and lethal fighting force in the world.¹¹

This perspective establishes the construct for the SOF operator and, by extension, has implications for the evolution of the SOF MIS Soldier. The prime directive for special operations is sustaining the operator and ensuring that he is the world's foremost expert in warfighting and foreign cultures, and that he can execute missions in a defense, diplomacy and development (3-D) construct.¹²

"The USSOCOM 3-D warrior is that special operator who is regionally grounded, diplomatically astute, an expert in SOF core activities, and whose actions produce tactical

through strategic effects within a coordinated whole-of-government approach."¹³

In application, the SOF 3-D construct calls for MIS operators who exhibit exceptional intelligence and possess the right mix of cognitive abilities to bridge the gap between analysis and creativity.

The Way: Military Information Support Operators

MISO's primary job today is twofold: to craft effective messages and to provide commanders with the psychological implications of conducting operations.¹⁴ But MISO did not escape a trap common to many military forces coming of age in a technology-dominated era: too much emphasis on the equipment required to transmit messages and not enough placed on the messages themselves — or even more basic, on the skills of the individual crafting the transmission.

That oversight is now being rectified. USSOCOM's former commander, Admiral Eric Olson, recently directed that the MISO organizational focus shift immediately from hardware to the exponential expansion of intellectual capital. Finally, the operator is the acknowledged platform.

With MISO's focus now squarely on the human, not the hardware, USSOCOM is faced with a challenge: How do we invest in this new SOF MIS warrior?

Special operations have always placed a significant amount of emphasis on the quality of its people. Both by doctrine and in practice, special operations are conducted by specially selected, trained and equipped units with "highly-focused capabilities."¹⁵ In fact, the most repeated SOF Truth is, "Humans are more important than hardware." SOF assessment and selection is specifically designed to ensure that Soldiers who do not possess the right cognitive attributes for mission success are screened out as early as possible.¹⁶ That evolutionary process has consistently produced Special Forces, SEALs and special-operations aviators who are the best in the world.

In the same way, USSOCOM commanders believe that identifying the right set of suitability factors for MIS candidates will significantly increase both individual and organizational effectiveness.

The Model MIS Candidate

All elements of SOF seek similar qualities in those they select for training. Soldiers must

demonstrate physical fitness, trainability, good judgment, motivation, a strong intellect and the capacity to be a team player.¹⁷ The ideal SOF MIS Soldier has the same virtues.

But the MIS mission demands an additional suite of cognitive attributes — intelligence and problem-solving capabilities that have special value in crafting effective messages and winning the battle for popular influence.

Psychologically, human beings are not created equal when it comes to their “smarts.” Instead, people possess multiple, autonomous intelligences, as opposed to a single intelligence,¹⁸ according to Dr. Howard Gardner, a neuropsychologist who helped pioneer this field of study.

For example, many of us know someone with who possesses a near-magical ability to deal with computers (technical intelligence), but zero ability to get along well with others (personal intelligence).

Likewise, in defining an individual’s psychological suitability for MISO, the key question is not if an individual is intelligent overall — that is just the minimum assessment and relatively easy to discern.

The much more complex question is whether the candidate has the right type of intelligence to make a successful MIS operator. In fact, the fundamental challenge in the MIS community is how to recognize the individual cognitive characteristics that contribute to mission success.

Based on operational engagement, observation, training and testing, the most successful operators possess three specific skill sets: an ability to read the desires and intentions of others; the ability to create mental images; and sensitivity to patterns in language, both written and oral. In short, they are “people smart” (personally intelligent), “picture smart” (spatially intelligent) or “word smart” (linguistically intelligent).¹⁹

In the case of personal intelligence, an individual can “read intentions and desires — even when these are hidden — for example, by influencing a group of disparate individuals to behave among desired lines.”²⁰

With regard to spatial intelligence, one has “the capacity to perceive the visual world accurately and the ability to recreate aspects of one’s visual experience, even in the absence of relevant physical stimuli,” according to Gardner.²¹

And in the domain of linguistic intelligence, “One has a sensitivity to the different functions of language — its potential to excite, convince, stimulate, convey informa-

tion or simply please.”²²

MIS Soldiers who excel in these three cognitive attributes are a natural fit for the demands of the mission.

The cognitive capacity expected of a SOF MIS Soldier has never been greater. The development of a MIS assessment methodology that includes the measurement of personal, spatial and linguistic aptitude will provide the influence community with a stronger foundation for enhancing the cerebral development of MIS Soldiers.

Conclusion

Debates over MIS terminology, organization and integration often miss the main point: military information support is strategically important; and the MIS Soldier’s cognitive capacity is the single most important factor in determining how effectively he will meet the complex challenges that special operators face.

As we develop the overall model for the ideal MIS operator, our efforts must focus on improving the evaluative mental models we use to select that Soldier. We must be more concerned with the influence operator’s mental wiring than with most other aspects of his professional qualifications. The quality of that intellect will ultimately decide his or her capacity for the creativity, accuracy and organizational effectiveness so critical to today’s mission.

Transforming the SOF MIS Soldier’s selection criteria will not guarantee instantaneous behavioral change in foreign target audiences. But the quest to further refine assessment methodologies cannot help but improve the effective, agile and flexible application of credible influence which the U.S. military is able to exert in today’s geostrategic environment. **SW**

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ON CAMERA Special-operations' spouse reps learn how to interact with the media prior to a unit deployment. Photo by Jodi Breckenridge Petit

SOF LEADER RESOURCES: The UW Auxiliary at Home

BY JODI BRECKENRIDGE PETIT, PH.D.

Unconventional warfare: What can it teach us about our own families? Plenty.

A strong family network — like a developed auxiliary¹ — is a foundational asset that strengthens the Soldier, the unit and the mission. The “family as auxiliary” association is useful to prompt leaders of special-operations forces, or SOF, to fully recognize the powerful volunteer resources resident within their organizations. Using those resources, SOF leaders can mobilize the talents and time of a family auxiliary to build cohesive and effective family-unit teams.

Guerrilla forces derive their security and support from their developed auxiliary and underground networks. That allows the guerrillas themselves to focus on combat actions. Similarly, a SOF leader can preserve his combat focus by investing in and utilizing a family-support network. A developed family-support network, like an auxiliary, provides units with the instinctive confidence that the “home front” is organized and prepared to contend with whatever comes its way.

The development of a unit's family *program* — family readiness group, or FRG, family readiness support assistants, or FRSA, and families — can be viewed as similar to the development of an auxiliary. Though a family network serves a distinctly different purpose from a

wartime auxiliary, the governing principle is the same: Support and develop those who will sustain and secure you.

This article discusses the three main components of a family auxiliary: the FRG volunteer cadre, the FRSA and each Soldier's family. Recognizing that family-network building can be complex, it addresses specific methods for developing cohesive family-unit teams and their advantages. Finally, family-team building will present unpredictable conundrums and inevitable pitfalls. Thus, the article raises several cautions and caveats about engaging with volunteers and families.

FRG

Just as local cells and elements must organize in UW, a family auxiliary needs volunteer leadership and organization.² The FRG is that cadre. The Army has an elaborate definition and purpose for the FRG.³ For the sake of this article, an FRG is an organization of volunteer spouses who represent team/platoon, company and battalion spouses and serve as support and communication conduits.

An effective FRG has a representative from each team/platoon, two company co-leaders, a battalion-level leader and adviser-team and other delegates as needed (secretary/treasurer, welcome-committee delegates, social chair, event planners, etc.). The volunteer pool includes anyone willing to serve. Because the FRG is a commander's responsibility, commanders' wives are often default leaders, qualifications notwithstanding.⁴ The most effective volunteer cadres contain spouses who have institutional knowledge and continuity, rank immaterial. That continuity can often be found in the senior NCO and warrant-officer spouses. Wherever that talent lies in the unit, there is always a place for volunteers who are positive, mature and willing to freely invest their time.

To properly mobilize the volunteer cadre, SOF leaders need to articulate clear expectations. To adequately function at the basic level, a battalion commander needs to convey to company commanders that he expects the company to have FRG delegates (preferably two, a leader and co-leader). A company commander also needs to convey to team/platoon leaders that he expects a team/platoon to have an FRG delegate. Be

firm on those expectations; without those delegates, the family-unit team will not function smoothly.

In selecting volunteers, SOF leaders should be personally involved, including directly asking spouses to volunteer. It is a bad assumption that spouses — based on competence, seniority or familiarity — will volunteer. Make it a priority to engage and recruit volunteers. Some will decline, some will be thrilled, some simply *aren't sure about it* until they are directly engaged and asked to help.

Once the cadre is identified and in place, direction and development must follow. Precise discussions referencing social events, deployment training, procedures for handling family issues and SOF leader-to-FRG volunteer communication will create a healthy relationship. Discussions prevent erroneous reports and harmful speculations

tion. However, recognition need not be event-driven. Recognition can be simple public praise among peer groups or larger venues, such as hail and farewells. Simple notes of appreciation are helpful. At times, respecting and listening to a volunteer is a wonderful form of recognition.

In remote lands, SOF leaders work to establish rapport with guerrilla leaders. Demonstrating an understanding of, a confidence in and a concern for local leaders in engagement areas aids in reaching mission goals.⁶ Those same UW skill sets can be used to great effect with unit families.

FRSA

In addition to FRG volunteers, each SOF battalion has a paid civilian staff member to aid in family resiliency. The FRSA's broad mission statement includes providing continuity, administrative support, stability

of that pattern. Form the habit of apprising the FRSA of changes and expect subordinate leaders to do so, as well. The pattern can include a monthly or weekly meeting, or it can be established electronically.

Secondly, unit leaders should develop a positive working relationship with their FRSA. In addition to having the FRSA lead roster management, know and visit their office, invite them to any family events and include them on any electronic communication to families. SOF personnel build rapport with guerrillas based largely on mutual trust, confidence and understanding.⁸ The basic leader tenet of developing productive personal relationships will establish a loyalty that will pay dividends during periods of duress and mission execution.⁹

Finally, take a small amount of time to learn about the resources the FRSA is connected to and understands. There may

The “family as auxiliary” association is useful to prompt leaders of special-operations forces to fully recognize the powerful volunteer resources resident within their organizations.

from spreading. Clear goals and broadly understood principles from unit leaders are critical guideposts that should steer the military and family representatives alike.

Building and maintaining a cohesive team takes the time and effort of SOF leaders and volunteers. When volunteers become vested in the unit, they will take pride in unit successes and be more supportive of their Soldiers' membership in the unit.⁵

Maintaining a positive volunteer base has one critical requirement: Respect a volunteer's time. Quickly return volunteer calls and e-mails. That demonstrates respect to someone who is volunteering their time and talents. Also, asking volunteers for advice and guidance is essential. It is a courtesy that breeds trust. Volunteers become informed of the needs of the unit, and the SOF leader gains insight into his extended unit family.

A final key ingredient in developing the family auxiliary is volunteer recognition. Volunteer-recognition events are wonderful forums for showing apprecia-

and outreach for the unit and its volunteers.⁷ Within that mission statement, there is specific support in three areas: rosters, relationships and resources.

Initially, and most importantly, the battalion FRSA can maintain the spouse/family roster for every level of a unit — squad, team, platoon, company and battalion. Family data should be captured during in-processing. By delegating that responsibility to the FRSA, a SOF leader increases the likelihood that the rosters will be complete, frees FRG volunteers to address the needs of the unit families and allows Army leaders to focus on other tasks. Roster management sounds like a simple task; however, it is the top crisis-prevention measure. Furthermore, a routine roster scrub brings greater familiarity with names and important family transitions (births, marriages, divorces) that may influence Soldier readiness.

Establish an administrative pattern with the FRSA to update the unit roster and contact information. The S1 staff can be a part

be money available through community grants and the military post. The FRSA also has contacts to family assistance, such as counseling and financial aid. They can also help promote free camps, school supplies and holiday gifts for junior Soldiers' families. An FRSA should be knowledgeable of offices that might be more appropriate for handling certain issues: chaplains, physicians, judge advocates or other resources. Direct Soldiers and family members to the FRSA. The resourceful SOF leader plans early and utilizes the battalion FRSA to aid in family support, education and mission readiness.

Families

The third and final unconventional resource for a SOF leader is a Soldier's family, defined here as spouses, children, girlfriends and parents. The latter two can be included or removed in the unit communication process per the Soldier's direction. Girlfriends lack legal recognition but do require consideration, especially in times of crisis.



MILITARY BEARING Children of SOF Soldiers practice saluting during the Kid Q-Course hosted at Fort Lewis, Wash. Photo by Jodi Breckenridge Petit

Veterans, friends of the unit, community businesses and military associations can also be a part of a unit's family auxiliary.

An effective SOF leader can develop healthy unit-to-family relationships by focusing on three areas: communicating, developing personal relationships and establishing clear Soldier and spouse expectations.

Effective communication — paper, verbal and electronic — is imperative. While the unit is in garrison, a quarterly newsletter published at the battalion level, with detailed sections from company-level commanders, promotes a positive pattern of communication. The volunteer who creates the newsletter is always looking for appropriate unit-level stories and photos. Send them unit news and promote unit families. Additionally, stand-alone, paper correspondence mailed to the families from any level of command serves two purposes. It verifies that mailing addresses are accurate and, more importantly, serves as positive communication between leader and family.

As a deployment nears, electronic communication should increase. Correspon-

dence can present broadly set expectations, reassure spouses of block leave and promote marriage retreats and pre-deployment briefs. Once Soldiers are deployed, it is imperative to continue sending appropriate unit updates to the extended unit family. Create a system in which spouses recognize and read your e-mails. Create a pattern of communication. A reliable communication system gives the unit confidence that news of casualties, extensions or concerns is disseminated thoroughly.¹⁰

Social media and rapid-communication means, such as texting and mass calling, are providing new methods for enhancing the unit communication chain. However the unit commander chooses to disseminate information, the medium should be known and practiced as part of routine communication.

Creating personal relationships between SOF leaders and family members is a wise venture. Recognize and acknowledge positive life events in the unit's families. Sending welcome letters or certificates to new

babies is an example of a small effort that demonstrates that a leader is connected and concerned with a Soldier and his family. Utilize the battalion FRSA and lead volunteers to create and disseminate those letters. If a spouse or child graduates from a school or acquires a new job, a simple e-mail, note or verbal comment can show leader interest and commitment. Certainly, building rapport is a difficult and complicated process,¹¹ but it is an essential task for investment in a family auxiliary.

In addition to communicating with spouses and recognizing familial accomplishments, a commander should aim to be clear in disclosing goals and needs for each unit spouse and Soldier.¹² It is fair and appropriate to request that a spouse read unit e-mails, knows the FRG point of contact and, during deployments and training, informs the unit when they are traveling from home and how they can be reached in an emergency. Those are basic expectations. While a spouse in corporate America might find them invasive, the spouses of SOF Soldiers should understand that national-defense requirements do not adhere to neat timelines, and in this high-risk profession, crises will occur that require contact with family members.

A leader can also continually encourage spouses to have a more vested relationship with the FRG and unit. Spouses can attend unit family events, become an FRG member, mentor new spouses and informally check on other unit spouses. Military marriages have adapted to increased combat demands.¹³ Articulating coherent expectations to spouses aids in that adaptation.

Communicating clearly to spouses is effective only if the same expectations are also presented to Soldiers. A team leader needs to explain to team members that all spouses should be linked electronically to the FRG and unit, should know the team contact information and should communicate travel contact information to the FRG. A Soldier needs to understand that his spouse does not have to attend unit functions or volunteer, but he also needs to know that connected, informed spouses directly improve unit readiness and home stability. Ultimately, Soldiers should recognize that a spouse who is informed and involved is more inclined to understand the demands of

the Soldier's profession and the sacrifices it requires.¹⁴

Advantages

Training and engaging the family auxiliary is an investment that can provide advantages. Done early and often, the efforts improve combat readiness, improve rear-detachment preparedness for adversity and enhance combat focus.

Combat readiness. Combat readiness prior to a deployment is a unit's top priority. However, that readiness goes beyond field skills. An established pattern of communication with spouses prior to deployment will provide necessary psychological and informational preparation. If a leader invests the effort in volunteer cadre and spouses, then families will better understand their role within the unit during the train-up for a deployment. Also, an educated spouse will serve less as a stressor for the Soldier and family prior to deployment¹⁵ and more as a stable foundation.

Rear-detachment preparedness. The second advantage of investing in volunteers and families is that it prepares the rear-detachment for adversity during deployment. Just as an UW auxiliary enables a guerrilla force to survive and function¹⁶ away from formal support, a family auxiliary enables the SOF unit to function and excel while deployed. Prepared spouses and families can solve the majority of their problems rather than turning immediately to the rear detachment. When a problem does arise that a spouse cannot solve, they will understand that the FRG and FRSA are viable and useful resources. Prepared spouses can turn to the FRG with questions or for assistance. With a developed network of unit peers or friends, spouses can help each other with meals, doctor appointments, health issues and life's frustrations. The rear detachment can also forward requests, questions and issues that they receive from spouses to the FRG team. That is a practical force multiplier and a smart use of an auxiliary.

An oft-overlooked advantage of a strong volunteer force is the conduit that it can provide for information flow — both *from* and *to* the SOF leader. With a unit's mental focus forward, volunteers are perfectly positioned to interrupt rumors and clarify data.

SOF leaders can also take advantage of the physical labor and time that FRSAs and

FRG leaders can give to the unit. Volunteers can serve as a communication venue — electronic, phone and in-person — to send timeline changes, improve morale and provide support following KIA/WIA/MIA notifications. The unit FRSA and volunteers truly can serve as part of an extended team of informed advocates.

Combat forward focus. A functional family auxiliary also allows for a healthy climate in combat zones. Today's demands on SOF units require Soldier focus. An unprepared spouse at home is a stressor for a Soldier in combat.¹⁷ A spouse with clear expectations understands how spouse conversations, correspondence and conduct can affect safety and effectiveness.

In the event of a combat casualty, the forward unit will be focused on many things, including the next mission. During this intense and trying time, a commander can find comfort in knowing that a strong volunteer auxiliary in the rear will provide relief and aid to the affected spouse/family and the extended unit family. A volunteer personnel team now includes spouses who can assist with memorial arrangements. They can greet and console other unit spouses and, if requested, the widow. They can channel the auxiliary talents effectively. They can synthesize unit care teams if needed. And they can provide follow-through and long-term links to unit gold-star spouses. In short, look to trusted volunteers as a resource during those times of intense need.

Caveats and cautions

Volunteers are not under your command. They do not get paid for their work. Volunteer relationships require additional skill, patience and nuance. A gentler touch is required. Persuasion and appreciation are paramount.

Consider historical and cultural barriers when engaging spouses and volunteers. Spouses may have preconceived notions of officer-NCO relations that may not conform to the culture found in many SOF units. Give support and respect to volunteers regardless of rank, and remind them not to wear their Soldier's rank. Be mindful of spouses who are non-native English speakers: They may not understand implied expectations or American customs.

Do not be intimidated by FRG folklore. Any Soldier can tell stories of a difficult spouse or radioactive volunteer who created

A Leader's Guide to **FAMILY READINESS**

COMBAT ASSETS

FRG: Family Readiness Group

- A spouse rep for every team.
- Develop and train volunteers:
 - » Ask them to help.
 - » Be clear on goals/needs.
 - » Respond quickly.
 - » Seek guidance.

FRSA: Family Readiness Support Assistants

- Allow paid staff members to support you.
- Maintain spouse rosters.
- Utilize his/her resources.

Family

- Communicate with families.
 - » Garrison.
 - » Pre-deployment.
 - » From down-range.
- Give clear expectations.
 - » To Soldier.
 - » To Spouse.

ADVANTAGES

Combat Readiness/ Rear-detachment Support

- Families prepared for news of higher magnitude.
- Spouses understand their role.
- Families vested in organization.
- Spouses are not a training distraction.

Forward Support

- A stable spouse at home is a stable Soldier in combat.
- Your volunteers and FRSA will work hard for you.
- Long-term support of extended unit family (parents, Gold Star, families).



HAPPY FAMILY The health and happiness of SOF families has a direct impact on unit and Soldier readiness. U.S. Army photo by Major David Butler

destructive drama. Certainly, it is important to remember that troubled and debilitating volunteers do exist.¹⁸ However, a leader looks forward, sets clear guidelines, encourages spouses to improve upon the past and learns from negative experiences.

Finally, expect gaps in volunteer support if you have not invested upfront. It is often ineffective to try developing relationships during a crisis. Employ a strategy that conducts deliberate relationship-building and nurturing *prior to* the need for volunteer crisis assistance. As in unconventional warfare, such relationships are rarely accomplished overnight.¹⁹

Conclusion

How will a SOF leader know if he has an able volunteer corps and stable families? A successful auxiliary will crystallize during a deployment. Soldiers will be mission-focused, the rear detachment will manage Soldier issues, and families will be capable of managing stressors as they arise.²⁰

It is the uninformed spouse and the ailing FRG that will create problems for the unit and its command team. It is the unguided and unvested FRSA who will distract the unit from its mission. It is unclear expectations that allow misinformation to proliferate.

SOF leaders are in the business of people. They understand that developing an auxiliary requires proficiency at developing relationships and taking a long-term outlook.²¹ SOF leaders can find an incredible unit resource in volunteers, the unit FRSA and informed spouses. With thoughtful and persistent efforts, the SOF leadership team can employ UW cultural skills to develop a family auxiliary. With that reliable auxiliary on hand, a unit can increase combat readiness, mitigate deployment stressors and provide essential support during tragedies.²² Look beyond seeing the unit family program as a responsibility, burden or obligation. Create a family auxiliary, and consider it an asset. **SW**

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ACTIVE DUTY

FY 2012 second quarter selection-board schedule

DATE	BOARD
Jan. 4, 2012	Colonel command
Jan. 24, 2012	Sergeant first class promotion
Feb. 22, 2012	Lieutenant colonel promotion/major selective continuation

Board preparation: a self-help guide

Each year, the Army Human Resources Command publishes the schedule of promotion/school/command-selection boards for the upcoming fiscal year. Identify the board or boards that apply to you. Familiarize yourself with the eligibility criteria so that you know when your record will go before the board. By taking proactive steps, you will be on your way to getting the best possible review by the board.

When was the last time you updated your Enlisted Record Brief, or ERB, or Officer Record Brief, or ORB? If it has been more than a year, you need to update it. Does the duty assignment show you in your current job or your previous job? Does it show your most recent school? Do you have a DA photo? If not, get one! If you have one, how old is it? If it is more than two years old, the board that views your file will not know about your latest award. You want them to know.

Familiarize yourself with your regiment's chapter in DA Pam 600-25, *U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer Professional Development Update*, or DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*. Find out which schools, tours and self-development will make you stand out from your peers. Be proactive in seeking out those opportunities.

Advice for raters and senior raters

Make sure your S1 or G1 informs you of the upcoming promotion/school/command schedule and identifies your Soldiers who are in the zone of consideration. Early planning for the board will ensure that all records have been reviewed and all evaluations completed and processed in time to meet the established suspense.

The records review should be comprehensive. Did the Soldier update his ERB or ORB? Is the completion date of the Soldier's most recent schooling, military or civilian, annotated in the appropriate schools section of the record brief? Does the Soldier have a current DA photo?

Does the duty title on the Soldier's upcoming evaluation report match the duty title on the ERB or ORB? If the Soldier changed jobs prior to the minimum time specified in DA Pam 600-25 or DA Pam 600-3, regardless of circumstance, did someone comment on it? If you are the senior rater, did you quantify the Soldier's performance, compared to his peers?

Raters and senior raters should give selection-board members a clear picture of the Soldier. If the board member has to guess or infer, it is a distraction that may not be favorable to the Soldier. With the right input from raters, the selection-board process works, and it is fair. Everyone plays an important part, and if you are offered the opportunity to participate in a selection board, take the opportunity to help shape your regiment's future.

OFFICER

Officers may apply for more than one ARSOF branch

The Directorate of Special Operations Proponency and the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion have implemented a new procedure for officers requesting accession into any of the Army special-operations regiments. Previously, an officer could apply to the annual accession board for one branch only. Under the new process, applicants designate their primary choice for branch accession and up to two secondary choices, depending on the branches' eligibility requirements. The choice to compete for secondary branches is optional. The new process allows the board to better match an officer to the branch for which he or she is best-qualified and provides officers more opportunities for serving in ARSOF.



WE WANT YOUR FEEDBACK!

Which parts of SW do you look forward to? What do you want to see more of, or less? Drop us a line and let us know what you really think. Better yet, submit an article, a book review or opinion piece. After all, it's your magazine.

SpecialWarfare@ahqb.soc.mil

Ease your pain and tight muscles using a foam roller BY MAJ. JESSICA ORTH

One of the best ways to treat and prevent common exercise injuries is to use a foam roller. Now a staple in most physical therapy offices, the foam roller offers many of the same benefits as deep-tissue massage.

How foam rolling works

The fascia is the soft tissue covering and connecting the muscles, bones, nerves and blood vessels of the body. Together, muscle and fascia make up what is called the myofascial system. Typically, because of injuries or a lack of stretching, the fascia and the underlying muscle tissue can become stuck together. That adhesion results in restricted movement of the muscle and subsequent pain and loss of mobility. By breaking up the adhesions using a foam roller, you can reduce pain and restore normal movement.

How to use

Find some space on the floor. Position your body so that the area you want to work on is on top of the foam roller. Your body weight will create the pressure needed to massage the area and thereby release adhesions and soften muscle knots, called trigger points. You control the pressure by applying more or less body weight on the foam roller and using your hands and feet, as needed, to offset your weight. Instructional videos are available online.

- Foam-roll when your muscles are warm or after a workout.
- Gently roll your body weight back and forth across the roller.
- Move slowly, working from the center of the body out toward your extremities.
- If you find a trigger point, hold the position until the area softens.
- Focus on areas that are tight or have a reduced range of motion.
- Roll over each area a few times until you feel it relax.
- Expect some discomfort. Areas may feel tender or bruised at first.
- Stay on soft tissue and avoid rolling directly over bones or joints.
- Keep the first few foam-roller sessions short: 15 minutes or less is adequate.
- Drink lots of water afterwards, just as you would after a massage.



Where to buy

There are many places online and in sports stores that sell foam rollers. The best types to get are made of high-density foam: They will last the longest. The cost is approximately \$10 to \$20. Soldiers have also created field-expedient rollers from alternative items such as PVC pipe, rolling pins, plastic water bottles, etc.



NUTRITION *essential to* improving performance

BY CHRISTI LOGAN

If you're looking for a way to optimize your performance, you can't beat a solid physical-training plan coupled with a daily nutrition plan of quality carbohydrates, lean proteins and performance-enhancing fats. Soldiers, in general, often overlook the nutrition plan and rely solely on their physical training for performance optimization.

SOF Soldiers, in particular, would not even consider waiting until the week before an event to begin their physical training, but many address their nutrition plan just before, during or immediately following the competition, selection or deployment, if they address it at all. That lack of attention to nutrition will most certainly prevent

some Soldiers from completing selections, can reduce or slow healing from injuries, and will reduce mission performance. Additionally, the SOF Soldier has a unique daily lifestyle. The heavy training, intense optempo, and often poor access to nutrition in austere environments are all significant contributors to the breakdown of the SOF operator's physical and mental capabilities.

The solution: Start simple, increase fruits and vegetables every day. Fruits and vegetables provide essential nutrients like vitamins, minerals and antioxidants that are vital in strengthening the immune system and reducing muscle fatigue and injuries. Variety is key. Choose a variety of fruits and vegetables, not only in the types consumed but also in the colors chosen, as the deeper colors contain the highest nutrient densities. Increasing daily fruit and vegetable consumption ensures adequate reserves of nutrients, which are a necessity for your body to function under increased performance demands.

Warm-up and movement preparation BY STEPHEN M. MANNINO

Prior to beginning any physical activity, Soldiers should perform a proper warm-up. The purpose of the warm-up is to raise the body's core temperature, increase circulation and prepare the muscles and joints for physical activity.

Static stretching should not be confused with a warm-up! The most current research has shown that static stretching may not be appropriate prior to exercise. Before beginning a physical training session, ask yourself the following questions:

- Can I prepare to move by standing still for extended periods of time?
- Should I move slowly, or not at all, to prepare to move quickly?
- Should I sit down and be still to prepare my body to be on its feet and moving?

The answer to all of these questions is undoubtedly no! Therefore, your warm-up should reflect the motions of the activity in which you are about to embark. The following warm-up is an all-purpose one that can be used prior to weight training, running or agility training. It is designed to warm the body and take the muscles and joints through a dynamic range of motion. Performing this warm-up/movement-prep routine will yield a significant improvement in mobility, flexibility and stability, and an increase of speed and power output by nearly 20 percent, compared to static stretching.

This movement-prep routine will also improve long-term mobility and flexibility, help to correct any movement-pattern dysfunction you may have, improve your quality of movement and decrease your risk of injury. It works by lengthening your muscles and then contracting them, meaning that you actually use the muscle in that stretched position.

Movement-prep exercises should begin with a general warm-up to raise the core temperature, then progress from the slowest movements to the fastest, gradually increasing the tempo of each movement in order to excite the nervous system and prepare the body for exercise.

The drills listed below are only an example of the many exercises one can perform prior to a training session:

Sample warm-up/movement-prep drills

- Air squats*
- Side-straddle hops* - 10x
- Seal jacks* - 10x
- Criss-cross jacks* - 10x
- Lunge to instep stretch to hamstring stretch* - 5x each leg
- Inch worm or inverted hamstring* - 5x each leg
- Knee-hug lunge* - 5x each leg
- Backwards lunge and twist* - 5x each leg
- Drop lunge or leg cradle* - 5x each leg
- Lateral lunge* - 5x each leg
- Straight-leg march* - 5x each leg
- Butt-kick run* - 10x each leg
- High-knee run* - 10x each leg
- Pogo jumps* - 10x
- Squat jumps* - 10x

Cost-effective ways to increase fruit and vegetable intake:

1

GROW IT

Grow your own herbs and vegetables. Whether in pots or in the ground, both are easy to grow and cost-effective.

2

FRESH IS BETTER

Buy local, on sale and in season. Farmer's markets, commissaries and co-ops all offer a great selection.

3

MIX IT UP

Include frozen, canned and dried forms of fruits and vegetables in your menu. All are nutritious and handy for quick-fix meals.

4

WASTE NOT

Use leftover veggies and fruits in salsas, sauces, soups and smoothies to reduce waste and increase nutrient density.

5

CHEAP FILL

To reduce costs, replace half the meat in a recipe with beans.

6

TOP IT OFF

Top potatoes with veggies and salsas for increased food volume.

7

PUMP IT UP

Add dried fruit to salads, rice or meat dishes to increase the flavor and nutrient density.

SOF seek new capabilities in mobility platforms

The United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, is pursuing a new capability for the ground mobility of its forces called the Ground Mobility Vehicle, Version 1.1, or GMV v1.1.

The U.S. Army Special Forces Command, along with the 75th Ranger Regiment, requires a ground-mobility platform that will directly support operations in direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, security-force assistance and counterinsurgency and provide all the attributes required to accomplish the missions of special-operations forces, or SOF.

The GMV v1.1 would be used to support the spectrum of SOF operations in complex and uncertain environments. It would provide a flexible, transportable, lethal, survivable, sustainable and networked vehicle that combines ground tactical mobility with penetrating vertical-lift platforms in order to optimize the effectiveness of joint special-operations forces.

The objective is to field a vehicle platform as a system of systems that provides an extremely flexible, internally air transportable vehicle. It would allow as many as seven SOF operators in full combat equipment to move rapidly around the battlespace in terrain not easily navigated by currently fielded vehicles.

Since 1986, SOF have fielded a variety of ground-mobility vehicles based on the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or HMMWV. The GMV was introduced in 1998 as a SOF variant of the HMMWV. Over the last few years, GMVs have undergone many modifications, have performed in extremely harsh combat environments and have been used in combat operations as a sole mission platform or in conjunction with the heavier vehicle fleet.



OUT WITH THE OLD The GMV, a special-operations variant of the HMMWV, has been in use for more than 13 years in a variety of terrains. U.S. Army photo

Unfortunately, increases in armor protection and vehicle dimensions have exacerbated capability gaps in areas such as mobility, transportability and operational flexibility. Compared to other vehicles now available, the current fleet of GMVs possesses limited capabilities, and the GMV no longer meets the requirements of current and future warfighting concepts.

The Army is also pursuing a replacement for the HMMWV known as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, or JLTV, but the JLTV will not have the capability of being internally transported by CH-47/MH-47 helicopters.

The GMV v1.1's weight and payload would allow it to maneuver in a variety of terrains, its size would allow it to be transported across the battlefield via CH-47/MH-47 aircraft, and its scalable armor would allow the operator to tailor the protection to specific threats.

The GMV v1.1 is expected to be used 70 percent of the time on secondary roads, cross-country and trails. It would have a modular-kit capability for add-on kits such as armor, reconnaissance and assault. The add-on kit concept provides the capability of switching between known probabilities of the mission and threat while maintaining a light, mobile vehicle that has standardized reliability, lethality and networking integrity. That would enable the units to tailor the vehicle configuration to the mission.

USASOC is currently staffing the GMV v1.1 requirement prior to submitting it for validation by the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, USASOC anticipates that, with USSOCOM validation by the end of this year, the capability could be available as early as fiscal year 2014. **SW**



The Danish Army's Modern Day Vikings:

THE JAEGER CORPS

The Danish Army's Jaeger Corps, or *Jægerkorpset*, is one of two premier special forces unit of the Danish armed forces. Stationed at Aalborg Air Base, the Jaeger Corps traces its origins to the year 1785.

The corps was first formed as "the Jaeger Corps of Zealand." Zealand (the largest island possession of Denmark) is the closest portion of Denmark to Sweden. Faced with emerging threats from Sweden, Prussia and Britain, Denmark identified the need for a light-infantry force. As a result, it formed the Jaeger Corps of Zealand from hunters and woodsmen whose experience in operating independently aided their effectiveness. While many European powers in the late 18th century created independent irregular forces, the Jaeger Corps is one of the few of that lineage that has survived.

Modern-day members of the Jaeger Corps go through a rigorous training, selection and vetting process. Once a year, Soldiers from all over Denmark assemble at Aalborg Air Base for Jaeger selection. A series of "pre-courses" train the potential candidates in land navigation, swimming and basic shooting techniques. Throughout the pre-course phase, tasks increase in complexity and difficulty, with more progressively rigorous grading applied. Jaeger candidates participate in both individual and team assessments, with the element of the unknown as a constant companion. Following pre-phase, the Patrol Course (eight weeks) uses basic direct-action and special-reconnaissance training events to assess candidates. Candidates also receive basic medical, demolition and marksmanship training. During this phase, surprise events and short-notice scenarios take the potential candidate to the breaking point. Not surprisingly, 60 percent of Jaeger candidates do not make it past that portion of the selection process.

Successful candidates then attend the eight-week selection course. During the selection course, candidates get training in advanced breaching, close-quarters battle, demolition, sniping and communications. Concurrently, candidates undergo a structured physical program designed to increase their capabilities toward the achievement of strict physical standards. A combatives program is

also integrated into training for these modern-day Vikings. Following completion of the selection course, candidates receive the first portion of their unit insignia, the cap device consisting of a hunter's bugle. Following the selection course, Jaeger candidates undergo training in static-line parachuting and combat swimming. Successful Soldiers (approximately 10 percent of those who begin the program) receive the coveted burgundy beret that indicates completion of training and designation as a Jaeger.

Successful Jaeger candidates report to the unit and receive both team and individual training during their first (probationary) year. During this time they will attend a high-altitude, high-opening/high-altitude, low-opening parachute training, environmental training (desert, winter), advanced infiltration training (mountain, nontactical vehicle, ski, rotary-wing), attain joint-terminal-attack-controller certification and gain additional communications skills.

The modern Jaeger Corps has been a force to be reckoned with since 1961. Fewer than 400 soldiers have been selected to serve in the small but agile force during the last 50 years. In the post-Cold War era, the Jaegers deployed to Sarajevo in 1995 as a counter-sniper force. Deploying in support of the war on terror, the Jaegers deployed as part of Task Force Kabat for operations in Afghanistan in 2002. In honor of their efforts, the Jaegers were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation in 2004.

Currently, the Jaeger Corps is positioned to support the efforts of SOF in the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, and other NATO efforts toward global and regional stability. Recently, the Jaegers deployed a special-operations task group to Afghanistan as a combined Danish/Romanian/Hungarian/U.S. task force assigned to ISAF SOF. **SW**

Articles in this section are written by allied military officers at the International Special Training Center, Pfullendorf, Germany.

A QUESTION OF COMMAND: COUNTERINSURGENCY FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO IRAQ

Writing in *Parameters*, Colonel Gian P. Gentile recently criticized what he considers the unstudied orthodoxy of population-centric counterinsurgency, or COIN, in the Army. He wrote, “The principles and ideas that emerged out of the Army’s counterinsurgency field manual . . . have become transcendent. The field manual has moved beyond simply Army doctrine for countering insurgencies to become the defining characteristic of the Army’s new way of war.” Gentile might appreciate *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, Mark Moyer’s useful, but ultimately flawed, counterargument to the prevailing wisdom of population-centric COIN.

Moyer, the former Kim T. Adamsom Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the Marine Corps University, asserts that instead of population protection, the most important factor in the success of a counterinsurgency campaign is the quality of leadership of counterinsurgent and host-nation forces. Rather than spending resources and effort on practicing population-centric counterinsurgency, Moyer advocates waging “leader-centric warfare” in which the United States develops quality civilian and military leaders and then gives them the freedom to determine the best course of action. Moyer’s book is intentionally provocative, and he challenges what has become the foundation for American operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines.

In *A Question of Command*, Moyer’s ambitious agenda includes a broad survey history of Western-led counterinsurgency efforts, a comprehensive study of the roles of leadership in counterinsurgency success and wide-ranging personnel-policy recommendations for the Army and Marine Corps. Moyer examines nine counterinsurgency conflicts and the role leadership played in the success of each. Moyer identifies 10 attributes of superior counterinsurgent leaders: initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity and organization.

While many of these attributes are common to effective leaders in all types of conflict, some characteristics, such as empathy, charisma and sociability, are unique to the counterinsurgency environment. Moyer


writes that leaders who are successful in conventional conflicts sometimes lack the necessary psychological qualities to succeed as counterinsurgents. Moyer’s analysis calls into question long-held views on how to identify and develop qualities essential for combat leaders.

A Question of Command is also a useful primer on many less-studied counterinsurgency campaigns, such as the post-Civil War reconstruction period and the Salvadoran civil war. Of particular interest to many readers will be Moyer’s focus on the leadership qualities of host-nation military and political leaders. Given the recent concerns that have been raised about key Afghan and Iraqi leaders, Moyer’s work is especially revelatory.

Despite the potential for Moyer’s work to serve as an important counterargument to the increasingly unchallenged assumptions of population-centric counterinsurgency and provide badly needed innovative strategies in personnel policy, he fails to adequately bolster his analysis with convincing evidence or uniformly consistent arguments. His sometimes questionable scholarship also detracts from what would otherwise be exactly the kind of outside-the-box thinking that the military needs to encourage in its deep thinkers.

For instance, Moyer frequently points to the results of a rather grandly titled “Counterinsurgency Leadership Survey” he conducted as evidence of his thesis and in support of his policy recommendations. This survey, unfortunately, lacks rigorous scholarship. Moyer surveyed only 131 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan — hardly a statistically significant sample — from the Army and Marine Corps. The respondents ranged in rank from captain to colonel, yet Moyer provides no information on how many of each rank participated in the survey. The reader does not know how many respondents served in each conflict, when they served or what positions they held. Lacking even the most basic understanding of his survey methodology, the reader should cast serious doubt on the validity of any conclusions Moyer draws from his survey.

In addition, Moyer’s critique of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* — that the



DETAILS

By Mark Moyer

New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009
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286 pages. \$30.

Reviewed by:

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manual “impeded innovation to a degree by advancing as universal principles and methods that were not actually viable in all or even most counterinsurgency settings” — lacks convincing support. Moyer writes as if the field manual was intended to be a playbook rather than serve as the broad intellectual foundation on the topic of counterinsurgency. Moyer fails to cite evidence for his statement that FM 3-24 impeded innovation or that any key Army leaders viewed its principles as universal.

Moyer’s arguments are also occasionally inconsistent and contradictory. In his later chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan, Moyer criticizes senior commanders who, in his analysis, impeded risk-taking and initiative by junior leaders because of their tendency to investigate any actions by their subordinates that had even a “hint of impropriety.” Yet, in earlier chapters Moyer cites the importance of leadership integrity to success in counterinsurgency. In his chapters on

PROGRESS OF EDUCATION

BY DR. DAVID L. BRAND

While deployed, Army special-operations Soldiers wear many hats. At times they act as diplomats, archeologists, economists and political scientists. Their roles and responsibilities change constantly, and they must adapt to meet the need.

To be successful in complex, ever-changing environments, ARSOF Soldiers must have the right blend of the three aspects of professional development: education, training and operational experience.

Education is the acquisition of knowledge designed specifically to foster diverse perspectives, critical analysis, comfort with ambiguity and abstract reasoning with respect to complex, nonlinear problem-solving.

Training is task-specific learning under controlled conditions to achieve a predetermined standard. Training focuses largely on the mechanical domain of instruction.

Experience is the sum total of all our activities or exposure to events or people over a period of time.

In an effort to create that blend, the number-one priority at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is professionalizing the force.

At the schoolhouse, Soldiers receive training in their tactical skills, and those have been honed by experience during 10 years of constant deployments. Where ARSOF falls short is in education. The SWCS commander, Maj. Gen. Bennet Sacolick, noted, "We have a remarkably well-trained, experienced but undereducated force. Our current operational force consists of a generation of hardened, combat-proven officers and NCOs. However, we have failed to provide a comprehensive, holistic opportunity to harness and nurture the intellectual curiosity that exists in our officers, warrant officers and NCOs."

In an effort to balance the equation, SWCS has undertaken a comprehensive education program to provide our Soldiers career-long, continuing-education opportunities that complement their training, experience and professional military education. For enlisted Soldiers, the foundation is the associate degree, and it ties qualification-course training to degree completion. By taking a

handful of concurrent courses, a Soldier finishes his qualification course with a fully-accredited associate degree. Those credits can then be applied toward a bachelor's-degree program from a variety of schools, including Norwich University or the schools of the University of North Carolina system. Soldiers with a bachelor's degree can apply to work toward a master of arts in strategic security studies through the National Defense University.

Additionally, SWCS has beefed up its capabilities for teaching language and regional studies to ensure that its Soldiers will have the language and cultural skills they will need for working through and with their indigenous partners.

But despite its vision and improvements, SWCS cannot work alone in the effort to educate our force. Senior leaders must understand that for ARSOF to fulfill their mission, we must invest in a force capable of working in the indirect realm — meaning that appropriate resources and funding should go to developing the force's greatest weapon: the mind of the Soldier.

In order to operate effectively in the irregular and unconventional realm that is ARSOF's specialty, Soldiers must be able to analyze problems and find creative solutions. We need Soldiers who can assess and shape their environment to prevent and deter hostilities before they occur. In short, we need thinking Soldiers.

If the special-operations leadership is serious about professionally developing the force, it will see that only the holistic blending of education, training and experience can create the force we will need in the future. By combining all three aspects of professionalization, we can produce an ARSOF warrior highly trained in warrior skills, broadly educated and able to make rapid adjustments based upon a continuous assessment of the situation. He will have leadership qualities based upon humility, critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and acceptance of prudent but calculated risks.

Garry Reid, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism, may have summed it up best during a recent visit to SWCS: "The progress of our force can be no swifter than the progress of our education." **SW**

continued from page 42

insurgencies in the Philippines and El Salvador, Moyar argues that one of the most important contributors to victory for the counterinsurgents was the refusal of senior leaders to tolerate abuses by their own forces. He praises the decisions by American and local commanders who fired, punished or reassigned Soldiers who abused locals or committed crimes. The same actions that Moyar claims were essential to success in earlier conflicts he criticizes as harmful in current counterinsurgencies.

Moyar also frequently relies upon misleading or vague endnotes for much of

the book. Too often, far-reaching statements such as, "The large majority of officers today oppose tours exceeding one year," and "The Marine Corps generally outdid the Army in keeping weak leaders out of its officer corps," are supported only with unconvincing references to secondary sources, Moyar's own counterinsurgency leadership survey, and unexplained "interviews with U.S. military personnel." Loaded statements like those require much greater evidence.

Ultimately, despite Moyar's sometimes questionable scholarship and the incon-

sistencies in his arguments, *A Question of Command* is extremely useful for those interested in the theory and history of counterinsurgency. Moyar does successfully provide a succinct, broad survey history of Western-led counterinsurgency efforts, and his ideas on leadership in counterinsurgency and the services' potential role in identifying effective leaders are innovative and worthy of further study. Despite its flaws, work like Moyar's is important in keeping counterinsurgency theory from becoming stagnant and succumbing to group-think. **SW**

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