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Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Organizing and Preparing for Success

1-25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) ‘Arctic Wolves SFAT’ Experience and Lessons Learned Part 2


Introduction

With the Afghan National Army (ANA) demonstrating increased operational proficiency and the role of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) shifting to securing the Afghan people, deploying BCTs need to fully leverage their Security Force Assistance Team (SFAT) with training and developing their AUP partners. Contained in the following pages are lessons 1-25 SBCT (Task Force Arctic Wolves) learned while advising AUP in support of its MB-SFA mission in OEF. Like Part 1, this paper’s intent is to assist deploying BCTs with organizing and preparing for their SFA mission. Included are TASK FORCE ARCTIC WOLVES SFAT’s experiences during the first 6 months of its 12-month deployment. Lessons learned center on improving the AUP’s logistics and training efforts.

Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)

Transfer of security within a district will ultimately be to the AUP, not the ANA, because the ANA will likely be focused on contested areas outside the major population centers. Ultimately, the objective is to ensure the AUP, the primary civil law enforcement agency in Afghanistan, are perceived as a trained, capable, and non-predatory force that provides security for the Afghan people. Additionally, the AUP must demonstrate their loyalty to the Afghan Government (GIRoA) and not to a powerful individual or individuals external to the police or government.

Consistent with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) imperative to grow capability and capacity in the AUP in order to combat the insurgency, secure the population, and promote GIRoA legitimacy, Task Force Arctic Wolves (TFAW) committed significant resources to professionalizing the AUP in its Area of Operations (AOR) that included Dand, Daman, and Panjwa’i Districts in Kandahar Province. First, however, the Brigade conducted a thorough mission analysis including an assessment of the current state of AUP training and readiness in all 3 districts. The analysis concluded the following:

- Confidence in the AUP is increasing slowly as they improve through enhanced training, mentoring, and experience gained conducting independent operations. Mentor and partner contact time is essential in building both capacity and capability.
- Mistrust of the AUP resulting from a history of predatory behavior, endemic corruption, and an inability to provide security to the population persists. Institu-
tional reform remains a stated goal of ISAF.

- The limiting factor preventing the development of the AUP’s long term capacity is its ability to sustain operations.

**Logistics and Sustainment**

Transition to independence requires significant improvement in the AUP’s logistics and sustainment capabilities. Equipment shortages in communications, mobility, and heavy weapons remain critical. AUP sustainment challenges include all classes of supply. The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) continues to pursue a centralized sustainment system characterized by labyrinthine complexity and bureaucratic inefficiency.

While logistics insufficiency continues to impede AUP operations and prevent them from operating independently, the AUP are capable of functioning at a basic level and can operate better if higher echelon logistics support is provided through the Provincial and Zone Headquarters. MOI and the Zone Headquarters still oversee and control distribution of supplies from the Regional Logistics Center (RLC). These headquarters are capable of anticipating and pushing supplies through the logistics system upon request. Additionally, the AUP continue to receive some supplies from MOI through the MOI-14 process which are distributed from the RLC. All 10 different classes of supply are requested using the MOI-14 per the MOI Logistics Handbook.

The AUP has demonstrated their resourcefulness when it comes to obtaining supplies and equipment. Additionally, experience has shown that when they realize Coalition Forces will not provide them with supplies, they find means in which to obtain the required resources. The Provincial Headquarters (PHQ) is not able to fulfill all requests from the districts, but the districts have enough of the essential items on hand to function.

The districts, however, still lack proficiency in large and complex supply transactions such as removing damaged Ford Rangers from their property books and requesting replacement Ford Rangers. This requires wrecker capability and a functioning turn-in system that enables the AUP to turn in non-mission capable equipment and to receive replacement equipment in return.

Finally, one of the most critical supply issues plaguing the AUP is fuel shortages. The AUP has been heavily reliant on Coalition Forces for fuel and are willing to stand by and receive fuel from Coalition Forces as long as they are willing to supply them.

**The MOI logistics system today**

In the development of its current logistics system, MOI was unable to use any system or process with which the AUP were already familiar because they lacked documentation. Pre-Taliban and Pre-Soviet systems were supply point based as well as
centrally planned and executed. Contrast these systems with more modern NATO and U.S. systems characterized by responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, attainability, sustainability, survivability, economy, and integration, and you have the basis for improvements eagerly sought by MOI and those advising MOI.

MOI’s aim was to effect significant changes in training, readiness, planning and operational systems in order to create a modern supply and sustainment system that attains the efficiency and effectiveness a modern police force requires. Additionally, MOI intended to reap the benefits of a demand-based, distribution-focused system. The method they needed included top-down guidance and instruction and bottom-up determination of requirements and demands. What resulted was a ‘push’ system to be used for only Tashkil authorizations and to fill initial stockage levels. The remainder of the requests was based on the ‘pull’ system, demand data, and consumption of supplies/materiel and required the organization to submit an MOI Form 14, or MOI-14.

This entire process mimics U.S. Army doctrine and neglects to consider the need for realistic, sustainable Afghan solutions. Those who designed this system assumed that the AUP would be able to adapt to a western-style logistics system, that is, one heavily reliant on high literacy rates, robust automation (computers and computer peripherals, the Internet, Wide and Local Area Networks, and office software), and western-style, decentralized leadership. Unfortunately, at the district level, illiteracy rates can exceed 80%, Soviet top-down orthodoxy persists, and automation equipment is largely non-existent. In addition to the system being unsustainable, the MOI logistics forms are complicated even by U.S. standards. They require NSNs, Julian dates, codes, and several different supporting forms designed for automated auditing and accounting. The reality is these forms may never really apply at the district level, much less be executed.

An alternative approach

TFAW SFAT performed an analysis and discussed the current system with PHQ and the district AUP leadership. Discussions focused on why MOI-14s were constantly being rejected and why the logistics system appeared to be failing. Advisors viewed the MOI forms as too cumbersome and complicated. They also concluded that the MOI-14 approach was incompatible with the way Afghans conduct business. In the process, advisors discovered an Afghan request form that was being used and referred to as the ‘proposal form.’

The proposal form has evidently been used by the Afghans for many years. It is basically a ledger form with a request on one side and an order or approval provided on the other. It is simple, straightforward and useful for multiple different types of actions, including those to increase personnel authorizations and to request all classes of supply. The form is well understood at all levels and can be created with a blank piece of paper and a straightedge.
TFAW advisors observed the proposal form being used in several instances and discovered that it was working and something the AUP were comfortable with. By contrast, advisors learned that the AUP viewed the MOI-14 as a form the Coalition mentors use and therefore not exclusively Afghan. The proposal form is effective for a pre-determined number of supplies or fixed quantities of a particular commodity (e.g., fuel) that PHQ has already specified. And it centers on a ‘push’ system of sustainment.

Additionally, use of the proposal form obviates the need for an MOI-14 designed more for a ‘pull’ system. The AUP allocate food, firewood and other classes of supply based on their district personnel numbers maintained at the PHQ. The proposal form is used to request routine supplies and is approved at the PHQ. Its approval triggers the supply officer for the particular commodity to provide the amount the district is allocated based on number of assigned policemen.

The proposal form terminates at the PHQ because the PHQ typically has the items on hand. The Logistics Mentors Handbook indicates that the PHQ does not warehouse any items and only forwards these requests to the Regional Logistics Center (RLC) or Zone Headquarters. However, PHQ in Kandahar does store items. TFAW advisors have visited and observed AUP receiving uniforms, and the AUP have a bulk fuel issue point at Police Substation (PSS) 10 in Kandahar City.

After further analysis, TFAW advisors determined that as long as the PHQ is comfortable with the proposal form, to the extent it allows for control and accountability, then the Coalition should support this Afghan solution. These same advisors believe that there is far too much emphasis placed on completing forms properly instead of fostering dialogue between the DHQ and PHQ. The District Chief of Police (DCoP) in Panjwai, for instance, was able to negotiate the provision of additional fuel by talking directly to the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP). Solving logistics problems is about leadership taking active steps through dialogue, not through complicated forms.

The lesson learned from the TFAW SFAT experience is that simple solutions Afghans devise themselves may be preferable to more sophisticated and centrally-directed and executed approaches. More important, future efforts to advance the AUP sustainment system should leverage long-term, Afghan-developed solutions. Similarly, advisors learned that the AUP can benefit from a long-term training program in which they play an active role.

In an insurgency police should be the eyes and ears in uncovering violent networks, spotting bombs, guarding public facilities and reporting suspicious activities. More generally – but just as importantly – police keep everyday public order on the streets. Reducing general criminality and providing security to the public provides the most widely shared and distributed public good. It is much more effective in winning hearts and minds than digging wells or building schools – and indeed encourages and protects such development activities. 

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AUP Multi-Echelon Training

Lack of effective policing not only hinders the counterinsurgency effort but actually contributes to the insurgency. An insurgency can be aided by widespread crime and a corrupt and unaccountable police force which is often the face of the government to the general public. Insurgency is waged across the governance landscape just as much as the urban and rural terrain of a country.

Developing a professional AUP force capable of securing its home district is an important goal in the campaign to establish a viable government in Afghanistan. Afghan police patrolling in local communities are a visible sign of GIRoA presence and are often the only representatives of the government for kilometers in any direction.

Afghans will only view their government as legitimate if it promotes the rule of law and security. District development and construction will stagnate until the police provide security and the environment for reconstruction to advance. Building a professional and competent AUP force is critical to the fight against the Taliban. Unlike Coalition Forces, and to a lesser extent, members of the Afghan National Army (ANA), AUP know the communities and the population, i.e., who is an insurgent and who is not.

In order to represent the government in a positive light, the AUP must act professionally and demonstrate competence in both basic police and security tasks. To create a police force that meets these requirements, mentors and partners must foster a training culture among the District AUP leadership. This will help them develop and execute a throughput schedule for attendance at MOI-approved schools; execute individual basic skills training for untrained police awaiting attendance at MOI courses; and conduct individual and small unit collective training at checkpoints and police substations (PSSs). This approach represents a multi-echelon training strategy. By executing these training tasks simultaneously, the battle space owner (BSO) can rapidly build professionalism while ensuring police are able to perform their basic security and community policing functions.

Fostering a Training Culture in the AUP

The AUP are generated as a fighting organization in a manner unlike other
branches of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As an example, Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers are recruited, trained, and then transported to Army units across Afghanistan to perform their duties. Police on the other hand are recruited locally and employed in the District immediately with a promise that they will attend the six-week-long, MOI-approved Basic Patrolman Academy. As a result of many factors, these untrained policemen may spend up to a year serving in their District before they attend the course.

| Training must be a core focus in order to shape the AUP into an effective law enforcement organization. There is no quick or easy solution for producing a quality patrolman. Training must be comprehensive and enduring. Expedited courses have frequently led to poor police capabilities and an inability to provide security and to resist powerbrokers outside the chain of command. With limited resources and time, there is a temptation to concentrate training on the upper levels of the police, assuming that experience and best practice will ‘trickle down.’ Neither arbitrary timelines nor external pressures should determine the length and quality of police training. If the aim of training is to create a professional police force able to provide security, then it must be continuous, comprehensive, and most importantly, conditions-based. Patrolmen must embrace training as a key part of everything they do. Indeed, the district leadership must foster a training culture among their patrolmen. |

![Figure 2. Task Force Arctic Wolf AUP 3-Tiered Training](image-url)
Developing a Long-Term Training Strategy for the AUP

When TFAW SFAT conducted its pre-deployment mission analysis focused on team structure and organization, mentors were aligned with key ANSF staff positions. Logistics, Operations, Intelligence, Communications, and Personnel mentors were identified. After being deployed to Afghanistan for five months and following the 2011 fighting season, TFAW shifted from partnered kinetic operations to AUP training involving both partners and mentors. Similar to partnered operations, developing a long-range training strategy included equal input and effort from AUP leadership in Daman, Panjwa’i and Dand Districts. Advisors quickly realized that the AUP in all three districts lacked the knowledge and experience to develop such a plan and execute it on a sustained basis. Consequently, many of the TFAW SFA Teams assigned a senior NCO (E7/8) to serve as the primary training mentor to their respective district headquarters.

Additionally, to further solve the problem, TFAW SFAT conducted further mission analysis and developed a recommended training model that can be tailored to a district’s specific training and security needs. The training model has several criteria, the first being consistent standards between the MOI-approved training and district-level training. The identified individual and collective tasks and subsequent lesson plans were consistent with those used during the MOI Basic Patrolman course (Figure 1). Consistent lesson plans ensure that training at the District and MOI level reinforce one another and minimize the patrolman’s confusion.

The second criteria of the training model was its flexibility which allowed for district-specific training plans. Based on each district’s security situation, some tasks were more critical than others. Traditional police functions relating to upholding RoL can only be effectively achieved in a relatively secure environment. Until security is achieved, the AUP will continue to serve as a security force versus an investigative police force. When AUP operate in areas that are either in the ‘clear’ or ‘hold’ phases of Counterinsurgency (COIN), upholding RoL is frequently ignored by both politicians and military leaders. As the district transitions into the ‘build’ phase of COIN, a greater emphasis can be placed on RoL and Community Policing tasks.

The final criteria was to develop a model that allowed training while at the same time minimizing the impact on the AUP’s ability to accomplish its security and po-
licensing missions. In addition, the training model factored in Afghanistan’s fighting and non-fighting seasons. The non-fighting season could also be referred to as the ‘training season’, with the AUP committing a higher portion of its police force to MOI courses and unit-sponsored, district-level training. The best way to minimize training impact on the AUP’s ability to perform their policing function was to conduct training at the checkpoint level, thus minimizing the need to move AUP to and from training at a centralized location.

To achieve all three criteria for the training model, TFAW developed a 3-tiered approach which included MOI training, partnered checkpoint training, and SFAT training located at the District Police headquarters (Figure 2). The MOI training included the NCO Course, Basic Patrolman Course, Medic Course, Armorer’s Course and Wrecker/Recovery Course. In order to maximize attendance it was critical that the PHQ issue a cipher (order) directing the districts to send the specified number of candidates to each of the courses.

The second tier of training was the Training Academy which was conducted at the District headquarters by the SFAT and the lead AUP training NCO. These courses included tasks that could not be resourced at the checkpoint level and required more planning effort. Courses included Combat Life Saver (CLS), weapons training and qualification, field sanitation, literacy training, and counter IED (CIED) training.

The final tier of training was the partnered checkpoint training that was conducted at each checkpoint by the partnered coalition unit, or BSO. Each training cycle was three weeks, with the first two weeks consisting of training and demonstrations by the instructor utilizing the TFAW training guide and the standardized lesson plan. The third week consisted of partnered operations which incorporated tasks that were previously trained. The model allowed for 100% of AUP trained on key tasks annually while committing no more than 20% of the police force to training at any given time.

Building a credible security force, specifically a police force, requires patience, resources and time. Given the current geopolitical environment existing in both Afghanistan and the Coalition nations, time is the essential element. A legitimate security force can only be created by a government institution that is viewed by the people as being equally legitimate. The development of the AUP, with a blind eye to the weakness of the Afghan Government, lack of Rule of Law, and the high level of corruption significantly undermines the effectiveness and development of the required security and policing organizations that will be required throughout Afghanistan.


**Recommendations and Way Ahead**

After 6 months working with the AUP, TFAW SFAT concluded the following:

- Afghan-developed solutions, particularly in the logistics and sustainment area, are more likely to be used and therefore more likely to endure beyond the Coalition’s presence in Afghanistan.
- Patrolmen can benefit from a long-term, multi-echelon training program that they help develop and execute.

With respect to logistics ordering, TFAW SFAT’s recommendation is that district AUP are permitted to use a simple request form, similar to the proposal form, for routine requests involving supply items maintained at the PHQ. These include food, fuel, firewood, ammunition, uniforms, sundry items, etc. The PHQ can track consumption and maintain authority. MOI-14s can still be used, but only for special requests involving items not maintained at the PHQ. Alternatively, the PHQ can fill out the MOI-14 to send to higher levels after receiving the requests from the DHQ on a proposal form. This method is both practical and efficient.

Training of the AUP should include individual and collective training tasks and an approach that complements MOI-sponsored training. It must include the MOI METL tasks. A way is a 3-tiered model that includes MOI training, partnered checkpoint training, and SFAT training. This model guaranteed consistency and repetition in patrolman training for TFAW. More important, it nested with the institutional training approach undertaken by MOI and facilitated by NTM-A.

Preparing for Transition in Afghanistan, TFAW took a two-fold approach to training the AUP:
1) SFAT teams focused on developing the District Headquarters in terms of both command and control and staff processes; and
2) Partnering at the platoon level which consisted primarily of MOI METL task training at the checkpoints.

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*ibid.*


CASE STUDY – Dand District AUP Training Strategy

Perhaps most illustrative of some of these concepts was Task Force Arctic Wolves’ effort to train the AUP in Dand District, Kandahar Province, southern Afghanistan.

Major Rahmatullah, the Dand Chief of Police, is a professionally trained police officer with 26 years of experience. He attended a three-year police academy during the Soviet-backed Afghan regime. Over the course of his career he has attended such diverse professional courses as a Russian Mortar Leaders Course, Afghan Criminal Investigators Course, Afghan Intelligence Course, and the United States Drug Enforcement Agency Intelligence Course for foreign police. His background alone suggests his understanding of the need for training and professional development.

Upon arriving to Dand District in June 2011, he recognized the need for a well-trained professional policeman to serve as the training officer. After a few months of working through Afghan police channels, he was able to secure the assignment of a trusted and experienced colleague to work as his senior Sergeant as well as his training officer. Senior Sergeant Haji Niamatullah had over 20 years of service in ANSF, including ten years in the Afghan Army during the Soviet occupation. He had served the last three years as a policeman in volatile Zharay District and understood the need to have competent and well-trained police to maintain security. Hajji Niamatullah took to the job with relish, and constantly looked for additional training opportunities. As an example, with some resourcing and planning assistance from Coalition Forces, Hajji Niamatullah ran the first ever PKM machine gunners course for the Dand AUP. The idea from this course was generated after a policeman had a negligent discharge with a PKM at the District Center. Upon investigation, SFAT 5 discovered that neither the Basic Police Academy nor the NCO Academy train on the basics of using the weapon. Presented with this information, Hajji Niamatullah worked diligently with SFAT mentors to rectify the situation by developing and executing a local PKM training course.

To mitigate the risk associated with having high numbers of untrained police conducting the community policing and security functions, SFAT mentors in conjunction with Hajji Niamatullah developed a basic police skills course to be taught at the Dand District Police headquarters over a three-day period. The course was taught once every three weeks and included the basic skills and knowledge required to ensure the AUP can operate safely. The course included basic police ethics, search techniques, basic weapons handling, basic first aid, and IED awareness. Upon graduation, the students were provided a certificate with their picture that identifies them as graduates of the Basic Police Skills course. While this course was no substitute for the six-week MOI-sponsored academy, it is a source of motivation and pride for the patrolmen. The Basic Skills Course filled the gap created by a system of hiring
Engaging the Population

By Capt. Richard Fowle and Lt. Col. Alberto Garnica Jr., Daman District Headquarters, SFAT 3

The Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) are the front line counterinsurgents whose primary role is to maintain order in their areas of operation (community policing). They interact directly with the population and sometimes are the only Afghan National Security Forces in the area. They understand that they are here to protect and serve the population. It is highly important to be able to engage the population in a positive manner in order to portray the unit as a professional force and gain the population support. This will lead to familiarity with the local leaders and villagers in order to determine patterns of life and gather information while building trust and confidence in the community.

In the Daman District 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment has used combined patrols and village assessments in order to put the AUP in the front and create the conditions for positive interaction with the population. Every village assessment patrol includes the AUP plus additional enablers to include Civil Affairs, Female Engagement Teams, and the District Support Team. The patrol comes prepared to conduct an initial assessment and build a positive relationship with the village elders and the population. The AUP play an important role in the mission.

The AUP send out a five or six man patrol with vehicle when they accompany the Coalition Forces (CF). The National Directorate of Security (NDS) occasionally sends out representatives that work closely with the patrol. The Deputy District Chief of Police (DCoP) or a senior NCO usually leads the patrol which allows the AUP leadership the opportunity to get out and see the local leaders in their villages. The police vehicles and the uniformed policemen allow for a perception of security and cooperation of the forces in the patrol.
During the execution of the patrol, the CF element establishes security on the outside of the village and allows the AUP forces to lead the way into the village and conduct the initial link up with the population. Additionally, CFs provide the AUP with Rapport Building Items (RBI) such as school supplies, radios, flashlights, soccer balls, shoes, and blankets. As the leaders engage the population, the policemen distribute the RBI from the back of their patrol vehicle in coordination with the elders. This immediately portrays a positive image of the police and allows for successful interaction with the population. The police additionally accompany the CF in conducting shuras with the elders and leaders in order to conduct the assessment of the village.

The AUP in Daman continue to develop into a professional police force that has the support of the population and can serve and protect the community. They are making a positive impression on the population by conducting combined patrols with the CFs during village assessments and engagements. By entering the village first, handing out RBI, and engaging the population they continue to establish themselves among the community as a competent security force.
Intel Sharing

By 1st Lt. Antonette DeLeon, Panjwa’i District Headquarters S2, SFAT 6

The District Headquarters in Panjwa’i is a very industrious place. Over 200 Afghan citizens frequent the district center each week. The district governor, the district chief of police, various line ministry officials and over 80 Afghan National Police (ANP) work out of this compound. Taskeras and IDs are also issued to the local population. Through all of this hustle and bustle, you will also find one container housing Shamsudin, Noor Badsha, and Saifullah. They are the two Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) who live at the district center. These three individuals, along with the US mentors meet with the ANP each night to share intelligence.

As the old saying goes, intelligence drives operations. With this being said, the US mentors are trying to foster a relationship between the ANP, the ANA and the ANCOP. These three organizations share the battle space and occupy checkpoints that are as close as 1 km apart. With an operational area measuring no larger than 35km, and with a high amount of kinetic activity, the ultimate goal is to get the AUP to lead an intel sharing meeting and for all organizations to be able to work together on the battlefield.

In late October, the US mentors received information from an Afghan source stating that an IED was emplaced on the main road and an ANCOP convoy was 8km away from the site. The information was passed on to the ANCOP representative and he worked with the ANP to relay the message to his check point and to the convoy. His Soldiers were able to verify that an IED was in the vicinity and they cordoned the area until US forces arrived to blow the explosive in place. This cooperation between ANSF and ISAF partners kept people from detonating the IED. Saifullah was very grateful to receive the information, explaining that it kept his men from getting injured.
Each Afghan representative brings unique experiences and training to the table. Shamsudin trained in Kabul on basic soldier tasks such as radio communications and medical training. Noor Badsha had extensive training as a radio operator and Saiful-lah was trained with the ANP, the border patrol, ANCOP basic training and specialized intelligence training. Regardless of their experience they all joined their perspective branch for honor and country. All three branches continue to meet each night to share information and hopefully improve security in Panjwa’i.

Lessons learned:

* Create a pattern. Have the meeting at the same time each day with the same people.
* Have maps and resources in both Dari and Pashto languages.
* Create systems that are sustainable when ISAF leaves. i.e. overlays to plot SI-GACTs, functional communications, etc.
* Teach proper techniques in evidence handling and the importance of time sensitive information.
Have you ever been lost, and found yourself asking, “How will I be able to get back in the right direction? Or how will I be able to get home? Is anyone looking for me? What about if I get captured by insurgents or get in a middle of a firefight? Who knows about our whereabouts?”

These are questions that come up often, especially when you are in a combat area. Can you identify your exact location or who is around you? Technology has evolved in the last 30 years. The Army started with a simple Global Positioning System (GPS) device in the mid 80’s and then went further with the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) and Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR). It has been mass produced for our leisure in our economic world. Our computers, cell phones, vehicles, and other communication gadgets have integrated Global Positioning Systems. We have become reliant on the GPS to get us to our destinations.

Our armed forces use the DAGR, Blue Force Tracker (BFT) or FBCB2 to provide us with grid locations, way points, maps, near unit/patrol locations, text, send reports and post graphic control measures. In our goal to build, train, and equip the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF); combined combat operations are a daily task to increase the security and defeat the insurgency. Our biggest challenges are green on blue, blue on blue, or green on green incidents that have increased exponentially in Afghanistan. The Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and their Ministries have invested funds to supply the ANSF forces with a GPS tracking device capable of maintaining personnel and equipment situational awareness of their forces on the battlefield. The second major area is to reduce the number of green on green or blue on green incidents. This system is not only beneficial for the ANA, but also the ISAF forces during combined operations.

The Afghan National Tracking System, well known by its initials, ANTS, provides ANSF and ISAF the capability to track Afghan elements throughout the battle space. The system utilizes handheld (9602B - shout nano) and vehicle mounted (9602) GPS/Iridium tracking devices which are viewable via a laptop or desktop computer (contractor does not provide, Google Earth (GE)/Google Earth Internet Server (GEIS) are uploaded on existing Afghan system). The devices report to two servers so that the device information is displayed on Google Earth. Internet is required to see. The devices are also viewable on the BFT, providing US and ISAF commanders a view of all elements operating in their areas of responsibility. This will decrease the blue on green incidents. Each device has a push button emergency feature which
transmits an emergency status back to the server alerting the HQ that immediate assistance is needed.

A Field Support Representative (FSR) is assigned within the major provinces of Afghanistan to train, field and install the system. Some lessons learned that might be helpful for SFA teams when dealing with ANTS FSR:

Lessons Learned:

- Coordinate with the BSO or ISAF mentors and the ANA partner unit prior to the installation and distribution phase.
- Link up with Afghan units to provide an overview brief (leadership) and answer questions.
- Coordinate for location, time, and identification of vehicles based on Tashkil (TOE and TDA)
- Mentors, in conjunction with the ANSF leadership, must identify the vehicles in which the equipment will be installed and priorities. This will expedite the process for the field support representative to initiate the installation and fielding process.
- ANSF leadership must identify hand receipt holder and officer responsible to sign for all equipment. Our recommendation for the G-6 is to write the distribution plan and the G-4 to identify S-4 OICs to sign for equipment for their respective units. A copy of the HR must be turn in to their assigned Property Book Officer (PBO).
- Location with power generation, open area to work, security, transportation to install site, and interpreter to facilitate the process. Preferably collocated near an ISAF Tactical Infrastructure (TI). The security is a must for the FSRs because they are not authorized to carry weapons and are not capable of providing their own security.
- An ISAF mentor presence is required for C2 to de-conflict any issues that arise with the ANSF partner.
- Highly recommend that ANSF units clean vehicles before system installation.
- On the spot training is given to the driver of the vehicle explaining equipment capabilities, PMCS, and emergency response system as part of the equipment capability.
- After all ANTS equipment has been distributed and installed for all the units
within the higher headquarters command, classroom instruction of the full capabilities and performance of the ANTS should be provided to the key leaders and Soldiers within the organization. The class covers hands on instruction on the operation of the system, including the emergency response system.

- The command must identify a C2 computer and location where they have the ability to monitor their personnel/vehicles. The FSRs will install Google Earth software and configure it to display unit devices. FSRs provide overview and training on Google Earth.

The FSRs will schedule refresher training upon completion of all initial training. They will provide the ANSF and mentor units with copies of briefings, hand receipts (DA Form 3161), and contact information for continuity.

With the help of GPS and the ANTS fielding, ANSF is able to share information and mitigate fratricide to a zero level for a safe operational environment.
The Datron RT-7000 Radio

By Lt. Thor Hartwig, 25th Brigade Support Battalion S6

The Datron RT-7000 is a small High Frequency (HF) radio that allows for long-distance communication over 1.6 to 30 MHz. The radio is easily configurable for either a base station setup, for TOC or headquarters usage, or a vehicular mount for use on the move in HMMVs or Rangers. The Afghan National Army (ANA) prefers this radio for use in HQ areas, as it allows for long-distance communication without the need for a line-of-sight, or retrans assets. This radio is also compatible with the Afghan National Police (ANP) force’s Codan 2110 HF man pack radio, and the Codan 2020 HF vehicular radio between 3 and 13 MHz. This is an important aspect of the radio, especially when considering the planning of communications during joint operations between the ANA and ANP.

While the radio is ideal for the terrain, and operations that the ANA undertake, it is also the most complex radio in the signal inventory. Proper radio training presents a challenge for the Soldiers in 5th Kandak, at Camp Hero in southern Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. In comparison with reaching proficiency with the RT-1077 and RT-1099 radios, it takes about three times the amount of time for the RT-7000. The low level of literacy rates among the ANA presents the biggest issue to fully training the Soldiers in the basic usage of the radio. Mandatory attendance and graduation of the Signal Basic Training Course (SBTC) would be the best measure to limit any training issues potential Signaleers would have with this radio.

The other issue with this radio system is the power supplies in the ANA supply system. The UPF-7000A seems to have issues with the circuit boards shorting out after minimal usage. The reason for the failures is not readily apparent, but the issue is so widespread throughout the ANA that there is a major shortage of these power supplies. 5th Kandak is at the point where they are running base station RT-7000 radios with car batteries.

Despite the issues with training and power supply failures, the RT-7000 radio seems to be the type of reliable equipment the ANA needs to communicate throughout their areas of operation, as well as being able to effectively communicate with their ANP counterparts.
Afghan Transition Strategies

By 1st Lt. David Ribardo, Assistant Operations Officer, 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment

When C Company, 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment In moved into Combat Outpost Sperwan Ghar, the three companies of Afghan National Army (ANA) they were partnered with were reliant on Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) for everything from operational planning to daily resupply. By the end of the summer, the Afghan Soldiers were walking point. This article is based on my experiences as a Platoon Leader throughout the Summer 2011 fighting season.

How 2nd Kandak, 1/205th ANA Took the Lead

Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, the Gimlets, arrived in the horn of Panjwai in June 2011. Throughout a month long Relief In Place process, Canadian forces introduced the incoming platoons to their battle space and to the ANA they would be partnered with. At this time, the three companies of ANA were partnered with a five-man Canadian OMLT element. The OMLT provided them with a high level of support, both in terms of operational planning and logistics. This approach was successful at getting the ANA operating in the battle space. However, by providing the degree of support it did, the OMLT acted as a set of training wheels that encouraged ANA dependence on ISAF leadership and systems. As their capabilities developed, a more hands off approach was ultimately successful at allowing the ANA to take the lead.

The initial problem set that was tackled was the difficulty getting Afghan Soldiers to take the lead with squad level patrolling. This proved to be the biggest hurdle to overcome. ANA leadership would state, “We don’t have minesweeper training, so we need to follow you.” This was mostly untrue, as the Canadians had provided them with weekly Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED) training. The main problem was a lack of confidence and an established pattern of letting ANA follow on patrols. By jointly developing a more complex CIED lane that accurately depicted enemy TTPs and used real IED components to simulate threat situations recently encountered, the quality of CIED training increased.
Through several weeks of this training the lower level leaders and their Soldiers gained the confidence in their abilities and began to use borrowed mine detectors to walk point and lead in the execution of patrols.

Incorporating the ANA element leader going on patrol into the planning process was another key step in motivating Afghan security forces to take the lead. When told what to do, ANA squads displayed little initiative and motivation, but once acting on their own ideas, they were surprisingly good and took great pride in their performance. Following each patrol, a joint hot wash was conducted. Initially the ANSF was extremely reluctant to point out their faults; it took several months before they became comfortable pointing out their weaknesses and giving their leadership ideas for improvement. This eventually proved to be a valuable tool and resulted in an increase of their basic patrolling skills, and our ability to work jointly.

The company level Afghan leadership was enthusiastic about taking the lead in planning and this proved to be the easiest area to transition to being Afghan-led. When asked to do so, the ANA company commanders quickly demonstrated their ability to create simple and effective plans for individual platoon and company level operations. They proved very proficient at conducting village clearance operations with blocking positions and at setting in ambushes. Their main gap in ability was building effective patrol matrices to target specific insurgent activities. They initially preferred a terrain-based approach of sequentially patrolling through each village in their area of responsibility. This approach failed to target insurgents or act on intelligence. “Where are the Taliban now” and “how will this patrol help us defeat them” became questions asked of every patrol.

Once challenged to tie in operations with an overall targeting strategy, the COs quickly began to think long term and create effective patrol matrices.

Until now, the ANA have been reliant on ISAF for supplies, and a constant stress point was always what ISAF would provide them with. Key issues were always fuel, water, maintenance for their equipment, and food. A hands-off approach here successfully forced them to use their own supply system. ANSF will always take the path of least resistance to obtain supply needs. When they stated that we needed to provide them with an item, simply explaining that we did not have the item requested, but were more than willing to assist in filling out the supply request paperwork would usually result in obtaining it independently, rather than jointly filling out paperwork. A useful tool was maintaining a copy of the inventory of the local National Supply Depot to quickly show that they could obtain the desired item through their own channels. This “cold turkey” approach was stressful at the start but over a two month period had the ANA effectively providing for themselves.
One of the major campaign goals is the establishment of GIRoA influence, which up until now has been limited to nonexistent in the horn of Panjwa'i. At the platoon level this was accomplished by our establishment of local shura meetings. This process was slow to gain momentum but ultimately proved worthwhile. Once per month we would provide food and a meeting location. The Afghan company commanders would use their independent patrols to spread the information about the shura and invite all the local elders. Initially, we had limited representation from villages and the insurgents conducted an intimidation campaign against those attending shuras. As months progressed there was increasing turn out as fears of Taliban reprisals decreased. The shuras became an effective system of identifying security threats, establishing communication, and providing a forum for promoting CERP projects.

Though not truly independent yet, throughout the summer fighting season the 1st, 2nd, and 4th companies of the 2/1/205th ANA demonstrated their capabilities to take the lead in operations. Though still reliant on ISAF for fire support and air MEDIVAC, they are largely responsible for their battle space. This transition was a direct result of encouragement to take the lead, partnered mentorship at all levels, and adopting a hands-off approach once the ANSF had the skills necessary for success.
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