COMANDANT
BG Mark Inch .......................................................... 563-8019
<mark.inch@us.army.mil>

ASSISTANT COMANDANT
COL John Huey .......................................................... 563-8019
<john.huey@us.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM John McNeirney .................................................. 563-8018
<mcneirneyj@us.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER
CW5 Leroy Shamburger .................................................. 563-8035
<leroy.shamburger@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMANDANT-USAR
COL Daniel Foulkrod .................................................. 563-6223
<daniel.foulkrod@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMANDANT-ARNG
LTC Craig Chandler .................................................. 563-4570
<craig.chandler@us.army.mil>

QUALITY ASSURANCE ELEMENT
Miss Cathy Bower .................................................. 563-5892
<cathy.bower@us.army.mil>

14TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
COL Kevin Vereen .................................................. 596-0968
<kevin.vereen@us.army.mil>

701ST MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Curtis Schroeder .................................................. 596-2377
<curtis.schroeder@us.army.mil>

787TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Richard Heidorn .................................................. 596-0317
<rheidorn@us.army.mil>

795TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Kyle Bayless .................................................. 596-2384
<kyle.bayless@us.army.mil>

USAMPS Directors

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING
COL Ramona Plemmons ................................................. 563-8098
<ramona.plemmons@us.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS
LTC Michael Henshaw .................................................. 563-8027
<michael.henshaw@us.army.mil>

G-37 AT-PUBLICATIONS
Managing Editor, Diane E. Eidson .................................. 563-4137
<diane.eidson@us.army.mil>

Editor, Diana K. Dean ................................................. 563-5004
<diana.k.dean@us.army.mil>

Graphic Designer, Dennis Schellingberger ...................... 563-5267
<dennis.schellingberger@us.army.mil>

Editorial Assistant, Phyllis E. Grayson ......................... 563-7651
<phyllis.grayson@us.army.mil>

Contributing editor: Rick Brunk

Military Police, an official U.S. Army professional bulletin for the Military Police Corps Regiment, contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations. The objectives of Military Police are to inform and motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. Military Police reserves the right to edit material. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to Military Police and the author. All photographs are official U.S. Army photographs unless otherwise credited.

Articles to be considered for publication are due 1 December and 1 June. Send submissions by email to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil>, or send an electronic copy in Microsoft® Word on a compact disk and a double-spaced copy of the manuscript to Military Police Professional Bulletin, 464 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702 Due to limited space per issue, we normally do not print articles that have been published elsewhere.

Military Police (ISSN 0895-4208) is published semi-annually at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Third-class postage is paid at Fort Leonard Wood and additional mailing offices.

CORRESPONDENCE: Correspondence should be addressed to Military Police Professional Bulletin, 464 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702 or to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil>. Please provide a telephone number and complete return address.


ADDRESS CHANGES for personal subscriptions should be sent to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000.

UNIT SUBSCRIPTIONS are available by e-mailing <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil>. Please include the complete mailing address (including unit name, street address, and building number) and the number of copies per issue.

POSTMASTER: Send unit address changes to Military Police, 464 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702.
2 Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School
4 Regimental Command Sergeant Major
5 Regimental Chief Warrant Officer
6 The First 180 Days in Support of the Division in Combat: Let's Get It Right!
   By Colonel John (Mack) Huey
9 From the Ground Up: Restructuring the Military Police Corps for Peace and War in the 21st Century
   By Captain Benjamin G. Franzosa
12 783d Military Police Battalion—Lineage and Honors
13 Rookie: An American Military Policeman in World War II
   By Mr. Thomas E. Christianson
16 508th Military Police Battalion CERT Training
   By Second Lieutenant Justin Hilderbrand
18 I/R Companies: Making Time to Train
   By Captain Darren W. Moe
20 Interrogations: Are They Getting Their Due?
   By Chief Warrant Officer Two Walter D. Smith
22 The Evolution of a Police Partnership in a Mature Theater: Lessons Learned From Iraq
   By Major General Ken Tovo and Lieutenant Colonel Glenn C. Schmick
29 Watchdogs Return to the Land of the Morning Calm and ULO: Lessons Learned in Targeting
   By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Medina
32 Combat Forensics: Afghan National Police Crime Scene Unit
   By Major Pedro E. Vazquez
34 Military Police as Unsung Heroes of the Battle of the Bulge
   By Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr. (Retired), PhD
36 93d Military Police Battalion Reactivates the Rio Grande Chapter of the MPRA
   By Second Lieutenant Nicholas A. Davis and Second Lieutenant Joseph D. Librande
38 Doctrine Update
40 COIN: A Family Business in Afghanistan
   By Captain Chance A. Lundy
41 The Terrorist Threat and Information Sharing
   By Colonel Richard Vanderlinden (Retired) and Captain Vince Makiling
45 The 508th Military Police Battalion and the NWJRCF
   By Captain Henry S. Leung
47 The Expanded Role of the 307th Military Police Company in Afghanistan: Female Engagement Teams
   By Captain Brandy L. Toth
48 Religious Support Operations Volunteers in a Correctional Environment
   By Chaplain (Major) Darren K. Coleman
50 Brigade/Battalion Commands
52 Subscribe to Military Police
53 Military Police Writer's Guide

Front cover and back cover—U.S. Army photographs
As the U.S. Army, we share in the sacrifices of all Americans during this period of fiscal uncertainty; we must shape the Army of 2020 with an understanding of our national security obligations and our shared fiscal constraints. We will continue to be good stewards of the resources we receive by developing our Nation’s capabilities through prudent investment in, and modernization and transformation of, the institutional Army. As America’s decisive force, the Army affords our national security decisionmakers greater flexibility in responding to a range of threats at home and abroad. As we transition to a leaner, more agile Army, we will build a future force with the capability and versatility to prevent conflict; shape the environment; and decisively win our Nation’s wars. The Army of 2020 will possess the capabilities required to support the Joint Force and ensure that the Army is the Nation’s adaptive land force for decisive action (offense, defense, and stability operations simultaneously or defense support to civil authorities). But the question is: Are we prepared to shape the Military Police Corps Regiment of 2020 to provide unique and essential capabilities required by the Joint Force for decisive action?

The Chief of Staff of the Army has directed that the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command lead the effort to redesign the Army of 2020. It is important that the actions we take are firmly rooted in our senior leaders’ guidance and strategic vision, that they conform to policy, and that they can be accomplished with anticipated resources. We clearly need an overall strategy to organize, train, man, and equip our Military Police Corps Regiment to provide professional police operations, investigations, corrections, and security and mobility support so that the Joint Force and Army can “prevent, shape, and win.” Our Regiment has been specifically tasked to represent the Army’s interests in national and international policing, law enforcement, and interment. To meet this responsibility, the Provost Marshal General “…develops and executes Army strategy, policy, plans, and programs…” The strategy development is nearly complete; as of the writing of this article, the final coordinating draft of the Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan—a cooperative effort among senior military police leaders with the Office of the Provost Marshal General, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”), U.S. Army Corrections Command, and the field—is out for staffing. The final version of the plan is scheduled to be briefed at the USAMPS-hosted Military Police Senior Leader’s Conference at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in September 2012.

Ongoing processes taking place concurrently with the development of the Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan have already signaled or resulted in changes in the Army and the Military Police Corps Regiment. The most notable of these processes are the annual Total Army Analysis and the Capability Portfolio Reviews (Assured Mobility, Protection), working in parallel with actions such as tactical wheeled-vehicle studies and personnel grade plate reviews. These processes allow us the opportunity to fundamentally reexamine how we are organized. For example, is our smallest element (the three-person team) still viable? Which formations provide mission command to bring our unique capabilities to bear across all warfighting functions in support of brigade combat teams, divisions, corps, and theaters? This issue of Military Police contains an article (page 6) written by Colonel John (Mack) Huey, assistant commandant of USAMPS, who draws from his experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom and before to argue for aligning a full military police company with each brigade combat team and a military police battalion with each division; the demand signal is clearly evident.

We have initiated a military police organizational assessment and a Capability Portfolio Review at USAMPS and the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE), Fort Leonard Wood. The military police organizational assessment scopes anticipated requirements within the operational environment and considers force design and force mix changes to ensure that our Regiment is postured to provide effective and efficient military police support to the Joint Force and Army of 2020. The Capability Portfolio Review is a structured process used to eliminate gaps and redundancies, understand risk, validate investments and, ultimately, enable senior Army leaders to make programmatic decisions, including the termination of systems.
I have found that, in this time of transformation and strategic reset, it is useful to reflect on how our Military Police Corps Regiment enabled combined arms maneuver and wide area security during previous wars we have fought and on what plans and training were implemented for the war we successfully deterred in Europe and the ones we continue to deter in locations such as Korea. We have also accumulated a vast reservoir of lessons learned during the past 12 years of stability and counterinsurgency operations. Without losing an appreciation for the inherent versatility of military police units to operate across the full range of military operations (Major General Charles A. Hines’ 1990 article, entitled “Military Police in Contingency Operations: Often the Force of Choice,” still resonates!), we must take a hard look at those actions necessary to open a theater of operations and to defeat a range of threats in an antiaccess/area denial environment. In the past, we have frequently provided a menu of military police capabilities within our five battlefield functions (now being replaced by the three military police disciplines) from which to choose without an expectation that we perform all of those functions simultaneously. But for the Army of 2020, we must determine exactly what is needed and then organize, train, man, and equip our units to meet those requirements. The considerations that led to the use of military police in contingency operations of the past are largely the same motivating factors for our use in decisive actions. The inherently unique characteristics and qualifications of our military police Soldiers and formations facilitate the supported commander’s freedom to move and maneuver, and they preserve the force so that the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. The military police security and mobility support, police operations, and internment disciplines cross all phases of an operation; and history illustrates that the demand signal for military police is immediate and high.

So, between now and 2020, will we be able to shape and balance the Military Police Corps Regiment for decisive action? Will we be able to provide professional police operations, investigations, corrections, and security and mobility support across the full range of military operations to enable protection and promote the rule of law? I believe the answer is “yes.” The primary focus of the 2012 Senior Leader’s Conference will be to illustrate the linkages and close collaboration of the entire Military Police Corps Regiment to best support the Army and the Joint Force now, in 2020, and beyond. The conference will provide a common strategic narrative for our Soldiers and the commanders we support.

The focus of the Spring 2013 issue of Military Police will be on the results of, and responses to, the Senior Leader’s Conference and on those actions that we, as a regiment, have taken to meet the goals and objectives of the Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan—at our installations and while deployed. For in the final analysis, it is not about who we think we are; it is about what we know we must provide to combatant commanders, senior mission commanders, and tactical maneuver commanders for our Army and our Joint Force to prevent, shape, and win.

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Endnotes:

1General Order 2012-01, “Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities Within Headquarters, Department of the Army,” 11 June 2012.

Too many times over the past 26 years, we have referred to ourselves as “not those MPs [Military Police].” The scenario goes like this: A military police staff sergeant or sergeant first class is talking with his infantry buddies, who ask if the military policeman can help out with a barracks larceny or a traffic ticket or if he can explain why one of their Soldiers got pulled over. The military policeman replies, “I am not that kind of MP.” The infantry Soldier looks confused and asks for clarification. The MP explains that he is a field or combat MP—not the type of MP who “works the road” or carries out the installation law enforcement mission. Combat military police Soldiers often take pride in drawing a distinction between their duties and those of the “other” military police.

I contend that all of us are “that MP.” It is the skills and attributes of that MP that the Army wants from the Military Police Corps Regiment. It is the high standards of conduct and ethical role modeling of that MP that the Army expects of us. It is the capability and technical proficiency of that MP that make us unique and add to our value among commanders across the Army. It is that MP who has built the long heritage of service and professionalism that continues today. It was that MP who supported the war efforts for every major conflict in which our Nation has fought. It was that MP who combatant commanders repeatedly requested in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are all that MP!

To add value to the Army at home station and while deployed, military police must be disciplined Soldiers who possess policing and corrections competencies. These are unique skills that we acquire via formal education and self-development and that we maintain through the experience of practicing our police profession. We are the Army’s subject matter experts in the planning and execution of missions involving law enforcement, nonlethal weapons, accident investigations, physical security, area security operations, criminal investigations, forensics, biometrics, corrections, resettlement, antiterrorism, special-reaction team operations, and maneuver support operations.

As professional military police Soldiers, we must trust each other; and that trust is gained and maintained through demonstrated competence in all that we do. For our units to prevail on the battlefield, we must possess a high level of esprit de corps and we must never quit—for winning is the only acceptable outcome of combat. Victory is achieved through honorable service and full commitment to more than “just a job.” As true professionals, we must regulate ourselves and become stewards of our profession. We must invest the time and sweat necessary for the success of our Military Police Corps Regiment and our Army.

Remember, we are “Soldiers who are the Army’s police professionals.” We are the MPs.

Assist, Protect, Defend!

“The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.”
—Thomas Jefferson
Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger

On 29 June 2012, I assumed my duties as your Military Police Regimental Chief Warrant Officer. I am honored to have the opportunity to continue serving the Soldiers, civilians, and family members that comprise our great Regiment; and I can’t wait to visit your units and see the tremendous things that you are doing on a daily basis.

I would like to thank Brigadier General Mark Inch, chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment and commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), for his kind words during the change-of-responsibility ceremony. I really appreciate his vote of confidence and the opportunity to be a part of the regimental command team. I look forward to supporting, and contributing to, the vision of a premier, integrated military police force recognized as policing and corrections professionals who are certified and credentialed by nationally recognized certifying organizations.

I would also like to pay tribute to the military police regimental chief warrant officers and the senior warrant officers who previously worked within the walls of USAMPS. Our opportunities and success are, in large part, due to the efforts of those who came before us. Many senior warrant officers served as role models and mentors to me and many others like me. They clearly understood that they had a responsibility to develop the leaders of the future. Without their sacrifices, caring leadership, mentorship, and sound guidance, I don’t believe that I would be the regimental chief warrant officer today. As we move up in grade and position, I hope we all understand that we have an increased responsibility to serve the Soldiers placed in our care. The opportunity to train, coach, and mentor young Soldiers to become our future leaders is a privilege that comes with grade and position.

“...we must maintain our relevancy as the Military Police Corps Regiment by demonstrating the technical and tactical capabilities that make us unique. We must also continually focus on being the best that we can be in the core competencies of soldiering, policing, investigations, and corrections.”

I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of the Soldiers, civilians, and contractors who currently work within the walls of USAMPS. Their efforts don’t go unnoticed. I have personally benefited from the initiatives and quality training provided by the great USAMPS institution. It has been said that people are expanding or shrinking, moving forward or backward, and giving or taking. Thanks to the efforts of USAMPS personnel, the Regiment is expanding, moving forward, and giving Army leaders what they need to wage our Nation’s wars. They have ensured, and continue to ensure, that the Soldiers at the tip of the spear are ready and relevant. I am excited to learn about, and be involved in, the behind-the-scenes efforts that make USAMPS a world-class institution and make the Military Police Corps Regiment the best in the Army.

Our Army is in transition; our force is becoming smaller. Therefore, we must maintain our relevancy as the Military Police Corps Regiment by demonstrating the technical and tactical capabilities that make us unique. We must also continually focus on being the best that we can be in the core competencies of soldiering, policing, investigations, and corrections. We must ensure that the military police force of 2020 is capable of functioning across the full range of military operations. I am thrilled to be at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as we develop the documents that will shape the military police force of the future.

Assist, Protect, Defend!
As we near the 10th anniversary of the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom and I reflect back on the early stages of the campaign, I come to the same conclusion that I did in 2003—that a military police company in support of a division during the first 180 days of conflict is woefully inadequate for meeting the maneuver commander’s requirements. And the same applies to a military police platoon in support of a brigade combat team (BCT). (I actually first came to this conclusion nearly 30 years ago, when I was a direct-support platoon leader with the 1st Military Police Company in support of 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division [Mechanized].) Let me explain myself from the perspective of a former commander of the 3d Military Police Battalion (Provisional) and provost marshal of the 3d Infantry Division (3ID) (Mechanized) who was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, March–August 2003.

Given sufficient force structure (consisting of a full military police battalion, including four military police companies, aligned to the division), combined with our unique policing and corrections expertise and other technical and tactical capabilities, we can provide maneuver commanders with the full range of technical military police support necessary to enable them to conduct decisive action—from participating in major combat operations, to building partner capacity, to promoting the rule of law. However, under a minimal force structure, we only scratch the surface of what we are capable of accomplishing as military police. As members of the Military Police Corps Regiment, we are extremely proud of our legacy and of our performance in the five battlefield functional areas, but a single military police company cannot adequately support a division during the first 180 days of a combined arms maneuver/wide area security fight.

Doctrine is wonderful; however, its full application is suspect. The 3ID planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2002 and early 2003 incorporated the doctrinal premise that the division provost marshal could expect up to two additional military police companies from the corps before assuming tactical combat positions and crossing the berm into Iraq. However, that did not come to fruition—mostly due to changes and flawed force flow that delayed the deployment of military police units into the theater. The lack of additional corps personnel required me to notify the division commander that he would receive only one platoon per brigade or BCT and that the three remaining platoons would support the only mission we were capable of conducting based on the number of military police within the 3ID—enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) operations. (Note: I previously coauthored an article entitled “The 3d Military Police Company Supports EPW Operations in Iraq,” which details the EPW mission.) Not only was it impossible for us to consider performing any of our other four battlefield missions, but I was also later forced to go back to the division commander and request additional manning and resources just to accomplish the EPW mission. This, in itself, left the division commander; the division operations, plans, and training officer (G-3); the chief of staff; and the three BCT commanders (all of whom are now major generals and lieutenant generals) with the permanent negative impression that military police are capable of very little and that they have a marginal impact on the overall accomplishment of the division mission. This is embarrassing, to say the least.

Alternatively, if each BCT had a military police company and I, as the division provost marshal, had the fourth company with which to conduct EPW operations, we would have been able to accomplish multiple military police battlefield missions—and we would have been more positively perceived as a true combat multiplier. I have often wondered what would have happened if there had truly been enough military police in the 3ID “March to Baghdad” and subsequent “Thunder Run” to provide security and mobility along the main supply routes, at gap/river crossings, and through passages of lines and while performing straggler/discharged civilian control, conducting critical-site/high-value asset security, and working with host nation police to restore law and order. Maybe—just maybe—we could have helped prevent the “lost convoy,” the rampant looting in Baghdad, and bottlenecks at river crossings and helped provide a smooth passage of lines between the 3ID and 4th Infantry Division. There were many other situations where, given the appropriate force structure, we could have been a better combat multiplier and enabler to the division commander.

I will never forget the day that, without one bit of previous planning, we “magically” transitioned from Phase III (combat
operations) to Phase IV (postconflict/stabilization of the environment operations). The 3ID was originally to move from the border of Kuwait to Baghdad, take down Saddam Hussein’s regime, and then withdraw to Kuwait while being replaced by another division. Immediately following the seizure of Baghdad, we were ordered to secure the city and to cease planning for our withdrawal to Kuwait. After having just completed more than 30 continuous days of major combat operations, we literally transitioned to Phase IV operations overnight. According to the after action report, the 3ID “transitioned into Phase IV in the absence of guidance” and many of the planners indicate that commanders did not produce a formal Phase IV plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom until November 2003—7 months after Baghdad fell. In retrospect, our failure to plan for Phase IV operations (which could have occurred anytime from 1 to 180 days—or simultaneously with other phases of the operation) was clearly a mistake. Furthermore, we should never have expected appropriate replacements to be available to go from one phase to another.

Time after time, we relearn the same lessons from Panama, Haiti, Iraq and, now, Afghanistan: Large numbers of military police are needed after the rapid elimination of effective defense forces and in the absence of legitimate host nation police. Without the proper restoration of law and order and civil control, large-scale vandalism, looting, and criminal activity ensue. Yet, U.S. military planners continue to avoid truly focusing on conflict termination and postconflict operations. These planning failures highlight the need for a doctrinal paradigm shift which institutionalizes the concept that the decisive military aspect of a war ends during Phase IV, rather than Phase III, operations.

On 1 May 2003, only about 45 days after crossing into Iraq, we passed the complete 3ID EPW mission to the 115th Military Police Battalion—a V Corps asset. This allowed us to refocus on meeting the division commander’s priorities with regard to rebuilding infrastructure and providing a safe and secure environment for the people of Baghdad (which, in 2003, was a city with a population of more than 6 million). This was a true Phase IV operation. Most of the missions that were assigned to the division military police were in support of establishing a safe and secure environment, which included—

- Protecting civil affairs elements, engineers who were conducting infrastructure assessments, health specialists who were conducting hospital assessments and delivering medical supplies, and fuel tankers who were supplying fuel for generators.
- Conducting protective service detail missions for visiting dignitaries, route reconnaissance, route signing, and traffic control.
- Securing seized currency.
- Supporting U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) elements that were charged with mass grave investigations and investigations of crimes committed by Soldiers.

We took on these missions without any additional corps military police assets. This clearly supports my position with regard to the appropriate force structure and force flow for support of Phase III and Phase IV operations.

In June 2003, with the limited 3ID military police assets available, we were directed to relocate to Fallujah (about 35 kilometers west of Baghdad) to establish liaison with the senior Iraqi police force officer and assist the Iraqi police in standing up a viable police infrastructure by providing expertise, training, weapons, uniforms, vehicles, joint patrols, operating police stations, and a police academy! We were not prepared for this mission—nor did we gain any additional corps military police assets. Nevertheless, we moved out with the Headquarters, 3d Military Police Company; two remaining platoons (one of which was divided into squads to provide protective service detail to the 3ID command group); and what remained of Task Force EPW4 to accomplish the mission in Fallujah. The goal was to ensure that the Iraqi police force was capable of shooting, moving, and communicating and that, in the eyes of the people of Fallujah, it was a legitimate police force. Although we accomplished the mission, we clearly could have done a better job given the required assets.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was a complete success for the U.S. Army and for the people of Iraq; but I know that, given the appropriate resources, our Regiment could have accomplished what we say we can and we could have been a more effective combat multiplier. Clearly, a military police battalion should be aligned to each division; similarly, military police companies should be aligned to future BCTs.

According to Mr. Tom Christianson, the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) historian, military police units experienced these precise problems during World War II. Divisions were sometimes assigned one company, but oftentimes even less—meaning that there might be 80–100 military police per division. These military police were attached in various ways to maneuver regiments, the division, or the corps. Based on the number of personnel available, military police became increasingly incapable of performing routine reconnaissance, EPW, traffic, and crime investigation missions. The “solution” was to take infantrymen and turn them into military policemen within hours of training. Mr. Christianson recently interviewed a World War II military policeman who indicated that, after
As I prepare for my retirement from 30 years of service to our beloved Regiment, Army, and Nation, I look forward to continuing to discuss, support, and serve in whatever capacity possible to remain alongside some of the best Americans our country has to offer.

“Of the Troops, For the Troops.”

**Endnotes:**


3 Ibid.


Colonel Huey is the assistant commandant, USAMPS, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor’s degree in public administration/criminal justice from the University of Mississippi and master’s degrees in public administration from Jacksonville State University, Jacksonville, Alabama, and strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
As the Army transitions its focus to garrison operations, the Military Police Corps faces an existential dilemma: How do we realign ourselves to provide professional law enforcement (LE) in garrison and still remain postured to deploy as an effective fighting force in support of combatant commanders? To handle future security threats and remain a relevant force, the Military Police Corps must be capable of effectively leveraging its unique military police assets (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division [USACIDC] [commonly referred to as “CID”] agents and military police investigators [MPIs]) as a force multiplier on the battlefield. At the same time, as the Army downsizes, the Corps must streamline the conduct of LE operations in garrison—in terms of personnel and budgets—without any degradation of capabilities.

In a previous article entitled “A Return to the Division: Tailoring the Military Police Corps for a New Age of Conflict,” Captain Christopher J. Parker describes an excellent plan for managing the competing demands of LE and tactical reform through the restructuring of the Military Police Corps at the battalion level (to include the use of CID agents as an organic battalion asset, while maintaining their stovepipe reporting through CID channels) and the aligning of military police battalions under division maneuver enhancement brigades. After reading the article, I have no doubt that our Corps should follow this model; but I think that we can do even better. By restructuring down to the team level, we can posture our leaders to better execute mission command; more effectively employ our unique military police skills at the squad, company, and battalion levels; and rebuild the Military Police Corps for success in peace and war.

The combat support military police battalion is currently built around the traditional three-Soldier military police team that consists of a team leader, driver, and gunner. Four of these military police teams make up a 12-Soldier military police squad, which is an effective, highly mobile fighting force. However, the military police team/squad structure is inadequate for meeting the requirements of the current military police garrison LE mission. The demands of the LE mission often require that platoons or companies run consolidated schedules to manage LE shifts. The use of consolidated schedules allows units to meet LE manning requirements, but separates team and squad leaders from their Soldiers. This robs junior leaders of the day-to-day oversight of their Soldiers and limits the amount of time Soldiers work with their organic teams. The solution to this problem is to restructure the military police team and military police squad to meet LE requirements by adding an additional Soldier (a “dismount”) to each team, thus restructuring the military police squad as four military police teams with four Soldiers each.

The reorganization of the military police squad into four teams of four Soldiers would result in significant advantages for LE and tactical operations. For LE operations, the four-Soldier military police squad would be split into two 2-Soldier patrols. (See Figure 1, page 10.) The team leader could supervise subordinate Soldiers, and team integrity would be maintained. The military police squad would then consist of eight 2-Soldier patrols operating as a LE shift, with the squad leader (or, alternately, the senior team leader) serving as the shift supervisor. This configuration would allow the organic squad to cover a full shift—with a shift supervisor and four patrols working a 5-day-on/2-day-off schedule. For larger posts, the two most senior members of as many teams as necessary could be further separated into one-Soldier patrols, creating a total of up to 12 patrols per squad and allowing up to eight patrols to work a 5-day-on/2-day-off schedule while still maintaining team and squad integrity.

Under this configuration, the military police squad would also be more versatile during war. In a 16-Soldier squad, which would be able to deploy eight (rather than four) dismounted troops, there would be a driver and gunner available for all four vehicles. With four vehicles, the squad would be able to secure a small- to medium-size building and enter and clear it with eight dismounted Soldiers. It would no longer be necessary for the squad leader to sacrifice the squad’s mobility or firepower in order to dismount Soldiers for room clearing. The squad would be significantly more flexible, lethal, and survivable if it were operating as a self-sufficient force in built-up areas.

An increase in the size of a squad from 12 to 16 Soldiers would mean that one platoon could effectively manage the LE mission. Each squad would be assigned a shift (day, swing, or midnight), and the squad leaders would internally manage the manpower. This setup would allow the other platoons within the company to perform access control, conduct red-cycle
training, and backfill the LE platoon. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant for the platoon working LE would serve as the on-call duty officers. Depending on the circumstances of a particular post, if the duty officers needed to be more involved in the daily operations of the provost marshal’s office, the duties could be rotated through the senior leaders of the company. Under the proposed new military police platoon configuration, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant would not need their own organic team; during war, they would ride with the decisive-effort squad or participate wherever friction points were anticipated.

To supplement the investigative ability of each company during peace and war, all of the military police investigator slots—except the E-6 noncommissioned officer in charge slot—from the battalion LE detachment (five Soldiers with military occupational specialty [MOS] 31B20V5 and five with MOS 31B10V5) and a military police investigations section (three Soldiers with MOS 31B20V5 and three with MOS 31B10V5) could be added under the company operations section. (See Figure 2.) When the company was not deployed, this section would fill the traditional MPI role, working directly for the LE detachment’s MPI noncommissioned officer in charge. During war, the section would function as an experienced, school-trained, police intelligence operations cell, integrating Military Police Corps investigative expertise into company level operations.

The unit at the battalion level would include an LE detachment with an organic CID element; and as proposed in Captain Parker’s article, it would be organized as a “division military police battalion” with one exception—a decrease in the number of line companies in each battalion from four to three. (See Figure 3.) The larger line companies would be able to provide more robust, capable LE and access control support, depending on installation-specific requirements. Under the current modified table of organization and equipment, a line company generally requires external support—usually provided by another line company within the battalion—to accomplish the same missions. Under current manning, two companies are aligned against the LE and access control missions and two are available for deployment.
Figure 2. Proposed reorganization of the military police company

Figure 3. Proposed reorganization of the military police battalion

(continued on page 15)
Lineage and Honors

Constituted 12 November 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 783d Military Police Battalion.

Activated 28 November 1942 at Fort Custer, Michigan.

Inactivated 29 November 1945 at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

Redesignated 2 March 1948 as the 301st Military Police Battalion and allocated to the Organized Reserves.

(Organized Reserves redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Organized Reserve Corps; redesignated 9 July 1952 as the Army Reserve.)

Activated 26 March 1948 at Kansas City, Missouri.

Inactivated 31 May 1952 at Kansas City, Missouri.

Redesignated 24 June 1953 as the 783d Military Police Battalion.


Ordered into active military service 23 April 2004 at Inkster, Michigan; released from active military service 22 April 2005 and reverted to reserve status.

Campaign Participation Credit

*World War II*

- Normandy
- Northern France
- Rhineland

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered EUROPEAN THEATER
Mr. Walter Pruiksma is a true member of the “Greatest Generation.” During a recent interview with him, it became evident why Mr. Pruiksma—who is now in his eighties—made such a good military policeman during World War II. He still has the quick, warm smile; sense of humor; and dignity that make him an unforgettable character. Like so many of his generation, Mr. Pruiksma downplays his contribution to our Nation’s victory; however, it was he and people like him—average Americans thrown together by destiny into the greatest struggle of the 20th century—who won the war. And Walter, who is better known as “Rookie,” has a home full of plaques and pictures that reveal the importance of his service in World War II to his life.

Rookie landed on Utah Beach, Normandy, France, in June 1944—some 68 years ago—and served across France and Belgium and into the heart of Germany during the war. While he was gone, he wrote to his sweetheart Claire (whom he later married); those letters document his service and contributions and describe some of his unique experiences during the war.

One of Rookie’s most memorable wartime events was what he called the “Mission of Mercy,” which took place just a few days after D-Day. While he was stationed with the 783d Military Police Battalion in the small French village of Sainte-Marie-du-Mont, a French woman was wounded by a grenade that had been thrown into her home during the fighting. Infection set in, and volunteers were sought to take the woman to the hospital in Carentan for treatment. Although the fighting between the Americans and Germans in the vicinity of Carentan was intense and the status of the town was unknown, Rookie volunteered for the job. So in the dark of night, while the fight was still raging, Rookie—accompanied by his friend and fellow military policeman, Cecil Morris—set off with the woman and her family members in a small, horse-drawn carriage. Rookie could not help but notice that, in the square against the church walls, were two separate piles of bodies—one pile of German bodies and one pile of American bodies—each stacked 5 feet tall. At the hospital, the travelers rang a bell to get someone’s attention. The gate slowly opened; and they were greeted by a “peg-legged Frenchman,” who profusely thanked the Americans, hugging them and offering them wine. Nurses quickly came and took the woman into the hospital for treatment. Within minutes, Rookie and his friend were back in the carriage and back off to Sainte-Marie-du-Mont. They were stopped and challenged several times by the 101st Airborne troopers. Rookie’s Mission of Mercy was never officially recognized—and neither was the courage that it took to complete the mission, which involved crossing lines in the middle of combat at night.

However, neither history nor the French family involved in the incident have ignored or forgotten the events that occurred. In 1984, Rookie received word from family members who remembered and thanked him for his mission. And the authors of the book Rendezvous With Destiny: History of the 101st Airborne Division describe the incident from the perspective of the 101st paratroopers who were observing and listening from the edge of town: “The lone cart had crossed the causeway from [Sainte-Côme-du-Mont], missed the right turn at the end of the causeway [Writers’ Note: The cart had not missed the turn; the French driver knew where he was going.] and in the small hours of the night, had continued on the highway to Carentan. In the deserted center of the town, the only sounds outside those of the perimeter’s fighting were the horse’s hooves and the steel tires on the cobblestone. Fires, unfought, burned in various sections from the phosphorus shells lobbed in by the 4.3-inch] chemical mortars and naval guns. In the center of town, the horse stopped.

**So in the dark of night, while the fight was still raging. Rookie—accompanied by his friend and fellow military policeman, Cecil Morris—set off with the woman and her family members in a small, horse-drawn carriage.**
The Soldier driver [Editor’s Note: The 101st paratroopers mistakenly assumed that the driver was a Soldier]—suspecting that he might not be in the right place—began to feel conspicuous in the still-deserted town square. Suddenly, the unnatural silence was broken. In the duffel on the cart, a forgotten alarm clock began ringing—the sound echoing among the stone buildings.” The “alarm” was undoubtedly the hospital bell, which Rookie had rung in hopes that someone would open the gate.

Following the Invasion of Normandy, Rookie served as a military policeman on the Red Ball Express—the famous convoy system responsible for the delivery of more than 12,500 tons of supplies from the beaches to the front lines each day from August to November 1944. Military police were a critical component of the movement of traffic along the supply routes. As a private first class, Rookie often performed these duties with no direct supervision—taking the initiative when required, moving forward as necessary, and making decisions and acting in his best judgment, even if those decisions and actions were unpopular with higher-ranking Soldiers who were using the route.

In the latter part of 1944 and early part of 1945, Rookie moved with the Army across France and into Belgium—just in time for the Battle of the Bulge. Like so many other Soldiers, Rookie remembers that winter as the coldest he has ever experienced. The Germans flew in low and strafed the town and the railway lines nearly every night. Explosions were common. One night, just as a German fighter plane banked and began to strafe the town, Rookie ducked into a hotel at the same time a Belgian woman was attempting to get out. Rookie knocked the woman down with the butt of his rifle, and they collapsed in a heap. Fortunately, the German bullets missed them both. Another time, the strafing ignited a house fire; and the family—who had no idea what was happening—watched incredulously as Rookie dashed through the door of the home, grabbed a kettle from the stove, ran up the stairs, and put out the fire.

One day, while Rookie was manning a traffic control point, a German plane was shot down and a parachutist descended. Soldiers, bent on revenge, ran toward the German pilot. Rookie managed to restrain them from shooting the prisoner (whose only weapon was a flare gun) and convince them to give him up to the military police. Noticing that the prisoner had a shoulder injury, Rookie took him to the medical aid station, a railroad car, for treatment.

During the Battle of the Bulge, there were incidents in which Germans wore American uniforms and infiltrated American lines. Although some of the offenders were caught and executed, a significant scare swept through American lines. American Soldiers exercised extreme caution. Individuals who looked suspicious or were from units not known to be assigned to the area were questioned. To ascertain their correct status, military police asked questions that average Americans—but not Germans—would be capable of answering, such as “Who is Mickey Mouse’s girlfriend?” and “What is the Brooklyn baseball team called?” It was during this time of heightened suspicion that Rookie nearly caused an international incident.

As Rookie was manning a traffic control point during the Battle of the Bulge, a German convertible that had been repainted olive green and had two stars on it approached the intersection. The two men in the car were dressed strangely and were wearing old-fashioned leather pilot hats. Rookie signaled for the two suspicious men to halt, but the car sped off. Rookie stepped to the side and raised his rifle, but because there were Belgian civilians in the area, he held his fire. He ran to his radio and notified the military policeman at the next traffic control point to stop the conspicuous vehicle. Within an hour, the vehicle had been halted and an infantry patrol had escorted it to Gembloux. Rookie was ordered to report to the hotel where the men were being interrogated. When he arrived, he saluted the captain who was conducting the hasty investigation and the captain asked, “Are these the men who did not stop when you ordered them to do so?” “Yes, Sir,” Rookie replied. “Well it’s a good thing you didn’t shoot at this fleeting car, as you would have caused an international incident,” said the captain. “How is that?” asked Rookie, who was puzzled. The captain explained that the two men were the Belgian ambassador to Mexico and his brother, who had just returned to Belgium to visit their family. As Rookie turned to depart, he asked the captain if he could say something to the men. The captain—perhaps expecting Rookie to apologize to them—said, “Sure. Go ahead.” But, rather than apologizing, Rookie looked at the two men in the eyes and said, “In the future, if an American [military policeman] ever signals you to stop, you better stop because the next time, you might not be so fortunate.” With that, he saluted, did an about-face, and returned to his post at the traffic control point. He never heard another thing about the incident.

After the war, Rookie returned to the United States, got married, raised a family, and became a successful businessman. Today, he lives a quiet life in a small New Jersey town with his lovely wife Claire (pictured here with Rookie and his mother)—his sweetheart who formerly sent him not only letters, but also a woolen hat-mask that helped fight the cold in the Ardennes region of Belgium. Like so many of the Greatest Generation and the more than 200,000 military policemen who served during World War II, Rookie’s selfless service to our Army and our Nation is an inspiration to the Military Police Corps Regiment today. His period of service was marked by sacrifice and genuine...
devotion to duty. He is proud of that service, and we are proud that he served as a U.S. Army military policeman.

It is with great pleasure and anticipation that Walter “Rookie” Pruiksma plans to join in the activities commemorating the 71st anniversary of the Military Police Corps as an active component of the U.S. Army, which are to be held during Regimental Week at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in September. I am sure that he will have many stories and memories to share.

Endnotes:

1The Greatest Generation is a term that was originally used by journalist Tom Brokaw to describe the generation of individuals who grew up in the United States during the Great Depression and then went on to fight in World War II or materially contribute to the war effort from the home front.

2D-Day refers to 6 June 1944—the beginning of the Allied invasion of Normandy.


Reference:

Personal interview with Walter “Rookie” Pruiksma, 2 March 2012.

Mr. Christianson is the U.S. Army Military Police School historian.

Under the proposed manning, one company would be able to support both garrison missions and the number of line companies per battalion could be decreased from four to three—leaving one for garrison operations and two available for deployment without a loss of capabilities.

These proposed changes would result in a more streamlined, versatile Military Police Corps. Military police battalions would be more efficient and effective when conducting garrison missions. The addition of MPI assets at the company level and CID assets at the battalion level would streamline the unity of command for LE. And having the existing military police battalion, rather than a CID battalion, provide administrative support to the CID detachment would remove 290 redundant billets across the Military Police Corps. The other suggested company and battalion level changes would also conform to the realities of a downsizing force, lowering the total strength per battalion to 709 personnel—down from the current modified table of organization and equipment strength of 745 (four line companies and a headquarters and headquarters detachment [HHD]). Finally, with the use of organic leaders, the teams, squads, and platoons would be better task-organized to conduct LE operations.

The integration of additional investigative assets into the company and battalion would also create a more versatile force for the combatant commander during deployment. Internal company MPI assets would allow company commanders the opportunity to disperse investigative experience as necessary throughout the mission. For example, MPIs could be attached to quick-reaction force squads for site exploitation or MPI teams could be sent to augment a platoon conducting host nation police training. When deployed, the CID detachment would add the expertise of the most skilled investigators within the Military Police Corps to the battalion commander’s arsenal. The CID agents would provide the capability to conduct forensic analyses of sensitive sites; disrupt criminal organizations that fund, support, and conduct insurgent activities; and train host nation police on advanced LE techniques. This reorganization of the Military Police Corps would enable companies and battalions to leverage the unique military police skills of a smaller, more effective force to support combatant commanders and secure a place for the Military Police Corps as a relevant force on the modern battlefield.

Endnotes:


2Ibid.

3Ibid.

Captain Franzosa is a plans officer with the 91st Military Police Battalion, Fort Drum, New York. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from the University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio.
How would you handle an emergency situation inside a correctional facility? This is a very serious question about a situation that should not be taken lightly. Do you have an emergency response team ready to quickly and efficiently react to such a situation; and if so, does the team have the equipment and technology necessary to be successful? Numerous emergency situations, ranging from riots to hostage crises, occur inside the walls of correctional facilities every year.

It is difficult to believe that such serious incidents are so prevalent inside structures that are supposed to be free of violence and where rehabilitation is supposed to be taking place; however, statistics show that emergency situations are actually fairly common. It is not a matter of whether these situations will occur, but when. Will you be caught unaware, or will you be ready to react accordingly?

On 3 May 2012, the 508th Military Police Battalion (Internment/Reintegration), Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, sent a corrections emergency response team (CERT) of eight Soldiers and leaders to Moundsville, West Virginia, to train and compete in the annual West Virginia Department of Corrections Mock Prison Riot, which is held at the old West Virginia State Penitentiary. The mock prison riot is a series of scenarios made up of a combination of technical and tactical training opportunities placed inside a real-world penitentiary setting. This year’s field of teams included many civilian law enforcement agencies from across the United States, Canada, and Australia. In addition, many of today’s leading law enforcement and corrections technology developers were on hand to model new developments.

The weekend started with the team competition, which included an obstacle course; pistol shoot; compound search-and-clear scenario; restore-order scenario; and low-light, active-shooter scenario. The object of the obstacle course was for the team to complete the course in the least amount of time possible—a feat that required a lot of stamina and upper-body endurance. For the pistol shoot, the team entered the range and each member drew a number from a hat. The numbers corresponded to numbered targets set at varying distances. Each team member had the opportunity to shoot one round from a Glock 17 pistol at their designated target. The scenarios were very simplistic in nature; and although tactical movement was highly encouraged, Soldiers were evaluated on speed and efficiency. All scenarios began the same way—with the teams receiving a situation report while outside the penitentiary and then rushing into a low-light area of the building. There were different objectives for the various scenarios, which included eliminating a target and rescuing hostages. Some of the scenarios required that the team don protective masks and even squeeze through small ventilation shafts.

Following the team competition, the best personnel from each team were selected to compete in the individual Super SWAT Cop competition. This contest involved rerunning the obstacle course (carrying a 100-pound dummy over a few
obstacles), participating in a stress shoot immediately following the obstacle course, running a 100-meter dash with the 100-pound dummy, and participating in a controlled pistol shoot. The competitors demonstrated exactly what law enforcement and corrections officers are called upon to do on a daily basis—perform under the harshest of conditions.

Once the head-to-head bouts were finished, participants enjoyed some of the vendor displays, classes, and training that were offered. The vendors exhibited new tactical armor, riot shields, weapons, holsters, cameras, and nonlethal equipment and technologies. Participants had a chance to test the new developments, and vendors held classes for individual certification.

In between taking classes and learning about new technologies, the teams developed their own specialized scenarios, including compound search-and-clear, active-shooter, and riot scenarios. With the help of college students serving as role players, the teams worked through these scenarios. Each team watched the other teams, highlighting successes, identifying mistakes, and gaining valuable training tools for the future.

Members of the 508th CERT focused on a few important lessons learned throughout the event. We noticed that, in some cases, the teams engaged in unsafe practices. For example, team members might enter a building from multiple locations, surround the threat, and fire on the enemy until the enemy cowered to the ground. Based on this scenario, we concluded that entering the building at a single location would help the team drive the threat into any position and it would also be a safer approach.

We also concluded that it would be best for the shield man to face the fatal funnels (or the most likely avenue of approach) when conducting a compound search-and-clear operation—and for the team to remain behind the shield man at all times, since he is the best protected. Communication is vital during such operations; it helps the mission run smoothly and without fault. The team leader should be the only one giving commands at any given time. Too many people talking at the same time only creates confusion for the entire team. In addition, team members within individual rooms must thoroughly communicate in order to declare a room to be clear.

When the mock prison riot concluded on 10 May 2012, the teams left Moundsville with valuable training tools, increased knowledge, and team cohesion. Each team became aware of its own strengths and weaknesses and is now better able to address them. The original purpose of the exercise was to train and prepare corrections emergency response teams for events which are likely inevitable. During the course of the mock prison riot, it became clear that preparing for something which may never happen is much better than failing to prepare for something that does.

Endnote:

The acronym SWAT refers to special weapons and tactics.

Second Lieutenant Hilderbrand is assigned to the 508th Military Police Battalion, 42d Military Police Brigade, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, where he has served as the assistant operations and training officer (S-3), assistant American Correctional Association manager, and detachment executive officer. He holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio.
As with every population, there are military members who exhibit criminal behavior. The worst of these commit offenses ranging from financial fraud to violent crimes. These individuals are often incarcerated at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or at one of the U.S. Army Regional Correctional Facilities (USARCFs).

The primary mission of the 67th Military Police Company (Internment/Resettlement [I/R]) involves providing trained and ready I/R specialists to conduct corrections operations at the USARCF located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, and upon order, deploying worldwide to provide I/R battle command for theater level operations. All I/R companies conduct corrections operations; therefore, the challenges they face mirror those encountered by the 67th Military Police Company when conducting training.

Corrections operations are manpower-intensive operations by nature; a Soldier presence is required 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. The creation of a standard duty schedule in which Soldiers work 8 hours per day, 5 days per week, and still conduct physical training requires the establishment of multiple shifts, which in turn, quickly decreases the number of Soldiers available for training. Furthermore, in addition to the Army-required training, the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks and all USARCFs are accredited through the American Correctional Association, which means that I/R companies must also conduct American Correctional Association-specified training. The combination of these factors leaves the 67th and most other I/R companies in the dilemma of trying to balance their corrections and training requirements against the well-being of their Soldiers.

Striking a balance between mission requirements and Soldier well-being is a battalion level challenge. The 67th Military Police Company and its higher command—the 508th Military Police Battalion (I/R)—have overcome time constraints by using various training management methods designed to increase the number of Soldiers available and the number of hours they are capable of working, which in turn, creates more time for training. The first and simplest of these methods can be implemented by cutting out physical training once a week and dedicating that 1–2 hours to other training instead. The additional training time generated may seem inconsequential for the near term, since it is not sufficient to allow for large-scale collective training events. However, if the additional time is dedicated to individual training (preliminary marksmanship instruction or training outlined in Soldier Training Publication [STP] 21-24-SMCT, Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks: Warrior Leader Skills, Level 2, 3, and 4, or Army Regulation [AR] 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development), larger blocks of time can be used for squad level and higher collective training.

While this weekly opportunity allows companies to integrate individual training into an already tight training schedule, it can become resource-intensive. Furthermore, a separate training event is required for each shift. As a result, the company operations and training section (S-3) can quickly
become overwhelmed. The 67th Military Police Company has discovered that, by integrating the American Correctional Association-specified training (which often consists of classroom instruction), the operational tempo can be moderated via the creation of localized training cycles.

The 67th Military Police Company has also discovered that, in conjunction with requiring Soldiers to work 1–2 hours before or after their facility shift, the additional weekly training time allows the company to conduct qualification ranges for individual and crew-served weapons. Using the customary “days, swings, and midnight shift” model, members of the headquarters platoon can serve as range cadre, running a zero/qualification range within the standard duty day. Soldiers can qualify before or after their 8-hour facility shift. While this approach is less than ideal for maximizing the number of Soldiers who qualify, the method ensures that every Soldier within the company receives training. And, although it requires more of the Soldiers’ time, it provides them with some stability and predictability and minimizes the impact to their weekly work schedules.

Most of the individual training needs of the 67th Military Police Company can be adequately addressed through the replacement of physical training once a week. However, despite this increased training time, longer periods of time are needed for higher-level collective training. With the help of the 508th Military Police Battalion, the 67th Military Police Company addressed this problem in two ways:

- Transitioning to 12-hour shifts for 1 week per quarter.
- Increasing the number of available Soldiers.

The unique conditions of the USARCF at Joint Base Lewis-McChord allow the 67th Military Police Company to pull two squads from the facility shift rotation so that their time may be dedicated to training. While this method requires that some Soldiers work 12-hour shifts, it allows each of the eight squads to participate in 1 full week of training during the calendar year. The focus of the training can be placed on those team and squad level collective tasks that could not otherwise be addressed during the shorter training periods created in lieu of physical training. Through a combination of these two approaches, the 67th Military Police Company can maintain the current training assessment and minimize the decline of company combat readiness. While it would be possible to expand these week-long training cycles, commanders should be aware that this would create additional stress for those Soldiers working 12-hour shifts.

Although the implementation of these training management methods helps the 67th Military Police Company sustain the current training assessment, the ability to progress and improve upon that assessment required an increase in the number of Soldiers available to train—which in turn, required battalion level support. The current modified table of organization and equipment for the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 508th Military Police Battalion, includes several compound enclosure teams comprised of I/R specialists. These teams support the battalion during deployment; however, they are fully capable of integrating with the 67th Military Police Company and supporting the USARCF during garrison operations. With the approval of the 508th Military Police Battalion, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 67th Military Police Company have pooled their resources to meet the manning requirements of the USARCF and to allow for the continuous training of one squad throughout the year. This opens a myriad of training opportunities; but more importantly, it provides the 67th Military Police Company with the ability to create a long-term, sustainable training plan that builds upon itself, thus improving the training assessment while minimizing the impact to Soldiers’ families.

Taking the concept of creating more manpower a step further, the S-3 of the 508th Military Police Battalion is coordinating with local I/R Army National Guard units within the greater Joint Base Lewis-McChord area in an attempt to integrate the 508th with the Army National Guard units during their annual 2-week training. This would provide Army National Guard units with the training necessary to work within the USARCF and provide an opportunity to deal with a true U.S. military prison population. The Army National Guard unit would, in turn, provide the additional manpower needed for the 67th Military Police Company to free up multiple squads for a platoon or company level field training exercise. This is no small undertaking; the 67th Military Police Company and the 508th Military Police Battalion must overcome numerous obstacles. However, if the partnership is successful, the 67th Military Police Company will have the opportunity to conduct a field training exercise while simultaneously providing I/R specialist support to the USARCF.

There is a solid plan in place to address the training needs of the 67th Military Police Company. The plan spans the continuum from company-implemented methods that address individual and squad training requirements to battalion-implemented efforts to free up and create additional manpower for platoon and company level field training exercises. While the plan demands more of our Soldiers’ time, it does not do so in excess. As with any plan that requires an increase in the number of hours a Soldier spends on duty, commanders at all levels must assume additional risk. However, this risk can be mitigated by controlling the number of training events, thus striking the balance needed to complete the mission and take care of Soldiers. The end result is that Soldiers receive the high-quality training they need and deserve.

References:

AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, 18 December 2009.


Captain Moe is the commander of the 67th Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor’s degree in international relations from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, and a master’s degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.
INTERROGATIONS: Are They Getting Their Due?

By Chief Warrant Officer Two Walter D. Smith

The U.S. Army has some of the most talented and dedicated criminal investigators in the world. But the work done by U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) agents and military police investigators (MPIs) often goes unnoticed and unrewarded by the rest of the Army. Consequently, we are left only with each other and the hope that we are making a difference.

Investigators must deal with constant challenges, such as continuous changes in investigative techniques (resulting from improved technologies) and new administrative requirements (which involve significant time, leaving less time for day-to-day training and mentorship). However, one of the most important areas of the military police profession that cannot be allowed to suffer is the area of interrogations.

While it is sometimes possible to solve a crime and secure a prosecution without the advantage of a confession, success in these areas often depends on the results of an interrogation. Contrary to common television portrayals, physical evidence is sometimes just not available; testimonial evidence may be all that can be obtained. Whereas physical evidence can be held indefinitely, investigators generally get only one chance to discern the truth through interrogation. Despite the significance of interrogations, competing interests—such as heavy caseloads and extra administrative requirements—often lead to reduced CID and MPI emphasis on interrogation.

Most Soldiers who become CID agents or MPIs have no previous experience in conducting interrogations. Most who become CID agents have no military police experience, and many who become MPIs have no previous experience working the law enforcement mission. However, regardless of previous experience, new investigators receive nearly a month of excellent interrogation instruction during their initial training as investigators. Students are instructed in all facets of interrogation when attending the Military Police Investigations Course or CID Special Agent Course at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Following the completion of these courses, investigators are sent to their respective offices with the realization that the honing of their skills will require much practice and real-life experience. But we must ask ourselves whether we are providing the continued training and mentorship necessary to ensure that these new investigators are as successful as possible.

Although brand-new investigators have recently completed rigorous crime scene training, they do not process crime scenes alone. And their reports are not approved without careful scrutiny. While other vital areas of the profession are commonly developed using a crawl-walk-run methodology, when it comes to critical interrogations, brand-new investigators are often thrown straight into the fire. Although some may have a natural ability, the intentional initiation of a direct confrontation with another individual is a very unnatural experience for most people. Most require guidance from experienced investigators to become proficient and comfortable with the interrogation process.

But is the role-play method that is currently used in training really enough to prepare Army investigators for initial interviews and interrogations? Unfortunately, there is simply no substitute for the real thing. The responsibility for guiding new investigators to becoming competent and confident interrogators falls on their colleagues and leaders, and we cannot afford to fail them.

And do fictional characters have a greater influence on Army investigators than their own leaders do? The popularity of television shows such as NCIS, Law & Order, and the various CSI series have soared in recent years. These shows are quite entertaining, but are—in many aspects—far from realistic. They typically show interrogators yelling and making threats, and they typically depict the situation ending in a quick confession; unfortunately, things seldom work out this way in the real world. Still, many young investigators use these tactics as their primary method of interrogation. When the tactics prove unsuccessful, the investigators frequently lack the skills required to handle the situation without the continuing guidance of more experienced interrogators.

It is tempting to assume that skills will come with experience. Realistically, though, without proper training, investigators develop bad habits that continue throughout their careers—and may even be passed on to others. Will an investigator who has been on the job for a few years admit that he is uncomfortable with conducting an interrogation? Not likely. The effect is even more lasting, as today’s interrogators become tomorrow’s supervisors. Because so much is riding on a supervisor’s ability to pass his or her expertise on to the investigators of the future, supervisors must be able to conduct honest assessments of their own abilities and continuously seek self-improvement.
Interrogation is truly an art form; it cannot be mastered in a year. And there is always room for improvement. Some Soldiers are naturally adept at verbal and nonverbal communication and can use various methods to get to the truth of a matter. For others, additional effort may be necessary to become proficient. Because each investigator requires a different level of guidance, a “cookie cutter” approach to training may be insufficient for some and inefficient for others. Guidance should, instead, be tailored to meet the needs of the individual.

These days, unit manpower is frequently limited. However, taking the time to devote our undivided attention to providing new investigators with the necessary guidance will pay great dividends. Therefore, we must find a way to make this a priority in our units. During normal day-to-day operations, there are plenty of opportunities for us to pass our knowledge on to investigators under our command. Not only would this benefit them through feedback about what they are doing well and what they might improve upon, but it would also relay to them the importance of what they are doing. The crawl-walk-run technique used in other areas of the profession should also be applied to continued interrogation training.

During the crawl phase, the newly assigned investigator would observe an experienced investigator conducting one or two complete interrogations. The new investigator would learn new techniques, which in turn, would help build confidence. Subsequent discussions would provide the new investigator with an opportunity to ask questions that he or she may not have thought of while training in a school environment.

During the walk phase, the new investigator would conduct the interrogation while being monitored by an experienced investigator. Before the interrogation begins, the monitor should discuss the interrogation with the investigator, suggesting themes and approaches. The monitor should then provide tips throughout the interrogation. An in-depth, after action review should be conducted following the interrogation. Honest feedback will prove much more beneficial than a simple pat on the back. Whenever possible, several different experienced investigators should be assigned as monitors so that the new investigator can gain insight into the various styles and techniques of interrogation. In addition, assigning another investigator to conduct a peer-to-peer evaluation could also serve as a very valuable learning opportunity for both individuals.

Once the monitor is confident in the investigator’s abilities, complete monitoring is no longer necessary and the run phase may begin. The amount of guidance needed by each individual will vary, so the process must be flexible. Leaders should determine the specifics of this process; however, regardless of the particular training methods used, the focus should be on the desired results—building a competent, confident interrogator.

In addition to their guidance, leaders can also provide motivation to help ensure the best interrogation possible. With today’s operational tempo, we are frequently required to do more with less. As a result, we are burdened with immense investigative and administrative responsibilities. With so many demands on our time, we often forget to give praise when praise is due. Given the proper motivation, Soldiers can accomplish great things. But if they perceive that no one else cares about the outcome, will they give 100 percent? When they know that their leaders and peers are heading out the door at 1700, will young investigators overcome the urge to “throw in the towel” and do what it takes to get that thief or rapist out of the Army?

Although leaders often intend to provide the necessary motivation, too frequently that is one of the first things left behind when the demands on our time start piling up. But we must not forget our obligation to those placed under our control, and we should seek opportunities to reward Soldiers who put forth the extra effort. Whether an award recommendation or simply a weekend pass, recognizing Soldiers for their hard work can play a big part in motivating those who give so much of themselves for their organizations.

Even with experience under their belts, Soldiers must continue to polish their skills. But are they taking the time to get further training on one of the most important aspects of their job? There are currently no advanced interviewing or interrogation courses offered at USAMPS; however, there are plenty of training opportunities available through various private companies and agencies. Local polygraph examiners are also available to assist in conducting interrogation training for CID agents and MPIs. And Soldiers should be taking maximum advantage of each other’s experience. CID agents and MPIs should be sharing their knowledge and resources through the use of joint training. The failure to take advantage of these resources means that Soldiers are missing out on some great opportunities to better themselves, each other, and their organizations.

Success in the criminal investigation profession takes hard work and dedication. The daily activities of an investigator can potentially affect people (positively or negatively) for the rest of their lives. The question of whether or not justice is accomplished often comes down to the quality of criminal interrogations. It is up to the dedicated members of our field to ensure that interrogations get their due.

Chief Warrant Officer Two Smith is a polygraph examiner assigned to the 76th Military Police Detachment (CID), 11th Military Police Battalion (CID), Fort Bliss, Texas. He holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Troy University, Troy, Alabama.
As any student of military history knows, no two wars or campaigns are identical. However, there are often parallels that can benefit future leaders who are involved in similar operations. Although the campaign in Iraq has culminated, the one in Afghanistan is now reaching a peak. Therefore, it is important to capture critical lessons learned during the development of an Iraqi police force so that those lessons may be applied to similar situations in Afghanistan or locations of other future U.S. efforts. This article describes the operational environment (OE) that was facing Iraqi police services in 2010, as the rule of law emerged as a dominant line of effort; the U.S. Division–Center (USD-C) police construct designed to support the police under the “advise and assist brigade (AAB)” concept; support mechanisms designed to complement key capabilities; and specific operational lessons learned.

Operational Context

As the 1st Armored Division (AD) assumed control of USD-C (formerly known as Multinational Division–Baghdad [MND-B]), initially encompassing Baghdad in January 2010, the United States was in its seventh year of conflict in Iraq. Providing security for the upcoming Iraqi national elections was the most immediate critical operational task facing the force; the force was also responsible for the continuing task of improving Iraqi Security Force (ISF) capabilities to fully transition security responsibilities from U.S. to Iraqi forces. Significantly reduced violence, an increasingly capable ISF (particularly the Iraqi army), the security agreement from U.S. to Iraqi forces. Security agreement between the United States and Iraq, and directives from U.S. political leaders led to sizable U.S. troop reductions across Iraq. As a result, USD-C expanded to encompass Al Anbar Province (formerly designated as Multinational Forces-West [MNF-W] territory) in late January 2010; by the end of 2010, the 1st AD held an operational area that, just 1 year earlier, had been covered by two division-equivalent headquarters and more than seven brigades, with just one division headquarters and two AABs. During the same time frame, the last military police brigade headquarters in Iraq ended its mission, leaving all police operations and support to the divisional landowner. Until this point in the campaign, police professionalism had been the domain of a single, separate corps military police brigade on an annual rotational basis. Divisional OE owner involvement in police professionalization tasks varied from limited to almost no participation during the course of the campaign. But now, divisions were to assume direct responsibility for police partnership at a time when Iraqi politicians were pushing for the responsibility for internal security to be transferred from the army to the police. To complicate matters, this transition was to occur while the United States executed the largest troop withdrawal in modern history, which involved the loss of dozens of National Guard military police companies full of civilian police and administrators.

As U.S. forces wrestled with force reductions and competing priorities, the ISF (specifically, the police) faced the tremendous task of sustaining security while transitioning to the rule of law. As a result, the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and the local judiciary rapidly increased their involvement in, and control of, the security process affecting the full spectrum of operations—from traditional targeting to postcapture detention. Iraqi and U.S. leaders subsequently placed a great deal of emphasis on “transitioning responsibility for internal security to the police” (TRISP—an Iraqi-generated acronym), calling for the realignment of the Iraqi army to face external threats and the placement of police in the lead role for providing internal security. Despite spending half a decade focused on force generation, the police were critically short of key capabilities such as performing investigations, collecting evidence, and conducting the police intelligence operations required to sustain success under the rule of law. Statistics from the Iraqi Higher Judicial Council indicate that, although the country-wide average conviction rate was 49 percent, there was a dismal felony conviction rate of 27 percent in Baghdad in 2009 and the rate in Al Anbar Province was slightly worse (25 percent). Baghdad and Al Anbar were ranked as two of the three worst provinces with regard to conviction rate.

The reduction of available U.S. partnership forces further compounded the stress placed on the ISF. The strength of U.S. forces was no longer sufficient to provide huge personnel resource surges against the police mission set, as was the case during the decaying security situation in 2006–2007. The U.S./ISF partnership no longer reached down to the Iraqi field battalions or companies. As U.S. brigade combat
teams departed the OE, the partnership was further reduced; eventually, only police provincial headquarters, division headquarters, key operation centers, and a few select Iraqi army brigades had a U.S. partnering unit or advisory team. As the ISF gained confidence in their ability to maintain security, they truly became responsible for their assigned sectors. Although this was a generally positive development, it had the negative effect of greatly limiting U.S. access to, and knowledge of, the OE beyond the limited headquarters and centers previously mentioned. Because U.S. forces no longer had consistent, unfettered OE access, the days of validating Iraqi tactical information with information independently developed by U.S. ground forces were largely over.

**Design of the Police Partnership Construct**

With the departure of the 49th Military Police Brigade in June 2010, the 1st AD assumed the operational police advise, train, and assist mission. To effectively place assets against the mission, the division analyzed three facets—the desired end state for the police, current requirements for maintaining security, and the ability to partner based on location and forces available. Because the OEs of Al Anbar and Baghdad Provinces were diametrically opposed, the division was forced to approach the mission as two separate problem sets. Al Anbar was an ethnically homogenous, primarily rural area facing challenges of time and distance. The police theoretically had the lead role in providing security for Al Anbar cities, with varying levels of support and involvement from the Iraqi army. At the operational level, the Anbar Operations Command (AOC), which was an Army corps-like headquarters commanded by an Iraqi army lieutenant general, had the lead for overall security in the province; however, the AOC commander cooperated closely with the provincial chief of police (PCoP), using him as his de facto deputy. At the tactical level, the police generally had the lead (with episodic Iraqi army support) in urban areas. In contrast, Baghdad consisted of an urban landscape densely packed with a multitude of ethnic factions and steeped in provincial and national bureaucracy. The Iraqi army firmly held the lead for providing daily security at the operational and tactical levels, with command exercised through the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC). Senior police involvement in Baghdad security issues was minimal.

The analysis of the first facet identified—the desired end state for the police—proved to be as challenging as navigating the densely packed streets of the capital. Nebulous Department of State (DOS) and strategic military police goals directed the establishment of a force possessing the “minimum essential capability” necessary to provide internal security. The minimum essential capability was expected to include the seven specified international policing functions of leadership, training, investigations, operations, logistics, administration, and facilities; however, the 1st AD was unable to locate any references that helped “operationalize” this concept into strategic expectations or tactical tasks. Therefore, based on specific needs under the rule of law in each province, the division developed its own minimum-essential capability standard, taking into consideration assets and the remaining time available. (See Figure 1, page 24.)

Using current operational data and historical case studies, the 1st AD quickly identified three major desired objectives for the police:

- The police need to be equally integrated into the planning efforts and operations centers with the remainder of the ISF in order to gain the mission command, intelligence, and crisis management skills imparted on their Iraqi army counterparts throughout the past 5 years.
- The police must be capable of processing crimes and effectively supporting the successful prosecution of a case within the parameters of Iraqi law. This task, often taken for granted, proved unusually complex. The transition of Iraq to a democratic entity under a rule-of-law system appeared to have been a strategic goal since the start of the war in Iraq; however, in practice, Iraq’s agencies were far from prepared to execute this task. Initial requirements to generate forces and provide basic security outweighed rule-of-law development during most of the Iraq campaign. As a result, jurisdictions, acceptable practices, and roles among the dozens of security and judicial entities were poorly understood by U.S. forces and the ISF.
- The police must be able to effectively manage the most deadly threat to the populace—improvised explosive devices—in order to fulfill the lead role for internal security in the near future. The police needed to be able to detect explosives and render them safe, which operationally translated to advising and assisting Iraqis in creating and expanding explosive detection canine (K-9) teams and explosive ordnance detachments.

During the second facet of mission planning—maintaining security—it became evident that, while the development of police programs that include K-9 teams and explosive ordnance detachments may be expected to improve long-term security, the placement of energy against these efforts could not be allowed to put existing security at risk. As a result of the withdrawal of forces, USD-C was forced to reduce the partnership to Iraqi army soldiers and Federal Police (FP) division headquarters and operations centers, with limited coverage to a few critical brigade headquarters. It was a challenge to determine how a division that was already partnered with 40,000 Iraqi army soldiers and FP could also partner with an additional 60,000 police without additional assets or any reduction in security. (See Figure 2, page 24.)

The 1st AD elected to treat the police partnership as an operational mission set nested within the support-to-ISF line of effort under the division operations and plans officer (G-3)—and not to “stovepipe” or compartmentalize the task under the few remaining military police assets (the division and brigade provost marshal cells and the two remaining military police companies attached to the AABs). The division provost marshal served as the proponent and division lead for the Iraqi police; however, the mission of partnering with the police was squarely identified as an operational task with direct emphasis from the division commander. The depth and breadth of division capacity and capability were available as support to the police. Aviation, intelligence, targeting, judicial, medical,
Figure 1. 1st AD police linkage nesting district to PCoP partnering tasks, including shaping operations, to ensure the unity of effort across echelons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directorate/District Partnering Tasks</th>
<th>PCoP Partnering Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Synchronize. Increase ISF unity of effort through the synchronization of Iraqi police operations and lines of effort with Iraqi army/FP counterparts at the tactical level.</td>
<td>1. Synchronize. Increase ISF unity of effort through the synchronization of Iraqi police operations and lines of effort with Iraqi army/FP counterparts at the operational command center level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Investigative Task Force. Assess holistic ability to prosecute crimes.</td>
<td>3. Investigative Task Force. Establish a joint investigative task force as the single lead ISF element for high-yield crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Investigative Task Force. Identify key prosecution tasks or linkages requiring improvement, and generate plans to mitigate deficiencies.</td>
<td>4. Training. Improve the use of Ministry of Interior sustainable training through the mentorship of respective training officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Training. Improve the use of sustainment training at regional training centers and police colleges through the direct mentorship of training officers.</td>
<td>5. Forensics. Support ITAM efforts to source personnel and equipment at the expansion laboratory. Facilitate Ministry of Interior forensic laboratory tours for key police leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Detentions. OE 2: Provide provincial detention facility oversight to ensure minimum standards.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brigade Shaping Operation Tasks

1. Facilitate tactical-level geographic ISF coordination.
2. Operationalize Iraqi police/FP/Iraqi army unit and district OEs, and sustain this common operating picture.
3. Mentor and ensure force protection support to government of Iraq rule-of-law key facilities.

Figure 2. 1st AD provost marshal concept sketch for the identification of high-yield police partnership efforts.
The reduction of forces in the maturing Iraq theater was not accompanied by a reduction in problems, problem solving, or efforts to improve the ISF. The injection of the AABs into the OE and the increased DOS planning for the follow-on mission had nearly the opposite effect. In Al Anbar Province alone, more than 40 4th AAB, 3d Infantry Division, field grade officers were dedicated to working on Iraqi police issues. At the same time, the Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM)—a component of U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I)—maintained a large complement of senior officers and civilians as project officers and national-level partners who focused on police. Based on host nation progress, efforts within the division were reweighted toward the police. This created a number of police partnerships across the operational and strategic environments; however, the operational troop drawdown eliminated many of the tactical partnerships as well as the ability (in the form of manpower) to place energy, assets, and enablers to service targets or support initiatives. Due to the loss of ground forces at the tactical level, issues that were once easily supported by U.S. companies or battalions no longer received the same level of response.

To ensure that assets were appropriately allocated and that efforts were sufficiently synchronized, the 1st AD established itself as the synchronizing agent for institutional training, strategic objectives, tactical problem solving, and interagency planning. The division staff adopted a systematic method for approving division ISF support. Each new request was validated based on the commanding general’s approved and published priorities, and the extremely limited support of the division was only allocated toward actions or issues that supported the desired end state. This drove a unity of effort across the OE and ensured that plans and activities were nested at all echelons. In a commander-directed effort to “flatten the lines of communication,” the 1st AD hosted weekly “police breezes” (meetings conducted over secure Internet), which involved the collaboration of all components of the police partnership architecture. Individual police training teams; battalions; AABs; division staff; and ITAM, USF-I, and DOS personnel discussed programs, issues, and requests for assistance. This open dialog proved vital in a time of limited assets, competing interests, and diminishing time available to complete the mission. The results of the police breezes were directly input into the ISF bureaus and boards provided to the G-3, chief of staff, DCGs, and commanding general. Police issues and actions were brought before the operational chain of command weekly, allowing the division to rapidly shift resources and efforts to effect change in a timely manner.

The reduction of forces in the maturing Iraq theater was not accompanied by a reduction in problems, problem solving, or efforts to improve the ISF. The injection of the AABs into the OE and the increased DOS planning for the follow-on mission had nearly the opposite effect. In Al Anbar Province alone, more than 40 4th AAB, 3d Infantry Division, field grade officers were dedicated to working on Iraqi police issues. At the same time, the Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM)—a component of U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I)—maintained a large complement of senior officers and civilians as project officers and national-level partners who focused on police. Based on host nation progress, efforts within the division were reweighted toward the police. This created a number of police partnerships across the operational and strategic environments; however, the operational troop drawdown eliminated many of the tactical partnerships as well as the ability (in the form of manpower) to place energy, assets, and enablers to service targets or support initiatives. Due to the loss of ground forces at the tactical level, issues that were once easily supported by U.S. companies or battalions no longer received the same level of response.

To ensure that assets were appropriately allocated and that efforts were sufficiently synchronized, the 1st AD established itself as the synchronizing agent for institutional training, strategic objectives, tactical problem solving, and interagency planning. The division staff adopted a systematic method for approving division ISF support. Each new request was validated based on the commanding general’s approved and published priorities, and the extremely limited support of the division was only allocated toward actions or issues that supported the desired end state. This drove a unity of effort across the OE and ensured that plans and activities were nested at all echelons. In a commander-directed effort to “flatten the lines of communication,” the 1st AD hosted weekly “police breezes” (meetings conducted over secure Internet), which involved the collaboration of all components of the police partnership architecture. Individual police training teams; battalions; AABs; division staff; and ITAM, USF-I, and DOS personnel discussed programs, issues, and requests for assistance. This open dialog proved vital in a time of limited assets, competing interests, and diminishing time available to complete the mission. The results of the police breezes were directly input into the ISF bureaus and boards provided to the G-3, chief of staff, DCGs, and commanding general. Police issues and actions were brought before the operational chain of command weekly, allowing the division to rapidly shift resources and efforts to effect change in a timely manner.

Lessons Learned

Each of the units and organizations that previously served in Iraq did so with the highest degree of professionalism, prioritizing their resources and efforts against the most significant issues faced at those points in the campaign. This article specifically highlights the successful 2010 practices of the 1st AD so that future campaigns in other environments may be positively affected.

Defined End States

At face value, the notion of a clearly defined end state may seem simple and intuitive. However, the strategic end state is often not sufficiently developed or disseminated to ensure that
stakeholders clearly understand their roles. End states should be developed in a manner similar to that used for defining end states under the mission-essential task list crosswalk, which was drilled into Army leaders during the 1990s. This system drove leaders at all levels to define the end state for a unit mission and to describe the tasks associated with the objective. Subordinate individual and collective tasks that were required to support the mission-essential task list were then cross-checked. This method of end state development is critical in designing a campaign plan that is to survive numerous operational phases and unit rotations.

As a division headquarters in its seventh year of ISF partnership, the desired strategic police end state was clear; however, the phases and key tasks required to achieve the police objectives lacked definition and acceptance across the strategic and operational framework. Unlike the mission-essential task lists of the 1990s—which were supported by field manuals (FMs), Army Training and Evaluation Program manuals, and manuals of common tasks—police partnerships are devoid of specific collective tasks and links to doctrine that could be used for campaign planning. Even the newest field manuals provide little solid baseline guidance beyond strategic concepts. For example, although the importance of police forces is described in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, neither the critical skills required by these forces nor the linkages between security, police, and the court system are fully developed. Police are discussed throughout FM 3-24,2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency; but beyond broad principles, police training is not adequately addressed. As a result, most maneuver units revert to training what they understand best—the tactical security aspect of policing; they typically do not train the advanced skills required to prosecute criminals and ensure sustained civil security.

As an institution, the U.S. military naturally gravitates toward partnerships with host nation military forces. Due to the level of threat across the OE during the early stages of the campaign in Iraq, a large number of military units were needed to provide stability and security—and the required planning for the desired strategic end state may have fallen victim to early security requirements. While sufficient, effective Iraqi army forces were necessary for combating the insurgency, these army units were never intended to remain focused on internal security. Although achieving the desired strategic end state required that police secure the populace, this element of the campaign plan received inconsistent focus and resourcing; in some ways, it seemed that security was “outsourced” to the lone military police brigade that was tasked with police development in the theater at the time. Consequently, the progression of Iraqi police capabilities did not keep pace with Iraqi army capabilities. As the security environment improved, Iraqi civilians generally expected that the Iraqi army role in policing and internal security would be transitioned to the police. However, in many areas, the transition was impeded by the lack of police capability.

The complex nature of police training makes it significantly more difficult than military training. Strategic and operational planning and execution are necessary to ensure parallel development with the military. Police must remain in their assigned sectors each and every day; it is impossible to remove all police station personnel from the OE and send them to training. Trainers are forced to visit individual stations. Therefore, unlike military training, police training is decentralized and dispersed across the OE. Furthermore, the continual development of a partnered nation often creates additional changes in police and judicial standards and practices and this information must reach individual officers, further highlighting the need for effective sustainment training at the operational and tactical levels.

Commands cannot relegate police training and development to a supporting entity. Once force generation is completed by an ITAM entity, the owner of the OE must assume full responsibility for the unit training program—just as the U.S. Army Forces Command must assume full responsibility for training when a Soldier leaves the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

**Recommendation:** For future operations, the strategic, operational, and tactical end states for host nation police should be defined and nested in operational terms during each phase of the operation. The end states should be codified in the operational campaign plan and, at a minimum, updated on an annual basis.

**Nested Police as an Operational Effort**

Immediate security requirements prevented U.S. forces from placing a significant operational focus on the police in preceding years. This rapidly became clear in 2010, as USF-I moved to set the conditions for the transfer of the police mission to the DOS. For nearly 7 years, the burden of training the Iraqi police had fallen almost exclusively to the Military Police Corps. However, the Military Police Corps could place only one brigade against this mission at any one time—while a second brigade was consumed with detainee operations. To put the workload in perspective: On average, more than 20 brigades were partnered against 200,000 Iraqi army personnel, while only one brigade was partnered against more than 400,000 police—and this was despite the existence of counterinsurgency doctrine that emphasized the importance of the role of the police in securing the Iraqi population. The effect of this lack of asset allocation was obvious across the OE. In addition, while the responsibility for police partnerships and training had previously been inconsistently delegated to landowning divisions,3 the separate military police brigade that was assigned directly to the corps headquarters actually retained the task—with limited division participation. As a result, the police were relegated to a second-class security force that did not benefit from the operational capacity, enablers, or synchronization that divisions can bring to bear upon an operational mission.

As the 1st AD assumed the police mission, the task was clearly set as an operational effort under the G-3, with the provost marshal serving as the lead staff proponent. The division commander directed U.S. brigades, battalions, and individual training teams to execute area coverage for all ISFs in their spheres of influence; this drove close interactions between Iraqi police and army elements within the same area. By elevating
Figure 3. 1st AD police partnering construct using the full spectrum of available U.S. forces to cover training, operational, and administrative efforts

the police mission so that it was on even footing with those of all other ISFs, the 1st AD ensured that the police had equal standing with their Iraqi army partners during their day-to-day interactions. The police also reaped the benefits of combined arms and enablers. Police units benefited from 1st AD aviation, engineer, supply, maintenance, personnel, and intelligence assets while the operational assessment of the police and their requirements simultaneously entered the division planning continuum. (See Figure 3.)

The commanding general of the 1st AD did not believe that military police units were the only elements that could effectively partner with host nation police. Rather, he believed that—if provided with military and/or civilian police subject matter experts—multidisciplinary STTs or nonmilitary police units could effectively partner with host nation police. This concept allowed the division to task-organize military police, law enforcement professionals (LEPs), and civilian police advisors (CPAs) throughout the AABs, creating an operational network that simultaneously supported targeting under the rule of law, forensic exploitation, evidence handling, and training. Senior military police and LEPs served as experts in facilitating Iraqi police partnerships and advanced skill development. CPAs—augmented with the limited available military police squads—supported the desired end state by executing focused training, as identified by the AABs.

The training conducted by the mobile training teams and advisors specifically addressed the low conviction rate and lack of critical capabilities impacting the sustainment of the rule of law. The tailored training that was nested within division operations included topics such as basic investigations, counter explosives, sensitive-site exploitation, and field interrogation. In the end, the departure of the military police brigade and its capabilities was more than mitigated by adding “police partnership” as an operational task assigned to the division.

Recommendation: Future host nation police development and partnership efforts should—just as any other security element—remain nested as an operational task for landowning commanders.
Rigid Enforcement of a Multiechelon
Unity of Effort

As challenging as mitigating the loss of the military police brigade was, in many ways, it was easier than trying to synchronize the efforts of those agencies that were part of the theater. And the mature theater made the task even more difficult, as there were many of projects already underway; other governmental agencies, nongovernmental agencies, and contractors were accustomed to operating relatively independently; and expectations of support were high.

There were dozens of police programs and projects in various states of development or completion in USD-C during 2010. These programs and projects were controlled by several different entities, and there was no master list of objectives or completion dates. To complicate matters, many of the projects had been created and resourced several years earlier and current units and project officers had little or no information about the initial requirement or desired intent.

Because the USF-I did not have an ISF section to synchronize the efforts, the chief of staff of the 1st AD directed the division staff to insert themselves as the synchronizing agent among all ITAM, USF-I, DOS, and landowning units, making certain that efforts were nested and complementary. The intent was to ensure consistent communication with Iraqi counterparts without repetitively engaging individual host nation points of contact. The division executed weekly police meetings via computer linkage. During the meetings, units took turns presenting briefings about their current operations and raising concerns or requests for support. ITAM, USF-I, and DOS personnel also participated, describing programs, strategic intent, and field requests. This system flattened communication lines and set a common operating picture across all echelons.

**Recommendation:** As a theater matures, operational commands should synchronize all known policing efforts, holistically manage the efforts to create unity and maximum desired effect, and publish the results of the efforts.

**Conclusion**

Our ability to accurately estimate future military requirements has proven imperfect. Nevertheless, it certainly seems that training and advising indigenous military and police security forces is a critical capability that the United States must be able to offer to strategic decisionmakers in the future. Our experience in Iraq has taught us that military partnerships are difficult, but comfortable. On the other hand, police partnerships are difficult and uncomfortable. When the issue of host nation police partnerships arises in future phases of this persistent conflict against terrorism, a clearly defined end state that places police training on even footing with military development and aggressively synchronizes support efforts under the landowning commander is imperative to ensure that sufficient, effective police forces are available at the required point in the campaign.
In the fall of 2011, the 8th Military Police Brigade, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, returned to the Republic of Korea, where it was attached to the 2d Infantry Division for the annual Warpath Exercise. This was a nondoctrinal command relationship. Military police brigades are typically assigned to corps or higher levels and serve in support roles at the theater level; however, the Warpath Exercise presented the best opportunity for the brigade to be validated as a contingency expeditionary force by the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP).

Although the 8th Military Police Brigade was required to adjust its concept of command relationships, the Warpath Exercise provided a realistic and valuable opportunity for the brigade to exercise command and control over three military police battalions. The full spectrum operations (now referred to as unified land operations [ULO]) exercise enabled the brigade staff to familiarize themselves with internal processes—specifically, the processes of targeting and planning—and to re-familiarize themselves with the brigade mission in Korea. This article contains a discussion of the experiences of the 8th Military Police Brigade in Korea, with a focus on brigade targeting and planning processes in a ULO environment.

The Road to ULO

About 6 months before the Warpath Exercise began, the 8th Military Police Brigade initiated a staff training plan and identified shortcomings in brigade structure and capability. The identified deficiencies led to a request for augmentation in two areas—targeting and information operations (IO). Through coordination with the 25th Infantry Division, the brigade acquired a targeting cell and an Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. In addition, the brigade also acquired an IO officer. Although these personnel and equipment are not authorized under military police brigade headquarters modified tables of organization and equipment, their capabilities proved indispensable to brigade operations in Korea. Despite excellent analytical and military decisionmaking process training, the staff did not fully realize the importance of the targeting and planning processes before participating in the full spectrum exercise, nor did the brigade properly integrate additional capabilities into planning and training for operations in Korea.

Background of Targeting

Although an overview of ULO targeting and planning processes was provided in the unit mission command seminar, the brigade staff was ill-prepared to tackle the complexities of these processes. Most officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) thought of targeting as an isolated process used solely for calling in lethal fires on the enemy, rather than as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of command objectives, operational requirements, and capabilities.”

Adding to the woes, many of the sectional officers in charge were new and most of the staff had never previously participated in the targeting process. Most Intermediate-Level Education graduates could not recall any discussion of the subject during their professional military education. And those who were familiar with targeting understood the process when dealing with a longer (1-week) targeting cycle, such as that of recent counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq—but not when dealing with a 24-hour daily cycle, as is the case with ULO. This faster-paced cycle was something that most senior officers and NCOs had forgotten about and few junior officers and NCOs understood.

Despite its importance to supported units, targeting has not been stressed in the military police world. Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-39.20, Police Intelligence Operations—the sole military police doctrine eventually referred to by the staff—discusses police intelligence operations and devotes a portion of the discussion to targeting. However, the discussion focuses primarily on criminal intelligence and does not include enough detail to assist with understanding and implementing the targeting process in a military police brigade.

If asked, most military police leaders would indicate that targeting applies to lethal fires and the destruction of enemy targets—not to the way in which military police plan or operate on the battlefield. They would continue by saying that targeting is only for those units that own an area of operations and have assigned targeting officers—primarily combat teams.

However, within days of the start of the Warpath Exercise, the brigade staff began to understand that the focus of targeting is not simply on combat teams planning or calling in fires; rather, targeting is an integrated, problem-solving process where problems and solutions (lethal or nonlethal, organic or outside the unit) are identified. The brigade then incorporated targeting as a cyclic planning and decision process to integrate operations within the brigade and to fall in line with the air tasking order (ATO) cycle. (See Figure 1, page 30.) The identification of problems and solutions within a 120-hour time frame and the ability to provide the brigade commander with recommended solutions for decisions and subsequent operations required an important mental leap from the brigade staff.
Execution of the Targeting Process in ULO

With the help of officers from Operations Group Foxtrot (the MCTP multifunctional brigade headquarters training team), the staff of the 8th Military Police Brigade jump-started the brigade’s cyclic targeting, planning, and decision processes. This was necessary for the integration and synchronization of the brigade plans, intelligence, and operations staffs. (See Figure 2.)

First, the staff needed to understand the battle rhythm of the division—specifically, the division targeting cycle. Key division components included a targeting working group and an IO working group. Because working group meetings were conducted on a daily basis, the unit needed to be constantly aware of the ATO cycle for 24 to 120 hours out. Although it was a struggle to stay ahead of the fight, the staff addressed this issue by simultaneously conducting daily targeting working group and targeting and operations working group (TOWG) (a combination of a targeting working group and operations synchronization group) meetings before conducting a targeting and operations decision board (TODB) for the brigade commander.

Overall, the planning and targeting cycle (Figure 3) incorporated the division targeting and IO working groups, the brigade TOWG, and a TODB. In the future, a pretargeting meeting will be incorporated as allowed by the battle rhythm.

The division’s 48- to 120-hour operational plan, which was disseminated by the Long-Range Planning (LRP) Section, and the daily support of the brigade were critical to targeting and planning. Without these resources, staff sections would have been unable to develop courses of action (COAs) for future missions or anticipate decisions required of the brigade commander.

**Working Groups**

The purpose of the TOWG is to identify and target enemy formations and capabilities according to the commander’s intent and targeting guidance and to synchronize and match sensors and delivery systems to selected targets. The brigade developed quad charts for TOWG members so that they would be aware of the inputs and outputs required and they would know who should attend working group meetings and other working group constructs.

The key to the TOWG was to start looking 120 hours out according to the ATO cycle (Figure 1), with the appropriate sections (LRP; fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; IO; and public affairs office) identifying division priorities and the brigade COA plan in support of division operations. As an example, if the TOWG for problem “X” were to be conducted on 8 December, the working group involved in the 96- to 120-hour-out period (annotated as ATO YE) would be the first to address the mission or problem and to begin the planning and problem-solving processes. During the 9 December TOWG, the ATO YE would be reviewed at the 72- to 96-hour-out period and a final concept regarding the solution to problem X would be required. The solution to problem X would continue to be revised and refined until the 0- to 24-hour-out “execute” phase was reached on 12 December. The situation would then be assessed on or about 13 December to determine whether the solution to problem X was effective.

Other key TOWG outputs include an updated higher-priority task list, updated fires and nonlethal target nominations, recommended changes to the brigade mission and commander’s critical information requirements, and a list of other required decisions (with recommended decision points).

The purpose of the TODB is to provide daily reviews, obtain the approval of brigade targeting efforts, and synchronize operational forecast and targeting guidance. The brigade developed quad charts similar to those developed for the TOWG. Beginning 120 hours out on the ATO cycle, the staff presented target nominations or other items that required a command decision (ranging from when to jump the tactical command post to modifying the task organization to support future operations). A map that incorporated decide, detect, deliver, and assess criteria was used for target nominations. The decision brief template
followed the basic military decisionmaking process model, which outlines facts, assumptions, COAs, COA criteria, COA comparisons, and COA recommendations condensed on one slide. Using the ATO cycle, the commander was briefed on the big picture (division operations, intelligence) 96 to 120 hours out and then the brigade-recommended target nominations and required decision briefs were outlined.

Target nominations were approved and sent to the division targeting working group, and any operational decisions were sent to units via fragmentary orders (FRAGOs). Upon completion of the division targeting working group, the targeting officer returned to the brigade targeting working group to determine how the unit should readress those target nominations that were not accepted by the division.

The final critical area involved the assessment of decide, detect, deliver, and assess criteria to determine whether the desired results were achieved.

Conclusion

By using the described planning and targeting process, the brigade staff managed to stay ahead of the ULO fight, improve integration into the division planning and targeting cycle, and provide the commander with the information required to make accurate and timely decisions. While this article is not intended to serve as the definitive answer regarding how to conduct targeting and planning in a military police brigade, it should provide battalion and brigade headquarters with ideas that can be refined and incorporated into their targeting and planning cycles.

The question of the identity of the targeting officer is a final key aspect for consideration. While augmentees from the 25th Infantry Division assisted the 8th Military Police Brigade during the Warpath Exercise, they will not be available to help during deployment. The criminal intelligence officer (311AO) or NCO (31D40) assigned to the headquarters and headquarters military police brigade intelligence (S-2) section may be a possible candidate. These personnel are familiar with analyzing crime (identifying the problem), targeting crime (outlining solutions), and assessing the results. Although they would require additional training in lethal and nonlethal fire platforms and capabilities, they are well prepared to adopt the targeting responsibility.

Numerous units routinely conduct targeting, which is a key element of ULO. Military police would benefit from the ability to contribute to the brigade combat team and division ATO planning cycle. Military police should talk with brigade combat teams, divisions, or the MCTP. They should also examine Field Manual (FM) 3-60, The Targeting Process, and other military publications.

---

**Figure 3. 8th Military Police Brigade targeting and planning cycle**

**Acknowledgement:** Special thanks to MCTP Operations Group Foxtrot for their contributions to this article.

**Endnote:**

1JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.

**References:**


Warpath Exercise III After Action Review (unclassified portions), MCTP, November 2011.

At the time this article was written, Lieutenant Colonel Medina was the executive officer, 8th Military Police Brigade. He is now the deputy provost marshal, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. He holds a bachelor’s degree in public justice from Saint Mary’s University, San Antonio, Texas, and a master’s degree in business and organizational security from Webster University.
Most military police Soldiers do not know that a crime scene unit is part of the Afghan Criminal Investigation Division operating within the Afghan National Police. I mentored a crime scene unit that had jurisdiction over a portion of Kabul and served a population of more than 5 million residents. The unit was comprised of more than 400 special agents who, while working with the Ministry of Interior Affairs crime laboratory, processed crime scenes ranging from robberies, to murders, to acts of terrorism.

I was assigned to the National Police Coordination Center and was responsible for the crime scene unit. I was tasked to teach special agents the basics of forensic science. The special agents assigned to the crime scene unit are some of the best that the Kabul city police have to offer. They can read and write, and they have a great understanding of investigative examinations. Most of our work involved a Level 1 field exploitation unit that captures the scene and events of a criminal incident and recovers, identifies, and preserves evidence. Given the size of Kabul and the wide variety of events that occur there, new unit members must quickly mature on the job. My job was to ensure that when we were at a crime scene, the special agents knew the basic processes and were competent in collecting and examining the evidence.

Standards

The forensics process takes place in a very chaotic and complex environment, which is only made more complicated by the constraints of security, time, and occasional media scrutiny. U.S. Army military police helped the special agents with the materials and equipment needed to successfully collect and preserve evidence—and with techniques (sometimes very simple) that helped close some of the biggest cases encountered during my 1-year assignment to this unit.

Our agents became proficient at controlling, preserving, recording, and recovering the physical evidence available at a crime scene. At times, tasks as basic as establishing inner and outer cordons, maintaining a crime scene log, and preventing unnecessary entry proved difficult. However, as our team matured and gained experience from working together, these problems were soon resolved. The agents became intimately familiar with U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) standards, which helped them to process crime scenes in a professional and thorough manner. The standards specified that the scene be cataloged and recorded in its original state before any work started. Teaching this to the senior members of the unit first was critical to providing the continuity of procedures and ensuring that a detailed record could be provided to the prosecution and defense in any resulting trial. The catalog allowed investigators room to interpret the events that had occurred, cross-check their interpretations with the facts, reexamine items that might have been missed, and look at evidence from a new angle. This was not the practice before my arrival.

Our senior special agents favored the rotation of agents through different positions in the evidence collection process. This proved beneficial when team members were fatigued following exposure to a traumatic incident. This is also a lesson for our own forces, as we have learned (at a heavy price) in environments like Afghanistan and Iraq.

The logical sequence of recovering evidence, using suitable packaging for preservation, and maintaining a detailed log followed naturally. The team was eager to receive instruction and perform their duties in a professional and responsible manner. The senior Afghan leaders and I made it clear that every step of the investigation was critical in ensuring that the correct individual was brought to justice for the crimes committed; to do this right, we could not cut corners.

Lessons Learned

The smallest piece of properly recovered evidence can make a huge difference in determining who committed a crime. Our Afghan counterparts were worried about a number of murders in our area. Our team was dispatched to assist with
an investigation where an unknown subject (UNSUB) had targeted currency exchange workers (who walk around flashing handfuls of money at potential customers); we were contacted to recover the body of one of the workers who had been killed in a back alley. We quickly realized that the UNSUB fit the description of an UNSUB who had recently carried out several similar attacks in the area. Those attacks began with the UNSUB luring money exchange workers to secluded spots and then threatening them with a screwdriver. However, the threats soon escalated to the use of a gun. After threatening the victims with the weapon, the UNSUB used the weapon to beat them over the head. Finally, in our case, the UNSUB had graduated to murder.

We collected the available evidence in the area, including a number of cigarette butts. Cigarette butts were also recovered at each of the similar crime scenes. Smoking is not uncommon in Kabul, but the recovery of cigarette butts at all five crime scenes was more than a coincidence. Once the evidence was processed, it was sent to the Ministry of Interior laboratory in Kabul. The laboratory identified DNA that was traced back to a person registered in the ministry system. The result was an arrest, a confession and, ultimately, a conviction. With this case, our newer investigators learned that criminals are likely to continue to commit crimes (and, in some cases, escalate them) until they are caught.

We collected the available evidence in the area, including a number of cigarette butts. Cigarette butts were also recovered at each of the similar crime scenes. Smoking is not uncommon in Kabul, but the recovery of cigarette butts at all five crime scenes was more than a coincidence. Once the evidence was processed, it was sent to the Ministry of Interior laboratory in Kabul. The laboratory identified DNA that was traced back to a person registered in the ministry system. The result was an arrest, a confession and, ultimately, a conviction. With this case, our newer investigators learned that criminals are likely to continue to commit crimes (and, in some cases, escalate them) until they are caught.

The Ministry of Interior Affairs and senior leaders of the Afghan National Police have a clear understanding of what they need to develop future forensic capacity throughout their organizations. During the past year, I have had the opportunity to grow as a military police officer and to learn that detectives and police officers really depend on each other. As part of the Afghan Criminal Investigation Division, I was refreshed to see that policing has no language barrier and that there will always be individuals who will risk their lives to achieve justice and closure for the family members of victims. I look at my partners and see a bright future. I am extremely proud and honored to have been part of the Kabul crime scene unit.

As my time in Afghanistan came to a close, I looked for signs of improvement in my team since my arrival. At our last crime scene, my team—under enemy fire—applied all the lessons they had learned, worked in unison, and functioned as a team. In that one event, I saw that the team members clearly understood the value, limitations, and potential of their jobs. Dealing with explosions, shattered glass, and body parts was messy; but it was clear that the team members understood that the job was to make sense of chaos.

Leaders must understand that the field of forensics deals with science, law, and policing. The best way to make sense of these interlocking areas is by understanding that shared knowledge, improved communications, and patience are the keys to obtaining the help of forensics in the pursuit of justice—even when the pursuit is attempted in the most difficult environment and in a different language.

Major Vazquez handles evidence from a crime scene.

Major Vazquez is the deputy provost marshal, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Kingdom. He holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, and a master’s degree in business and organizational security from Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri. He is also a graduate of the Criminal Investigator Training Program at the American College of Forensic Examiners Institute, Springfield, Missouri.
There were many unsung heroes among the American Soldiers engaged in combat during the infamous “Battle of the Bulge” in Belgium, December 1944–January 1945. These heroes, who represented many branches of the Army, served on the front lines and in rear areas. However, as the years have gone by, most of the recognition has been bestowed upon those men who fought in combat units from squad to army. Those who acted alone or in groups of two or three have seldom been recognized. Significant among these groups were military police, who often performed their duties by themselves or in combinations of pairs or trios.

The index of The Ardennes: The Official History of the Battle of the Bulge lists only four entries for “military police,” and two of these refer to German military police. Nevertheless, the role of military police in stopping the advance of the German counterattack was very important. And it was executed mainly by Soldiers who, among a plethora of duties, directed traffic along vital roads, manned critical posts at crossroads, guarded key installations, escorted key personnel, and hunted German spies. A closer look at the various military police duties and how they were performed reveals a clear picture of the contributions of military police to the final Allied victory in the German winter counterattack. The military police of today are still executing such duties.

Part of the reason that military police receive little recognition for their role in the fighting in the Ardennes is due to the different types of military police organizations that were engaged. For example, the military police assets of VII Corps, which played a key role in engaging and then attacking the Germans on the so-called “north shoulder,” consisted of a military police platoon; the 518th Military Police Battalion; the 437th and 482d Military Police Escort Guard Companies; C Company, 503d Military Police Battalion; and the 804th Military Police Company. But these were not the only military police organizations functioning in the VII Corps area of operations. There were also military police platoons organic to each infantry and armored division. These units, which carried no designation other than “military police platoon,” fell under the command of the division provost marshal (who was usually a major) and consisted of two junior-grade officers and about 70 enlisted Soldiers—roughly twice the size of an infantry rifle platoon. Because the military police platoon seldom operated as a unit, military police were generally not included in descriptions of units in combat—except as subjects of diverse anecdotes. Therefore, few division military police platoon unit histories exist.

In spite of this general lack of recognition, a careful culling of the literature regarding the Battle of the Bulge reveals significant military police participation. In many cases, the judgment of an individual military policeman meant the difference between the success or failure of a large formation. A hypothetical example provides some insight:

A division military policeman is manning a critical post at a crossroad through which a column of tanks must pass along the way to the front. As in the Battle of the Bulge, enemy saboteurs in U.S. Army uniforms have dropped in the vicinity of

By Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr. (Retired), PhD
the crossroad and turned the directional road signs. The tank column approaches the road junction, and the leader does not have an accurate map—meaning that the tank column could easily make a wrong turn and get lost. However, the military policeman stationed at the crossroad has the opportunity to direct the tank column along the correct route. To do so, the military policeman must be familiar with his surroundings, be able to read a map, and know where the tank column is going. The crossroad is located within German artillery range, so it is subject to periodic accurate fire. Therefore, the military policeman must also know what to expect in the way of enemy fire and he must be able to protect himself in the event that his duty station is shelled. If a tank column appears while the crossroad is under fire, the military policeman must leave shelter to direct traffic.

The level of responsibility expected of the military policeman during the days of the German counterattack is clear. In addition to performing his duties, the military policeman often braved the elements alone. He fought cold temperatures and wet conditions. And because of the fluidity of the situation during the first days of the German attack, there was a good chance that he would be required to handle a great deal of confusion as panicked units—all bent on retreating as quickly as possible—arrived at his post from various directions. The confusion could easily be exacerbated by officers attempting to intimidate the military policeman, who was trying to achieve order from chaos. It took a special type of private to inform a colonel that his unit did not have priority at a critical traffic point or to explain to the colonel that he could not properly identify himself.

An example of such a situation occurred when Brigadier General Bruce C. Clarke, commander of Combat Command B, 7th Armored Division, was on his way to St. Vith to coordinate the arrival of his troops so that they could stymie the German attack on that town. Because of a rumor that German paratroopers had landed in the vicinity and that one of them was masquerading as a one-star general, a military policeman stopped Brigadier General Clarke’s jeep. One of the identification tactics frequently used to challenge a suspected saboteur was to ask an “off the wall” question that required a specific—but not universally known—answer, and Clarke was asked to which professional baseball league the Chicago Cubs belonged. He replied by indicating that the Cubs were an American League team, and he was quickly taken into military police custody as a suspected German. Clarke’s prompt arrival at St. Vith was critical to the defense of the town, and special persuasion was required to secure his timely release. Brigadier General Clarke’s lack of knowledge nearly had an adverse effect on the war; however, the military policeman who questioned him had every right to be suspicious and act accordingly.

On 16 December, the U.S. First Army was thrown back on the defensive by the German Fifth Panzer Army and Sixth SS Panzer Army; and the U.S. Third Army soon entered the fray. The major military police organizations of the 503d and 759th Military Police Battalions quickly became involved in Third Army traffic control activities. Because the initial attack was not within the Third Army area of operations, the American counterattacking units were required to drive great distances over poor roads to join the battle. The military police battalions were tasked to direct these units to their correct destinations under confusing—and often chaotic—conditions. In one instance outside of Bastogne, military police at two control points located just 200 yards apart were sending columns that were destined for a single location in two different directions. Because these columns needed to close on towns such as Bastogne as quickly as possible, immediate action was demanded from knowledgeable, high-ranking officers.

But military police did more than simply man critical crossroads. Members of the 30th Infantry Division military police platoon performed heroic civil affairs tasks in the town of Malmedy, which was just down the road from the location of the infamous German SS troopers’ massacre of a field artillery observation battery. Although never overrun by the Germans (who bypassed it), the town was on the border of the Allied northern defensive shoulder and was thought to be occupied by the Germans. Consequently, American aircraft mistakenly bombed Malmedy four times, resulting in significant property damage and the deaths of many innocent Belgian citizens. Elements of the 30th Infantry Division military police platoon had been stationed in the town for the duration of the battle; consequently, they also found themselves under aerial attack. They did their best to help rescue survivors from the ruins and extinguish the fires. And they had to explain the inexplicable to the local inhabitants. The very presence of the American Soldiers performing their duties helped assuage the damage done by the American aircrews, who apparently never received word that the town was in American hands.

Another particularly sensitive military police task involved the search for the German saboteurs who were dropped behind American lines at the beginning of the battle. This select group of Germans, who wore American uniforms and used captured American equipment, sought to destroy critical installations and to create confusion in rear areas by turning the directional signs at crossroads. The ferreting out of these individuals—who could easily pass for viable American Soldiers—required special alertness and the ability to use special means of identification (such as that attempted in the case of Brigadier General Clarke). When word quickly spread that German soldiers clad in American uniforms were operating in the combat zone, military police used their knowledge of unique American institutions in their attempts to separate the German imposters from true Americans. In one instance, an officer from the 7th Armored Division was allowed to pass when he correctly answered, “Minnie” upon being asked the name of Mickey Mouse’s spouse. On the other hand, two war correspondents were inadvertently allowed to pass when they were stopped and asked the name of their state of origin. When they answered, “Maryland,” the military policeman asked (continued on page 46)
In just 2 years, personnel from the 93d Military Police Battalion, Fort Bliss, Texas, have led the Rio Grande Chapter of the Military Police Regimental Association (MPRA) from a dormant organization to an active one with more than 100 members. Although the reactivation of the local MPRA chapter seemed daunting at first, with help from the national organization, it was really very easy.

First, we contacted the national MPRA and asked for help in reestablishing the local chapter. The national organization sent a packet containing instructions for a simple, six-step process and samples of all necessary paperwork. The six steps were—

- **Step 1.** Fill out a petition for a charter.
- **Step 2.** Adopt existing MPRA bylaws or adopt MPRA bylaws modified to fit the needs of the local chapter. (Examples of Ozark Chapter bylaws and documents were included on a compact disk [CD].)
- **Step 3.** Staff all documents for private organizations with the local morale, welfare, and recreation organization. The morale, welfare, and recreation organization should, in turn, staff these documents with the staff judge advocate (SJA) to ensure compliance with post regulations. If the morale, welfare, and recreation organization does not staff the documents with the SJA, obtain SJA approval.
- **Step 4.** Contact the state department of revenue and obtain a tax identification number to qualify for tax-exempt status. The department of revenue will provide assistance and guidance to ensure compliance with state laws.
- **Step 5.** Coordinate with the local SJA to determine the need for an organizational insurance policy. If one is needed, coordinate with an insurance provider and purchase a policy.
- **Step 6.** Mail all documents to MPRA at the following address:
  
  Military Police Regimental Association  
  P.O. Box 2182  
  Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473  

The MPRA phone number is (573) 329-5317 or (573) 329-6772; the e-mail address is <mpra@webound.com> or <execdirector@webound.com>.

By the fall of 2010, the Rio Grande Chapter, El Paso, Texas, had been dormant for more than 3 years. While some organizational funds had been maintained, the chapter lacked the personnel and logistical support necessary to make things happen. Simply put, the organization needed leadership. In October 2010, a call for volunteers for the executive board (comprised of a local chapter president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer) went out across the battalion. The first meeting of the reactivated Rio Grande Chapter of the MPRA was held on 10 November 2010, and executive board members were elected to 1-year positions. The executive board then voted to accept the chapter bylaws, which were modified from the national MPRA bylaws.

Immediately following the first meeting, the Rio Grande Chapter petitioned the national organization for a charter. The chapter name, address, anticipated membership, and goals and objectives—along with the names and positions of the elected executive board members—were submitted. While awaiting the local charter, the accepted bylaws were submitted to the Fort Bliss SJA for legal review and memorandums for record for Statement of Civil Rights, Statement of Extremist Activities, Statement of Liability, Statement of Reimbursement, and Treasurer Orders were completed. In December 2010, the Rio Grande Chapter received a local charter. Finally, a request for tax-exempt status was submitted to the Texas secretary of state office and that status was approved on 18 April 2011.

The executive board established two clear, pragmatic goals for the Rio Grande Chapter. The first goal was to reenergize the chapter in the hearts and minds of Fort Bliss military police Soldiers. People needed to know about the chapter and consider its importance. The second goal was for the chapter to become active in the community. These goals nested well with the MPRA mission statement, which indicates that the MPRA is “a professional organization dedicated to promote
the pride, heritage, and history of the Regiment and to support the future for members, family, and friends of the Military Police.” From the value it provides its members to the service its members provide to the community, the benefits of an MPRA chapter range from college scholarships to a benevolent fund dedicated to providing financial relief in times of need to current and retired members of the Military Police Corps Regiment and Soldiers or civilians working in support of the Military Police Corps Regiment.

Because leaders of the 93d Military Police Battalion were encouraged to be engaged, the Rio Grande Chapter grew quickly. Company commanders announced upcoming MPRA functions, highlighted the benefits of MPRA, and encouraged attendance at membership drive luncheons. Moreover, the chapter actively listened to its members and encouraged personal initiative.

In the fall of 2011, a staff sergeant who was newly assigned to Fort Bliss came up with an idea for an MPRA Veterans Appreciation Day. After contacting the local Department of Veterans Affairs hospital and securing food and drinks, chapter members spent a very special day serving more than 200 veterans. Veterans of the Korean War and the Vietnam War imparted wisdom and swapped stories with the current generation of Soldiers. Based on their shared experiences, young and old connected over their military service. Veterans Appreciation Day was an incredibly successful event that led to continued relations with the local Department of Veterans Affairs hospital.

The Rio Grande Chapter continued to build momentum. More and more Soldiers, civilians, and external groups and agencies wanted to participate in the chapter’s charitable work. Donations rose, which ultimately benefited the MPRA and the community.

In the spring of 2012, the Rio Grande Chapter approved a golf tournament to financially support the Department of Veterans Affairs hospital. The chapter contacted local golf course personnel, who agreed to host the event, while a local restaurant offered to serve food at a discounted rate. More than 125 people—including Soldiers, community law enforcement partners, and personnel from local companies—entered the tournament. In addition to raising money for the local Department of Veterans Affairs hospital, the event illustrated the commitment of the Rio Grande Chapter to serving the community.

The success of the MPRA Rio Grande Chapter can be attributed to two factors:

- **Ownership.** The president of the chapter recommended that members “get people to the level where they’re asking about what’s going on—not being told about what’s going on.” A shared sense of ownership and initiative is imperative for the organization to carry on. It is clear that the Rio Grande Chapter of the MPRA cares—not only for military police, but also for the community at large.
- **Leadership.** For chapters to grow, leaders must make it happen. Senior leaders must raise the expectation of selfless service, and junior leaders must have the initiative to get involved. Like all things Army, leadership is paramount.

The MPRA is a phenomenal organization. Not only does it represent a vast charitable network within the Military Police Corps, but it also provides military police Soldiers with a way to reach out to the community. The most important thing that a chapter can do to stimulate growth is to identify new junior officers and noncommissioned officers who can generate enthusiasm within the organization. This provides the necessary base of ownership and leadership. Ultimately, a successful MPRA chapter participates in mutually beneficial exchanges not only with the Soldiers who sustain it, but also with the greater community in which it serves.

**Endnote:**


Second Lieutenant Davis is the leader of 2d Platoon, 591st Military Police Company, 93d Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor’s degree in business management from the College of Business Administration, Kent State University, Ohio.

Second Lieutenant Librande is the leader of 1st Platoon, 591st Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Catholic studies and a juris doctorate degree from the University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATTP 3-39.10</td>
<td>Law and Order Operations</td>
<td>20 Jun 11</td>
<td>A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. Status: Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTP 3-39.20</td>
<td>Police Intelligence Operations</td>
<td>29 Jul 10</td>
<td>A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander’s protection program, and homeland security. Status: Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTP 3-39.32</td>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>3 Aug 10</td>
<td>A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation (AR) 190 (Military Police) Series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. Status: Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTP 3-39.34</td>
<td>Military Working Dogs</td>
<td>10 May 11</td>
<td>A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. Status: Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-19.11 (will be ATTP 3-39.11)</td>
<td>Military Police Special-Reaction Teams</td>
<td>13 May 05</td>
<td>A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. Status: Under revision; projected for publication 2d quarter, fiscal year (FY) 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-19.15 (will be ATTP 3-39.33)</td>
<td>Civil Disturbance Operations</td>
<td>18 Apr 05</td>
<td>A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. Status: Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publication Number</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-37.2</td>
<td>Antiterrorism</td>
<td>18 Feb 11</td>
<td>A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-39</td>
<td>Military Police Operations</td>
<td>16 Feb 10</td>
<td>A keystone manual that describes military police support to Army forces conducting full spectrum operations within the framework of joint operations. It emphasizes the importance of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations and contains a critical discussion of civil support operations. <strong>Status:</strong> Under revision; projected for publication 2d quarter, FY 13.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-39.40</td>
<td>Internment and Resettlement Operations</td>
<td>12 Feb 10</td>
<td>A manual that describes the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police and other elements employ when dealing with internment/resettlement (I/R) populations. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-90.31</td>
<td>Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations</td>
<td>26 Feb 09</td>
<td>A manual that provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. It facilitates operations and employment considerations of the maneuver enhancement brigade as it organizes, prepares for, and conducts full spectrum operations. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 19-25 (will be ATTP 3-39.13)</td>
<td>Military Police Traffic Operations</td>
<td>30 Sep 77</td>
<td>A manual that addresses traffic operations in garrison and combat environments. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TM 3-39.30</td>
<td>Military Police Leaders’ Handbook</td>
<td>2 Feb 12</td>
<td>A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, I/R, law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TM 3-39.31</td>
<td>Armored Security Vehicle</td>
<td>20 Aug 10</td>
<td>A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. <strong>Status:</strong> Current.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at [http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/](http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/). Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to [usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil).
For Major General David E. Quantock (U.S. Army Provost Marshal General and former commander of the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence [MSCoE]) and his brother, Brigadier General Mark R. Quantock (Combined Joint Staff Branch for Intelligence [CJ2], International Security Assistance Force Joint Command), the recent combined military police/military intelligence mentorship of the Zone 202d Shamshad Commander, Lieutenant General Fazluddin Ayar, has served as a counterinsurgency (COIN) tactic in Afghanistan. The Zone 202d Shamshad area of responsibility, which falls within the Combined Joint Task Force 1 Regional Command–East area of operations, spans eight provinces across the North of Kabul Region: Bamyan, Parwan, Panjshir, Kapisa, Laghman, Nangarhar, Kunar, and Nuristan. The 84 districts throughout the 64,476-square-kilometer area of Zone 202d Shamshad are patrolled and defended by more than 17,300 Afghan Uniformed Police and Afghan Local Police. Key terrain includes the provincial borders around Kabul, international borders with Pakistan, Torkham Gate, Highway 7, Bagram Airfield, and Jalalabad Airfield—to name a few.

With the transition of authority, coalition forces will turn the lead for security over to the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). This will be coupled with a decrease in lethal conventional operations. As a result, the responsibility for intelligence collection and analysis will shift toward local villages and neighborhoods. Together, the information gathered through community patrolling and the enhanced legitimacy of governance achieved through the enforcement of the rule of law will greatly expand the pool of potential intelligence resources. Thus, senior leader mentors from the U.S. Army Military Police and Military Intelligence Branches have begun to focus on the training of Afghan Uniformed Police as they become the first line of defense in security stability within Afghanistan.

The 728th Military Police Battalion, based in Kabul, participated in an embedded partnership with the Zone 202d Shamshad Headquarters and staff. An integral part of the 728th mentorship strategy was to promote—through a strategic information operations initiative—current manning and training statistics, accomplishments, and the status of security improvements within the Zone 202d Shamshad area of responsibility. To do so, the unit organized a trip in which Lieutenant Colonel Ross Guieb, the battalion commander, escorted Lieutenant General Ayar to the United States, where they presented briefings at the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Associates Annual Training Conference and at U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) leader professional development training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; visited the St. Louis Police Department, where they attended briefings on organizational management, personnel, training, and operations; attended a meeting at the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) Headquarters in Quantico, Virginia; and conducted an office call at the Office of the Provost Marshal General at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.

While at USAMPS, Lieutenant General Ayar spoke to Major General Quantock (then the MSCoE commander). Major General Quantock stressed the importance of training in classroom settings and in field environments to produce a professional force capable of defeating the insurgent threat and improving the legitimacy of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan through the implementation of the rule of law. The private office call was conducted in conjunction with a USAMPS overview briefing, academic demonstrations of forensic and crime scene investigations, and field training presentations on corrections and weapons simulation training.

Brigadier General Quantock also served as a mentor to Lieutenant General Ayar and the headquarters of the Zone 202d Shamshad. Brigadier General Quantock’s Kabul battlefield circulation schedule included a visit to Zone 202d Shamshad and Lieutenant General Ayar. Brigadier General Quantock emphasized the importance of incorporating actionable intelligence into police information obtained through active community engagement. The fusing of these two types of data will help quell insurgencies and organized crime and promote an effective COIN strategy that can be executed throughout the Zone 202d Shamshad area of responsibility.

Through executive level mentorship, Major General Quantock and Brigadier General Quantock have helped accelerate the professionalization and development of senior commanders of the 202d Afghan Uniformed Police force. But to the two brothers, their contributions to the COIN fight in Afghanistan are just “part of the family business.” According to an Afghan proverb, “If you want to go fast, you go alone. If you want to go far, you go with others.”

Shona ba Shona (shoulder to shoulder).

Endnote:


At the time this article was written, Captain Lundy was the intelligence staff officer (S-2), 728th Military Police Battalion, 8th Military Police Brigade, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He is now a student at the Military Intelligence Captain’s Career Course, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He holds a bachelor’s degree in economic and political geography from the University of Hawaii.
"Whether a plan for a terrorist attack is homegrown or originates overseas, important knowledge that may forewarn of a future attack may be derived from information gathered by state, local, and tribal government personnel in the course of routine law enforcement and other activities."

—National Strategy for Information Sharing

For a variety of reasons, the U.S. military remains a high-priority target of terrorist groups. Terrorists seek to:

- Exploit the symbolic value of the target.
- Demonstrate their organizational capability.
- Delay or prevent military movements.
- Reduce the operational capability.
- Degrade the social environment.
- Disrupt the economic environment.
- Influence U.S. government policy.

**Targets**

Although terrorists targeted military personnel and civilians nearly equally from 2001 through 2011 (military personnel: 47 percent; civilians: 46 percent), a qualitative review and analysis of the data by the Antiterrorism Operations and Intelligence Cell, Office of the Provost Marshal General, Department of the Army, revealed an overall preference for targeting military personnel due to their heightened symbolic value and target accessibility (especially overseas) and terrorists’ ideological purposes of waging violent jihad against the West.

Moreover, military-associated facilities were considered for targeting more often than their nonmilitary counterparts. In addition to the devastating attacks of 11 September 2001, two later attacks also exclusively targeted civilians within the United States:

- On 22 December 2001, Richard Reid, an Islamic fundamentalist and self-proclaimed al-Qaida operative from the United Kingdom, carried shoes packed with two types of explosives onto a plane with the intent to bomb a U.S.-bound flight.
- On 3 August 2004, seven members of a terrorist cell led by Dhiren Barot planned to attack the New York Stock Exchange and other financial institutions in New York City; Washington, D.C.; and Newark, New Jersey.

**Threats at Army Access Control Points**

A small sampling of data from recent events (March 2011–April 2012) suggests an ongoing and increasing interest by likely nefarious actors to gain entry to U.S.-based Army installations and stand-alone facilities. Attempted or actual access control point breaches represented 89 percent of the reported suspicious activity, followed by surveillance activity at 6 percent and expressed or implied threats at 5 percent. (See Figure 1, page 42.) However, the data (which was obtained by the Antiterrorism Operations and Intelligence Cell through open-source or law enforcement reporting) is not all-inclusive.

Common methods used in attempts to breach access control points included using fraudulent identification, hiding in concealed vehicle compartments, and overtly bypassing security guards. An incident that occurred at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, garnered the nationwide attention of the media. In that case, a 31-year-old man attempted to access the installation and later fired at law enforcement officers during a 4-hour, off-post pursuit that ended at a nearby university.

Attempts to access stand-alone facilities typically involved the tailgating of authorized vehicles and the use of fraudulent identification. The surveillance of Army installations and stand-alone facilities was another common threat of concern due to the unknown intentions regarding the suspicious activity and the difficulties faced by law enforcement personnel in apprehending the offenders. The U.S. military and its interests continue to be highly valued targets for criminal elements, terrorists, and foreign governments; and it is likely...
that the rate of suspicious-activity reporting will increase through the end of 2012 as a result of increased citizen awareness and vigilance.

**Trends in Homegrown Violent Extremism and Criminal Threats**

Trend analyses indicate a steady occurrence of terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets within the homeland from 2006 through 2008. Most of these attacks were conducted primarily by lone-wolf attackers and homegrown violent extremists. According to the 7 December 2011 testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Reid Sawyer (director of the Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York) on the topic of “Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States” before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, while homegrown terrorists are products of the broader al-Qaeda movement, the broader movement itself derives significant benefit from attacks such as those at Fort Hood, Texas, on 5 November 2009 and on the military recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas, on 1 June 2009. At attacks on the homeland—especially against military targets—result in significant propaganda value for al-Qaeda. More than 200 major military installations and thousands of stand-alone facilities, including more than 5,000 recruiting stations, exist within the homeland, and they all adjoin civilian communities. These symbols of America’s military have repeatedly been targeted for attack. “At least 33 threats, plots, and strikes against U.S. military communities since 9/11 have been part of a surge of homegrown terrorism,” also commonly referred to as homegrown violent extremism.

**The Bigger Picture: Why Information Sharing Is Vital**

Suspicious-activity identification, reporting, and information sharing directly support the frontline defense against terrorist attacks. Responding to and investigating suspicious behaviors that may indicate a criminal or terrorist act are functions of good police work. Individual behavior and suspicious activity may not constitute illegal acts on their own; however, when examined within the context of a bigger picture, they may provide the justification necessary for police to engage in questioning, initiate a preliminary investigation, and potentially discover sufficient information to detain or arrest an individual. Military police endeavor to establish collaborative working relationships with other Department of Defense (DOD) law enforcement agencies and civilian law enforcement organizations (city, county, state, federal, tribal and, where appropriate, host nation). Furthermore, police (including the Army’s military police) directly contribute to the Nationwide Suspicious-Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI)—which, in turn, benefits the Army’s antiterrorism effort.

The NSI was the result of an enormous collaborative effort conducted in response to the 9/11 Commission Report. The goal of the effort was to develop “a standardized process whereby SAR [suspicious-activity reporting] information can be shared among agencies to help detect and prevent terrorism-related criminal activity.” The NSI reflects a heightened commitment toward a constructive role in identifying suspicious activity that may have a connection to terrorists while also strengthening the privacy of information and the protection of civil rights and liberties.

In August 2008, the NSI published a SAR cycle. (See Figure 2.) The cycle, which was adopted as a model by the Major Cities Chiefs Association, describes the steps to be followed to gather, document, process, analyze, share, and evaluate suspicious activities potentially related to terrorism.

To effectively prevent terrorist acts, we must first acquire knowledge about terrorists’ intentions, plans, and tactics. We can then ensure that this information is available to those responsible for preventing and responding to those attacks—primarily military police. Information regarding possible attack planning may be derived from many sources—some of which are not within the DOD. Therefore, information

---

**Figure 1. Suspicious activity at access control points**

---
sharing among law enforcement agencies contributes to the overall protection of our Army and civilian communities. The 8 May 2007 arrest of six radical Islamist men who had been plotting an attack against U.S. military personnel at Fort Dix, New Jersey, demonstrates how information provided by private citizens can be used to disrupt terrorist schemes. (See sidebar.)

The sharing of threat information is a critical function that supports the ability to prevent, detect, defend against, and defeat terrorist activities. Military police constitute the frontline force protecting the Army community; their tasks include policing, performing criminal investigations, and implementing random antiterrorism measures. As the principal group responsible for preventing terrorist attacks against the Army community, military police are ideally suited to collaborate and share with local, county, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement agencies. By developing and sustaining expert police knowledge regarding preventive policing practices and by using effective SAR processes and protocols, military police directly support the Army Antiterrorism Program. Moreover, by training military police in SAR initiatives and sharing relevant threat information across regional law enforcement organizations, military police enhance the ability of the NSI to support broader efforts to determine threat associations, patterns, and activities that might otherwise go unnoticed.

**Patrol Officer Training: The First Step**

Before organizations can share threat information, they must first understand the overall SAR operating environment and their place within it. Military police operating at installation and higher levels must follow a process to gather and analyze terrorist threat information. Information gathering begins with individual patrol officers, and these officers must understand the terrorist threat and know whether information should be shared with other agencies. Therefore, unit level sustainment training and professional military education should be provided to frontline personnel and leaders. Additional training is available through online resources and partnerships with accredited law enforcement agencies. For example, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, developed SAR Line Officer Training to assist law enforcement line officers in understanding suspicious behaviors associated with preincident terrorist activities; documenting and reporting suspicious activity; and protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties when documenting information. The SAR Line Officer Training is an excellent online training resource directly applicable to military police and Army leaders. The modules, which require less than 30 minutes to complete, are suitable for individual or group training (such as military police guard mount training). The training covers gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing suspicious-activity information and includes vignettes that demonstrate how “everyday police work serves as a force multiplier.” It also covers the requirements to protect civil rights and civil liberties to ensure that citizen trust is maintained. By ensuring that all patrol officers and leaders receive SAR training, military police directly contribute to the
NSI and the intended outcome of effective policing and anti-terrorism—the prevention of terrorist acts.

In this era of persistent conflict, extremists and terrorists will continue to seek asymmetric means of conducting attacks. They are expected to continue concentrating on U.S. military targets, which represent easily identifiable, relatively soft targets—especially where thousands of stand-alone facilities within civilian communities are concerned. The need to understand the threat and share relevant information remains a critical component of the Army Antiterrorism Program. Military police serve as the first line of defense against the threat of terrorist activity.

Endnotes:


2Field Manual (FM) 3-37.2, Antiterrorism, 18 February 2011.

3The Islamic term jihad refers to the religious duty of Muslims to engage in war with those who do not believe in the mission of Muhammad. The purpose of jihad is to advance Islam and keep evil toward Muslims at bay.


Colonel Vanderlinden (Retired) is a principal military analyst with the Antiterrorism Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Northern Michigan University and master’s degrees in criminal justice from Michigan State University and strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is also a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy.

Captain Makiling is a terrorism watch officer with the Antiterrorism Operations and Intelligence Cell, Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in criminology, law, and society from the University of California–Irvine.
The mission of the 508th Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement [I/R]) “Guardians” is to deploy worldwide to provide I/R mission command in support of the combatant commander for theater level operations; prepare elements and individual Soldiers to deploy in support of unified land operations; provide mission command for the U.S. Army Correctional Activity (USACA), Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; and as always, take care of Soldiers and their families.

In August 2011, the Northwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility (NWJRCF)—Joint Base Lewis-McChord was granted American Correctional Association accreditation. The facility scored 100 percent compliance with mandatory standards and 97.9 percent compliance with nonmandatory standards. To maintain these high standards, the Guardians continue to develop their relationship with NWJRCF personnel by integrating battalion assets into the facility.

Integration of Assets Into the NWJRCF

One of the key focuses of the 508th is the full integration of battalion assets into the NWJRCF. This focus is nested and aligns with the Army Corrections Command campaign plan for the direction of Army Corrections Command and Army Corrections System facilities. In addition, it meets an Army Corrections Command priority to fully integrate I/R units and Soldiers at the battalion level into Army Corrections System operations.

Battalion Staff Sections and Integration

To integrate battalion assets into the NWJRCF, the Guardians provide unique training opportunities and experiential learning for battalion staff sections and the USACA:

- The battalion adjutant (S-1) section supports prisoner postal operations in the NWJRCF. Administrative clerks provide additional manpower, which allows operations to run smoothly. This arrangement has also benefited the battalion S-1 section due to the experiential learning gained from working with prisoners in a correctional environment.
- The battalion intelligence (S-2) section provides guard force training in interpersonal communication skills, including body language, to help resolve prisoner disturbances in the NWJRCF. It also conducts vulnerability assessments of the facility to help prevent injuries to the staff and prisoners.
- In addition, the S-2 section produces a monthly newsletter for facility personnel. The most recent newsletter contained valuable information about inappropriate relationships in the correctional facility.
- The battalion supply (S-4) section supports the enhancement of the NWJRCF Command Supply Discipline Program. The supply section conducts training on proper hand receipt procedures, standardizes property inventories, and procures supplies and equipment to sustain the facility.
- The battalion signal (S-6) section assists with matters related to information technology. The signal section has provided the battalion and NWJRCF with Microsoft® SharePoint capabilities to improve knowledge management. It has also developed a Web site for the NWJRCF.
- The battalion engineers provide the capability to improve NWJRCF infrastructure. They serve as the battalion commander’s technical advisors in the areas of battalion and facility construction and repair. They take the lead and work with the installation Directorate of Public Works on all facility projects involving immediate improvements to the infrastructure of the 57-year-old facility.
- The battalion preventive medicine section provides expertise in environmental health hazards. Preventive medicine personnel conduct monthly facility inspections to ensure that the highest disease-preventing standards are met; and they assist facility personnel with clothing and bedding supplies, housekeeping, personal hygiene, sanitation inspections, water testing, and waste disposal.

Staff Training Emergency Action Plans

The battalion operations and training (S-3) section and the USACA staff continue to assist with and improve NWJRCF operations and training. Guardians and USACA staff conduct an Emergency Action Plan exercise each quarter. This training event provides the battalion staff, facility staff, units, and other agencies with an opportunity to prepare for an emergency situation that could potentially occur inside the facility.

The Incident Command System (ICS)—a key feature of the National Incident Management System—was integrated into the Missing Prisoner portion of the Emergency Action Plan exercise. The ICS, which is designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management, incorporates a
A combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure. The ICS is currently used by all levels of government (local, state, federal, and tribal) and many nongovernmental and private-sector organizations. Considering the number of organizations involved in an emergency response, the ICS capability was an essential part of the Emergency Action Plan training event.

During the Missing Prisoner portion of the Emergency Action Plan exercise, the battalion and NWJRCF staff quickly activated the Emergency Operations Center and coordinated with the I/R units to deploy search teams and apprehend missing prisoners. Using the ICS as a framework, the efforts of local and federal (military) law enforcement agencies were synchronized so that prisoners could be apprehended as quickly and safely as possible. As a result of the unified efforts of various agencies and staff, prisoners were apprehended within 2½ hours of their reported escape.

The battalion continues to explore ways to fully integrate I/R units and Soldiers into Army Corrections System operations. The integration of the battalion staff improves staff training, efficiency, cost savings, and general daily operation. Battalion leaders should be trained on the ICS, and they should provide training for the USACA staff. Furthermore, the battalion is currently working on developing new training opportunities outside the military sphere, including cross-training opportunities with local correctional agencies. This should improve NWJRCF operations and assist leaders in serving as corrections advisors when deployed in support of unified land operations. There will always be challenges, but the leaders and Soldiers of the 508th Military Police Battalion will continue to find new ways to develop expert correctional professionals.

Endnote:

Brigadier General Bell (Retired) is a former commander of the 220th Military Police Brigade, Gaithersburg, Maryland. He currently writes about various military subjects.
During deployments to Afghanistan, military police have performed missions that deviate far from those considered to be a part of their military occupational specialty. The training received by a maneuver fires and effects military police unit before deployment prepares the military police for host nation police training, area security operations, maneuver, mobility, support operations, police intelligence operations, and law and order operations. Once the training has been completed, the military police feel prepared for the deployment and confident in their ability to successfully accomplish the mission. However, once they arrive in the Afghanistan theater of operations, they may find that the mission requires them to perform more than just the military police functions on which they trained.

When the 307th Military Police Company deployed to Afghanistan in March 2011, they found that they were solely responsible for an area of operations. They were tasked to rebuild the governance, security, and economics of the Shinwar, Mohmand Dara, and Dur Baba Districts in Nangarhar Province and prepare them to transition to independence. The military police Soldiers were in charge of mentoring government leaders, government officials, and Afghan National Security Forces. The unit adapted what it had learned before deployment to Afghanistan and applied professionalism to establish a positive relationship with the leaders of the three districts of Nangarhar Province. With the help of the 307th, the Afghan districts headed down the path to independence.

In assisting with the transition to independence, the 307th Military Police Company worked to rebuild roads and schools, provide vocational training, hold security meetings, and implement a governance operation and maintenance budget for the Nangarhar Province districts. The company provided training for the Afghan National Security Forces (including the Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan Border Police, and Afghan National Army). In addition, the unit met with village elders and facilitated female engagement meetings, or shuras, for the female villagers within the districts.

During the shuras, the Afghan women were trained regarding The Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which went into effect in August 2009. In addition, a variety of other topics—including women’s rights, female education, security, and health care—were also discussed at the shuras. To capture the issues, the women completed written surveys regarding education, marriage, and violence. Through the discussions and the results of the survey, the 307th Military Police Company gained an understanding of the problems faced by Afghan women.

Several startling facts came to light during the shuras. For example, it was revealed that most Afghan women are forced into marriage. Many girls get married at the age of 11–14 and have their first child at the age of 13–16, and many women reportedly give birth to eight children. Due to the constant wars in Afghanistan, many of the women surveyed are now widows. These women tended to view their husbands’ deaths as a bridge to freedom; however, they now have very little means of providing for their families.

The education level of the women surveyed was only at the 5th grade. There is little emphasis placed on the value of education in Afghanistan, and there is a huge lack of concern for female education in southeast Nangarhar Province. An estimated 17,809 girls between the ages of five and 12 attend one of 20 primary schools throughout the three districts. However, males are not allowed to teach females above the primary school level and there is a serious lack of female teachers available to educate the girls of Nangarhar Province. Only 612 females attend one of two high schools in existence among the three districts. Not surprisingly, many of the Afghan women do not believe that education leads to a better way of life.

The capabilities of a military police company are beneficial in serving as a mentor to the districts in Afghanistan. The 307th Military Police Company’s successful participation in the shuras was due to the female military police officers assigned to the unit. These officers heard the issues, concerns, and needs of the female villagers; and this enabled the unit to facilitate the governmental and Afghan National Security Force leader responses in order to better serve the villages. The 307th Military Police Company used the training they received—in conjunction with their maturity, professionalism, and life experiences—to assist the Shinwar, Mohmand Dara, and Dur Baba Districts along the road to independence.

Endnote:

1The Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 1 August 2009.

At the time this article was written, Captain Toth was the commander of the 307th Military Police Company. She holds a bachelor’s degree in psychology from The Ohio State University and is working toward a master’s degree in education from Franciscan University of Steubenville, Steubenville, Ohio.
Religious Support Operations Volunteers in a Correctional Environment

By Chaplain (Major) Darren K. Coleman

"Chaplain, no one cares! My unit doesn’t care! My wife is now divorcing me! There is no one, Chaplain, no one! Nothing can help me."

—Anonymous prisoner

The U.S. Army Regional Correctional Facility (USARCF) religious support mission enhances the spiritual and emotional sustainment of incarcerated personnel by promoting rehabilitation, redemption, and reduction of negative behavior. By building a robust, engaging religious support program with a team of volunteers from diverse backgrounds to achieve these objectives, prisoners can transform and improve their lives. This article focuses on why religious support volunteers effectively augment programs; how the volunteer program is implemented at the USARCF at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; and why command support for volunteers is essential.

Religious support operations volunteers from the local community play a crucial role in increasing the scope, quality, and effect of a ministry in a correctional facility. This directly affects the lives of the prisoners in significant and positive ways. Army Regulation (AR) 165-1, Army Chaplain Corps Activities, states that the duty of a chaplain is to ensure the free exercise of religion within the command so long as it doesn’t affect the health, welfare, safety, or mission of the unit. The chaplain performs religious services, rites, and sacraments or secures equivalent treatment if unable to meet some of the specific faith requirements of individual Soldiers.

In a correctional setting, prisoners cannot leave the facility to worship as they desire. Yet, they still have an inherent right to worship according to the dictates of their own conscience—so long as their practices do not violate regulations. Therefore, local community resources can greatly enhance accommodations.

Community volunteers also offer prisoners a connection that they may not be able to establish with individuals in uniform. Some prisoners may view the Army chaplain in the same light as the “green suiters” who threw him in prison, took his pay, and gave him a bad conduct discharge (or worse). As a result, some prisoners have lost respect for and confidence in the military system and its leaders and find it difficult to fully confide in the chaplain. Therefore, military correctional chaplains rely heavily on volunteers to help provide quality spiritual mentorship and on role models to help prisoners work through their issues and effectively transition to the “outside.” Similar situations exist at state and federal correctional facilities. Thus, the American Correctional Association requires that facility chaplains use local community clergy resources with diverse backgrounds.

The use of community resources also builds relationships between the military and the community and encourages collegiality between the two entities. This is significant as both entities strive to curb the issues and challenges that affect the local area as a result of a large population of Soldiers and family members. The diverse volunteers support various USARCF weekly worship services, devotionals, choir practices, movies with a message, bimonthly concerts, and prayer breakfasts. They also assist with religious education and rehabilitation programs such as spiritual wellness classes and marriage and family relations classes. Finally, certain clergy also provide additional pastoral care visitation to prisoners as coordinated by the chaplain. On average, more than 115 volunteer hours are logged at the USARCF per month in the areas of services, programs, and pastoral care.

There are three required steps for those who want to serve as USARCF volunteers. First, volunteers must be cleared for entry through the approval of a security form. Next, volunteer clergy must submit endorsement letters, licenses, or certifications from their denominations and must provide documentation of prison ministry training comparable to clinical pastoral
education to teach rehabilitation classes. After the initial receipt of approval (and at least annually thereafter), volunteers must receive facility training in standards of conduct, safety and emergency procedures, and orientation in ministry to prisoners. The curriculum also includes the following topics:
- The impact of prison culture and lifestyles on ministry.
- Prisoner manipulation.
- Basic crisis-counseling techniques.
- Suicide prevention.

The American Correctional Association also requires that those who have regular, close contact with prisoners above and beyond participation in a weekly service complete 16 hours of training annually. This includes teaching classes, visiting those in segregation, and providing pastoral counseling. Fulfilling these requirements may seem burdensome, but volunteers willingly comply because they love the ministry and are concerned for the prisoners.

Finally, command support is crucial in implementing effective religious support operations. A command’s positive attitude about, and response toward, these programs and volunteers make a significant difference in maintaining smooth religious support operations. An expression of gratitude toward these diligent, unpaid workers goes a long way—especially for those who willingly give up precious family time or travel great distances to encourage prisoners. This, in turn, directly affects the well-being and behavior of the prisoners. Positive leaders create successful environments, which nurture growth and development.

If used appropriately, religious support volunteers from the community provide downhearted prisoners with fresh, meaningful perspectives of connection, care, and normalcy. While volunteers do not take the place of the chaplain, their pastoral presence provides an effective outlet in meeting the unique spiritual needs of the prison population. They truly have a lasting effect on the ability to promote rehabilitation, redemption, and the reduction of negative behavior. Commanders can also improve their support of religious programs by ensuring that volunteers are incorporated as an integral part of the team. The facility staff, prisoners, family members, and general public benefit as a result of the volunteers’ willingness to serve.

Endnotes:
1AR 165-1, Army Chaplain Corps Activities, 3 December 2009.
2Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, American Correctional Association, 1 June 2006, p. 160.

Major Coleman is a former chaplain at U.S. Army Corrections Activities, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and is currently assigned to the Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas. He has a master’s degree in educational counseling and a doctorate of ministry degree. He also has 13 years of Army chaplaincy experience—three of which have been in the area of corrections.
### MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>CSM/SGM</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David E. Quantock</td>
<td>Gary J. Fowler</td>
<td>OPMG</td>
<td>Pentagon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David E. Quantock</td>
<td>Thomas J. Seaman</td>
<td>HQ USACIDC</td>
<td>Quantico, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David E. Quantock</td>
<td>Jonathan O. Godwin</td>
<td>Army Corrections Cmd</td>
<td>Alexandria, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark S. Inch</td>
<td>John McNeirney</td>
<td>USAMPS</td>
<td>Ft Leonard Wood, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandi A. Murray</td>
<td>Christopher M. Smith</td>
<td>46th MP Cmd</td>
<td>Lansing, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanford Holman</td>
<td>Kurtis Timmer</td>
<td>200th MP Cmd</td>
<td>Ft Meade, MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark A. Jackson</td>
<td>Richard A. Woodring</td>
<td>8th MP Bde</td>
<td>Schofield Barracks, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottie Carpenter</td>
<td>Gerald W. Capps</td>
<td>11th MP Bde</td>
<td>Los Alamitos, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Vereen</td>
<td>Scott R. Dooley</td>
<td>14th MP Bde</td>
<td>Ft Leonard Wood, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioban J. Ledwith</td>
<td>Steven M. Raines</td>
<td>15th MP Bde</td>
<td>Ft Leavenworth, KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad B. McRee</td>
<td>Todd Spradling</td>
<td>16th MP Bde</td>
<td>Ft Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Bisacree</td>
<td>Brenda K. Curfman</td>
<td>18th MP Bde</td>
<td>Sembach AB, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert M. Taradash</td>
<td>Dawn Rippelmeier</td>
<td>42d MP Bde</td>
<td>Ft Lewis, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David J. Medeiros</td>
<td>Joseph P. Klosterman</td>
<td>43d MP Bde</td>
<td>Warwick, RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Arruda</td>
<td>Joseph Menard</td>
<td>49th MP Bde</td>
<td>Fairfield, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert N. Dillon</td>
<td>Peter Ladd</td>
<td>89th MP Bde</td>
<td>Ft Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael White</td>
<td>Dale V. Clarment</td>
<td>177th MP Bde</td>
<td>Taylor, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel T. Nichols Jr.</td>
<td>Dennis J. Thomas</td>
<td>290th MP Bde</td>
<td>Nashville, TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therese M. O’Brien</td>
<td>Edward Simpson</td>
<td>300th MP Bde</td>
<td>Inkster, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillip Churn</td>
<td>Andrew Lombardo</td>
<td>333d MP Bde</td>
<td>Uniondale, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas H. Byrd</td>
<td>Andre Proctor</td>
<td>3d MP Gp (CID)</td>
<td>Hunter Army Airfield, GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert K. Burk</td>
<td>Timothy S. Fitzgerald</td>
<td>6th MP Gp (CID)</td>
<td>Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donna W. Martin</td>
<td>Anthony D. Mason</td>
<td>202d MP Gp (CID)</td>
<td>Kleber Kaserne, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John G. Voorhees Jr.</td>
<td>Crystal Wallace</td>
<td>701st MP Gp (CID)</td>
<td>Ft Belvoir, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John V. Bogdan</td>
<td>Michael H. Borlin</td>
<td>Joint Detention Gp</td>
<td>Guantanamo Bay, Cuba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>CSM/SGM/1SG</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sara K. Albryacht</td>
<td>Brian K. Garon</td>
<td>5th MP Bn (CID)</td>
<td>Kleber Kaserne, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey T. Stewart</td>
<td>Franklin L. Porter</td>
<td>10th MP Bn (CID)</td>
<td>Ft Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arturo J. Horton</td>
<td>Mathew J. Walters</td>
<td>11th MP Bn (CID)</td>
<td>Ft Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shannon Lucas</td>
<td>Henry James</td>
<td>19th MP Bn (CID)</td>
<td>Wheeler Army Airfield, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Russell-Tutty</td>
<td>Clyde Wallace</td>
<td>22d MP Bn (CID)</td>
<td>Ft Lewis, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Bonesz</td>
<td>Marcus N. Jackson</td>
<td>33d MP Bn</td>
<td>Bloomington, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob E. Willis Jr.</td>
<td>Michael P. Bennett</td>
<td>40th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Ft Leavenworth, KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley R. Oneal</td>
<td>Carrol J. Welch</td>
<td>51st MP Bn</td>
<td>Florence, SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guenther Pearson</td>
<td>David Burton</td>
<td>91st MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Drum, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeffrey P. Bevington</td>
<td>James M. Schultz</td>
<td>92d MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Leonard Wood, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard J. Ball</td>
<td>Timothy J. Lamb</td>
<td>93d MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Bliss, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd E. Schroeder</td>
<td>Lisa C. Pottie-Edwards</td>
<td>94th MP Bn</td>
<td>Yongsan, Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Decosta</td>
<td>Henry Stearns</td>
<td>95th MP Bn</td>
<td>Sembach, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elvis Hugue</td>
<td>Eric Mills</td>
<td>96th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>San Diego, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael L. Mathews</td>
<td>Patrick M. Quirk</td>
<td>97th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Riley, KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur E. Zegers IV</td>
<td>ThomasCiampolillo</td>
<td>102d MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Auburn, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maceri Craig</td>
<td>Scott C. Smilinich</td>
<td>104th MP Bn</td>
<td>Kingston, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren R. Wintrobe</td>
<td>Alpheus A. Haswell</td>
<td>105th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Asheville, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clints S. McIntry</td>
<td>James A. Young</td>
<td>112th MP Bn</td>
<td>Canton, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric C. Brown</td>
<td>Aaron Henderson</td>
<td>115th MP Bn</td>
<td>Salisbury, MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Crum</td>
<td>Fowler L. Goodowens II</td>
<td>117th MP Bn</td>
<td>Athens, TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javier A. Reina</td>
<td>David R. Morgan</td>
<td>118th MP Bn</td>
<td>Warwick, RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis A. Munizmartinez</td>
<td>Armando Estradamiranda</td>
<td>124th MP Bn</td>
<td>Hato Rey, PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monica Alpi</td>
<td>Rene Torresestrada</td>
<td>125th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ponce, PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvin B. Jenkins</td>
<td>Ardis Harden</td>
<td>136th MP Bn</td>
<td>Tyler, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theresa James</td>
<td>Lonnie R. Bryson</td>
<td>151st MP Bn</td>
<td>Dunbar, WV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Allen</td>
<td>John Watts</td>
<td>160th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Tallahassee, FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry L. Collins</td>
<td>Victor Watson</td>
<td>168th MP Bn</td>
<td>Dyersburg, TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Adams</td>
<td>Donald Madden</td>
<td>170th MP Bn</td>
<td>Decatur, GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Benson</td>
<td>Edward Stratton</td>
<td>175th MP Bn</td>
<td>Columbia, MO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current as of 1 September 2012
For changes and updates, please e-mail <usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.list.pii@mail.mil> or telephone (573) 563-7949.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>CSM/SGM/1SG</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clifford W. Carter</td>
<td>James Coltrel</td>
<td>185th MP Bn</td>
<td>Pittsburg, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel W. Murphy</td>
<td>Daniel F. Lawler</td>
<td>192d MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Niantic, CT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bren Rogers</td>
<td>Joseph Thill</td>
<td>193d MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Denver, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shontelle C. Adams</td>
<td>Randy Wright</td>
<td>198th MP Bn</td>
<td>Louisville, KY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael A. Izzo</td>
<td>Perry Hooper</td>
<td>203d MP Bn</td>
<td>Athens, AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodney Ginter</td>
<td>Jonathan Stone</td>
<td>205th MP Bn</td>
<td>Poplar Bluff, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott W. Hiipakka</td>
<td>Jon Sawyer</td>
<td>210th MP Bn</td>
<td>Taylor, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patric B. Conaway</td>
<td>Brian P. Branley</td>
<td>211th MP Bn</td>
<td>Lexington, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Garcia</td>
<td>Randy E. Abyta</td>
<td>226th MP Bn</td>
<td>Farmington, NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James McGlaughn</td>
<td>Jimmy Patrick</td>
<td>231st MP Bn</td>
<td>Prattville, AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bair</td>
<td>Steven S.lee</td>
<td>304th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Nashville, TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacqueline Gordon</td>
<td>Christopher Whitford</td>
<td>310th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Uniondale, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Giles</td>
<td>Gregory Minor</td>
<td>317th MP Bn</td>
<td>Tampa, FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Stanley</td>
<td>Louis Ditullo</td>
<td>324th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Fresno, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominic Wible</td>
<td>Peter Schimmel</td>
<td>327th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Arlington Heights, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Heflin</td>
<td>Joseph Plezia</td>
<td>336th MP Bn</td>
<td>Pittsburgh, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jay Pulliam</td>
<td>Keith Magee</td>
<td>340th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Ashely, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perkins M. Robinson</td>
<td>Juan J. Mitchell</td>
<td>372d MP Bn</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Keen</td>
<td>Edward Simpson</td>
<td>384th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Fort Wayne, IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerry Chandler</td>
<td>Clayton Sneed</td>
<td>385th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Stewart, GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Engelmeier</td>
<td>Richard Wieder</td>
<td>391st MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Columbus, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sean Siebert</td>
<td>Allen Freeman</td>
<td>393d MP Bn (CID)</td>
<td>Bell, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Valcourt</td>
<td>Timothy Eddy</td>
<td>400th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Fort Meade, MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randy Ames</td>
<td>Lawrence A. Hall</td>
<td>402d MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Omaha, NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric D. Nagy</td>
<td>Jonathan Williams</td>
<td>437th MP Bn</td>
<td>Columbus, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter C. Reyman</td>
<td>Anthony Pasqualichio</td>
<td>502d MP Bn (CID)</td>
<td>Ft Campbell, KY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terry M. Nihart</td>
<td>Billy Ray Counts</td>
<td>503d MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamar Parsons</td>
<td>Russell Erickson</td>
<td>504th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Lewis, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Davel</td>
<td>Jeffrey Cereghino</td>
<td>508th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Ft Lewis, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glen C. Schmick</td>
<td>Jonathan Narcisse</td>
<td>519th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Polk, LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darcy L. Overbey</td>
<td>Michael L. Baker</td>
<td>525th MP Bn</td>
<td>Guantanamo Bay, Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Pennock</td>
<td>Jess Patteson</td>
<td>530th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Omaha, NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Bacote</td>
<td>Norman Barnes</td>
<td>535th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Cary, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Haflay</td>
<td>Troy Gentry</td>
<td>607th MP Bn</td>
<td>Grand Prairie, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtis M. Schroeder</td>
<td>Michael L. Cosper</td>
<td>701st MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Leonard Wood, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolanda D. Colbert</td>
<td>Stephen J. Hansen</td>
<td>705th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Ft Leavenworth, KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven G. Yamashita</td>
<td>Scott Anderson</td>
<td>709th MP Bn</td>
<td>Grafenwoehr, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David G. Thompson</td>
<td>Willard Smoot</td>
<td>716th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Campbell, KY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David D. Stender</td>
<td>Myron J. Lewis</td>
<td>720th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Hudson</td>
<td>Robert Eichler</td>
<td>724th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Fort Lauderdale, FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theresa Farrell</td>
<td>Bradley E. Cross</td>
<td>728th MP Bn</td>
<td>Schofield Barracks, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Wright</td>
<td>Craig Owens</td>
<td>733d MP Bn (CID)</td>
<td>Fort Gillem, GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stacy Gannity</td>
<td>Jason Wells</td>
<td>744th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Bethlehem, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher A. Heberer</td>
<td>Barry R. Oakes</td>
<td>759th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Caron, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emma Thyen</td>
<td>Marc Peterson</td>
<td>761st MP Bn</td>
<td>Juneau, AK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher A. Rollins</td>
<td>Jesse S. Perry</td>
<td>773d MP Bn</td>
<td>Pineville, LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Atchison</td>
<td>Charlotte Randazzo</td>
<td>785th MP Bn (I/R)</td>
<td>Fraser, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Heidorn</td>
<td>Richard E. Epps</td>
<td>787th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Leonard Wood, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen E. Gabavics</td>
<td>Bryan Lynch</td>
<td>793d MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Richardson, AK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyle W. Bayless</td>
<td>Angela Flourney</td>
<td>795th MP Bn</td>
<td>Ft Leonard Wood, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew D. Stubbs</td>
<td>Paul Ohland</td>
<td>850th MP Bn</td>
<td>Phoenix, AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason M. Stoddard</td>
<td>Humberto Murati</td>
<td>1002d MP Bn (CID)</td>
<td>Warner Barracks, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Felices</td>
<td>Rhonda Brown</td>
<td>Benning CID Bn</td>
<td>Ft Benning, GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew P. Sullivan</td>
<td>Marvin Marlow</td>
<td>Washington CID Bn</td>
<td>Ft Myer, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbi L. Aleandre</td>
<td>Andrew M. Falk</td>
<td>Protective Services Bn</td>
<td>Ft Belvoir, VA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current as of 1 September 2012
For changes and updates, please e-mail <usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.list.pii@mail.mil> or telephone (573) 563-7949.
# Publication and Subscription Order Form

**Publications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Stock Number</th>
<th>Publication Title</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Total Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subscription**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>List ID</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Total Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>708-069-00000-1</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prices include regular domestic postage and handling and are subject to change. International customers please add 40%.

Please return order form with payment:

- [ ] Check payable to Superintendent of Documents
- [ ] SOD Deposit Account
- [x] VISA  [ ] MasterCard  [ ] Discover/NOVUS  [ ] American Express

Expiration date:

Thank you for your order!

---

Thank you for your interest in U.S. Government Information. ALL SALES ARE FINAL.
MILITARY POLICE Writer’s Guide

MILITARY POLICE is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army law enforcement and investigation community. We include articles by and about officers, enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter after-action-type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Include photos (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not include illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photos in Microsoft PowerPoint or Microsoft Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid excessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including your full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a list of your past assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; a fax number; and a commercial daytime telephone number.

Articles submitted to MILITARY POLICE must be accompanied by a written release by the author’s unit or activity security manager prior to publication. All information contained in the article must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. MILITARY POLICE is distributed to military units worldwide and is also available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment or foreign individuals and organizations.

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles, photographs, or illustrations. They are accepted for publication only after thorough review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we will notify you. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes in your e-mail address or telephone number. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as editing for style.

MILITARY POLICE is published semiannually in March and September. Submission dates for articles are 1 December and 1 June. Send submissions by e-mail to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mdotmppb@mail.mil>. If you prefer, send an electronic copy in Microsoft Word on a compact disk (CD) and a double-spaced hard copy to MILITARY POLICE Professional Bulletin, 464 MSCoE Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8702.