




# MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS



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# MILITARY POLICE

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- 2 Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School**
- 3 Regimental Command Sergeant Major**
- 4 Regimental Chief Warrant Officer**
- 5 Strategic Landpower for the Company Commander: Leading the U.S. Army Into the 21st Century**  
*By General Robert W. Cone*
- 8 Risk Management: Linking Tactical Execution to Strategic Outcomes**  
*By Colonel Richard Vanderlinden (Retired)*
- 11 Integrating Army Law Enforcement Response Systems**  
*By Ms. Katherine Brennan and Colonel H. Tracy Williams III (Retired)*
- 12 The 31E: More Than a Correctional Officer**  
*By Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Grande (Retired) and Sergeant Major Ronald W. Hussung*
- 16 The Human Domain and the Hybrid Threat**  
*By Captain Ari Fisher*
- 21 Team Justice Certification Program: Education, Training, and Experience**  
*By Major Melissa Cantwell*
- 24 Military Police Liaison Team Coordinates Afghan Skills Course for Deploying DEA Agents**  
*By Lieutenant Colonel Gerald G. Mapp*
- 26 Integrating the ALM Into 31E AIT**  
*By Captain Eric Luley*
- 28 Military Police Celebrate 72d Anniversary**
- 30 CID Conquers the LTP**  
*By Major Thomas Bessler, Major Melissa Cantwell, and Major Dennis Holiday*
- 33 The HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, Approach to the Army Ready and Resilient Campaign**  
*By Captain Wayne A. Dunlap and First Lieutenant Shanee Allen*
- 34 Corrections Certification Program**  
*By Private First Class Shane T. Powers*
- 36 On the Move: Military Police in a Movement Control Battalion in Afghanistan**  
*By First Lieutenant Chad Plenge*
- 38 Maintaining Training Objectives in a Budget-Constrained Environment Through Simulation**  
*By Major Brian E. Bettis and Captain Melvin L. Mack*
- 40 A Simulated Inmate Escape at Camp Arifjan**  
*By Sergeant Jennifer Spradlin*
- 42 Criminal Investigation in the European Theater of Operations During World War II**  
*By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)*
- 44 A Junior Officer's Guide to DSCA**  
*By Second Lieutenant Christopher Francis Larkin*
- 46 Brigade/Battalion Commands**
- 48 Commandant's Professional Reading List**
- 50 Doctrine Update**
- 52 Subscribe to *Military Police***
- 53 91st Military Police Battalion—Lineage and Honors**



Cover photos: U.S. Army photos

Inside photo collage: U.S. Army photos by Dawn Arden and Melissa Buckley taken during the Military Police Corps 72d Anniversary Week in September 2013.

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# Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

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*Brigadier General Mark S. Spindler*

## Priority One: Leader Development—First and Foremost

*“If we do not develop leaders well, we cannot build quality units, design cogent campaigns, or execute effective operations in theater.”*

—Army Leader Development Strategy 2013<sup>1</sup>

It should certainly be clear that leader development is the No. 1 priority of the U.S. Army. Leader development is also certainly the No. 1 priority of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment and the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS)! The current strategic environment, coupled with the significant changes that we are undergoing as we transition from an “Army at war” to an “Army preparing for war,” will fully test the mettle and competencies of our future Army and military police leaders.

At USAMPS, we continuously review programs of instruction to ensure that we are providing the most current, relevant information to shape the curricula. USAMPS personnel are actively reviewing leader development instructional programs to ensure that we are properly attending to the three tenants of leader development—training, education, and experience. Following the highly successful military police credentialing pilot program, we are now moving forward with the **training** in an attempt to achieve the standards outlined in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5525.15, *Law Enforcement (LE) Standards and Training in the DOD*, thereby improving expertise and professionalism within Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and parallel civilian police communities.<sup>2</sup> Recognizing that self-development remains fundamental to leader maturity, we are continuing to expand personal and professional **education** opportunities outside the normal schoolhouse prospectus. However, much work remains to be done in the area of **experience**.

I’m not confident that our officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer career timelines afford leaders the opportunities (or breadth of opportunities) necessary to gain a thorough understanding of the full military police portfolio (which includes professional broadening outside the military police specialty). Great collaborative efforts with the Office of the Provost Marshal General and the U.S. Army Human Resources Command are underway to ensure that the assignment process helps build and execute the right career paths for each leader. Success with this endeavor will depend heavily on the active involvement of senior leaders in the field who guide the process and ensure that each leader receives individual attention (based on Army needs and his or her particular talents, skills, and desires) with regard to broadening assignment considerations. Military police leaders must do their part to ensure that the Regiment and the Army are ready and on point to meet tomorrow’s challenges—to assist, protect, and defend through all lines of operation to preserve this great fighting force!

Our Army can continue to count on us!

### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Army Leader Development Strategy 2013, <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal/repository/ALDS5June%202013Record.pdf>>, accessed on 15 January 2014.

<sup>2</sup>DODI 5525.15, *Law Enforcement (LE) Standards and Training in the DOD*, 27 April 2012.

**Of the Troops and For the Troops—Army Strong**

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# Regimental Command Sergeant Major


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*Command Sergeant Major John F. McNeirney*



We are experiencing exciting times in the Military Police Corps Regiment. As the Army goes through many changes and adjustments, we are implementing a number of initiatives to support the Army. Here at the home of the Regiment and the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), we are working hard to support Soldiers and units around the world. This support takes a variety of forms. For example, we are continually updating functional courses and the courses presented to Soldiers at all levels, from initial entry to leader development. As we visit units around the world, we will continue to rely on our observations and your feedback to ensure that we are providing Soldiers with the best training possible to meet current and future challenges.



Soldiers remain the lifeblood of the Regiment. In my travels, I often find that—despite the operational tempo—many Soldiers manage to find time to actively pursue professional development opportunities. Many are enrolled in the Army Correspondence Course Program or resident or online college courses. Some are seeking professional certification opportunities. In addition, military police continue to win NCO and Soldier competitions in nearly every category throughout the Army. Military police are at the pinnacle of the Army profession, serving as shining examples of what it means to follow the Warrior Ethos.

Regardless of the unit, military police leaders and Soldiers are doing great things at every location. This exceptional performance has resulted in the great reputation of the Military Police Corps. And senior commanders from around the world continue to commend the military police Soldiers who provide them with support.

I am often asked, “How do today’s military police Soldiers measure up to those that came before them?” I proudly reply, without hesitation, that today’s military police Soldiers are not only trained, equipped, and led as well as (or better than) those who served before, but that they are also just as courageous as their predecessors. The sacrifices, professionalism, and commitment of today’s battle-tested military police Soldiers do not go unnoticed or unappreciated by the Regiment or the public.

Team: I am proud of what you accomplish every day. And I thank you for all that you do to support the Regiment, the Army, and our Nation.

**Assist, Protect, Defend!**




# Regimental Chief Warrant Officer



## Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger

I recently read an article entitled “Collaborative Partnerships to Solve Community Issues,” which appeared in the October 2013 issue of *The Police Chief*. According to the article, the definition of the term *collaboration* includes “common purpose, shared goals, or a joint effort” and the definition of the term *community policing resources* includes “community partnerships and problem-solving techniques.” Partnerships in community policing are described as “essentially fall[ing] into place with two components: police working in partnership with others and residents being proactive and engaged in their neighborhoods.” The article indicates that “When the police partner with reputable community-focused organizations, the partnerships they create demonstrate increased credibility to the community, which allows police organizations to be more effective.” Furthermore, it describes thriving communities as “those where law enforcement is engaged with varied cross-sector partners serving, restoring, and sustaining a community” and suggests that the residents of some communities have low levels of trust in law enforcement personnel caused by “a general distrust for authority or lack of understanding of police procedure, language, or techniques” or “a negative experience with misconduct by the police.” Finally, the article states that “Perhaps most of all, distrust occurs when there is a lack of a relationship between residents and law enforcement. Distrust of police creates a barrier when dealing with crime and people . . . .”<sup>1</sup>



I believe that the authors of the article are trying to drive home the point that community policing consists of more than police officers walking around neighborhoods. Proper community policing requires that the police and the community become more involved in the process. There must be a common purpose, shared goals, and a joint effort between law enforcement personnel and the community. I am sure that many communities across the United States are tremendously successful in using these techniques. And these techniques are working well at many of our camps, posts, and stations around the world. As military police, we are constantly under the watchful eyes of our communities and we serve as significant contributors to successful, collaborative partnerships on our military installations. Although we are doing a phenomenal job of policing our communities, we still have much more work to do. Our interactions with communities determine whether community members trust law enforcement personnel; therefore, we must perform our jobs in a dignified, respectful manner. We must continue to build trust—not tear it down through misconduct. If community members don’t trust us, it will be difficult to collaborate with them, which will make it more difficult to reduce crime.

With respect to the success of collaborative partnerships, I think that our military communities have a distinct advantage over civilian communities. Simply put, we have shared values, missions, and goals and a common purpose. We have rules, regulations, and policies that contribute to good order and discipline. Very early in our careers, we are indoctrinated into the Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. And according to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*, trust is “the bedrock of our profession.”<sup>2</sup> Soldiers trust one another—and they trust their commanders. Units trust one another. Our Nation trusts its Army. And Soldiers, Family members, Department of Defense civilians, and retirees trust military police to keep installation residents safe. Furthermore, senior leaders trust in the ability of military police to accomplish that mission 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

To maintain the trust and confidence that senior leaders and military communities have in the Military Police Corps, we must continue to serve as competent, committed professionals of character. We must conduct our operations in a proactive manner, with an eye toward prevention or getting left of the bang. Primitive operations are generally viewed by commanders and the community in a positive light; but if conducted improperly, they can be viewed in a negative way. For example, if military police are hiding in the woods and operating radar with the intent of catching speeders, commanders and the community will view this as a negative means of speed control. If the intent is to reduce speed, a better technique might involve parking a patrol car with flashing lights in a location where it is easily seen by the public. I’m not saying that we should stop writing citations for individuals who violate the law. I’m saying that writing citations is not the reason for our existence.

According to the Military Police Regimental Strategy (commonly referred to as the *box top*), our mission is to “provide professional policing, investigations, corrections, and security and mobility support across the full range of military operations in order to enable protection and promote the rule of law” to preserve the force.<sup>3</sup> Preserving the fighting force is all about helping leaders prevent incidents that degrade the force. Our men and women need to be ready and available to fight our future wars.

### Of the Troops and For the Troops—Assist, Protect, Defend

(continued on page 20)

# Strategic Landpower for the Company Commander:

## Leading the U.S. Army Into the 21st Century

In Iraq and Afghanistan, a generation of officers grew up solving strategic dilemmas at the company and platoon levels. Well versed in the requirements and responsibilities of an Army at war, this generation must guide the Army into an ever-evolving and uncertain future. In order to navigate through the complexities in front of us, the Army needs capable, adaptable leaders—now more than ever—who champion the Army's strategic purpose and goals. With that, one of the most important discussions over the next few years will be how company commanders understand and implement the Army's central role in strategic landpower.

Over the last 2 years, the Army has put a lot of great people to work examining every facet of our training, doctrine, and warfighting capability. We did not do this to examine where we stand today. Rather, all of this effort was aimed at figuring out two things—what kind of Army we will need to meet future challenges and what we have to do to build that Army even as we continue fighting in Afghanistan and remain engaged throughout the world. Much of what we concluded is available in a single, brief document—U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-0, *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*.<sup>1</sup> If you have not read it yet, please do so.

I won't summarize an already brief document in this article. Instead, I will discuss how the newest and most vital ideas relate to the execution level—the company. While things have been written about strategic maneuver, nothing has been written about its application at the tactical level. Although some ideas may be new, much of what must be done remains the same—training, standards, and the understanding of the human environment. This is a result of the unchanging character of the Army's basic strategic problem and mission. As in prior eras, as part of the joint force, our Army must retain its ability to protect U.S. national interests, execute any mission assigned to us, and win on any battlefield around the world.


Given our national strategy, we are required to field an Army capable of waging war decisively. Fielding a ready and responsive force with sufficient depth and resilience to wage sustained land combat is central to our mission, and that force must be able to conduct both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. A ready, robust, responsive force deters adversaries, reassures allies and, when necessary, compels our enemies to change their behavior. Maintaining such a force requires high levels of adaptability throughout each echelon of the Army. Only Soldiers with tactical skill and operational flexibility can effectively respond to changing tactical situations in support of our Nation's strategic goals and interests.

This is where company commanders fit into the concept of strategic landpower. Much like company grade officers did in Iraq and Afghanistan, the company commander of the future must be mentally agile enough to thrive within the parameters of mission command. Developing leaders who can do so, while providing clear task and purpose to their subordinates, will be critical to the success of any mission across the range of military operations. Effective Army commanders, including those at the company level, do not use fiscal constraints as an excuse for failing to develop the best possible mix of training, equipment, and regional expertise they can within their formations. Rather, they motivate their people and guide their units in a way that makes optimal use of available resources to create adaptive, effective forces.

Our Army has three primary and interconnected roles—prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win the Nation's wars. The company commander has important responsibilities in each of these.

### Prevent Conflict

It is prudent here to define what a conflict is. Since the term gets thrown around a lot and attached to a lot of different situations, it is easy to misunderstand the doctrinal meaning. Conflict is an armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Irregular forces frequently make up the majority of enemy combatants we face now and may continue to do so in the future. Conflict is often protracted, geographically confined, and constrained in the level of violence. Each conflict also holds the potential to escalate into a major combat operation.



**General Robert W. Cone**  
Commanding General, U.S. Army  
Training and Doctrine Command

Many of the contingencies to which the United States responded militarily in the past 50 years have been appropriately defined as conflicts. The same can reasonably be expected in the future, but with the addition of cyberspace.

As was true during the Cold War, many of our greatest successes in the future will not occur on the battlefield; rather, maintaining peace may be our greatest achievement. This will be no easy task as global tensions and instability increase in ungoverned or weakly governed spaces around the world. History has taught us that without a capable, highly trained land force, the United States has little influence in many of those spaces. That land force, our Army, must remain the best-equipped, best-trained, and most combat-ready force in the world if it is to have the strategic effect we seek. That readiness is built from the bottom up.

This is the first critical point where company commanders must help shape the future. As owners of the training schedule, commanders have a critical role in developing team, squad, and platoon skills. Commanders ensure that broadening training—like language, geographical, and cultural familiarization—is done effectively, in a rigorous manner. Soldiers from the generation that fought in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be satisfied with training that is focused on artificial scenarios and made-up adversaries, so their commanders need to be innovative about preparing well-coordinated, realistic training. Subordinates must be challenged, and they have to feel that their challenges have a direct link to future operations. In order not to lose 12 years of combat-proven leader development, company grade officers must find a balance between building an Army prepared for the range of military operations and succumbing to pressure to “get back to the way it used to be.”

Unfortunately, the possession of such a trained and ready force is useless if it cannot affect regions where trouble is brewing. As units reposition from overseas bases and return to the United States, it becomes more crucial than ever for the Army to adopt an expeditionary mind-set and improve its expeditionary capability. To do so, the Army is aligning units to specific geographical regions and arranging them into scalable and tailored expeditionary force packages that meet the needs of the joint force commander across the range of military operations. In short, our Army will be better postured to generate strategic influence anywhere in the world and, as part of the joint force, to deter aggression.

In this construct, company commanders must conduct environmental training specific to their regions. Becoming familiar with the people, cultures, and languages of the region in which one’s unit will operate is critical to the success of a continental U.S.-based Army. Conventional-force companies learned much over the past 12 years as they executed missions historically reserved for special forces. War is fundamentally a human endeavor, and understanding the people involved is critically important. Company commanders cannot now ignore the hard-won lessons of their predecessors by ignoring one of the special forces’ key tasks of understanding the operational environment. Those who meet this intent and enforce standards during this training will ensure that we pay those lessons forward to the next generation.

### **Shape the Operational Environment**

During peacetime, the Army is continuously engaged in shaping the global environment to promote stability and partner nation capabilities. We do this for several reasons—the most important of which is maintaining peace in the pursuance of American national security interests. Where conflict has already broken out, engagement helps keep it contained and may even lead to a peaceful resolution. By helping to build partner capacity and trust, forward-engaged Army units greatly add to regional and global stability. Moreover, by building strong relationships of mutual trust, we facilitate access and set the conditions for success in any future combined operation in a particular region or country.

But what are shaping operations, and how are they executed at the company level? Shaping operations, which occur at any echelon, create or preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Thus, engagement by regionally aligned forces positively shapes the environment in which the Army operates throughout the range of military operations. This aligns with the notion of the “strategic corporal,” which recognizes that in the information age, the actions of individuals and small groups can have widespread impact well beyond what was intended at the time. Every action has a reaction, and it is necessary for junior officers to be aware of the role their Soldiers and units play in the overall strategic goals of our Nation.

As part of regionally aligned shaping operations, the Army will employ a careful mix of rotational and forward-deployed forces, develop relationships with foreign militaries, and conduct recurring training exercises with foreign partners to demonstrate the Nation’s enduring commitment to allies and friends. Where we share mutually beneficial interests with an ally, the Army enhances that partner’s self-defense capacity and improves its ability to serve as a capable member of a future military coalition. More-capable allies generate a stabilizing influence in their regions, tending to reduce the need for American military interventions over time.

Shaping operations do not end with planned training engagements by forward-deployed units. Other actions that the units, or even small groups of individual Soldiers, take can have a shaping effect. Those actions will run the gamut from brigade- or division-size assistance after a natural disaster, to a single act of kindness to a foreign student in an Army school who later rises to high levels in his nation’s armed forces. All shaping activities should convey to our intended audiences a clear message: We are committed to peace, and our Nation protects its friends and defends its interests. Instilling this understanding among our Soldiers and junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is one of the vital roles that company grade officers play in the execution of strategic landpower.

But there is a caveat. What may be the standard for us is not necessarily useful or welcome with our host nation partners. So, shaping also entails tailoring our delivery of security assistance to our counterparts in ways appropriate for their culture and military capabilities. Company commanders can gain great success here by applying key interpersonal skills to know and understand officers, NCOs, and Soldiers from other armies and to be humble when dealing with them.

## Win the Nation's Wars

Despite our best efforts to shape a stable global environment and prevent conflict, violence is likely to remain endemic to the human condition. It has been said that “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”<sup>2</sup> While we do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of war, we must ensure that there never will be a day when the U.S. Army is not ready to fight and win wars in defense of our Nation.

What is a war? Historically, war has been defined as a conflict carried out by a force of arms, either between nations or between parties within a nation. However, as we consider hostile acts in cyberspace, the definitions of war and acts of war will continue to evolve. For example, large-scale cyberattacks against government operations or critical infrastructure—such as those

*“An Army that cannot win on the battlefield is of little worth to the security of the Nation.”*

in the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict—can reasonably be considered acts of war. Leveraging the technological savvy of today’s Soldiers requires that leaders have an engaged interest in Soldier development. This will require junior leaders from the same generation who are as adept at leader development as they are technologically competent.

To defend our Nation, the Army must maintain the capacity to conduct strategically decisive land operations anywhere in the world. Though we will always conduct such operations as part of a joint force, we also acknowledge that war is a clash of wills that requires the ethical application of violence to compel change in human behavior. Here, company commanders make a dramatic contribution to the application of strategic landpower by being tactically and technically proficient in the execution of combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Without successful tactical execution, the best strategic concepts are doomed to failure.

The U.S. Army capstone concept lays out the details of what capabilities the Army must sustain and provides some guidance on how the force may be employed in the future. But it all boils down to one crucial point: An Army that cannot win on the battlefield is of little worth to the security of the Nation. As everyone is aware, we are facing austere times ahead. This fiscal reality cannot be an excuse for not doing our duty or losing sight of our purpose. In the final analysis, this country will one day—maybe soon—ask us to deploy to some distant land, close with and destroy an enemy, and then build a secure and lasting peace. Our Army is uniquely qualified to ensure the training necessary to make those things happen, thanks to the strength of our NCO Corps. Commanders must leverage the experience of their senior NCOs and find creative ways to properly train the fundamentals despite resource constraints. We’ve successfully done it before in our Army, and we are counting on our young leaders to do it again.

## Conclusion

It was often platoon and company leaders who took the lead in solving strategic issues in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will continue to be platoon and company leaders who keep the Army the well-trained and globally responsive force that our Nation needs to deter our adversaries, protect our friends, and defeat our enemies in the 21st century. The U.S. Army must have company commanders who understand strategic landpower and their role in it. Seek out opportunities to ingrain your training events within the framework of strategic landpower. Write articles for your branch professional bulletins, discussing the impacts of strategic landpower for your specialty. You can find the strategic landpower white paper on the TRADOC Web site at [http://www.arcic.army.mil/app\\_Documents/Strategic-Landpower-White-Paper-06MAY2013.pdf](http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/Strategic-Landpower-White-Paper-06MAY2013.pdf)<sup>3</sup> and on company commander discussion forums. This white paper is the primary reference for strategic landpower concepts and the one jointly approved by the Army Chief of Staff, the Marine Corps Commandant, and the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.

It is the responsibility of senior Army leaders to set the conditions to make you and our Army successful. Your senior leaders appreciate what you do every day. These will be challenging, but exciting times; and I thank you for your service and sacrifice as we move toward making the Army of 2020 and beyond the best in the world.

**Acknowledgement:** Captain Jon D. Mohundro, Commander’s Planning Group, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, contributed to the development of this article. 

### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*, 19 December 2012, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf>, accessed on 7 November 2013.

<sup>2</sup>Although this quote is widely attributed to the Greek philosopher Plato, the source has never been definitively confirmed.

<sup>3</sup>“Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills,” Strategic Landpower Task Force, [http://www.arcic.army.mil/app\\_Documents/Strategic-Landpower-White-Paper-06MAY2013.pdf](http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/Strategic-Landpower-White-Paper-06MAY2013.pdf), accessed on 7 November 2013.

# Risk Management: Linking Tactical Execution to Strategic Outcomes

By Colonel Richard Vanderlinden (Retired)

## Introduction

The U.S. Army Antiterrorism Program is a risk-based protection program. At the heart of a risk assessment, lies an intersection between threat, vulnerability, and criticality as they relate to organizational mission accomplishment. The Army antiterrorism policy and doctrine establish risk assessment methodologies that are intended to support a common approach to risk management. Risk management concepts and execution cut across the Army Antiterrorism Program and the Army Protection Program (APP) and serve as critical elements of the evolving Department of Defense (DOD) *Mission Assurance Strategy* and the DOD *Mission Assurance Strategy Implementation Framework*.<sup>1,2</sup> As DOD and the Army continue to improve program and mission integration and synchronization, risk assessment methodologies from installation to strategic levels are expected to make use of a common framework, allowing aggregate risk visibility at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. At each level, results of the risk assessment are intended to be used for resource allocation and decisionmaking for the budget execution year and for programming for out-year requirements.

## Current Methodology

Army antiterrorism risk assessment methods have evolved over time, primarily as a result of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Khobar, Saudi Arabia.<sup>3</sup> The current risk assessment methodology is detailed in Field Manual (FM) 3-37.2, *Antiterrorism*, which contains in-depth information regarding the Army composite risk management process and the tools used in the process.<sup>4</sup> The procedures and tools presented in FM 3-37.2 include—


- Threat assessments.
  - Criticality assessments.
  - Vulnerability assessments.
  - Risk assessment matrices and tables.
  - Risk assessment concepts and tools.
- **Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability (CARVER).** CARVER is a tool used to assist protection staffs in conducting risk assessments by determining criticality and vulnerability. In the case of criticality, CARVER helps determine which assets are most critical to the success of the overall mission of the organization. This helps decisionmakers determine what resources need to be allocated to protect critical assets. For vulnerability, CARVER allows for the

assessment of potential targets from a terrorist's perspective to identify assets that might be perceived as good targets by adversaries.

- **Mission, Symbolism, History, Accessibility, Recognizability, Population, and Proximity (MSHARPP).**<sup>5</sup> MSHARPP is a targeting analysis tool used to analyze likely terrorist targets and assess their vulnerability. After developing a list of potential targets, the protection staff uses MSHARPP to associate adversaries' weapons or tactics with specific targets to determine the effectiveness, efficiency, and plausibility of the attack method and identify vulnerabilities related to the target.

An understanding of the overall significance of risk and the direction that the Army and DOD are taking with regard to risks related to terrorist threats begins with the Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan (ATSP), Phase III, "Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016."<sup>6</sup> The objectives of the ATSP include Objective 6B, which was specifically developed to promote the integration of antiterrorism within the APP, and Objective 6C, which was designed to integrate antiterrorism with larger security-related initiatives such as the evolution of the DOD mission assurance construct. Together, these two objectives constitute a game changer for the Army Antiterrorism Program. Now, more than ever before, antiterrorism must be integrated with other, higher-level security and protection programs and missions.

Risk management is a critical, crosscutting function that is common to the Army Antiterrorism Program, the APP, and the DOD *Mission Assurance Strategy*. This article describes the linkage among the Antiterrorism Program, the APP, and the *Mission Assurance Strategy* and explains the future of risk management within the Army antiterrorism community. Due to the importance of risk as a factor in Antiterrorism Program and mission planning and execution, risk implications are woven throughout the fabric of the ATSP goals and objectives. At least 22 of the 40 overall



objectives within the ATSP are tied to, or have implications associated with, risk management.

### **Explicit Antiterrorism Program Link to the APP**

Draft Army Regulation (AR) 525-XX-A, *The Army Protection Program*, describes the APP policy.<sup>7</sup> The APP applies risk management processes in integrating protection programs into Army operations, expanding program oversight, ensuring senior leader accountability, and facilitating informed decisionmaking and resource allocation. The Army Antiterrorism Program is one of 12 functional elements within the APP.

The APP integrates, synchronizes, and effectively prioritizes and uses the resources of APP functional elements and enabling functions (with the associated risk management processes) to enable the execution of Army missions in all-threats/all-hazards environments. The APP supports operational objectives and will serve as the primary means for the Army to support DOD *Mission Assurance Strategy* execution.

The Antiterrorism Program is also an element of APP assessments, which cover Army command, Army service component command, direct reporting unit, and Army National Guard program, plan, and mission execution performance. The APP facilitates stand-alone facilities, installations, and commands in nesting their protection programs and efforts with Army strategic priorities. Stand-alone facilities, installations, and commands execute the APP to ensure that tactical and operational vulnerabilities do not compromise strategic and operational capabilities.

As the office with primary responsibility for the APP, the Army Protection Directorate (G-34), Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), annually updates the Army prioritized protection list to identify and rank installations using an objective methodology that accounts for various factors, including standard garrison organization input, strategic functionality and criticality, and the threat.

The APP policy also requires that commanders develop integrated protection plans to address the continued execution of mission-essential functions; other operational requirements; the protection of critical assets; personnel security, as determined by mission analysis; and means that the command will use to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from threats and hazards. Given the importance of the Army's ability to support national security objectives, critical infrastructure risk management policy and doctrine are of increasing importance among the APP functional elements. Draft AR 525-XX-A specifically prescribes that any Army or DOD task- or defense-critical asset must rise to the top of the critical asset list for a stand-alone facility or an installation and thereby receive a heightened level of analysis in terms of a holistic risk assessment.

### **Mission Assurance: The Way Ahead**

Mission assurance is an integrative process designed to ensure the availability, function, and resilience of assets and

capabilities critical for DOD to carry out its functions and assigned missions. The *Mission Assurance Strategy* addresses all threats and hazards regarding the readiness of critical capabilities and, when fully implemented, will synchronize existing protection-related risk management programs and provide senior leaders with increased visibility and knowledge to assist in decisionmaking.

The *Mission Assurance Strategy* also establishes and will sustain a methodology to manage risk, enabling DOD leaders at all levels to make informed, risk-based decisions. This will enhance resilience and support the prioritization and allocation of resources to mitigate risks across missions, policies, plans, and programs. The *Mission Assurance Strategy* advocates strengthening successful initiatives and establishing new mechanisms and activities while conforming to the current fiscal environment. Progress will be measured by the success in achieving specified objectives. Mission assurance efforts will support the enhancement of four *Mission Assurance Strategy* pillars:

- Identify and prioritize Headquarters, DA, critical assets, supporting assets, functions, and critical missions.
- Develop and implement a comprehensive, integrated mission assurance risk management framework.
- Use risk-informed decisionmaking to optimize risk management solutions.
- Partner to reduce risk.

### **The Mission Assurance Strategy Implementation Framework**

To ensure the collaboration and synchronization of existing defense and protection-oriented risk management processes, the *Mission Assurance Strategy* will be implemented through horizontal and vertical approaches. Horizontal integration involves collaboration on protection programs and missions at the installation, component, and DOD levels to holistically understand criticality, threats, hazards, vulnerabilities, and the consequences of the loss of an asset or capability on mission accomplishment. In addition, horizontal integration involves ensuring that the efforts of the protection communities help shape broader plans and operations across protection programs and missions. It also ensures that all protection-related programs and missions follow a standardized, integrated process for conducting risk management activities to help inform decisionmakers about the potential risks to plans, operations, and missions. Vertical integration focuses on ensuring that risk assessments and management information are continually shared between all echelons of command and that risk awareness decisions are made at the appropriate levels.

Initially, the *Mission Assurance Strategy* will focus on the development of policy for the horizontal integration of risk assessment and on installation level mitigation efforts in the areas of the Antiterrorism Program; the continuity-of-operations initiative; the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program; information assurance measures; the Installation

Emergency Management Program; physical security; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives protection. The reason for the focus is to provide installation commanders and staffs with a holistic understanding of the critical assets they own or rely on in terms of threats and hazards, associated vulnerabilities, and the resultant risks posed to their assigned or supported missions.

Initial efforts to improve the vertical alignment of protection-related activities will focus on improvements in linking current and forthcoming DOD planning and resourcing processes for risk assessments. It will be a challenge to design a mission assurance risk management framework that ensures the proper identification of mission risk by mission owners and the appropriate aggregation and prioritization of risk mitigation efforts and resources at the component and DOD levels. The intent is to build a mission assurance process through the strengthening of existing DOD level planning, resourcing, and operations processes rather than by creating an additional stovepipe.

### **Nesting the Antiterrorism Program and the APP Within the *Mission Assurance Strategy* (or the “So What?”)**

The risk management process guides and informs programs and activities with regard to enabling mission-essential functions, which preserve resources and capabilities that, in turn, enable mission accomplishment. Feedback throughout the process allows for continuous improvement through the identification of lessons learned and best practices, which effect changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy related to the Antiterrorism Program, the APP and, eventually, the *Mission Assurance Strategy Implementation Framework*.

### **Conclusion**

Given the persistent threat of terrorism, coupled with the reduction in protection resources, risk management essentially serves as the cornerstone of the Army Antiterrorism Program and missions. As such, risk management must be integrated across the Antiterrorism Program, the APP, and the *Mission Assurance Strategy*. Several essential actions are necessary for full integration:

- Enhance antiterrorism mission assurance to identify critical assets, critical capabilities, and mission-essential functions and determine how they relate to the other APP elements at specified stand-alone facilities and installations.
- Seek to achieve processes and methodologies to better integrate the Antiterrorism Program with other APP functional and enabling elements.
- Leverage and enhance antiterrorism integration through existing APP bodies and forums at the installation, component, service, and DOD levels to advocate integrated APP (and eventually mission assurance) policy, planning, and resource decisions while ensuring that antiterrorism programs and missions receive appropriate oversight and resource allocation.

- Integrate the Antiterrorism Program into Army-wide policies and strategies, thereby achieving integration across the APP. An APP strategy should seek to establish standardized goals, objectives, roles, and responsibilities; supporting structures and processes; and metrics to assess readiness and performance.
- Review the APP assessment processes to identify additional streamlining and integration approaches related to antiterrorism integration and support of the evolving *Mission Assurance Strategy* framework.
- Ensure that effective processes exist (or are established) to allow for antiterrorism assessment information sharing across APP elements at the installation, component, service, and DOD levels.
- Identify capabilities for the integration of antiterrorism risk management, trend analysis, and strategic issues.
- Examine Antiterrorism Program and mission linkages with regard to energy grid security, transportation, financial services, cyberspace, telecommunications, international collaboration, and supply chain concerns at the installation, component, service, and DOD levels and within external partners. Based on the likely threat capabilities on the horizon, these operating spaces require increasing attention.

### **Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>*Mission Assurance Strategy*, DOD, April 2012, <<http://dcip.dtic.mil/MAstrategy.pdf>>, accessed on 16 January 2014.

<sup>2</sup>*Mission Assurance Strategy Implementation Framework*, DOD, October 2013, <<http://dcip.dtic.mil/MAframework.pdf>>, accessed on 16 January 2014.

<sup>3</sup>The Khobar Towers bombing was a terrorist attack on a building complex that was being used to house foreign military personnel, including U.S. Air Force personnel. A total of 19 U.S. military personnel were killed in the attack.

<sup>4</sup>FM 3-37.2, *Antiterrorism*, 18 February 2011.

<sup>5</sup>Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-39.20, *Police Intelligence Operations*, 29 July 2010.

<sup>6</sup>“Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016,” Army ATSP, Phase III, 14 February 2013.

<sup>7</sup>AR 525-XX-A, *The Army Protection Program*, working copy (not for implementation).

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# Integrating Army Law Enforcement Response Systems

*By Ms. Katherine Brennan and Colonel H. Tracy Williams III (Retired)*

The U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG), in collaboration with the Army staff and commands, is developing an information-sharing architecture that improves mission command in the delivery of protection and emergency services for installations. The objectives of the initiative are to—

- Achieve a unity of effort through the sharing of networks, information, data, and analytical tools within a unified system.
- Standardize reporting procedures to improve Army protection and mission readiness across the range of military operations.
- Standardize communication systems that store and rapidly transmit information.
- Develop and implement technical interface capabilities for the interoperability of appropriate protection, access control, identity-vetting systems, police records management, and crime analysis.

## **Addressing Policing-Community Initiatives**

Ongoing Army policing-community initiatives include means to—

- Achieve a unity of effort in misdemeanor and felony criminal records management systems.
- Field common computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems using an enterprise approach.
- Make use of criminal intelligence analytical tools.

## **Unity of Effort**

OPMG and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly known as CID) are developing a single Army police records management system—the Army Law Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (ALERTS). ALERTS merges the misdemeanor case management system (Centralized Operations Police Suite) with the felony case management system (the Army Criminal Investigation/Criminal Intelligence System), thus forming a single Army case management system. This will allow the seamless transfer of cases between military police and criminal investigators, resulting in a single repository for criminal analysis.

## **CAD Systems**

At full operational capability, ALERTS will also be linked with an Army CAD system. In an enterprise approach, an

Army program executive office will use Army-established acquisition processes to guide the procurement of a CAD system that is standardized across the Army. This will assure compatibility with other Army systems, improve procurement efficiency through the economy of scale, and facilitate the training of Soldiers and Department of the Army (DA) civilian police on common systems.

## **Criminal Intelligence Analytical Tools**


OPMG also partnered with CID to provide criminal intelligence analysts and military and DA civilian police investigators with a criminal intelligence analytical tool. The analytical tool, which is now available, enables users to query Army-wide information from the Army criminal records data warehouse. This access assists commands in improving proactive, preventive, intelligence-led policing. The criminal records management system will also provide crime analysis tools and reports that can be used for trend analysis.

In addition, OPMG is working with the Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange (LE D-DEx) Program Management Office at the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service to comply with Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5525.16, *Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange (LE D-DEx)*, which directs all Department of Defense (DOD) law enforcement agencies to use the LE D-DEx system to share criminal justice information across organizational boundaries, thereby enhancing DOD lead sharing in the areas of crime prevention and investigation.<sup>1</sup> The LE D-DEx is an online, real-time, criminal justice information data-sharing system that serves as the DOD portal through which criminal justice information is externally shared with the Federal Bureau of Investigation Law Enforcement National Data Exchange and regional law enforcement data-sharing systems that participate in the Law Enforcement Information Exchange (a data repository that contains information from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies). The LE D-DEx provides accurate, complete, and timely criminal justice information to improve Army criminal investigations and to enhance public safety for all jurisdictions.

## **Supporting Other Efforts**

This new information-sharing architecture will also allow installation access control points to interface with dispatch/operations centers, link patrols for heightened awareness and improved officer safety, and provide direct connections to criminal records management systems. When fully operational, the CAD system will provide shared situational awareness

*(continued on page 15)*



# THE 3IE: MORE THAN A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER

By Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Grande (Retired) and Sergeant Major Ronald W. Hussung

A professional Soldier is defined as “an expert, a volunteer certified in the profession of arms, bonded with comrades in a shared identity and culture of sacrifice and service to the Nation and the Constitution, who adheres to the Army ethic and is a steward of the future of the profession.”<sup>1</sup> Thus, Military Police Corps Soldiers who work in the field of corrections are more than just correctional officers; they are professionals who are known throughout the military as internment/resettlement (I/R) specialists. This is their story.

The 1960s constituted a decade of political, civil, and social unrest in America. Vietnam War protests, the civil rights movement, and increases in the use of illegal drugs and other law breaking occurred during that time. As a microcosm of American society, the U.S. Army experienced its share of Soldiers who violated rules and regulations and were consequently confined in Army stockades around the world.

Guard duty at Army stockades was assigned to junior enlisted Soldiers as a 30-day temporary duty. These Soldiers, selected by company leaders, were not often considered the cream of the crop; and they viewed stockade duty as demeaning. Some leaders deliberately selected problem Soldiers for the job to illustrate to them what it was like to be confined. But the lack of training and professionalism exhibited by some of the guards sparked massive riots in many stockades.

In 1967, the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) recognized the training and professionalism shortcomings and established a correctional course designed for private first class and private second class military police Soldiers who had a military occupational specialty (MOS) of 95B and were at least 20 years of age. This course complemented corrections courses that had already been established for military police officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).<sup>2</sup> In 1969, the Military Police Corps refined the standard and established the MOS 95C correctional specialist, with permanent duty in Army stockades.

In 1970, a group of expert civilian penologists conducted a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the Army Confinement System (ACS), which consisted of three tiers:

- The first tier consisted of stockades (later renamed installation detention facilities) which housed pretrial and short-term posttrial prisoners.

- The second tier consisted of the U.S. Army Retraining Brigade (later renamed the U.S. Army Correctional Brigade), which provided a “return to duty” program.
- The third tier consisted of the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), which housed long-term prisoners.

The resulting *Report of the Special Civilian Committee for the Study of the United States Army Confinement System* indicated that the ACS was plagued with problems similar to those of civilian corrections systems—specifically, a weak, decentralized management structure; personnel problems; overcrowding; and riots. It recommended the establishment of an Army Correctional Command and suggested that all ACS facilities fall under the direction of the Provost Marshal General. The report further indicated that only 32.4 percent of the authorized 1,492 MOS 95C stockade positions were actually filled with 95C Soldiers.<sup>3</sup> This was no surprise, as MOS 95C was still in its infancy and only a limited number of training courses were available at USAMPS. However, by 1977, MOS 95C Skill Level 1 positions (privates through specialists fourth class) were filled with 95C Soldiers. In fact, the MOS was overstrength, forcing the Military Police Corps to reduce its numbers.

The Military Police Corps changed its recruiting policy for MOS 95C in 1985, eliminating Skill Level 1, thus making MOS 95B Skill Level 2 (sergeant) the lowest entry level. The rationale for the change was to gain experienced military police NCOs who could effectively interact with the older, more sophisticated military prisoner population at the USDB—the only Department of Defense (DOD) maximum-custody facility. This policy change barred lower-ranking enlisted Soldiers from transitioning to the corrections MOS and prevented civilians with corrections experience from joining the Army as part of the corrections field. The USAMPS converted the basic Correctional Specialist Course to an entry level Corrections NCO Course and made it a requirement for all NCOs transferring to MOS 95C.<sup>4</sup> However, a negative perception of the corrections field was generated from within the Military Police Corps. Working in close confinement with prisoners had always been the least desirable duty in the Military Police Corps, and MOS 95B military police were reluctant to transfer to an MOS that was now perceived as less challenging and as offering fewer opportunities for career

advancement. This self-deprecation contributed to the steady decline of the corrections MOS strength; and 3 years after the policy change (just 10 years after MOS 95C was identified as overstrength), the number of Soldiers in the corrections MOS was dangerously low.<sup>5</sup>

The innovative programs of the 1980s that were designed to lure Soldiers into the corrections MOS were not working. While the number of correctional officers within state and federal corrections systems swelled, the number of MOS 95C Soldiers fell to an all-time low. In response to the decline, the Military Police Corps initiated a public relations campaign, with incentives to increase awareness and promote the corrections program. Senior military police leaders conducted briefings in which they described career opportunities and dispelled myths regarding the corrections field. But the corrections MOS continued to deteriorate, dropping to a worldwide operating strength of 78 percent in 1992. Therefore, the Army immediately implemented several policy changes. All Skill Level 1 MOS 95B military police Soldiers who were eligible for reenlistment and those who were serving in an MOS that was terminated due to the nuclear arms reduction were presented with an ultimatum: reclassify to MOS 95C or separate from the Army. In addition, the restriction for entry into MOS 95C Skill Level 1 was rescinded.<sup>6</sup> Seven years after MOS 95C was initially restructured, young Skill Level 1 Soldiers once again walked the cell blocks, supervising prisoners. While most of the senior NCOs assigned to correctional facilities got their start in the corrections field as privates, the sergeants who transitioned to the corrections MOS in midcareer never experienced the private-to-inmate phenomenon; consequently, training and mentoring the new privates was a management challenge for those who had transitioned into the MOS.

In 1986, senior Army leaders directed that an evaluation of the ACS structure be conducted and that the role of corrections Soldiers in the year 2000 be defined. The major recommendations of the study, which was completed in 1987, were to establish a centralized management office to oversee the ACS (a recommendation that was also made in a 1970 study) and to adopt a regional correctional facility (RCF) concept.<sup>7</sup> But before the Army could implement these recommendations, the Secretary of Defense, in order to consolidate and conserve resources, mandated a study of all Service correctional programs in 1989. The consolidation of DOD correctional programs was approved in 1990; and by 1992, the number of stateside Army ACS facilities had been reduced to seven. Although neither the mission of the USDB nor that of overseas confinement facilities was drastically changed, the second tier of the ACS was totally eliminated.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the closure of the U.S. Army Correctional Brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas, eliminated the only centralized correctional facility where Army prisoners were retrained for return to active duty. Throughout the next 12 years, there was an increase in the number of correctional specialists at ACS facilities who deployed in support of contingency operations. They served as advisors for enemy prisoners of war and participated in detainee operations and resettlement operations (see Table 1, page 14).

In March 2003, the Secretary of the Army informed the Secretary of Defense of a plan to outsource the operation of military prisons, suggesting that the long-term incarceration of prisoners was not considered a core competency of the Army. The Army would no longer manage prisons, and MOS 95C Soldiers would be reclassified into other Army MOSs. A few months later, the senior Army staff recommended that the Acting Secretary of the Army reverse this decision. The staff argued that the operation of prisons directly supported the Army core competency of “sustained land dominance under required capability” by providing control in the theater of operations and that it indirectly supported the Army core competency of “shape the security environment and support civil authorities.” Collective training and experiential learning opportunities within ACS facilities served to hone the unique skill set that correctional specialists needed to perform detainee operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Correctional specialists who were deployed to Afghanistan and the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, were already incarcerating high-risk detainees and serving as valuable advisors to combatant commanders. Colonel Colleen McGuire, who was then the commandant of the USDB, stated, “Because of their experience at RCF/USDB facilities, [correctional specialists] have developed an eye for what works and what doesn’t work. Interpersonal communication and people skills, safe and effective procedures with high-risk inmates, and an experienced understanding of how to operate a facility would undoubtedly ensure greater efficiencies in any type of I/R operation. As with any skill, these operations simply can’t be learned from a book. We must recognize that abuse, apathy, and gross mistakes come from frustration and a lack of confidence due to inexperience and poor training. An efficient, safe facility comes from Soldiers with confidence, skill, and pride. 95Cs (31Es) do it best.”<sup>9</sup> The order to outsource Army corrections was eventually reversed, but the reversal was accompanied by a grand restructuring of the 95C MOS.<sup>10</sup> In a separate personnel action, the Army began modifying enlisted MOS numbers to coincide with the branch numbers associated with commissioned officers. Commissioned officers within the Military Police Branch were designated as the 31 series; therefore, on 1 April 2003, MOS 95C was eliminated and Soldiers holding that MOS were reclassified to MOS 31E.<sup>11</sup>

In December 2003, Regular Army military police corrections units began to be restructured for deployment from stateside installations on a rotational basis. In 2004, the 31E correctional specialist title was changed to I/R specialist and the duties were expanded to include not only the supervision of military prisoners, but also the supervision of enemy prisoners of war, detainees, and refugees. In October 2004, the 525th Military Police Battalion (I/R) was activated in Cuba to provide supervision for the high-risk detainees confined at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. In 2005, military police corrections units at the USDB and the RCF at Fort Lewis, Washington, were reorganized, equipped, and scheduled for deployment to Iraq. The first to deploy to Iraq was the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 508th Military Police Battalion (I/R), Fort Lewis, which

Year	Operation	Mission	Location
1980	Maribel Boat Lift	Cuban refugees	Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
1989	Just Cause	Enemy prisoners of war	Panama
1990	Desert Storm	Enemy prisoners of war	Iraq
1992	Safe Harbor	Haitian refugees	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
1994	Restore Hope	Detainees	Somalia
1995	Sea Signal	Haitian/Cuban refugees	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
1996	Joint Endeavor	Enemy prisoners of war	Taszar, Hungary
1998	Joint Forge	Enemy prisoners of war	Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo
1999	Joint Guardian	Enemy prisoners of war	Kosovo
2002–Present	Enduring Freedom	Detainees	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Afghanistan
2003–2011	Iraqi Freedom	Detainees	Iraq
2012–2013	Enduring Freedom	Military prisoners	Theater Field Confinement Facility–Kuwait

**Table 1. Deployment of Army correctional specialists in support of contingency operations**

deployed in 2005 and again in 2008. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 705th Military Police Battalion (I/R), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, deployed in 2006 and again in 2009. During the 2006 deployment, the 705th Military Police Battalion was the only active duty military police battalion at Camp Bucca, Iraq, where 23,000 detainees were confined. Immediately and at a relentless pace, MOS 31E Soldiers reassessed security measures, separated security threat groups, established rehabilitation programs, and improved the overall handling of detainees. Many senior military leaders believe that the 31Es singlehandedly shaped the strategic role of the Nation by improving the international community view regarding the safe, secure, and humane treatment of detainees. The Global War on Terrorism continued; and in April 2009, the 40th Military Police Battalion (I/R) was activated at Fort Leavenworth. Within 2 years, it was deployed to Iraq. After transferring the final 200 high-value detainees to the Iraqi government under a status-of-forces agreement, the 40th was the last military police unit to leave Iraq.



**Camp Bucca**

The I/R specialists of today are multifaceted. First, they are warriors, defending our Nation against all enemies—foreign and domestic. As Soldiers, they are held to strict standards regarding ethics, conduct, physical fitness, weight control, appearance, security maintenance, combat skills, weapons qualification, and survivability. Second, as supervisors of captives, they must differentiate between military prisoners, enemy prisoners of war, and detainees. They train in the areas of military justice and the use of force, Army corrections policies and procedures, the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the rules of war, and international political and religious customs. They must be aware of the informational, social, political, infrastructural, economic, and physical spectra of the country in which they are operating. Besides the normal dangers of working among violent offenders, they must deal with the outsider threat. Corrections officers commonly face active-shooter scenarios; however, the additional uncertainty of rocket and mortar attacks and suicide bombers faced by I/R specialists is constant. Although English is the operational language within ACS facilities, I/R specialists dealing with enemy prisoners of war and detainees must rely on linguists in order to effectively supervise and execute detention processes. Finally, I/R specialists must develop host nation partnerships. The transfer of the detention mission to the host nation is crucial to any exit strategy. MOS 31E Soldiers train host nation correctional officers to understand safe and secure detention operations. I/R specialists must instill in their host nation counterparts the realization that—while crowding, neglect, and torture may have been common practices in the past—humane treatment within a safe and secure environment is now the standard. These are tremendous responsibilities for 31E Soldiers, as mission success completely

depends on their ability to inculcate these considerations into detention operations.

The unique skill set of I/R specialists is critical. If present, it can spell strategic success; if absent, strategic and international failure are distinct possibilities. Therefore, MOS 31E Soldiers operate within a profession that influences the operational goals of military commanders, the realities of combat operations, and the strategic end state of our Nation. The title of the I/R specialist will soon be changed to corrections and detention specialist.



#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>*The Army Profession*, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, October 2012, <<http://cape.army.mil/repository/ProArms/Army%20Profession%20Pamphlet.pdf>>, accessed on 12 December 2013.

<sup>2</sup>William Cockerham, "New Correctional Course Developed," *Military Police Journal*, August 1967, p. 16.

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<sup>5</sup>William G. Keyes, "The Correctional Specialist . . . 'A Rose by Any Other Name?,'" *Military Police Journal*, September 1967.

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<sup>7</sup>*Corrections 2000*, Department of the Army, 1986.

<sup>8</sup>*Report to the Secretary of Defense on Consolidation of Corrections Under DOD*, DOD, May 1990.

<sup>9</sup>Colleen McGuire, "MP Internment/Resettlement Institutional Training," *Detainee Task Force Initial Update: Policy and Training Way-Ahead*, USDB, 27 February 2004.

<sup>10</sup>Military Personnel Message 03-124, April 2003.

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*("Integrating Army Law Enforcement Response Systems," continued from page 11)*

of patrol dispositions to operations centers using geographic information system mapping and prepopulated reports of calls for service.

The information-sharing architecture and associated tools will enable intelligence-led, problem-oriented, prevention-focused policing. The capability for integrated sharing will enable faster analysis of courses of action, speed response processes, and increase the horizontal and vertical dissemination of information. It will enable Soldiers to mitigate threats and allow leaders to align manpower and protection assets to best meet overall mission needs.

Lastly, this effort will allow movement toward the 2012 Army Campaign Objectives of "Deliver services and provide infrastructure to enable global operations" and "Sustain and enhance business operations."<sup>2</sup> It also supports Goal 2 of "Military Police Force Strategy 2020," which is "Assess and implement a preventive policing strategy to protect the force at home and abroad."<sup>3</sup>

#### Conclusion

The technological integration of protection information will enable military police to communicate a more accurate picture of criminal threats against the Army and impart the benefits to senior leaders.



#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>DODI 5525.16, *Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange (LE D-DEX)*, 29 August 2013.

<sup>2</sup>"Army, AMC, and CECOM Strategic Linkages," U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, <[http://www.cecom.army.mil/Campaign\\_Plan\\_2013/files/assets/basic-html/page16.html](http://www.cecom.army.mil/Campaign_Plan_2013/files/assets/basic-html/page16.html)>, accessed on 6 February 2014.

<sup>3</sup>"Military Police Force Strategy 2020," <[http://www.army.mil/article/97162/MP\\_Strategic\\_Plan\\_2020/](http://www.army.mil/article/97162/MP_Strategic_Plan_2020/)>, accessed on 6 February 2014.

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# THE HUMAN DOMAIN AND THE HYBRID THREAT

*By Captain Ari Fisher*

“Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills,” a recent Strategic Landpower Task Force white paper, succinctly articulates the strategic importance of the human domain in future operations. Given the fundamental premise that people are at the epicenter of national engagements, “conflict is also an inherently human endeavor.”<sup>1</sup> Force indomitability will not be sufficient; therefore, strategies used to accomplish the missions outlined in defense strategic guidance must have human objectives, defined as “actions taken to influence people—be they government and military leaders or groups within a population—as their core strategic focus.”<sup>2</sup> This leaves much to the imagination, resulting in more questions than answers—questions like: What is the human domain? How do opposing forces operate within it? How do we achieve objectives within a domain that is inherently intangible? The human domain encapsulates the elements that influence the human condition—which, in turn, define human terrain features. This provides friendly forces a map with which to identify decisive points against a populace center of gravity and serves as friendly and opposing force “ways” to a populace “ends.”

## Part One: Framing

According to Admiral William H. McRaven, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, “The human domain encompasses the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior.”<sup>3</sup> Although this is an informative description, further characterization of the human domain is prudent.

Human and land domains overlap along the range of military operations. For friendly and opposing forces, operations centered on the human domain strategically precede operations focused on the land domain.<sup>4</sup> Historically, hybrid threat actors who conduct irregular warfare are dominant within the human domain—their preferred arena of conflict. Consequently, U.S. government agencies are left to analyze what it takes to “win wars among the people,”<sup>5</sup> addressing what it means to win hearts and minds.

The categorical analysis of the human domain is far more difficult. For this reason, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs may be useful (see Figure 1).<sup>6</sup> For this article, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs provides a construct to guide discussion about

irregular opposing-force actions and a means of leveraging operational art. The purpose is not to develop or advocate a comprehensive analytical comparison of human psychological needs within the operational environment.

Abraham Maslow believed that people are inherently motivated to achieve certain needs and that, once achieved, they move on to other, more advanced needs. The satisfaction of lower-order needs is requisite to climbing the hierarchy to higher-order needs. The five levels of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, in ascending order, are—

- **Biological and physiological.** Biological and physiological needs include food, water, warmth, sleep, and sex.
- **Safety.** Safety needs include security, protection from the elements, law and order, and stability.
- **Social.** Social needs include love and affection, family, work and social groups and relationships, and a sense of belonging.
- **Esteem.** Esteem needs include responsibility, self-esteem, achievement, mastery, independence, social status, and prestige.
- **Self-actualization.** Self-actualization needs include the realization of personal potential, self-fulfillment, and peak experiences (personal growth).<sup>7</sup>

Whether conscious of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs or not, hybrid threat actors can be very effective at executing tasks, roles, or operations to fulfill needs. The ability to attain an effective level of authenticity is paramount for any actor seeking longevity as a figure or apparatus of authority granted by the general public. This is just as true for a policeman on the beat or an elected official as it is for a criminal, insurgent, or guerrilla. Ultimately, within the human domain, “the irregular [opposing force] seeks to obtain recognition of its legitimacy by a willing populace.”<sup>8</sup> Insurgents and guerrillas are largely native; their indigenous knowledge of the language, geography, residents, customs, and concerns provides them with the innate ability to develop relationships and meet hierarchical needs. They also enjoy a marked advantage over visitors, who are often portrayed—or at least viewed—as imperial.<sup>9</sup> As a result, hybrid threat actors can be highly effective at executing tasks, operations, or roles to fulfill their needs.



**Figure 1. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs**

According to Army doctrine, centers of gravity in a complex operational environment can be either physical or moral. Whereas physical centers of gravity are easier to identify and are singularly affected by military means, moral centers of gravity are “intangible and more difficult to influence.”<sup>10</sup> A strong-willed populace is an example of a moral center of gravity. Through the identification of the center of gravity, planners are well on the way to applying operational art to the human domain.<sup>11</sup> The center of gravity is identical to the desired core of legitimacy of the irregular opposing force. Subsequent efforts should be applied to decision points and the classification of lines of operation and effort.

### **Part Two: Opposing-Force “Ways”**

There are multitudes of ways that hybrid threat actors can exert control over the populace within the human domain. Ultimately, locals may actively or passively support the efforts of hybrid threat actors.<sup>12</sup> Motivations may vary, but can generally be aligned along hierarchical need. For example, the motivation could be related to finances (receipt of payments or benefits), security (receipt of physiological or safety needs), or ethnic or religious issues (receipt of social needs).<sup>13</sup> There are numerous examples of overlap between the need deficiencies of the populace and the need fulfillment by hybrid threat actors.

Human biological and physiological needs are vital. Where the state fails to provide basic physiological services, other actors step in. For instance, in the Dominican Republic, community organizations, churches, and other nongovernmental organizations temporarily filled the gap between physiological populace needs and state-provided

services. However, criminal organizations with the necessary funds and resources have recently begun to fill the vacuum left by repeated state failures.<sup>14</sup> One way for groups to obtain money is through resource or commodity sales. In southern Afghanistan, the opium trade is rich. The Taliban offers loans to farmers who agree to grow poppies to meet production quotas. These agreements provide farmers with work and a means to sustain their families. However, under this *salaam* system, farmers “presell their crops at planting time at a price that was lower than its market value at harvest,” ultimately “[trapping] thousands of poor farm families into a crippling debt cycle.”<sup>15</sup> Although the Taliban helps farmers meet the biological need to minimally provide for their families, it also holds the farmers captive for future exploitation. This is a common example of insurgent civic interaction and support of criminal enterprise profiting. While the *salaam* system may meet an essential need and serve as an effective means of control, it is not the best means of gaining legitimacy.

Security, law and order, and stability are necessities for the human condition. To illustrate, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia is best known for what it is today—a terrorist organization and transnational, organized-criminal syndicate; however, it “got its start like modern-day Robin Hoods, protecting rural peasants from the excesses of a corrupt government.”<sup>16</sup> Protection is only one of the components. The establishment of a governing structure to supplant the state is another, more effective component. When successful, this approach garners great populace support. For instance, the Haqqani network furnished shadow organizations to provide minimal state functions, such as dispute resolution,

in Afghanistan for a long period of time.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the Haqqani is not alone; it is one of “many insurgent and organized crime networks throughout history and around the globe” to serve as security and a rule-of-law provider.<sup>18</sup> The Haqqani network and other irregular opposing forces seek to gain legitimate authority and provide for needs across hierarchies.

Social needs are also very important. Jalaluddin Haqqani (the leader of an insurgent group fighting against U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and the government of Afghanistan) put forth great effort to maintain good community relations in Afghanistan. Rent collection provided information about “vital public services, including religious education and health care.”<sup>19</sup> The Afghan religious education system offers the perfect forum for fostering family, relationships, and a sense of belonging. In addition, Haqqani “founded a *madaris* (plural *madrassa*) network that played a key role in spreading his jihadist world view.”<sup>20</sup> In duality, the demonstration of support and civic interaction serves populace needs and threat actor operations. The use of information technology, electronic networks, and social media for social belonging is a recent development. These media enable “people to mobilize and create strategic events at incredible speeds and then dissolve, shift activity, or disappear entirely,” while “also creat[ing] second- and third-order ripple effects that can be felt outside the region.”<sup>21</sup> For instance, a reporter who live-tweeted about U.S. drone strikes occurring in Yemen garnered quite a Twitter following.<sup>22</sup> Likewise, Hafeez Assad, the Syrian president’s son—or someone claiming to be him—created a Facebook® post that was liked, shared, and commented on numerous times, garnering a large number of supporters.<sup>23</sup> These examples illustrate how social needs may be met while adversaries engage in perception management as a component of their larger information warfare effort.

Needs for esteem are more likely to be met by a willing populace that is not only satisfied, but also pleased with those who are in power. For example, “A grateful public can provide valuable security and support functions. The local citizenry may willingly provide ample intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and security support.”<sup>24</sup> Under these circumstances, the support is not a product of some form of coercion—as that would not meet the needs of achievement, status, or managerial responsibility. In some cases, divergent beliefs help rationalize active support to continue the fulfillment of esteem needs and to profit in order to fulfill lower-order needs—especially biological needs. The issue involving Islam and the use of drugs provides a case in point: Some Islamic scholars contend that Islam bans any dealings with narcotics; others argue that, although it is wrong to consume narcotics, partaking in other aspects of the drug trade to earn money and fight the holy war is acceptable.<sup>25</sup>

Self-actualization is far more rare and difficult to target. It most likely occurs only in isolated instances for select individuals with satisfied esteem needs. Irregular opposing-force actions occur predominantly within the realm of the lower hierarchies, as that is where opposing forces have greatest control.

### Part Three: Friendly-Force Articulation

The implementation of concepts and the execution of objectives within the human domain are important in achieving strategic success. The purpose of this discussion, which describes one way to approach operational implementation, is to serve as a stimulus for further discourse. Considering the identification of a shared center of gravity or core of legitimacy with irregular opposing forces, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, and examples of hybrid threat actor engagements, this article moves forward using operational art and examining a paradigm of an interdependent and interoperable structure designed to achieve success in the human domain.

The human domain may not be a line of effort (LOE) in itself; however, consideration should be given to using Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs to develop decisive points relative to the human domain. The purpose of decisive points is to fulfill populace needs or to have an operational effect on the ability of the irregular opposing force to fulfill populace needs. Arranging LOEs in ascending order (restoration/development of essential services, security, governance, infrastructure development) and subsequently plotting the human domain-focused decisive points reveal Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. The ability to identify and depict decisive points, achieve decisive point objectives, and uniformly progress along LOEs provides insight into operational effectiveness by answering the question, “Are we doing the right things?” and helps avoid the question, “How did we do so much and achieve so little?”

Military action in the human domain may arguably be viewed as a proactive effort, rather than as a final instrument of national power. For instance, special operations forces are advocates for a seventh warfighting function which “addresses the related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of a people (friendly, neutral, adversary), security forces, and governments and enables the prioritization and synchronization of efforts to achieve strategic effects.”<sup>26</sup> The assertion is that this approach allows the Army to leverage its recent wartime experience when performing missions involving unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, stability operations, and security force assistance. Preventing conflict is preferable, but proactive involvement also reduces the likelihood of encountering strategic surprises, aggressor miscalculations of friendly capabilities or resolve, or heightened aggressor responsiveness to crises.<sup>27</sup> In a recent article, Colonel Robert Simpson (acting director, Concept Development and Learning Directorate, Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC]) stated that, in a proactive capacity, “We have the ability not only to compel, but to persuade people in a positive way.”<sup>28</sup>

Successful engagements in the human domain include interdependent, interoperable strategies. The Strategic Landpower Task Force white paper asserts that “Interdependent teams of conventional and special operations forces can build local forces capable of handling many situations that previously called for direct U.S. intervention.”<sup>29</sup> A concept that was recently developed during Rotation 13-09 at the Joint



**Figure 2. The elements of combat power (Adapted from ADRP 3-0)<sup>30</sup>**

Readiness Training Center serves as an example. Leaders and subject matter experts from the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) and the U.S. Army Military Police Corps convened to develop a model provost marshal cell within the Special Forces Command and to construct small, deployable, interoperable teams. Using shared security force assistance experience and branch-specific knowledge, skills, and abilities, the main effort would focus on assessing and developing culturally attuned national and strategic policing capabilities to support mission objectives and to build partner nation capacities for security, governance, and the rule of law. The growth of capability and capacity could include—but would not be limited to—the areas of public safety, emergency response, police management, and anticorruption. This example highlights two interesting points:

- With regard to operational art, the suturing of special operations forces and military police provides a unique means to achieve success with decisive points along multiple LOEs during multiple phases of operation.
- With regard to proactive engagement and a seventh warfighting function, deployable special operations forces/military police teams are applicable throughout the range of military operations and are probably most effective when used early in the process.

Diligent and careful extrapolation to derive specificity in the approach to the human domain is surely forthcoming. However, certain truths are evident. First, it is necessary to understand

that “When we have formally studied the lessons of our wars and anticipated the demands of the new order that historically follows those wars, we have been successful in subsequent conflicts.”<sup>31</sup> Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and operational art serve as means to frame and visually model a way to view the human domain. Critical and creative thinking are essential. Second, whether by populace-supported legitimacy or by coercion, irregular opposing forces consistently dominate within the human domain, as their operations often align with the most basic of human needs. Looking forward, further complexity of the strategic environment can be expected due to the “rising velocity of human interaction (e.g., through the Internet, Twitter®, Facebook, and other social media), multiplied by the ever-increasing numbers of people in constant close association (urbanization).”<sup>32</sup> Third, leaning forward, the joint force is now working to develop concepts such as the articulation of a seventh warfighting function and interdependent and interoperable teams capable of producing successes in multiple forms to better engage in a complex operational environment. Ultimately, we must truly believe that “thinking is free.”<sup>33</sup> To that end, we must be exhaustive, inventive, and aggressive; our adversaries surely are and will continue to be.

**Endnotes:**

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Claudette Roulo, "Success in Human Domain Fundamental to Special Ops," American Forces Press Service, 5 June 2013, <<http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=120219>>, accessed on 30 January 2014.

<sup>4</sup>"ARSOF 2022," U.S. Army Special Operations Command, *Special Warfare*, Vol. 26, Issue 2, April–June 2013, <<http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/11815>>, accessed on 30 January 2014.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is a psychological theory proposed by Abraham Maslow in his paper entitled "A Theory of Human Motivation," which was published in *Psychological Review* in 1943. Although Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is often depicted in the form of a pyramid, with the most fundamental needs at the base and the most advanced needs at the top, Maslow himself never used a pyramid to illustrate the levels of the hierarchy.

<sup>7</sup>Sam McLeod, "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs," *SimplyPsychology*, 2007 (updated 2014), <<http://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html>>, accessed on 30 January 2014.

<sup>8</sup>Training Circular (TC) 7-100.3, *Irregular Opposing Forces*, 17 January 2014.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 16 May 2012.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>TC 7-100.3, 2014.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Lillian Bobeia, "How Caribbean Organized Crime is Replacing the State," InSight Crime: *Organized Crime in the Americas*, 24 July 2013, <<http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-benefits-of-organized-crime-in-the-caribbean>>, accessed on 3 February 2014.

<sup>15</sup>Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2009.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>*Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2012.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>David Vergun, "Influencing Narrative, Human Behavior Key to National Security," *Army News Service*, 28 August 2013, <[http://www.army.mil/article/110179/Influencing\\_narrative\\_human\\_behavior\\_key\\_to\\_national\\_security/](http://www.army.mil/article/110179/Influencing_narrative_human_behavior_key_to_national_security/)>, accessed on 3 February 2014.

<sup>22</sup>Spencer Ackerman, "Yemeni Tells Senators About 'Fear and Terror' Caused by U.S. Drones," *Wired*, 23 April 2013, <<http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/yemen-drones-muslimi/>>, accessed on 3 February 2014.

<sup>23</sup>Liam Stack, "Facebook Post Said to Be by Assad's Son Dares Americans to Attack," *The New York Times*, 29 August 2013, <[http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/facebook-post-said-to-be-by-assads-son-dares-americans-to-attack/?\\_php=true&\\_type=blogs&\\_php=true&\\_type=blogs&\\_r=2](http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/facebook-post-said-to-be-by-assads-son-dares-americans-to-attack/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=2)>, accessed on 3 February 2014.

<sup>24</sup>TC 7-100.3, 2014.

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<sup>26</sup>"ARSOF 2022," 2013.

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<sup>28</sup>Vergun, 2013.

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

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("Regimental Chief Warrant Officer," continued from page 4)

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<sup>1</sup>Georjean Trinkle and Todd A. Miller, "Collaborative Partnerships to Solve Community Issues," *The Police Chief*, October 2013, pp. 26 and 27.

<sup>2</sup>ADRP 1, *The Army Profession*, 14 June 2013.

<sup>3</sup>Mark S. Inch, "Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School," *Military Police*, Spring 2013, pp. 2 and 3.

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# TEAM JUSTICE CERTIFICATION PROGRAM: EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE

*By Major Melissa Cantwell*

**A**s a military police officer who had limited interaction with the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly known as CID) before being assigned as an operations officer with the 3d Military Police Group (CID), I did not appreciate the capabilities and capacity inherent in CID. However, after assuming my current duty position, I began to realize that I was failing to articulate the full scope of Military Police Corps capabilities and capacity to the commanders and staffs that I previously served. Fortunately, my initiation and integration into the 3d Military Police Group—through the 3d Military Police Group Team Justice Certification Program—quickly compensated for my shortcomings. The Team Justice Certification Program—a leader development strategy for all newly assigned personnel, especially commissioned officers—enables the group to educate, train, and expose new personnel to the unique challenges, capabilities, and capacity of CID. I regret that the opportunity to participate in the Team Justice Certification Program came so late in my career. To improve support to, and understanding of, the military police core competency of investigations, I believe that building upon the Team Justice Certification Program is critical in providing all junior military police officers with the opportunity to learn about CID. A more comprehensive military police officer leader development strategy would better educate personnel about CID and investigative opportunities and, in turn, improve junior military police officers' ability to advise and assist commanders at all echelons.

## **CID Mission**

The mission of CID is to investigate and deter serious crimes in which the Army has an interest. CID collects, analyzes, processes, and disseminates criminal intelligence; conducts protective-service operations; coordinates forensic laboratory support with all Department of Defense investigative agencies; and maintains Army criminal records. CID also provides criminal investigative support to all U.S. Army

elements, deploying on short notice in support of contingency operations worldwide when necessary. CID uses modern investigative techniques, equipment, and systems to provide commanders at every echelon with a full range of efficient investigative support, protective services support, police intelligence operations, and logistics security operations.<sup>1</sup> These CID mission-essential tasks fully support the military police core competency of investigations—just as the traditional Military Police Corps supports the mission-essential task of law and order operations.<sup>2</sup> Although mission command tasks carried out by CID and Corps support military police staffs are similar, the commonalities end there. The CID mission, mission-essential task list, vernacular, organizational culture, and career progression are unique. Thus, the transition and subsequent learning curve for officers newly assigned as CID battalion or group staff officers are significant. When an officer assumes a position within a CID element, additional education, training, and experience are required.

The ability to transition between staffs leads to well-rounded military police officers. However, within the Military Police Corps, opportunities to transition to CID elements are often limited to just a few field grade officer assignments—even though there are CID offices located at nearly every post, station, and camp. If a deliberate leader development program extending beyond an introduction to the CID mission set within an institutional environment were developed and implemented, junior leaders could gain greater insight, understanding, and respect for CID and the unique mission and capabilities of the organization. Such a leader development program would allow junior military police leaders not only to learn about CID and investigative operations, but also to serve as better advisors to senior mission commanders.

## **Leader Development and the Team Justice Certification Program**

The *Army Leader Development Strategy 2013* emphasizes that leaders at all levels must, within their organizations, create

conditions that maximize the development of subordinate leaders by educating them, training them, and providing them with the supporting experiences they need to grow as leaders.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the 3d Military Police Group developed the Team Justice Certification Program to educate and train new officers and expose them to the CID mission set. Although still in its infancy, the program strives to enable officers who are newly assigned to the group to learn about CID, the CID daily mission, and the use of CID in support of senior mission commanders at all echelons.

The objective of the 3d Military Police Group Team Justice Certification Program is to assimilate and integrate new officers into the CID group within 180 days of arrival. The comprehensive program is coordinated, supported, and ultimately facilitated by enlisted agents and chief warrant officers. The following topics are covered in the program:

- CID overview.
- Evidence program management.
- Case file management.
- Investigations overview.
- Automated Criminal Investigation and Criminal Intelligence System introduction.
- CID subprograms.
- Drug Suppression Team.
- Protective services.
- Sources.
- Contingency operations funds (.0015).
- Logistic security/economic crime.
- Counterterrorism.
- Personal security vulnerability assessments.
- Computer Crimes Program.
- Polygraph Program.
- Crime scene processing.

At the end of the training, the officers work at a local CID office for several days, shadowing the staff and observing the day-to-day activities, investigative operations, and evidence room management. If possible, they observe polygraph tests, autopsies, and computer crime activities; interact with the Drug Suppression Team; and visit the Defense Forensic Science Center, Forest Park, Georgia.<sup>4</sup> Although time- and resource-intensive, the education, training, and experience gained are priceless. Therefore, the group plans to seek ways to collaborate with other military police units throughout the group area of responsibility so that additional military police officers can participate in the Team Justice Certification Program.

### **Components of Leader Development**

There are three main components of leader development—education, training, and experience.

### **Education**

The *Army Leader Development Strategy 2013* defines education as the “process of imparting knowledge and developing the competencies and attributes Army professionals need to accomplish any mission the future may present.”<sup>5</sup> Education focuses on fundamentals, which Soldiers later practice and expand and improve upon through training and experience. Therefore, education relies predominantly on institutional training or professional military education.

The U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) must provide more education and exposure to CID at the earliest possible point in an officer’s career. Fostering a stronger understanding of the CID mission and role within the law enforcement community would help officers with the execution of law enforcement duties. It would also improve their knowledge and confidence in advising and assisting leaders at all echelons. An understanding of the scope of CID capabilities and the basic employment of agents would help alleviate the confusion and stigmas regarding what CID is and what it does. This, in turn, would increase respect for the niche organization and for the agents who work to support U.S. Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, felony investigations Army-wide.<sup>6</sup>

The Team Justice Certification Program complements the fundamentals covered during professional military education courses for military police officers. In addition, the 3d Military Police Group leverages USAMPS and Federal Law Enforcement Training Center courses to provide advanced educational opportunities for officers and agents. Attendance at advanced investigative training courses increases the staff ability to understand, coordinate, synchronize, and support the mission. Thus, by improving the education of officers with regard to investigations and the critical mission and unique skill sets of CID, USAMPS would help demystify this facet of the Military Police Corps. Increased education would also result in increased respect for the CID mission and agents and would arm a greater percentage of military police leaders with the facts and data necessary to inform senior mission commanders about the support and assistance provided by military police—especially CID.<sup>7</sup>

### **Training**

Training is defined as an “organized, structured, continuous, and progressive process based on sound principles of learning designed to increase the capability of individuals, units, and organizations to perform specified tasks or skills.”<sup>8</sup> Soldiers receive training in institutional or operational environments. Training is most advantageous when it takes place within the operational environment, where CID agents and other law enforcement professionals and organizations come together in a realistic setting. Joint and combined exercises not only enhance agent abilities, but also provide officers with an increased understanding of the unique CID mission and capabilities and illustrate the partnership and integration of CID within the directorate of emergency services and the law enforcement community. The 3d Military Police Group participates in training (such as annual critical-incident

response training and continuity-of-operations events) and exercises (such as Guardian Shield and Capital Shield) to enable directorate of emergency services personnel, staff officers, and agents to work together, fostering respect and teamwork and improving overall investigative operations skill sets. Through annual training guidance, the 3d Military Police Group directs leaders to seek out, lead, and participate in a wide variety of operational training opportunities. The Military Police Corps should, likewise, seek out additional collective training opportunities focused on investigative operations in order to increase awareness, understanding, and respect among military police leaders and agents at all echelons.<sup>9</sup> Institutional and operational training exposes leaders to the interdependence of CID, the Military Police Corps and, ultimately, the directorate of emergency services.

### **Experience**

The Army uses assignment progression, development, broadening opportunities, and outside influences to provide leaders with the experiential opportunities required to reach their full potential.<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately, experiences that expose military police officers to the CID mission often occur very late in the officers' careers. The sooner officers can gain exposure to (and experience with) CID, the more rounded and diversified they become. Officers with early CID exposure and experience are better informed and may serve as better advisors. This exposure to, and experience with, CID ensures that the officers are capable of integrating all facets of the military police mission as they advise senior mission commanders.

Experience can come in many forms; however, with the 3d Military Police Group, experience comes through hands-on events such as tours of the Defense Forensic Science Center, observations of polygraph tests, ride-alongs, and crime scene processing. The 3d Military Police Group experience also comes in the form of day-to-day interaction between staff officers and agents. Such interaction provides an opportunity for the exchange of questions and answers. Working together and exposing staff officers to the full scope of the CID mission set allow understanding and respect to flourish. Experience ensures that officers internalize and fully understand how the CID mission complements the overarching military police mission and investigative operations and how it supports the Army at large.<sup>11</sup>

### **Conclusion**

The Military Police Corps must not only foster multifunctional training events, but also seek means to expose officers to the CID mission set at the earliest opportunities. A more comprehensive military police officer leader development strategy integrating education, training, and experience would increase junior military police leaders' working knowledge and understanding of the CID mission and investigative operations. By adapting the Team Justice Certification Program and executing training at all posts, camps, and stations, the Military Police Corps could create military police leaders (at all ranks) who are well versed in the multifunctional military police mission set—especially in the area of investigations. Educated leaders would, in turn, serve as stronger advocates

for the entire law enforcement community and provide better support and advice to senior mission commanders at every echelon.



### **Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>“Mission,” *U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command*, <<http://www.cid.army.mil/mission.html>>, accessed on 22 January 2014.

<sup>2</sup>“HQDA Standardized METL: CID Group and Military Police Brigade (MP BDE),” *Army Training Network*, <<https://atn.army.mil/fso/default.aspx>>, accessed on 22 January 2014.

<sup>3</sup>*Army Leader Development Strategy 2013*, <[usacac.army.mil/cac2/CAL/repository/ALDS5June%202013Record.pdf](http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CAL/repository/ALDS5June%202013Record.pdf)>, accessed on 23 January 2014.

<sup>4</sup>“3d MP Group Operations Order 004-12 (Operation Justice Certification),” 3d Military Police Group, 15 August 2012.

<sup>5</sup>*Army Leader Development Strategy 2013*.

<sup>6</sup>U.S. Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*.

<sup>7</sup>“3D MP Group Operations Order 004-12 (Operation Justice Certification).”

<sup>8</sup>*Army Leader Development Strategy 2013*.


<sup>9</sup>“3D MP Group Operations Order 004-12 (Operation Justice Certification).”

<sup>10</sup>*Army Leader Development Strategy 2013*.

<sup>11</sup>“3D MP Group Operations Order 004-12 (Operation Justice Certification).”

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# MILITARY POLICE LIAISON TEAM COORDINATES AFGHAN SKILLS COURSE FOR DEPLOYING DEA AGENTS



*By Lieutenant Colonel Gerald G. Mapp*

All U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) employees who deploy to Afghanistan volunteer to do so. While some may have previous military experience, many do not attend tactical training before they deploy. For an interagency law enforcement element to work effectively in the dangerous and complicated environment of Afghanistan, two skills are paramount—the ability to conduct self-defense operations and the ability to conduct coordination and joint operations with U.S. and other military forces. As the DEA mission in Afghanistan expanded, the importance of providing these skills to personnel before their deployment became increasingly obvious; however, the capacity to provide these skills was not an organic DEA training system capability.

In February 1980, following the December 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan, the DEA closed its office in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, ending 9 years of drug enforcement efforts in that country. In 2002, DEA personnel accompanied the first U.S. diplomatic team to return to the previously abandoned embassy. In 2003, the DEA reestablished the Kabul Country Office and began working with the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) to reestablish a counternarcotics capability within the Afghan Ministry of Interior.

The initial emphasis of the DEA was on helping the nascent Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan stand up its Narcotics Interdiction Unit, which has an advanced training and tactical capability that allows it to execute tactical counternarcotics

operations throughout the country, targeting opium bazaars, heroin laboratories, and opium/heroin storage sites. Given the realities of conducting law enforcement operations in an active combat zone, this was a considerable challenge.

Afghanistan plays a prominent role in the global heroin trade, accounting for most of the heroin produced worldwide.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the DEA Kabul Country Office maintains a significant presence in Afghanistan. DEA personnel perform 2-year tours of duty, working shoulder to shoulder with the Narcotics Interdiction Unit and members of the Sensitive Investigative Unit—a vetted and mentored unit capable of conducting complex, long-term investigations—to target the highest echelons of the Afghan heroin trade.

***“For an interagency law enforcement element to work effectively in the dangerous and complicated environment of Afghanistan, two skills are paramount—the ability to conduct self-defense operations and the ability to conduct coordination and joint operations with U.S. and other military forces.”***

Afghanistan represents a challenging environment for the DEA. DEA personnel in Afghanistan support the counternarcotics objectives of the Government of Afghanistan, the U.S. government, and the international community by routinely executing law enforcement operations in conjunction with their Narcotics Interdiction Unit and Sensitive Investigative Unit counterparts

and select International Security Assistance Force partners in some of the most hotly contested regions of the country. At the same time, DEA works closely with the International Security Assistance Force to ensure that counternarcotics operations support the counterinsurgency campaign objective of removing sources of funding to the Taliban and other insurgent or terrorist groups. Meeting this objective requires that DEA personnel acquire a skill set which is unique among U.S. law

***“. . . the Military Police Liaison Team that was assigned to DEA designed and coordinated a month-long military predeployment Afghan Skills Course to prepare deploying agents and support personnel to hit the ground running.”***

enforcement agencies—a skill set that can only be acquired with DOD assistance.

To meet this need, the Military Police Liaison Team that was assigned to DEA designed and coordinated a month-long military predeployment Afghan Skills Course to prepare deploying agents and support personnel to hit the ground running. Working with the DEA Office of Global Enforcement for Europe, Asia, and Africa and the Kabul Country Office to develop a comprehensive training plan, the Military Police Liaison Team identified the gap between existing DEA skill sets and those skill sets required to operate in-theater. Members of the Washington Army National Guard counternarcotics team and local U.S. Army Reserve special forces Soldiers were enlisted to establish the training team needed to support the predeployment rotations. Over the course of four iterations of the Afghan Skills Course, the training team has trained and certified 93 DEA special agents and six intelligence research specialists assigned to work in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As with comparable military predeployment programs, deploying personnel conduct some administrative predeployment activities before leaving their home offices. The deploying team is then assembled at the DEA Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia, for further preparation before flying to Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, where team members receive extensive training in first aid, land navigation, improvised explosive devices, and patrolling. Due to the training facilities and support units available, Joint Base Lewis-McChord serves as a superb training location.

Following 2 weeks of training, the team is relocated to the Yakima Training Center (150 miles to the east) by helicopter. There, team members begin to put their new skills to use in training scenarios that focus on planning and conducting missions based on actual, in-theater DEA operational conditions. The natural desert of the Yakima Training Center simulates aspects of the Afghan terrain and climate and creates an immersive atmosphere that prepares the team for deployment. Additionally, the available firing ranges allow for the training and firing of a variety of foreign and domestic weapon systems that DEA personnel may encounter in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Like the deployed environment, the Afghan Skills Course is continually evolving. To ensure that the course remains relevant and effective, the Military Police Liaison Team established a process to continually review and update the course instruction based on lessons learned in-theater and through other applicable DEA training venues. During the preparation phase for each iteration of the course, the team collects feedback from DEA personnel who recently completed 2-year tours in-country, personnel who attended the most recent class and have been deployed for at least 30 days, DEA primary firearms instructors, and members of

the Washington National Guard/U.S. Army Reserve training team. The Military Police Liaison Team also collects and incorporates applicable lessons learned from deployed U.S. military personnel. By constantly reviewing and updating the course and incorporating evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures, the team ensures that deploying DEA personnel receive the best possible training to meet the vast array of professional hardships which they may encounter during their tours of duty in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

DEA special agents and intelligence research specialists who attend the Afghan Skills Course receive instruction in the following areas:

- Mission planning and operational orders.
- Foreign and domestic weapons.
- Combat shooting.
- Personnel recovery.
- Urban movement.
- Improvised explosive devices.
- Combat lifesaving.
- Communications.
- Day and night land navigation.
- Convoy operations and movements with civil unrest.
- Cultural awareness.
- Air mobile operations.
- U.S. military structure.

The Afghan Skills Course culminates with a 72-hour field training exercise, which serves as the capstone training event. This exercise simulates the Afghanistan/Pakistan counternarcotic environment that the DEA special agents and intelligence resource specialists will soon experience. By the close of the training, the DEA personnel are ready to transition from the city streets of the United States to the dusty village roads of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

**Endnote:**

<sup>1</sup>*The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, July 2011, p.16.

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# INTEGRATING THE ALM INTO 31E AIT

*By Captain Eric Luley*

The way ahead for U.S. Army training is clear. No longer will instructors stand at the platform and lecture on various subjects for hours. The goal for the Army of 2015 is the Army Learning Model (ALM).<sup>1</sup> Training will become less focused on course-based throughput and more centered on the individual learner. Training outcomes will be evaluated based on nine areas of Soldier competency.

## **Transition to the ALM**

Much initial-entry training must be doctrine-based and presented in a manner that allows everyone to understand the basics. This is a philosophy that seems to have worked well for basic training; new Soldiers have been successfully trained to support the Global War on Terrorism over the past 13 years. As the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) shifts techniques, the ALM should focus primarily on advanced individual training (AIT) sites and on the AIT portions of one station unit training.

## **Soldier Competencies**

Many of the nine areas of Soldier competency have already been integrated into training at the platoon and company levels for Company C, 701st Military Police Battalion, 14th Military Police Brigade, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. This integration serves as a model for military police training—a model that should be implemented in all Military Occupational Specialty 31-series AIT phases.

According to TRADOC Pamphlet (Pam) 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, the nine 21st century Soldier competencies are<sup>2</sup>—

- Character and accountability.
- Comprehensive fitness.
- Adaptability and initiative.
- Lifelong learner.
- Teamwork and collaboration.
- Communication and engagement (oral, written, and negotiatory).
- Critical thinking and problem solving.

- Cultural and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational competence.
- Tactical and technical competence (full spectrum-capable).

Initial-entry 31E AIT training introduces and emphasizes six of the nine specified competencies; the remaining three competencies (comprehensive fitness; lifelong learner; and cultural and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational competence) are best trained and reinforced at operational assignment locations.

## ***Character and Accountability***

The Company C, 701st Military Police Battalion, mission is twofold: Army values must continue to be reinforced, and 31E Skill Level 1 tasks must be taught with the goal of preparing and certifying correction and detention specialists for operational assignments throughout the world. Students are required to live up to the Army values, and the company implements scenarios (such as those involving the rules of engagement or the use of force) that help identify possible values issues among students. Accountability is reinforced and rewarded within Company C. Student leaders must account for each other, ensure that they meet formation times, and sign for personal equipment issued to them. In this way, they practice personal accountability throughout the course of instruction.

## ***Adaptability and Initiative***

Adaptability and initiative are two of the greatest assets that Soldiers can possess. These key competencies are included in every facet of 31E AIT training. Although working in a detention facility requires strict adherence to guidelines and procedures, the operating environment changes constantly and 31Es must be able to adapt to any situation while still performing their duties to standard. Various types of environments are simulated by conducting field training exercises in a theater internment facility training camp and a disciplinary barracks facility.

## ***Teamwork and Collaboration (Oral, Written, and Negotiatory)***

Teamwork is one of the greatest competencies of a modern Army; and for Soldiers attending training as correction and detention specialists, it is of utmost importance. Teamwork is heavily emphasized throughout the entire course, but it is

especially vital during certain events. Riot control and forced cell move training require that each participant know exactly what the others' missions are and how the team fits together like a puzzle. AIT squad leaders often observe forced cell moves with dynamic initial entries—but because one Soldier fails to successfully complete a specific task, the entire mission fails. Teamwork and collaboration are stressed from the beginning, and they pay off through the entire training cycle.

### ***Communication and Engagement***

The most vital correction and detention specialist skill is interpersonal communication. Whether dealing with a rowdy inmate at Fort Leavenworth or a high-risk detainee in Afghanistan, a guard who excels in interpersonal communication can make the right things happen. Communication skills are taught during the first week of training and are then used throughout the remainder of the course. Soldiers must employ the newly acquired skills in exercises involving close-confinement operations, dining facility procedures, and visitation. The ability to use interpersonal communication skills in engagements with inmates is often the difference between a student's success or failure in the final field training exercise.

### ***Critical Thinking and Problem Solving***

Problem solving is another key competency for Soldiers, who are often thrust into situations where immediate reasoning and quick problem solving can strategically affect the country. Many Soldiers leave training and are employed in guard force positions where they must solve problems without the immediate presence of a noncommissioned officer. They must be able to react to minor and major disturbances by making sound and timely decisions, finding and accounting for missing detainees, and simultaneously dealing with multiple situations. Therefore, critical-thinking and problem-solving skills—the cornerstones of the ALM—are taught throughout the course and heavily emphasized during the field training exercise, as they are crucial to the development of dynamic military police Soldiers. Critical thinking and problem solving are perhaps most important for 31E Soldiers who perform the vital mission of guarding detainees at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

### ***Technical and Tactical Competence (Full Spectrum-Capable)***

Technical and tactical competencies continue to be main priorities for Soldiers, regardless of military occupational specialty or rank. AIT for correction and detention specialists builds these competencies through the time-tested method of crawl-walk-run training. All Soldiers are presented with the basic, doctrinal standard for completing a technical or tactical task. Throughout the training cycle, Soldiers attend lectures and receive hands-on training, which progresses as competence is proven. Each Soldier must exhibit individual technical competence, as determined through facility exams (similar to common task tests). Once the Soldiers have proven individual technical competence, they are brought together for the final field training exercise, where they must use their



**Soldiers prepare for a forced cell move at a mock confinement facility.**

skills in a tactical or theater internment facility. Although this does not represent a strictly tactical environment, the ability of Soldiers to successfully demonstrate the employment of these skills in a simulated stressful environment serves to provide the instructors with validation that a new class of correction and detention specialists is ready to perform the mission in any environment.

### **Conclusion**

The ALM represents the future of training. Although the model does not apply to every individual skill and task, it has already been used for many courses. It will continue to be necessary to teach standards—with little room for discussion—to Soldiers in basic training. However, as these Soldiers transition to AIT, they must begin to build a foundation of Soldier competencies. For correction and detention specialists, that process starts with committed, professional leadership within Company C. Company C leaders take great pride in building adaptive 31E Soldiers for the future. The ALM is the basis for what has been done and the reason for success in the AIT system.




### **Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, 20 January 2011.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

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*Captain Luley is the commander of Company C, 701st Military Police Battalion, which is the only unit that trains initial-entry correction and detention specialists in the U.S. Army. He has more than 20 years of experience serving in a variety of leadership positions throughout the U.S. Army Military Police Corps.*



# Military Celebrate 72





# Police and Anniversary





# CID Conquers the LTP

*By Major Thomas Bessler, Major Melissa Cantwell, and Major Dennis Holiday*

The Leader Training Program (LTP) at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, is a premier program focused on the deliberate execution of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to enhance individual and collective staff skills at battalion and brigade levels. The mission of the LTP is to “assist U.S. Army brigade and battalion commanders in preparing their staffs for future operations by enhancing their individual and collective skills in decisionmaking, staff planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization of all warfighting functions in time and space during the development of operations orders/plans.”<sup>1</sup> Dedicated LTP coaches train and mentor staff members, providing them with an opportunity to exercise mission command, focus on leader development, and increase unit readiness while preparing for future deployments and contingency operations.<sup>2</sup> By replicating the complexity of the current operating environment, the LTP challenges the commander, the staff, and the unit to rapidly apply the MDMP through a combined approach involving academics and practical exercises. It also enables repetition and, therefore, increased confidence in the application of MDMP in general. The collective benefits of the LTP led the 3d Military Police Group (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command [USACIDC] [commonly known as CID]) to coordinate an LTP rotation for the 502d Military Police Battalion (CID) before its deployment in fiscal year 2014.

The 502d Military Police Battalion was the first CID battalion headquarters to participate in an LTP rotation; therefore, LTP leaders worked closely with staff from the 3d Military Police Group and the 502d Military Police Battalion to create a training event that would—

- Reflect the real-world mission set.
- Meet the commander’s training objectives.
- Provide the battalion with an opportunity to refine information and knowledge management products and to develop requests for information in advance of the predeployment site survey (PDSS).

Although the planners initially faced some challenges and concerns, their collective effort led to a unique, low-cost/high-payoff event that reinforced individual and collective skills in an isolated, off-site facility.<sup>3</sup> The LTP rotation, which was conducted 8–14 September 2013, truly enhanced the 502d Military Police Battalion staff synchronization, proficiency, and warfighting focus. It was a success worthy of replication.

## Preparation

The LTP does not require many resources or much external support; however, a concerted effort was necessary to develop and refine baseline products for this exercise. LTP coaches worked closely with 3d Military Police Group staff to develop the base order, fragmentary order, and annexes used throughout the training. The LTP coaches adapted to the CID force structure and mission, and their flexibility enabled the training event to meet the unique needs of the 502d.<sup>4</sup> Using more traditional maneuver unit products, the CID theater campaign plan and its annexes, and monthly theater update briefs, the LTP coaches and group staff developed a realistic set of documents to enable the 502d Military Police Battalion staff to—

- Conduct the MDMP based on a realistic scenario.
- Discuss current trends in the operational environment.
- Identify requests for information for the PDSS.

In addition to educating LTP coaches about the CID mission set and assisting in the development of baseline products, the 3d Military Police Group coordinated all information technology, administrative, and logistic support required to sustain the LTP rotation. The Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations (S-6) Section, 3d Military Police Group, coordinated with the Fort Polk Network Enterprise Center to ensure that it could support and sustain the 502d throughout the LTP rotation. Through several reconnaissance and fact-finding trips conducted over the course of several months (but before the 502d arrived and initiated the exercise), the group S-6 section, the LTP staff, and the Fort Polk Network Enterprise Center identified general requirements, worked through connectivity issues, and established mission command requirements.

Although the training venue and coaches were provided by the LTP, the 3d Military Police Group successfully spearheaded the administrative and logistic coordination required for life support, travel, and facility setup. The officer in charge of the 3d Military Police Group rotation provided the mission command and administrative orders necessary to unite all elements and personnel. He also conducted reconnaissance and working groups to ensure that all elements were synchronized.

The training took place in a nonthreatening environment that was conducive to learning and team building. LTP staff provided the instructor support, observer/controller support,

and mentorship required during the training rotation. To further improve staff proficiency, systems, and products, LTP coaches shared advice and lessons learned from past rotations.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, the 3d Military Police Group did not send personnel to serve specifically as observers/controllers or as the exercise white cell; it simply sent an advance echelon consisting of key staff, including the command group, the S-6, and the rotation officer in charge. These key staff members facilitated the initial establishment of the training site; in-briefed 502d Military Police Battalion Soldiers, reiterating LTP rules and training objectives; answered real-world requests for information; and monitored administrative and logistic requirements throughout the training rotation.

As the 3d Military Police Group focused on synchronizing the overall rotation, the 502d Military Police Battalion prepared its own staff for the rotation. The 502d developed and executed an LTP preparation event at the Battle Command Training Center, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. There, the battalion staff received introductory MDMP courses, defined staff roles and responsibilities, built templates, and solidified and internalized the commander's intent. The LTP preparation event allowed the staff to focus its efforts, mentally and physically prepared the staff for the LTP, and enabled a warm start to the LTP rotation.

### **Training Objectives**

The 502d Military Police Battalion developed several key training objectives for its LTP rotation:

- Promote team building.
- Conduct leader development.
- Exercise, revise, and codify standing operating procedures.
- Exercise and refine battle drills.
- Focus on the mission and the MDMP.
- Train with, and increase proficiency on, software and systems associated with theater requirements.
- Exercise tactical command post, tactical operations center, and mission command operations.
- Improve the understanding of mission set, intelligence, criminal intelligence, and threat assessments, ultimately leading to a more synchronized and proficient staff focused on the future mission in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

In addition to enabling deployment preparation for the 502d, the LTP rotation provided an opportunity for the 3d Military Police Group to engage with its Reserve Component (RC) counterparts—the 159th and 733d Military Police Battalions. Representatives from these RC units supported several objectives during the LTP rotation:

- Providing support for the LTP rotation.
- Locking in the deployment alpha roster and assisting in refining the unit deployment order and predeployment training plan.

- Discussing the establishment of their own LTP rotation or collective battalion and group staff development training plan in cooperation with the 3d Military Police Group. The training, now only in the initial stages of development, would involve a phased process that would culminate with a certification exercise (CERTEx) in spring 2014. Battalion and group leaders will work with LTP coaches to modify current CID LTP objectives and products to enhance mission command, develop leader and staff capabilities, and build the team, strengthening the bond and interoperability between the Regular Army and the RC.

### **Lessons Learned**

The LTP coaches and battalion staff learned a great deal during the inaugural LTP rotation, and the LTP experience exceeded battalion and group staff expectations. The acronyms, vernacular, and diversified mission set of the 502d Military Police Battalion were new to the LTP coaches; at the same time, the MDMP posed a new challenge to many battalion staff members. But the LTP rotation enabled the 502d to achieve its training objectives and simultaneously forced the battalion staff to focus on the mission ahead, empowered the rear detachment to exercise its new authority, and provided a great venue for the 502d to identify key requests for information and objectives for its PDSS. Additional specific lessons were learned in the areas of sustainment and improvement.

### **Sustainment**

The battalion staff deployed to Fort Polk and transferred all day-to-day requirements to the rear detachment. While Fort Polk does not constitute an austere environment, the deployment provided the staff with some insight into the rigors of expeditionary operations, exercised the forward and rear detachments, and enabled those who were deployed to work through repetitions—training to standard rather than time.

The 3d Military Police Group staff established, coordinated, and facilitated all facets of the LTP rotation for the 502d Military Police Battalion, arranging all administrative and logistics requirements, establishing information technology support, and building the products used throughout the exercise. This allowed the 502d to prepare for the PDSS and empowered the rear detachment to assume the day-to-day mission, thereby enabling the forward element to participate in the LTP free of daily responsibilities and distractions.

The 3d Military Police Group presented an unclassified, yet realistic training scenario so that the event would serve not only to focus the staff, but also to prepare it for PDSS and deployment. The 3d Military Police Group also eased the sharing of products and information with the RC units and the respective battle command training centers supporting LTP preparation and, eventually, CERTEx operations and minimized manning requirements associated with classified training events.

The 502d Military Police Battalion staff conducted an LTP preparation event at its home station battle command training center a week earlier. The event provided the battalion with

an opportunity to clearly identify roles and responsibilities, discuss the MDMP, and build products before the LTP rotation. Preparation, LTP, and the upcoming CERTEX operations reflect the traditional crawl-walk-run training concept, which works well with a junior staff.

### **Improvement**

Due to the worldwide distribution of CID battalion agents, not all battalion staff members were able to attend the LTP rotation. The most notable absence was that of the criminal intelligence analyst. The participation of criminal intelligence analysts in the LTP rotation and the MDMP process would help improve the staff understanding of real-world criminal activity and provide greater insight into the unique role of criminal intelligence analysts and the support they provide within the theater. The information provided by the criminal intelligence analyst would greatly enhance the understanding of the operational environment and operational risks and improve the course-of-action development process.

The LTP does not generally include a white cell; however, additional group staff members—such as subject matter experts in specific warfighting functions or unit members currently stationed downrange—should be integrated. The integration of additional subject matter experts to mentor and assist junior staff members and the integration of unit representatives who are currently deployed to answer requests for information would improve the overall training effect. If this is not possible, a request for support from the unit that most recently returned from theater may be another viable option for providing greater insight into the administrative and logistic systems used throughout the theater. Fortunately, such a partnership will occur during the CERTEX.

### **Future Possibilities**

The LTP served as a dynamic, adaptable training resource capable of meeting the needs of a CID headquarters deploying in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, while also framing the operational environment. The training event, which was commander-driven and tailored to meet the needs of the specific unit and staff, included a deliberate MDMP exercise in an environment of nonattribution. The after action reviews conducted throughout the exercise “help[ed] commanders and their [staffs] learn to improve and sustain unit performance through the process of self-discovery”<sup>6</sup> and also helped build confidence and teamwork. Given the benefits gained from the LTP, the 3d Military Police Group will now coordinate LTP rotations for all units. The group will also seek ways to integrate units, detachments, and agents into echelon-above-brigade force packages and multiechelon warfighter exercises hosted by combat training centers to more closely reflect real-world operational support and to improve the training and education of CID battalion agents and staffs and area coordination center/maneuver unit staffs.<sup>7</sup>

The group must also look for ways to foster an expanded expeditionary mind-set. The local continuation of operations, critical-incident response teams, and battle command training center rotations enable units to focus, once again,

on expeditionary requirements and to remind leaders of the challenges of operating in an austere environment. While all units conduct annual emergency response exercises, battalion and group staffs must continue to evolve by pushing beyond the minimum training requirements to truly test their resiliency and expeditionary capabilities. The LTP is a means of forcing units and staffs to disconnect, to jump the tactical operations center, and to focus on operational requirements and leader development. By integrating CID elements into all facets of the combat training center collective training, the 3d Military Police Group can exercise and improve expeditionary capabilities at multiple echelons while enhancing relationships and support provided to senior mission commanders.<sup>8</sup>

The LTP was critical to the advancement of individual leaders and the collective staff of the 502d Military Police Battalion. While the LTP rotation illustrated that “practice is tougher than the game,” the 502d persevered and achieved its training objectives.<sup>9</sup> And the benefits of the LTP rotation will continue to add up as the 502d conducts its PDSS, participates in a predeployment CERTEX, and leverages lessons learned and newfound skills while deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom during fiscal year 2014. Furthermore, as a result of the success of this first LTP rotation for a CID battalion, the 3d Military Police Group plans to send all subordinate battalions to LTP rotations at Fort Polk or request training support from LTP mobile training teams, allowing battalions to improve their mission command and staff skills. The group staff will also seek echelons-above-brigade/multiechelon warfighter training opportunities. In addition, the group RC counterpart battalions—the 133d and 759th Military Police Battalions—are now actively searching for their own opportunities to implement similar training activities.

### **Summary**

The inaugural CID battalion LTP rotation was a true success. The training event represented one of several critical opportunities to prepare the 502d Military Police Battalion for its upcoming deployment. The LTP enabled the battalion to achieve its training objectives and to expand its understanding of the operating environment, the mission set expected to be encountered in-theater, and the MDMP. The event also enabled members of the battalion to grow as individuals and as a staff. The LTP is expected to become a critical training opportunity for all 3d Military Police Group subordinate and RC counterpart battalions. By applying the lessons learned before and during the 502d training event, the group staff and LTP coaches will continue to refine the training products in order to test and improve the mission command, leadership skills, and expeditionary mind-set of each battalion so that the “practice is tougher than the game.”<sup>10</sup>



### **Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>“JRTC Leader Training Program,” Information Briefing, JRTC, Fort Polk, Louisiana, 8 August 2013, slide 3.

<sup>2</sup>Michael Barbee, “The CTC Program: Leading the March Into the Future,” *Military Review*, July–August 2013, pp. 16–22.

(continued on page 35)

# The HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, Approach to the Army Ready and Resilient Campaign

*By Captain Wayne A. Dunlap and First Lieutenant Shanee Allen*

In recent years, the U.S. Army has experienced a marked increase in divorce, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and suicide rates. The impacts of continuous, permanent change-of-station moves and multiple deployments are not limited to Soldiers. Family members can also be negatively affected due to the need to adjust to life without the Soldier—and to make further adjustments once the Soldier returns.

Army Families are essential Army resources. Their health and welfare are vital to the effectiveness of the Army, and their strength supports Soldiers and civilians and helps ensure safety within their homes. The resiliency of Army Families depends on individual and communal strengths, the willingness of Families to support each other during stressful times, and the courage of Families to reach out for help when needed. The Army has a responsibility not only to the Soldiers who serve, but also to the Families that live the Army values.

In an effort to combat the stressors that troops and their Families face, the Army has developed the Ready and Resilient Campaign—a multifaceted resiliency campaign that teaches Soldiers and Family members strategies for coping with stressors. The strategies address how to cultivate a strong sense of community and how to keep an optimistic outlook on life. The campaign is designed to provide real-life solutions to everyday challenges and a resource for overcoming adversity. The Ready and Resilient Campaign focuses on reinforcing the physical, emotional, and psychological resilience of our Soldiers, civilians, and Families and on improving their ability to deal with the challenges and rigors of the demanding military profession.

The Army leader is a key component of the Ready and Resilient Campaign. Leaders must establish a climate that fosters trust and resilience and provides relationship-building opportunities for Soldiers, civilians, and Family members. The philosophy and vision of the commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 705th Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement), regarding resiliency at the company level involve providing a command climate that supports Soldiers and Families, while fostering individual and unit excellence. The commander realizes the importance of balancing work and Family priorities.

In keeping with the goals of the Ready and Resilient Campaign, the Family Readiness Group (FRG), HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, has focused on creating events that

build total Soldier and Army Family fitness and help create a safe, supportive, caring atmosphere for those associated with the HHC. The leader of the HHC FRG is no stranger to the challenges faced by Army Families. She has been married to a Soldier for more than 14 years and is the mother of four children.

According to the FRG leader, FRG events build resiliency by offering spouses a personalized path to assistance. She said, “[The FRG] gives [spouses] the knowledge of where to go and what to do without actually doing [these things] for them. It is a tool that allows them access to an advocate who has had the exact same experiences that they’re having and who knows how to maneuver through the hoops. It allows them to become self-sufficient and have the ability to pass that knowledge on.” She also indicated that the FRG has fostered resiliency in her Family, stating, “Our Soldiers work long hours and have experiences that are unique to the 31E correctional specialist [military occupational specialty]. Being part of the FRG has allowed my Family to come together with other Families going through the same trials. It has given us an avenue to share with them the insights we have gained and be an example to them. It is important to remember there is nothing we can’t overcome if we work together. It allows us to peer behind the curtain, so to speak, and get a glimpse of what our Soldiers do, while giving us our own path to be a part of something bigger than ourselves.”

By using FRG events to engage Soldiers, Family members, and friends in activities that foster communication, understanding, and bonding, the HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, has made resiliency training a reality. The HHC FRG has diligently worked to provide events that address physical and mental well-being. For example, the FRG placed baskets in the rooms of single Soldiers scheduled to return from deployment and provided a first-class, welcome-home ceremony for HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, warriors. In addition, the FRG hosted a “GI Jane/Junior Day,” which provided Family members, civilians, and friends with an opportunity to experience the life of a military police Soldier. The event included an overview of an obstacle course, a tour of various vehicles and weapon systems, marksmanship training with paintball guns, a cookout, and a class on riot control.

The HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, believes that *resiliency* is more than just a buzz word and that there is much more to resiliency training than fulfilling mandatory training

*(continued on page 35)*

# Corrections Certification Program

*By Private First Class Shane T. Powers*

From its beginning 125 years ago, the American Correctional Association (ACA) has played a vital role in ensuring that standards are upheld throughout the world of corrections. One of the ways the ACA does this is by offering a corrections certification program (CCP), which is available to military personnel. According to the ACA Web site, “The [CCP] is a self-study program followed by a 4-hour proctored exam. It provides individuals with a national method to become certified corrections professionals and recognizes the high-level capabilities and accomplishments they have demonstrated in the field of corrections.”<sup>1</sup> Accreditation is available to military or civilian corrections officers and managers who work in the corrections environment. Several levels of certification are offered:<sup>2</sup>

- **Certified corrections officer (CCO).** These officers work directly with offenders.
- **Certified corrections supervisor.** These mid-management level supervisors work with staffs and offenders in a corrections setting.
- **Certified corrections manager.** These managers manage major units or programs within a corrections setting. They may contribute to the development of policies and procedures, they are responsible for the implementation of those policies and procedures, and they have authority over supervisory personnel.
- **Certified corrections executive.** These individuals have reached the highest executive level and oversee the development of policies and procedures in agencies that deal with adult offenders.

## Certification Process

Several Soldiers (myself included) from Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Joint Regional Correction Facility, 705th Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement), 15th Military Police Brigade, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, have pursued ACA certification. To date, 11 of us—ranging from private to captain—have completed the program and received certification at our respective levels. The

certification process begins when Soldiers who have a desire to become certified visit the ACA Web site and download the necessary paperwork. A supervisor validates that the applicant currently works in a position that qualifies for the desired level of certification. For example, a corrections officer with 2 years of experience conducting daily duties in a housing unit would not be eligible to apply to become a certified corrections executive. When all paperwork is complete and the application fees are paid, the Soldier travels to one of the testing locations on a designated date. There, the applicant takes the 4-hour proctored examination. The results are later mailed to the applicant. When an applicant receives a favorable result and a congratulatory letter, he or she has the option to have leadership informed and to have the information released to the press.

## Leadership and Motivation

The motivation for me to achieve certification was that I wanted to set myself apart from my peers. I was fortunate enough to have leaders who saw my potential and motivated me to pursue my goal of becoming a CCO. Great leadership is important in any aspect of life—but especially when it comes to career advancement. Leaders are there to coach and mentor their Soldiers. I recommend that all Soldiers, regardless of rank, reach out and find a mentor who will guide them in the right direction—not only in their military lives, but also in their personal lives. From my perspective as a junior Soldier with less than a year in the Army, it is imperative that leadership is fully engaged in this entire process. I admit that there were times when certification seemed unachievable to me, but that’s when my leaders stepped in and kept me going.

## Preparation for Certification

Applicants for corrections certification must set aside plenty of time for studying before taking the examination. Soldiers may obtain study materials from their local ACA points of contact—or, for a small fee, they may obtain study materials through the ACA Web site. The study materials consist of textbooks and a practice test that coincide with the level of certification desired.

Soldiers seeking certification are highly encouraged to participate in small study groups so that they may better understand the materials. It is also recommended that they request the assistance of coworkers who have previously taken the examination and may be able to provide additional helpful information. I was one of the first few corrections specialists to take the certification examination, and I was certainly the first at my skill level to take the examination for CCO. Luckily for me, three others in my squad were also studying for the same test at the same time. During downtime at work, we reviewed what we had learned in the textbooks and we discussed our various viewpoints on the subjects. In addition, I sacrificed many personal hours (holidays and other days off) to prepare for the examination.

### Conclusion

Becoming a certified corrections professional is a rewarding experience. There are only a small number of corrections professionals throughout the United States who complete the certification process, and we represent our units in positive ways on a daily basis. We consider the corrections field more than just a job—we consider it our profession, and we want to be professionals. To me, becoming certified wasn't just something to do; it was something that I felt I had to do in order to be a subject matter expert. I encourage all corrections professionals to take this step and achieve corrections certification.



### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>“Professional Certification,” ACA Web site, <[https://aca.org/certification/CCP\\_overview.asp](https://aca.org/certification/CCP_overview.asp)>, accessed on 27 January 2014.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

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(“CID Conquers the LTP,” continued from page 32)

<sup>3</sup>“JRTC Leader Training Program,” slide 13.

<sup>4</sup>Barbee, pp. 17 and 19.

<sup>5</sup>“JRTC Leader Training Program,” slides 4 and 13.

<sup>6</sup>“JRTC Leader Training Program,” slide 4; and Barbee, p. 17.

<sup>7</sup>Barbee, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup>Barbee, pp. 17–19.

<sup>9</sup>Barbee, p. 16.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

### Reference:

Thomas H. Byrd et al., “93d Military Police Battalion: NTC Rotation 09-01.” *Military Police Bulletin*, Spring 2009, pp. 31–34.

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(“The HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion . . . ,” continued from page 33)


hours; rather, being ready and resilient should be a way of life. Integrating goals outlined by the Army Ready and Resilient Campaign and using them to build the foundation for the FRG has developed a company in which Soldiers and Family members want to be actively involved and want to improve unit readiness. HHC, 705th Military Police Battalion, Soldiers and Family members have a heightened sense of self-awareness and a desire to forge lasting, fruitful relationships. This has resulted in a company that is resilient and ready for the future.




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# On the Move: Military Police in a Movement Control Battalion in Afghanistan

*By First Lieutenant Chad Plenge*

The mission of the 39th Movement Control Battalion, Parwan Province, Afghanistan, is to provide movement control for thousands of local national trucks each week. This is a complex and challenging mission, but one that is essential to the success of Afghanistan contingency operations. Military police are a key element of the 39th, protecting the force and leading the effort to reduce fraud and pilferage in Afghanistan. Recognizing the value of military police, the battalion deployed a military police officer with the Headquarters Detachment. This officer performs three crucial functions—serving as a liaison with interagency law enforcement organizations, providing force protection (FP) expertise, and conducting antiterrorism operations.

The 39th Movement Control Battalion, which deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, provides movement control for all of Afghanistan. It supports more than 120,000 U.S. and coalition troops and civilian personnel, enables sustainment for International Security Assistance Forces, and assists with retrograde and redeployment operations. The battalion accomplishes these feats through the mission command of more than 15 movement control teams dispersed throughout the Combined Joint Operations Area—Afghanistan. In addition, the 39th manages the ground transportation, National Afghan Trucking, and short takeoff and landing airlift contracts. Each week, the 39th plans, synchronizes, and provides in-transit visibility for more than 1,500 ground and air transportation missions, moving personnel; mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles; fuel; shipping containers; and nearly anything else in-theater. According to a 2010 congressional report, “In Afghanistan, the U.S. military faces one of the most complicated and difficult supply chains in the history of warfare. The task of feeding, fueling, and arming American troops at over 200 forward operating bases and outposts sprinkled across a difficult and hostile terrain with only minimal road infrastructure is nothing short of herculean.”<sup>1</sup>

The use of contracted transportation obviates the need for three deployed brigades (or, under a 3:1 rotation, nine brigades in the force structure). Additionally, the contracts safeguard U.S. lives and equipment by keeping Soldiers off the dangerous roads of Afghanistan. But with a vast transportation enterprise that is largely sourced by contracted local national transportation, opportunities for criminal activities abound. Based on Department of Defense and congressional audits conducted in 2009, the cost of known fraud and pilferage exceeded \$25 million. According to a National Afghan Trucking contracting officer, “If \$25 million in financial loss was known at the time, you can be sure the actual amounts were many times that.” However, through the concerted efforts of the 39th Movement Control Battalion and numerous investigative agencies, the National Afghan Trucking contracting officer estimates that current rates of corruption across the multibillion dollar enterprise are down by more than 50 percent. This significant victory not only safeguards millions of taxpayer dollars, but also eliminates a significant source of income for criminal and enemy forces working against—and in many cases, in direct combat with—the coalition. An agent of another Afghan organization that is fighting nefarious activities said, “Just like for us, money is the lifeblood for these [enemy] forces. As we squeeze it off, we are absolutely depriving them of capability used against us.” The military police officer assigned to the Headquarters Detachment of the 39th plays a key role in liaison with these investigative agencies.

FP is another concern of the 39th Movement Control Battalion. A deployed environment includes threats and FP challenges that are not present in the garrison environment. The 39th is actively involved in countering internal and external threats on Bagram Airbase. With a law enforcement and security background, a military police officer was the obvious choice for the leader of the battalion FP team. When under a heightened security posture, the team emplaces and



**An FP team member assists Soldiers from the 39th Movement Control Battalion at a pistol range in Afghanistan.**

operates multiple access control points. In an unannounced, base-wide drill held early in the deployment, the FP team executed its defensive plan and thereby reduced its response time by 80 percent. The success of the team is a testament to the detailed planning and training provided by the military police officer.

In addition to leading the FP team, the Headquarters Detachment military police officer also provides antiterrorism and FP guidance to movement control teams spread throughout Afghanistan. A movement control team, which is comprised of about 20 Soldiers and up to 150 contractors, performs a variety of movement functions (including manning entry control points, sorting cargo, coordinating transportation, and routinely leaving the base perimeter) to organize local national contracted trucks for in-processing. Part of the military police officer's responsibility is to advise movement control team commanders on appropriate antiterrorism and FP measures to adopt within theater and in transit. This information increases the likelihood that battalion Soldiers and civilians (who are facing increased risks from improvised explosive devices, small arms fire, and other means of bodily harm) will return home safely. The 39th is nearing the end of its deployment; and due to its training and readiness, no combat-related casualties have been sustained.

The 39th Movement Control Battalion plays a pivotal role in supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. The Army recognized the unique skills that military police bring to the fight and aligned that skill set with the 39th. The lone military

police officer in the Headquarters Detachment functions as a force multiplier by serving as a liaison with investigative agencies and as the antiterrorism and FP subject matter expert for members of the 39th. Through the application of military police training and experience and through coordination with multiple investigative agencies, the 39th has saved Soldiers' lives and safeguarded millions of dollars by combating fraud and pilferage. The military police officer, Headquarters Detachment, 39th Movement Control Battalion, truly exemplifies the Military Police Corps motto by assisting, protecting, and defending personnel and equipment and enabling the 39th Movement Control Battalion to accomplish its mission.



**Endnote:**

<sup>1</sup>“Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan,” Executive Summary, majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. Congress, 22 June 2010.

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*First Lieutenant Plenge is the operations and training officer (S-3), 39th Movement Control Battalion, currently deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. He holds a bachelor's degree in chemistry from the U.S. Military Academy—West Point, New York, and a master's degree in business administration from the University of Phoenix.*

# Maintaining Training Objectives in a Budget-Constrained Environment Through Simulation

By Major Brian E. Bettis and Captain Melvin L. Mack

The 705th Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an organization filled with tradition and a long lineage of pride and accountability. Personnel assigned to the battalion are charged with a unique and important mission—maintaining custody and control of U.S. military prisoners while also remaining ready to deploy in support of war. This is a 24/7 mission that requires highly trained Soldiers with a special skill set.

Military Occupational Specialty 31E falls under the military police career management field; but unlike their counterparts, 31Es are correctional specialists who are trained in every aspect of the custody, control, and accountability of U.S. prisoners and detainees. Due to the nature of the 31E profession, 31Es must constantly address numerous obstacles and realities to satisfy the mission requirements of the 705th. These challenges include—but are not limited to—decreased budgets; the maintenance of accreditation; the operational tempo of personnel; preparation for the arrival of highly visible prisoners; and the human factors of the daily care of, and interaction with, prisoners. Armed with a trained, professional staff, the officers, noncommissioned officers, and other Soldiers of the battalion meet these challenges head-on. 705th Military Police Battalion personnel provide support for the newest correctional facility in the Department of Defense—the Joint Regional Correctional Facility (JRCF). This state-of-the-art facility is capable of housing up to 512 pretrial and convicted prisoners. Although filled with the latest government and private-industry corrections technology, the most critical JRCF assets are the trained Soldiers that staff the facility on a daily basis.

The JRCF is fully accredited by the American Correctional Association—a national, private, nonprofit organization, which began in 1978. More than 1,500 correctional facilities and programs currently participate in accreditation. The accreditation process offers correctional facilities the opportunity to have operations evaluated against national standards. During the accreditation process, every aspect of operating a correctional facility is evaluated and assigned an overall percentage of compliance with national standards. In 2012, the JRCF made history when it became the first facility to receive a rating of 100 percent on an initial accreditation evaluation. This achievement can be partially attributed to the professionalism and dedication of the members of the JRCF team, but also to the emphasis placed on training. All Soldiers assigned to the 705th Military Police Battalion must successfully complete 2 weeks of training in which they learn about working in a correctional environment. These reoccurring training cycles include Soldiers who are straight out of basic training; seasoned 31Es who have previously worked in correctional facilities; Soldiers who do not directly

provide custody and control to prisoners, but who provide support to the battalion; and civilian employees who provide support services inside the facility. To ensure proficiency in core tasks, 31Es must also meet additional training requirements throughout the fiscal year. This additional training helps build confidence not only in the Soldier, but also in the team. In the grand scheme of the JRCF mission, the time and assets spent on training are worthwhile; however, as Soldiers leave the organization and new ones enter, the entire training process must begin again. The knowledge, experience, and proficiency gained throughout a JRCF tour of duty are priceless; and when a seasoned 31E departs, leaders must—through effective foresight and training—ensure that newly assigned 31Es are postured for success. In a perfect world, extended 705th Military Police Battalion assignments would ensure the continuity of a highly effective correctional force; however, the reality of personnel changes and transitions will forever pose a challenge to JRCF operations.

At any given moment in time, a worst-case scenario can become a reality in just a matter of seconds. Realistic training prepares the JRCF correctional force to be vigilant in identifying and eliminating potential hazards and to react appropriately in any given situation. Although the JRCF leverages technology to enhance daily operations, the technology is simply a tool; it cannot duplicate or replace the knowledge and experience of 31Es who have mastered their craft. For this reason, personnel turnover is one of the many challenges facing the JRCF.

Considering the limited budget, coupled with personnel turnover issues, the 705th Military Police Battalion decided to use simulations in conjunction with unit training plans to give JRCF leaders, Soldiers, and civilians a chance to exercise their knowledge without jeopardizing the safety and security of the prison. To incorporate simulations into the JRCF training, the 705th enlisted the help of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager (TCM)—Gaming, National Simulation Center, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth. The term *gaming* refers to the application of computer games to support military training and education. TCM—Gaming is responsible for combat development activities, including the planning, managing, fielding, and integrating of gaming technology into Army-wide training. The organization focuses on ensuring that gaming technologies used by leaders and Soldiers adhere to Army standards for training environments and eliminates the duplication of effort for gaming initiatives and programs.

To maintain accreditation, JRCF standing operating procedures must be fully compliant and orders must be posted for all staff members to ensure that they know what to do in any situation. The prison also conducts quarterly emergency action plan exercises that focus on disturbances, bomb threats,

procedures for missing inmates, and severe weather situations. Facility and training objectives are severely hindered when exercising these plans, due to the real-world confinement of inmates. The exercises are staff-intensive, as the JRCF attempts to make them as “real” as possible through the use of role players and observers/controllers. Usually, not all staff members are immersed in the exercise and only a few training objectives are met by the end of the exercise. But through gaming, the commander—with much more flexibility—can ensure that all staff members participate and that the facility continues to operate without disruptions.

To help create a realistic simulation, or game, of the JRCF, the 705th Military Police Battalion supplied the National Simulation Center with blueprints of the JRCF, which provided a realistic view of exactly what the commander, staff, and Soldiers actually see every day. TCM-Gaming personnel added recorded sounds of slamming doors and inmate banter and requests. In addition, data from the Digital Training Management System was used to create avatars that accurately represent the capabilities of Soldiers. For example, a Soldier who is an expert with a 9-millimeter pistol is depicted as such in the game. Likewise, an avatar moves only as quickly as a particular Soldier’s actual physical fitness capabilities will allow.

The 705th is taking the TCM-Gaming simulation to a different level than most other units. Professional certifications are important in a prison environment, and assurance that the right person is in the right position can certainly enhance the professionalism of day-to-day operations. For example, a watch commander, who is ultimately the lead element for the facility commander, has a vital job within the prison. The JRCF can now use the TCM-Gaming simulation as a tool to verify that a potential watch commander has the necessary knowledge and skills before he or she actually steps foot inside the prison. The simulation can also be used to retrain Soldiers who might need to refresh their knowledge about a procedure or to validate a Soldier’s understanding when a new standard is implemented.

A prison commander who fails to think through an entire process can be haunted by the “what if” factor. But now, realistic scenarios can be created to help in the training development process and to show leaders and staff what could go wrong.

Thanks to the arrival of a few high-profile, pretrial prisoners, the JRCF has been in the public eye since it opened in 2010. Once it becomes public knowledge that these prisoners are to be held at the JRCF, major planning and coordination are initiated to ensure their safe arrival. Due to the controversial nature of some cases and the history of displays of public outrage on and off Fort Leavenworth, major precautions are taken.

In some cases, protesters line the main entrance to the installation and the high level of public attention naturally attracts numerous media outlets—all hoping for a chance to report the newest developments. As a matter of common practice in virtually any correctional facility, including the

JRCF, electronic devices such as cameras, cell phones, and portable computers are not allowed. In addition, taking pictures of the JRCF is prohibited. When high-profile prisoners with a great deal of media attention are confined at the JRCF, vigilant Soldiers continuously monitor the perimeter of the facility and identify and report any suspicious media activity they observe. Two armed guards conduct mobile patrol operations around the facility to ensure the security of the perimeter and beyond.

In addition, as predicted, deceptive tactics are sometimes used in attempts to entice inside information from the JRCF staff. One common media tactic involves locating various areas where Soldiers normally gather and engage in conversation about what they do in the Army. Once individuals are identified as Soldiers, media representatives ask probing questions in an effort to identify JRCF staff members. To counteract this and other, similar approaches, the JRCF staff attends numerous hours of media training. Through the training, the Soldiers learn how to interact with media crews while continuously maintaining operational security. The training is very beneficial.

Although the JRCF staff experiences life under the microscope when high-profile cases like these come along, the staff does not treat highly visible pre- or post-trial prisoners any differently than other prisoners. Without exception, JRCF prisoners are treated with dignity and respect.

Unit commanders, first-line leaders, and trainers must mitigate the risk associated with reduced resources with efficient, effective, innovative training. The Chief of Staff of the Army has indicated a need to balance the mix of live, constructive, and virtual training. This means that the type of training must be reviewed by echelon. The maximum use of existing training support systems is necessary, and the use of simulations will prepare the 705th Military Police Battalion for cheaper, more flexible training with less risk.

In a career field where teamwork is a must and predictability is a luxury, the Soldiers of the 705th Military Police Battalion rise to the occasion and fulfill their duties every day. From the lowest-level private to the facility commander, each Soldier plays a critical role in the custody and control of prisoners housed at the JRCF. Although the Soldiers of the 705th will continue to come and go, the mission of providing vigilant custody and control to U.S. military prisoners housed at the JRCF will remain the same. Soldiers assigned to this fine organization will provide custody and care for the inmates and serve as the standard—today and for years to come. 

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*Captain Mack is the assistant operations and training officer (S-3), 705th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor’s degree in human resources from Park University, Parkville, Missouri.*

# A SIMULATED INMATE ESCAPE AT CAMP ARIEFJAN


*By Sergeant Jennifer Spradlin*

It is a typical bright, hot day in Kuwait. At the Theater Field Confinement Facility, Camp Arifjan, a construction crew moves and arranges large, concrete force protection barriers. A military police Soldier is overseeing an inmate who is clearing trash. The guard and the inmate begin to tussle, and the inmate breaks free.

But this escape is planned. The “inmate” is actually another military police Soldier wearing an orange jumpsuit and participating in a scheduled exercise. For the U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers of Detachment 1, 450th Military Police Company—who are responsible for the only Level 1 confinement facility for military members in the Middle East—it is a real, if unlikely, threat.

According to the detachment commander, the purpose of the exercise was to test the unit emergency plan for dealing with inmate escapes and to make any necessary improvements to the plan. This was the first opportunity for the unit to conduct the training since arriving in Kuwait. It was also the first time such an exercise had been held at Camp Arifjan since 2010.

The emphasis of the exercise was on ensuring that the unit could quickly contact the appropriate agencies in the event of an inmate escape. In the United States, where escaped inmates can get off post, reaction time is crucial. Although escapees in Kuwait have nowhere to go, they can still cause



**A U.S. Soldier plays the role of an escaped inmate during a training exercise at Camp Arifjan.**



**Military police officers return an “inmate” to the Theater Field Confinement Facility at Camp Arifjan.**


damage. The detachment commander, who has more than 28 years of experience and works as a civilian law enforcement officer, speculated that escaped inmates might return to their units to try to gain assistance, to steal a uniform to avoid detection, or to seek retribution against those responsible for their incarceration. Training is the best way to eliminate these possibilities. With repeated practice, Soldiers will know what to do if an escape occurs.

After the escape of the simulated inmate during the Camp Arifjan exercise, military police Soldiers consulted the contact list and alerted emergency services and other law enforcement agencies. The unit coordinated the return of off-shift personnel. Response teams were formed, and relevant information—such as the physical appearance of the inmate—was used to create a flyer known as a *rabbit card*. These activities and the recommendations of the Soldiers who participated in the search patrols helped unit leaders revise standing operating procedures and identify locations where a would-be escapee might hide.

The chief of the unit correctional service branch said that, although the operation took longer than desired, he was pleased with the coordination displayed during the exercise. He also indicated that, while the reaction time of the provost marshal’s office was very good, the assembly of other confinement facility personnel took longer. The issue of time will be the main focus of the next such exercise, which is scheduled to coincide with the arrival of the replacement unit.

*Sergeant Spradlin is a public affairs specialist assigned to U.S. Army Central and deployed to Kuwait. She holds a bachelor’s degree in English from the American Military University and is working toward a master’s degree in American history.*





# Criminal Investigation in the European Theater of Operations During World War II



*By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)*

While World War II was raging throughout Europe and the Far East, the United States tried to avoid taking sides; however, we were providing materiel support to our allies who were fighting. U.S. factories produced arms and munitions for the Chinese, Russians, French, and English. When we finally entered the war, we were woefully unprepared in many areas. Our standing Army was small, and the Navy was inadequate for taking on the massive German and Japanese fleets.

The Army had abolished the Corps of Military Police at the end of World War I; therefore, with the outbreak of World War II in Europe in 1939, a military police corps needed to be created virtually from scratch! In conjunction with rising national concern over possible subversion and the perceived need to control hostile aliens, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson appointed Major General Allen W. Guillon, adjutant general of the Army, as the acting provost marshal on 31 July 1941. To meet the demands associated with an army mobilizing for war, the War Department also recognized the need for a centralized authority above the corps level. On 26 September 1941 (now the official birthday of the Corps), the Military Police Corps was established as a permanent branch of the Army.<sup>1</sup>

Before the invasion of Europe, there were 236 criminal investigation agents—who were supervised by 20 officers who were also criminal investigators—operating in the United Kingdom (UK). These agents were under the staff control of the Criminal Investigation Branch, Military Police Division, Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, and were distributed by unit throughout the Western Base Section, Eastern Base Section, North Ireland Base Section, Southern Base Section, and Central Base Section (located in London). At that time, a basic criminal investigation unit consisted of a first lieutenant and 10 enlisted agents. In addition to the agents in the basic criminal investigation units, 36 individual agents were assigned to various headquarters within the UK. Several reorganizations and expansions of criminal investigation units took place from May 1944 to April 1945.<sup>2</sup>

Supplying these investigative units proved troublesome, especially in the area of photographic equipment. U.S.-based criminal investigation detachments were required to turn in their photographic equipment before they deployed and were unable to get the items reissued upon their arrival in Europe.

Typewriters were also in short supply. While one typewriter per two-agent team was preferred, entire detachments often had access to only one typewriter. In addition, some of the handcuffs that were issued were of a British style and were cumbersome and difficult to use.<sup>3</sup>

Taking the crime rate and the number of available units into consideration, the theater provost marshal assigned incoming criminal investigation units as needed. Five detachments were assigned to the 12th Army Group and, in turn, distributed among the armies. Twelve detachments were maintained at the base sections in France, and six were retained in the UK. One specialized detachment—the 27th Military Police Detachment—provided technical support from Paris, but also had a mobile capability.

The five detachments assigned to the 12th Army Group proved to be inadequate. Consequently, in November 1944, the 12th Army Group urged all armies to use the organic criminal investigation section within each military police battalion (previously used only in the investigation of minor incidents) for the investigation of major crimes. In December 1944, all 11-man criminal investigation detachments were converted to 14-man units commanded by captains. In addition, four more 14-man detachments were created by using qualified men from within the theater.

While Field Manual (FM) 19-5 indicated that “Criminal investigators should be provided separate billeting and separate mess,”<sup>4</sup> such facilities were not always available. In many instances, agents were required to share quarters and mess with the men of military police battalions.

To more readily accomplish their missions, agents were given credentials and authorized to wear civilian clothing or the standard field uniform (minus the blouse) that was prescribed for civilians in the theater. When in the civilian uniform, agents displayed a metallic “US” collar ornament, but no insignia or rank. Agents generally did not wear civilian clothing outside the UK.

Due to personnel shortages, investigations in the European theater were restricted to major crimes—with some exceptions involving criminal investigation detachments along major supply routes. Investigators along major supply routes often conducted crime prevention surveys that extended to supply

depots, railroad yards, and other locations where large concentrations of equipment and supplies were stored.

Investigative personnel throughout the theater were directed to carry concealed weapons. Various suggestions regarding the proper type of weapon were offered. Some agents believed that the M1911 .45-caliber, semiautomatic pistol was too cumbersome and difficult to conceal and, therefore, suggested that the .32-caliber Colt automatic pistol in a shoulder holster or the .38-caliber Colt Official Police or Detective Special Models would be better.<sup>5</sup>

Criminal investigation units were not assigned to echelons of command below the army level; however, agents operated within corps and division areas when requested and when operations permitted. This often caused discord between the provost marshals at different echelons of command. At the corps level, provost marshals were responsible for keeping commanding generals informed about the crime situation within their areas and, consequently, demanded case and progress reports from agents. Staff echelons settled these difficulties among themselves.

Tens of thousands of Soldiers were court-martialed in the European theater of operations. The branch office of the Judge Advocate General analyzed the trial records of more than 12,000 offenders who were court-martialed before 8 May 1945. The reasons for the excessive problem population are complex. Many of the offenders joined the Army before beginning their adult lives. Many were good citizens who—except for circumstances peculiar to military life in an active theater—may have lived out their entire lives without experiencing an appearance in a court of law.<sup>6</sup> However, a large percentage of the prison population could have been properly classified as psychopathic or psychoneurotic. One group of offenders was discovered to have civilian criminal records. These offenders had been found guilty of robbery, burglary, and other felonies in their civilian lives and had repeated these offenses after induction into the Army. Crimes investigated in the European theater of operations included assault, larceny, looting, black market activities, rape, murder, sodomy, and manslaughter.

The assault cases almost always included intoxication, and many included the use of weapons (some of which had been issued). Black market activities were rampant in the larger cities, and offenders who carried out those activities were often absent without leave—or were deserters. Rape became a big problem following the invasion of France, with a large increase in the number of rape cases from August to September 1944. A second increase in the number of rape cases took place from March to April 1945, following the large-scale invasion of Germany. Incidents of murder increased gradually after August 1944, with some acceleration in January to February 1945 and a greater increase as troops moved into Germany 2 months later.<sup>7</sup>

Many death sentences—most of which were for the crimes of rape and murder—were adjudged in the European theater of operations. However, a relatively small number of those sentenced to death (96) were actually executed. All of those who were executed had been convicted of murder or rape—with one exception (a deserter).

The organization and manning of additional criminal investigation detachments continued as the war progressed. By the end of April 1945, 585 agents and 39 supervising officers were working in the European theater.<sup>8</sup> That same month, it was determined that a mobile crime laboratory capable of offering the scientific evaluation of evidence in forward areas would be a valuable asset. Captain George R. Bird—an experienced criminalist from Illinois—obtained and outfitted a small arm repair truck to enable field examinations in the areas of ballistics, photography, fingerprinting, handwriting, and chemical analysis. From the beginning of April to 5 July 1945, the mobile laboratory had been used to examine evidence for 91 major crimes. This included the testing of 238 firearms, 228 bullets, and 749 cartridge cases. Laboratory reports and accompanying photographs were used as court exhibits at trial.<sup>9</sup>

Criminal investigation detachments in the European theater of operations performed their assigned tasks in admirable fashion, often overcoming shortfalls with equipment and supplies. Based on their firm footing, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC), commonly known as CID, has become one of the country's premier investigative agencies and an asset of which the Military Police Corps can be proud. 

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Robert K. Wright Jr., compiler, *Military Police*, Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1992, <<http://www.history.army.mil/books/Lineage/mp/mp.htm>>, accessed on 10 January 2014.

<sup>2</sup>*Criminal Investigation*, The General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater, p. 4, <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/eto/eto-102.pdf>>, accessed on 10 January 2014.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 4 and 11.

<sup>4</sup>FM 19-5, *Military Police*, 14 June 1944.

<sup>5</sup>*Criminal Investigation*, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup>*The Military Offender in the Theater of Operations*, The General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater, p. 1, <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/eto/eto-084.pdf>>, accessed on 14 January 2014.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 6 and 7.

<sup>8</sup>*Criminal Investigation*, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup>*Criminal Investigation*, p. 11.

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*Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.*

# A JUNIOR OFFICER'S GUIDE TO DSCA

*By Second Lieutenant Christopher Francis Larkin*

Aside from foreign combat deployments, some of the most stressful and demanding situations confronted by a junior Army National Guard officer involve the defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). These operations, which usually occur immediately following major disasters or traumatic events, require that junior leaders be mentally nimble, effective, and adept at using noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to implement change in the operational environment. The purpose of this article is to prepare young lieutenants—particularly those in the National Guard—for the possibility of DSCA operations.

Oftentimes, junior National Guard Soldiers become the unsung heroes of a natural disaster recovery or a response to a terrorist attack or other traumatic event. As part-time Soldiers and full-time leaders, National Guard officers and NCOs have the same training and duty responsibilities as their Regular Army counterparts. However, they have an additional constraint; they do not see troops on a daily basis. When disasters occur, state governors call upon the National Guard to bring a semblance of order to the chaos. This responsibility generally falls on the shoulders of the lieutenants. These lieutenants are expected to focus their training and implement the DSCA plans that the states have created through decades of trial and error. This article discusses how junior officers can prepare themselves and their troops for DSCA operations, how they should work within a state emergency management agency chain of command, and what pressures they might face as leaders operating in the aftermath of a disaster.

Fundamental Soldier skills—including the ability to shoot, move, and communicate—serve as some of the biggest contributors to mission success in any DSCA operation. Mobility, internal and external communication, and the ability to enforce change on the environment help determine the success or failure of a DSCA operation. As leaders prepare for DSCA operations, they must determine how to ensure that personnel and vehicles remain capable of movement, communication channels remain open, and relationships and competencies are maintained. If these goals are not met, the best that a junior leader can hope for is to enact stopgap measures until more state or federal support can be brought to

bear on the situation. Because DSCA operations tend to move rapidly by nature, it is up to the junior leader to implement an appropriate operational tempo without sacrificing safety on the altar of expediency.

DSCA operations begin when an active duty unit staff initiates the alert roster, prompting leaders to begin contacting their Soldiers for an impending mission. It is critical that the Soldiers and leaders arriving at the armory have packed the appropriate equipment, based on the mission variables and the projected duration of the crisis. Soldiers should be prepared for an extended stay with little to no infrastructural luxuries (beds, hot meals, showers, laundry facilities) at the support location. This general lack of infrastructure requires that leaders make allowances for the missing items so that the basic needs of the Soldiers can be met. The problem is especially significant for DSCA operations that depend on electricity, computers, printers, and communication systems to maintain a constant flow of composite risk assessments, situation reports, and other important information that must be disseminated up or down the chain of command. It is particularly important that primary, secondary, and tertiary means of communication are prechecked, loaded with appropriate frequencies, and packed for the mission so that mission command will not suffer in the event that one or two methods of communication are disrupted. Relying on cell phone communication in rural areas is ineffective; the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System or two-way radios are often the best overall options in these areas. To ensure that Soldiers have a clear and defined set of parameters in which to operate, the warning order, primary point of contact, civilian chain of command alert roster, and phone roster for the entire operation should be provided to the officer in charge or NCO in charge before the unit departs from the armory.

Junior leaders should proactively prepare for DSCA operations. These preparations usually involve the use of common sense and are generally easy to accomplish in a single drill weekend. A standardized packing list should be generated at the platoon/company level and then disseminated to troops who, in turn, should prepare a “go bag” that is available for any mission. This cuts down on the time required

for Soldiers to prepare for a specific operation. The go bags should contain standard work items (such as uniforms, socks, boots, and helmets) and personal items (such as foot warmers, phone chargers, and anything else a Soldier might wish to have). Go bags could become part of the inventory that platoon sergeants and platoon leaders rapidly check before extreme weather seasons occur. A standardized packing list and a list of desirable sensitive items (radios, maps, thermal/night vision equipment, digital camera, pens, dry erase markers) for a tactical operations center might be a practical means of enabling the leading elements of the operation to rapidly arrive, prepare, and enter the disaster area with a minimum number of forgotten items. The objective of preparing for DSCA operations is a unit that can rapidly activate, organize, and deploy to the operational area with everything necessary to get the job done.



**The author briefs the adjutant general and search and rescue task force personnel at a tactical operations center in Maryland in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy.**

When a unit arrives at a disaster area, it is likely to be greeted with near or complete chaos. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many military and civilian chains of command were disrupted for jurisdictional, infrastructural, or communication reasons. Such disruption puts junior officers in a position where they must glean facts and directives from multiple military and civilian chains of command. The most effective way to handle chain-of-command issues is simply to ask the senior-most military member available how to deal with the situation and to whom to report. Regardless of whether the company commander is involved in the operation, the junior leader must remember to keep the company commander and the first sergeant informed about events and concerns so that they can provide the upper-echelon support that is not influenced by junior rank. On a more practical note, informing company leaders provides personnel and logistic support that is not immediately available in the disaster area. If the disaster drags on for weeks or months, company leaders can provide replacements for Soldiers and vehicles. In short, to accomplish

the mission, leaders on the ground must be able to quickly grasp the complicated military/civilian chains of command present in the disaster area while also keeping the existing (but not necessarily present) chain of command in the rear apprised of the situation on the ground.

Junior leaders must not shy away from making decisions—even unsavory ones. Instead, they should brainstorm with other junior leaders and solicit the opinions of senior enlisted advisors—especially before implementing anything that will significantly affect the mission. One DSCA contingency for which many junior leaders fail to prepare is that something *will* go wrong. Whether the problem entails an injured Soldier, a fatality, or a damaged vehicle, junior leaders must be prepared for the impact on Soldier morale and for the fallout from above. Leaders must be ready and able to face their Soldiers and to support them in recovering from any setbacks—including submitting requests for chaplain support, if necessary. Meanwhile, behind the scenes, junior leaders must also communicate with higher headquarters and complete whatever sworn statements; Department of Defense (DD) Forms 200, *Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss*; or other documentation that is needed to proceed with the mission.<sup>1</sup> Access to computers, printers, copiers, and other infrastructural items make this much easier. In any case, junior leaders are responsible for learning from mistakes and moving forward with operations.

With Operation Iraqi Freedom ending and the war in Afghanistan winding down, the National Guard will once again transition to an operational Army reserve rather than remain a heavily deployed component. The focus might again turn toward protecting the homeland and preparing for DSCA operations. Junior National Guard officers must prepare themselves for very different battlefields than the ones that they have primarily been facing during the last decade. The new battlefields will be located in our communities rather than on distant mountain tops. The focus will be on supporting our civilian government rather than on using warrior tasks to close with the enemy. Soldier training should always adhere to the basics, but preparation for DSCA operations should become an increasingly large component of the unit training calendar.

#### **Endnote:**



<sup>1</sup>DD Form 200, *Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss*, July 2009.

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*At the time this article was written, Second Lieutenant Larkin was a platoon leader with the 29th Military Police Company, Maryland Army National Guard. He was deployed to Garrett County, Maryland, where he commanded a search and rescue task force of military police; state police; and emergency management services, search, and rescue personnel in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy in October 2012. Second Lieutenant Larkin holds a bachelor's degree in business administration and economics from Salisbury University, Salisbury, Maryland.*

**MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS**

<b>COMMANDER</b>	<b>CSM/SGM</b>	<b>CWO</b>	<b>UNIT</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>
David Quantock	Dawn Rippelmeyer		OPMG	Alexandria, VA
David Quantock	Timothy Fitzgerald	John Welch	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Mark Spindler	John McNeirney	Leroy Shamburger	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
David Quantock	Jonathan Godwin		Army Corrections Cmd	Alexandria, VA
Burton Francisco	Jerome Wren		46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Sanford Holman	Kurtis Timmer	Mary Hagerdy	200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Mark Jackson	Richard Woodring		8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
Eddie Jacobsen	Gerald Capps		11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Bryan Patridge	Scott Dooley		14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Sioban Ledwith	Steven Raines		15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Alexander Conyers	Thomas Sivak		16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Zane Jones	Henry Stearns		18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
David Chase	Keith Devos		42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
Thomas Clark	Joseph Klostermann		43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Kelly Fisher	Joseph Menard Jr.		49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Robert Dillon	Peter Ladd		89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Stephen Potter	Terry Berdan		177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Malcom McMullen	Craig Owens		290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Eric Engelmeier	Abbe Mulholland		300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
Keith Nadig	Andrew Lombardo		333d MP Bde	Farmingdale, NY
Thomas Byrd	Andre Proctor	Kevin Roof	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Ignatius Dolata Jr.	Henry James III	David Albaugh	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
John Voorhees Jr.	Crystal Wallace	Steve Grant	701st MP Gp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
John Bogdan	Michael Borlin		Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
<b>MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS</b>				
Sara Albrycht	Peter Harrington	Dan Eaves	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Geoffrey Stewart	Tara Wheadon	Keith McCullen	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Lawrence Stewart	Mathew Walters	Phillip Curran	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Larry Dewey	James Tyler	Paul Bailey	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Christine Whitmer	James Sanguins	Mark Arnold	22d MP Bn (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Marcus Matthews	Marcus Jackson		33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Phillip Lenz	Michael Bennett		40th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Stanley Oneal	Carrol Welch		51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Matthew Dossman	James Hecimovich		2-80th MP Bn (TASS)	Owings Mills, MD
Michelle Goyette	Russell Erickson		91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Jeffrey Bevington	Brian Flom		92d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Richard Ball	Timothy Lamb		93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Todd Schroeder	Lee Sodic		94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
James Walker II	James Breckinridge		95th MP Bn	Sembach AB, Germany
Vincent Duncan	Gregory Jackson		2-95th MP Bn (TASS)	Baton Rouge, LA
Marc Hale	Freddy Trejo		96th MP Bn (I/R)	San Diego, CA
Kevin Comfort	Kevin Rogers		97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Scott Perry	William Rinehart		2-100th MP Bn (TASS)	Nashville, TN
Michael Fowler	Mark Duris		102d MP Bn (I/R)	Auburn, NY
Craig Maceri	Scott Smilnich		104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Timothy Pulley	Vacant		1-104th MP Bn (TASS)	Aurora, CO
Jerry Baird Jr.	Alpheus Haswell		105th MP Bn (I/R)	Asheville, NC
Lawrence Christmas	Vacant		2-108th MP Bn (TASS)	Fort Jackson, SC
Gregory Hargett	Darrell Masterson		112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Andrew Collins	Kimberly Mendez		115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
Barry Crum	Fowler L. Goodowens II		117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Robert Hayden	Robert Wall		118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis De La Cruz	Jose Perez		124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, Puerto Rico
Haymet Llovett	Francisco Ramos		125th MP Bn	Ponce, Puerto Rico
Randal Brown	Mikeal Crummedyo		136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
Tanya McGonegal	Chadwick Money Penny		151st MP Bn	Dunbar, WV
David Samuelsen	Robert Steele	Scott McGill	159th MP Bn (CID)	Terra Haute, IN
William Allen	Steven Slee		160th MP Bn (I/R)	Tallahassee, FL
Jennifer Steed	Victor Watson		168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Jonathan Adams	Donald Madden		170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
John Benson	Edward Stratton		175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO

**MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)**

<b>COMMANDER</b>	<b>CSM/SGM</b>	<b>CWO</b>	<b>UNIT</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>
Howard Zimmerman	Nelson Reyes		185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Paul Deal	Daniel Lawler		192d MP Bn (I/R)	Niantic, CT
Isaac Martinez	Richard Yohn		193d MP Bn (I/R)	Denver, CO
John Treufeldt	Marshall Ware		198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
John Whitmire	Jimmy Patrick		203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Lance Shaffer	Jonathan Stone		205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Kenneth Dilg	Jon Sawyer		210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
Allen Aldenberg	Brian Branley		211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Michael Treadwell	Randy Abeyta		226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
Ronald Neely	Robert Engle		231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
Timothy Winks	Fred Waymire		304th MP Bn (I/R)	Nashville, TN
Marcia Muirhead	Christopher Whitford		310th MP Bn (I/R)	Uniondale, NY
Charles Seifert	John Schiffl		317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Joseph Lestorti	Mark Allen		3-318th MP Bn (OSUT)	Fort Meade, MD
Christine Borognoni	Louis Ditullio		324th MP Bn (I/R)	Fresno, CA
Richard Vanbuskirk	Peter Schimmel		327th MP Bn (I/R)	Arlington Heights, IL
David Heflin	Richard Clowser		336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Anthony Hartmann	Keith Magee		340th MP Bn (I/R)	Ashley, PA
Alexander Shaw	Juan Mitchell		372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
David Albanese	Brett Goldstein		382d MP Bn	Westover AFB, MA
Kelly Jones	William Henderson		384th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Wayne, IN
Jerry Chandler	Michael Robledo		385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
Steven Gavin	Howard Anderson		387th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Vacant	Michael Poll		391st MP Bn (I/R)	Columbus, OH
Victor Bakkila	Ann Vega	Manuel Ruiz	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
Cheryl Clement	Timothy Eddy		400th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Meade, MD
Eric Hunsberger	Richard Cruickshank		402d MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Susan Kusan	Jason Litz		437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Mike Self	James Stillman	Mauro Orcesi	502d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Caroline Horton	Jeffrey Maddox		503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Robert Arnold Jr.	Lisa Piette-Edwards		504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Jonathan Doyle	Jeffrey Cereghino		508th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lewis, WA
Jon Myers	Clayton Sneed		519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Darcy Overbey	Michael Baker		525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Richard Millette	Mark Bell		530th MP Bn (I/R)	Omaha, NE
Laura Steele	Milton Hardy		535th MP Bn (I/R)	Cary, NC
Kevin Smith	Troy Gentry		607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
Curtis Schroeder	Thomas Gray		701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Rolanda Colbert	Stephen Hansen		705th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Steven Yamashita	Scott Anderson		709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
Leevaine Williams Jr.	David Tookmanian		716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Dave Stender	Myron Lewis		720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
James Eisenhart	Robert Eichler		724th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lauderdale, FL
Theresa Farrell	Bradley Cross		728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Kenneth Powell	Vacant	Robert Mayo	733d MP Bn (CID)	Forest Park, GA
Stacy Garrity	Rodney Ervin		744th MP Bn (I/R)	Easton, PA
Christopher Heberer	Barry Oakes		759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Emma Thyen	Shawn McLeod		761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
Mark Howard	Todd Marchand		773d MP Bn	Pineville, LA
Kenneth Richards	Richard Weider		785th MP Bn (I/R)	Fraser, MI
Richard Heidorn	Richard Epps		787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Kirt Boston	Bryan Lynch		793d MP Bn	Ft Richardson, AK
Kyle Bayless	Angelia Flournoy		795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Lonnie Branum Jr.	Scott Flint		850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Sylvester Wegwu	Cole Pierce	Lane Clopper	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Dewey Haines	David Astorga	Edgar Collins	Washington CID Bn	Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, VA
Michael Thompson	Andrew Falk	Gerald De Hoyos	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

Current as of 18 March 2014

For changes and updates, please e-mail <usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.mbx.ppo@mail.mil> or telephone (573) 563-7949.

# Commandant's Professional Reading List

by Brigadier General Mark S. Spindler

**This reading list is an important element in the professional development of all military police leaders in the Army. We can never spend too much time reading and thinking about the Army profession and its interaction with the world at large. These products will deepen our understanding of the Military Police Corps role in accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic strategies while facing the complexities and unstable environments of the world. The reading list is intended to complement professional military education.**

## Commandant's Recommendations

- Nate Allen and Tony Burgess, *Taking the Guidon: Exceptional Leadership at the Company Level*, The Center for Company-Level Leadership, Delaware, 2001, ISBN 978-0-96782-921-0.
- Alan Axelrod and Peter Georgescu, *Eisenhower on Leadership: Ike's Enduring Lessons in Total Victory Management*, Jossey-Bass, 2010, ISBN 978-0-470-62691-7.
- Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, *Hope is Not a Method*, Crown Business, New York, 1997, ISBN 978-0-7679-0060-7.

## Leadership and History

- Warren Bennis, *On Becoming a Leader*, Basic Books, 2009, ISBN 978-0-46501-408-8.
- Pete Blaber, *The Mission, The Men, and Me: Lessons From a Former Delta Force Commander*, The Berkley Publishing Group, 2010, ISBN 978-0-42523-657-4.
- Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan, *Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done*, Crown Business, New York, 2002, ISBN 978-0-609-61057-2.
- Janis A. Cannon-Bowers, PhD, and Eduardo Salas, PhD, *Making Decisions Under Stress: Implications for Individual and Team Training*, American Psychological Association, 2001, ISBN 978-1-55798-767-9.
- Steven R. Covey, *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2000, ISBN 978-0-76240-833-7.
- Daniel K. Elder, *The Sergeants Major of the Army*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003, ISBN 978-0-16067-867-7.
- David Finkel, *The Good Soldiers*, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010, ISBN 978-0-31243-002-3.
- Arnold G. Fisch Jr. and David W. Hogan, *The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps: The Backbone of the Army*, Department of the Army Center of Military History, 2006, ISBN 978-0-16067-868-4.

- Malcolm Gladwell, *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*, Little, Brown, and Company, 2007, ISBN 978-0-31601-066-5.
- Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, Back Bay Books, New York, 2009, ISBN 978-0-31604-093-8.
- John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, Harvard Business Review Press, 2012, ISBN 978-1-4221-8643-5.
- Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, Da Capo Press, 2010, ISBN 978-1-45156-403-7.
- John G. Meyer Jr., *Company Command: The Bottom Line*, National Defense University Press, 1990, ISBN 978-0-78812-153-1.
- J.D. Pendry, *The Three Meter Zone: Common Sense Leadership for NCOs*, Presidio Press, 2001, ISBN 978-0-89141-728-6.
- Richard W. Stewart (ed), *American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2008*, 2010, U.S. Army Center of Military History, ISBN 978-0-16084-184-2.
- George J. Thompson and Gregory A. Walker, *The Verbal Judo Way of Leadership: Empowering the Thin Blue Line From the Inside Up*, Looseleaf Law Publications, 2007, ISBN 978-1-93277-741-3.

## Junior Leader's Developmental Reading List

### Child Abuse

- *Child Molesters: A Behavioral Analysis*, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, <[http://www.missingkids.com/en\\_US/publications/NC70.pdf](http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC70.pdf)>, accessed on 10 February 2014.
- *Investigation and Prosecution of Child Abuse*, American Prosecutors Research Institute, 2003, ISBN 978-0-76193-090-7.
- Bruce Perry, *The Boy Who Was Raised As a Dog—And Other Stories from a Child Psychiatrist's Notebook*, Basic Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-46505-653-8.

- Anna C. Salter, PhD, *Predators: Pedophiles, Rapists, and Other Sex Offenders*, Basic Books, 2004, ISBN 978-0-46507-173-9.

### **Combat Support**

- David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, *The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime*, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2010, ISBN 978-1-58826-705-4.
- Mark R. Depue, *Patrolling Baghdad: A Military Police Company and the War in Iraq*, University Press of Kansas, 2007, ISBN 978-0-70061-498-1.
- Kelly Kennedy, *They Fought for Each Other: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Hardest Hit Unit in Iraq*, St. Martin's Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-31267-209-6.

### **Corrections**

- Bud Allen and Diana Bosta, *Games Criminals Play: How You Can Profit by Knowing Them*, Rae John Publishing Company, 1981, ISBN 978-0-96052-260-6.
- Gordon Cucullu, *Inside Gitmo: The True Story Behind the Myths of Guantanamo Bay*, Harper Collins, 2009, ISBN 978-0-06176-230-7.
- Pete Earley, *The Hot House: Life Inside Leavenworth Prison*, Bantam, 1993, 978-0-55356-023-7.
- Roger Morris, *The Devil's Butcher Shop: The New Mexico Prison Uprising*, University of New Mexico Press, 1988, 978-0-82621-062-0.

### **Crime Scene**

- Ross M. Gardner, *Practical Crime Scene Processing and Investigation*, Taylor and Francis, 2011, ISBN 978-1-43985-302-3.
- Werner U. Spitz (ed), *Spitz and Fisher's Medicolegal Investigation of Death: Guidelines for the Application of Pathology to Crime Investigation*, Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 2006, ISBN 978-0-39807-544-6.

### **Policing**

- Marcus Felson and Rachel Boba Santos, *Crime in Everyday Life*, SAGE Publications, 2010, ISBN 978-1-41293-633-0.
- Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, McGraw-Hill, 1990, ISBN 978-0-07023-694-3.
- George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities*, Free Press, 1998, ISBN 978-0-68483-738-3.
- Phyllis P. McDonald, *Managing Police Operations: Implementing the NYPD Crime Control Model Using COMPSTAT*, Wadsworth, 2002, ISBN 978-0-53453-991-7.
- Jerry H. Ratcliffe, *Intelligence-Led Policing*, Willan Publishing, 2008, ISBN 978-1-84392-339-8.
- Jon M. Shane, *Developing a Performance Management Model: Your Action Guide to What Every Chief Executive Should Know—Using Data to Measure Police Performance*, Looseleaf Law Publications, 2008, ISBN 978-1-93277-774-1.

- Edward A. Thibault, PhD, et al., *Proactive Police Management*, Prentice Hall, 2010, ISBN 978-0-13609-365-7.

### **Sex Crime Investigations**

- Arthur S. Chancellor, *Investigative Sexual Assault Cases*, Jones and Bartlett Learning, 2012, ISBN 978-1-44964-869-5.
- Robert R. Hazelwood and Ann Wolbert Burgess, *Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, CRC Press, 2008, ISBN 978-1-42006-504-6.

## **Senior Leader's Developmental Reading List**

### **Combat Support**

- Kenneth R. Murray, *Training at the Speed of Life, Volume One: The Definitive Textbook for Police and Military Reality Based Training*, Armiger Publications, 2004, ISBN 978-0-97619-940-3.

### **Crime Scene**

- Tom Bevel and Ross M. Gardner, *Bloodstain Pattern Analysis—With an Introduction to Crime Scene Reconstruction*, CRC Press, 2008, ISBN 978-1-42005-268-8.
- Vernon J. Geberth, *Practical Homicide Investigation Checklist and Field Guide*, CRC Press, 2013, ISBN 978-1-46659-188-2.

### **Criminal Investigations**

- Seth. L. Goldstein, *The Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Practical Guide to Assessment, Investigation, and Intervention*, CRC Press, 1998, ISBN 978-0-84938-154-6.

### **Policing**

- Ronald V. Clarke and John E. Eck, *Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps*, 2005, <<http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/CrimeAnalysis60Steps.pdf>>, accessed on 10 February 2014.

### **Sex Crime Investigations**

- Robert D. Shadley, *The GAME: Unraveling a Military Sex Scandal*, Beaver's Pond Press, 2013, ISBN 978-1-59298-996-6.

### **Stress Management**

- Gavin de Becker, *The Gift of Fear and Other Survival Signals that Protect Us From Violence*, Dell, 1999, ISBN 978-0-44050-883-0.
- George S. Everly Jr. and Jeffery T. Mitchell, *Critical Incident Stress Management: A New Era and Standard of Care in Crisis Intervention*, Chevron Publishing Corporation, 1999, ISBN 978-1-88358-116-9.
- Douglas Paton et al., *Traumatic Stress in Police Officers: A Career-Length Assessment from Recruitment to Retirement*, Charles C. Thomas Publishing Ltd., 2009, ISBN 978-0-39807-894-2.

# DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
<b>Current Publications</b>			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	26 Aug 13	This manual describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-39.40 (will be FM 3-63)	Internment and Resettlement Operations	12 Feb 10	A manual that describes the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police and other elements employ when dealing with internment/resettlement (I/R) populations. <b>Status:</b> Under revision; projected for publication 2d quarter, Fiscal Year (FY) 2014.
FM 3-37.2 (will be ATP 3-37.2)	Antiterrorism	18 Feb 11	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. <b>Status:</b> Under revision; projected for publication 3d quarter, FY 14.
ATTP 3-39.10 (will be ATP 3-39.10)	Law and Order Operations	20 Jun 11	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. <b>Status:</b> Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 15.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and military police Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATTP 3-39.20 (will be ATP 3-39.20)	Police Intelligence Operations	29 Jul 10	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. <b>Status:</b> Under revision; projected for publication 4th quarter, FY 15.

# DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
ATTP 3-39.32 (will be ATP 3-39.32)	Physical Security	3 Aug 10	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) Series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. <b>Status:</b> Under revision; projected for publication 3d quarter, FY 14.
FM 3-19.15 (will be ATP 3-39.33)	Civil Disturbance Operations	18 Apr 05	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. <b>Status:</b> Under revision; projected for publication 3d quarter, FY 14.
ATTP 3-39.34 (will be ATP 3-39.34)	Military Working Dogs	10 May 11	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. <b>Status:</b> Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 15.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective service missions and the management of protective service details. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.4 (will be TM 3-39.30)	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	2 Aug 02	A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, I/R, law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary. <b>Status:</b> Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 15.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. <b>Status:</b> Current.
<p><b>Note:</b> Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at &lt;<a href="http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/">http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/</a>&gt;. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to &lt;<a href="mailto:usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdiddmpdoc@mail.mil">usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdiddmpdoc@mail.mil</a>&gt;.</p>			

*“Doctrine is indispensable to an Army. Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”*

General George H. Decker,  
U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1960–1962





# Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 91st Military Police Battalion



## Lineage and Honors

Constituted 8 June 1945 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 91st Military Police Battalion.

Activated 13 June 1945 in France.

Inactivated 14 October 1945 at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

Activated 20 September 1950 in Korea.

Allotted 25 October 1951 to the Regular Army.

Inactivated 24 June 1955 in Korea.

Activated 1 August 1962 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

Inactivated 25 March 1964 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

Activated 17 October 2005 at Fort Drum, New York.

## Campaign Participation Credit

### *Korean War*

United Nations Offensive

Chinese Communist Forces Intervention

First United Nations Counteroffensive

Chinese Communist Forces Spring Offensive

Summer–Fall Offensive

Second Korean Winter

Korea, Summer–Fall 1952

Third Korean Winter

Korea, Summer 1953

### *War on Terrorism*

#### *Afghanistan*

Consolidation I

Consolidation II

#### *Iraq*

Iraqi Surge

Iraqi Sovereignty

Additional campaigns to be determined


## Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered AFGHANISTAN 2005–2006

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA 1953–1954

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950–1952

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1952–1953



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