


# ARMOR

September-October 2006



# ARMOR

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-06-5

Editor in Chief  
**LTC SHANE E. LEE**

Managing Editor  
**CHRISTY BOURGEOIS**

Commandant  
**MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS**

*ARMOR* (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi-monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

Disclaimer: The information contained in *ARMOR* represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor in chief.

Authorized Content: *ARMOR* will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponentcy. That proponentcy includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all 19-series officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to *ARMOR* and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

September-October 2006, Vol. CXV, No. 5

## Features

- 6 With Patience and Careful Teaching of Sound Doctrine: The U.S. Army on the Brink of Change**  
by General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army, Retired
- 9 Preserving Shock Action: A New Approach to Armored Maneuver Warfare**  
by Lester W. Grau
- 13 Ruminations on Modular Cavalry**  
by Major Andrew D. Goldin
- 18 Maneuver Captains Career Course**  
by Lieutenant Colonel Patrick A. Clark and Major Edward Hayes
- 23 The Secret Testing of Israeli M111 "Hetz" Ammunition: A Model of Failed Commander's Responsibility**  
by James M. Warford
- 26 Contemporary Lessons from the Past: A Second Look at South Carolina in the Revolutionary War**  
by Captain William S. McDaniel
- 33 Agile Birds: Junior Officer Professional Development During Training Hold Periods**  
by Lieutenant Davis Ozier, Lieutenant Christopher Lareau, and Major Bret P. Van Poppel
- 37 A Better Recce Troop**  
by Master Sergeant John Hegadush
- 40 Forging the Sword: Conventional U.S. Army Forces Advising Host Nation (HN) Forces**  
by Major Todd Clark
- 45 PREPARING TO MITT: Working With and Training the Iraqi Army**  
by Captain David J. Smith
- 49 Tactical Resourcefulness: A Case Study**  
by Captain Dave R. Palmer  
*Reprinted from the July-August 1966 Issue of ARMOR*
- 53 Mounted ManeuverNet: The Professional Forum for Mounted Soldiers**

## Departments


- 2 Contacts**
- 3 Letters**
- 4 Commander's Hatch**
- 5 Driver's Seat**
- 50 Reviews**



Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

USPS 467-970



## ***“From My Position...”***

*“To be useful in battle, military knowledge like discipline must be subconscious. The memorizing of concrete examples is futile, for in battle the mind does not work well enough to make memory trustworthy. One must be so soaked in military lore that he does the military thing automatically. The study of history will produce this result. The study of algebra will not.”*

GEN George S. Patton, Jr., note card,  
c. 1920, entitled ‘Training’, from the Patton  
collection, Library of Congress.

When the post exchange begins to sell combat vehicle models decorated with bumper numbers from your battalion’s tanks, it becomes eerily apparent that your unit has transitioned from the recesses of personal memory to national history. As Soldiers, we tend to take history for granted. We all know intuitively that the study of history is important to our professional development, but we tend to put it in the same category as eating more vegetables or slowing down on the interstate. We know these choices are good for us, but other considerations always seem to take priority. Most of us now realize that many of the same decisions made routinely during peacetime training exercises become profoundly significant during times of war. Leadership decisions we make today will become part of the public record and will be readily available for future generations to dissect, analyze, and second-guess forever.

Some of history’s best lessons are often found in unexpected places. At the conclusion of the Vietnam War, our Army was battered, bruised, and nearly broken. Our leaders wisely determined that, to chart the way forward, it was critical to examine history’s lessons through the filter of sound doctrine. They not only examined our own military history, but also scanned the archives of foreign armies faced with similar challenges to develop the operational and training concepts necessary to rebuild our Army. One of those leaders was General Donn A. Starry, the architect of Air-Land Battle.

On 18 May, during the Armor Association’s annual banquet, General Starry was honored by being selected for the International Commander’s Wall, now located in Boudinot Hall. During his ac-

ceptance speech, he described the conditions that precipitated his work on the doctrinal concepts that turned our Army around in the late 1970s and continue to influence our Soldiers today. The transcript of his speech is the first article included in this issue of the magazine.

A quick glance at this issue’s cover may cause some confusion. You may be surprised to learn that the “redcoats” in the picture are not British regular soldiers, but are actually American loyalist soldiers serving under the command of British Major Patrick Ferguson during the battle of Kings Mountain, South Carolina, in 1780. In recent years, we have concluded that one of the keys to success in counterinsurgency warfare is successfully training and fielding indigenous forces. This is not a new concept. The Romans used it quite effectively to maintain their empire and the British army tried unsuccessfully to apply it to quell the revolution in their American colonies. The reasons for Britain’s failure are complex and varied, and Captain McDaniel only touches on them in his article. We present this article, therefore, as a means to facilitate discussion so that all of our readers can be better equipped to seek out useful historical lessons that will help us to defeat our current enemies.

*ARMOR* has been and continues to be a forum that seeks out unusual articles designed to educate the force and encourage professional debate. We believe the articles chosen for this issue are consistent with that theme. Historically based articles are a great vehicle to illustrate and discuss current concepts without fear of violating operational security guidelines. In this issue, you will find several articles that are not simply dry recitations of historical minutia and trivia but serve instead to provide us with some useful insights. To paraphrase General Patton’s quote, it is very difficult to recall specific historical examples to draw from in order to defeat your enemies in the midst of a campaign. A broad-based and thorough understanding of history, however, can provide us with the general concepts that will help us to make better decisions, regardless of the situation or the specific circumstances we face in combat against a thinking and adaptive enemy.

S.E. LEE

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

Official:

*Joyce E. Morrow*  
JOYCE E. MORROW  
Administrative Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

0619201

# Points of Contact

DSN prefix – 464-  
Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

---

## ARMOR Editorial Offices

---

<b>Editor in Chief</b> LTC Shane E. Lee E-mail: shane.lee@knox.army.mil	4087
<b>Managing Editor</b> Christy Bourgeois E-mail: charlotte.bourgeois@knox.army.mil	4582
<b>Editor</b> Vivian Oertle E-mail: vivian.oertle@knox.army.mil	2610
<b>Art Director</b> Mr. Jody Harmon E-mail: jody.harmon@knox.army.mil	3923
<b>Editorial Assistant</b> Kathy A. Johnson E-mail: kathy.johnson@knox.army.mil	2249

**ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS:** To improve speed and accuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at:

*ArmorMagazine@knox.army.mil*

When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing address and daytime phone number.

**SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE:** Due to the limited space per issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your article to only one Army professional bulletin at a time.

**GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS:** We prefer conventional photo prints, but will accept electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300 dpi format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use PowerPoint for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of excessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above.

**ADDRESS CHANGES, PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS, AND ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS:** For paid subscription service, address changes, and delivery problems, or for awards information, contact Connie Stiggers or Connie McMillen, United States Armor Association, P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; E-mail: *Brightcg@bbtel.com*; phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their web site at *www.usarmor-assn.org*.

**UNIT DISTRIBUTION:** To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at *ArmorMagazine@knox.army.mil*; phone DSN 464-2249, commercial (502) 624-2249; or FAX DSN 464-5039, commercial (502) 624-5039. Requests to be added to the official distribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Editor in Chief.

**EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS:** ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

**ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE:** Visit the ARMOR magazine web site at *www.knox.army.mil/armormag*.

**ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK:** The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force.

---

## U.S. Army Armor Center

---

<b>Commanding General</b> MG Robert M. Williams E-mail: robert.m.williams@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-CG) 2121
<b>Deputy Commanding General</b> BG Michael S. Tucker E-mail: michael.s.tucker@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-DCG) 7555
<b>Chief of Staff</b> COL Russell Cloy E-mail: russell.cloy@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-CS) 1101
<b>Command Sergeant Major</b> CSM Otis Smith E-mail: otis.smith@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-CSM) 4952
<b>Command Sergeant Major to DCG</b> CSM Joseph P. Zettlemoyer E-mail: joseph.zettlemoyer@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-DCG-CSM) 7091
<b>Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG)</b> COL Marlin Levendoski E-mail: marlin.levendoski@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-SA) 1315
<b>Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development</b> COL Richard G. Piscal E-mail: richard.piscal@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-TD) 8247
<b>TRADOC System Manager for Abrams</b> COL John M. Shay E-mail: john.shay@us.army.mil	(ATZK-TS) 7955
<b>Experimentation and Analysis Directorate</b> COL David Hubner E-mail: david.hubner@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-UAE) 7809
<b>TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle Command/Combat Identification</b> COL Alan Mosher E-mail: alan.mosher@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-PBC-CID) 4009
<b>Office, Chief of Armor</b> Aubrey Henley E-mail: aubrey.henley@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-AR) 5155 FAX 7585
<b>Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab</b> Joe Hughes E-mail: joe.hughes@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-UA) 5050
<b>Assistant TRADOC System Manager Soldier - Mounted Warrior</b> MAJ Bryan Salyers E-mail: bryan.salyers@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-ATS) 3519

---

## U.S. Army Armor School

---

<b>Director of the Armor School</b> COL Robert Valdivia E-mail: robert.valdivia@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-DAS) 1050
<b>1st Armor Training Brigade</b> COL Peter D. Utley E-mail: peter.utley@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-BAZ) 8736
<b>16th Cavalry Regiment</b> COL Robert R. Naething E-mail: robert.naething@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-SBZ) 7848
<b>NCO Academy</b> CSM Samuel Wilson E-mail: samuel.wilson@knox.army.mil	(ATZK-NC) 5150

# LETTERS

## Recognizing the Importance of Leader Development — A Core Competency

Dear *ARMOR*,

Captain C.J. Kirkpatrick's article, "Leader Development at the Company Level," in the July-August 2006 issue is right on target. Furthermore, the problem he identifies with counseling exists at all levels and his solution applies universally. I have personally witnessed, and in some cases been guilty of, the glossed-over counseling that Captain Kirkpatrick describes. Proper leader development takes a great deal of thought and effort, but produces a high pay-off.

Indeed, I would argue that developmental counseling is the most important tool we have for developing soldiers and leaders. The Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth is in the process of publishing U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, to replace FM 22-100. Appendix B of FM 6-22 states, "Counseling is one of the most important leadership development responsibilities for Army leaders. The U.S. Army's future and the legacy of today's Army leaders rest on the shoulders of those they help prepare for greater responsibility." A wartime army cannot afford to take shortcuts with counseling, and time constraints are not a valid excuse.

Mentoring is another great tool for leader development. Captain Kirkpatrick's example seems to imply that commanders should actively assign mentors to junior leaders. I believe that the mentoring relationship is best when it happens voluntarily and spontaneously, rather than as a mechanical command requirement. But since not all potential mentors and "mentees" naturally gravitate toward each other, perhaps some encouragement to further the cause is appropriate.

Chapter 8 of FM 6-22, "Developing," covers aspects of leader development, to include counseling, coaching, and mentoring. Appendix B provides more in-depth information on counseling. A significant change in FM 6-22 is the introduction of a new leadership requirements model, consisting of attributes (what an Army leader is; the "be") and core leader competencies (what an Army leader does; the "do"). Among the core leader competencies is "develops leaders." This is recognition of the importance of leader development — it is a *core competency* of all Army leaders. This means we must strive to develop our subordinates as Captain Kirkpatrick suggests if we are to consider ourselves true leaders.

TIM KREUTTNER  
MAJ, U.S. Army

## Taking Another Hard Look at the Combined Arms Cavalry Platoon

Dear *ARMOR*,

It was refreshing to read "The Stryker Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop," by Captain Matthew Blome in the July-August 2006 issue of *ARMOR*, which seems to look at transition as

being just that, transitional. His comments, in some ways, mirror Major J.D. Keith's comments concerning hunter-killer platoons in, "3d Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry Up Front: Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned," in the March-April 2006 issue of *ARMOR* (reprinted from September-October 2003).

Call me old fashioned; I am older and probably not that fashionable. I believe we would be remiss if we did not take another hard look at the combined arms cavalry platoon. Scouts and tanks (or MGS) joined at the hip in the same platoon-level organization made sense during World War II and throughout the 1950s and 1960s. We still retain that option today via the "troop scramble" in the heavy cavalry, but are fast losing it as we transition to lighter equipped cavalry organizations. The question is, "which organization is most effective, most of the time?" I don't pretend to know, but someone should find out. I do know that cavalry must never lose the ability to fight for information.

Further, I believe there is a universal agreement about the pressing need to increase the number of dismountable scouts in both motorized and track-mounted cavalry. All the high technology reconnaissance equipment in the world cannot duplicate what the scout with the Mark I eyeball brings to the game. We must look at these problems only through the lens of combat effectiveness and never as an exercise in juggling spaces, faces, and pieces of equipment.

Once again, *ARMOR* has produced an outstanding issue. All the ideas in the world are valueless without a forum to express them.

CHARLES W. TREESE  
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

## Training Combat Leaders: Courage, Intelligence, and Competence

Dear *ARMOR*,

I would like to respond to Major General Faith's letter, "Balancing the 'Big 12,'" in the July-August 2006 issue of *ARMOR*. I am in total agreement with Major General Faith on the importance of combat leadership. I further agree that an environment that encourages intelligent risk and treats leaders like the professional, competent, and patriotic women and men they are, is more likely to produce leaders who will be successful in war.

It is very difficult to identify great generals in peacetime. Two notable exceptions were General Marshall and Admiral Nimitz. Although they mostly got it right, even they were not perfect; however, one cannot go wrong when promoting the careers of Eisenhower, Bradley, Stillwell, Gerow, and Collins. Nimitz did well with Halsey and Turner as well. Certainly, the general officers who led us during Desert Storm were terrific from the division commander level to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We must have done something right as an institution to develop the Powells, Schwarzkopfs, Franks, Griffiths, and Funks of the U.S. Army.

kopfs, Franks, Griffiths, and Funks of the U.S. Army.

Faith asserts that "the warrior ethic and combat leadership challenges are inevitably in the forefront." I wish that were the case in peacetime. My own experience would indicate we are too often concerned with matters such as the "Big 12," but give short shrift to demonstrated tactical competence. Too often, we all agree on the imperative to train and develop our subordinates, but the higher we go in the organization, the less time we devote to such matters. For those of us lucky enough to have served in Germany when General Starry commanded V Corps, we experienced firsthand terrific tactical and leadership training when he trooped V Corps GDP. General Starry was personally briefed by every maneuver company commander in V Corps on plans to defeat an attack.

I assure you that I am not an advocate of micromanagement. My point in using Wellington, Jackson, and Patton as examples was to point out that there is no leadership formula for battlefield success. There are micromanagers, such as Jackson, who have been extraordinarily successful, and there are beloved leaders, such as McClellan, who were abject failures. Braxton Bragg probably would have failed no matter what. One could argue that Jackson, Wellington, and Patton violated many of the "Big 12" principles for various reasons. But they all were intelligent, displayed remarkable tactical competence, and were cool under stress. We can consistently create and train great battalion and brigade commanders, the centurions of our Army. Much of what they are charged to do is execute our great doctrine at the tactical level of war. If there is a genius among this group, it apparent in how he trains his unit — and even here, the Army standard provides great doctrine. Our current training challenges are all about availability of scarce resources — not method.

If there is a formula for preparing combat leaders, it ought to explicitly include courage, intelligence, and tactical competence.


PHILIP ALLUM  
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

## Correction

General Walter Ulmer's letter to the editor, "Big 12' Leader Behaviors: A Closer Look" was published in the May-June 2006 issue of *ARMOR*. During the editorial process, a significant mistake was made in the text of General Ulmer's letter. As written, it gives a very wrong impression of the findings of the U.S. Army War College's study on leader behaviors. In the last sentence of paragraph 3, it reads, "And expectations for personal and moral courage were also high, but not generally met." Correctly, it should read, "And expectations for personal and moral courage were also high and were generally met."

*ARMOR* sincerely apologizes to General Ulmer for this oversight and to its readers for any confusion this has caused.

Major General Robert M. Williams  
Commanding General  
U.S. Army Armor Center



## Preparing the Abrams Fleet for 2050

In today's operating environment, the tank remains the platform of choice. Its shock effect, intimidation, protection, and firepower make it a key component in fighting the war on insurgency. While past armored warfare avoided urban battle, insurgents in Iraq have moved the fight to the cities of Iraq. This fact alone has changed the Armored Force's outlook on the future of the Abrams tank. Once considered something from a past era, heavy armor is making a comeback in a big way. Even with the future combat system (FCS) entering the Army in the next decade, the Abrams tank will be an integral part of our Army through 2050.

The Armor Center is in the process of refitting the Abrams for urban combat. Upgrades to the Abrams fleet will provide the tank the ability to fight and survive in hostile urban environments with great advantage. These upgrades include the tank urban survivability kit (TUSK) and specific spin outs from the FCS development process. The development of TUSK is gaining momentum to accommodate the increasing rate of global urbanization.

In the May-June 2006 edition of *ARMOR*, in his article, "Abrams and the Need for TUSK in the Age of Rapid Urbanization," Lieutenant Colonel Ben Harris clearly lays out both the need and the capabilities of TUSK. Since that publication, we have received \$100M in supplemental funding to support fielding TUSK to the Armor Force.

The first TUSK component to reach the field will be advanced driver night sights. This change is long overdue; the driver's sight has not been upgraded since 1978, and we have received multiple requests from the field for this improvement.

Beginning in May 2007, TUSK will provide image-intensifying devices for the loader's and tank commander's weapons. The loader will have an improved sight, which can also be used by infantrymen on their M240B machine gun. Tank commanders on the M1A2 SEP will have the common remotely operated weapons system (CROWS), carrying a .50-caliber machine gun (similar to that used on the Stryker) in place of the tank commander's original .50-caliber machine gun mount, wherein the tank commander was exposed when firing the weapon. The U.S. Marine Corps' firepower enhancement program solution will be used for the M1A1's .50-caliber. The Abrams will also have an external telephone for armor and infantry Soldiers to communicate. Finally, the Abrams will get some extra add-on armor protection based on the concept already fielded for the Bradley. The program manager will complete most of these near-term modifications for vehicles in theater by April 2008.

As we look to the mid-term, the Evaluation Brigade Combat Team (EBCT) at Fort Bliss, Texas, will begin testing FCS capabilities, namely the FCS Spin Out 1 (SO1) systems, beginning in fiscal year


2008 (FY08). The spin outs are capabilities originally designed for the FCS that can easily be retrofitted for the current force. After field testing is complete, these systems will be fielded to the operational force, adding significant capabilities to our existing structure.

With an eye on long-term developments, we are currently working a capabilities development document (CDD) for an updated Abrams tank. This document is designed to address problems that cannot be solved by changes in doctrine, organization, training, leader development, personnel, or facilities. The new draft Abrams CDD has just been completed and will be sent out for staffing worldwide to gather comments from the field. This document was generated from your input, and it spells out, in detail, what the Armor Force wants in an upgraded Abrams. As long as we require a heavy tank in the field, I am committed to keeping our tanks the best in the world.

From my hatch, I think the most critical need for our tankers and cavalrymen is the right equipment. Training, doctrine, and organization are important, but having a capable vehicle is just as important. Given the time we will have the Abrams in our formations, it is important that we keep its modernization at the cutting edge of our combat development. With your help, the Armor Center and School will do exactly that.

Forge the Thunderbolt!

CSM Otis Smith  
Command Sergeant Major  
U.S. Army Armor Center



## The Maneuver Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course

The current operating environment places extensive demands on soldiers. Today's soldiers have more responsibility and are required to contend with more uncertainty to accomplish their mission than any other time in recent history. Preparing soldiers to serve successfully in this environment has led to substantial change in the professional military education programs.

The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) report, which went into effect on 9 November 2005, stipulates creating a Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia. These recommendations will effectively collocate the Armor and Infantry Schools under one organization. This union will create a combined arms Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) course — the Maneuver Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC).

The Noncommissioned Officers Academy (NCOA) at Fort Knox, Kentucky, has developed a new education system to train sergeants first class. In partnership with the NCOA at Fort Benning, Georgia, we have created the Army's first combined arms NCOES course. This course combines both 19 and 11 series sergeants first class into one ANCOC. This course will eventually become part of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning.

The course is designed to produce NCOs who are tactically and technically proficient in the skills they require to lead, train, employ, and maintain armor and infantry platoons in the combined-arms company team environment. These soldiers will also possess a working knowledge of first sergeant duties at the company/troop level with an added basic knowledge of battalion and brigade staff functions. Its primary function, however, is to execute training that meets current and relevant standards for training soldiers of an Army at war.

Maneuver ANCOC will replace the traditional ANCOC for both career management fields 11 and 19. This includes the 11B, 11C, 19D, and 19K military occupational specialty (MOS) series. Initially conducted at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and Fort Benning, Georgia, this course combines infantry and armor senior NCOs in a small-group instruction environment. They will receive instruction and lessons learned from sharing experiences as they pertain to the responsibilities of a platoon sergeant. This instruction and small-group discussion incorporates doctrinal knowledge, as well as the most current and relevant tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). It will serve as an open forum for students to discuss combat experiences and learn how those experiences affect and help shape ever-evolving TTP.

The course also fuses critical MOS skills with current TTP — instructors from both branches and all four MOS series will conduct the course. The course structure and lesson plan design will allow for ongoing revision based on the current operational environment. Through the use of resources, such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS), *Mounted ManeuverNet*, mounted maneuver NCO forums, and combat experience from cadre and students, this course will continuously evolve as challenges emerge.

All students will use laptop computers, rather than hard-copy text. They will be linked via network to each other and to the internet, which will allow students access to the same material as the instructor. More importantly, it allows students access to web-based resources to incorporate information coming straight from theater.

Training is set in a "live-in" environment and includes instruction on common leader subjects, platoon tactical training, close-combat tactical trainer (CCTT), joint conflict and tactical simulation (JCATS), Force XXI battle command, brigade and below (FBCB2), maintenance management, training management, lead-

Continued on Page 48



## With Patience and Careful Teaching of Sound Doctrine: The U.S. Army on the Brink of Change

*As part of the U.S. Armor Association's annual banquet, General Donn A. Starry was formally recognized as the latest member of the International Commander's Wall on 18 May 2006. Currently, the portraits of five legendary armor leaders, who changed the art of war, adorn a dedicated wall of the central hallway of Boudinot Hall. General Starry's portrait will soon be the sixth.*

*The International Commander's Wall is a portrayal of great leaders, which includes General Creighton Abrams, General George S. Patton Jr., Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, General Musa Peled, General Israel Tal, and now General Starry, who all believed training and educating leaders was critically important. Fundamentally, they were teachers, passing on knowledge and experience earned during difficult times to prepare young Soldiers for future wars. Each was a true student of history; learning from the past, they had the ability to both recognize present and future challenges while laying the foundations for changing their armies to meet emerging threats. Each served as an agent of change; a champion whose leadership and force of will became the standard by which other leaders are measured.*

*The honor of being selected for the International Commander's Wall is rare and the next selection may not occur for years to come.*

*ARMOR would like to share General Starry's warm and generous acceptance speech with its readers.*

"To say I am deeply honored by this would be the understatement of the century. To say I am humbled to be included among those already honored on the Commander's Wall would equally be an understatement.

However, I am profoundly grateful to those who had a part in the events for which I am being honored. What we celebrate here is not something I did by myself. We celebrate the rebuilding of our Army from the dismal conditions in which we found ourselves as we redeployed from Vietnam in the early 1970s, to the magnificent Army we deployed to the Middle East in Desert Shield and Desert Storm nearly 20 years later — the Army that so dramatically won the Hundred-Hour War. That Army was the creation of many people — goodly numbers of whom are in this room tonight. That Army was very much our Army, not mine — OURS. And for that, I stand as representing all of us.

When I discovered what was to happen here tonight, I sought advice about what I might say — if anything. First to mind came the frequent admonition of the elder General Abrams that one should never pass up an opportunity to remain silent. The senior advisor at home, Lefty (his wife),

advised that since I would be having the last word, it should be nice but brief: "Just thank them nicely and sit down," she said. Given these circumstances, however, it seems to me that I do owe you a few hopefully relevant words.

Long ago, a very wise American made the following observation:

*'If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it.'*

Those words of Abraham Lincoln, more than a century ago, well reflect where we were as we began in the early 1970s the work we celebrate here tonight. They could, in some measure, also describe where we are today. But in either case, standing on the threshold of the future, we were and are really at the leading edge of the past. Some of that past was and is of our own making; more of it reflected then, as now, how we have come to where we were and are. In either case, the past reflected and reflects the long sweep of the history of the purpose of war — and the art of war — especially war since the onset of the industrial revolution, the kaleidoscope of national strategies, supporting operational and tactical level military strategies, and accompanying systems of war — equipments, structures, and organizations, training and education of soldiers and leaders. In both cases, then and now, the past defines the changing purpose of war as an instrument of national policy.

So it was that when the elder General Abrams came to office as Chief of Staff in 1972 our Army was confronted by a dilemma. To the east was the threat of nuclear Armageddon — an end to civilization as we knew it, by means of thermonuclear warheads aboard intercontinental ballistic missiles. Instead of the traditional unconditional surrender, there was the real possibility of unconditional destruction. Further to the east, or to the west if you prefer, there appeared the equally ominous, but less well understood threat of the destruction of states and their peoples by the work of radical revolutionaries of various persuasions from political to religious. Before us, in the wake of Vietnam, lay our own Army, largely incapable of coping with either threat. We were without a clearly stated national strategy.

The Army had been twice mortally wounded in the Vietnam years; once by the early and persistent refusal to mobilize large Reserve Component forces for Vietnam, closer to hand by ongoing political pressure to end the draft. Forces that deployed to theaters other than Vietnam suffered mightily from personnel turbulence, the drug culture, multitudinous disciplinary infractions (the military jails were full to overcrowded), and depletion of the experienced NCO corps, all reflected in a serious lack of confidence in leadership at virtually every level. Units deployed to Europe did not believe they could successfully defend against an attack by Group Soviet Forces Germany whose numbers, structure, and equipment inventories had been substantially enhanced while we were away in Vietnam. Against NATO Europe, the Soviets had embraced new doctrine, which sought to bring down NATO Europe by either conventional or nuclear means, preferably the former, but the latter if necessary. It was enough to concern even the most steadfast.

Those of us who knew him well enough to do so, responded to the newly nominated Chief of Staff's question, "Where are we?" The response from the Army whose Chief of Staff

he was about to become was, 'out on its ass.' His response was (characteristically) more questions: "You've told me where we are; if that be true, then: Where are we going? What do we need to do to get there? How best should we go about doing it?" He echoed President Lincoln; thus, was born an Army for what we now call the Cold War. The war we won, but never had to fight.

Four years ago, before an earlier audience much like this, I reflected on the great Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe's characterization of society's need for three kinds of people. He called them drummers, warriors, and storytellers. Drummers, Achebe said, are those who develop a deep understanding of the past, a realistic appraisal of the present, then drum up enduring causes for the future. Warriors are those who go forth to fight battles — military, political, even social, and perhaps economic, for great causes — perhaps many times, demonstrating thereby the enduring worth of the causes. Storytellers, Achebe said, are the most important, for it is their version — right or not right — of what happened, which becomes recorded history.

I went on to characterize the then residents of the Commander's Wall, of whom there were five, as drummers, warriors, and storytellers; even though, in some cases, their story had to be told by others. Particularly the case with General Abrams, whose story has been told in Bob Sorley's two great books: *Thunderbolt* and *A Better War*. Shortly after the event, that speech appeared in *Army*. Certainly, you all have studied it and taken its lessons to heart, so they need no further embellishment.

Finally, one of history's greatest letter writers, a man who wrote in a completely different venue, provided relevant observations for the situation in which we found ourselves in the 1970s, and perhaps today as well.

Two thousand years ago, Paul the Apostle wrote to his friend, Timothy, words that provide, as the media likes to say today, useful insights: *'Preach the word; be prepared in season and out of season; correct, rebuke, and encourage with great patience and careful teaching for the time will come when men will not put up with sound doctrine; instead, to suit their own desires, they will gather around them a great number of teachers to say what their itching ears want to hear. They will turn their own ears away from the truth, and turn aside to myths.'*

For the past fifteen years, I have served as a Senior Fellow on the faculty of the (now) Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk. For thirteen of those years, we conducted a course called the 'Joint and Combined Warfighting School.' Twelve weeks in duration, the course took O5- and O6-grade officers, graduating from service war colleges and en route to assignments on joint staffs, through a course in joint and combined force planning and operations. The last of those twelve-week courses was on a visit to the joint staff in the Pentagon. Here, an eloquent young Army brigadier general from the J8 staff held forth on joint matters as seen by his staff section. When he finished, a class member asked if the general could provide a statement of the National Military Strategy. After a pause the reply was, "Why — to deter forward and to win decisively." The questioner then observed that to be Cold War strategy a la George Kennan, but in counterinsurgency warfare, ongoing at the time, what does it mean to 'deter' and what does 'win' mean against a threat that seeks to destroy our very civilization, and that now has,

or soon may have, the nuclear means to do so. The general suddenly remembered that he was late for another meeting and departed quickly. The Senior Fellows led the after-dinner discussion of the matter that evening — it lasted long into the night.

But that, you see, is the 21st-century question. It was earlier a serious question in the last half of the 20th century, one about which we had considerable information; information we had not studied seriously enough to set forth a relevant operational concept — a doctrine. In the early 1970s, after considerable discussion with the newly appointed Chief of Staff, it was decided that the primary threat remained against NATO Europe; and to that we turned our undivided attention. Well, indeed we did, for under President Ronald Reagan's enlightened leadership, it led to the end of the Cold War.

As Cold War survivors focused on the future, counterinsurgency war came under closer scrutiny. Its character and conduct have a long and complex history. In the 20th century alone, our experience, together with that of the South Koreans in their country, the French experience in Indo-China and Algeria, and the unmasking of militant Islam in various venues post-Cold War, struck home recognition of an active virulent threat to our very existence. The history of the matter in Korea, Indochina, and Vietnam signaled the virtual impossibility of conflict termination under favorable circumstances to either side. Once the possibility of nuclear arms in insurgent hands became real, the threat of nuclear Armageddon (total nuclear war) and insurgent Armageddon (total insurgent war) merged to create a demand for new measures and countermeasures; new doctrine, new equipment, new organizations and structures, and new training and education of military cohorts and leaders. It also raised once more what is perhaps the signal lesson of the Korean, French, and our own counterinsurgency expe-


riences — that quite likely military forces can handle only a part of total counterinsurgency warfare. If conflict termination under favorable circumstances is to be sought, it will require the total resources of the nation, organized, trained, equipped, deployed, and coordinated in action in order to bring about termination under acceptable conditions. In our own country, we have not experienced a coherent effort to face that problem since Project Solarium, undertaken by President Dwight Eisenhower in his search for the means to cope with an uncertain, but threatening future, when stakes were high and there appeared little or no consensus as to what to do about a growing threat to national survival.

And so the world has turned over once more, as so eloquently remarked by General MacArthur in his famous farewell address at West Point.

This now turned-over world is your world. The difference between where you are now and where we found ourselves in the early 1970s is almost incomprehensible. Today, we have a good, indeed a great, Army. It is well equipped, well trained, well organized, well led; it operates well under extremely difficult conditions, both in-theater and in the homeland. Even the most severe problems seeking resolution have been rationalized, if not resolved. So your work begins from a far better 'where we are' than did ours.


But remember Paul to Timothy — what happens next begins with great patience and careful teaching of sound doctrine — operational concepts that form the basis — a beginning for everything else.

The answers to President Lincoln's questions, where we are, whither we are tending, and how best to judge what to do and how to do it, are all in new hands. They are your hands; they invite a new phalanx of patient and careful teachers who are also drummers, warriors, and storytellers, all without itching ears. Good Luck."



*General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army, Retired, enlisted in the Army in 1943. He won an appointment to West Point and was commissioned in 1948. Subsequently, he commanded armor and armored cavalry units from platoon through corps in Europe and in Vietnam. During his notable career, he served in various command positions, to include commander, U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky (1973-1976), V U.S. Corps in U.S. Army Europe (1976-1977), the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (1977-1981), and from 1981 to 1983, the U.S. Readiness Command, whose forces included what became U.S. Central Command, the force that deployed and fought Operation Desert Storm 1991, as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003. He served twice in Vietnam, leading the famous 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment into Cambodia in May 1970. He was principal staff designer of the post-Vietnam Army force structure, then in a succession of commands, principal architect of AirLand Battle doctrine.*

*A graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College, he holds an M.A. from George Washington University and several honorary Doctoral degrees. He is author of Mounted Combat in Vietnam (USGPO 1977), co-editor and co-author of Camp Colt to Desert Storm, The History of US Armored Forces, and has authored more than a hundred articles for professional journals and encyclopedias. Since 1991, he has served as a Senior Fellow on the faculty of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk.*



# Preserving Shock Action: A New Approach to Armored Maneuver Warfare

by Lester W. Grau

In theory, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, and armored forces are mutually supporting. Artillery rains destruction to the front and flanks as infantry personnel carriers and dismounted infantry protect tanks from enemy antitank systems and enemy infantry. Simultaneously, tanks protect the personnel carriers and dismounted infantry from enemy tanks and strong points. In practice, personnel carriers have problems keeping up with fast-moving tanks, their armor protection is too thin to survive at the point of the attack and battle drills between tanks and mechanized infantry frequently break down due to the lack of sufficient team training prior to combat. Artillery fire may be on or off target, or too early or too late. The bottom line is that there is often too great a gap between the tanks and the mechanized infantry at the crucial point and artillery may not bridge that gap.

During the 3d Infantry Division's battle for An Najaf in March 2003, the division attacked to seize two main bridges to the north and south of the city. When the 1st Brigade Combat Team's attack on the northern bridge in the town of Al Kifl was stalled because of resistance, B Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry (two mechanized infantry platoons and a tank platoon) moved to assist. As the column was forcing the bridge, the Iraqi defenders blew up the bridge, damaging a span and isolating three tanks on the east bank of the Euphrates, while the remaining tank and all the mechanized infantry were on the west bank. The attack stalled. Finally, the remaining tank and Bradleys crossed the damaged bridge to join the tanks, but the momentum was lost. The company fought off attacks for about six hours before withdrawing across the damaged bridge.<sup>1</sup>

The proliferation of rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)-7 anti-tank grenade launchers and antitank missiles have complicated the task of tanks and mechanized infantry working together. The Russians entered the Chechen City of Grozny on 31 December 1994. The first unit to penetrate the city center was the 131st "Maikop" Brigade. Russian forces initially met no resistance when they entered the city at noon. They drove their vehicles straight to the city center, dismounted, and moved into the train station. Other elements of the brigade remained parked along a side street as a reserve force. Then the Chechens attacked with

RPGs. They first destroyed the Russian lead and rear vehicles on the side streets, trapping the unit. The tanks could not lower their gun tubes far enough to shoot into basements or high enough to reach the tops of buildings. Infantry fighting vehicles and personnel carriers were unable to support their tanks. Chechens systematically destroyed the column from above and below with RPGs and grenades. Other Chechens surrounded the force in the train station. The commander of the Russian unit waited until 2 January for reinforcements, but they never arrived. Part of his decimated unit broke out. By 3 January 1995, the brigade had lost nearly 800 men, 20 of its 26 tanks, and 102 of its 120 armored vehicles.<sup>2</sup>

Several nations have recognized the problem of the tactical gap and tried to deal with it. The Soviet Union (and now Russia) has led the effort to find a solution. Their solutions have been technological, tactical, and structural.

## The Soviet Technological Approach

The first Soviet technological solution addressed the problem before the infantry armored personnel carrier was common. Designers recognized that the tank needed a variety of firepower immediately available during the attack, so they hung a variety of weapons systems on the tank. The Soviet T-35 heavy tank weighed 50 tons, had an 11-man crew and carried a 76.2mm cannon, two 45mm cannons, and six 7.62mm machine guns. These awesome five-turret monsters were produced from 1936 to 1939, but proved too cumbersome for the battlefield.<sup>3</sup> Even the Soviet T-28 medium tank carried a 76.2mm cannon and four 7.62mm machine guns.<sup>4</sup> These over-equipped tanks did not survive the early days of World War II. The main Soviet tanks of World War II were the T-34-85 medium tank and the KV1 heavy tank. The T-34-85 weighed 32 tons, had a five-man crew, and carried an 85mm cannon and two 7.62mm machine guns.<sup>5</sup> The KV1 weighed 47.5 tons, had a five-man crew, and carried a 76mm cannon and four 7.62mm machine guns.<sup>6</sup>

After World War II, the Soviet Union began to mechanize their entire army. Infantry began to ride in armored personnel carriers. The first carrier was a six-wheeled armored truck that entered service in 1950. It was open-topped, lightly armored, slug-



*"The main Soviet tanks of World War II were the T-34-85 medium tank and the KV1 heavy tank. The T-34-85 weighed 32 tons, had a five-man crew, and carried an 85mm cannon and two 7.62mm machine guns. The KV1 weighed 47.5 tons, had a five-man crew, and carried a 76mm cannon and four 7.62mm machine guns."*

gish, and had limited cross-country mobility. The BTR-152A eventually carried dual-mounted 14.5mm heavy machine guns — though more for antiaircraft fire than for tank support. Production of the BTR-152 series ceased in 1959.<sup>7</sup>

In 1959, the Soviets decided to develop two types of infantry personnel carriers: tracked infantry fighting vehicles that would serve in tank divisions and cheaper wheeled armored infantry personnel carriers that would serve in the more numerous motorized rifle divisions. The tracked chassis of the BMP offered better mobility and a better chance to keep up with the tanks. However, the tracked vehicles were more expensive to produce, operate, and maintain.<sup>8</sup> The BMP was designed to serve as more than a mere battle taxi. Its armor protected the crew and infantry from bullets and radiation and its armaments and firing ports



*"After World War II, the Soviet Union began to mechanize their entire army. Infantry began to ride in armored personnel carriers. The first carrier was a six-wheeled armored truck that entered service in 1950. It was open-topped, lightly armored, sluggish, and had limited cross-country mobility. The BTR-152A eventually carried dual-mounted 14.5mm heavy machine guns — though more for antiaircraft fire than for tank support. Production of the BTR-152 series ceased in 1959."*

allowed the vehicle to engage the enemy effectively without dismounting the infantry squad.<sup>9</sup> The BMP allowed the tanks and mechanized infantry to function as a mutually supporting team.

There were three main types of Soviet BMP produced between 1966 and 1991. The basic BMP-1 is armed with a 73mm low-pressure cannon, an AT-3 Sagger antitank guided missile launch rail, and a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. It has a one-man turret and all weapons can be reloaded from inside the vehicle.<sup>10</sup> The BMP-2 entered service in 1980. The basic model has a two-man turret and is armed with a 30mm automatic cannon, a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, and a launch rail for either the AT-4 Spigot or AT-5 Spandrel antitank missiles.<sup>11</sup> The BMP-3 entered service in 1987 and has a 30mm automatic cannon, a 100mm cannon, a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun, and two 7.62mm bow-mounted machine guns.<sup>12</sup> The BMP-2 and BMP-3 have a significant antiaircraft capability against helicopters and low-flying, fixed-wing aircraft.

After the Soviet tank divisions were equipped with the BMP, the Soviets examined the composition of their motorized rifle divisions. The wheeled BTR infantry personnel carriers were lightly armored and only carried a 14.5mm heavy machine gun. Clearly, they were not the optimum vehicles to fight in coordination with tanks, and each motorized rifle division had a regiment of tanks. To upgrade the capability of the motorized rifle division, each division was re-equipped so that one of the three motorized rifle regiments had BMPs in lieu of BTRs. The tanks and BMPs always fought together on the main attack. Self-propelled artillery and self-propelled antiaircraft weapons, such as the ZSU 23-4, accompanied the tanks and BMPs to provide a lethal, integrated combat team where each system provided mutual support. But, technology is only part of the equation.

### **The Soviet Tactical Approach**

The Soviet armored attack was a highly orchestrated lethal ballet. It was a ballet built around an artillery schedule where massed artillery was fired in phases and the armor and mechanized artillery advanced behind a wall of sizzling shrapnel precisely in accordance with those phases. Battalion and below tactics were a series of simple battle drills that were repeated endlessly so that soldiers could perform them automatically and flawlessly when they were frightened, tired, or had just been called out of the reserves after ten years as a civilian. Tactics were rigid and provided predictability — a strong suit for an army that valued operational flexibility.<sup>13</sup>

Artillery was key (and close). Self-propelled howitzers accompanied the attack and provided direct fire on resisting en-

emy strong points. Multiple rocket launchers were even used in direct fire against a particularly stubborn enemy. Helicopter gunships and fixed wing fighter bombers served as a very mobile artillery in support of the advance throughout the depths. The enemy was NATO or China-modern, industrial armies defending in-depth in predictable patterns.

### The Soviet Structural Approach

Despite the impressive technology and tactics, tanks still tended to separate from BMPs and artillery during the advance. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War proved the value of the RPG and antitank-guided missile to the defender. Tanks had to fight as a combined arms team to survive, but could not afford to slow down and lose the momentum of the attack. The answer appeared to be better combined arms training. In the late 1980s, the Soviets began forming combined arms battalions, which had organic tanks, BMPs, and artillery. The combined arms battalion allowed units to train for mutual support continuously, instead of only during scheduled exercises. However, the combined arms battalion required seasoned commanders who could deal with the training, supply, and maintenance demands of this complex unit. Soviet junior officers were usually younger and less-experienced than their Western counterparts when they commanded at various levels — although they tended to command longer during a career. The combined arms battalion experiment failed due to its complexity, internal turmoil in the army, and leadership challenges.

### Mind the Gap

The Soviet-Afghan War and the Chechen Wars emphasized the tactical gap for the Soviets and the Russians. The enemy was not modern, mechanized, nor arrayed in a defense in-depth. Their RPG gunners knew where the soft spots were on the various Soviet/Russian vehicles.<sup>14</sup> The terrain worsened the problem of the tactical gap and, in the areas where the tanks could go, tanks and BMPs were often separated and unable to support each other. In the mountains of Afghanistan, the tanks were often left behind and the BMPs and BTRs had to accomplish an independent mission they were not designed for. The Russians decided that the tactical gap between tanks and mechanized infantry is almost inevitable.

The battle of Grozny on New Year's Eve 1994 provided the impetus to develop a heavily armored close combat system. The Russians discovered that the thinly armored ZSU 23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun was the optimum system for tank support in city fighting, but its vulnerability offset the efficiency of its four 23mm automatic cannons.<sup>15</sup> To ensure the survivability of tanks, they needed a new system that was built like a tank, but provided mutual close combat support. The new system should provide protection against en-



*"There were three main types of Soviet BMP produced between 1966 and 1991. The basic BMP-1 is armed with a 73mm low-pressure cannon, an AT-3 Sagger antitank guided missile launch rail, and a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. It has a one-man turret and all weapons can be reloaded from inside the vehicle. The BMP-2 entered service in 1980. The basic model has a two-man turret and is armed with a 30mm automatic cannon, a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, and a launch rail for either the AT-4 Spigot or AT-5 Spandrel antitank missiles."*

emy antitank weapons, infantry, strong points, helicopters, and fixed wing aviation. The new system needed to be an integral part of the armored unit, but it could not be a modern T-35 with five turrets and multiple weapons. The Russian answer was the BMPT tank support vehicle. It was not an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) and the Russians were not discounting the value of mechanized infantry in the combined arms team. They were recognizing that the mechanized infantry may not be at the critical point at the critical time.

The BMPT [Beovaya mashina podderzhki tankov] is built on a T-72 or a T-90S tank chassis, so it has the armored protection, maneuverability, and ruggedness to maneuver directly with the tank platoon. It has laminated and reactive armor and weighs 47 tons and carries a five-man crew. There are several variants. The



*"The Russians discovered that the thinly armored ZSU 23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun was the optimum system for tank support in city fighting, but its vulnerability offset the efficiency of its four 23mm automatic cannons. To ensure the survivability of tanks, they needed a new system that was built like a tank, but provided mutual close combat support."*

first has a low-profile turret, housing a 30mm automatic cannon with a coaxial AG-17D grenade launcher, an AT-14 Koronet antitank guided missile, and a 7.62mm machine gun. The second variant has a dual 30mm automatic cannon, a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun, two grenade launchers, and four Ataka-T guided missiles with a shaped charge or thermobaric warhead.<sup>16</sup> A third variant has dual 30mm AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers and antiaircraft guided missiles.<sup>17</sup> The final design will probably use the dual 30mm automatic cannon, four Shturm-SM missiles, and two AG-17D 30mm grenade launchers (with a range of 1,700 meters), or 7.62mm machine guns in lateral sponsons.<sup>18</sup> The BMPT is designed to stay up with and support the T-90S main battle tank, nicknamed “the terminator.” The BMPT has an advertised antitank capability out to five kilometers and the ability to clear the enemy from a city block at a distance of three kilometers.<sup>19</sup>

The BMPT will be part of the Russian armor forces. Initial tactical employment envisions putting one BMPT with two tanks in the field and two BMPTs with one tank in city fighting.<sup>20</sup> This is probably not the final answer. The BMPT engages secondary targets allowing the tanks to deal with enemy tanks and strong points. The mix will depend on the situation, but a standard platoon deployment of three tanks and one BMPT is most likely. Since the BMPT is neither an infantry fighting vehicle nor a tank, it may not be covered by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty that limits Russia to 6,350 tanks and 11,280 personnel carriers on its territory. But that is something for the diplomats to wrangle over. Russia believes that tracked tanks have a future and that the BMPT will ensure their survivability and future.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, pp. 196-202.

<sup>2</sup>Timothy Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,” *Parameters*, Summer 1999, pp. 87-102.

<sup>3</sup>Gennadiy Kholyavskiy, *Entsiklopediya Tankov. Polnaya entsiklopediya tankov mira 1915-2000* [Encyclopedia of Tanks. The complete encyclopedia of the world’s tanks from 1915 to 2000], Kharvest [Harvest], Minsk, 2000, pp. 133-138.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid, p. 132.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, p. 268.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, p. 274.

<sup>7</sup>Andrew W. Hull, David R. Markov, and Steven J. Zaloga, *Soviet/Russian Armor and Artillery Design Practices: 1945 to Present*, Darlington Productions, Darlington, MD, 1999, pp. 208-213.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid, p. 213.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid, p. 238.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid, pp. 238-252.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid, pp. 252-256.

<sup>12</sup>Russian Ministry of Defense, *Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI Encyclopedia, Armored Vehicles: Volume VII*, [Russian-English language], Moscow, 2003, pp. 214-228.

<sup>13</sup>Christopher Donnelly, *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War*, Jane’s Information Group, Surrey, England, 1988, passim.

Weight (tons)	47
Crew	5
Number and type cannon	2 X 30mm 2A42
Ammunition reserve 30mm cannon rounds	900
Cyclic rate of fire, cannon rounds per minute	up to 600
Number and type machine gun	1 X 7.62mm PKTM
Ammunition reserve, 7.62mm machine gun	2,000
Machine gun cyclic rate of fire, rounds/min.	up to 400
Degrees elevation of cannon and machine gun	45°
Degrees depression of cannon and machine gun	5°
Number and type grenade launchers	2 X 30mm AG-17D
Ammunition reserve, grenades	600
Type antitank guided missile	Ataka-T
Number of antitank guided missiles	4
Degrees elevation of grenade launchers	25°
Degrees depression of grenade launchers	5°
Engine	V-92S2 Diesel
Horsepower	1,000
Horsepower per ton	21.28
Maximum speed	65 kilometers per hour
Distance on tank of fuel	550 kilometers
Armor	Exceeds that of basic tank
Type of smoke grenade	902A
Stabilized gunners sight	Laser rangefinder, thermal imaging and optical with 4X and 12X magnification
Stabilized commanders sight	Panoramic, television coupled with laser rangefinder

Figure 1. Specifications for BMPT Variant 2<sup>21</sup>

<sup>14</sup>Lester W. Grau, “Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience,” *Red Thrust Star*, January 1977.

<sup>15</sup>Dimitriy Litovkin, “Kombayn dlya polya boya. Boevaya mashina podderzhki tankov skoro postupit v voyska” [Combination for the battlefield. The tank support vehicle soon will be introduced into the force], *Izvetiya*, 15 March 2005, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup>Russian Ministry of Defense, pp. 208-213. The Russians have developed a variety of thermobaric munitions for bunker busting, minefield clearing and artillery preparation. See, Lester W. Grau and Timothy Smith, illustrated by John Richards and Ivan Pavlov, “A Crushing Victory: Fuel-air Explosives and Grozny 2000,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 2000, pp. 30-33.

<sup>17</sup>“I tanki nado podderzhat’...” [And tanks must be supported...], *Krasnaya zvezda* [Red star], 22 December 2004, p. 7.

<sup>18</sup>Ian Kemp, “Unthought-of Roles,” *Armada International*, 2/2005, p. 28.

<sup>19</sup>Litovkin.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Russian Ministry of Defense, pp. 208-213.

*Lieutenant Colonel Lester Grau, U.S. Army, Retired is a military analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.A. from the University of Texas at El Paso and an M.A. from Kent State University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the U.S. Army Russian Institute, the Defense Language Institute, and the U.S. Air Force War College. He held various command and staff positions, to include deputy director, Center for Army Tactics, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth; chief, Soviet Tactics Instruction Branch, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth; political and economic adviser, Headquarters, Allied Forces, Central Europe, Brunssum, the Netherlands; and diplomatic courier, Moscow.*



# Ruminations on Modular Cavalry

by Major Andrew D. Goldin

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense.*

Although plenty of today's Army units bear the moniker "cavalry," increasingly fewer perform cavalry missions. *Dictionary.com* defines cavalry as, "A highly mobile army unit using vehicular transport, such as light armor and helicopters," and for historical purposes as, "troops trained to fight on horseback." The fact I had to use the internet, rather than current or emerging doctrine, to find a definition of cavalry is revealing in and of itself. No current field manual defines the term "cavalry," or uses it beyond a historical context.

Meanwhile, the 1996 version of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*, describes cavalry by its roles.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, "the fundamental purpose of cavalry is to perform reconnaissance and

provide security for close operations... Cavalry is, by its role, an economy of force." The field manual goes on to say, "Cavalry has historically served as a flexible multipurpose force. Capitalizing on a significant mobility advantage over infantry, cavalry performed long-range reconnaissance and security for commanders."<sup>2</sup>

For the purpose of this article, cavalry will be defined as "a highly mobile force, capable of operating independently to perform reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force missions," which is defined in FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, as:

"Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken to obtain ... information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data ... of a particular area.

"Security: Measures taken by a military unit... to protect itself against all acts ...

which may impair its effectiveness, and One of the nine principles of war: never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.

"Economy of Force: The allocation of minimum essential combat capability to supporting efforts, with attendant degree of risk, so that combat power may be concentrated on the main effort. One of the nine principles of war: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts."<sup>3</sup>

With these definitions in mind, we will discuss doctrinal cavalry missions. Today, as in earlier days, reconnaissance missions include zone, area, and route reconnaissance. These missions focus on gathering information about enemy forces, terrain, and civilian considerations such as attitude of the population, infrastructure, and culture. The amount of detail delivered to the commander varies on the reconnaissance focus and tempo

of the operation, all of which are driven by mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians (METT-TC). These elements differ primarily on the amount of ground that needs to be covered, with an area recon generally being the smallest amount of ground and zone recon being the largest and most comprehensive effort. FM 17-95 also discusses the “reconnaissance in force,” which has more of the characteristics of a movement to contact rather than reconnaissance.<sup>4</sup> For example, a “thunder run” would be considered a reconnaissance in force.

Typical cavalry security missions consist of screen, guard, and cover. In these missions, cavalry provides reaction time and maneuver space for the commander of the main body; that is, the element being secured. On the continuum of security missions, one may think of screen as providing the least security, while cover provides the most. In a screen, the cavalry “observes, identifies, and reports information... while fighting only for self protection.”<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, a cover mission “protects the main body by fighting to gain time... reports information ... and prevents enemy observation of and direct fire against the main body.”<sup>6</sup> Significantly, a covering force can also act in-

dependently of the main body. A robust cavalry force can also perform hasty attack, movement to contact, defend a battle position, defend in sector, and delay missions.

Before force modularity, the Army was fairly well organized and equipped to accomplish these missions. Each tactical echelon (corps, division, and brigade) had a dedicated formation, which could accomplish all or most of these missions within the environment it was intended to fight. Corps had armored cavalry regiments (ACRs), divisions had divisional cavalry squadrons, and brigades had brigade recon troops. Heavy and light cavalry formations existed to perform similar roles in the environment for which they were intended; heavy forces for a high-intensity environment and light forces for low-intensity conflict. This provided the commander of each echelon, heavy or light, a dedicated force to accomplish a variety of reconnaissance and security tasks in support of his mission, without necessarily having to divert maneuver forces. As a practical matter, it was often necessary to beef up a brigade recon troop or a light cavalry squadron with tanks or other additional assets based on METT-TC. Although these organizations were

not perfect for every situation, at least commanders had an existing organization for task organizing when required.

After modularity, a fully functional cavalry force effectively no longer exists. That is, we no longer have units capable of performing all of the enduring cavalry functions. Modular force capabilities are limited to the surveillance and reconnaissance pieces of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) paradigm. The only echelon that maintains a cavalry-like organization is the brigade combat team (BCT). These organizations, called “reconnaissance squadrons,” are aptly named. The final draft of FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance Squadron*, provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for reconnaissance squadrons in heavy, Stryker, and infantry BCTs.<sup>7</sup> Regardless of BCT organization, the reconnaissance squadron is responsible for “finding and tracking the enemy throughout the BCT AO [area of operations]” and “providing targeting data.”<sup>8</sup> According to the FM, each squadron has limitations. The reconnaissance squadron is not organized, equipped, or trained to conduct a reconnaissance in force; should only be used in a security role when unavoidable; and will use fires as a primary weapon — inherent firepower is mainly for self protection.<sup>9</sup>



*“The reconnaissance squadron is characterized by a new emphasis on stealthy reconnaissance and surveillance operations and integration into the joint battlespace by “analog and digital information linkages horizontally within the squadron and vertically to the BCT and subordinate command nodes.” I assume this means that when scouts send a spot report via an onboard electronic information system, everyone in the BCT knows about it and we can count on joint fires — the U.S. Air Force — to save our skins. I hope that works.”*

Doctrinally, the reconnaissance squadron can accomplish the same reconnaissance missions — zone, area, and route — as its organizational predecessors, as well as limited security missions such as screen, area security, and local security. As in earlier organizations, the reconnaissance squadron’s significant capabilities include the ability to perform continuous, all-weather reconnaissance and security missions in support of the commander’s objectives. It is capable of rapid movement and deployment, close reconnaissance, and gathering information on various threats, conditions, and civilian considerations. The reconnaissance squadron is characterized by a new emphasis on stealthy reconnaissance and surveillance operations and integration into the joint battlespace by “analog and digital information linkages horizontally within the squadron and vertically to the BCT and subordinate command nodes.”<sup>10</sup> I assume this means that when scouts send a spot report via an onboard electronic information system, everyone in the BCT knows about it and we can count on joint fires — the U.S. Air Force — to save our skins. I hope that works.



In contrast, FM 3-20.96 is very clear in the reconnaissance squadron's limitations. Specifically, "it lacks direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability in open and rolling terrain and needs augmentation when a heavy armor threat is anticipated; it requires augmentation to perform offensive and defensive operations as an economy of force; and it has limited sustainment assets that must frequently operate over extended distances."<sup>11</sup> A review of the task organizations of the three types of reconnaissance squadrons shows why the manual states this. The reconnaissance squadron's task organization for the heavy BCT is shown in Figure 1.<sup>12</sup>

Compared to the future force brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) reconnaissance squadron is significantly more capable, consisting of nearly three times the amount of personnel and equipment as its predecessor. It appears to be fully capable of sustained reconnaissance operations for the BCT in many likely scenarios. However, the BRT (much like its parent brigade) was designed and intended to operate in the context of a division organization where the division cavalry had a mix of Bradleys and M1-series Abrams tanks.

Since the BCT is intended to operate independently, HBCT reconnaissance squadrons must operate without the additional layer of divisional cavalry (the divisional cavalry squadron) ahead of them. Thus, the counterreconnaissance fight will fall entirely on the reconnaissance squadron's 23 M3 Bradleys, 30 M1114 long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3)-equipped HMMWVs, and whatever fires they can call in with the aid of the fire support team (FIST) or the combat observation and lasing team (COLT). The absence of tanks from the squadron's task organization in the heavy fight means the squadron can likely conduct the missions for which it was intended, but no more. While the reconnaissance squadron is more capable, the absence of the divisional cavalry squadron means it also has a lot more work to do, resulting in a zero-sum gain.

The infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) reconnaissance squadron, shown in Figure 2, has some similarities to the light cavalry squadron of the divisional cavalry, as well as the light brigade cavalry troop because it is a HMMWV-centric organization.<sup>13</sup> Adding another ground troop is a welcome improvement and will be of great use in the light-fighter environment.

Less clear, however, is how to make best use of the dismounted troop. FM 3-20.96 provides little guidance on the subject. Lack of inherent high-speed transportation is problematic and denies the troop the advantage of mobility typically associated with cavalry. In theory, based on METT-TC, the dismounted troop could be inserted by helicopter near its reconnaissance objectives or infiltrate along dismounted avenues of approach. The most obvious solution would be to motorize the troop,



providing it with the same capabilities as the other two troops in the squadron.

Meanwhile, the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) has a dedicated reconnaissance squadron that has some unique capabilities, shown in Figure 3.<sup>14</sup> The Stryker reconnaissance squadron is unique for two reasons: use of the Stryker vehicle as the standard platform and the addition of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) unit. The Stryker was built with digital integration in mind and connects scouts with the SBCT by digital data, as well as voice. Meanwhile, under favorable environmental and operational conditions, the UAS can provide a significant surveillance capability unique to the Stryker squadron in the form of direct video feeds to ground-based units or headquarters. The multisensor platoon offers a capability typically associated with military intelligence battalions. Adding these specialties to the task organization significantly enhances the SBCT reconnaissance squadron's capabilities. The remainder of the squadron is conventionally orga-

### SBCT Reconnaissance Squadron




Figure 3

nized around three troops of three platoons each, along with a mortar section for each troop.

The implications of the modular force effect not only reconnaissance squadrons, but the BCT commanders who use them. Reconnaissance squadrons of all types are organized to accomplish reconnais-

sance missions and limited security missions (screen) only. The other enduring cavalry missions — guard, cover, and economy of force — are left unanswered by the modular cavalry force.

The rationale for this omission appears to be twofold. First, in network centric warfare, planners declare that “information dominance, when achieved, is security.”<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately, this assumption remains untested in the real world. While knowledge is power, it doesn’t translate into the boots, tires, or treads on the ground needed to react to physical threats that don’t respond as planned. After all, the enemy does get a vote. The second reason — if you can call it that — is a post-fact rationalization of

the merits and pitfalls of the future force of cavalry squadrons. As FM 3-20.96 states, “In our nation’s history, reconnaissance and cavalry units that were impressively armed (possessing organic armor, aviation, and artillery, for example) routinely proved too much of a temptation for commanders to employ in direct combat roles. When reconnaissance units engage in direct combat missions, one thing has proved certain — reconnaissance ceases. When reconnaissance ceases, the potential for achieving and capitalizing upon information dominance is lost.”<sup>16</sup> Therefore, to gain information dominance, we must remove the cavalry’s ability to fight for information and perform security missions.

Apparently, removing combat power will prevent reconnaissance squadrons from being misused. Unfortunately, history suggests the opposite. Captain William Nance draws a number of compelling parallels between the modular cavalry force and the mechanized cavalry groups of World War II in his article, “The Armored Reconnaissance Squadron and the Mechanized Cavalry Group,” in the January-February issue of *ARMOR*.<sup>17</sup> Nance discusses historical examples where our predecessors were used doctrinally, and just as often non-doctrinally, with unfortunate results. Therefore, removing combat power from the cavalry will not necessarily prevent cavalry from being misused. If occasional misuse is the price for having the inherent capability to perform all the enduring cavalry missions organi-



*“Lack of inherent high-speed transportation is problematic and denies the troop the advantage of mobility typically associated with cavalry. In theory, based on METT-TC, the dismounted troop could be inserted by helicopter near its reconnaissance objectives or infiltrate along dismounted avenues of approach. The most obvious solution would be to motorize the troop, providing it with the same capabilities as the other two troops in the squadron.”*



*“The Stryker reconnaissance squadron is unique for two reasons: use of the Stryker vehicle as the standard platform and the addition of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) unit. The Stryker was built with digital integration in mind and connects scouts with the SBCT by digital data, as well as voice.”*

cally, I would rather pay that price than beg, borrow, and steal the additional combat power needed to accomplish the commander’s security or economy-of-force objectives.

Network-centric warfare or not, somebody on the battlefield has to accomplish reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force missions. Taking required combat power from reconnaissance squadrons does not solve the problem. Instead, the conduct of security missions will be tasked to units that have the combat power to conduct them — elements of the two maneuver battalions. Therefore, taking combat power away from the cavalry simply shifts the burden of these enduring missions to the very people who are supposed to gain from them — the main line battalions. Is this progress?

Throughout history, commanders have relied on cavalry to perform reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force missions on the battlefield; and cavalrymen — regardless of their mounts — have delivered. Currently, the technology required to deliver the siren-song promise of network-centric warfare does not exist, and it certainly isn’t in the hands of soldiers of the modular force. Currently,

future force reconnaissance squadrons can accomplish their very narrowly defined missions as they are. More worrisome, however, is the cavalry missions the “cavalry” is *not* doing — security and economy-of-force missions. Network-centric warfare or not, the need for units on the battlefield to perform cavalry’s enduring missions continues. Removing the cavalry’s ability to fight simply means that “someone else” will have to do it, or it may mean that the reconnaissance squadrons will be tasked with security missions beyond their capability. In either case, this will likely yield results that are as unfortunate as they are predictable. Scouts out!



#### Notes

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 24 December 1996.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, GPO, Washington, D.C., 21 September 2004.

<sup>4</sup>FM 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*.

<sup>5</sup>FM 3.0, *Operations*, GPO, Washington, D.C., 14 June 2001.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance Squadron*, GPO, Washington, D.C., TBP.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Captain William Nance, “The Armored Reconnaissance Squadron and the Mechanized Cavalry Group, *ARMOR*, January-February 2006, pp. 7-11.

Major Andrew Goldin is the state marksmanship coordinator for Joint Forces Headquarters, Maryland Army National Guard, Reisterstown, MD. He received a B.A. from the College of William and Mary and an M.S. from George Mason University. His military education includes the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, Air Assault School, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include platoon leader, troop XO, troop commander, and assistant S3, 1st Squadron, 158th Cavalry Regiment, Maryland Army National Guard, Annapolis, MD. He was mobilized in support of Operation Joint Forge where he served as the G3 Operations Battle Captain for MND-North (SFOR 10), Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina.



# Maneuver Captains Career Course

by Lieutenant Colonel Patrick A. Clark and Major Edward Hayes

Today's operating environment places extraordinary demands on junior leaders. Company commanders in the current fight have more responsibility, more assets to employ, and are required to contend with more uncertainty to accomplish their mission than any other time in recent history. Preparing company grade officers to serve successfully as commanders and staff officers in this environment has led to substantial change in the professional military education of armor and infantry captains.

The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission's (BRAC) recommendations went into effect on 9 November 2005. This report stipulates creating a Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, effectively combining the Armor and Infantry Schools into one organization.<sup>1</sup> This "merger" will create a combined infantry and armor captains career course — the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MC3).

Initial entry training for armor and infantry lieutenants will remain under the respective chiefs of armor and infantry. However, MC3 will become a new organization focused exclusively on captain

professional education, outside the umbrella of the armor and infantry branches. Its charter remains to execute training that meets "current and relevant" standards for training officers of an Army at war.

## The Maneuver Captains Career Course

MC3 trains and develops infantry and armor captains collectively for company-level command and combined arms staff officer positions during full-spectrum operations in various environments against an adaptive enemy. Officers graduate from this course understanding the capabilities and employment of light infantry, Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) infantry, reconnaissance, and tank/mechanized units.

Under lifecycle management, students graduating from career courses may arrive at their brigade combat team (BCT) during its reset phase and immediately take command of a troop or company; other career course graduates will arrive and serve on the BCT, battalion, or squadron staff. This represents a significant shift from the former assignment model for career course graduates, where students could expect to spend significant time on staff prior to taking command. The new

paradigm reflects the need to prepare students graduating from career courses to take a guidon immediately after arriving at their unit.

The concept for MC3 divides the program of instruction into two phases. Phase I, company core training, combines all officers for the first half of the course. During this phase, all students receive the same training on company-level, full-spectrum operations for light infantry, SBCT infantry, and tank/mechanized companies. The Human Resources Command provides all students follow-on assignments based on the requirements of the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model.

Phase II, the second half of the course, begins by dividing students into formation-based small groups to prepare officers to serve in an infantry, Stryker, or heavy BCT. Officers (including the other branches attending MC3) assigned to an HBCT will be assigned to a small group with all members pending assignment to an HBCT. Officers assigned to an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) or SBCT will be assigned to a small group with all members pending assignment to an IBCT

or SBCT. Officers selected for Special Forces will be assigned to a small group with all members pending assignment to the Special Forces Qualification Course. These new small groups, focused on one particular BCT type, provide students the requisite technical and tactical skills for company- through brigade-level operations.

Fort Benning and Fort Knox jointly developed the concept and training for MC3. Both the Infantry and Armor School contributed to redefining the expectations for the course. Each graduate of MC3 will have:

- Demonstrated the ability to think critically.
- Demonstrated adaptiveness and flexibility in problemsolving, including tactical problems.
- Demonstrated an ability to effectively communicate and inspire confidence in subordinates.
- Demonstrated mastery of the “science” of tactical planning at company through battalion/task force level, and have a thorough understanding of planning at the BCT level.
- Practiced in the “art” of tactical planning.
- Demonstrated understanding of critical training and leader functions of a company commander.

The classroom environment will continue to focus on a small group of up to 16 students trained by a small-group instructor. This environment encourages experiential learning in the classroom and during constructive, virtual, and live exercises. Students will have multiple opportunities to practice and demonstrate their abilities, as well as receive continuous verbal and written feedback from instructors and peers based on performance.

### Phase I: Company Core

Phase I of the MC3 provides all students the same foundation in fundamentals and company-level, full-spectrum operations for light infantry, SBCT infantry, and tank/mechanized companies. The objective for this phase is to produce captains who are proficient with the three basic company-level formations. All maneuver captains must understand the capabilities, limitations, and employment of the three basic company types.

Recent operations have shown that captains must have the knowledge and capability to employ a full range of units and

assets in a wide variety of operations. For example, tank company commanders in Iraq plan and execute air assault missions throughout their tour. Future MC3 graduates will have these required skills because they have actually planned operations during the course.

At the beginning of MC3, all branches intermix equally. Each small group is made up of a mixture of captains based on experiences and prior duty assignments. This diversity sustains the strengths of small-group instruction and capitalizes on the combined benefits of the armor and infantry career courses. Each student brings a different skill set to the group, which leads to greater training results for all officers.

During the company core phase of MC3 instruction, all students receive the same training on different company organizations for full-spectrum operations in various environments against a variety of threats (see Figure 1).

Phase I training includes:

**A0 – Company Fundamentals.** This module provides officers a foundation in doctrine and in the art and science of company-level operations. Students train on warfighting functions (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protection, sustainment, and command and control) and their application at company level. The module also includes

training on the contemporary operating environment (COE), weapons and systems capabilities, close combat attack and combat air support, and receiving and analyzing the mission as part of troop leading procedures.

**A1 – IBCT Company Attack and Defend.** This module prepares officers to develop company-level offensive and defensive plans for a light infantry company. Students train on light infantry tactics, troop leading procedures, direct fire planning, and engagement area development. This module is conducted in the local area so officers can conduct a terrain walk to analyze the terrain and apply that knowledge to their planning.

**A2 – HBCT Company Team Defense.** This module prepares officers to develop a tank/mechanized company team defensive plan in a high-intensity fight at the National Training Center. Students train on tank/mechanized defensive tactics, troop leading procedures, direct fire planning, engagement area development, and the warfighting functions of a combined arms battalion. In addition, students execute their defensive mission in the close combat tactical trainer (CCTT).

**A3 – HBCT Company Team Offense.** This module prepares officers to develop a plan for a tank/mechanized company team attack in an Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I scenario. Students train on offensive tactics, direct fire planning,




Figure 1



"The HBCT company team defense module prepares officers to develop a tank/mechanized company team defensive plan in a high-intensity fight at the National Training Center. Students train on tank/mechanized defensive tactics, troop leading procedures, direct fire planning, engagement area development, and the warfighting functions of a combined arms battalion."

breaching operations, and mechanized urban operations.

**A4 – SBCT Company Urban Defense.**

This module prepares officers to develop an urban defensive plan for an SBCT infantry company in an OIF I scenario. Students train on SBCT infantry company tactics, urban population and terrain considerations, urban direct fire planning

and engagement area development, securing a forward operating base (FOB), and interaction with the media.

**A5 – Urban Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO)/Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN).** This module prepares officers to execute SRO/COIN operations as a company commander with a task organized SBCT infantry compa-

ny team. Students train on SRO operations, cordon and search, raid, and urban equipment. Additional training includes an introduction to insurgency, the infrastructure of an insurgency, counter-guerrilla operations, and COIN operations.

**A6 – Battle Forge Exams.** This module is the comprehensive exam week for the first phase of MC3. It consists of a hands-on performance exam, a comprehensive knowledge exam, and individual counseling. Students receive a task force order for an attack. Students must then prepare a company order for a maneuver company in their future BCT. In other words, an armor officer heading to an HBCT following MC3 will develop an order for a tank company team. An infantry officer heading to an IBCT will develop an order for a light infantry company. This exam is the gate evaluation all students must pass prior to entering assignment-based training.

**Assignment-Oriented Training**

This phase of MC3 provides students with specialized tactical and technical training for the brigade formation of their follow-on assignments. While the company core phase provides all captains a solid foundation for company-level operations, considering different organizations, operations, and environments, it does not provide details that company




Figure 2

commanders and staff officers require for future units of assignment. Dividing the course into specific tracks, based on future assignments, enables students to receive more unit-specific technical and tactical training to be successful as commanders and staff officers in future BCTs.

Prior to executing Phase II of MC3, the Human Resources Command provides all captains follow-on assignments during the first half of the course. The ARFORGEN model determines the requirements for captain assignments based on unit lifecycle management. As the system matures, there will be more predictability to manning requirements, which provides more certainty to structuring MC3 assignment-based training tracks. As shown in Figure 2, all officers assigned to an HBCT attend the HBCT track; officers assigned to an IBCT or SBCT attend the IBCT/SBCT track. Officers from different branches attend their track based on future assignments and foreign officers attend the track that resembles their own particular unit or branch.

Officers assigned to tables of distribution and allowance (TDAs), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and echelons above brigade attend the track reflecting either their branch or most probable follow-on BCT assignment. For example, an infantry student, assigned to III Corps G3 at Fort Hood, will attend the HBCT track because there are no Fort Hood-based IBCT/SBCTs. After he receives his follow-on assignment and completes the battle forge exams, he will begin training with a new small group that corresponds with the assignment-based training track.

### Phase II: HBCT and IBCT/SBCT Track

This 12-week phase of MC3 provides the force with captains who are well versed in technical and tactical aspects of BCTs. This phase includes company, battalion, and brigade training (see Figure 3). For battalion and brigade training, students will train on the same staff tasks; however, they will be part of a small group staff and prepare orders for their future-assignment organizations. For example, an armor student, on orders to Fort Campbell, prepares an IBCT reconnaissance squadron order with his infantry brothers on the IBCT track, while another armor officer, on orders to Fort Hood, prepares a similar order for an HBCT reconnaissance squadron. With the exception of the reconnaissance module, all battalion and brigade training uses a common higher headquarters order for a unit that is task




Figure 3

organized with the three different BCT-type organizations. For example, the battalion defense module has an HBCT conducting an area defense. The HBCT's task organization includes a combined arms battalion, light infantry battalion, and a Stryker infantry battalion. Each small group uses the common higher order to prepare specific battalion plans. This common scenario and higher order ensures students receive the same standard training with focus on future units, and it allows cross-talk and planning coordination between different small groups.

Phase II training includes:

**A7 – Company Specialized Tasks.** This two-week module provides students with additional detailed company-level training for their future organizations. Students receive more instruction on certain tasks, such as movement to contact for tank/mechanized companies, that they did not previously receive. They also have more opportunities to plan and execute operations in a virtual or live environment. Students on orders to an IBCT develop plans for light infantry company op-



*"The SBCT company urban defense module prepares officers to develop an urban defensive plan for an SBCT infantry company in an OIF I scenario. Students train on SBCT infantry company tactics, urban population and terrain considerations, urban direct fire planning and engagement area development, securing a forward operating base (FOB), and interaction with the media."*

erations for execution in a networked, off-the-shelf virtual simulation in the classroom. Select IBCT-track individuals will train with infantry second lieutenants. Students on the HBCT track initially execute more company operations in CCTT. They also execute five days of the tank company gauntlet field training exercise (FTX) with second lieutenants from the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course III. Each HBCT small group provides company commanders, executive officers, fire support officers, and company observer/controllers for two different company teams for force-on-force exercises. This leadership and training opportunity with lieutenants in the field at the current Armor Captains Career Course generates positive responses from students, and it will continue with MC3.

**B0 – Battalion Fundamentals.** This module provides students with a foundation in the science of battalion-level operations. Students train staff operations, warfighting functions and their application at battalion level, and how to operate Force XXI battle command, brigade and below (FBCB2) and maneuver control system-light (MCS-L).

**B1 – Battalion Defense.** This module trains students on the military decision-making process (MDMP) by using a battalion defensive scenario as the mechanism. Students plan a battalion defense as a combined arms, light infantry, or Stryker infantry battalion staff during a high-intensity fight in a Korean scenario.

**B2 – Reconnaissance Squadron ISR and Security.** This module provides students a foundation in planning intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and security operations for the reconnaissance squadron of their future BCT. This training ensures all students develop and understand the capabilities and employment of reconnaissance squadrons and troops, which allows them to execute the capstone BCT exercise at the end of the course. Students develop a squadron area reconnaissance plan against a full-spectrum threat, in addition to a screen and area security operation, along a border with a hostile nation. More detailed reconnaissance and security training for officers heading to a reconnaissance unit is provided by the Cavalry Leaders Course following graduation.

**B3 – Battalion Offense.** This module reinforces training on MDMP through planning a battalion offensive operation against a full-spectrum threat. Students train on battalion offensive tactics and fundamentals, command post operations, air assault planning, and continuous, time-constrained MDMP. For the practical exercise, a small-group staff arrives at 0300 hours to receive a BCT order; and 18 hours later, brief their battalion operations order (OPORD). The next training day, students execute a command post exercise, fighting their battalion OPORD as staff and company commanders in joint conflict and tactical simulators (JCATS).

**B4 – Urban Offense.** This module reinforces training on MDMP through plan-

ning a battalion attack against a full-spectrum threat in an urban environment. Students train urban fundamentals, information operations, and targeting and pattern analysis.

**B5 – BCT Full-Spectrum Operations.** This module provides students with a foundation for BCT-level operations. Students receive training in their future BCT organization and capabilities, plus how the warfighting functions operate at the BCT level. Additionally, students train on joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) operations. Each small group then prepares a BCT order against a full-spectrum threat using the Iraq common teach scenario developed by the Combined Arms Center. Once this order is complete, the capstone exercise for the course occurs with the pre-command course gauntlet (multiechelon exercise). Students become the battalion or brigade staff officers and company commanders for future battalion/squadron and brigade commanders attending pre-command courses. The students develop BCT and subordinate battalion/squadron orders, which are then executed in a command post exercise in JCATS.

**A8 – Taking Command.** The final module of MC3 provides students technical tools to prepare for company command, which includes instruction on training management, planning gunnery/live fire exercises, maintenance, Uniform Code of Military Justice, supply, and other leadership and administrative requirements.

### Agile Leader Training in MC3

Equally important to MC3's current and relevant course material is preparing students to become agile leaders. Training students to adapt to changing circumstances requires a comprehensive approach from the first day of the course. Captains need to develop a thinking problem-solving process that supports making adjustments in an unfolding plan under the dynamic conditions of military operations. This adaptive thinking is a behavior and stems from specific knowledge and practical experience. It is not a personality trait, but rather a trainable skill. Agile leader training in MC3 seeks to instill automatic decisionmaking, or the ability to perform a thinking process so thoroughly that the action is automatic and does not require much cognitive effort.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to the programmed OPORD and fragmentary order (FRAGO) exercises throughout the course, the follow-

Continued on Page 47



*"The company fundamentals module provides officers a foundation in doctrine and in the art and science of company-level operations. Students train on warfighting functions (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protection, sustainment, and command and control) and their application at company level."*

# The Secret Testing of Israeli M111 “Hetz” Ammunition: A Model of Failed Commander’s Responsibility

by James M. Warford

On 10 June 1982, during Operation Peace for Galilee, Israeli forces launched an attack against Syrian forces believed to be preparing for a counterattack along a strategic highway. As elements of the Israeli 362d Tank Battalion entered the Lebanese town of Sultan Yakoub, Syrian and Palestinian forces heavily engaged the advancing Israeli Magach-4 main battle tanks (MBTs). The incoming fire was so intense that the lead elements of the Israeli battalion were cut-off and effectively surrounded by Syrian and Palestinian forces. Fighting continued throughout the night with the cut-off Israeli forces being pounded by effective and coordinated direct and indirect fires, as well as close air support. Additionally, the Syrians employed several antitank teams that used both rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and Milan antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).

Finally, on the morning of 11 June, after intense fighting, the Israelis saw their chance to disengage from the battle and made their move. Moving as quickly as possible, the remnants of the 362d Battalion managed to break contact and return to Israeli lines. Reportedly, when the

smoke and dust cleared, the Israelis left at least eight Magach-4s (either captured or destroyed) on the battlefield.

Several hours after the battle, Western reporters covering Peace for Galilee from Syria, reported that “something interesting could be seen in Damascus.” Wasting no time, the Syrians had moved at least one of the captured Magach-4s to the capital and paraded it, along with its captured crew, through the center of Damascus, flying both Syrian and Palestinian flags. Although rarely seen, photographs of this tank being paraded through the streets have appeared on the internet. While the whereabouts and final disposition of the majority of the captured Magach-4s from Sultan Yakoub are unknown, three of the tanks have been accounted for; and this is where the story truly begins.

This article does not intend to second-guess actions or decisions made by a commander under enemy fire; it is clear that a commander’s responsibility to secure and safeguard his classified and high-priority equipment is steadfast and ongoing — even after the battle. Failure to do

so can have a massive impact far beyond the battle at hand.

As mentioned above, three of these captured Israeli Magach-4s have been accounted for: one is on public display at the Teshren Panorama Museum in Damascus; another is publicly displayed at the Russian Military Historical Museum of Armored Vehicles and Weaponry at Kubinka; and the third tank, actually delivered to the Soviets as part of a set of two in 1982-1983, was reportedly destroyed during secret live-fire testing by the Soviets. This live-fire testing was standard procedure for captured equipment and the Soviets had been testing at Kubinka since 1936.

While interesting to be sure, the Magach-4s were not the most modern tanks available at the time and were not even the most modern Israeli tanks used during Peace for Galilee. Far more important than the tanks, the intelligence windfall for the Soviets (and equally the disaster for many others around the world), was the Israeli ammunition on-board when they arrived at Kubinka. The Soviets must have been literally thrilled to



Above, a captured Israeli Magach-4 on display at the Teshren Panorama Museum, Damascus, Syria. (Photo: Tom Cooper)



At left, an Israeli Magach-4 on display at the Kubinka Museum in Russia.

(Photo: Roman Bazalevsky)

discover that the delivery from Syria included an unconfirmed quantity of the new 105mm M111 (“Hetz” or “arrow”) armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) ammunition.

In 1982, it would have been difficult to overestimate the importance of the exploitation and testing of this new cutting-edge tank ammunition to the Soviets. Their own propaganda machine was already providing dramatic claims of victorious Syrian tank crews hugging the glacis armor of their new Soviet-designed T-72 MBTs that had reportedly survived the fire of the new Israeli Merkava Mk 1 MBTs, using the new M111 ammunition. The Israelis, on the other hand, were trying to convince as large an audience as possible of the exact opposite; in fact, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin added his own comments during a television interview on 15 June 1982. According to Begin, the Israelis destroyed nine T-72s with the Merkava; “while NATO claimed that the T-72 is undefeated in one respect — it cannot be hit (penetrated) from the front — NATO now knows this is not so. This is also a myth.” The unexpected opportunity to exploit what was perhaps the best 105mm tank round in existence at the time would not only allow the Soviets to confirm the performance of the Hetz round against their own tanks, but also determine its effectiveness against the armor of the tanks it was actively exporting to many of its allies around the world, including those in the Middle East.

The secret live-fire testing of the Hetz reportedly took place at Kubinka in 1982 and involved firing the round at a Soviet T-72A MBT. In 1982, the T-72A was a very new development for the Soviets; in fact, it had only been identified by NATO

the previous year and given the NATO reporting name of M1981/3. According to reliable Russian sources, this live-fire testing confirmed that the M111 Hetz round was able to penetrate the T-72A’s glacis armor, but not the tank’s turret frontal armor. This superior performance shocked the Soviets; up until these tests, they had been confident that the frontal armor of the T-72A (both turret and glacis), was immune to 105mm ammunition. The Israeli Hetz had proven them wrong. The Soviets knew they had to act and act quickly; if word of the true capabilities of the M111 Hetz round got out to their allies, especially those countries arrayed against Israel, the significance and export potential of the T-72 (and all of its variants), would be in jeopardy. Following these tests, the Soviets “attacked” this problem and very quickly developed and fielded a solution that would have an impact far beyond their efforts at Kubinka and the battle of Sultan Yakoub.

In addition to testing the Israeli M111 Hetz, there are unconfirmed reports that the Soviets managed to acquire an unknown number of brand-new U.S. 105mm M735 APFSDS rounds as well. This was very unlikely, since M735 ammunition had just started to reach U.S. tank battalions in Germany in 1981; however, if true, it could well have provided additional incentive to the Soviets to deal with the threat of new 105mm tank ammunition. Finally, a few photos believed to show the tanks involved in the Kubinka live-fire tests recently appeared on the internet. While still unconfirmed, the photos do clearly show holes punched into the armor of a T-72 to include the small gouges cut into the tank’s armor by the small fins of a penetrating APFSDS round. After observing similar results on knocked-

out Syrian tanks left on the battlefields of Peace for Galilee in 1982, the arrangement and shape of these tell-tale gouges prompted the press to label them “Stars of David.”

The Soviet solution to the surprising Israeli M111 Hetz round was not only important to the Soviets, but would also have a very significant impact in countries ranging from Europe to the Middle East, and as far away as the People’s Republic of China. The Soviets decided that the best solution was to redesign the glacis of the T-72A MBT specifically to defeat Hetz ammunition. Up until the testing at Kubinka, the T-72 series tanks were protected by a three-layer laminate glacis with an outer layer of high-carbon steel, 80mm thick, a middle layer of “steklotekstolit” or glass-reinforced plastic (GRP), 100mm thick, and an inner layer of high-carbon steel, 20mm thick, for a total thickness of 200mm. The Soviets decided to maintain this alternating steel-GRP-steel laminate design, but increased the number of layers from three to five. The new five-layer glacis design had two outer layers of high-carbon steel, two middle layers of GRP, and one inner layer of high-carbon steel. Additionally, the Soviets added a very hard 16mm thick steel faceplate to the outer layer of the glacis. The faceplate is easily identifiable by the two “cookie-cutout” holes cut into the plate to allow it to be placed over the tank’s two tow hooks, and welded directly to the outer layer of the glacis. For vehicle identification purposes, the faceplate became the defining feature of tanks fitted with this redesigned glacis armor. In effect, the Soviets had very quickly developed a new variant of the T-72, designated the T-72M1 MBT.

Since the Soviets had learned all they needed to know about the Hetz, and they realized that a significant portion of the military threat directed against the Soviet Union was actually directed at their allies (from NATO in Europe and from Israel in the Middle East), the T-72M1 would be intended solely for the export market. In addition to rushing as many of the tanks to their allies as possible, the Soviets also provided the design plans to several of their allies to allow those countries to produce the T-72M1, which included Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, and Yugoslavia (as the M84A).

The production of this new tank outside the Soviet Union not only allowed the

**At right, a captured Iraqi T-72M1 with add-on glacis faceplate on display at Fort Stewart, Georgia.**

(Photo: James M. Warford)

non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries to produce and field a large number of these tanks, it also allowed those same producing countries to export the tanks produced in Eastern Europe to the Middle East. In fact, the majority of the T-72M1s that the United States and coalition forces fought during Desert Storm and during Operation Iraqi Freedom were produced in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Interestingly enough, photographic evidence confirmed that the need for the 16-mm glacis faceplate fitted to the T-72M1 (if not redesigning the complete glacis armor array) was identified by the People's Republic of China. At least one example of a prototype of the new Chinese Type 98 MBT included the same 16mm glacis faceplate.

In addition to forcing the Soviets to develop an armor solution and a new tank to deal with the threat of the Israeli M111 Hetz, the exploitation of that ammunition also led to the international proliferation of that same tank. The T-72M1 quickly became the tank of choice for the armored forces of Soviet allies. It was deployed by several countries, including Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and India.

At the end of hostilities in 1982, the Israelis celebrated the success of the M111 Hetz round and decided to market it internationally as the proven T-72 killer. While still relatively unknown, prior to the Peace for Galilee Operation in 1982, the Hetz may have already had a following in Europe. Reportedly, the German military showed interest in the new Israeli round during its development in the late 1970s, and may have agreed to purchase the round for its own 105mm-armed tanks. The Hetz finally made it to Germany and was adopted by the German army in 1983, as the DM-23. In addition to Germany, the Hetz was adopted by other countries as well, which included South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

Interest in the Hetz was growing and the Israeli marketing efforts appeared to be paying off. Unfortunately for the Israelis and other countries that used the Hetz, the years that followed the success of the new round in 1982 included the proliferation of the T-72M1. Unknown to the rest of the world, the Soviet tank, protected by armor designed specifically to defeat the Israeli Hetz round, had given



much of the armored forces opposing NATO and Israel a significant advantage. Ultimately, the window of opportunity provided by the T-72M1's capabilities, like so many other weapons systems developed on both sides of the Cold War, did not last long. NATO and Israel would continue to develop and field new and improved 105mm tank ammunition, while concurrently fielding much better protected and significantly more powerful 120mm gun armed tanks. While the glory days of the T-72M1 were short, and any lingering assessments concerning the capabilities of its armor were left burning on the battlefields of Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the consequences resulting from the Soviet testing of the M111 Hetz, made possible by failed commander's responsibility, cannot be overlooked.

During the battle of Sultan Yakoub, Israeli commanders failed to complete the fundamental requirements of securing, safeguarding, recovering, or destroying their abandoned tanks. The fighting in Iraq over the past few years has confirmed that these same requirements have become a challenge for U.S. forces as well. Photographic evidence has confirmed that some U.S. 120mm APFSDS and HEAT ammunition has been discovered in captured Iraqi insurgent ammunition caches. Additionally, international press reports have confirmed the existence of a few isolated cases of U.S. M1s being temporarily abandoned without being secured or safeguarded. In one case, the attempted total destruction of an abandoned M1A1 by U.S. forces proved to be a significant challenge. This now-famous tank

was abandoned during the "thunder run" into Baghdad, due to a persistent engine fire. In spite of the use of thermite grenades, two 120mm HEAT rounds fired by another M1A1, two U.S. Air Force-delivered Maverick missiles, and one U.S. J-DAM bomb, the stricken tank remained intact. Clearly, it is the commander's responsibility to secure, safeguard, recover, and if necessary, completely destroy any abandoned M1 tank. These requirements, perhaps now more than ever, not only run chronologically (before, during, and after the battle), but also geographically, throughout the entire depth of the battlefield. Failure to do so could cause irreparable damage impacting not only our current operations in Iraq, but the operations of U.S. forces well into the future.



James Warford, U.S. Army, Retired, is a trainer/training coordinator, Training and Education Division, Cubic Defense Applications, Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.A. from the University of Santa Clara, CA, an M.M.A.S. from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and an M.A. from Webster University. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Armor Officer Advanced Course, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. During his career, he served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor, 2d Armored Division (2AD), Fort Hood, TX; commander, A Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 66th Armor, 2AD, Garlstedt, Germany; tactics instructor, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; S3, 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; and S3, 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart.

# Contemporary Lessons from the Past: A Second

by Captain William S. McDaniel

The Revolutionary War in South Carolina begs a second look at how behavior toward hostiles and host nation civilians relate to the modern contemporary operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Universally, all human beings will generally be incensed by perceived injustices and threats to hearth and home. In the context of counterinsurgency, bearing and actions toward people can be used as a great recruiting tool for the insurgents, all the more important as we fight an enemy who fights us in the international media. The injudicious application of force, misuse of authority, failure to understand cultures, and reprisals had a direct bearing on the success of irregular forces in the southern colonies during the American Revolution, leading to Lord Cornwallis' defeat at Yorktown, Virginia.

The point of this article is not to argue against the use of overwhelming force or to minimize the effects of combat power, but to point out the results of the injudicious application of violence

and the failure to understand the people with whom American soldiers may be dealing with now or in the future.

## Britain's Strategy

The British strategy was to isolate the colonies in rebellion. The southern colonies were seen as more loyal, which was not quite correct. It would be better described as one-third Loyalists, one-third neutral, and only one-third of the population wanting independence. The intent of the British government was to capitalize on this perceived loyal majority in the south to restore British rule. The method by which this was to take place would be a quick and decisive military victory over any of the rebel forces in the field. However, the continued punitive approach to anyone remotely considered disloyal by military forces on the ground undercut British political-military strategy in South Carolina and provided motivation to rebel forces. This not only led to the unnecessary loss of British blood, but to the loss of control of the entire area of operations, and retarded British of-



# Look at South Carolina in the Revolutionary War

fensive operations into North Carolina and Virginia due to the inability to secure the lines of communications and rear areas.


The war in South Carolina is of note to students of low-intensity conflict, in that it demonstrated the three phases of guerrilla warfare. The first phase occurred after conventional elements were destroyed after the fall of Charleston, and later at Camden, when an organized resistance was formed and began operations against British forces. The second phase, small attacks and organizational maturity, grew in intensity as more of the people became disaffected with heavy-handed British methods. The third phase, characterized by the emergence of an organized force capable of sustained, conventional operations, became apparent at Kings Mountain, and even more so after Cowpens. It was during this final phase that American General Nathaniel Greene used the popular discontent with Britain and the active militia in concert with conventional forces.

The results of this guerrilla campaign were no small matter. Although all of the ports were in the hands of the Crown, and a se-

ries of outposts were erected from Georgia to North Carolina, British offensive operations could never be effectively launched because of their inability to secure rear areas and lines of communications. Simply put: the tighter the British fist clenched around South Carolina, the looser Britain's grip became elsewhere.

## South Carolina Prior to 1775: Understanding the Politics and the Culture

At first, there was no overwhelming support for independence in South Carolina. South Carolina had everything to lose by revolting against Britain. Exports of rice and indigo had made vast fortunes for the planter set. In 1775, by measuring per capita wealth, nine of the ten richest men in America were South Carolinians.<sup>1</sup> Far from being a populous colony, South Carolina only had a population of 174,550, compared to 327,305 in Pennsylvania and 317,760 in Massachusetts.<sup>2</sup> Of South Carolina's population at the time, approximately 59 percent was black, and most of that not free.



British Army Major Patrick Ferguson falls from his horse mortally wounded while leading American Loyalist soldiers during the Battle of Kings Mountain, 7 October 1780.



*"The injudicious application of force, misuse of authority, failure to understand cultures, and reprisals had a direct bearing on the success of irregular forces in the southern colonies during the American Revolution, leading to Lord Cornwallis' defeat at Yorktown, Virginia."*

Geographically, South Carolina was approximately the same area as Scotland, but with two porous land borders that easily accommodated maneuver of hostile forces into the colony. Only the seaboard could be controlled by British naval power. Old growth forests did not significantly impair the movement of formed bodies of soldiers. The subtropical climate, with its mosquito-borne diseases, became a deadly enemy.

Culturally, the predominantly English peoples and French Protestants along the coastline favored independence. The interior, largely composed of Scots-Irish, was loyal to Britain. This set of people was still largely "celticized," and were generally at odds with the planter set. They were only two generations removed from Culloden Moor, and were fiercely independent.<sup>3</sup> These men were experienced fighters, who had been defending their families and homes from Indians and outlaws before the Revolution. They would also prove to be the "wild card" of the war.

### 1775 to 1780

Along the road to independence, the first actions were South Carolinian against South Carolinian. The fighting became personal, with settlement versus settlement. The 1775 campaign against the Loyalists in the interior secured the colony for a time. The level of brutality exhibited in these operations did much to create animosity between both Tories and Whigs (supporters of revolution). In June 1776, a British army and naval combined-arms assault against Charleston failed.

An amazing lack of understanding of the backcountry citizens was shown by the British command authority during this time. During the latter part of June 1776 to 1777, British agents had convinced the Cherokee to take action against the ever-encroaching settlers of the backcountry. The intent was to ensure that the attacks against the settlers would take place closely to the planned British attack on Charleston in June. This erupted in a most horrific and bloody fight from Georgia to Virginia in which women and children on both sides were not spared. This led to the decimation of the Cherokee and allied tribes, and the tenuous control of the backcountry by the Whigs. This also caused many heretofore Loyalists in the backcountry to take the side of the rebels. This hard, reconnaissance-in-force-style fighting on the part

of the South Carolinians also served as a training ground for the violence to come.

### Fall of Charleston

The third attack against Charleston proved to be the charm, and it was a masterpiece of combined arms operations and maneuver. This action, deserving study in its own right, resulted in the investiture of Charleston and its eventual surrender of the Southern Continental Army on 12 May 1780 by General Lincoln. British General Sir Henry Clinton proved to be more than equal to the task of coordinating combat power and maneuver. Sir Henry Clinton, remembering his mission to restore order and control, issued paroles for all privates and noncommissioned officers captured. All men were to return to their homes.

Not only did the British army knock out the Continental Army in the south, but they also seized the largest port south of Philadelphia. The capital of the rebellion in the south had fallen, its major port city, its arsenals, and its men. This became a spring-

board from which the Southern Campaign — a mounted war of maneuver — would begin.

The British victory and military presence encouraged loyalists to seek revenge for the earlier depredations of the rebellion supporters. As soon as Charleston was secure, mounted British forces drove inland to destroy the remnants of the Continental Army, state troops, and militia moving toward Charlotte. Within five days of Charleston's capture, a series of posts, arrayed in an arc from Georgia to North Carolina, were established to project British force into the interior and maintain control. These prototype "forward operating bases" were attached to the ports at the end of tenuous land and water routes. The end of major combat operations in this theater was at hand.

### The Grip Tightens Through Overconfidence

With the fall of the port of Charleston, the interior of the state lay open and ripe for the mounted forces of the British army to exploit. The British Legion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, overtook the remnants of the Virginia Continentals with their detachment of William Washington's cavalry on 29 May after a hard ride of 105 miles in 54 hours near the North Carolina line. Tarleton's forces finally caught up with and furiously attacked the American rear guard at approximately 1500 hours. The British forces attacked with the cavalry on the right and left wings, with dismounted infantry in the center, destroying the shattered American formation. What happened next was to spur debate for the next 200 years and cause a rallying cry for the "rebels."

After seeing that further resistance was useless, the American commander, Colonel Abraham Buford, decided to surrender. Whether the actions were mistakes made through the fog of war, a deliberate decision on the part of the British command, or the rage of Tarleton's soldiers seeing their commander's horse being shot out from under him after the flag of truce was raised, the deliberate killing of surrendering and wounded soldiers definitely took place. No American soldier was spared in this assault — 113 men were killed outright and 150 were left to die on the battlefield. Of the survivors, many gave testimony that 15 minutes after the action, British infantrymen bayoneted the living, dying, and the dead on the ground. Surgeon Brownfield later wrote of the affair: "The demand for quarters, seldom refused

to a vanquished foe, was at once found to be in vain; not a man was spared — and it was the concurrent testimony of all the survivors that for fifteen minutes after, every man was prostrate. They went over the ground plunging their bayonets into every one that exhibited any signs of life, and in some instances, where several had fallen one over the other, these monsters were seen to throw off on the point of the bayonet the uppermost, to come at those beneath.”<sup>4</sup>

The fact that an atrocity was taking place was plainly clear. Major Patrick Ferguson, present at this action and later to command British forces at Kings Mountain, was so incensed that he had to be restrained from firing on British forces with his own troops.<sup>5</sup> This act of barbarity toward surrendering soldiers became known as “Tarleton’s Quarter,” and American soldiers vowed to give the British “Buford’s Play,” in that there would be no prisoners. Ironically, this would later come back to haunt Ferguson during operations in the backcountry.

After receiving word of this action at the Waxhaws, Clinton was certain that all resistance had been destroyed in South Carolina. Clinton’s assumption was that because things were going so well, then obviously the vast majority of persons within the colony were loyal. Even so, there was no effort to restore a level of pre-war civil government. Clinton chose the punitive approach, since the rebels seemed to be a very small minority who were already defeated. This approach worked well in Scotland during the Jacobite Rebellion approximately 30 years earlier, and British operations began to mirror the same heavy-handedness.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, all pretensions of civility ceased, along with Clinton’s tactical patience, with restoring the popular support of the “disaffected.”

Accordingly, Clinton announced on 3 June 1780, that all paroles were “null and void” after 20 June. This act erased any good that offering paroles did in the first place. The population thought that life would return to somewhat normal as promised, but this promise was broken by the very man who made it. All holders of paroles were to take part in crushing the rebellion, including being prepared to take up arms for the king. This spurred Cornwallis to continue with a plan that had worked well for him in the northern colonies: Loyalist regiments were being formed and manned, with the idea of continuing operations against the rebels. In his own words, “to raise a provincial corps of five hundred men, with the rank of major, to be Natives of the country, and which it is at present extremely probable he will succeed.”<sup>7</sup> Although there were many regular British regiments in South Carolina of excellent reputation, such as the 71st Highlanders and Volunteers of Ireland, there was a key ingredient added to the mix. Many of the British units already with Cornwallis were Provincials from New York and New Jersey. These Provincials were trained and equipped by regular British leadership to increase manpower. This did not set well with the South Carolinians, as there were sectional and cultural differences between these colonies long before the revolution.


This change in official demeanor pushed many persons to choose sides against Britain. Violence began to break out against administration of the loyalty oath in the backcountry. Additionally, many Whigs were summarily executed or imprisoned at St. Augustine. Guerrilla organizations began to grow and take shape under three main commanders, notably Marion in the east, Sumter in the middle of the colony, and Pickens in the west. It should be noted that the rebel Governor of South Carolina, using emergency powers conferred on him, gave the guerrilla leaders the official sanction to operate as South Carolina militia. This gave them an undeniable stamp of “legitimacy.”

Clinton returned to New York with a sizeable portion of his army, and left Lord Cornwallis, his capable and aggressive second in command, in command. Cornwallis had every idea of completely destroying all opposition and launching north into North Carolina and Virginia. The punitive approach toward destroying a strengthening rebellion included the destruction and seizure of private property. To many South Carolinians, Tarleton, the “Butcher of the Waxhaws,” became the symbol of British excesses. Tarleton, an exceptionally competent cavalry commander, allowed his troopers to abuse the local population and destroy or confiscate private property. On one expedition against Thomas Sumter, he went as far as to exhume the body of Colonel Richard Richardson, who had commanded Whig forces during the fighting in 1775.

Of note was Major James Wemyss’ heavy hand in the Pee Dee section. Wemyss commanded a combined force of the 63rd Regiment, Provincials, and Loyalist militia that burned a swath 15 miles wide along a 70-mile route between Kingstree and Cheraw. During this movement, gristmills and livestock were destroyed, denying food to both citizens and guerrillas alike. Blacksmiths’ shops were not spared the torch. In his report to Lord Cornwallis on 20 September, Wemyss stated, “I have burnt or laid waste to about 50 houses and plantations, mostly belonging to people who have either broke their paroles or oaths of allegiance, and are now in arms against us.”<sup>8</sup> Further disregard for houses of worship was shown by British forces, with the most notorious being the burning of the Indiantown Presbyterian Church, with Wemyss terming it a “sedition shop.” The main Church of England in Georgetown was used as a stable. Wemyss also used the technique of holding guerrilla’s family members hostage, as was done in the case of a major, whose wife and children were locked in one room of their home while British forces waited for the major to arrive and rescue his family; when the major did not arrive, the home was burned before his family.

The second phase of the campaign was developing rapidly with pressure on Cornwallis’ forces. With this heavy-handed approach, the guerrilla activity only grew in intensity. Lines of communications and outposts were taking pressure from guerrillas, which stripped Cornwallis of his freedom of action. At first, guerrilla actions were small, squad-sized affairs.

In the Pee Dee, however, things were growing quickly out of control for Britain. After Gates’ defeat at Cam-




*“The British Legion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, overtook the remnants of the Virginia Continentals with their detachment of William Washington’s cavalry on 29 May after a hard ride of 105 miles in 54 hours near the North Carolina line. Tarleton’s forces finally caught up with and furiously attacked the American rear guard at approximately 1500 hours.”*

den, Marion struck against an element of the British rear guard, capturing 24 regulars and Loyalists, freeing 150 Maryland Continentals, and a sizeable quantity of horses, arms, and ammunition. Marion planned to use his logistics windfall. Two major actions of guerrillas versus Loyalist militia did much to shape the Blue Savannah and Black Mingo Creek attacks in September 1780. Marion used the weapons and ammunition taken from Camden to destroy British forces converging on him. These actions secured the Pee Dee as an area of operations for the growing rebellion. This second phase, the operational maturing of the organizations by small attacks and recruiting, saw the guerrillas grow quickly into a conventional operations capable force.

Cornwallis was growing impatient with launching north on offensive operations. Sickness was taking its toll on his army, sapping him of badly needed manpower. In Cornwallis' desire to attack northward, it seemed he turned a blind eye to the excesses of his commanders. Cornwallis' own orders stated: "That all the inhabitants of this province, who have subscribed and taken part in this revolt, should be punished with the greatest rigor, and their whole property taken away and destroyed...that every militia-man, who has borne arms with us, and afterwards joined the enemy, shall immediately be hanged."<sup>9</sup>

The heavy-handed approach toward pacifying the colony had resulted in tying him down to his outposts and bases of operation; however, his command emphasis on unrestrained punitive action led to the aborted invasion of North Carolina.

As Cornwallis decided to aggressively strike deeper into North Carolina, he ordered Major Patrick Ferguson on 2 September



*"While General Nathaniel Greene split his force into two locations astride the obstacle of the Great Pee Dee River, he forced Cornwallis to expose one flank to approach either location. Furthermore, he forced him to either concentrate his forces to meet an attack, or strike at the Continentals and dangerously expose his flanks and lines of communication to the guerrillas."*

1780 to begin operations in western North Carolina to protect his western flank.

Ferguson, a brilliant light infantry officer, had proven time and again that Loyalist militia could be trained and used as a conventional unit. His Scots background also put him culturally in tune with the settlers of the backcountry. Not only could this native Scot speak plainly and peacefully with the Scots-Irish of the Carolina backcountry, he attempted to win over the population by winning their minds instead of using coercion. Ferguson was also set at odds with Cornwallis because he believed that a trained and trustworthy Loyalist militia could be raised and put into the field at this date in the war, even though his commander seemed to have lost any confidence. While the British army undertook an operational pause in the summer of 1780, he actually raised 4,000 Loyalist militiamen and placed 1,000 of them in the field.

On 7 September, Ferguson arrived at Gilbert Town, North Carolina, with his Loyalist forces. While there, he paroled a captured patriot and sent a message to the mountain people. Uncharacteristically, Ferguson's message was a plain threat to anyone who was not loyal: "if they did not desist from their opposition to the British arms, and take protection under his standard, he would march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay their country waste with fire and sword."<sup>10</sup> This message had the opposite effect than he intended.

### The Final Stage of Guerrilla Warfare

What happened next illustrates how militia forces operated as a conventional force. The fact that militia units organized, moved over a mountain range, linked up with South Carolina, Virginia, and other North Carolina militia units en route to a common objective, demonstrates the level of operational maturity achieved. The militia now had every motivation in the world to fight against British authority. These militia units had been galvanized into a fighting force that would fight to literally defend families and homes. Any hopes of gaining popular support for the restoration of British rule had evaporated.

The experience of Indian fighting and actions in the war, and thus far by using a mounted advanced guard as a reconnaissance in force, allowed the militia to keep pressure on Ferguson all the way to Kings Mountain, which was only a day's hard ride away from Cornwallis' main force.

Ferguson proved correct about using and training volunteer militia, but it was a rebel militia that killed him and destroyed his brigade atop Kings Mountain on 7 October 1780. The loss of approximately one-third of his force caused Cornwallis to withdraw from Charlotte into South Car-



*"In the wake of Cowpens, guerrilla activity continued to wear down British forces in South Carolina. Of particular note were several weeks of skirmishes in the Pee Dee that failed to corner Marion's forces and gain control of the Pee Dee. Still, Cornwallis eyed Greene's Continentals as his real enemy."*

olina. All the while, pressure was kept on outposts and lines of communication.

As time wore on, guerrilla formations became more experienced and adept at engaging British regulars and Provincials. The victory at Kings Mountain only emboldened American aspirations — and increased the numbers of rebel recruits — in the south. The nature of the guerrilla fighting bled the British forces of experienced manpower in numerous smaller actions, forcing an increased reliance on Loyalist militia.

As the Southern Continental Army was being refitted in the area north of Cheraw, near the North Carolina line, an effort to link the actions of the guerrillas was made to buy time for the Colonial forces. While General Nathaniel Greene split his force into two locations astride the obstacle of the Great Pee Dee River, he forced Cornwallis to expose one flank to approach either location. Furthermore, he forced him to either concentrate his forces to meet an attack, or strike at the Continentals and dangerously expose his flanks and lines of communication to the guerrillas. In addition to coordinating efforts, Greene sent Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee to assist Marion's operations with his dragoons and infantry.

As half the Continentals moved toward the important outpost at Ninety Six, Washington's dragoons and South Carolina militia put pressure on the area to shape the battlefield. Two important actions, the 40-mile running pursuit and the battle at Hammond's Store, along with a group of South Carolina militia who struck an outlying fort approximately 12 miles north of the main British fort at Ninety Six, forced the Loyalists to concentrate for security at Ninety Six, clearing the area for Daniel Morgan's forces headed toward the Cowpens. The movement of Morgan's forces prompted Cornwallis to move against Morgan, sending Tarleton ahead to fix the Continentals. Cornwallis was encouraged by the arrival of 1,500 fresh regulars from New York moving to link up with his main body already on the attack.

On 17 January 1781, a combined force of Continentals, state troops, and militia engaged and destroyed Tarleton's brigade at the Cowpens in a classic defense in-depth and counterattack. Tarleton barely escaped capture after being pursued by American cavalry. Kings Mountain and Cowpens marked the end of good British fortunes in the rebellious colonies.

In the wake of Cowpens, guerrilla activity continued to wear down British forces in South Carolina. Of particular note were several weeks of skirmishes in the Pee Dee that failed to corner Marion's forces and gain control of the Pee Dee. Still, Cornwallis eyed Greene's Continentals as his real enemy. Always seeking to act decisively, Cornwallis decided to move out and meet Greene in decisive battle. This forced Cornwallis to run through the militia as they maneuvered northward on forced marches and light march order, exposing their rear lines of communication to guerrillas.

The action at Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina, was a tactical victory for Cornwallis, but a strategic one for Greene. Cornwallis' army was now in worse condition than before, which forced his move to Wilmington, North Carolina, for rest and refit. Not only was Cornwallis aware that he could not fight Greene at his current strength, he never returned his force to South Car-



*"The action at Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina, was a tactical victory for Cornwallis, but a strategic one for Greene. Cornwallis' army was now in worse condition than before, which forced his move to Wilmington, North Carolina, for rest and refit. Not only was Cornwallis aware that he could not fight Greene at his current strength, he never returned his force to South Carolina."*

olina. The British presence in South Carolina then became one of being stretched to the limit, occupying bases and conducting local patrols, and proved to be incapable of protecting any loyal subjects. This lack of a sufficient force exposed the British outposts to being picked off, one by one.

### The Final, Fatal Blows

Conventional operations began against the outposts in South Carolina in concert with Greene's Continentals. In six weeks' time, the rebels would capture or occupy five British posts. The first to fall was the surrender of Fort Watson and then the evacuation of Camden. Lieutenant Colonel Francis, Lord Rawdon assumed command of forces in South Carolina after the departure of Cornwallis and consolidated his forces to present a more concentrated defense. The dispersion of British posts, scarcity of forces, and inability to mount a relief force to come quickly enough to the aid of the beleaguered posts cost British forces blood and territory.

The continued punitive measures against the rebels and the rebels' own military successes fueled the insurgency. Rawdon attempted, and failed, to counterattack and relieve the seizure of both Forts Motte and Granby. By 21 May 1781, all that remained of the line of British outposts were Georgetown, Ninety Six, and Augusta, Georgia. Both Augusta and Ninety Six were attacked on 22 May; Augusta surrendered that very day; and Ninety Six surrendered on 19 June. Georgetown eventually fell on 6 June 1781. By then, British strategy had evolved into yielding the interior to the rebels and occupying port enclaves reinforced with the strength of the Royal Navy, foregoing any hope of relying on the Loyalist militia. British forces had drawn into an even tighter perimeter around Charleston and were under constant pressure until the end of the war.

### Post-Mortem

How could the most powerful army in the world achieve a dazzling success and lose all of its gains within the space of about a year against guerrillas and a "beaten" army? This was supposedly a loyal colony — what happened?

The British saw operations in South Carolina largely through the lens of the Jacobite Rebellion where Scotland was isolated

mostly by sea and naval power, cornered in north Britain, a sizable portion of Scots in support of London, its army destroyed, the infrastructure (clans) destroyed, and leaders ruthlessly executed. It worked before, why not now?<sup>11</sup>

In short, the British forces on the ground gave the rebels reason to fight, regardless of “who started it.” Among the first things that caused widespread disaffection was using Indians against the backcountry settlers. The barbaric nature of this fighting meant that there was no such thing as noncombatants and the many people who survived held the Crown directly responsible.

The second major issue that alienated the population even more was the failure to reinstate civil government. South Carolina had been a near-autonomous colony since 1670, and had managed to develop a sense of self-government in the 100 years prior to the Revolution. It had a long tradition of self-government and religious freedom, including its original constitution being authored by John Locke. Military rule did not go far to win the sympathies of a people who had developed a sense of “sovereignty” in the wilderness.

Thirdly, the most egregious mistake was the revocation of all paroles — the administration of the loyalty oath and the requirement of all those who swear loyalty to partake in scourging their neighbors. The first and most obvious result of this revocation was that colonists could not trust the word of occupying British forces. After placing trust in the word of the governing authority, they were now being told to take up arms and fight, or else. Next, the expectation to take part in bringing the fight to their neighbors was not relished by a state with one-third, at best, of the population being loyal, one-third neutral, and one-third in “rebellion.” The miscalculation of the other two-thirds as being “loyal” to the mother country emboldened British forces to take harsher, more punitive actions against the rebellious “minorities.”

Fourthly, harsh penalties applied broadly against any and all persons who happened to be in the area of operations caused much disaffection. British regulars, Provincials, and Loyalist militia did much to destroy the popular support of their own cause. Even after four years of war and the fall of Charleston, the colonists were largely under control and pacified. Resistance was small in numbers and sorely lacking in all classes of supply. The destruction and theft of personal property and the destruction of homes and food stocks may have prevented the guerrillas from being supplied from a particular neighborhood, but was guaranteed to turn that neighborhood, along with the surrounding settlements, against the government.

Lastly, direct threats of violence against homes and families caused the most dawdling of the colonists to choose sides. The threats of violence were seen as credible, as had been demonstrated by atrocities against combatants and civilians, the burning of homes, food, houses of worship,

and summary executions of the most brutal order. Men were not going to sit idly by and let the British government make good on their threats to their loved ones and homes.

In conclusion, as demonstrated by this example from our past, the efforts of counterinsurgency should be placed against the appropriate targets, at the appropriate time, with the appropriate force to produce the desired effects — winning the support of the occupied population while destroying the armed threat. This is a time-consuming process, not unlike domestic police operations. Historically, this has been the realm of special operations units, but the nature of today’s contemporary operating environment has forced conventional forces to adopt the same approach to root out terrorists and insurgents as the enemy seeks to negate our firepower advantage. The British command’s loss of tactical patience in its desire to quickly and entirely smash the rebellion, as was done in Scotland during “the ’45,” and as would successfully be done later in Ireland, only conspired to unravel what British blood, sweat, and tears had gained.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup>John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup>*Editor’s note:* The Jacobites constituted a political movement that supported the restoration of the Stuart kings to the thrones of England and Scotland. The Jacobites also included many individuals motivated by economic, religious, and political concerns. The last Stuart king, James II, was driven to abdicate in 1688. The Jacobite influence proved greatest over the next few decades, and it resulted in several attempts to restore the Stuart kings through military force. Perhaps the most famous of these efforts was that associated with Prince Charles Stuart, who landed in Scotland, rallied supporters, and invaded England in 1745. However, the invasion proved abortive despite initial success. Prince Charles returned to Scotland with his army, which was defeated decisively at the battle of Culloden in April 1746. This defeat destroyed the credibility of the Jacobite movement and resulted in many of Prince Charles’ supporters being imprisoned, executed, or forced to emigrate to Britain’s colonies, including South Carolina.

<sup>4</sup>William Dolbien James, *A Sketch of the Life of Brigadier General Francis Marion and the History of His Brigade*, Gould & Riley, Charleston, SC, 1821, p. 39.

<sup>5</sup>Lewis P. Jones, *South Carolina: A Synoptic History for Laymen*, Sandlapper Publishing, Orangeburg, 1971, p. 108.

<sup>6</sup>See endnote 3.

<sup>7</sup>Robert D. Bass, *Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion*, Henry Holt & Co., 1959, p. 35.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 58.

<sup>9</sup>Wilma Dykeman, *The Battle of Kings Mountain 1780, With Fire and Sword*, National Park Service, Washington, DC, p. 38.

<sup>10</sup>The Patriot Resource — Battle of King’s Mountain, at <http://www.patriotresource.com/battles/kingsmntn/page1.html>.

<sup>11</sup>See endnote 3.



“Lieutenant Colonel Francis, Lord Rawdon assumed command of forces in South Carolina after the departure of Cornwallis and consolidated his forces to present a more concentrated defense. The dispersion of British posts, scarcity of forces, and inability to mount a relief force to come quickly enough to the aid of the beleaguered posts cost British forces blood and territory.”

Captain William S. McDaniel is currently the S1, 1st Battalion, 263d Armored Regiment (1-263 Armor), South Carolina Army National Guard, Mullins, SC. He received a B.A. from the Citadel. His military education includes Infantry Basic Training, Airborne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, and Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include mechanized infantry embedded trainer, Afghan National Army, Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix II, Afghanistan; S3 Air, 1-263 Armor, Fort Stewart, GA; commander, A Company, 1-263 Armor, Fort Jackson, SC; and commander, C Company, 1-263 Armor, Conway, SC.

# Agile Birds: Junior Officer Professional Development During Training Hold Periods

by Lieutenant Davis Ozier, Lieutenant Christopher Lareau, and Major Bret P. Van Poppel

*During one 30-day period in the summer of 2005, the Armor Officer Basic Course at Fort Knox accounted for over 170 newly commissioned lieutenants in a training hold status.<sup>1</sup>*

Without question, leader development is very important to the Army. Since 1985, when General Wickham convened the Professional Development of Officers Study, the Army has aggressively sought to define and describe leadership and leader professional development.

In 2005, the Director of the Army Staff established a review of education, training, and assignment of leaders (RETAL) task force and directed it to examine the policies and programs that govern the education, training, and assignments of Army leaders.<sup>2</sup> This was a significant step toward functionally aligning and integrating leader development. The RETAL task force was instructed to evaluate the three principal components of leader development — training, education, and ex-

perience — and recommend appropriate strategies for “growing” adaptive future leaders.<sup>3</sup>

The contemporary operational environment and the Army’s operational tempo provide few opportunities for professional development and education outside of duty tours specified for such purposes. There are few signs that the pace will significantly decelerate in the near future. The Army Posture Statement 2006 (APS 2006) characterizes the near-term security environment as, “The Nation will continue to be engaged in a long struggle of continuous, evolving conflict that... will manifest itself in complex, traditional, and irregular challenges.”<sup>4</sup>

The environment presents an intriguing paradox — the Army needs multifunctional leaders of character, yet it is so busy *operating* that there is little time available for the requisite *learning and growing* to produce such leaders. Junior officers, particularly lieutenants, repre-

sent a critical segment of Army leaders. Lieutenants arguably stand to benefit the most from professional development opportunities, feedback, and mentorship.

The Army’s emphasis on leader development and the RETAL task force are positive, prominent steps in the direction of growing adaptive leaders. Nevertheless, it will be several years before the Army harvests the fruits of these efforts. In the short-term, Army leaders can use training hold periods that accompany initial officer training to shore-up gaps in education, training, and experience. Implementing the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) may result in increased training hold periods or training hold time at some locations, thereby setting ideal conditions for formalized professional development programs.

This article details one professional development experience, highlights lessons learned, and recommends strategies for





*"The contemporary operational environment and the Army's operational tempo provide few opportunities for professional development and education outside of duty tours specified for such purposes. There are few signs that the pace will significantly decelerate in the near future. The Army Posture Statement 2006 (APS 2006) characterizes the near-term security environment as, 'The Nation will continue to be engaged in a long struggle of continuous, evolving conflict that... will manifest itself in complex, traditional, and irregular challenges.'"*

"donor" officers and host organizations to maximize the benefits of similar opportunities.

### Post-Commissioning Professional Development Opportunities

Many professional development opportunities exist between the commissioning date and the first unit of assignment date. Some of these are formal programs, such as scholarships or fellowships, for advanced schooling or the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Gold Bar Recruiting program. Others are targets of opportunity for internships with installation organizations.

A few formal opportunities exist for post-commissioning advanced degrees through competitive scholarship or fellowship programs. Each year, several U.S. Military Academy (USMA) cadets qualify for post-graduate studies through internationally renowned scholarships. Available scholarships include the East-West Center Graduate Degree Fellowship located at the University of Hawaii; Marshall Scholarship in the United Kingdom; Rhodes Scholar in Oxford, United Kingdom; the Hertz Foundation Fellowship; and the Truman Scholarship. While these are exceptional opportunities for advanced education and professional development, few slots are available and selection is very competitive.<sup>5</sup> Gold Bar Recruiting (GBR) is another formal post-commissioning opportunity available to many new lieutenants. As a GBR, the recently commissioned officer will remain

at the university or college to assist the recruiting operations officer (ROO) for up to 140 days.

Informal opportunities exist within the Army's new framework for officer education and initial entry training. The BOLC model has three components: BOLC I (pre-commissioning training); BOLC II (a standardized, branch-neutral first course in tactical fundamentals); and BOLC III (branch-specific training). Some officers may attend training courses and schools between BOLC III and their first units of assignment. This model presents two or three periods of loiter time between courses or training hold (also known as "snowbirding," "greybirding," or "blackbirding"):

- Between BOLC I (commissioning) and BOLC II.
- Between BOLC II and BOLC III.
- Between BOLC III and follow-on training courses (for some students).

Traditionally, training hold periods carry a negative connotation. These periods are typically characterized as "dead time," which lasts for days or months.<sup>6</sup> Training hold periods are often one of the first Army experiences for officers. While these periods are usually inevitable, they do not have to be wasted time. Junior officers can use this time for professional development and it can be mutually advantageous for host organizations. The following case study describes the experience of two newly commissioned armor offi-

cers who worked as junior operations research analysts while in a training hold status.

### Case Study: Junior Officers Become Junior Analysts

Two junior officers reported to Fort Knox for Maneuver Officer Basic Course in July 2005 and assumed a training hold status. On the first day of regular duty, unit leadership requested volunteers with a degree in marketing or economics. The junior officers reported to the Director, Center for Accessions Research (CAR), U.S. Army Accessions Command (USAAC). For the next six weeks, a professional staff of field grade officers and equivalent grade civilian analysts would train these "junior analysts" on tools and techniques of operations research and systems analysis. Much like any other analyst in the CAR, the junior analysts would provide strategic insight to Army leadership on the Army's marketing, recruitment, and initial entry training of soldiers and officers.

After assignment to a specific division within the CAR, the division chief placed the junior analysts under the supervision of a major. They were to conduct an analysis of a command climate survey administered to all members of a large and geographically separated command. Following initial guidance and some formal software training, the junior analysts began their project. The challenge in this initial project was not the data analysis, but rather organizing the data logically.

Flaws in the design of the survey questionnaire increased the difficulty in analysis — most of the responses were open-ended and therefore very difficult to code for data entry and analysis. To aid in the analysis, other analysts in the CAR provided training in text mining software specifically designed for open-ended responses. The junior analysts identified major themes and trends in responses for each question. They analyzed another sample to determine statistical variation in responses. Their final product comprised a summary paragraph and associated charts for each survey question. The CAR submitted this analysis to the commanding general for his review.

The junior analysts were further instructed to analyze an extensive study of college students' attitudes and perceptions of the military. The study measured responses of over 3,500 undergraduate college students from over 30 four-year colleges and universities; the study produced over 150,000 data points. This analysis required familiarization with new software, and the junior analysts participated in a two-day software-training course prior to commencing their analysis.

Under the supervision of an assigned mentor, the analysts began examining the data in aggregate and then by demographic segment, such as gender, ethnicity, and years in school. Within a week, they began to gather significant results and presented an in-progress review (IPR) to their division chief. Following three weeks of compiling their own results and insights from other analysts, the analysts presented a one-hour presentation and interim report to the Director, Deputy Director, and other members of the CAR. For their final requirement, the analysts drafted an information paper to summarize their work and serve as a point of departure for follow-on analyses.

### Lessons Learned

An unorthodox training hold opportunity carries many benefits that may emerge as the officer matures and progresses in rank. Nevertheless, the chance to serve as junior analysts on a diverse and professional staff was a high-quality professional development experience. Many factors contributed to this enriching experience, including unique skill development, problemsolving, flexible learning environment, mentorship, and project and task organization.

Working with the ‘big’ Army equipped the lieutenants with basic analytical skills most of their contemporaries will not have early in their careers. By the end of their assignment, the two junior officers had organized and analyzed mounds of data and had written a report for a commanding general. They worked with analysis software and became familiar with the standards for conducting military briefings and information papers. Additionally, the lieutenants gained many valuable and unique skills, to include designing studies and experiments; marketing research types and methodologies; data collection fieldwork; data entry and analysis techniques and procedures; types of data; data analysis software, including Excel spreadsheets, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), and text mining software; and survey questionnaire design.

Problemsolving was one of the most important benefits of this experience.<sup>7</sup> There were many new tasks that appeared daunting initially; however, problem decomposition proved to be very manageable. The junior analysts learned and employed elements of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and troop leading proce-



*“The environment presents an intriguing paradox — the Army needs multifunctional leaders of character, yet it is so busy operating that there is little time available for the requisite learning and growing to produce such leaders. Junior officers, particularly lieutenants, represent a critical segment of Army leaders. Lieutenants arguably stand to benefit the most from professional development opportunities, feedback, and mentorship.”*

dures (TLPs), such as backward planning, identifying key concepts, and understanding the commander’s intent. With the assistance of the mentor, the lieutenants first defined the problems and relevant issues, and then decomposed these problems into manageable components. Much like the planning involved in a military operation, problem definition, problem decomposition, and the mentor’s

input were critical to successful problemsolving. In his article “Learning and Transformation,” in the September-October 2005 issue of *ARMOR*, Major David Culkin asserts that: “...adequately defining the bounds of a problem is essential to developing a unit mission that addresses the problem...defining the problem for subordinates in a time-constrained situation may be more important than deducing a mission.”<sup>8</sup>



*“A few formal opportunities exist for post-commissioning advanced degrees through competitive scholarship or fellowship programs. Each year, several U.S. Military Academy (USMA) cadets qualify for post-graduate studies through internationally renowned scholarships.”*

In the end, the problemsolving process was an effective one, due in part to the mentor’s leadership and guidance. More importantly, the mentor defined the problem — not the mission — and encouraged the lieutenants to employ innovation and creativity. This flexible environment promoted ownership in the project and imbued the analysts with the confidence to develop unique solutions.

The learning environment was a significant benefit of this experience. An appropriate balance of formal training, mentorship and guidance, and hands-off work time characterized this internship. To communicate the tasks and intent of the analysis, the mentor employed a task-purpose-endstate (TPE) model. While a model of task-conditions-standards (TCS) is widely employed in the Army to define and describe individual-level tasks, the TPE model is much less prescriptive. The TPE model

focuses on the purpose and commander's intent — the why— rather than on the task and its description, thereby encouraging problemsolvers to operate within the commander's intent. In *War as I Knew It*, General George S. Patton cautions against prescriptive guidance, "Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity."<sup>9</sup>

For this case study, the flexibility of the TPE model promoted creative solutions to the challenging and open-ended projects. Seasoned with some mentorship and guidance, the TPE model promoted initiative, innovation, and creativity, especially in junior officers whose methods had not yet been shaped by years of operational experience.

Mentorship was a critical component of this experience. Although addressed previously, the value and importance of mentorship cannot be overemphasized. As defined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership*, mentorship is defined as the "proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity."<sup>10</sup>

Mentoring a junior officer is important in that it establishes trust and promotes learning. An opportunity is not necessarily an experience and it is critical for the mentor to give guidance and purpose throughout the professional development program or task. Creating a quality professional development program will "expand the competencies of the lieutenant and prepare him for performance at his next duty level."<sup>11</sup> Mentored professional development opportunities are always valuable, especially for junior officers.

## Recommendations

The case study discussed in this article was a rewarding experience for the junior officers and the Center for Accessions Research — and one that others should capitalize on. Senior officers and directorate-level civilians, as well as junior officers, should actively seek these mutually beneficial opportunities. The Army's priority on leader development, coupled with new opportunities within BOLC's emerging architecture, offer ideal conditions for ad hoc professional development during training hold periods. We offer several recommendations to help create a successful experience from this potential opportunity.

For directorate-level officers and civilians, it is essential to empower junior of-

ficers with resources, training, guidance, and mentorship that will create the conditions for success. The process begins with the selection of the junior officer. Matching education, skills, and personality of the officer to the organization's mission and core competencies is a key to success. Overall project organization and management are also very important. A project organization similar to a four- or six-week cadet troop leader training (CTLT) experience works well for short-duration opportunities. To frame the experience, well-defined scope, goals, and objectives are essential to bound and guide the overall experience, as well as the individual tasks. We found the use of milestones with specific calendar dates to be very effective in guiding progress and maintaining effort levels. If applicable, skills training — whether formal or informal — will provide the foundation for junior officers to effectively solve problems and negotiate projects.

While supervision is important, quality mentorship is critical. In this vein, we discovered that assigning an appropriate field-grade officer or equivalent-grade civilian to mentor the junior officers to be essential. To conclude a project or internship, a culminating event is a very effective technique for "book-ending" the experience. As an example, a final briefing or a professionally published article is an excellent capstone event.

Lieutenants interested in investing in their own professional development can realize substantial benefits from opportunities such as the one described in this article. These assignments differ from a typical, operational duty assignment because they have the potential to offer experience and insight into unusual fields of operations or arcane Army functions. We recommend actively and aggressively seeking opportunities that align with personal skills, undergraduate education, and interests. Much like managing one's own career, managing a project will require both individual effort and input. Once assigned to a project, it is critical to ensure goals, objectives, and milestones are clear, well defined, and accommodate the conditions of the training hold period. Presenting the results of interim or final work has many benefits, to include collaborating and gaining insights from others, keeping the organization's leadership apprised of efforts and progress, developing oral and written communication skills, and guiding the experience with hard-stop requirements. Finally, we recommend advocating positive professional development experiences to fellow officers — word-of-mouth marketing can be the most influential chan-

nel for sharing benefits and contributing to peer-to-peer development.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Recommendation of Major Holly F. West, Center for Accessions Research, data provided by the office of the S3, Operations, 2d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY.

<sup>2</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *2006 Army Posture Statement*, online at <http://www.army.mil/aps/06/>. The APS 2006, states, "The complexity of the 21st century security environment requires more Army leaders at all levels. To be effective today and tomorrow, we are growing a new breed of leader...who is able to rapidly transition between complex tasks with relative ease. ...The future environment will demand Army leaders at all levels be multi-skilled, innovative, agile, and versatile."

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Army Posture Statement, 2006, page 2, <http://www.army.mil/aps/06/>.

<sup>5</sup>For additional information, please visit [www.usma.edu](http://www.usma.edu).

<sup>6</sup>It is not uncommon for lieutenants to be tasked to landscaping details, or simply nothing at all.

<sup>7</sup>As identified by Lieutenant Ozier and Lieutenant Lareau, the single most significant benefit of working in this nontraditional setting was acquiring analysis and problemsolving skills early in their careers.

<sup>8</sup>David Culkin, "Learning and Transformation," *ARMOR*, September-October 2005, pp. 12-17.

<sup>9</sup>General George S. Patton Jr., *War as I Knew It*, Houghton Mifflin Company, May 1978.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 22-100, *Leadership*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 31 August 1999, Chapter 3.

<sup>11</sup>Jonathon A. Hall and Eric A. McCoy, "Designing a Lieutenant Professional Development Program," *Army Logistician*, November-December 2002.

Lieutenant Davis Ozier is currently serving as an infantry platoon leader, C Troop, 3d Squadron, 73d Cavalry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B.A. from Vanderbilt University. His military education includes the Mounted Officers Basic Course, Scout Leaders Course, and Ranger School.

Lieutenant Christopher Lareau is currently serving as XO, C Troop, 4th Squadron, 73d Cavalry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B.A. from Boston University. His military education includes the Mounted Officers Basic Course and Scout Leaders Course.

Major Bret P. Van Poppel is a communications research analyst, Center for Accessions Research, U.S. Army Accessions Command, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy (USMA) and an M.S. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His military education includes the Infantry Officers Basic Course, the Infantry Officers Advanced Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, including assistant professor, Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, USMA, West Point, NY; commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, Camp Greaves, Korea; support platoon leader, 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Lewis, WA; and mortar platoon and rifle platoon leader, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 6th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Wainwright, AK.

*The authors express sincere gratitude to Colonel Ralph H. Gay, Mr. Kevin Lyman, and other members of the Center for Accessions Research for providing this unique opportunity for professional development.*

# A Better Recce Troop

by Master Sergeant John Hegadush

*Recently, I spoke with an armor officer who had served on tanks and as a scout platoon leader. The officer and I were discussing my experiences as a platoon sergeant of a Stryker reconnaissance platoon. He was surprised to hear me say we didn't have enough people to do what was expected of us, remarking that we were designed with a "robust" dismount capability. His remark reminded me of my former battalion commander's explanation of a RSTA squadron, "God love 'em, they're good at what they do, but when an infantry Stryker drops its ramp, nine guys spill out, and when an RV ramp drops, two get out." Note the disparity between the armor officer's perception and that of my former battalion commander.*

*It is time to take a serious look at dismounted scout capabilities. The days of the two-man scout team, hiding under a bush calling for fire on a coil of enemy tanks is a fond memory. If I sent two men out by themselves on the streets of Iraq, I should be relieved from duty. This article was originally written in the back of my Stryker in Samarra, Iraq, in early 2004. It may be a platoon sergeant's perspective; however, my opinions are shared by many. This article represents how platoon*

*sergeants see their units changing to fit mission requirements.*

The 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry was the U.S. Army's first reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron. The squadron is Stryker-equipped and is making history as the Army's first unit in a move toward a lighter, more deployable future force. Our new unit required a new modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) to reflect the unique capabilities of the Stryker reconnaissance vehicle (RV), as well as the unit's anticipated role in the brigade.

Having lived in the squadron for some time, after growing up in "legacy" units, my experience in the squadron thus far has been very positive; however, I have found several issues with the organization of our troop and platoons. The good news is: we can change to a better setup with a minimal amount of disruption and new equipment.

## The Current Recce Troop

The squadron has three recce troops (mostly 19Ds and 97Bs), one surveillance troop, and a headquarters and headquarters troop. Each recce troop has three

scout platoons, a mortar section, a fire support team and the troop headquarters. Each scout platoon has four Stryker RVs, with a personnel strength of twenty-one. At full strength, the platoon has a platoon leader, a 19D40 platoon sergeant, two 19D30 section leaders, six 19D20s (gunners and team leaders), seven 19D10s, one 97B20 (senior counterintelligence (CI) agent) and three 97B10s (CI specialists). The platoon leader and platoon sergeant have MK19s mounted on their vehicles and the section leaders have M2s mounted on their vehicles. Every RV has a mounted long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3) and an M240B for additional security and firepower. The platoon has two M203s, one per section. The theme of the recce platoon, as I understand, is to maximize its dismounted capabilities, leaving only eight personnel, the gunners and drivers, mounted.

Figure 1, as per the MTOE, depicts a platoon battle roster.

## Reorganizing the Current Recce Troop

We need more scouts and less CI agents. Two CI agents would be sufficient and should be replaced with two 19Ds. I understand that human intelligence is a real



### MTOE Platoon Battle Roster

VEHICLE 1	VEHICLE 2	VEHICLE 3	VEHICLE 4
PL	SL (19D30)	SL (19D30)	PSG (19D40)
GNR (19D20)	GNR (19D20)	GNR (19D20)	GNR (19D20)
DVR (19D10)	DVR (19D10)	DVR (19D10)	DVR (19D10)
TL (19D20)	MG (19D10)	MG (19D10)	TL (19D20)
CI (97B20)	CI (97B10)	CI (97B10)	CI (97B10)
MG (19D10)	<i>PL - Platoon Leader GNR - Vehicle Gunner DVR - Driver TL - Team Leader</i>		<i>SL - Section Leader MG - M240B Gunner CI - Counterintelligence Agent PSG - Platoon Sergeant</i>

**Figure 1**

priority in the current operating environment, which is why the unit has organic CI agents; however, we rarely have an interpreter on every mission, so our questioning capability is usually diminished. The CI agents normally end up working as scouts, or at times, gunners or team leaders. Because the CI agents rarely operate as intended, our scouts on the ground could be increased by replacing CI agents with 19Ds — our dismounted capability is already more crippled than a quick glance at our MTOE might suggest.

We have more leaders than soldiers. Leaders outnumber soldiers 11 to 10. This fact provides no real advantage. Ideally, sergeants should be in charge of soldiers, staff sergeants in charge of sergeants, and so forth. The probable reason for the existing ratio is the perception that a gunner must be a sergeant. I disagree; gun-

ners do not have to be E5s. Tank and Bradley gunners have a relatively complicated weapons system to operate, but a HMMWV or Stryker does not need a sergeant behind every gun. I can teach anyone to operate an MK19 or M2 in a day or so. Having a noncommissioned officer behind every crew-served weapon does not help anything; it just worsens the leader-to-soldier ratio.

The team leaders are not in charge of anything because there simply are not enough people. With the people on the ground that doctrine suggests, the team leader has either the platoon leader or platoon sergeant with him, and a section leader as well, in addition to one or two other soldiers he might be lucky enough to have. Since units are never at full strength, a team usually consists of a section leader, the platoon leader or platoon

sergeant, the team leader, and maybe one other soldier. Who is really in charge of the team; who's carrying the M240 and ammo? Usually, the section leader takes charge and the team leader is just another soldier on the team. For example, if the platoon takes a casualty, everything changes; soldiers from one team may move to another team and the section leader will probably end up back on his vehicle. Without soldiers dedicated to the ground and consistent leadership throughout, battle drills are almost nonexistent or are quickly rehearsed before taking off.

As far as the mounted element, the current number of assigned soldiers cannot cut it for any length of time. When one soldier is manning the gun, the other must be in the driver's seat ready to move out quickly, especially in urban areas or thickly vegetated terrain where the enemy can close in quickly. On HMMWVs, this was rarely a problem. The driver could sleep behind the wheel and when it was time to go, the gunner would alert him and away they would go. However, two guys in a Stryker, one behind the wheel and one behind the gun, cannot provide local security because the vehicle is too large, they cannot check the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2), or even change radio channels without leaving the gun. Crew rest becomes a nightmare — if the driver is sleeping in the driver's hole, the gunner has to climb down out of the hatch and through the "hell hole," where the driver is probably sleeping like a rock after hours of continuous operations.

We cannot effectively employ the M240B on anything but observation posts (OPs) — and even then it is questionable. I remember several observer controllers from the Joint Readiness Training Center, all infantry types, stating that we did not have enough soldiers to get "the pig" in the fight. They were right. If you are looking at a maximum of four soldiers on a team, the M240 is too much. The gun makes big money for the infantry, with a whole squad dedicated to employing two guns. Four soldiers can't do it — someone has to carry the ammo and the spare barrel, along with the truckload of stuff they already have — this probably is not going to be the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, or section leader. Using soldiers on the ground as pack mules might be necessary for a combat patrol, but not for a mission requiring stealth. A better answer would be having a squad automatic weapon (SAW) in each fire team; the platoon would need two, which would replace two of the M240s. We should keep



*"...human intelligence is a real priority in the current operating environment, which is why the unit has organic CI agents; however, we rarely have an interpreter on every mission, so our questioning capability is usually diminished. The CI agents normally end up working as scouts, or at times, gunners or team leaders. Because the CI agents rarely operate as intended, our scouts on the ground could be increased by replacing CI agents with 19Ds — our dismounted capability is already more crippled than a quick glance at our MTOE might suggest."*

some M240s; they are good on the back of Strykers when everyone is mounted, and they have use on long-duration OPs, but for four soldiers on the ground, three of them leaders, “the pig” is too much. The M240 is also difficult to qualify because the exact same soldiers are not dismounted every time. If the team did take the M240, they would never have more than one out on patrol — two SAWs per platoon are better.

Four vehicles do not make an effective reconnaissance platoon. It works for tanks, with their maximum effective range and roles as straight killers; it works for the infantry, with a ton of soldiers in the back of each vehicle. However, a scout platoon, operating miles away from its tactical and logistics support, is rendered useless when a vehicle goes down for maintenance or if it takes casualties. In Iraq, some missions require no less than three vehicles moving together. If a vehicle or a casualty has to be evacuated, the platoon is out of the fight. Similarly, if the platoon sergeant is attempting resupply, if he breaks the rules and just takes one vehicle, 50 percent of the platoon’s combat power is gone. Typically, the recce platoons are spread so thin that two LRAS3s off the battlefield are detrimental and some named area of interest (NAI) doesn’t have eyes on it anymore — there is a better way.

**A Better Composition for Recce Platoons and Troops**

The Army should take a page from the infantry and organize a coherent *squad*, consisting of a squad leader, and two teams led by team leaders. After this squad is dismounted, we need three personnel on each vehicle. We need six Strykers per platoon — more scouts and less CI agents.

If there was a magic wand, it could be waved and more Strykers and personnel would appear, bringing three platoons up to six, with more scouts. However, reality suggests that the best way to bring



*“Usually, the section leader takes charge and the team leader is just another soldier on the team. For example, if the platoon takes a casualty, everything changes; soldiers from one team may move to another team and the section leader will probably end up back on his vehicle. Without soldiers dedicated to the ground and consistent leadership throughout, battle drills are almost nonexistent or are quickly rehearsed before taking off.”*

three platoons up to the strength of six is to turn three platoons into two. If we got rid of one platoon, we could make two platoons of six vehicles. In changing personnel, the troop would lose a platoon leader and platoon sergeant slot, lose eight CI agents, and the troop would only need four more 19D10s to make the model outlined below work.

The losing platoon would lose its platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and all four of its CI agents immediately. This does decrease slots, thus promotions, but in the grand scheme of things, I doubt the Army would feel much effect. The gaining platoons would lose two of their 97B10s as well. Remaining in the losing platoon are the two 19D30s, the six 19D20s, and the seven 19D10s — 15 personnel total. The gaining platoons would then receive a 19D30, three 19D20s, and three or four 19D10s. Adding these seven or eight

brings the gaining platoon’s strength to around 26 personnel. This proposed model requires 29, so as indicated before, the troop would need about four more 19D10s, or they could keep two CI agents to fill those positions until the slots can be filled with 19D10s. The troop would need four M249 SAWs to make this work as well.

The platoon now has six vehicles, with three MK19s, and three M2s. The simplest setup is the two-section concept, made up of Alpha and Bravo sections. Alpha section has vehicles 1, 2, and 3, the platoon leader’s vehicle, the senior scout (19D30), and the wingman (19D20). It also has gunners and drivers, a five-man fire team led by a team leader, and a 19D30 squad leader, who is in charge on the ground of the fire teams from Alpha and Bravo. Bravo section has vehicles 4, 5, and 6. It is similar to Alpha section and consists of the platoon section’s vehicle, the Bravo section sergeant’s (19D30) vehicle, and the wingman (19D20). Bravo transports its five-man fire team, also led by a team leader. The platoon would look like Figure 2 on a battle roster.

During operations, this leaves 18 personnel mounted and 11 dismounted. The dismounted squad has a true squad leader, who is always the squad leader, and two team leaders, who are always team leaders. Each team has a SAW. If the platoon leader’s role is on the ground, he

**Battle Roster for Proposed Platoon**

Alpha Section			Bravo Section		
VEHICLE 1	VEHICLE 2	VEHICLE 3	VEHICLE 4	VEHICLE 5	VEHICLE 6
PL	SL 19D30	TC 19D20	PSG	SL 19D30	TC 19D20
GNR 19D20	GNR 19D20	GNR 19D10	GNR 19D20	GNR 19D20	GNR 19D10
DVR 19D10	DVR 19D10	DVR 19D10	DVR 19D10	DVR 19D10	DVR 19D10
SL 19D30	TL 19D20	GREN 19D10	SCT 19D10	TL 19D20	GREN 19D10
CI 97B20	SAW 19D10	SCT 19D10	CI 97B10	SAW 19D10	

**Figure 2**

Continued on Page 48



# Forging the Sword:

## *Conventional U.S. Army Forces Advising Host Nation (HN) Forces*

by Major Todd Clark

U.S. Army conventional forces are accustomed to building training plans and training management processes for U.S. forces. It is an entirely different perspective when conventionally trained U.S. forces elements are tasked with developing the armed forces of a different nation. Mission accomplishment is plagued by friction-producing diverse factors. Unlike our specially trained unconventional warfare experts, many of our conventional force advisory teams must learn through trial and error.

### Background

The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT), 1st Brigade Special Police Commando (SPCDO), Special Police Transition Team's (SPTT's) mission statement is to conduct operations with Iraqi 1st SPCDO Brigade to enable Iraqi security forces to complete the transition to a stable Iraq. The desired endstate for the mission is to relinquish operations to Iraqi forces and redeploy. Fully embedded in the mission are teach, coach, and mentor requirements for all facets of daily commando police operations, to include planning, prepara-

tion, administration, and logistics. A tertiary requirement is assisting acquisition of materiel to enable the unit to conduct operations.

### Special Police Commando History

The special police commandos were spawned from a requirement for an organized counterinsurgency (COIN) force that focused on internal conflicts of the country. The unit began operating independently of coalition forces in September 2004 under the direction of a major general, a former dissident imprisoned during Saddam Hussein's regime, who selected fellow dissidents as the leaders of this new organization. Essentially light and motorized urban infantry, the SPCDOs immediately began operating throughout hostile areas in central and northern Iraq; their motto became "*Al Wallah, Ul Wat-tan*" (loyal to country).

The unit manned and equipped itself until it was discovered by a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. Initially, many members possessed formal military training through the various Saddam Hussein-era security forces (including both military and civilian forces). Subsequent attrition through both combat operations

and desertions created the unit's major deficiency — a lack of formal initial entry-type training for its personnel. The U.S. Army Special Forces officer assisted the SPCDOs with necessities and organization and immediately began operations in support of coalition forces.

Early SPCDO combat operations alongside U.S. advisors occurred in Mosul, Iraq, in November 2005. The 1st Brigade SPCDO, accompanied by U.S. advisors, responded to a police station being attacked by insurgent forces. En route to the police station, the unit was ambushed, sustaining heavy casualties. The unit fought the insurgents for four hours.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. Army Special Forces advisor was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for displaying competence and confidence in the face of the enemy and he did not abandon his comrades during this dire situation.

The SPCDOs most widely known major engagement occurred at Lake Tharthar, located near Samarra approximately 90 miles north of Baghdad. This Sunni Triangle area is well-known for its insurgent activities; the city had been overrun by insurgents on several occasions.

During COIN operations south of the city, a company-sized SPCDO element, accompanied by a U.S. assistance team, discovered a reinforced insurgent base camp. The insurgents immediately engaged the column, killing and wounding several SPCDOs. Efforts by the SPCDOs to counterattack and seize the enemy position repeatedly met with withering small arms fire, thus the SPCDO element commander held back the bulk of his forces. Only the introduction of U.S. attack helicopters into the fray allowed the eventual seizure of the objective and prevented further attrition of the SPCDO force.

### Advisor Considerations

**Language.** Language is perhaps the most apparent barrier. Our SPTT teams were allotted four locally hired interpreter/translators (I/T) to bridge this gap. These individuals vary greatly in their abilities and educational backgrounds; on our team, they varied from a 19-year-old that did not complete high school to an English Masters Degree scholar.

**I/T selection.** A key concern when selecting an I/T is the command of American English. Good baseline knowledge of American-English is critical. However, this baseline knowledge can be developed in most I/Ts over time working with their U.S. forces advisors. The criticality of this ability lies in the importance of a rapid understanding and transmission of information in a “word-for-word” dialogue. This also intimates the criticality of a local national (as opposed to a third-country national with the same language background); local slang is omnipresent and can lead to significant problems if misunderstood. As the team advises the host-nation commander in combat, while concurrently coordinating with coalition elements, it is critical that dialogues are stated verbatim. The implications of incomplete or inaccurate translation may be measured in the deaths of troops if guidance or coordination is not completely understood.

**I/T development.** Every team will have interpreters with superior abilities to others. A successful technique for I/T employment is to have the most experienced I/T be the primary interpreter for the team leader and host-nation unit commander. The remaining I/Ts must remain with other members of the team to develop conversational and operational American-English vernacular. Even maintaining the less-developed I/Ts with the vehicle security element allows interaction between both American and host-nation forces, in turn, increasing I/T capabilities through on-the-job training.


**Team language training.** When U.S. Army conventional forces are alerted for deployment with an advisory team, it is essential to begin some type of language training program. Preferably, this instruction is provided by an individual who has the regional dialect of the deployment area. The benefit of this instruction is twofold: it sets conditions to build the team with host-nation counterparts and allows the team to correct shortcomings in I/T skills. A great secondary method is using the Rosetta Stone language program, which is available through Army e-learning at [usarmy.rosettastone.com](http://usarmy.rosettastone.com). After a six-month period of language study, our team is beginning to make on-the-spot corrections to misinterpretations of our I/Ts. There is no way of knowing whether any previous misinterpretations had negative consequences. At a minimum, all team members must be capable of greetings, introductions, basic questions, and basic military terminology.

### General Considerations

**Culture.** Every culture, especially those in the ancient land of Mesopotamia, has developed a certain pride in their history and traditions. In Iraq, for example, it is important for teams to understand that modern trade, the decimal system, and irrigation are all ancient Mesopotamian inventions. Our very system of numbers was created in the place we are fighting today. Likewise, ancient warriors have infused a strong sense of pride in the people here.

**Religion.** Religion is clearly a driving force in the Middle East — Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, these major religions all have roots in this region. It is critical to understand the importance of religion to an area of operations. A greater understanding of the history of these religions further creates the foundations for team-building. Host-nation personnel respect our ability to discuss historical circumstances of the Islamic religion, as well as the importance of significant holy areas throughout the country. Knowledge of local religion also allows us to be situationally aware of local events and can even assist predictive analysis of the threat. For example, many extremists believe that dying during Ramadan while fighting infidel forces will yield huge rewards upon arrival at the seventh level of heaven.

**Protocol.** First impressions are lasting, regardless of the culture. There are definite “dos and don’ts” that must be learned. Over time, standards for protocol will tend to relax as relationships develop. Initially, however, it is critical to properly introduce and comport oneself. Some issues to address prior to initial introductions may include the proper verbal greeting, the proper physical greeting (handshake, embrace, or salute), the proper location and posture for sitting, which hand is food/drink handled, and when it is proper to consume the provided food/drinks. Knowledge of local customs and traditions can build a strong first impres-



*“The desired endstate for the mission is to relinquish operations to Iraqi forces and redeploy. Fully embedded in the mission are teach, coach, and mentor requirements for all facets of daily commando police operations, to include planning, preparation, administration, and logistics. A tertiary requirement is assisting acquisition of materiel to enable the unit to conduct operations.”*



*“A key concern when selecting an I/T is the command of American English. Good baseline knowledge of American-English is critical. However, this baseline knowledge can be developed in most I/Ts over time working with their U.S. forces advisers. The criticality of this ability lies in the importance of a rapid understanding and transmission of information in a “word-for-word” dialogue.”*

sion, as well as set the conditions for future integration to the host-nation team.

**Sectarianism.** Fraternal systems have provided tribal and family security and stability in this region for centuries. The battles against religious and tribal loyalties continually overshadow a sense of duty to the country as a whole. In Iraq, divisions may be made by familial, tribal, political, and denominational lines. This provides conditions for outside influence and perhaps interference with the national goals. At times, teams will find themselves deconflicting elements within a unit as the result of disagreements based on this mindset. It is critical for the host-nation unit commander to establish a standard in line with the national interest and hold his troops accountable. A best-case scenario is a multi-ethnic unit.

### **Military Considerations**

**Military traditions.** In Iraq, there were vast European influences on local militaries. From the colonial experiences, the influence is primarily British. For example, certain ceremonial drills, marching, and basic rank structures are remnants of British rule; many British military academies provided professional military instruction. Unfortunately, as colonial oversight withdrew, cultural tendencies caused the departure of much of the professional military establishment. Many incidents of personal influence and selfish actions have degraded the military establishment since the Ba’ath era.

It is always important to remember that counterparts do not always have capabil-

ities commensurate with their ranks. The divergence from western militaries is most visible in the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps within the SPCDOs; sergeants are literally not empowered nor afforded respect commensurate with U.S.-based ranks.

**Role of the officer.** Arab culture dictates that the commander is all-knowing and therefore is the sole decisionmaker

for his unit. Even battalion-level commanders may refuse to make a command decision unless it is approved by their brigade commander. This lack of initiative, or perhaps even courage, results in considerable frustration for the advisory team. Officers are the primary givers of orders, and primary supervisors for task completion; essentially junior officers perform the traditional duties of the NCO.

**Role of the NCO.** Developing a functioning NCO corps is essential to the success of units in combat. Soldiers simply cannot always wait for an officer to direct their actions. Advisory NCOs must cultivate the importance, training, and capabilities of leaders. Furthermore, formal recognition and empowerment is absolutely critical to the success of these leaders. NCOs are typically “glorified privates” in the SPCDOs. It is imperative that advisory teams make unit leaders aware of the importance of these individuals to mission accomplishment.

**Military capability.** Do not expect the unit to be 100-percent equipped or manned. In the Iraqi forces, the “contractual agreement” binding a soldier to his unit is far different than U.S. military enlistment contracts. Furthermore, equipment accountability is poor at best; many items issued are viewed as gifts rather than government equipment. These factors are exacerbated by the generally low-level of initial entry training of all ranks.



*“Religion is clearly a driving force in the Middle East — Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, these major religions all have roots in this region. It is critical to understand the importance of religion to an area of operations. A greater understanding of the history of these religions further creates the foundations for teambuilding. Host-nation personnel respect our ability to discuss historical circumstances of the Islamic religion, as well as the importance of significant holy areas throughout the country.”*

**Equipment.** Expect your unit to primarily field Soviet-block weapons systems, primarily AK47, PK-series machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) systems, and a wide array of pistols. Likewise, personal equipment, such as helmets, body armor, load carrying equipment, and uniforms, will be extremely diverse. To ensure the advisory team's success and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, an accountability system must be developed and enforced by the host-nation unit commander.

**Weapons.** The weapons will generally range between poor and good condition, but the operator will not know or understand the operating systems. This generally results in poor maintenance and employment of weapons systems. It is imperative that advisory team members understand and communicate the capabilities and limitations of these weapons systems. An in-depth knowledge of care and use is essential to promoting proficiency in host-nation units.

**Personal equipment.** Many troops will not have 100-percent equipment issue; some may reconcile shortages by purchasing items on the civilian market, while others may simply use civilian articles until military items are issued. A very effective method with which to establish a solid relationship is through the provision of personal equipment to the unit. Soldiers remain similar regardless of nationality or region. Providing troops with quality equipment has a threefold impact: it is a symbol of comfort and well-being; having the proper equipment to conduct the mission reinforces mission success; and quality equipment develops competence in performing missions. Unfortunately, it is imperative that someone takes responsibility for the maintenance and accountability of this equipment. In the poor economy of Iraq, it is not unusual for a soldier to sell his uniform, weapon, and/or equipment to supplement his income. A system of rewards and punishment for stewardship remains a major shortfall with these forces. Advisors also must keep in mind that continual "giving" should be avoided to prevent the unit's dependence on U.S. support.

**Uniforms.** Units will display a wide variety of uniforms. Once again, many personnel purchase uniforms from the civilian market. Similar to equipment provision, acquiring uniforms for the host-nation unit is an excellent method to build a professional relationship. Furthermore, uniformity promotes esprit de corps within a unit. It is critical for the host-nation commander to establish standards for the wear of the uniform and enforce basic



*"Fraternal systems have provided tribal and family security and stability in this region for centuries. The battles against religious and tribal loyalties continually overshadow a sense of duty to the country as a whole. In Iraq, divisions may be made by familial, tribal, political, and denominational lines. This provides conditions for outside influence and perhaps interference with the national goals. At times, teams will find themselves deconflicting elements within a unit as the result of disagreements based on this mindset."*

military discipline. Tactical considerations are also important — a uniformed force facilitates "identification, friend or foe."

**Manning.** Fully manned units are rare, even in the U.S. Army. This is complicated in host nation military forces by ongoing local combat operations, desertions due to poor or overdue pay, murder of security forces personnel, and general malaise among the troops. Further exacerbating this problem in the beginning was the recruiting method — off-the-street hires and word-of-mouth. Advisory teams will find a constant struggle to assist the host-nation commander with recruiting, retention, and administrative matters. It is important for advisory teams to learn the systems in place for their units, including pay, punishment, rewards, enlistment, and retention.

**Pass and leave policy.** Brigade commanders established their own policies for personnel leaves and passes. This varied from 50 to 90 percent manning in units at all times (as much as half of the unit on leave at any given time). This obviously had severe impacts on training and operational tempos. Advisory teams will have an extremely difficult time understanding, much less monitoring, the pass and leave policy.

**Training.** Developing countries recovering from decades of tyranny or conflict will rarely field a professional military. Host-nation unit personnel may have months or years of combat experience,

but little exposure to formal training or basic tactical skills. The absence of an initial entry training program will also degrade the effectiveness of sustainment training, as host-nation personnel will simply not "know what right looks like." Because the majority of personnel have no formal training, an advisory team must coach the unit commander to institute his own. Eventually, the goal would be a formal national-level means of initial entry training; however, troops already on-hand may not be required to complete this formal program.

**Discipline.** Military discipline is crucial to a unit's performance on the battlefield. This is attained through establishing standards, constant training and drills, and eventual confidence in leaders, equipment, and performance. Advisory teams will find a wide range of discipline within units. Most units will be a direct reflection of their commander's attitude, proficiency, and experience. Quite literally, units will range from undisciplined rabble to well-trained fighting forces. Advisory teams must identify a baseline and coach the unit commander to the correct path. A key indicator proved to be the negligent discharge rate for the SPCDO units.

**Military Systems.** Western thinking and the eastern mind do not form a common picture. Over many years, host-nation forces have developed systems that work for them; it is critical not to force systems on them, a compromise approach is

generally the best course of action. For example, the SPCDOs did not have a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) when we were assigned to the unit. To enable full manning and equipping, U.S. advisors developed an MTOE, which was given to the SPCDO chain of command and subsequently approved. The units then conducted extensive task organization to meet mission requirements.

**Planning.** If you fail to plan, you have failed. This age-old axiom is only partially true in Iraq. A host-nation commander will typically conduct all planning independently of his staff. This is for two reasons: withholding the information will prevent operational security lapses; and the commander is considered the “supreme being” within his unit and therefore the expert in all situations. The commander and the ranks may view receiving military advice and/or assistance from a subordinate as a weakness. Instilling a military decisionmaking process or troop-leading procedures may prove to be a frustrating endeavor. Many times, advisory teams may find the after-action reviews the most efficient method of instilling a planning mindset within units.

**Logistics.** Units that cannot sustain themselves cannot persevere on the battlefield. A host-nation military may have far different historical methods of logistics support than those of our own. Advisory teams must once again learn and attempt to understand the historical procedures and seek a compromise that will allow effective supply discipline, forecasting, and acquisition. In Iraq, logisticians and commanders traditionally withheld supplies as bargaining chips. Units would receive portions of their allotments based on the favor with the supplier (or superior). Senior leaders may also withhold some materiel for personal reasons or purposes.

**Professional development.** With the absence of initial entry training, leaders rarely continue their professional development within units. Most knowledge is gained through trial and error; some promotions are based on relationships, rather than ability. Advisory teams must seek out the true leaders of a unit and encourage their advancement. Concurrently, the team must emphasize the importance of continued leader development to improve host-nation forces. Teams must maximize opportunities to develop all leaders, whether formally or informally, to ensure the future competence of the force.

**Team building.** This is probably the most critical aspect for success as an ad-

visor to host-nation forces. Simply put, if the host-nation personnel do not respect you and welcome you into their organization, they will make no effort to follow you. To be accepted, teams must demonstrate technical and tactical competence, understand and adhere to local customs, be physically fit, and have the physical courage to be accepted. These traits must be considered when building an advisory team. Honesty is also a critical trait, although at times it must be rendered diplomatically. At no point should an advisory team allow the host-nation commander to dictate actions; however, compromises must be made to suit both parties. It is essential to develop an esprit de corps in host-nation units; create conditions that promote an elite atmosphere where host-nation forces develop pride in themselves and their unit.

### Setting the Conditions

**Resourcing.** Critical to the success of the advisory effort is resourcing. Teams must be selected for their skill sets and exemplary service. Once teams are identified, an intense training regimen must be conducted. This training must be focused on physical readiness, foreign internal defense, small-unit tactics, community policing, weapons proficiency (U.S. and host nation), combatives, language training, cultural awareness, communications, combat lifesaver, and tactical maneuver. Furthermore, teams must be equipped with the latest weapons, accessories, communications, automation, navigation gear, and vehicles. All members on the team must have a primary specialty and be cross-trained with other team members. Lastly, the teams must be resourced with streamlined chains of command/headquarters elements and logistics channels. Experienced personnel, such as U.S. Army Special Forces, must be the proponent for advisory activities; for example, subject-matter experts with extensive experience with host-nation support, low-intensity conflict, foreign internal defense, and community policing would be ideal. Conventionally trained personnel are capable of performing this mission, but lack the institutional knowledge of decades of advisory missions.

### Location, Location, Location

In building the team and subsequently accomplishing the requirements of advising host-nation forces, every effort must be made to co-locate the team with the advised unit. This serves several purposes, foremost being proximity. Most SPTTs used bed-down locations that were geographically separated from their “client” units. This prevented necessary frequent interaction and availability for

both units, which resulted in minimal time spent with the client unit because of logistics restrictions and potential tactical hazards with extended periods of movement. It also may have created an impression of lack of trust between the SPTT and client unit. By ensuring the teams live, eat, and sleep with their host-nation partners, the relationship develops far better familiarity. Co-location also allows more frequent organized and hip-pocket training opportunities, and prevents “training to time,” rather than to standard. Increased joint training opportunities will provide an accurate capability assessment. Most importantly, co-location places the advisory team in position to immediately deploy with the unit on hasty missions; host-nation units cannot always wait until the SPTT arrives to execute short-notice missions.

Given the current sectarian strife in Iraq, to include allegations of Iraqi Security Forces involvement, it must also be emphasized that co-location allows advisory teams to monitor activities. It would be very difficult for host-nation units to conduct “off-the-record” operations if a transition team is observing the host-nation unit at all times.

An advisory team’s success or failure is corollary to their host-nation unit’s fitness for sustained combat operations. This benchmark cannot be fully realized until the advisory mission is complete and the host-nation forces are operating independently. The advisory team must be focused on their host-nation unit assuming the fight, supporting itself, and carrying on the traits of a professional military force. Only then can an advisory mission be judged a success or failure.



### Notes

<sup>1</sup>Lisa Burgess, “‘I was Going to Go Down Fighting’ Colonel Stood with Iraqi Commandos during Ambush,” *Stars and Stripes* (2006), online at <http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=36951&archive=true>, accessed 3 August 2006.

Major Todd Clark is currently a student, defense analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. He received a B.S. from Texas A&M University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Cavalry Leaders Course, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include operations advisor, 1st Brigade, Iraqi Special Police Commandos, Iraq; S3 and G Troop commander, 3d Battalion, 395th Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; commander, L Troop, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort Polk, Kuwait, and Iraq; S3 air, 3d Squadron, 2d ACR, Fort Polk, LA; and XO, C Company, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood and Bosnia.



## **PREPARING TO MiTT:**

# **Working With and Training the Iraqi Army**

by Captain David J. Smith

*“Better to let the Arabs do it tolerably than us doing it perfectly.”*

— T.E. Lawrence

T.E. Lawrence’s quote is the hallmark of the military transition team (MiTT). MiTTs are currently operating throughout Iraq on almost every forward operating base (FOB) as primary trainers and advisors to Iraqi army battalions, brigades, and divisions. A MiTT is designed to embed with an Iraqi army unit and provide training, logistics support, and leadership advice, as well as facilitate effects, such as artillery support and close air support (CAS), not yet available to the Iraqi army.

Iraqi army soldiers often struggle with dual loyalties to their tribes and families. Sometimes, family members work with the insurgency, or simply turn the other cheek, because they fear for their family’s safety. As a result, operational security (OPSEC) is very important. The Iraqi army leadership is very aware of OPSEC issues within the ranks and they work hard to overcome this challenge with specific OPSEC procedures. As an effective method, mission statements are issued to battalion commanders, and staffs develop the plan and issue operations orders (OPORDs) only to company com-

manders and platoon leaders. Generally, they do not issue the order past the platoon-leader level to maintain OPSEC.

Platoons and squads conduct generic troop-leading procedures (TLP) as they prepare for missions. Soldiers prepare for missions using standard operating procedures (SOPs) without knowing the specific objective area. Teaching soldiers and leaders to conduct TLP while maintaining OPSEC has been a very successful.

Trust is the foundation of our relationship with the Iraqi army. This is no easy task to accomplish; after all, we fought this army three years ago. Personal relationships are the doorways to success with the Iraqi army, as well as with the Iraqi people. We learned through early experience to build strong personal relationships to be successful. As Americans, we are accustomed to walking into someone’s office and getting right to business. In Iraq, it is customary to walk into someone’s office, shake hands with everyone there, give a warm greeting, and inquire about their well being. Usually, after about 15 minutes of general discussion, you can get down to business. This process takes time, but the dividends are unlimited.

We focus personal relationships at all levels by partnering with every staff section and each company commander, as well as regular MiTT members. This partnership-built trust between our battalions enables us to provide critical feedback on every aspect of the Iraqi unit’s development. It has also taught us that we share many common values and personality traits, despite cultural differences.

Building enduring systems is another key to success. It is important to build a useful long-term system — in other words, teach them to fish; don’t just give them fish to eat.

Training the Iraqi army using U.S. doctrine is the adopted model in Iraq. However, it is not as easy as pulling out a manual or training pamphlet and telling them what they should be doing. The biggest challenge is demonstrating our methods, adapting the methods to their operational environment, and then allowing them to take our concepts and apply the lessons in their way. This can be a frustrating experience for the more regimented trainer. Again, the quote from T.E. Lawrence comes to mind. This is a challenge, and as Americans, we must be willing to let them develop, learn, and apply the

*"Throughout our year of partnering with the Iraqi army, we have learned many lessons: they have tremendous pride in their country and army; they want to be successful; and they want a strong army. By getting to know Iraqi army soldiers on a personal level, we have scratched beneath the surface of outward appearances. This was not easy to do, but it must be accomplished by leaders at all levels to be successful in developing the Iraqi army."*



things we teach if they are ever going to internalize the lessons.

A soldier is required to be a soldier in any army, including the Iraqi army. From day one, we began building the common customs and courtesies of a professional army. For instance, each time I entered the Iraqi army battalion commander's office, I came to the position of attention and saluted. He was given the same respect as my own battalion commander. This made an immediate impact and he began enforcing these same standards in his battalion. He told his officers, "Captain Smith salutes me every time he sees me, and that is what we are going to do." He also noted that our battalion was always in uniform and he wanted that level of professionalism from his battalion. Anyone who has worked with the Iraqi army knows the challenges associated with keeping soldiers in uniform, so this was a giant leap forward. Soldiers are still occasionally caught out of uniform, but the immediate correction of those deficiencies by Iraqi army NCOs and officers has led to a continual progression of professional development and discipline.

Throughout our year of partnering with the Iraqi army, we have learned many les-

sons: they have tremendous pride in their country and army; they want to be successful; and they want a strong army. By getting to know Iraqi army soldiers on a personal level, we have scratched beneath the surface of outward appearances. This was not easy to do, but it must be accomplished by leaders at all levels to be successful in developing the Iraqi army.

Each year the situation changes in Iraq. We have gone from combat operations to stability and reconstruction operations. The current Iraqi army is over four years old and many of these soldiers have been working day in and day out without a break. Iraqi army soldiers put their families on the line everyday. My battalion commander reminded us many times, "they bleed the same as we do, except a whole lot more."

As members of a U.S. military transition team preparing to deploy to Iraq, soldiers and leaders alike should:

- Earn Iraqi soldiers' respect and trust; they will give it back twofold.
- Build personal relationships every chance you get.
- Build enduring systems.

- Teach them how to fish.
- Avoid being the "ugly American."
- Maintain a positive attitude.
- Realize you are only limited by your own imagination.
- Understand leadership principles are the roots to success in their army as well as ours.

Most importantly, keep in mind the words of T.E. Lawrence, "*Better the Arabs do it tolerably than us doing it perfectly.*"



Captain David J. Smith is currently an assistant operations officer, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, Military Transition Team (MiTT), Forward Operating Base Normandy, Iraq. He received a B.A. from Western Michigan University. His military education includes the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Captains Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (CD), Fort Hood, TX; XO, A Troop, 2d Squadron, 12th (2-12) Cavalry Regiment, 1st CD; and platoon leader, C Troop, 2-12 Cavalry Regiment, 1st CD.

# Maneuver Captains Career Course from Page 22

ing activities are specifically designed to improve agility:

- Historical vignettes help train tactics, but they also illustrate decisionmaking during combat. Each module includes several historical vignettes; for example, a vignette of Captain H.R. McMaster's fight and decisionmaking at the Battle of 73 Easting in Desert Storm is included in the HBCT company offense module.

- Tactical or rapid decision exercises occur several times a week throughout the course. Students are given tactical scenarios and a time limit to develop a plan or make a decision. These scenarios typically reinforce the day's training objectives, but occasionally focus on non-tactical dilemmas such as ethical decisionmaking in conflicted or vague situations and reacting to media interviews over a contentious event. Students brief their classmates on their plans or decisions and must justify thought processes to peers and small-group instructors. As the course progresses, scenarios become more difficult and students are allocated less resolution time.

- Think like a commander (TLAC) simulation is developed by the Army Research Institute at Fort Knox and trains students to increase their battlefield thinking ability. Students are presented computerized vignettes in which they must identify the critical information needed to make good decisions. As their ability progresses, students face more uncertainty and less time to react. Results of TLAC over the past few years indicate that students become better at identifying more required critical information in shorter time periods. Test results show that TLAC experienced officers perform better on graded exams and during live and virtual exercises.

- Live and virtual training exercises. MC3 is not confined to the classroom. Virtual training in CCTT, or with off-the-shelf individual simulations, provide officers a chance to exercise rapid decisionmaking against a thinking enemy. A gauntlet live exercise with second lieutenants is a very effective training event. Students must develop and communicate a plan while dealing with the friction of an FTX. They must build a team and provide leadership to brand-new platoon leaders. Finally, they must deal with numerous concurrent events, such as IEDs, civilian encounters, and FRAGOs, which emphasize their ability to multitask and make decisions.

Increasing the knowledge foundation in counterinsurgency and the contemporary

operating environment enhances the student's agility for the current fight. Students are required to submit a review of a COIN-themed book for evaluation of their critical thinking skills and written communications. Students prepare and brief numerous executive summaries of recent and relevant COIN-related articles to generate class discussion. Subject matter experts train students on cultural understanding by providing basic instruction on Middle East culture, specific methods for dealing with civilian populations, and advanced instruction on building rapport with indigenous officials such as military counterparts, local leaders, and Sheiks. Additionally, students enroll in the Army Knowledge Online (AKO)-based Rosetta Stone program to start building a basic proficiency in a foreign language.

## Making MC3 a Better Course

Understandably, there is some uneasiness that the formation of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning will lead to one branch dominating all captain-level professional military education programs for maneuver officers. While a valid concern, the process of creating the MC3 shows otherwise. During the nine months of development, both the infantry and armor branches have had equal say in the final training product. In fact, MC3 is a better course for captains because it not only captures the best current training material and methodologies from the infantry and armor captains career courses, it also creates new instruction to better prepare officers for the challenges of their next assignments.

During MC3, students are exposed to multiple organization types and they must demonstrate the ability to plan full-spectrum operations for each. There is more counterinsurgency, contemporary operating environment, and cultural understanding integration throughout the course. Exercises use real threat models from across the world with emphasis in the full-spectrum environment, using threats posed by paramilitaries, insurgents, and tribal/sectarian fighting. Not only is the content of the course material better, but the development of agile and adaptive leaders has improved. Rapid decisionmaking and the ability to deal with uncertainty and conflicting information are continually trained throughout the course.

Finally, the assignment-based training in Phase II of MC3 better supports the force by nesting an output of captain-level graduates within the requirements

of the ARFORGEN model. As BCTs begin lifecycle management cycles, they receive MC3 graduates better trained for those organizations and prepared to take command.

Both Fort Knox and Fort Benning are transitioning quickly to the Maneuver Captains Career Course by integrating newly developed MC3 course material into their current classes. Beginning in September 2006, complete MC3 instruction will begin at both locations as the career course expands to 21 weeks. Fort Knox will train the HBCT track for Phase II, while Fort Benning will focus on the IBCT/SBCT track. The Human Resources Command has already programmed more infantry and armor officers to attend MC3 at Knox and Fort Benning, respectively, during 1st Quarter, FY07, based on anticipated BCT requirements. This trend will continue until all MC3 instruction consolidates at the Maneuver Center of Excellence some time in the future.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission Report, 13 May 2005, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup>Think Like a Commander Training Program, Army Research Institute, Fort Knox, KY, March 2003, pp. 4-12.

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick A. Clark is serving as commander, 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.B.A. from the University of Phoenix. His military education includes the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include observer/controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany; S3, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 1st Armor Division, Baumholder, Germany; and XO, 2d Battalion, 6th Infantry, 1st Army Division, Baumholder.

Major Edward B. Hayes is serving as the course manager, Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and Joint Firepower Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include small-group instructor, Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox; commander, K Troop, 2d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox; commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA; and commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d BCT, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis.

## DRIVER'S SEAT from Page 5

ership skills, roles and responsibilities of a first sergeant, and staff support functions. The small-group instruction concept is employed throughout the course.

As a joint effort, both the Infantry and Armor Schools contributed to redefining the expectations for the course. The goal of the course is to produce graduates that are capable of operating efficiently and effectively as a platoon sergeant in a combined-arms company team. Each Maneuver ANCOC graduate will:

- Demonstrate a proficiency in tactical/technical planning and execution at the platoon level.
- Demonstrate the ability to use the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).
- Demonstrate the ability to think critically as a flexible, adaptive leader under stress.
- Demonstrate the ability to communicate in a way that is thoroughly understood and inspires

confidence in subordinates and peers.

- Develop a working knowledge of first sergeant duties at the company troop level and a basic knowledge of battalion and brigade staff functions.

The course will consist of three back-to-back phases. The first phase is five weeks and three days of universal training, which includes training on all four MOSs. During universal training, students participate in small group instruction on various subjects, learning new aspects of these subjects through the eyes of other senior NCOs from differing MOS backgrounds. The second phase is one week long, and the students move to small groups and conduct MOS-specific training. The final phase of the course is one week and two days, where the students come back together and conduct an urban operations situational training exercise (STX), learning and reinforcing dismounted urban operations and close-quarters TTP. They will finish

up this last phase with simulation exercises (SIMEX).

Maneuver ANCOC has been in development since February 2006. The team of developers includes personnel from Fort Knox and Fort Benning NCO academies, the Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development (DTDCD), Fort Knox, and Directorate of Training (DOT), Fort Benning.

There is some concern that forming the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning will lead to one branch managing the NCOES program for maneuver soldiers. However, during the development of the course, both the infantry and armor branches have had equal input toward the final training model. In fact, Maneuver ANCOC improves the NCOES because it combines the best current training material and techniques from both branches and creates new information and ideas that will increase warrior capabilities.

**YOUR PRIDE IS SHOWING AND SOMEONE IS WATCHING.**

## Reece Troop from Page 39

can put himself there and someone can take his place on the vehicle. There are seasoned noncommissioned officers left on the vehicles to send reports to the troop, and all vehicles have enough personnel to provide local security and execute a rest plan, if necessary. In a conventional fight, team leaders can still control their OPs, while the squad leader moves between teams, and dismounted patrols can be more quickly organized. The platoon truly has enough people, and when certainties, such as undermanning, casualties, or leave occur, the platoon can still function mounted and dismounted.

During a recent rotation to the JRTC, the RSTA squadron was conducting its mission for three days before the infantry entered the box. When they entered the box, the infantry battalions took a few more days to prepare for battle. For the RSTA squadron, it was a week of running, fighting, and reporting on the enemy, who kept us moving day and night. I was so proud of my soldiers as I watched them

report, fight, and reposition with almost no sleep. With a better setup, however, we would have been more effective in that tough fight, and we would have done more of what a recon platoon should do.

Whoever designed the recon platoons for the RSTA squadron wanted lots of scouts on the ground. It probably seemed like a great idea to place the entire platoon, minus gunners and drivers, on the ground. But who knew that the gunners and drivers would still be in the fight, watching with the LRAS3, talking on the radio, and monitoring the FBCB2 for days at a time? Who foresaw that when a vehicle crewmember is killed, one of the precious few people on the ground has to remount just to make the vehicle move?

A better recon troop is a platoon of six vehicles, with some type of onboard platoon leaders, and enough dismounts to actually gather intelligence — dismounts with competent and consistent leadership and organization. All these require-

ments can be met with a little restructuring and a minimal addition of personnel and equipment. All these requirements should be met to make us as good as, or better than, any recon organization out there — light, medium, or heavy; legacy or objective.



Master Sergeant John Hegadush is currently serving as the company noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of an Active/Reserve Component (AC/RC) observer controller/trainer team, B Company, 2d Battalion, 357th Infantry (TS), Fort Lewis, WA. He received an Associates Degree from Penn State University. His military education includes Air Assault School, Bradley Master Gunner Course, and Drill Sergeant School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include platoon sergeant, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry, Fort Lewis and Iraq; drill sergeant, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, Fort Jackson, SC; section leader, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO; and section leader, 5th Squadron, 9th Cavalry, Schofield Barracks, HI.

# Tactical Resourcefulness: A Case Study

by Captain Dave R. Palmer

(Reprinted from the July-August 1966 issue of *ARMOR*)

## The Problem

*You are a newly assigned advisor to the commander of a South Vietnamese armored company. Equipped with M113s, the company is organized into three rifle platoons, a support platoon, and a company headquarters. Shortly after you join, the company is ordered to a district in the "gray" area — a locality controlled by neither the government nor the Viet Cong. The mission: provide local security in the district.*

*On arrival at the district headquarters, you discover a rather bleak situation. Higher level considerations have dictated that your area of operations must be temporarily relegated to a low priority status. The entire military commitment to the district is just five platoon-sized outposts, the district headquarters, and the company of Armor which you advise. The Viet Cong have the capability of mounting assaults, in double company strength, against any of the outposts or against the district headquarters itself.*

*The terrain does not allow rapid relief of all the outposts from a central position. Even if it did, you are quite aware that a favorite guerrilla gambit is to stage an attack on an outpost as bait for an ambush against the relieving force. You do not relish that prospect. A check with both the district chief and your own higher headquarters reveals that the number of outposts in the district has been reduced to the absolute minimum. Consolidation, therefore, is out of the question.*

*As you ponder the unpromising factors, your counterpart approaches. After discussing the problem, he asks for your advice.*

*How would you do it?*

## Know Your Enemy

Not surprisingly, a knowledge of guerrilla tactics provides the basis for the solution. Fighting with lighter weapons and saddled with a tenuous supply system, the insurgent must utilize surprise and precise planning to compensate for his inherently inferior combat strength. Rapidly massing to strike an isolated or unsuspecting garrison is his primary hope for success. His doctrine is to fight only when victory is assured; if the outcome is doubtful, he is obliged to refuse combat.

Preparation for an attack is meticulous. The defensive system is analyzed completely and a mock-up of the objective is constructed in the guerrillas' lair. Rehearsals are conducted until every man is letter-perfect in the execution of his specific task. Detailed intelligence is painstakingly gathered. The Viet Cong want to know the jobs, routines, and habits of all the defenders: What is Sergeant Thuan's alert position? When is he on duty? Does Corporal Minh's family live nearby? Does the commander get up in the night to relieve himself?

Time is normally not a consideration. Should any element of the defense be altered, the insurgent band starts planning all over again. In one recorded instance, an attack that had been in preparation for over two months was cancelled when the sergeant commanding a small triangular fort was replaced by a new — and hence unknown — sergeant just a day prior to the scheduled assault. That single change upset the precise intelligence picture; the would-be attackers could no longer be sure of the exact plans of defense in the fort. The interjection of that element of the un-

known made the proposed foray too risky for the poorly armed guerrillas. An unexpected alteration — or possible alteration — of its defenses had saved the fort.

## The Solution

In the autumn of 1964, 4th Troop, 1st Armored Cavalry Squadron (ARVN), found itself in the perplexing situation described above. (It must be admitted that the commander, not the advisor, suggested the imaginative and successful solution.)

The insurgent's heavy dependence on preparation and his corresponding inability to adjust quickly to new situations were used against him. The company commander devised a system to alter continually the defensive status of the five mud forts and the district headquarters. On a completely random basis, he shuttled his platoons from outpost to outpost. The M113s might remain in any given site for an hour or a week. They could arrive at any time of the day or night. At a particular moment, an outpost could contain one, two, or even three platoons.

Random reinforcement of a position with the appreciable firepower and manpower of an armored platoon constituted a major and unexpected alteration of the defenses. For any Communist unit anticipating an attack on such a position, the probability of sustaining unacceptable losses was increased while the chances for success were diminished.

The very rules under which the guerrilla fights were used against him. Because he could never predict the ever-changing defenses, he was unable to launch an attack on any of the government forces in that district. An original and energetic application of several pertinent Armor characteristics — mobility, flexible communications, firepower, and an offensive spirit even in a defensive environment — resulted in a report of "mission accomplished."

## The Moral of the Story

This is but one example of the value of Armor in a counter-insurgency role. Armor, employed with ingenuity and imagination, has been doing yeoman service in Vietnam for some four years now. Moreover, in both quantity and quality, the commitment of Armor to that difficult war is increasing.

Unfortunately, doubt persists, even in the minds of many thoughtful people, over the efficacy of using Armor in a counterinsurgency war. It is too easy to say "the terrain is not suitable for Armor." How quickly we forget. We learned in WWII, and again in Korea, that terrain is an obstacle, not an absolute. The only real limits to the employment of Armor are mental and moral. The worst terrain can be overcome by intelligence and initiative; the best terrain is worthless when approached with stupidity and lethargy.

We, who have long prided ourselves on being members of the Army's most forward-thinking branch, need not be left out of the action in low-intensity wars. Indeed, we should not be omitted. Paced by mental mobility, Armor has special characteristics, which can offer much to the overall effort against Communist "wars of liberation."

---

*Editor's Note:* Captain Palmer went on to attain the rank of lieutenant general culminating his career as Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is the author of *Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective* and a recipient of the Gold Medallion, Order of St. George.

# REVIEWS

**On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom** by Retired Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2005, 539 pp., \$34.95 (hardcover)

*"As military science develops, innovation tends to be more difficult than less... In these circumstances, when everybody starts wrong, the advantage goes to the side which can most quickly adjust itself to the new and unfamiliar environment and learn from our mistakes."*  
— Sir Michael Howard

As the United States enters the fifth year of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and its third year of ground combat operations in Iraq, the constant images of improvised explosive devices, kidnappings, and debates on timing the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq, it is easy for the public to forget the overwhelming success of U.S. joint and coalition forces employed against the Iraq military in 2003.

*On Point* is a definitive account of the second Gulf War, which draws on the official record of after-action reviews from the Army's Operation

reforming the Army. Their vision of reforming the Army allowed the AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s and 1990s to adapt into a full-spectrum doctrine capable of dealing with more than ground combat operations. Their reforms would also serve as an "engine of change," allowing the Army to develop doctrine and cutting-edge technologies, making the Army relevant 15 years into the future.

The second half of *On Point* is a detailed synopsis of the ground campaign up to the end of major ground combat operations in Iraq. The authors do an excellent job walking the reader from operational to tactical actions throughout the entire book. The stories are compelling and provide the reader an excellent detail of how a modern army fights. To keep the reader linked to the human aspect of the war, there are small vignettes that give a personal perspective to the larger picture. The book's second half will appeal to any current or former soldier with its detail, humor, heroism, and tragedy.

Because *On Point* ends with coalition ground forces still engaged, the authors freely admit that their book is a first draft of the history of OIF. Their data points do not lead to any conclusions regarding future operations in Iraq.

---

*"Because On Point ends with coalition ground forces still engaged, the authors freely admit that their book is a first draft of the history of OIF. Their data points do not lead to any conclusions regarding future operations in Iraq. Nor does their book question the reason why the United States went to war in Iraq. Those questions are left for other analysts and authors."*

---

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Study Group. The authors cover the entire spectrum of combat and combat support operations, from logistics to fire-fights, at the platoon level. This broad coverage explains the success of U.S. joint and coalition operations during OIF I. In particular, it illustrates how U.S. Army transformation, which followed the first Gulf War, ensured overwhelming success during the initial march into Baghdad in early 2003.

"No plan survives the opening salvo of war," goes the old adage; however, there are two notable exceptions. The first, War Plan Orange, the U.S. Navy's strategy to defeat Japan, was formulated more than 40 years prior to World War II. Despite the shock of the raid on Pearl Harbor and previous upheavals in weapons and world politics, the plan brilliantly applied by U.S. Naval and Army planners, won the war in the Pacific. The other exception is the planning and transformation that occurred during the evolution of the Army following the first Gulf War.

The first half of *On Point* walks the reader through the evolution of U.S. Army development from the Cold War force that won the first Gulf War to the modular Army that was so successful during the early stages of the Iraq war. In particular, the book highlights the roles that former Army Chiefs of Staff Gordon Sullivan and Eric K. Shinseki and their staffs played in

Nor does the book question the reason why the United States went to war in Iraq. Those questions are left for other analysts and authors.

While an excellent analysis of early OIF combat operations, the book is full of acronyms and military jargon most civilian readers would not understand. The book's illustrations and maps are poor quality and many appear to be grainy copies of original presentations used at the headquarters. This can be a serious distraction to readers who are unfamiliar with the Iraqi battlefield or the equipment used to conduct the fight. The small contretemps aside, *On Point* is still a captivating and interesting book and a must read for any student of military operations.

The authors' years of combat and command experience are reflected in each chapter. Retired Army Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Army Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Degen, and Army Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, all served from the tactical to the strategic levels, and the book's style reflects that experience. This book is an excellent read for military officers who want to study how leaders take lessons learned from previous conflicts and transform a military force to fight on future battlefields.

JAYSON A. ALTIERI  
MAJ, U.S. Army

**Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency** by Anthony James Joes, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 2004, 351 pp., \$35.00 (hardcover)

Insurgency and the methods used to fight it have a long and varied history, ranging from the Spanish guerrillas of the Napoleonic era to Vietnam and Afghanistan. Anthony James Joes takes a critical look at this subject in his book, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*. Joes examines the factors that makes either side successful in such a conflict through analyzing a wide range of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies from different countries throughout history.

Joes' primary thesis is that "guerrilla insurgency is quintessentially a political phenomenon, and that therefore any effective response to it must be primarily political as well." He proposes that lasting peace comes through conciliation, which consists of limited, but effective, military tactics, and, more importantly, a successful political agenda, focused on addressing legitimate grievances. In his words, "counterinsurgent victory derives from justice supported by military power... justice that is seen to be done."

Joes looks at several insurgencies to support his thesis, to include the American Revolution, the Vendee and Spanish insurgencies during Napoleon's era, Central America, the Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, to name but a few. He highlights the American counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines, and the British in Malaya as examples of a successful counterinsurgency. These models primarily viewed the conflict as political and pursued aggressive political strategies, along with limited direct military action, to isolate the insurgents. Both models made effective use of amnesty and rectitude, allowing the insurgents to surrender and incorporating them into the overall political solution, essentially taking away their reason for rebellion.

At the same time, Joes recognizes that the subject of insurgency is a convoluted one with no clear solution. Many myths exist on how to put down an insurgency, as well as conduct one. He examines several of these myths, from communist imitators of Mao and Castro to the inherent misunderstanding of American society in regards to Vietnam.

History misunderstood — a problem for insurgents and those who fight them. Joes' key point is that many times during insurgency operations, core lessons learned are forgotten as quickly as the conflict ends, only to be relearned later by different countries or not learned at all. Concurrently, insurgents are just as prone to misunderstand the lessons of history, recognizing only one of the many conditions needed for a successful insurgency or completely misconstruing the lessons altogether.

Well organized and written, Joes concisely states his points and summarizes key ideas in each chapter. This book is easy to read and

understand. I recommend it to anyone seeking to understand more about the true nature of both insurgency and counterinsurgency.

ELIAS D. OTOSHI  
CPT, U.S. Army

**Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars** by Michael C. Fowler, Praeger Security International, Westport, CT, 2005, 200 pp., \$49.95 (hardcover)

In a time when governments around the world are looking for an answer to terrorism and insurgency, Michael Fowler provides us with his opinion on how modern conflict has changed, what its current influences are, and how it may be addressed. His book, *Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars*, provides keen insight into the forces that are waging war on the global battlefield today. Specifically, he argues there has been a paradigm shift in the conduct of warfare — today, amateur warriors, with an issue or cause, influence governments through unconventional warfare. Fowler argues that non-state-sponsored actors have the most impact on conflict and politics in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya.

While Fowler's work does not provide military commanders and staffs with the answer to their priority intelligence requirements, it does force them to think about the enemy in a different way, as it does describe how insurgent organizations are mobilized, funded, trained, organized, and operated. But most importantly, Fowler requires the reader to think about insurgency on a global scale, how al Qaeda and 9/11 have changed modern warfare, and what the United States and other nations must do to deal with the issue. To achieve this, Fowler devotes one chapter to describing his insurgent model and another to al Qaeda to support his hypothesis. Whether the reader supports his arguments or disagrees with them is not important; Fowler's endeavor provides much food for thought concerning the way war will be waged in the future. There is no doubt that many will find this manuscript a slow and challenging read; however, if the reader devotes a bit of time to this book, *Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars* is worthy of their effort.

MIKE MONNARD  
MAJ, U.S. Army

**The German Way of War** by Robert M. Citino, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2005, 428 pp., \$34.95 (hardcover)

*The German Way of War* takes the reader on a sweeping march through 300 years of Prussian/German military history and operational thought as he explains the "why" of the German style of waging operational war. Citino makes a convincing case that the development of German operational thought between the world wars was not a new epiphany, but simply a continuation of previous thought with the applica-

tion of better weapons, to include much improved tanks and aircraft. Since the time of Frederick William (The Great Elector), Prussians have sought to keep their wars "short and lively," as they fully understood that they could not succeed in long, drawn-out wars of attrition. Consequently, Prussian operational thought developed with a focus on war of maneuver, in which aggressive and independent field commanders would strike violently to destroy the enemy in the field. Citino also makes a strong case that "Auftragstaktik" is commonly misinterpreted as "mission-type orders" or "flexible command," when it is more correctly interpreted as the "independence of subordinate commanders."

*The German Way of War* is a meticulously researched academic work and sheds new light on Prussian, and subsequently German, operational thought. It includes almost 90 pages of footnotes and explanations, many of which are from German language primary sources. Citino does an exceptional job explaining the operational conduct of the German army during both world wars and how its style of fighting eventually contributed to the defeat of the Third Reich. In so doing, the author takes on several popular myths surrounding key decisions, and explains how the outcomes are actually consistent with prevailing operational thought. The only drawback to the book is that it tends to be a bit long-winded prior to addressing the period during and after the Franco-Prussian War and on through World War II.

This book will be most useful to readers interested in Prussian/German military history and senior leaders interested in the development of operational thought.

BRIAN M. MICHELSON  
MAJ, U.S. Army

**Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground** by Robert D. Kaplan, Random House, NY, 2005, 372 pp., \$27.95 (hardcover)

The first of two books depicting America's military on the ground at the dawn of the new century, *Imperial Grunts* tracks the two-year wanderings of journalist Robert Kaplan through many known hotspots, as well as those not yet brought to the public's attention. Using firsthand experiences and personal interviews, Kaplan offers up soldiers' perspectives on America's security commitments around the world, as well as insightful sketches of the soldiers.

Traveling from the deserts of Yemen, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa to the jungles of Columbia and the Philippines, Kaplan details the stories of American Marines, airmen, and Special Forces soldiers deployed to far-flung places unspoiled by commercial development, yet far too unstable for tourism. Providing descriptions of local history, geography, culture, and people, Kaplan offers vivid portraits of the nations and regions benefiting from America's military presence. His descriptions are enhanced by maps of each region placed at the beginning of each chapter,

which provide perspective for the narratives that follow.

Beyond the Global War on Terrorism, in Kaplan's view, America's military is engaged in something that can only be described as the maintenance of empire akin to the expansion of the American West or the British Empire during the Victorian Age. "Americans," he writes, "were uncomfortable with the idea of empire, even as the responsibility was thrust on them." Serving as advisors and nation-builders, America's soldiers live and work alongside local forces and people. Often Reservists on revolving deployments, the work they are engaged in is slow and tied to political and economic development.

Rarely engaged in direct combat, except in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans are trainers and development specialists with the weight of the entire U.S. Armed Forces' logistics system at their backs. These small teams of soldiers are engaged in nation-building on a scale almost too small to notice, yet their local impact is very real and very important to creating and enhancing the perception that America is not a giant to be feared, but rather one to be worked with and emulated. The goal in each example of America's involvement is to weaken and eliminate the avenues that allow anti-American, often Islamic, radicalism to flourish — military ineptitude, economic underdevelopment, and political corruption. By the use of well thought-out training programs, aid projects, and the judicious involvement of local governments, America's soldiers have invariably managed to undermine and discredit the radical elements against whom they are engaged.

One of the themes often repeated by the officers and enlisted men with whom Kaplan worked is, "there are no quick fixes." These soldiers are deployed to nations that have long histories of dysfunction and will not be fixed with handouts and simple aid projects. Yet, local elite military units can be trained, their officers and noncommissioned officers raised as close to American standards as possible, the prestige of local mayors and governors can be enhanced through high-visibility aid projects, and it is these people who make the difference in the long run. Their effect might be unknown, yet if the training and examples provided by their American advisors have any positive impact, it cannot be any worse than it already is. Barring massive commitments of money and resources by the United States, the tasks that can be accomplished by America's soldiers are subtle, certainly too subtle for the mass media to notice, but they succeed one village, one district council, one elite military unit at a time.

Kaplan also details the conflict within the American military and political establishments toward the burgeoning American pseudo-empire. Deployed across the globe, the U.S. military tries to recreate America using luxury filled, prefabricated base camps, whose isolation from the local population is both physical and cultural, and whose logistics needs are a significant distraction from the actual mission on the ground. Arguably, these base camps serve as bastions of military security to ensure both

the ability to project firepower as needed, and, just as important from the viewpoint of the political forces in the Pentagon and D.C., provide protection for the forces involved. This risk aversion rises again and again in Kaplan's travels as an impediment to the troops on the ground in accomplishing their ongoing missions. The prestige of a U.S. Special Forces soldier can only suffer when the unit he has trained with for months is ordered outside the wire without him because the rules of engagement were developed with a zero-casualty approach. To paraphrase many soldiers Kaplan interviewed, "the failure of Vietnam is past, let it go."

If anyone wants to know the future of American military policy, and their part in it, *Imperial Grunts* will point the way. It deserves to be widely read by all of America's soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines.

TIMOTHY S. SMYTH  
California ARNG, Retired

**The Soldier's General: Bert Hoffmeister at War** by Douglas E. Delaney, UBC Press, Vancouver, 2005, \$85.00 (hardcover)

*The Soldier's General* is an antidote to the bitterness at the sacrilege of seeing merit sacrificed on the altar of ambition and animosity. Reading my own Canadian military history, coupled with Canadian forces service in seven different United Nations mission areas, seems to demonstrate that war, combat, and operational imperatives are often not enough to ensure that the best leader for the job is selected. Douglas Delaney includes a biography about the best rising to the top.

*The Soldier's General* is the history of a reserve infantry officer successfully commanding an armored division, reputedly the only non-regular to command this level of formation in combat in the British Commonwealth. Bert Hoffmeister fought six battles as an infantry battalion commander, four as an infantry brigade commander in Italy, and eight in command of an armored division in both Italy and Northwest Europe. "With one, possibly two exceptions, all his actions succeeded." Hoffmeister was awarded a British Distinguished Service Order (DSO) at each level of battalion, brigade, and division command.

Further recognition came with the appointment to command Canada's planned divisional contribution to the invasion of Japan. Hoffmeister chose to leave the military for a successful career in business. He dropped off the radar screen of successful allied, indeed Canadian, commanders of the Second War.

Delaney addresses this deficiency. He contends that "while some commanders could move the chess pieces of battle with competence and aplomb, Hoffmeister was a master at getting his pieces to move themselves." Surely then *The Soldier's General* has much to offer on the question of leadership to those

engaged in a three-block-war concept in which individuals must act on their own initiative. As encouragement for those who must now watch from retirement, after some disillusionment from our own time in uniform, Delaney tells us about a battlefield master who rose to command purely on merit.

Although the price is steep, this book is recommended reading for any level of leader, serving or retired. It is of particular interest to National Guard or Army Reserve readers.

ROY THOMAS  
MAJ, Canadian Hussars, Retired

**The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke: Volume 2, July 29, 1876-April 7, 1878**, edited and annotated by Charles M. Robinson III, University of North Texas Press, Denton, TX, 2005, 530 pp., \$55.00 (hardcover)

In this volume, Charles Robinson continues his effort of transcribing, editing, and annotating the monumental set of diaries of John Gregory Bourke. Until Robinson's six-volume effort is finished, the complete set of Bourke's diaries is available only on microfilm at The United States Military Academy Library. Those who have read Bourke's book, *On the Border with Crook*, are familiar with the quality of Bourke's writing and his broad interest in the total environment of the western frontier.

This volume again includes part of the long period Bourke spent as aide-de-camp to General George Crook, now commander of the Department of the Platte. It begins soon after the Battle of Little Bighorn, where George Armstrong Custer met with disaster on 25 June 1876. Crook had suffered defeat in the Battle of Rosebud on 17 June and remained in the grassy area of the foothills of the Bighorn Mountains until early August, awaiting reinforcements and preparing to launch an offensive against the Sioux.

On 5 August, Crook, now joined by Colonel Wesley Merritt and his 5th Cavalry, began his campaign. His force consisted of 26 companies of cavalry (from the 2d, 3d, and 5th Regiments) and ten companies of infantry (from the 4th, 9th, 14th, and 23d Regiments). Crook had ordered that baggage would be reduced to a minimum, with each soldier and officer limited to, "the clothes on his back and no more, one overcoat, one blanket (to be carried by the cavalry over the saddle blanket), and one rubber tent." Rations were carried for 15 days. Two-hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition per man were carried, one hundred to be carried by the cavalymen and the remainder on the pack mules, a train of 400. Utensils were limited to a cup for each man and a limited amount for mess cooking. Much as a result of Crook's order for austerity, this campaign would become known as the "Horse Meat March." Bourke's recounting of the hardships endured by the troops during the next

six weeks is a testimony to the endurance of the frontier troops.

The diary continues with the story of the Powder River Expedition in the winter of 1875-76, Crooke's last operation of the Great Sioux War. Crook's force for this campaign included Colonel Ranald Mackenzie, commanding 11 companies of cavalry (from the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Regiments) and Lieutenant Colonel R.I. Dodge, commanding 11 companies of infantry (from the 9th, 14th, and 23d Regiments) and four companies of artillery (4th Artillery). Bourke accompanied Mackenzie in his cavalry attack and destruction of the main Cheyenne camp in what became known as the "Dull Knife Fight." Following this fight and General Nelson Miles' destruction of a hostile camp in May 1877, the main hostile chiefs either surrendered or were forced into exile in Canada.

As General Crook did not exercise field command again in the Department of the Platte, Bourke next handled the duties of a regular staff officer in departmental headquarters in Omaha. The remainder of this volume covers a hunting trip with General Philip Sheridan and other senior officers and civilian guests; and a chapter reflecting on Bourke's earlier service in Tucson.

Throughout the diaries, Bourke once again shows evidence of his broad interests in the environment and the Indians. His descriptions of terrain and vegetation of frontier towns and individual Indians show his keen appreciation of the world around him.

Robinson has added a particularly interesting appendix with biographical sketches of all of the officers, civilians, and Indians mentioned, by name, in the diaries. An additional appendix presents other views on the Horse Meat March with quotes from other participants. Another appendix provides the newspaper text of an interview with an Army officer concerning Indian government policies; Bourke included the clipping in his diaries. In a final appendix, Robinson includes the report of Lieutenant William Philo Clark's account of the Great Sioux War, a report written at Crook's order.

Robinson has continued his superb undertaking of editing and annotating Bourke's diaries, enhancing the work by excellent introductory remarks, informative footnotes, and including the aforementioned appendixes. Highly qualified to accomplish this effort, he is a fellow of the Texas State Historical Society and a history instructor at South Texas Community College. He has authored 15 books, including *Bad Hand: A Biography of Ranald S. Mackenzie* and *The Court Martial of Henry Flipper*.

As a final note, it is not necessary to read all of the volumes as they appear. While they tell a consistent story as Bourke's service progressed, each volume can be considered independent of the others and researchers can use each as desired in investigating particular actions on the western frontier.

PHILIP L. BOLTE  
BG, U.S. Army, Retired



**Join your fellow Mounted Soldiers and share your insights, ideas, and observations.**

*Mounted ManeuverNet* is a professional forum comprised of Soldiers who share a common set of problems, a *passion* for a topic, and are *dedicated* to deepening their knowledge and expertise.

### Mission

To provide mounted Soldiers a professional forum characterized by its candor, insight, and innovation designed to improve the collective warfighting skills of its members.

### Vision

To produce a mounted maneuver team capable of harnessing and applying the collective experiences and skills of its members to outthink and outfight all enemies.

### Key Tasks

- Help transfer knowledge from those who have it to those who need it.
- Provide a professional forum to share the latest thoughts, ideas, and lessons learned from the experienced mounted Soldiers, regardless of rank or duty position.
- Provide the ability to network with peers so that everyone improves. Professional networking is the key to

breaking the age-old cycle of constantly reinventing the wheel.

- Provide peer-driven professional and technical mentoring for those periods between attendance at service schools.
- Provide topical content, tools, and knowledge to assist deployed Soldiers.
- Drive change from the ground up.

### Knowledge Management

The systematic development of collaborative communities that quickly transfer knowledge to solve problems, share best practices, and develop professional skills.

### Battle Command Knowledge System

The Army's federation of existing and emerging knowledge management systems include NConet, CompanyCommand, S3-XO, LOGnet, COIN, IO, and many others. Log on to BCKS to see what else is available...

### HOW TO LOG ON

#### Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS):


<https://bcks.army.mil> or <https://bcks.army.smil.mil>  
 - Enter your AKO/AKOS user name and password at the prompt.

#### Mounted ManeuverNet:

- Go to the Fort Knox homepage at [www.knox.army.mil](http://www.knox.army.mil).
- Click on *Mounted ManeuverNet* link (right side of page).
- Enter your AKO user name and password at the prompt.
- Under "Participate" section (left side of screen), click "Become a Member," fill out the form and submit. You should be granted full access to site within 24 hours.

For assistance contact BCKS Operations:

Comm: (913) 684-2474 / DSN: 552-2474  
 E-mail: [bcks@leavenworth.army.mil](mailto:bcks@leavenworth.army.mil)



PB 17-06-5  
PIN: 083389-000



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A  
ARMOR  
201 6TH AVE STE 373  
FORT KNOX, KY 40121-5721

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Periodicals Postage  
Paid at Louisville, KY