In recent years, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has placed a great emphasis on the Special Forces training pipeline, and much of our activity has been concerned with recruiting, assessing and training Special Forces Soldiers to enter the fight against terrorism.

Less well-publicized, but nevertheless important, are our activities devoted to training Special Forces Soldiers in advanced skills. These skills, such as military free-fall, underwater operations, target interdiction and urban warfare, make our Soldiers more proficient in their close-combat missions and better able to infiltrate and exfiltrate without being detected. Located at Fort Bragg, at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz., and at Key West, Fla., the cadre of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group provides such training.

Not surprisingly, the global war on terrorism has engendered greater demand for Soldiers with selected advanced skills. Despite funding constraints and shortages of personnel, SWCS military and civilian personnel have been innovative and agile in responding to the new requirements.

The success of Special Forces Soldiers in the global war on terrorism has validated our training processes on a daily basis. Our focus on a core curriculum of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, coupled with advanced human interaction and close-quarters combat, has proven to be on-the-mark against the current threat.

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert
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2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG: Sharpening the Edge of the Spear

by Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Mulholland

While the Special Forces pipeline trains Soldiers in the SF basic skills, SF advanced skills make Soldiers more lethal, better able to gather intelligence and harder to detect during infiltration and exfiltration. Advanced-skills training is the job of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Many Soldiers are impressed, and rightly so, by training in advanced skills, such as sniper operations, military free-fall and underwater operations. But those who have never been assigned to the Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, or to the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, or SWTG, have no appreciation of the training apparatus “behind the waterfall.” They may not be aware of the difficulties of training management or of the day-to-day execution of special-operations courses.

There are many challenges within SWCS that outsiders never see — challenges such as providing manpower, resources and facilities for expanding training in SOF skill sets. This challenge is especially daunting for 2nd Battalion because it is the last priority in SWTG.

The battalion does, however, enjoy two unique benefits. One benefit is that in certain companies, cadre members and students are members of other services, and the variety of their experience and terminology lends a joint nature to the training. Another benefit is the large number of retired SOF soldiers who serve as civilian instructors throughout 2nd Battalion. Their special-operations experience and their teaching experience are invaluable to the success of 2nd Battalion’s training.

Training modifications

Over the past two years, 2nd Battalion has modified its courses, equipment and instruction in order to remain relevant for its customers — U.S. special-operations forces. The battalion has made great strides in opening communications with the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, and the rest of the SOF community in order to validate current instruction or to make changes based on customer feedback. In
making those changes, the battalion works closely with various elements of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

Using feedback from operational units and from instructors who have just come from operational units, 2nd Battalion follows the innovate, change and execute process, or ICE. ICE is constant, dynamic and cyclic, and it applies to every course taught by 2nd Battalion. Examples of innovation are the recent changes to the program of instruction in the Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis, Exploitation Techniques Course, the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course, the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course, the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course, the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course and the Combat Diver Qualification Course, or CDQC. Other examples include instructor assistance for CDQC pre-scuba; the integration of computers into the Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course, or ASOTC; cadre adjustments for larger class sizes in the Military Free-Fall Parachutist Course, CDQC, ASOTC and the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course; and the creation of the Military Free-Fall Challenge Course for Special Forces.

In some cases, the changes have been more drastic, affecting methods of instruction, course content or the courses themselves. Examples of those changes are the development of the Special Operations Terminal Attack Control Course (in conjunction with the U.S. Marine Corps) and the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course; the plans for doubling the number of student slots in ASOT before fiscal year 2005; the
development of the Advanced Regional Studies Course; the change in the automatic-opening device used in SWCS military free-fall operations courses; and the planning and development of the Special Operations Uninhabited Platform Training Course, a future course designed to institutionalize tactical training in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

All 17 of the battalion's courses have been modified to some degree to give students every opportunity to grasp the concepts being taught, to be successful in the course and to return to their unit ready to find, fix or destroy the threat.

Instructor cadre

Soldiers should take advantage of any opportunity to serve as instructors in SWTG. It is a rewarding experience that will broaden exponentially Soldiers' horizons and their understanding of training and training management. It will also give them a chance to serve among the ranks of the top-shelf military and civilian instructors at SWTG. The 2nd Battalion's instructors, whether military or civilian, are all professionals. They are teachers who have a deep desire to improve the force. They define success not as weeding students out but as helping them to understand the instruction, to learn to execute the tasks at hand and to pass the course.

Despite the instructors' desire to see students succeed, there is attrition in 2nd Battalion's courses. The battalion's instructors, as all instructors in SWTG, do not lower or compromise standards in any course. The cadre drops students who commit safety violations or fail to follow procedures. Some students withdraw or fail because they lack proper pre-training and preparation, or because they have extreme difficulty learning or lack a sufficient desire to train.

But despite their adherence to high standards, the battalion's instructors have reduced attrition in all courses over the past 18 months. As a result, the 2nd Battalion is producing more graduates of SF advanced-skills training than ever before, giving commanders more options for mission accomplishment and making the force more lethal and more undetectable. ✯✯

Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Mulholland is the commander of 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous assignments include infantry platoon leader, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division; platoon leader and executive officer, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; detachment commander and assistant group S3, 7th SF Group; exchange officer and Lancero instructor, Tolemaida, Colombia; company commander, battalion S3 and group S3, 7th SF Group; chief of current operations, Special Programs Branch, Special Actions Division, U.S. Special Operations Command; and commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He holds a bachelor's degree in biology from Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., and a master's degree in national security and strategy from the Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
Working in a variety of environments, Special Forces Soldiers must be able to employ advanced special-operations techniques, and they must be as comfortable working with computers and digital imagery as with maps, pencils and paper. Providing training to ensure that flexibility is the job of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Company A conducts four courses; the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course, or SFWOBC; the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or SFWOAC; the Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course, or ASOTC; and the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course, or SFISC.

SFWOBC

The SFWOBC provides newly appointed SF warrant officers with entry-level training in Military Occupational Specialty, or MOS, 180A prior to their first assignment as assistant SF detachment commanders within one of the SF groups. SF warrant officers are the only combat-arms warrant officers who lead soldiers in direct ground combat. They have proven themselves in combat and in other operations in Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and in the many other places where SF has operated.

The 19-week SFWOBC is taught twice a year and has a class capacity of 24 students. The course awards a military educational level 7, or MEL 7. SFWOBC training modules include general subjects; regional studies; training management; force protection; advanced special-operations techniques; SF doctrine, organization and operations; and personnel recovery. Students learn to conduct research, to improve their writing skills, and to design and conduct military briefings. Warrant-officer candidates who haven’t already attended the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, or SERE,
Level III Course will also attend SERE training. Each class also makes a week-long visit to Washington, D.C., where students receive capabilities briefings at the Central Intelligence Agency, at the Defense Intelligence Agency and at the Pentagon.

**SFWOAC**

The SFWOAC is a nine-week course that is conducted twice a year and has a capacity of 20 students. Senior warrant officers receive training in the history of unconventional warfare; in joint, strategic and crisis-action planning; in antiterrorism; in force protection; and in personnel recovery. The course objective is to prepare SF warrant officers to perform their duties at a forward operating base, as members of a joint special-operations task force, or as members of the staff of a theater special-operations command.

**ASOTC**

The ASOTC is a 13-week course that is conducted six times each year. “Advanced special-operations techniques” is a general description of the techniques, tactics and procedures covered in the course. For specific information on the type of operations that ASOTC teaches, refer to FM 3-05.220, (S) *Special Forces Advanced Special Operations Techniques* (U). The FM will assist units in preparing individuals, their equipment and their orders for course attendance.

ASOTC is taught at Fort Bragg, but in September 2004, a detachment from Company A will begin teaching the course at Fort Lewis, Wash., with classes running concurrently with those at Fort Bragg. The ASOT (West) Detachment, already permanently assigned to Fort Lewis, will also provide information necessary to assist units of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, and selected Navy special-warfare units in preparing their personnel to attend ASOTC. Detachment members will also serve as USASOC subject-matter experts on ASOT, providing assistance to all theater special-operations commands seeking to employ their staffs in planning and preparing ASOT support for their operations.

**SFISC**

The SFISC, established at the Special Warfare Center and School in 2003, trains selected SF NCOs in the intelligence functions that are necessary for supporting SF missions across the operational continuum. The SFISC detachment conducts the 13-week course three times a year. SFISC

*The SF Intelligence Sergeant Course teaches students traditional and state-of-the-art techniques in intelligence-gathering.*

U.S. Army photo
graduates are awarded MOS 18F (SF intelligence sergeant) and are qualified to fill positions ranging from the SF-detachment level to the unified-command level. In addition to training students in the traditional skills of SF intelligence sergeants, SFISC trains them in the latest techniques of intelligence-gathering and analysis, and it acquaints them with recent advances in the technology of geospatial information systems. The result is the creation of an SF intelligence sergeant who is prepared to leverage technology and his analytical skills in order to achieve information dominance by establishing a holistic, network-centric perspective of warfare in any operational environment.

Conclusion

Recent reports from the field reveal that Company A’s advanced-skills training has contributed significantly to battlefield successes in the global war on terrorism. Today, more than ever, the skills that SF Soldiers learn in Company A’s courses are in high demand. Company A’s cadre faces the challenge of keeping pace with that demand, keeping abreast of rapidly-changing technology, and maintaining time-honored traditional SF advanced skills. To meet the challenge, the cadre constantly examines the threat environment and operational demands in order to develop tactics, techniques and procedures that will integrate emerging technologies with the traditional SF warrior ethos, allowing SF Soldiers to fight and win in the network-centric environment of the 21st century.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bruce R. Watts is the commander of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Prior to his current assignment, CWO 4 Watts spent 21 years in the 5th SF Group, serving in a variety of duty positions that included SF engineer sergeant, SF intelligence sergeant and assistant SF-detachment commander. From 1990 to 1995, he was commander of SF Detachment 546, which saw service during the Gulf War and in Somalia. During his most recent assignment, CWO 4 Watts was a member of Forward Operating Base 51, participating in the planning and execution of operations in western Iraq. CWO 4 Watts holds a bachelor of science degree in public management from Austin Peay State University, Clarksville, Tenn.
When missions call for Special Forces Soldiers to perform air infiltration or to coordinate close air support for ground operations, Soldiers rely on the advanced-skills training provided by Company B, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Company B trains four advanced-skills courses: the Military Free-fall Parachutists Course, or MFFPC; the Military Free-fall Jumpmaster Course, or MFFJMC; the Advanced Military Free-fall Parachutists Course, or AMFFPC; and the Special Operations Terminal Attack Control Course, or SOTACC. Since the summer of 1995, Company B has been based at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz. Yuma Proving Ground’s consistently favorable weather, nearly unlimited air space and abundant ranges make it an excellent training location that allows consistent and efficient year-round training.

**MFFPC**

The MFFPC is a 20-day course that qualifies members of special-operations forces to conduct night combat-equipment, oxygen-assisted parachute infiltrations from high altitudes — generally 12,500 feet above ground level and higher. The course is taught 10 times per year. Training begins at Fort Bragg, N.C., where students learn body stabilization in a free-fall simulator. During their five days of training at Fort Bragg, students “fly” for 42 minutes in the vertical wind tunnel — 14 flights of three minutes each. Each of their wind-tunnel flights is digitally recorded and later reviewed by the student and an instructor. On the sixth day, the students and cadre travel to Yuma, where they conduct 28 free-fall jumps, using the MC-4 RAM-air parachute system, during the next 14 days of training.

Generally, the first five days of MFFPC training at Yuma are one-on-one training with an instructor, including the students’ jumps with combat equipment and oxygen. The next five days focus on the collective skills of grouping, ending with two high-altitude, high-opening, or HAHO, jumps. The second of these HAHO jumps is conducted from 17,500 feet above ground level and requires students to use oxygen and carry combat equipment. The last four days of training are conducted at night, and training concludes with two night, combat-equipment, oxygen jumps.

Recent changes to MFFPC training include the addition of the two HAHO
jumps. Equipment changes include the replacement of the AR2 automatic parachute-opening device with a military version of an electronic automatic-activation device equipped with closing loop cutters. Another equipment change is the replacement of the improved equipment-attachment sling (known as the spider harness) with the Parachutists Drop Bag.

**MFFJMC**

The MFFJMC is a 17-day course that trains students to conduct safe, standardized military free-fall operations. Taught 10 times per year, the course is open to officers, warrant officers, NCOs and enlisted members of all the services, as well as to selected students of allied countries.

The bedrock of the MFFJMC training plan consists of jumpmaster personnel inspections, oxygen operations, calculation of the high-altitude release point, and jumpmaster actions in the aircraft. Historically, the attrition rate of MFFJMC has been high, but new technology, training aids and the dedication of the instructor cadre have increased the student success rate to nearly 90 percent. Taking into account lessons learned from recent operations, military free-fall infiltration planning has been added to the portion of training that covers jumpmaster duties and responsibilities. The goal of the addition is to provide students with a framework for considering all aspects of military free-fall infiltration, from pre-mission isolation through consolidation on the drop zone.

**AMFFPC**

The AMFFPC is a 40-day course taught four times per year to selected personnel assigned to special-operations units and to the Department of Defense. AMFFPC focuses on producing advanced military free-fall trainers for the force while creating a pool of future military free-fall instructors. During the course, students make an average of 140 jumps...
as they are being taught multiple in-air skills and evaluated on their performance. Like MFFPC, AMFFPC begins at Fort Bragg, with five days of training in the vertical wind tunnel, where each student receives nearly five hours of individual training. The remainder of the course is taught at Yuma Proving Ground. The final tests in AMFFPC focus on observing and critiquing individuals and groups as they conduct military free-fall operations.

**SOTACC**

Lessons learned during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the value of close air support to SF operations, and SOTACC is the newest course taught by Company B's cadre. The 19-day course, a joint effort by the Army and the Marine Corps, aims at producing fully certified joint tactical attack controllers.

SOTACC uses state-of-the-art computer simulations and live aircraft controls in training. The simulations replicate the various types of call-for-fire missions (mortars and artillery) and tactical attack controls of all common aircraft.

Prior to controlling live bombing runs, students receive prerequisite training and a comprehensive written test. During the last week of training, students move out onto Yuma Proving Ground's vast range facility, where they will control at least 12 live bombing runs by fixed-wing fighter aircraft. SOTACC also employs the most recent battle-tested lasers and other equipment used for terminal guidance of aircraft. In the near future, the cadre plans to expand the SOTACC lesson plan to include the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in call-for-fire operations.

Major Buck Dellinger is the commander of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. His previous assignments in Infantry and Special Forces units include service with the 82nd Airborne Division, the Joint Special Operations Command, the 10th SF Group and the U.S. Military Academy. Commissioned in 1988 from the U.S. Military Academy, Major Dellinger holds a master's degree in international relations from Rutgers University. He is scheduled to assume duties as the 1st Special Warfare Training Group S3 during the summer of 2004.
The SF Underwater Operations School:
Co. C, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG

by Major David K. Hsu

In 1964, the Army began sending Special Forces A-detachments to Key West, Fla., on temporary duty to train selected special-operations forces in the infiltration skill of combat diving. Today, that training, marking its 40th anniversary, continues through the permanent cadre of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

During the late 1960s a permanent cadre was assigned to Key West to form the SF Underwater Operations School. Since the school’s creation, the majority of the instructors have been Soldiers from SF, but over the years, the instructor population has grown to include Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, Navy deep-sea divers, Air Force combat-control technicians and Air Force pararescuemen. The joint cadre brings a broad spectrum of expertise and experience to the training of future combat divers.

The cornerstone of the training at the Underwater Operations School is clandestine underwater infiltration using rebreather technology. Through the years, the rebreather equipment used at the school has changed from the Emerson rig to the CCR-1000 to today’s Draeger LAR V.

Despite changes in the cadre makeup, the replacement of antiquated equipment with new technology and the replacement of old training events with new ones, the mission of the school remains unchanged: to train special-operations forces to be competent, safe and tactically proficient combat divers.

Company C conducts three courses: the Combat Diver Qualification Course, or CDQC; the Combat Diver Supervisor Course, or CDSC; and the Dive Medical Technician Course, or DMTC.

CDQC

CDQC is a 24-day course, taught five times per year, that qualifies members of special-operations forces as combat divers. Instructors train students on two underwater breathing apparatuses: open-circuit scuba and closed-circuit rebreathers. The focus of CDQC is subsurface infiltration, and the course emphasizes underwater navigation. Students complete navigation dives ranging from 500 meters to 2,000 meters. Throughout
the course, students swim distances of more than 30 kilometers.

Open-circuit training involves navigation, search dives, a 130-foot deep dive, submarine operations and a 50-foot free-swimming ascent. Closed-circuit training involves underwater individual and team navigation, as well as procedures for establishing a beach-landing-site.

CDQC also includes a rigorous academic component. Students receive more than seven hours of instruction on dive physiology and dive physics, four hours of instruction on U.S. Navy dive tables, two hours of instruction covering dive injuries, and two hours of instruction on tides, waves and currents.

In October 2004, CDQC will add the following critical tasks:

- Nautical navigation and charts.
- Small-boat operations (combat rubber raiding craft and kayaks).
- Maritime air-operations classes (rotary-wing personnel casting and personnel recovery, and infiltration of boats by air).

In the past, Company C trained these waterborne-infiltration skills during the six-week Combat Waterborne Infiltration Course, or CWIC. When CWIC was cancelled, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School distributed those basic critical tasks to the pre-CDQC and the CDQC. The graduate of CDQC will also receive training in selected advanced CWIC critical tasks after he returns to his home station.

Recently, SF soldiers have attended CDQC in record numbers. More 18-series Soldiers have graduated from the past two iterations of CDQC than previously graduated during an average year — enough to fill more than four SF dive detachments.

**CDSC**

CDSC, three weeks long, runs concurrently with the DMTC. Both courses are conducted two times per year. In order to be selected to attend CDSC, applicants must have served on dive status for at least one year. CDSC graduates are qualified to plan and supervise military combat-diving operations. The dive supervisor is to the combat diver as the jumpmaster is to the parachutist. Thus, the dive-supervisor personnel inspection, dive planning and emergency procedures form the bedrock of this intense course.

Training also includes nautical navigation, inspection of closed-circuit rigs, and operation of the hyperbaric chamber. During the final mission of CDSC, the emergency-procedures situational training exercise, students work closely with students of the DMTC in retrieving, assessing, transporting and treating injured divers.

**DMTC**

The DMTC is three weeks in length. Applicants for the course are not required to be dive-qualified, but they must be members of military occupational specialty 18D (SF medical sergeant) or members of MOS 91W (medical specialist) who are also graduates of the Special Operations Combat Medical Course. DMTC covers the prevention, assessment and treatment of dive injuries. A dive medical officer, SF medics and Air Force pararescuemen provide instruction on subjects including neurological exams, decompression, anatomy and physiology of the neurological and cardiopulmonary system, dive pharmacology, decompression sickness, diving diseases and inva-
sive procedures. Students also conduct a chamber dive of 165 feet while treating a patient.

**Future**

The future of combat diving is one of expansion, in personnel as well as in technology. Fiscal year 2004 has already witnessed the addition of a second dive detachment to each SF battalion, which doubled the requirement for SF personnel who are qualified as combat divers. In addition, the Air Force, which has long sent students to the CDQC, projects a greater than 90-percent increase in the number of Air Force students who will attend CDQC over the next two years. Although the number of students will dramatically increase in the coming years, the objectives of the school will not change, and the cadre will ensure that the quality of training will not decline.

Recent technological breakthroughs promise dramatic improvements in underwater safety, underwater navigation, underwater mobility and underwater communications. As the subject-matter experts in combat diving, the cadre members of Company C are taking part in identifying future technologies that will aid underwater infiltration. Cadre members are studying the capabilities of underwater global positioning systems, diver-propulsion vehicles, and diver-to-diver and diver-to-ship communications systems.

Underwater infiltration remains a critical capability for Army special-operations forces. In its 40th year of operations, the Underwater Operations School remains dedicated to providing professional instruction and to training competent, safe and tactically proficient special-operations divers.

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Major David K. Hsu is the commander of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG, which conducts the SF Underwater Operations School at Key West, Fla. Commissioned in the Infantry Branch upon his graduation from Boston University, he served as a Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle platoon leader and staff officer in the 3rd Infantry Division in Schweinfurt, Germany. Since his graduation from the SF Qualification Course in 1995, Major Hsu has served as detachment commander for A-detachments 125 and 126 in the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group. He holds a master’s degree in defense analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.
Some of the most directly beneficial and relevant training for Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, who are successfully prosecuting the global war on terrorism, or GWOT, is taught by Company D, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Company D trains Soldiers in the United States Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, in advanced skills and serves as USASOC’s subject-matter expertise base for close-quarters battle, or CQB; breaching operations of a commander’s in-extremis force, or CIF; and the tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs, of special-operations sniper and antiterrorism operations.

To accomplish its training mission, Company D is organized into a headquarters detachment and three training units: the Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis, Exploitation Techniques Course, or SFARTAETC, Committee; the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course, or SOTIC, Committee; and the Antiterrorism Detachment, or ATD.

Although the courses conducted by Company D provide training critical to successful prosecution of the GWOT, the customer base for each course varies in accordance with classified and unclassified training-mission guidance and directives, as well as with command priorities. SFARTAETC is a non-solicitation course, taught exclusively to 18-series Soldiers who are assigned to or on orders to an SF CIF. SOTIC exclusively trains Soldiers assigned to SF, Ranger or other ARSOF units.

ATD conducts three antiterrorism courses: the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course, or INTAC; the Antiterrorism Instructor Qualification Course, or AIQC; and the United Nations Peacekeeping Observers Course, or UNPKO. All three are Department of Defense-directed training courses available to service personnel who are on orders to high-threat locations outside the continental United States.

Although many members of ARSOF are aware of the existence of the courses listed above, many are not aware of the courses’ scope or intent, or of the numerous changes that have recently occurred in the training. That lack of awareness has created a number of misconceptions, outdated perspectives and inaccuracies regarding Company D’s training courses.

During the past two years, Company D has expanded the scope of its training considerably, from being responsible for conducting four 48-man SFARTAETC iterations and five 24-man SOTIC iterations each year to absorbing the ATD and its courses, increasing SFARTAETC to 68-man classes, planning and resourcing the expansion of SOTIC to 10 32-man classes per year, and standing up the Special Operations Terminal Attack Control Course (later transferred to the 2nd Battalion’s Company B).
The resourcing and manpower changes necessary to support this training growth, although they were a substantial challenge, were essential for meeting the needs of the force. To date, Company D has accomplished many of the increases and has done the planning necessary for the others, all the while maintaining the high-quality training for which Company D is known.

SFARTAETC

SFARTAETC, taught four times per year, is an eight-week course that focuses on providing quality training in advanced marksmanship and CQB assault. Because SFARTAETC provides specialized and comprehensive instruction and training in the TTPs needed by CIFs, it is the prerequisite qualification course for assignment to CIFs.

During the eight weeks, students receive two weeks of advanced combat marksmanship followed by six weeks of training in CQB. The marksmanship training involves high-risk, live-fire drills that emphasize the employment of pistols and carbines and focus on the precise application of discriminate fire. The CQB portion includes training in combatives; rappelling; specialized target assaults; and breaching by explosive, mechanical and ballistic means.

In September 2002, USASOC directed the JFK Special Warfare Center and School to expand the size of SFARTAETC classes from 48 students to 68 students in order to better meet operational-force requirements. Iterations of the 68-man classes began in January 2003, but because of instructor vacancies created by operational contingencies, SWCS temporarily curtailed the increase in class size until the instructor shortage could be alleviated. As of March 2004, the SFARTAETC committee is once again conducting 68-man classes.

Another significant change in SFARTAETC during the last year has been the improvement in the student graduation rate. Based on input from the operational force and suggestions from instructors, Company D made substantial refinements to the execution of the SFARTAETC program of instruction. During the last five courses, the graduation rate has been greater than 80 percent. This represents a significant increase from the course's historic graduation rate of 66 percent. The com-
mittee has increased the graduation rate while maintaining high-quality training and adhering to validated standards. The success of SFAR\-TAETC graduates when their units are deployed on operational missions continues to validate SFAR\-TAETC’s training methods and content.

**SOTIC**

The six-week SOTIC is taught five times per year. SOTIC trains selected personnel in the technical skills and operational procedures necessary for delivering precision rifle fire from concealed positions (sniping) in support of ARSOF missions. SOTIC is the only Level-1 sniper-qualification course for ARSOF soldiers, and it is the best course in DoD for learning the art and skill of accurate, discriminate, long-range sniper engagement.

SOTIC students focus the majority of their time training on the essentials of long-range, precision shooting. In the process, they become intimately familiar with their assigned weapon and with foreign and nonstandard sniper weapons systems. SOTIC provides students with the solid foundation of skills essential for them to form effective sniper-observer teams.

During the course, students are trained in distance determination; precision engagement (static targets out to 800 meters, snap targets out to 400 meters and moving targets out to 300 meters); multiple target engagement; stalking; camouflage and concealment; observation techniques; reporting techniques; and hide-site construction. SOTIC begins training with iron-sight, known-distance marksmanship (advanced rifle marksmanship). The course soon transitions to known-distance marksmanship using optics (sniper marksmanship), and further evolves to unknown-distance sniper marksmanship (field fire). SOTIC culminates in a comprehensive field-training exercise that tests the students’ capabilities for infiltration; movement; fieldcraft; distance-judging; observation; target-surveillance and -reporting; and sniper engagement.

As with SFAR\-TAETC, in September 2002, USASOC directed SWCS to expand the SOTIC student output. That expansion — from 120 to 320 students per year — would mean increasing the size of each course iteration from 24 to 32 students and increasing the number of annual iterations from five to 10. Unfortunately, the lack of an adequate number of existing range facilities and the scarcity of land suitable for the construction of new ranges at Fort Bragg has stalled SOTIC expansion efforts.

In May 2003, SOTIC underwent a critical task skills board, or CTSB, through which the operational force identified additional training requirements. Despite the constraints on facilities, the SOTIC committee has implemented changes to...
address some of the needs identified during the CTSB: training on day and night digital and video systems; better limited-visibility shooting exercises; and more complex urban-sniping scenarios.

SOTIC is also in the midst of integrating the newly fielded universal night sight, the .50-caliber Barrett sniper system, and the SR-25 sniper system. In concert with those changes, the committee has updated the SOTIC program of instruction to incorporate the new equipment and to support the mandated 320-man annual output once the required range facilities have been approved and constructed.

ATD

ATD executes the only DoD-directed training in the SWCS 1st Special Warfare Training Group. The combined course student load for INTAC, AIQC and UNPKO is 650 per year, and the student population ranges from sergeants to general officers.

INTAC is a five-day antiterrorism course, with a class load of 20 students, taught 24 times per year. INTAC is intended for DoD personnel (and their adult dependents) who are scheduled for assignment to high-threat locations outside the continental U.S. INTAC provides classroom training on antiterrorism TTPs, as well as practical exercises on surveillance-detection, survival shooting and evasive-driving procedures. The course is recognized as the premier AT course in DoD by the J-34, Joint Staff.

AIQC is a two-week qualification course for antiterrorism instructors. Taught eight times per year with a class load of 16 students, AIQC is open to DoD officers and NCOs who will be assigned as antiterrorism officers, or ATOs. AIQC provides potential ATOs the Level-1 AT training information and the instruction skills they will need for conducting unit-level AT training.

Recent analysis of the AIQC by J-34 personnel resulted in the expansion of the course’s program of instruction from the original Level 1 AT curriculum to a Level 2 AT curriculum. The course change has resulted in the inclusion of a force-protection module that includes practical exercises in threat-vulnerability assessment and in surveillance-detection.

UNPKO is a 10-day course coordinated with the State Department and DoD. UNPKO provides military officers and NCOs on assignment to U.N. missions the AT training they will need in order to work and survive in high-threat locations outside the U.S. After five days of training that are identical to INTAC, UNPKO provides additional instruction on off-road vehicle dynamics, mine-awareness and first-aid skills. Students also receive classified briefings pertinent to the U.N. mission to which they will be assigned. The course is taught twice per year, in June and in December, and has a student load of 20 to 45 per class.

The logic of having SF warriors — experienced in working, living and surviving in high-threat regions — instructing others who will be assigned in small numbers to high-threat locations outside the U.S. is indisputable. The ATD instructors are world-class, and the constantly increasing demand for the three AT courses validates the quality and relevance of the training the detachment provides.

Facilities

In support of its courses, Company D uses many facilities in and around the Fort Bragg installation. The Miller Training Complex is the hub for all the company’s training, consolidating the classroom instruction and support components. Fort Bragg’s Range 37, Range 66E and Range 30, as well as the ATD driving track, serve as
the primary ranges for Company D's range work and practical exercises.

The SFARTAETC Committee also uses Fort Bragg facilities for military operations on urban terrain, or MOUT, and other selected target areas on and off the military installation. The SOTIC Committee uses several additional ranges on Fort Bragg for training in distance fire and field fire, uses drop zones and training areas for stalking and observation exercises, and uses the Fort Bragg MOUT facilities for training in urban sniping techniques. The ATD uses various facilities in and around Fort Bragg for its surveillance-detection training and for practical exercises in threat-vulnerability assessment. For all three of Company D's subelements, the use of numerous facilities creates flexibility, enables continued training execution despite operational priorities, and provides increased training realism by mitigating the tendency to execute “canned,” unrealistic scenarios.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Company D conducts a number of high-risk, realistic and relevant training courses. The focus of all Company D's courses is the live-fire or practical application of each course's skill sets. That focus on practicality makes the training valuable, effective and relevant to current operations. In the ongoing GWOT, the training provided by Company D is validated every day. The instructors who man the organization, epitomizing the quiet professional, maintain their focus on imparting advanced-skills training that is essential for operational forces to be successful on the battlefield.

Major Shannon Boehm is the commander of Company D, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. His previous SF assignments include detachment commander and company executive officer, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group. He was commissioned through the U.S. Military Academy.
On July 9, 1984, one month after the first class of 24 Special Forces warrant officers graduated from the SF Warrant Officer Technical Certification Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center, the Army created the SF Warrant Officer Branch. The SF warrant officers were brought into the force to provide the SF detachment with tactical and technical expertise based on their in-depth knowledge and experience of SF operations.

On July 9, 2004, the 20th anniversary of the SF Warrant Officer Branch and the 86th anniversary of the Army Warrant Officer Corps, SF warrant officers will become part of the SF Officer Branch. Their change of status will be acknowledged by the changing of their collar branch insignia from the warrant-officer eagle, worn by all Army warrant officers since May 1921, to the crossed arrows, worn by SF officers since June 1987.

When the Army created the SF Warrant Officer Branch, Military Occupational Specialty 180A, SF warrants were designated as SF technicians, in keeping with the Army tradition of warrants serving as technical experts and advisers to commanders. But from the beginning, SF warrant officers were different from other warrant officers. SF warrant officers are language-qualified; regionally oriented and regionally experienced. They are trained in mission-planning; staff organization; combined tactics; advanced special-operations techniques; and survival, evasion, resistance and escape. While they have fulfilled the role of technician, the SF warrant officers have also had the additional requirement of commanding at the SF-detachment level, and they are designated as combat commanders. That requirement has led to SF warrant officers' re-designation as assistant detachment commanders—a change that recognizes their unique capabilities and leadership responsibilities.

Today SF warrant officers serve with pride and distinction throughout the special-operations community: on SF detachments, at the SF group level, in the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, in the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and in theater special-operations commands. Sought for their experience and maturity, SF warrant officers also serve on various joint special-operations task forces actively involved in the global war on terrorism.

The SF warrant officer has become an essential member of the modern special-operations force.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is planning a ceremony to commemorate the 20th anniversary of SF warrant officers and the changing of their branch. Details on the ceremony will be released through command channels and via e-mail as soon as the planning is complete.

Chief Warrant Officer 5 William A. McPherson is the chief warrant officer of the SF Branch and the warrant officer proponent manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Mr. McPherson, formerly assigned to the 10th SF Group, has more than 30 years of service in the Army.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Douglas Jenkins is chief of the Collective Training Branch, Special Forces Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, SWCS. Mr. Jenkins has served more than 21 years in SF, and his assignments have included service in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 1st SF Group and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 7th SF Group.

May 2004
The Cody Conference: Discussing the War on Terrorism and the Future of SF

by Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert

On Jan. 15 and 16, 2004, an eclectic group of thinkers assembled in Cody, Wyo., to identify concepts that will be necessary for shaping the future of United States Army Special Forces.

Hosted by the commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, the group consisted of participants from academia, industry, the media, the military and the public-service sector. Cody was selected not only for its central location but also because its accommodating, relaxed atmosphere might foster uninhibited intellectual debate.

Addressing a range of issues pertaining to the war on terrorism, the conference focused principally on the role of Special Forces. It began with an attempt to define terrorists’ operational and behavioral characteristics, followed by a debate on appropriate responses to the terrorist threat. The participants then discussed contributions made by Special Forces, as well as courses of action that might be pursued by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School in preparing special-operations forces to meet the changing threat of terrorism.

This article is an attempt to capture the fruits of the Cody Conference’s debate and discussion. It is not a critical essay on terrorism or a definitive solution for the problems associated with the global war on terrorism. Instead, it presents a map for further exploration and development by collecting the ideas, opinions and suggestions of a group of gifted, informed and committed American citizens.

Terrorist characteristics

The terrorists the world faces today are masters of deception and denial. The terrorist threat is global, regional and local. Terrorists are spread out in classic cellular structures and use centralized guidance and decentralized planning and execution. They are astute at indirect warfare, propaganda, training, recruitment, dispersion, operational security, fieldcraft skills that prevent the detection of their cellular structures, and logistics. Many terrorist organizations are well-funded, and they make extensive use of multilayered fronts. Terrorists are skilled in the use of auxiliaries and support networks, both humanitarian and paramilitary, including auxiliaries that provide security and support in proximity to key cells. The Internet provides disparate terrorist groups a ready-made medium for collaborating, exchanging ideas and sharing lessons learned.

Terrorists operate in failed states, in ungoverned or uncontrolled areas, and in the seams and cracks where nation-states are lax or ineffective. Terrorists seek support — including technology, funding, logistics support, recruits, transnational mobility and media access — from a wide base of sponsors, although nation-state sponsor-
ship appears to be decreasing.

Ideology is key to terrorists’ success. Islam is the source of legitimacy for radical Islamists. Radical Islamist terrorism has significant informational advantages to exploit: U.S. support for Israel and the U.S.’s insatiable need for oil are successful terrorist propaganda themes that the U.S. has yet to counter effectively. Ideologies can be defeated (as was Marxism); however, defeating ideology requires long-term planning and persistent efforts over time.

For the radical Islamist terrorist, the strategic goals may be to spread his ideology and to attain a Middle East that is free of Western influence. Recent pronouncements by al-Qaeda and other groups, coupled with tactical target selection that is based on achieving the maximum psychological effect (such as the March 11, 2004, attacks in Spain), seem to support those strategic goals. However, the terrorists’ intent may also be to make a long-term effort to destroy strategic economic targets such as the Panama or Suez canals, thereby isolating the U.S., eroding the will of its coalition partners, and escalating costs of imported goods in the U.S. to intolerable levels.

As al-Qaeda has demonstrated, terrorist organizations adjust rapidly to take advantage of any opportunity. In Iraq, the call to arms to fight the “crusaders” is an example of agile armed propaganda. It exploits opportunities of killing Americans for propaganda value while it supports the strategic goal of eroding American will over time.

Tribes historically have believed in their respective goals, yet tribes have changed over time. The Internet has created new tribes — those connected globally and horizontally by common interests. Analyzing and engaging the threat in the context of the Internet will have merit as linkages develop, as support groups mutate, and as “delinked” supporting tribes emerge.

While the U.S. is constrained by rules left over from the Cold War and the post-Vietnam era, the terrorist threat is unfet-
tered. To win the global war on terrorism, we may need to wage unconstrained warfare, but we need to envision a return to normal constraints after the victory. The U.S. has forced the terrorist leadership further into the shadows and has shattered at least two-thirds of terrorists’ leadership and organization. Yet terrorists continue to co-opt other groups, winning support in Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Iraq and other locations. Although al-Qaeda has been rocked by the worldwide efforts of the U.S. and its allies, the group retains its agility and can still strike when and where it desires.

What must be done

We must gain and maintain the initiative. We must decapitate terrorist organizations by killing or capturing their leaders. We must deter, punish or destroy sponsors; harass, attack and eliminate nonstate sponsors; and use courts, economic sanctions or other means as necessary.

We must penetrate enemy organizations with human intelligence, or HUMINT. This difficult task may fall to surrogate intelligence personnel or to intelligence assets of other nations. We have to create a global environment of seamless information- and intelligence-sharing; improve coalition, allied and surrogate intelligence and operational capabilities; and advance our capabilities of intercepting low-level signal intelligence. It is imperative that we conduct deception operations to throw the enemy off balance. Conduct of area-denial, area-control and remote-area operations, either directly or with partners, is critical, as are integrated computer attack and defense capabilities. It is essential that we develop and execute plans for disrupting terrorist recruiting and flatten the enemy’s execution structure. We must re-energize military-to-military relationships with our
allies to assist in building a global consensus against terror.

We must begin, develop and support an Islamic renaissance. The U.S. and U.N. should export ideas, and they should rebuild, fund and support modern universities overseas. The best and brightest of the Middle East, both civilian and military, should be educated in the U.S., and there should be an increase in student exchanges. Scholarships for U.S. language students overseas should be coupled with the development of cultural, academic and business exchange centers. Economic aid should include funding for publishers to translate more books into Arabic and other appropriate languages. Economic-assistance programs that would encourage, train and fund Muslim countries to alter living conditions and create better opportunities could also be beneficial.

The U.S. should adopt a broader definition of “just governance.” Promoting safe and secure operations of nongovernment organizations, and expressing universal values (not only U.S.-based “freedom and democracy”) could have merit as a means of moving neutral audiences away from terror. By winning the support of uncommitted Muslims around the world, the U.S. could deprive al-Qaeda and other organizations of potential allies and recruits.

What can be done better

We should separate the metrics of the global war on terrorism from those of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operation Iraqi Freedom is a regional combat activity with implications for the global war on terrorism. Global measures of effectiveness need to be carefully articulated, and we need to grasp the international ramifications of information.

The image of self-policing Muslim governments is priceless. Why didn’t Muslim police capture Saddam Hussein? Why did Americans announce his capture? Why was the “we” who captured him not the populace whose members he had murdered by the hundreds of thousands?

Global perceptions and cooperation do matter. In the long term, it will be other nations’ intelligence, and possibly their policing actions, that will win the global war on terrorism. We need to define our enemies as narrowly as possible and our allies as broadly as possible. Cold War definitions of our enemies — even pre-9/11 definitions — no longer apply.

We must develop strategic themes and strategic information campaigns, then streamline our information operations and delegate the approval authority for information products down to the lowest levels — the country teams and military units. Bringing public diplomacy fully into the mix of informational tools will help.

Decapitating terrorist organizations will work well in the near-term, but over time, new leaders will arise if we do not examine and address the root causes of terrorism. Not all unemployed, underemployed or restless youth in many societies, including Muslim societies, are willing to commit suicide or to join radical, murdering clans. We should develop campaigns that synchronize and balance U.S. objectives against those of emerging indigenous leaders or factions that are attempting to recruit. If we are to be successful in disrupting terrorist recruiting, our examination needs to analyze the mechanics of terrorist recruitment.

Potential SF contributions

Special Forces’ niche is unconventional warfare, which includes counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. Special Forces should be chartered to monitor and combat insurgencies, even though other U.S. forces will move on to new priorities.

To effectively combat nagging insurgency problems and to conduct sustained guerrilla warfare, the U.S. needs to develop a standing, deployable Special Forces headquarters. The headquarters would have to be capable of conducting long-term operations in multiple locations.

In order to gain allies against the terrorist threat and to develop the long-term personal relationships needed for information-sharing and teamwork, the Special Forces headquarters would conduct prevention and mitigation operations. Those operations would include advising and training
host-nation military forces or police, intelligence units, counterterrorism forces, border guards and other members of the state security apparatus.

The headquarters could also conduct medical civil-assistance programs, joint/combined exercises and training, mobile training teams, engineer civil-assistance programs, and other projects in high-threat areas in order to improve the situation, to create opportunities and to open doors.

If required, Special Forces could operate in denied areas, assisting insurrections by recruiting guerrillas or other armed entities. The best examples of the success of an indirect approach in the global war on terrorism is the expulsion of the Taliban government by the 5th Special Forces Group and other government agencies and the virtual elimination of the terrorist threat on Basilan Island in the Philippines by the 1st Special Forces Group.

Special Forces must be capable of gathering and exploiting HUMINT. SF must also be educated in the latest techniques for collecting signal intelligence and imagery intelligence and equipped with the latest technology for both. These intelligence skills will allow Special Forces to prepare the battlespace with ground-truth intelligence and information.

Intelligence assets must be on the street — everywhere. Special Forces has the ability to train and assist other nations and government agencies in penetrating enemy organizations. We should develop a capability for tracking and analyzing insurgent movements worldwide for the long term, guaranteeing an indefinite “eye on the problem” regardless of changing national threats. We should publish new doctrine for counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare that captures ongoing field developments and lessons learned.

The worldwide deployment and rotation of Special Forces regional experts provides long-term presence in problematic areas. The Special Forces unit of action will remain the SF Operational Detachment Alpha, which is designed, trained and equipped to operate in remote, isolated areas. This force multiplier conserves conventional military force for the main efforts.

Special Forces can conduct operations to force enemy activity — any action or reaction that can be analyzed. SF operations allow us to expand the intelligence database, to conduct raids where appropriate or to deliver precision fires anywhere in the battlespace. Even down to the individual level, Special Forces Soldiers can be employed as a national asset.

**Actions for transforming SF**

*Invest in people and training.* We must ensure that Special Forces Soldiers remain the best in the world, tuned for independent operations far from logistics support. Our primary goal should be to build regional experts. We should consider seconding officers to foreign armies and allied special forces. We could also recruit selected minorities and native speakers, and employ off-the-street and out-of-college recruiting programs.

We might also explore the use of non-citizen/no-security-clearance detachments or bring women into the force for use in certain special-operations fields. If Special Forces looks the same after the war on terrorism, someone will have failed.

Special Forces must revolutionize its language program. Language and cultural training must be intensified and revolutionized by creating partnerships with leading civilian and military educational institutions. Consideration should be given to immersion education overseas, extended participation by the Defense Language Institute, and other solutions. Promotion for Special Forces officers and enlisted Soldiers should be tied to their language capability and to their completion of improved training in cross-cultural communication and negotiation.

We should develop an out-of-system Soldier track that would allow Special Forces Soldiers who have unique skills and potential to “max out” at a certain pay grade in order to contract out or go outside of service promotion norms to become regional experts or subject-matter experts in other areas, such as weapons of mass destruction.

We must train and develop SF personnel to work in smaller elements that will be employed in urban terrain and in covert or
clandestine environments. To allow Soldiers to learn to fight battles before they begin, it is a necessity that we create enemy-terrain training sites in all theaters. These would provide Soldiers with opportunities for training with the fires and mobility platforms requisite in that theater.

Another component of educational change would be to refocus the Army Special Operations Battle Lab, or ARSOBL, on solving the problems of unconventional operations and counterinsurgency. ARSOBL should be a “skunk works,” a hothouse of creative thinking that generates strategies in its distinctive areas of operations.

Intelligence is now a basic competency of Special Forces. Each Soldier graduating from the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, must have a journeyman’s understanding of intelligence operations, emphasizing HUMINT. Expansion of the Special Forces intelligence curriculum would require developing and implementing an additional Special Forces advanced-skills intelligence course.

Another part of the education realignment would be integrating and sharing instruction and training exercises with other government intelligence organizations. Special Forces should create an interagency exchange program. The interagency training could prepare individuals for challenges yet undefined, and the blending of intelligence and operational capabilities would result in a dynamic and proactive force. The new interagency potential would allow operators to provide a more intellectual response at the tactical level and policy-makers and planners to distinguish between the threat and the environmental context within which the threat is emerging. In addition to interagency training and cooperation, we must develop aggressive coalition-training programs that align with the programs of our potential partners in the global war on terrorism.

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, must develop a world-class special-warfare network that provides Special Forces Soldiers and their surrogates with full-time access to training, resources and lessons learned. SWCS needs to develop a simulations capability that is multinational-compatible and capable of analyzing and comparing unconven-
tional-warfare courses of action. All SWCS instruction must develop and continuously improve students’ skills in information-management and Internet use.

A Special Forces Soldier’s best weapon is between his ears. Special Forces instructional education and training must be physically robust and academically challenging — kinetic as well as nonkinetic. Special Forces must foster adaptive thinking and innovative execution by leveraging advanced behavioral and cognitive concepts with tough, imaginative, practical exercises. Through the unconventional-leader development program, we must develop Soldiers who can transition quickly from kinetic to nonkinetic solutions on the battlefield.

Army Special Forces officers should be awarded branch-qualification credit for fighting on the staffs of joint/combined special-operations task forces or in similar positions in theater special-operations commands. This would be a reversal of the current paradigm: Instead of placing officers in key joint billets after they have attained their Army qualification, we would place them in key joint billets that would provide their Army qualification. Special Forces must also develop career paths for specialties that require skills for planning and coordinating unconventional-warfare operations at the strategic and operational levels.

Enhance battle command/operations. We must build a standing, deployable Special Forces headquarters that is focused on the long-term, shadowy, unconventional fights of surrogate and guerrilla operations, and counterinsurgency. The headquarters would sustain the focus on terrorism after the regional component commands, services and other national resources have shifted to the next threat.

We must build small, rotational Special Forces elements in problematic regions and countries. These elements, immersed in the specific language and culture, would be chartered to establish permanent relationships in the host nation and to maintain potential basing and training sites. Engagement programs will be tailored to force enemy action, to act as a deception, or to build beneficial relationships and establish avenues for information.

Special Forces must make improvements in HUMINT training, skill sets and fieldcraft through a comprehensive focus on the redesign of military occupational specialty-producing courses and advanced-skills courses. We must redesign reachback and information-sharing networking to unconventional-warfare centers of excellence and build a precision-fires school that will be open to joint and interagency audiences. A Special Forces course should also be designed to teach the use of uninhabited vehicles for reconnaissance, fires and deception. We must also imbed joint-fires elements into Special Forces and use all “engagement” tools available for shaping the battlespace, including unconventional-warfare fiscal rules of engagement.

We must develop and continually enhance our capabilities of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR. We must also design and adopt interagency and interservice intelligence systems, and the ISR capability would allow improved interagency training, exchange of information, integration and experimentation.

Develop or procure materiel. Special Forces must make equipping the Soldier its number-one priority. The nature of our operations requires that special-operations forces-specific, compatible, nonlethal weapons be developed or purchased; that fixed-wing, short-take-off-and-landing aviation capability be procured; and that Special Forces mobility platforms be developed that are tailored for each theater of operation.

We must make advancements in the areas of unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles, integrated and persistent ISR technology, and state-of-the-art communications.

Special Forces units should be moved to better locations for long-term training and theater alignment (in conjunction with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closing program).

Modify doctrine. Special Forces must publish new doctrine for interagency operations, counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare and counterguerrilla operations. Special Forces must also expand its use of the military decision-making process to better address course-of-action development in an operational environment that
comprises disparate adversaries. We must develop the tactics, techniques and procedures needed for flushing the enemy out as a component of “finding and fixing.”

Conclusion

The Cody Conference was a valuable tool in focusing the requirements for change and transformation for U.S. Army Special Forces. Transformation does not happen overnight, because Special Forces Soldiers cannot be mass-produced. Nevertheless, Special Forces institutions must work quickly and untiringly so that our Soldiers will be prepared for the ever-changing face of the global war on terrorism. A participant at the conference asked, “How do we train people for a task that does not yet exist?” The answer is that we must educate them to improvise, adapt and overcome on their own … anything, anytime and anywhere. ☼

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert is commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He previously commanded the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, which provided SF units for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines and Colombia in the global war on terrorism. He has been an Infantry and Special Forces officer for more than 30 years, and he has held the additional specialties of foreign area officer and Civil Affairs.

Notes:
1 Participants were:
- Dr. Patrick Geary, professor of medieval history, University of California-Los Angeles.
- Dr. Gordon McCormick, chairman of the Department of Defense Analysis; director of the special-operations degree program at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.
- Marc Prensky, founder, president and chief creative officer of games2train.com and Corporate Gameware LLC.
- Jim Quinlivan, senior analyst for the Rand Corporation.
- Sarah Sewall, project director, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance.
- Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.), former commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.
- Wayne Williams, president of U.S. Comm-Sults Inc.; member of the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce.
- Dr. Leonard Wong, associate research professor of military strategy (human and organizational dimensions), Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
The 18X Program: Ensuring the Future Health of Special Forces

by Command Sergeant Major Michael S. Breasseale

How much better our unit will be if we ever learn that length of service and experience are no test whatsoever of the capacity to lead; and that character fortified by knowledge is the only charm which attracts unequivocal success.

— Major General Eldon Bargewell

The truth is, business as usual will not provide the capabilities we need to deal with the transnational and asymmetric opponents of tomorrow. A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change. ... We must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team. ... As new threats arise we must decide which of our current capabilities to retain or modify, which new ones to develop, and which old ones to discard.

— General Peter J. Schoomaker

Recently a senior leader in the United States Army Special Forces Command asked my opinion of the Special Forces Initial Accessions Program, known as the 18X program. This article is an expression of that opinion. As the command sergeant major of the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, my views and opinions are narrow in scope, and it is difficult for me to comment on the entire SF career field. But based on my knowledge of the three 18X Soldiers who have come into our battalion during the past year, and on my limited exposure to some of the 18X candidates undergoing training during SF assessment and selection, I believe the 18X program is selecting the right Soldiers. The 18Xs assigned to our battalion are some of the finest operators with whom I’ve ever had the privilege of serving.

Twenty-five years ago, the Army made an attempt to recruit SF Soldiers “off the street,” and the experiment caused controversy and negative perceptions that persist today. The 18Xs of 2004 are better Soldiers: They are more mature, their average GT score is 121 and 50 percent have attended college.

The U.S. Army Recruiting Command began recruiting 18X Soldiers in January 2001. Training for 18X Soldiers lasts for two years. A Soldier enlists in the Army as an 18X and attends Infantry one-station unit training and airborne training at Fort Benning, Ga. He then makes a permanent-change-of-station move to Fort Bragg, N.C., to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection. If he is selected for SF, he attends the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, as an SF weapons sergeant or SF engineer sergeant. Following the SFQC, he will attend language training and the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course before being promoted to sergeant. Approximately 150 18Xs are expected to arrive in SF groups during FY 2004, and eventually, SF detachments will average receiving a
new 18X every eight to 12 months.

The quality of the 18X recruits is impressive, and so far, the 18Xs have exceeded all expectations. The success of the 18X program to this point could be due to many factors, but four factors are most critical: the maturity of the operators, the 18Xs’ patriotism, the 18Xs’ commitment to the global war on terrorism, and the Army’s decision to pursue the best interests of the SF force.

**Maturity**

It is primarily the maturity of the 18X that puts him a step above his predecessors from the late 1970s. The 18Xs in the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, are, on average, 26 years old. They are not teenage recruits experiencing life away from home for the first time. They have sown a few wild oats and have made a conscious decision to better themselves and to serve a higher calling than they found in the civilian world.

The 18X is also being assessed, selected and trained by a more capable force that is drawing on experiences from Grenada, El Salvador, Panama, Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, the Balkan Theatre and current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 18X’s SF training is complemented by his previous civilian education and life experience. Two of the three 18Xs in our battalion hold undergraduate degrees in political science. The dedication and commitment they demonstrated in earning a college degree is being applied to their new occupation as an SF Soldier. Being an SF Soldier requires cunning, an ability to operate alone or in small groups with little or no supervision, and the highest levels of integrity and honesty. SF Soldiers must do what is right when no one is watching. Combine all of these attributes and you have a person who has made a career decision, not a first-time enlister who is seeking college benefits or a paycheck.

**Patriotism**

The maturity of our 18X Soldiers is backed by their desire to serve the nation as patriotic warriors. Part of my positive perception of the 18Xs may come from my own history. I joined the Army in 1980 because of the Iran hostage crisis; I felt that it was my chance to serve the nation and to make a difference. The hostages were released before I got my chance to participate in their rescue, but I continued to serve in the U.S. Army for the last 24 years.

Today, I see Soldiers, particularly 18Xs, coming to SF to join in the fight against terror. Timing is everything. Many heroes came to light only because of an exceptional need, higher than any personal agenda, when our nation is at war. When I talk with 18Xs, the global war on terrorism is a common theme of conversation. Patriotism is not lost on these young men — they are neither cynical nor embarrassed about their pride in their country. This is something that cannot be taught in a class. Every time I have conducted my CSM interview with incoming 18Xs, they have made it clear to me that they were successful in civilian life and did not need to enter the Army in order to make ends meet. They came into SF because of a desire to be part of a very special and unique family of highly trained men who want to serve their nation. I find that to be the truest definition of patriotism.

**Commitment**

But it is the 18Xs’ commitment to be the best from the very beginning that sets them apart from the average Soldier. The majority of new 18-series personnel come from the ranks of officers and NCOs who have spent three or more years learning and understanding what it takes to be a Soldier. They are men who have made a decision to stay in the Army beyond their initial enlistment, and they realize what their commitment to the Army and their careers will involve.

The 18X shows up with a commitment and
dedication that speaks for itself. For example, one of our battalion’s 18Xs was the distinguished honor graduate of the SF engineer-sergeant course, another made the commandant’s list for the SF engineer-sergeant course and has passed the Pre-Scuba Course, and another has already graduated from the Combat Diver Qualification Course and 7th Group’s Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course, Level III.

**Best interests of the force**

Despite the obvious quality of the 18Xs in our battalion, at this point we might ask the question, What is the big picture — is the 18X program good for the future of the SF community?

In order to remain relevant, SF must grow and develop. That will demand a significant increase in the personnel inventory of Career Management Field 18 as we build over the next few years to meet the requirements of the Enhanced Special Forces Group. In May 2003, during the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Pre-Command Course, the commander of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group gave a presentation on 18X recruitment. He explained that even if current in-service SF recruiting reaches its goals, there will be a large gap — about 1/3 of the total force — between the manpower requirement and the actual manpower level. The 18X program is intended to help fill that gap, but it is not so much a “fix” for the current recruitment shortage as it is a means of ensuring the health of SF in the future.

**Continuity**

The 18X program will provide not only more SF Soldiers but also more long-term continuity in the force. SF NCOs today are fortunate if they can serve four continuous years in an A-detachment before they must move to an assignment at the Special Warfare Center and School or to positions within the U.S. Army Special Forces Command or the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. An 18X could easily serve multiple SF-detachment tours of four years or more, as well as additional nontactical assignments, prior to being considered for promotion to master sergeant. Ironically, at a time when SF skills are highly sought-after, a large proportion of our SF NCOs are reaching retirement eligibility. The 18X program, bringing an infusion of quality SF Soldiers who have the potential of serving nearly 20 years in the community, is a critical force-management tool. The bottom line is that without the 18X program, SF will be extremely hard-pressed to maintain its current manning levels, not to mention actually growing as a force.

**Mentorship**

While 18X recruitment has been a resounding success, the true success of the 18X program will be determined only in years to come. We, the current generation of leadership in SF tactical units, not the recruiting system or the training pipeline, will determine the ultimate success or failure of the 18X program.

When the new 18X shows up in his battalion, it is extremely important that he be put on a strong team that has an excellent team sergeant. The significance of the initial team assignment cannot be stressed enough. We all learn positives and negatives from our leaders, and as we get more senior in rank, our ability to discriminate the good from the bad increases. But a young operator coming to his first team will get a look at SF, and the Army, for the first time. His eyes will be wide open, and he will take good and bad influences indiscriminately. The
impressions he receives will last his entire career, which could be either a long and rewarding experience or a short and negative one, depending upon whether he has a superior team sergeant for a role model.

If the 18X program has an inherent weakness, it is that the new 18X Soldier has served all his Army time in a school environment, without experiencing the daily drill and discipline of a regular Army unit. His frame of reference doesn’t encompass the huge disparity between the freedom and autonomy granted to the SF NCO and the strict control prevalent in conventional units. An 18X put under the mentorship of a mediocre senior NCO might never learn to appreciate what “right” looks like. This “1/3 of the force” contains many of tomorrow’s team sergeants, and the 18Xs’ first two years on an SF team will be critical in their development.

Suggested program

As a final observation, I believe the demonstrated success of the 18X program for the NCO corps could lead to related programs for the officer corps. While the quality of the SF warrant-officer program is high, recruiting successful WO candidates is difficult, and it may never be successful at keeping SF detachments fully manned with WOs. We have many SF NCOs who choose not to “go warrant” because of their current job satisfaction and their love of the NCO corps.

If the 18X program succeeds, then why not have a similar program for officers, recruiting second lieutenants to supplement and complement the SF warrant officers? The new SF lieutenants would not only help relieve the WO shortages at the detachment level but would also sustain the force in the future as company executive officers and staff officers. When the first lieutenant made captain and was assigned to be a detachment commander, he would be an experienced, trained asset from the start.

Today, SF detachment commanders are fortunate if they get 24 months on a team before they must move to other assignments or to mandatory schooling. This is an even greater problem than the stability of NCOs on SF teams. With a program for SF lieutenants, we could have future company commanders with more than four years of detachment time and a much broader understanding of special operations — from team to SF-group activities. Maintaining a core of experience while continuing to stabilize the NCOs and officers is what will make SF a viable fighting force in the future. Bringing back the SF lieutenant to complement the 18X program would take SF into the next two decades, ready to fight for our nation in the global war on terrorism.

In closing, I reaffirm my belief that the 18X program is successful. Current selection, assessment and training of the 18X appears to be hitting the mark. To remain relevant, SF will need not only to constantly review and modify the 18X program but also to consider other programs, such as the SF lieutenant program, in order to meet the challenges of the global war on terrorism and the unforeseen threats of tomorrow. 

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Evaluating Psychological Operations: Planning Measures of Effectiveness

by Sergeant First Class Robert H. Kellogg

In the current military operating environment of two major conflicts, Psychological Operations forces will play a larger and more visible role as combat operations give way to counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and rebuilding operations. But with more visibility will come closer scrutiny, and it will become more important for PSYOP forces to provide analyses of what they have done and how effective their actions have been.

Assessing the effectiveness of a PSYOP effort is always a difficult task. In the past, PSYOP forces have measured their effectiveness by numbers of products disseminated or by interesting anecdotal occurrences that do not, with any certainty, indicate the effectiveness of the PSYOP effort. An example of an anecdotal occurrence is, “PSYOP was successful because General Ratko Mladic sent a letter of complaint to the IFOR commander about our information activities.” In the case of General Mladic, had PSYOP caused a behavioral change? Did its information activities influence him to change the subversive behavior of his subordinates?

Before we can determine a PSYOP effort’s effectiveness, we must develop specific measures that will allow us to collect the necessary indicators. By identifying those measures of effectiveness during planning instead of following execution, PSYOP forces will improve their ability to evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts. A complete and coherent PSYOP plan is thus essential to an evaluation of PSYOP effectiveness. This article proposes an evaluation method that relies heavily on in-depth, articulated planning of PSYOP efforts. The proposed method will allow PSYOP forces to effectively assess their activities during — not following — an operation, so that they can make adjustments that will ensure the success of the PSYOP effort.

PSYOP objectives

Planners develop the PSYOP plan using several sources of information in the supported unit’s operations plan, or OPLAN, or operations order, or OPORD. Those sources include the commander’s intent or end-state, tasks to PSYOP units, and verbal guidance from the supported commander.

Planning begins with mission analysis and the development of psychological objectives, or POs, that will enable the supported commander to achieve his desired end-state. POs are the centerpiece of the PSYOP plan: They can be thought of as what PSYOP will do for the supported commander. A PO is a statement of measurable response that reflects the desired behavioral or attitudinal change of selected foreign target audiences, or TAs.

POs should be written in a verb-object format. The verb describes the type and direction of the desired change. The object is the overall behavior or attitude that is to be changed. Some verbs commonly used in POs are “reduce,” “decrease,” “prevent,” “increase,” “gain” and “maintain.” Verbs that are not measurable, such as “inform,” “publicize,” “dis-
suade,” “encourage” or “facilitate,” should not be used in POs. For example, a specified task from the commander’s intent of the OPORD could be, “Create a safe and secure environment for the people of Pineland.” This is not a statement of measurable response that reflects a desired behavior or attitudinal change. Restated as “Decrease violence in the area of operation,” it would describe a behavior or change of attitude that could be measured, and it could be used as a PO. Other examples of valid POs are:

- Increase participation in national democratic institutions.
- Decrease effectiveness of insurgents or opposition force.
- Decrease casualties caused by mines and unexploded ordnance.

The PSYOP planner must develop POs that will cover all aspects of the operation, from the entry of U.S. forces (whether the entry is permissive or nonpermissive) to the transition back to host-nation authorities. Depending on the size of the operation, planners may develop from four to 10 POs.

Although POs are developed at the highest level of PSYOP support, they do not change when subordinate units develop their own plan. Soldiers assigned to the PSYOP task force, or POTF, and Soldiers assigned to tactical PSYOP teams, or TPTs, use the same POs. For example, the POTF may develop the PO, “Decrease combat effectiveness of enemy forces.” At the beginning of the operation, PSYOP forces might develop, design and produce a radio broadcast disseminated by Commando Solo aircraft that would advise enemy soldiers not to activate their air-defense-artillery equipment. The broadcast would support the PO at the operational level. Two weeks later, after ground forces had entered the area of operations, a TPT might broadcast a loudspeaker message that would instruct enemy soldiers how to surrender. The loudspeaker message would support the PO at the tactical level. Even though the PSYOP forces would implement the PO in different ways, the objective would remain constant.

Supporting PSYOP objectives

Planners next develop supporting PSYOP objectives, or SPOs. SPOs are what PSYOP will do to influence the TA in order to achieve the POs. They are the specific behavioral or attitudinal responses desired from the TA as a result of PSYOP.

All SPOs must assist in accomplishing the POs. SPOs are specific to each PO, and each PO should have two or more SPOs. If planners cannot develop at least two SPOs, then the PO is probably too narrow in focus and should be rewritten.

SPOs should be written in a noun-verb-object format, and the noun should always be “TA.” Specific TAs are not written into the SPOs because often several TAs can be targeted to accomplish the desired behavior or attitudinal change. The verb-object combination describes the desired behavior or attitudinal change. The verb-object combination describes the desired behavior or attitudinal change. Figure 1 is an example of the linkage between the PO and its SPOs and the proper format for stating POs and SPOs. The SPOs shown support the PO of reducing the effectiveness of insurgent activity. SPOs that could be used for other types of operations include:

- TA voluntarily eradicates coca crop.
- TA decreases number of acts of interethnic violence.
- TA reports the locations of mines and unexploded ordnance.
- TA registers to vote.

Target audiences

After they develop POs and SPOs, planners begin identifying potential TAs — the audiences who have the ability to accomplish the SPOs. Planners then group potential TAs under the appropriate SPOs. The initial potential target-audience list, or
PTAL, will be broad, as the planner rarely has time to perform exhaustive research on TAs. The PTAL will be refined several times during the PSYOP process.3

Figure 2 shows what the PSYOP plan would look like at this point. The number of POs, SPOs and TAs needed for a PSYOP plan will be determined by the size of the operation and the culture or cultures within which the operation takes place.

The concepts of POs, SPOs and PTALs are not new to PSYOP planners. In fact, to this point our example of the planning process has been grounded in PSYOP doctrine. But PSYOP doctrine does not specify any evaluation structure that can be established during planning. We will now explore the idea that POs, SPOs and PTALs, rather than being the final steps of planning, are the basis of further steps. Those further steps are essential in building a structure for determining the extent to which PSYOP forces are achieving their objectives.

Measures of effectiveness

PSYOP doctrine states that measures of effectiveness, or MOEs, provide a systematic means of assessing and reporting the effect that a PSYOP program (PSYOP products and actions) has on TAs. PSYOP MOEs change with the mission, and they encompass a range of factors that are fundamental to the overall effect of PSYOP.

Simply put, MOEs are questions to be answered at set points during the operation. For example, for one of the SPOs used in Figure 1, “TA decreases support for insurgent activity.” MOEs for a hypothetical operation could be, “How much money does the National Liberation Front give to the Slobovia disgruntled slave traders?” or “How many recruits (male, ages 15-18) from Garbone joined the Slobovia disgruntled slave traders this month?” Neither of these MOEs alone would determine whether the SPO was being achieved. They would be, however, verifiable occurrences that could be measured.

The key to effective evaluation is focusing the data collection on factors that will indicate the extent to which POs are being met. MOEs must be developed during the planning process to ensure that organic assets and PSYOP enablers, such as the assets for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, or ISR, can be tasked to assist in collecting the answers to MOEs for evaluation by PSYOP forces. If other Army or joint assets can answer some of the MOEs, it lessens the intelligence-collection burden.
on the PSYOP force. Furthermore, when MOEs are written as part of the initial PSYOP plan, PSYOP units will know what to look for as they conduct their missions.

Given the inherent difficulties and complexity of determining cause-and-effect relationships regarding human behavior, it may take weeks or longer to evaluate the effectiveness of PSYOP. MOEs enable the PSYOP force to assess an operation as it progresses and make adjustments to ensure that POs and SPOs are being addressed, rather than waiting until the end of an operation to determine the degree to which the PSYOP plan succeeded.

MOEs need to be assessed more than once. Initial answers to the MOE questions give PSYOP forces the baseline data, and subsequent assessments help determine whether the SPO is being achieved. Figure 3 shows what the PSYOP plan would look like once MOEs have been developed.

**Impact indicators**

Impact indicators are particular events or facts that can be known at a particular time. Collectively, they provide an indication of the effectiveness of the PSYOP program. For example, under the SPO, “TA decreases support for insurgent activity” and the MOE “How many recruits (male, ages 15-18) from Garbone joined the Slobovia disgruntled slave traders this month?,” the impact indicators might be 12 recruits on Feb. 1 and nine recruits on March 1. An impact indicator may also be a spontaneous, unpredictable event that can be linked directly or indirectly to the PSYOP effort. Spontaneous indicators include events, such as bombings or riots, that do not occur over time, but which may serve as signs of a PSYOP program’s impact.

**Analysis**

A series of PSYOP products and actions are disseminated to a TA in an attempt to modify the TA’s behavior. PSYOP units or intelligence-collection assets then obtain impact indicators, which they analyze in relation to the products disseminated and the TA’s actions to see if there is a correlation between the PSYOP program and the TA’s behavior. That analysis will allow the PSYOP commander to determine the extent to which he has achieved his objectives and
to identify any necessary adjustments. Figure 4 shows a PSYOP plan that uses measures of effectiveness and includes spontaneous impact indicators.

PSYOP units can assess the impact of their programs only after they have analyzed multiple impact indicators that have been recorded over a specified period of time. Such a collective analysis will indicate to the PSYOP commander or to the supported commander the degree to which the SPOs, and ultimately the POs, are being achieved.

In the fictional operation shown in Figure 4, PSYOP planners have determined that they must focus on three TAs for the accomplishment of SPO 1, “TA decreases support for insurgents.” They have developed two MOEs for each TA that, once answered, will give insight into whether or not there has been any behavioral change. The MOEs were initially addressed on Feb. 1. The impact indicators for Feb. 1 are considered to be the baseline data, and PSYOP forces will implement their plan to decrease support from the baseline levels. In the example, the MOEs have been assessed at weekly and monthly intervals so that PSYOP forces can monitor behavioral changes over time.

Within TA 1, the number of recruits declined during the two months following Feb. 1. Circulation of the insurgent newspaper ceased after March 1 (this is explained by the spontaneous event of the burning of the print facility). Assessing these impact indicators against the PSYOP products disseminated may show the positive effect PSYOP is having on this TA.

The first MOE for TA 2 concerned NLF financial support to the insurgents. The amount decreased as of March 1, but it increased dramatically the following month. The increase may reflect money collected to help finance the repair of the burned printing facility.
facility. Further indicators may show the increase as a spike in support, or perhaps as part of a greater financial commitment.

The impact indicators for the second MOE show that there has been diminished contact between the leader of the NLF and the leader of the insurgents. The PSYOP series aimed at dividing these two individuals may be working; however, in an actual operation, additional MOEs would need to be developed — perhaps an MOE to determine the number of phone conversations, letters and e-mails between them. PSYOP may want to concentrate on TA 2's financial support of the NLF and continue to monitor it to see if the April 1 figures were indeed a spike or if the NLF is committing greater resources to the insurgent cause. If so, PSYOP in future months may need to concentrate more heavily on the NLF/insurgent relationship.

Politically active females compose TA 3, and the impact indicators demonstrate a continuous decrease in their meeting attendance. Indicators also show that the fire in the print facility eliminated newspaper circulation. Although the correlation between the unanticipated elimination of the newspaper and meeting attendance by females is anecdotal, it provides evidence that the PSYOP series discouraging female participation in public meetings may be working.

When we evaluate the impact indicators collected for the six MOEs under SPO 1, five of the MOEs indicate that support for insurgent activities is decreasing. One area — financial support — may actually be increasing, although that may be explained by an attempt to overcome the spontaneous event of the burning of the print facility. The PSYOP analyst must also factor in the anti-insurgent rally, which supports the SPO. The bombing of the PSYOP vehicle must be evaluated to see if it is connected with insurgents trying to decrease the PSYOP forces' ability to reduce support for insurgents. The radio station was attacked after it agreed to increase the amount of PSYOP air time. Taking all these impact indicators and assessing them against the PSYOP products and actions allows PSYOP forces to conclude that they have succeeded during three months in reducing support for the insurgents. Analysis also indicates that PSYOP may need to focus further effort toward reducing the financial support that the NLF is giving to the insurgents.

This hypothetical example does not include the complete breadth of factors that would be taken into account during an actual operation; however, it does give an insight into what must be done by PSYOP forces so that they can successfully evaluate their efforts.

**Conclusion**

To be truly effective, PSYOP planners must articulate clear objectives and identify potential target audiences that can fulfill those stated objectives by exhibiting the desired behavioral change. Planners should also develop MOEs that will help to identify the impact indicators that will aid PSYOP forces in measuring their progress and identifying necessary adjustments. In order for PSYOP forces to effectively assess the impact of their actions, it is imperative that the MOEs be established during planning and not after the operation has ended.

Better integration of MOE development into the PSYOP planning process will cue ISR assets to collect the necessary intelligence. It will also allow PSYOP personnel to better communicate to supported commanders the importance of the early integration of PSYOP into the operational-planning process. > <

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**Notes:**

1 A further discussion of PSYOP objectives can be found in Chapter 4 of FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.

2 A further discussion of supporting PSYOP objectives can be found in Chapter 4 of FM 3-05.301.

3 A complete discussion of target-audience analysis can be found in Chapter 5 of FM 3-05.301.

4 This is the definition, with a few minor changes for clarity, given in Chapter 4 of FM 3-05.301.

5 The examples used in this graphic and throughout the article are fictitious.
On Oct. 3, 1993, the United States Task Force Ranger executed a raid into General Mohamad Farah Aidid's stronghold near the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia, seeking to capture two of Aidid's key lieutenants.1 Although the task force captured 24 Aidid supporters, Somali clansmen shot down two MH-60L Black Hawk helicopters using rocket-propelled grenades, or RPGs.

With the downing of the first MH-60L, TF Ranger's mission changed from capturing Aidid's supporters to safeguarding and recovering American casualties. From a tactical perspective,2 the actions of TF Ranger members to defend the position of the downed Black Hawks and to retrieve the dead and wounded demonstrated their superb training, courage, initiative, individual Soldier skills and dedication to one another.

Several articles, research papers, studies and books have assessed the U.S. intervention into Somalia. While there has been an abundance of lessons learned from TF Ranger, the lessons have focused primarily on tactical-level leadership, small-unit tactics and individual Soldier skills. Little has been written on the mission as a strategic employment of special-operations forces, or SOF.

This article will examine the actions of TF Ranger within a theory of special operations in the hope that it will assist other special-operations Soldiers in planning and executing direct-action operations.

Background

The 1993 decision of the United Nations to intervene in the clash between warring factions in Somalia was unique — it was the first time the U.N. had intervened in a nation where it was not only unintended but also warned by the antagonists not to intercede. On June 5, 1993, an ambush by one of the antagonists, Somali warlord Mohamad Aidid, killed 24 Pakistani soldiers who were part of U.N. Operations Somalia II, or UNOSOM II.3 In response, the U.N. Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 837, which called for the apprehension of those responsible for the ambush.

Retired U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, the U.N. Special Representative to the Secretary General in Somalia, pressed the Clinton administration to deploy a special-operations task force specifically trained and equipped for the task of apprehension and capable of responding if any U.N. workers were taken hostage by Aidid's clan.4 Partially in response to Howe's persistence, the administration finally approved the deployment, but only after four U.S. Marines had been killed and seven others wounded on Aug. 21, 1993, in two separate incidents involving remote-controlled land mines.

The U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, made numerous objections concerning the appropriateness of the mission through Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell. The objections appeared to fall on deaf ears, and the task force, named Task Force Ranger, departed for Somalia on Aug. 24.

TF Ranger, under the command of Major General William Garri
son, was a battalion-sized, self-contained joint force consisting of 440 personnel who represented each of USSOCOM’s components, with selective augmentation from conventional forces. TF Ranger’s chain of command was separate from that of the other U.S. forces in UNOSOM II (see Figure 1). Garrison reported directly to General Joseph P. Hoar, the commander of U.S. Central Command, or USCENTCOM, without going through U.N. channels, but he maintained a close working relationship with the commander of U.S. forces supporting UNOSOM II, or USFORSOM, Major General Thomas Montgomery.

TF Ranger’s mission was to “initiate military operations in Somalia to capture General Aidid, to include the capture of his principal lieutenants and targeting of his Tier I infrastructure.” Hoar directed, “operations should retain [the] primary objective of capturing Aidid, with the secondary objective of capturing blacklist personnel.” He authorized the task force to neutralize Aidid’s critical command-and-control nodes and “other targets ... only if intelligence indicates that Aidid or any of his lieutenants are present and likely to be captured as a result of the operation.” The commander’s intent stated, “rehearsals are mandatory and include infiltration, isolation of the objective area, and exfiltration” and that, based on recent activities, “it is reasonable for Aidid to expect this type of operation will be conducted by U.S. forces,” therefore, “special preparations must be made to ensure operational security and force protection.”

USSOCOM defined mission success as the capture of Aidid or designated personnel, and it made the assumption that Aidid would probably remain underground in Mogadishu, using his lieutenants to direct continued attacks on U.S. and U.N. forces, and employ more lethal weapons in ever-increasing numbers.

The Oct. 3 raid was the seventh assault the task force had conducted since its arrival in Mogadishu. TF Ranger’s operations were founded on speed, surprise and violence of action. Success was dependent on reacting with a launch of a direct action force ... from pre-launch to launched in 25 minutes or less,”8 and getting away from the target as quickly as possible. TF Ranger was “normally on the target for just a matter of minutes before they began exfiltration,”9 which did not allow the Somalis time to react to the assault force in a cohesive manner. During the Oct. 3 mission, however, a series of unanticipated events caused the assault force to spend too much time on the target.

**McRaven’s theory**


McRaven’s analyses of the operations are based on his refined definition of a special operation: “A special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or military imperative.” McRaven, now a Navy SEAL admiral, describes the military and political background of each operation, reconstructs the operation itself, and analyzes the operation in terms of six principles.

According to McRaven, “Six principles of special operations ... simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose ... dominate every successful mission.” He further asserts, “Gaining relative superiority requires proper integration of all six principles ... [and] the practitioner of special operations must take account of the...
principles in the three phases of an operation: planning, preparation, and execution.”

McRaven defines relative superiority as “a condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy.” He asserts there are three basic properties of relative superiority. First, “Relative superiority is achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement when a decisive advantage is achieved, usually within five minutes of the initial engagement.” Second, “Once relative superiority is achieved, it must be sustained in order to guarantee victory.” Finally, “If relative superiority is lost, it is difficult to regain.”

The key to successful special-operations missions is to gain relative superiority early in the engagement, because “The longer an engagement continues, the more likely the outcome will be affected by the will of the enemy, chance, and uncertainty, the factors that comprise the frictions of war.”

McRaven uses graphs to show how and when each of the eight special-operations forces he discusses achieved relative superiority. The author’s graph (Figure 2) shows how TF Ranger lost and finally regained relative superiority. According to McRaven, the intersection of the X-axis (time) and the Y-axis (probability of mission completion) is the point of vulnerability, or PV, which he defines as the point in a mission when the attacking force reaches the enemy’s first line of defenses. The area of vulnerability is a function of the time required for mission completion. The longer it takes to gain relative superiority, the larger the area of vulnerability and the greater the impact of the frictions of war.

The graph also “provides a visual demonstration of the three properties of relative superiority: the pivotal moment can be seen as a dramatic rise in the probability of mission completion; sustaining relative superiority is a gradual rise from the pivotal moment to mission completion; and a decisive drop in the probability of mission completion shows a loss of relative superiority.”

McRaven’s six principles of special operations are interdependent. When depicted in a graphic model (see Figure 3), McRaven’s theory represents his idea that “Special operations forces succeed, in spite of their numerical inferiority, when they are able to gain relative superiority through the use of a simple plan, carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed and purpose.”

Although McRaven’s definition
of a special operation has not been widely accepted within the Department of Defense, his theory of special operations seems extremely well-suited to an evaluation of TF Ranger’s mission.

Simplicity

Of the six principles, McRaven says, “simplicity is the most crucial, and yet sometimes the most difficult, principle with which to comply.” He lists three elements of simplicity critical to success: a limited number of objectives, good intelligence and innovation. He believes, “Limiting the objectives to only what is essential focuses the training, limits the number of personnel required, reduces the time on target, and decreases the number of ‘moving parts.’”

He insists that good intelligence “simplifies a plan by reducing the unknown factors and the number of variables that must be considered.” “Innovation,” he states, “simplifies a plan by helping to avoid or eliminate obstacles that would otherwise compromise surprise and/or complicate the rapid execution of the mission.” “Innovation is normally manifested in new technology, but it is also the application of unconventional tactics ... Either new technology or innovative tactics [must] assist the assault element in reaching the objective and then quickly and effectively eliminating the enemy.”

From the onset of TF Ranger’s planning, two elements were essential to success: timely, accurate and reliable intelligence, and the ability to respond quickly to whatever mission scenario developed. The initial focus of all of TF Ranger’s intelligence-collection and analysis was to locate Aidid. Thus, mission success for TF Ranger was highly dependent upon accurate and timely intelligence, specifically human intelligence, or HUMINT.

General Wayne Downing, the USSOCOM commander, said, “I kept telling [Garrison] … be patient, be careful, eventually you will get a shot at Aidid … I told him that (1) he needed to be careful in populated areas, and (2) in certain circumstances not to go near the Bakara market … We did not have good intelligence about that part of the city. We didn’t have any presence there or good HUMINT.”

The most robust and critical portion of TF Ranger’s technical systems was its information infrastructure (intelligence system). While TF Ranger’s operations depended heavily upon the greatly deficient HUMINT system in Somalia, its other systems were extremely effective, accurate and timely. TF Ranger had a marked advantage in technical intelligence collection, not only over the warring clans but also over other U.N./U.S. forces in Somalia, because of the establishment of an intelligence fusion cell that provided the most capable intelligence network in the country. Unfortunately for TF Ranger, “high technology applications [did] not always overcome a low- to no-technology environment.”

TF Ranger’s mission was simple.
in terms of the number of its objectives. With only one major mission, TF Ranger had a task architecture that was relatively straightforward, and it varied only slightly during any of the seven missions TF Ranger conducted in Somalia.

The task flow began with an operations order, or OPORD, that delineated responsibilities for all TF Ranger members during the execution of one of two mission templates. Because the missions were templated, TF Ranger used a standing OPORD for the duration of its mission. To change the OPORD, the task force simply issued a fragmentary order.

As TF Ranger received time-sensitive intelligence, it analyzed the details, applied them to the appropriate template, and quickly synchronized the operation. Time permitting, the task force conducted rehearsals of the actions on the objective while it conducted final coordination with adjacent units and obtained approval from higher units. Once approval and coordination were completed, the task force could launch to accomplish the raid. The entire “notification-to-launch” process usually took less than an hour. It could be argued that changes in Somali tactics should have caused TF Ranger to modify its techniques. Yet TF Ranger failed to effectively use unconventional tactics, innovation and superior technical systems to its advantage, and the routine of TF Ranger’s operations gave an exploitable advantage to the Somalis.

Security

“The purpose of tight security,” McRaven says, “is to prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage through foreknowledge of the impending attack.” Because of the nature of special operations, “it is not so much the impending mission that must be concealed as the timing and, to a lesser degree, the means of insertion.” Security is important in achieving relative superiority “because it prevents the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage.”

A prevailing factor in the success of special operations is the ability of the attacking force to know what defenses the enemy has prepared. A failed security effort could allow the enemy to spring a surprise of his own and either pre-empt the attack or reduce the attackers’ speed on target, either of which would dramatically reduce the possibility of achieving relative superiority. Only eight days prior to TF Ranger’s raid, Somalis had used an RPG to shoot down a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter from the air component of the 10th Mountain Division Quick Reaction Force, or QRF. Knowledge of that shutdown, coupled with reports that Somalis had fired at least 12 RPGs at TF Ranger helicopters during their sixth mission, should have caused TF Ranger to change its method of operations, especially its means of insertion. The failure to learn that lesson contributed to the two helicopter shootdowns on Oct. 3.

After conducting six similar missions prior to Oct. 3, TF Ranger had become somewhat overconfident in its abilities and in the dominance of its means of infiltration. Had TF Ranger’s leadership adequately assessed the change in Somali tactics evidenced by escalating RPG use against helicopters, they would have realized the increased operational risk to the task force. The failure to appreciate the increased operational risk and to anticipate contingencies also caused TF Ranger to launch without most of their night-vision devices, without water sufficient to last more than two hours, and without ammunition sufficient for sustained combat operations.

Aidid’s use of civilians as part of the prepared defenses also contributed to TF Ranger’s lack of speed on the target. In a report to the U.N. Security Council on July 1, 1993, Howe stated that there was “increasing evidence that General Aidid deliberately and personally directed the use of women and children for attacks on UNOSOM II soldiers; and that he directed his militia to shoot into the crowd on June 13 in order to create casualties and embarrass ... UNOSOM II before the assembled world press.” Armed with the knowledge of Aidid’s willingness to put his civilians into harm’s way, TF Ranger could have better prepared its Soldiers for the Somalis’ eventual use of civilians as human shields.

Repetition

Discussing the principle of repetition in rehearsals, McRaven specifically addresses units with missions similar to TF Ranger’s. He states, “in the preparation phase, repetition, like routine, is indispensable in eliminating the barriers to success.” McRaven contends, “certain combat units, such as counterterrorist teams ... perform standard mission profiles as a matter of routine. This routine hones those tactical skills to a degree that allows quick reaction to a threat, provided that threat fits within the standard scenario for which the unit has been practicing.” Additionally, he believes, “repetition hones individual and unit skills, while full-dress rehearsals unmask weaknesses in the plan,” and that “both are essential to success on the battlefield.”

Largely because of personnel constraints imposed by higher headquarters, TF Ranger deployed with a smaller force than usual.
and without support from AC-130H Spectre gunships — the task forces’ accustomed platform for close air support, air interdiction and armed reconnaissance. Instead of modifying its tactics to account for the degradation in capabilities, TF Ranger operated as though it had a complete and battle-proven task-force organization. While TF Ranger generally faced threats that fit into the standard scenario for which the unit had rehearsed, the task force had not deployed with all the tools it had used in rehearsals at Fort Bragg, N.C. Standard mission profiles, conducted without the accustomed tools, are anything but routine.

In order to mitigate some of the shortcomings of equipment and intelligence, assault[s] had to be planned and initiated as quickly as possible (using pre-rehearsed battle drills fine-tuned for the actual situation). TF Ranger minimized mission-planning time in an attempt to ensure operational security and to maximize speed and surprise. There was generally no time available to rehearse actions at the objective prior to launch.

To facilitate rapid planning for any given situation, “two mission templates were developed, one for strongpoint assault and the other for assault against a moving convoy.” While routine hones tactical skills to a degree that allows quick reaction to a threat, especially in counterterrorist units, there were too many other “moving parts” and “mission specific details” that required more thorough rehearsals in order to sufficiently increase the probability of success.

The task force’s failure to conduct full-dress rehearsals with U.N. QRF units that were eventually used to rescue the task force also contributed to problems with extraction because the situation had not been considered during contingency planning, and time was lost accomplishing essential coordination and familiarization. The task force commander evidently never anticipated and “never thought of a contingency plan for backups of equipment like tanks and APCs [armored personnel carriers],” all of which were readily available from coalition forces under UNOSOM II, and which ultimately proved to be invaluable in the extraction of personnel pinned down on Oct. 4. Believing in secrecy and operational security, TF Ranger kept its distance from the nations comprised by the U.N. coalition, to avoid possible leaks to the Somalis.

**Surprise**

According to McRaven, “special operations forces do not generally have the luxury of attacking the enemy when or where he is unprepared.” SOF must typically attack in spite of enemy preparations. Therefore, in McRaven’s opinion, surprise means simply catching the enemy off balance. “In a special operation, surprise is gained through deception, timing and taking advantage of the enemy’s vulnerabilities.”

Using its six previous missions as indicators of its dominance in Mogadishu, TF Ranger become overconfident, underestimated Aidid’s leadership and military capabilities, and violated fundamental special-operations principles of deception and timing. It conducted operations during daylight hours and relied on the same operational templates in order to achieve rapid planning and execution. By conducting daylight operations, TF Ranger allowed the Somalis to observe its tactics, techniques and procedures, virtually eliminating any of the tactical advantages of speed, surprise and technology that it could have gained by conducting operations during hours of limited visibility.

Given the low altitudes and the relatively low air speeds of TF Ranger’s helicopters operating in the urban environment, the helicopters were much more vulnerable than TF Ranger’s plan assumed. For example, during the fifth and sixth assaults conducted by TF Ranger (both made during daylight hours on Sept. 18 and 21), the Somalis had fired increasing numbers of RPGs at TF Ranger’s helicopters. The Somalis were merely waiting for the helicopters to fly closer to their RPG gunners to use their new tactic with devastating results. Overconfidence led to the downing of the first MH-60L Black Hawk helicopter, Super 61 “Thunderstruck.” Journalist Mark Bowden wrote that this “cracked the task force’s sense of righteous invulnerability ... [since] they were the trump card in this God-forsaken place ... The Somalis couldn’t shoot [Black Hawks] down.”

In terms of surprise, the raid of Oct. 3-4 failed to achieve anything the task force desired to do. TF Ranger failed to: (1) delay the enemy’s reaction or divert the enemy’s attention, (2) attack where the enemy was weakest (the Bakara market was Aidid’s strongest location and his center of gravity), or (3) attack at a time that was most beneficial. Other than the unsuccessful signature or “profile flights” used to protect actual mission launches, the task force did little to deceive the Somalis or to delay their reaction to an actual operation.

**Speed**

In a special-operations mission, McRaven says, “any delay will expand [the] area of vulnerability and decrease [the] opportunity to
achieve relative superiority ... [because] in special operations the enemy is in a defensive position and his only desire is to counter [the] attack.” McRaven’s theory assumes that the enemy’s will to resist is a given and that his ability to react is a constant. The enemy’s ability to react makes it essential, “to move as quickly as possible regardless of the enemy’s reaction.”

With the most sophisticated equipment available, and with access to virtually every product of the national-level intelligence-collection architecture, the task force was prepared to launch an assault on extremely short notice, usually a matter of minutes. That level of readiness required a high level of organization, training and rehearsal. To ensure tactical surprise, TF Ranger depended on a rapid response and on spending the minimum time on target once it conducted an assault. Tactical surprise was facilitated by the use of extremely sophisticated assault aircraft such as the MH/AH-6 Little Birds and the MH-60L, as well as aerial-reconnaissance assets, such as the P-3C Reef Point and OH-58 Kiowa Warrior.

Because of the urban environment, land-based or vehicular technology was relatively “low-tech,” consisting of five-ton trucks and both cargo and armored HMMWVs. With few exceptions, the robust communications architecture, even when it employed as many as five separate radio nets, worked nearly perfectly. The ability to move quickly and stealthily, to shoot accurately and effectively, and to communicate with relative ease facilitated decisive operations in a short duration of time.

Unfortunately for TF Ranger, gaining relative superiority required the proper integration of all six principles of special operations. The monopoly that TF Ranger possessed in speed was not enough to overcome the shortcomings in the other five interdependent special-operations principles.

**Purpose**

According to McRaven, “purpose is understanding and then executing the prime objective of the mission regardless of emerging obstacles or opportunities.” He concludes that there are two aspects to the principle. First, “the purpose must be clearly defined by the mission statement. ... The

**The clearly defined purpose of TF Ranger’s ‘new’ mission ensured that even in the fog of battle, ... the Soldiers understood their primary objective and would die before failing to accomplish that mission. If there was any lack of purpose, it was clearly above the tactical level.**

mission statement should be crafted to ensure that in the heat of battle, no matter what else happens, the individual soldier understands the primary objective.” The second aspect of purpose is personal commitment to the extent that “the men must be inspired with a sense of personal dedication that knows no limitations.”

After the first of the MH-60Ls was downed, the mission of TF Ranger changed from one of capturing Aidid’s supporters to one of safeguarding and recovering American casualties. The actions of TF Ranger members to defend the position of the first downed Black Hawk and to retrieve the dead and wounded reflected credit on their training, courage, initiative, individual Soldier skills and dedication to one another. Their actions were automatic and required no prompting. The loyalty and sacrifice they displayed could be characterized only as “knowing no limitations.” The clearly defined purpose of TF Ranger’s “new” mission ensured that even in the fog of battle, and no matter what else happened, the Soldiers understood their primary objective and would die before failing to accomplish that mission. If there was any lack of purpose, it was clearly above the tactical level.

**Above the tactical level**

The mission of TF Ranger is typically regarded as more a political failure than a military or tactical one. From the outset, the mission had only a 50 percent chance of success if HUMINT operations were working well, and 20 percent if they were not. With such a low probability of success, TF Ranger’s failures seem ultimately attributable to those who placed the task force in such a disadvantageous situation.

A noted authority in national-security affairs, Dr. Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, classifies TF Ranger’s mission as a strategic special operation. TF Ranger’s deployment was “approved at the highest level of the U.S. government after detailed review,” and it clearly sought “to resolve, through the sudden, swift, and unconventional application of force, major problems of U.S. foreign policy.” Vandenbroucke further asserts, “strategic special operations are also high-risk ventures, for they seek to achieve difficult objectives in a single bid, with deliberately limited means. Because failure in such
operations is typically both highly visible and dramatic, the ensuing damage to U.S. prestige tends to be great.\textsuperscript{44}

TF Ranger found itself as the best choice of bad alternatives. As Vandenbroucke explains, “In some instances strategic special operations may seem like the only solution to otherwise intractable major foreign-policy problems. ... Decision-makers can become insidiously attracted to strategic operations, to the point of engaging in wishful thinking, in which hopes distort perception and wishes are mistaken for reality.” This is usually attributable to the fact that “the senior decision-makers who evaluate and approve these operations often receive poor information and advice.”\textsuperscript{45} Powell was under great political pressure to provide a quick military solution to the problems in Somalia. He did not convey the potential consequences or political ramifications of a mission failure to Defense Secretary Les Aspin. If he had, Aspin might have concluded that the risk of TF Ranger’s failure outweighed the benefits to be gained from capturing Aaidid and would have looked for other alternatives to resolve the foreign-policy crisis in Somalia.

Noted strategic theorist and defense analyst Dr. Colin S. Gray advances an explanation similar to Vandenbrouckée’s in his examination of the strategic utility of SOF. Gray says special operations must be conducted in support of foreign policy, and that SOF are a “national grand-strategic asset; they are a tool of statecraft that can be employed quite surgically in support of diplomacy, of foreign assistance (of several kinds), as a vital adjunct to regular military forces, or as an independent weapon.”\textsuperscript{46} But Gray reminds us, “tactical excellence in the conduct of special operations is no guarantee of strategic effectiveness,”\textsuperscript{47} and that there is always the potential strategic disutility of special operations as well.

In order to ensure that strategic ends support national strategy, Gray says, “SOF need an educated consumer, political and military patrons who appreciate what SOF should, and should not, be asked to do,” in order to “offer the prospect of favorably disproportionate return on military investment.”\textsuperscript{48}

TF Ranger’s tactical operations were expected to overcome a neglected area of U.S. foreign policy, but instead they proved to be a strategic disutility.

Crucial to the strategic failure in Somalia was the uncoordinated, unclear, shifting and inconsistent two-track policy of the U.N./U.S. When UNOSOM II assumed responsibility for the mission in Somalia, “the goals of the international effort ... were greatly expanded to include: forcibly disarming the warring factions; political reconciliation; and nation-building ... This U.N. policy, which was supported by the Clinton administration, was being implemented at the same time that the administration was pursuing a second policy track, which directed U.S. military leaders to reduce the U.S. military presence in Somalia.”\textsuperscript{49}

Even as the situation continued to change for the worse, policies and strategies were never adapted to fit the new environment. This contradiction in policy resulted in reductions in the size of the task force, the deletion of the AC-130 support from the package, the refusal to send armor support requested by Montgomery in September 1993,\textsuperscript{50} and the lack of adequate personnel and resources for USFORSOM to successfully conduct its missions in support of UNOSOM II.

The only strategic player who realized the need to adapt was Hoar, who in September 1993 attempted to force policy-makers to clarify their goals in Somalia. Hoar forwarded “an updated strategy assessment to Powell because he viewed the increase in U.S. military operations in Mogadishu as an unjustified expansion in the mission. Hoar’s assessment called for a review of the U.N. strategy that would either require the U.N. to ‘scale back its objectives’ or require the U.S. to significantly ‘increase its commitment to underwrite this operation for an indefinite period.’”\textsuperscript{51} Hoar never received a response.

Another critical failure was the inappropriate use of SOF in an environment in which both U.N. and U.S. policies were uncoordinated and unclear. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Frank F. Wisner stated, “The single most serious flaw in our policy was that we tried to accomplish political objectives solely by military means.”\textsuperscript{52} Wisner also stated, “No one in the UNOSOM headquarters was in charge in Mogadishu,”\textsuperscript{53} correctly assessing the fact that operations lacked a “coordinated over-arching theater-level strategy that integrated the political, economic (humanitarian), geographic, and military elements of power in Somalia.

Political, humanitarian, and military strategies were developed independently. There was no senior-level UN strategy group charged with developing a coherent, integrated approach to operations in Somalia that encompassed the entire mission.”\textsuperscript{54} Compounding the effects of this issue is the fact that TF Ranger was not under the operational control of UNOSOM II and would never be fully integrated into the UNOSOM II/USFORSOM operation-level strategy. Although political and military leaders in the U.S. realized these factors, they never adjusted their policies and strate-
gies to ensure success. Thus, the decision-makers at the strategic and policy levels sealed TF Ranger’s fate as a military misfortune.

**Conclusion**

Because the mission resulted in a strategic disutility, the tactical victory of the 15-hour engagement had and will continue to have a negative affect on U.S. foreign policy. While the task force succeeded in its mission of capturing the 24 Aaid supporters, its combined failures at the tactical level caused it to lose relative superiority. Relative superiority was regained only with the intervention of conventional heavy forces. Even though U.S. forces eventually achieved a tactical victory, a better appreciation of the six principles of special-operations success could have produced a quicker and more decisive victory, fewer U.S. casualties, and fewer negative political consequences.

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**Notes:**

1 Also referred to by different spellings of his name: Mohammad and/or Farrah, and/or Aideed. I am using the spelling from an official memorandum that was personally signed by him in 1993. As for the actual target, it is often incorrectly identified as being the Olympic Hotel itself. Actually, the target on Oct. 3, 1993, was a house in the Habr Gedir section of town that was close to the hotel. The alleged finance minister and top political advisor for Aaid, Omar Salad, was to be at the meeting site. Thus, the actual target was the Salad house and not the Olympic Hotel.

2 The tactical level of war is divided into battles, engagements and small unit/crew actions. The raid on Oct. 3-4, 1993, is most correctly defined as an engagement.


6 USFORSM’s mission was to “conduct military operations in Somalia in support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR)” (USFORSM AAR, Vol. I, 19.)


9 Akers and Singleton, 6.


11 McRaven, 4-6.

12 McRaven, 6-8.

13 McRaven, 11-14.


15 AAR for Task Force Ranger, 3.

16 The impact of the clan culture of Somalia, and its impact on successful HUMINT operations cannot be overstated. Access to certain areas of Mogadishu depended on having the proper clan, tribe, sub-clan, even so far as family pedigree. Somalis, being totally dedicated to these hierarchies, made it very difficult for TF Ranger to recruit Somalis to work against their own.


18 Faust, 33.

19 After the first raid, operations were subject to the following criteria prior to launch: (1) receive current/actionable target intelligence; (2) coordinate with the commander, USFORSM; (3) verify initial intelligence report using reconnaissance or other discipline; (4) confirm no NGO/U.N. facility locations near the target; (5) deconflict UNOSOM operations; and (6) notify commander, CENTCOM. (AAR for Task Force Ranger, enclosure 2, 5.)

20 McRaven, 14-15.

21 McRaven, 15.

22 Warner-Levin Report, 8.

23 If there was a single critical variable that was unknown to TF Ranger, it was the clans’ ability to adapt their operational tactics and
organize quickly to fight TF Ranger. During the fifth and sixth assaults, the use of RPGs had begun to pick up. Fortunately, the terrain during those assaults made effective RPG use much more difficult than during operations in downtown Mogadishu.

24 When I questioned retired Major General Garrison on May 28, 2003, about his decision to ignore increased Somali RPG use against helicopters, he argued that the fact was not ignored. He stated that he made his decision to continue using helicopters in the same manner as in the previous missions based on advice provided by the pilots and the unit commander of the 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. They informed/recommended to Garrison that it was an acceptable risk that could be mitigated at their level. I assumed this to suggest that the pilots believed that such a nonprecision weapon was ultimately no match for their flying skills. That assumption was confirmed in Colonel Faust’s monograph, in which he describes a conversation with one of the pilots who had met with other pilots to discuss the 25 September shootdown of the UH-60 from the 10th Mountain Division’s Aviation Task Force: “In their [the pilots’] opinion, the shoot down was lucky, i.e., ‘big sky, little bullet.’ ” According to Faust, the pilot suggested that TF Ranger aircraft “flew rapidly random and irregular flight profiles,” and that the combination of experience and better tactics minimized the RPG threat to TFR aircraft.” (Faust, 40.)

25 AAR for Task Force Ranger, tabs E and F to enclosure 3, 3-E-2 and 3-F-1.

26 Using all six previous missions as an indicator, the majority of the assault and blocking forces on the 3 October mission had not brought their NVDs or sufficient water, since the mission began in daylight and all were certain that the mission would end hours before dark.


28 McRaven, 15-16.


30 Because all operations were conducted from one of two operational templates, all members of the task force had to know their individual jobs inside and out; in this manner the task force could reduce any variability, control and predict behavior of the Soldiers, and regulate the activity as much as possible. Through the standardization of rules such as operating on the basis of joint tactics, techniques and procedures, TF Ranger was able to ensure that all members from varying services and operational backgrounds were focused on the same “tactical” sheet of music and speaking the same “joint” language. The task force had standard operating procedures for everything, and this formal set of procedures was followed on every mission. TF Ranger’s lack of competition should have allowed it to be very deliberate and thorough in its decision-making and execution. While TF Ranger’s template planning was deliberate and thorough, once the task force arrived in Mogadishu, mission planning and execution was anything but slow and deliberate.

31 Northacker, 3.

32 AAR for Task Force Ranger, tab G to enclosure 3, 3-G-3. When I questioned retired Major General Garrison about this decision on May 28, 2003, he stated that prior coordination with the QRF units, as well as pre-positioning them at the TF Ranger airfield, would not have resulted in an earlier launch time for the rescue. He stated that his intelligence indicated that, historically, Mogadishu turned into a ghost town at about 2300 hours every night, and that he didn’t launch the joint U.N./QRF/TF Ranger rescue force until 0233 hours for that very reason. He indicated that launching them that late would give the rescue force the best chance for success, considering that many of the Somalis might already have called it quits for the day.


34 McRaven, 17-18.

35 “In the postmortem of the October 3 battle, it transpired that Aidid’s militia divided Mogadishu into eighteen sectors, each with a tactical commander … Colonel Harif Hassan Giumale, the commander of the Somali force that engaged Task Force Ranger on October 3, had attended a Soviet military academy in Odessa for three years. His subordinate, Colonel Ali Eden, summed up his commander’s perspective on U.S. tactics: ‘If you use one tactic once, you should not use it a third time. And the Americans had already done basically the same thing six times.’ ” (Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia [Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995], 93-94.)


37 “TF Ranger randomly launched missions for training and rehearsal at all times of the day and night. We could not protect our launches but the idea was to put the challenge on the surveillance to determine if it was a real launch or not.” (Faust, 16.)

38 McRaven, 19-21.

39 McRaven, 21-23.

40 After the events of 3-4 October 1993, Aidid’s tactic of “killing Americans” and having that broadcast worldwide succeeded in changing a previously apathetic U.S. public and focused their anger on U.S. policy in Somalia (Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1992-1998 (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1999), 33. In the words of Montgomery, “It’s obvious that, if there was no political will in the United States to hang in there and see it through, we had to come out.” (Adams, 265.)

41 This assessment of probabilities of mission success (capturing Aidid) in relation to HUMINT was confirmed by retired Major General Garrison on May 28, 2003.


43 Vandenbroucke, 4.

44 Vandenbroucke, 4.

45 Vandenbroucke, 6-7.


47 Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 143.


50 In August 1993, Montgomery assessed that the situation required heavy forces (mechanized infantry units) in order to provide adequate force protection to U.S. logistics convoys and installations. He sent a request to Hoover in early September 1993. After Hoover scaled back the request by more than 75 percent, he forwarded the request for additional forces through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On Sept. 23, 1993, the commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the Secretary of Defense aware of the request, but the Secretary elected not to approve the request at that time. The request was not considered essential by policy-level authorities to carrying out the mission (USFOR-SOM AAR, Vol. I, 22-23.)


55 “The ground force fought its way back to the airport from the target. ... The vehicles left the target with 24 live and uninjured Somalis. There were only 22 alive when the convoy returned. Two Somali prisoners were dead; a third died shortly after we unloaded the vehicles. All were victims of Somali fire.” (USFOR-SOM AAR, Vol. I, 54-55.)
The man most often credited with founding United States Army Special Forces died April 1 at his home in Dana Point, Calif., at the age of 101.

Retired Army Colonel Aaron Bank, known throughout the military’s special-operations community as “The Father of Special Forces,” died of natural causes with his family at his side. He was buried at Riverside National Cemetery in Riverside, Calif., April 5 with full military and Special Forces honors.

Bank most notably broke new ground when in 1952 he was named commander of the Fort Bragg-based 10th Special Forces Group — the Army’s first official special-warfare unit, for which he had led the fight to create.

The announcement of Bank’s death has been difficult news for Special Forces Soldiers around the world, said Special Forces spokesman Major Robert Gowan.

“Colonel Bank’s passing marks a sad day for the Special Forces regiment,” Gowan said. “Colonel Aaron Bank was the father of Special Forces — he was a legend. His initiative and vision allowed the Army to create the U.S. Army Special Forces as we know them today, and every Special Forces Soldier in the Army will mourn his death.”

Born Nov. 23, 1902, in New York City, Bank traveled extensively in Europe and became fluent in French and German before entering the U.S. Army in 1939.

In 1943, after completing Officer Candidate School, Bank volunteered for duty with the Office of Strategic Services and was assigned to a Jedburgh team — a small, first-of-its-kind unconventional-warfare outfit. Bank and his Jedburgh team made a combat parachute jump into Southern France in August 1944, where they successfully employed hit-and-run tactics to harass Nazi forces that were withdrawing up the Rhone River.

Later, Bank was chosen as the commanding officer for Operation Cross (often erroneously referred to as Operation Iron Cross), a high-risk plan to snatch Adolph Hitler and key members of his inner circle should they retreat to the “national redoubt” in the Bavarian Alps. From French prisoner-of-war camps, Bank recruited a company-sized unit of anti-Nazi Germans, most of whom were communist sympathizers. They were to operate as an ersatz German mountain infantry
company. They spoke German during all their training, wore German uniforms and carried German weapons. The mission was never launched, however. Bank got word that the operation was aborted while he and his unit were waiting to board the aircraft that were to drop them into the target area.

After the aborted mission, Bank was transferred to Indochina to search for Japanese POW camps around the Vientiane-Laos area. His team located 143 French civilian internees at Naung Kai, 14 French internees at Vientiane, and eight French internees at Thakhek, supplying all with medical supplies and special food items for the numerous children held in the camps.

When World War II ended, the OSS was disbanded, but Bank and Colonel Russell Volckmann, another former OSS operative, remained in the military and worked tirelessly to convince the Army to adopt an unconventional, guerrilla-style force. They found an ally in Brigadier General Robert McClure, who at the time headed the Army’s psychological-warfare staff at the Pentagon.

Bank and Volckmann convinced Army leaders that there were areas in the world not susceptible to conventional warfare — especially Soviet-dominated eastern Europe — that would be ideal candidates for unconventional-warfare operations. Special operations, as envisioned by the two men — and Bank in particular — would be a force multiplier, meaning that a small number of highly-trained Soldiers could create disproportionate amounts of trouble for enemy forces.

It was a bold idea that went against the grain of traditional concepts of warfare, but by 1952, the Army was ready to embark into a new era of warfare. After months of preparation, the 10th Special Forces Group was activated at Fort Bragg, N.C., with Bank as its commander.

On the day of its activation, the 10th Group had a total strength of 10 Soldiers — Bank, one warrant officer and eight enlisted men. But that would soon change, and just over 50 years later, the nearly 10,000 Soldiers of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command continue to sustain the fight that Bank began at the opening of the Cold War.

Today, the Special Forces and other special-operations units that Bank helped create serve as the tip of the spear for the U.S. military in the global war on terrorism, serving in contingencies such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom and many others around the world.

Bank is survived by his wife, Catherine, and their two daughters, Linda Ballantine of Dana Point, Calif., and Alexandra Elliott of Anaheim, Calif.

The Bank family asks that donations be made to the Special Operations Warrior Foundation; P.O. Box 14385; Tampa, FL 33690.

This article was written by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office.
Proposal would make CMF 38 part of the active Army

The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the proponent for Civil Affairs, has approved the submission of a request to the U.S. Army Human Resources Command to add the Civil Affairs career management field, CMF 38, to the active Army. With the concurrence of the commanders of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, the SWCS commander directed the Special Operations Proponency Office to submit the proposal on March 31, 2004. The Human Resources Command initiated Armywide staffing for comments on April 14, with a suspense of June 14. If approved, the action will recode all enlisted positions in military occupational specialty 38A to MOS 38B and authorize the MOS to be held by Soldiers in the active army and the U.S. Army Reserve effective Oct. 1, 2005. Proposed growth in the force structure of the active Army will expand the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion to a brigade with four battalions. The establishment of CMF 38 as an active-component CMF would enable Reservists to transition to the active component and complete a career on active duty. The change would also reduce the strain on Civil Affairs manpower growth and training requirements. For additional information, telephone Major Michael J. Karabasz at DSN 239-6406, commercial (910) 432-6406, or send e-mail to: karabasm@soc.mil.

SF Branch seeks drill sergeants for 18X program

According to an agreement between the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., the Special Forces Enlisted Branch will begin filling seven drill-sergeant positions at the Infantry School during fiscal year 2005, in support of the 18X program. The SF Enlisted Branch is seeking volunteers from MOSs 18B and 18C for the positions but will consider SF Soldiers in MOS 18E on a case-by-case basis. The Soldiers selected will attend Drill Sergeant Course as early as July 2004 and will report for duty at the Infantry School in October 2004. Requirements are that applicants have at least 48 months service on an SF A-detachment and be able to pass the drill-sergeant selection process and background screening. Drill-sergeant duty lasts 24 months; Soldiers in the positions will not receive jump pay, but they will receive special duty assignment pay at the drill-sergeant level, which is $375 a month. For additional information on these assignments, contact Sergeant First Class Jorge Vargas at the SF Enlisted Branch, DSN 221-8399, commercial (703) 325-8399, or send e-mail to: vargasj@hoffman.army.mil.
Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, the Army G1, has authorized all officers who are career field-designated as Functional Area 39C (Civil Affairs) to regimentally affiliate with the Civil Affairs Corps in the United States Army Reserve. This is an exception to AR 600-82, *The U.S. Army Regimental System*. To request authorization to regimentally affiliate, FA 39C officers must submit their request via DA Form 4187 to: Commander, United States Army Human Resources Command, Attn: AHRC-OPY (colonels) or AHRC-OPF-B (majors and lieutenant colonels); 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0411. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6922 or commercial (910) 432-6922, or send e-mail to: goldmanj@soc.mil.

The new DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, is scheduled to be published during the summer of 2004. The Army is undergoing significant changes in personnel management, and Special Forces will see changes, though not necessarily as far-reaching as the rest of the Army. An extract of the SF chapter of DA Pamphlet 600-3 was printed in the February 2004 issue of *Special Warfare*, but all SF officers are strongly encouraged to read the new DA Pamphlet 600-3, as there have been changes since the extract was published. For additional information, telephone Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Strong at DSN 239-3296 or commercial (910) 432-3296, or send e-mail to: strongm@soc.mil.
Citing a growing role for German military forces in light of the world's changed political circumstances, commentators in and out of the German government continue to identify a need to expand Germany's special forces. According to some concepts, the expansion would include the small, elite Special Forces Commando, or KSK, and the 8,000-man Division of Special Operations, or DSO, which now comprises four airborne battalions. Elements of these forces have been widely reported as having been active in the Balkans and, more recently, in Afghanistan. Some anonymous officers have suggested that Germany — drawing on the KSK, DSO and other elements — should create larger special forces that would include a counterterrorist force, form DSO forces similar to U.S. Army Rangers, and focus on the interaction between special-operations forces and specialized detachments such as underwater-operations and air-rescue personnel. The establishment of a coordinating joint headquarters has also been postulated. Impediments to the proposed expansion and restructuring would be the long-standing shortfall in volunteers who can meet the rigorous selection criteria and the necessity of beefing up transport capabilities. These, along with considerations common in military restructuring — budget constraints, domestic political considerations and differences of viewpoint within the military establishment — will shape the structure and the mandate of future German special forces.

Fatal clashes between Mexican police and army units and the well-armed criminal group “Los Zetas” have increasingly concerned Mexican authorities and underscore the near-parity that well-funded criminal groups can achieve with law-enforcement and military organizations. Los Zetas provides firepower, security and coercion for the Gulf drug-trafficking cartel and provides the force needed for settling scores with rival drug-trafficking organizations. Mexican law-enforcement and military officials believe that Los Zetas is composed, at least in part, of former Mexican military personnel — more so than any other such group in Mexican history. Mexican military special-operations units, such as the Airborne Special Forces Groups, or GAFES, have been used extensively in counterdrug operations, but the units have had problems with corruption and human-rights violations. Disaffected members of the GAFES and similar groups have joined Los Zetas and turned their skills to murder, kidnapping and “narco-military” actions. Authorities have reported approximately 100 members of Los Zetas taking training in weapons and equipment at a site that resembles a GAFES training center. There is evidently some form of Zeta internal organization, given the existence of known Zeta components like “Comando Negro,” or the Black Command. In addition to having military training and organization, group members are also well-armed. A 40-minute firefight in Nuevo Laredo in August 2003 revealed that in addition to the standard automatic weapons (AK-47s and AR-15s), Los Zetas possessed grenade launchers and a 50-cal. machine gun.
Early in November 2003, a report attributed to sources in the Indian Central Reserve Police Force, or CRPF, raised the probability that the CRPF would create a “special strike unit” to deal with what the report characterized as a growing effort by Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence, or ISI, to destabilize India using left-wing extremist groups in at least six Indian states. The strike unit would work hand-in-hand with the actions and efforts of other security resources in the affected states. A special concern is the reported ISI effort to mobilize the Marxist-Leninist/Maoist Naxalite groups in this effort, as well as to obtain support from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. There are several dozen Naxalite groups in India whose roots stretch back to 1948. Naxalite groups have had a mixed inventory of old armaments, but they have recently acquired more sophisticated weapons. In 2002, Naxalite terrorists launched 1,465 attacks and killed 482 people. Serious and fatal attacks continued throughout 2003, featuring more sophisticated small arms and explosive devices. The Naxalite development takes place against the backdrop of a more general CRPF expansion: During the last two years, the CRPF has added 17 new battalions. CRPF recruiting for 22 additional battalions is already under way, and the force could add as many as 25 additional battalions during 2004 — which would bring the expansion to 64 new battalions in three years. If the expansion is successful, the additional 64 battalions would give the CRPF a total of 220 battalions and would likely make it the largest counterinsurgency/paramilitary force in the world.

Combat operations in Chechnya continue to generate casualties and damage to all aspects of the infrastructure. The Russian Interior Ministry — which conducts more than two-thirds of combat operations — as well as the Ministry of Defense and other special units, bear the main burden. Oil represents a special concern: The principal threat is the diversion of oil and the establishment by irregular forces of small, illegal oil-production enterprises. Russian authorities say oil diversion and illegal production are used to generate great sums of money for the support of Chechen armed-opposition groups. They liken the profits from oil diversion to drug-trafficking revenues. The problem of securing oil pipelines and other resources that are subject to attack by irregular forces has preoccupied military forces in many parts of the world. In Chechnya, where Russian forces and the key infrastructure they seek to protect face the potential of daily attack or theft, republic police have constituted what they refer to as an “oil special forces regiment” of some 1,200 men. Armed and equipped much like the Russian Interior Ministry’s special police, the force is divided into mobile groups whose mission is to provide continuous protection to the pipeline as well as to Chechen oil-production facilities generally. The “oil units” patrol roads and stop suspicious trucks they believe to be carrying stolen oil. If their suspicions are borne out, they destroy the vehicles. The oil units come under attack from guerrillas and need to be continually prepared to defend themselves.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., who recently retired from the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
Parker assumes command of SWCS

Major General James W. Parker assumed command of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School June 10 in the SWCS Auditorium at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Parker previously served as Director of the Center for Special Operations, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. His other assignments include director, Intelligence and Information Operations Center, USSOCOM; commander, Special Operations Command South; operations officer and chief of staff, U.S. Army Forces Command; deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; commander, 7th SF Group; commander, 17th SF Group; and U.S. adviser to the Salvadoran 4th Infantry Brigade in El Salvador.

A native of Miami, Fla., Parker enlisted in the Army in 1970. He began his special-operations career at Fort Bragg, where he served on an A-detachment with the 7th SF Group before attending Officer Candidate School in 1975.

The previous SWCS commander, Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, relinquished command June 4 and is scheduled to retire from the Army in August.

SWCS writing new MTP for PSYOP dissemination units

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School’s Psychological Operations Training and Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, is writing a new mission training plan, or MTP, for PSYOP dissemination battalions. The MTP will delineate the collective tasks and describe operations conducted by the highly skilled Soldiers in those unique units.

The MTP, ARTEP 33-715-MTP, will apply to active-duty and reserve-component PSYOP units. The 3rd Psychological Operations Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, is the only active-duty PSYOP dissemination unit. The reserve-component PSYOP dissemination unit is the 7th PSYOP Group’s 17th PSYOP Battalion, which has companies in Joliet, Ill., and Los Alamitos, Calif. In the future, the Army plans to add an additional reserve-component PSYOP dissemination battalion.

PSYOP dissemination battalions provide audiovisual and printed materials, signal support, media-broadcast capabilities and electronic-maintenance services to PSYOP groups, regional PSYOP battalions and tactical PSYOP battalions. The new MTP will provide doctrinal guidance to assist dissemination battalions in developing their training plans. The MTP will address the tasks required to train Soldiers on PSYOP-specific systems, such as the Special Operations Media System B, Deployable Print Production Center, Theatre Media Production Center and the new Media Operations Center located at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Active- and reserve-component subject-matter experts are developing the author’s draft of the new MTP with input from key personnel from the 3rd and 17th PSYOP battalions. The initial draft is scheduled to be available for review in the spring of 2005. The PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division will alert units when the new manual will be staffed for comments.

PSYOP commanders, staff officers and Soldiers of every skill level should review the initial draft and provide input. Once approved, the MTP will be accessible through the ASOCNet, the DOTD Web site, the PSYOP section of the ARSOF Doctrine and Training Library, and through Army Knowledge Online.

For additional information, contact the project officer, Captain Matthew Berriman, commander of the 306th PSYOP Company (310-995-6288); or Staff Sergeant John Tuel, DOTD PSYOP Division (910-432-7257, DSN 239-7257 or e-mail: tuelj@soc.mil).

Manuals to update doctrine for SF advanced skills

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is working on new and updated doctrinal publications that have applicability to Special Forces advanced skills.

The Advanced Skills Branch, SF Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, has produced a new manual, FM 3-05.221, Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat. Incorrectly printed the first time, FM 3-05.221 has been reprinted and is being distributed to SF units. For more information, telephone Master Sergeant Stephen M. Ryan at DSN 239-5952 or commercial (910) 432-5952, or send e-mail to: ryanst@soc.mil.

The Advanced Skills Branch is also completing the final draft of FM 3-05.212, SF Waterborne Operations. The FM has been updated.
with changes that will enable users to conduct waterborne missions more efficiently. The final draft of FM 3-05.212 is scheduled to be ready for distribution by September. For more information, telephone CWO 3 Jeff Kula at DSN 239-5952 or commercial (910) 432-5952, or send e-mail to: kulaj@soc.mil.

The Advanced Skills Branch is also making changes to update FM 3-05.211, *SF MFF Operations*. The updated manual will contain comprehensive information on military free-fall missions so that users will not need to consult any other publications. FM 3-05.211 is also scheduled for distribution to field units by September. For more information, telephone CWO 3 Randall C. Wurst at DSN 239-5952 or commercial (910) 432-5952, or send e-mail to: wurstr@soc.mil.

In conjunction with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Regular Army, the Advanced Skills Branch has produced a new training circular, TC 28-8-1, *Army Special Operations Forces Training Ranges*, which is a restricted supplement to TC 25-8, *Army Training Ranges*. TC 28-8-1 describes innovative ranges and complexes that can be built and used by Regular Army units or by units of Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF.

The information in TC 28-8-1 will give units the opportunity and the ability to train in state-of-the-art complexes and ranges. TC 28-8-1 standardizes 10 ARSOF ranges that have been approved by the Army and incorporated into the Army’s Master Range Program. For more information, telephone Master Sergeant Stephen M. Ryan at DSN 239-5952 or commercial (910) 432-5952, or send e-mail to: ryanst@soc.mil.

The Advanced Skills Branch has also produced a six-part CD-ROM video collection of tactics, techniques and procedures to be used when working with pack animals. The videos are for use in conjunction with FM 3-05.213, *SF Use of Pack Animals*. For more information, telephone Master Sergeant Joseph Register at DSN 239-5952 or commercial (910) 432-5952, or send e-mail to: registej@soc.mil.

With SF at the forefront in the war on terrorism, capturing emerging SF doctrine is critical to the success of the force. Anyone who has better techniques or lessons learned should forward the information to the SF Doctrine Division so that it can be documented and distributed to other SF Soldiers. Sharing the information can make SF a safer and more lethal fighting force.

### 3rd SF Group receives new commander

Colonel Patrick M. Higgins accepted command of the 3rd Special Forces Group June 8 at Dick Meadows Field, Fort Bragg, N.C. Higgins was previously operations officer for Special Operations Command Central, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. His other special-operations assignments include detachment commander, battalion S4, battalion executive officer and battalion commander, 5th SF Group; assignments officer, SF Branch, Total Army Personnel Command; action officer, Special Operations Division, Operations Directorate, The Joint Staff; and chief of the Special Forces Branch, Total Army Personnel Command.

The previous 3rd Group commander, Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, is scheduled to retire from the Army in October.

### SWCS civilian instructor receives Simons award

A civilian employee of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has received a lifetime achievement honor for his five decades of uniformed and civilian service with the Army and SF communities.

Ernest K. Tabata, a demolitions expert and SF instructor, received the Bull Simons Award May 12 from General Bryan Brown, commanding general of the U.S. Special Operations Command, at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

Named for legendary SF Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons, the Simons Award is presented to individuals who embody the spirit, values and skills that Simons exemplified. Previous award recipients include H. Ross Perot, the Honorable William S. Cohen, General Edward “Shy” Meyer, the Honorable John O. Marsh Jr., Colonel Aaron Bank, Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, Lieutenant General Leroy Manor, the Honorable Sam Nunn and Brigadier General Harry “Heinie” Aderholt.

After serving two years with the Hawaiian Territorial Guard, Tabata enlisted in the Army in 1948. He served in the Korean War and was discharged in 1952 but re-enlisted in 1955. After serving as a paratrooper in the 82nd and 11th Airborne divisions, he volunteered for Special Forces training in 1961.

Soon after completing SF training, Tabata volunteered for a clandestine mission in Laos, Operation White Star, led by then-Lieutenant Colonel Bull Simons. Tabata later served three tours in Vietnam, two of them with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, or MACV SOG. On his first MACV SOG tour, Tabata was a reconnaissance-team leader. In 1981, after 30 years of active-duty service, he retired as a command sergeant major.

In 1984, Tabata returned to SF as a civilian instructor at SWCS. Twenty years later, he continues to teach engineering and demolitions skills to SF candidates. At age 73, he still makes static-line parachute jumps as required in the course of his duties. — Captain John DeNicola, USN; USSOCOM PAO

May 2004
Book Reviews


This short report from RAND is a must-read for operators and for policy-makers who are developing strategy for the global war on terrorism.

War in our civilized age is aimed at influencing the behavior of an adversary by destroying, or threatening to destroy, what he values — usually military forces or economic assets. However, our adversaries in the current war do not have a traditional target array for us to destroy or threaten. Those targets that exist are small, mobile and often hidden among innocents. Davis and Jenkins analyze the al-Qaeda terrorist organization as a system and propose a method for determining ways of influencing both the individual parts of that system and the system as a whole.

The authors are well-qualified and bring complementary capabilities and perspectives to the report. Dr. Paul K. Davis, a research leader and professor at the RAND graduate school, has extensive practical, academic and research experience in military affairs and analysis. He served six years in the federal government, eventually becoming a senior executive and an acting deputy assistant secretary in the Department of Defense.

Brian Michael Jenkins brings field and research perspectives to the report. He served as a Special Forces officer during the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam. An acknowledged terrorism expert, he serves as a consultant and writes extensively on international terrorism.

The authors open the report with a discussion of terrorists’ motivation and commitment to their cause, the cultural traditions of violence, and al-Qaeda’s organizational structure. The discussion covers all parts of the terrorists’ organization, from grass-roots support and sympathetic governments to the terrorist core. It provides strategic insight into how each part of the terrorist system can — or cannot — be influenced and describes techniques for evaluating and predicting the interactions between parts of the terrorist system. Those interactions can then be exploited to influence the behavior of the terrorist “foot soldiers.”

In any conflict, there is a range of coercive options available for influencing enemy behavior — from co-option to persuasion, deterrence to destruction. As the title suggests, the authors focus on deterrence. They assert that governments must isolate individual terrorist vulnerabilities (family, tribe, home and people) and use both the mailed fist and the velvet glove to deter and disrupt future terrorist plans.

A successful counterterrorist strategy, they argue, shows attributes of manifest determination, relentless actions, moral validity, and a strategy that balances political, economic, military and cultural components. The lesson for operators and policy-makers is that a strictly military strategy cannot defeat terrorism.

While there may be no single center of gravity for terrorists, vulnerabilities should be exploited using a series of effects-based actions and a portfolio of influence techniques. A key emphasis in the authors’ prescription is the use of tailored, decentralized and adaptive responses. The report recognizes that one of the most effective ways of deterring terrorist actions is to either disrupt attempted attacks or to destroy as much of the terrorist system as possible in response to an attack. The authors make a fundamental assumption that most terrorists (even suicide bombers) are rational and will shy away from futile efforts to concentrate on more effective and damaging attacks.

The authors complete the report with broad strategic prescriptions and discussions on deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction, on political warfare, and on the clash...
between American values and those
of several of our regional allies.

Davis and Jenkins cannot pro-
vide a complete strategy in a short
report, but they do provide a useful
template and techniques for devel-
oping a comprehensive strategy for
the global war on terrorism. Their
report should be on the reading list
of every policy-maker or strategist.

Colonel John D. Jogerst, USAF
Special Operations Chair
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Across the Fence: The Secret
War in Vietnam. By John Stryker
Meyer. St. Ann, Mo.: Real War Sto-
$24.95. 246 pages.

During the Vietnam War, the
cross-border reconnaissance teams
of the Military Assistance Com-
mand, Vietnam’s Studies and
Observation Group, or MACV
SOG, suffered casualties on a level
reminiscent of Civil War units.

Initially, SOG had no formal in-
country training programs. That
was a reflection of the newness of
the program and the quality, actu-
al and anticipated, of the partici-
pants. In order to train their
teams, team leaders employed all
the skills that they had acquired in
years of Army training and in comb-
bat in Korea, in Laos and during
dearer Vietnam tours. Among
these early leaders were combat-
savvy veterans such as Master
Sergeants Dick Meadows, Jerry
Wareing, “Snuffy” Conroy, Ted
Braden and Don Fowler.

Unfortunately, the early personnel
wealth did not last. Casualties, pro-
motions, commissionings, retire-
ments, the rotation policy and the
competing demands of both SF and
the “big Army” for skilled NCOs soon
created a shortage of experienced
operators. Replacements reporting to
SOG were soon considerably less
experienced than desired.

A couple of years later, SOG had
developed training courses for its
newly assigned reconnaissance per-
sonnel, including one for the recon-
naissance leaders, or “one-zeros.”

During the interim between the
time of highly experienced personnel
and the establishment of in-country
training programs, the author of
Across the Fence, John Stryker
Meyer, arrived at SOG. In the grade
of specialist, Stryker, a 21-year-old
radio operator who had less than 18
months in the Army, faced demands
for which he had no experience and
had received scant training.

When Meyer arrived, the bleak
operational conditions that were to
exist throughout the duration of the
SOG reconnaissance effort prevailed.
Specifically, SOG’s ability to reinforce
engaged teams was greatly restricted
by the extended operational ranges
and the small number of available lift
aircraft. The operational ranges also
obviated any support by ground fires.
The teams were totally dependent on
U.S. Air Force aircraft that were with-
in FM radio range for communica-
tions, for reporting intelligence, for
requesting air support and for
requesting withdrawal.

Also by the time Meyer arrived,
the enemy had recognized the
inherent vulnerabilities of the
small SOG reconnaissance teams
and had made provisions for find-
and destroying them. Few mis-
sions were without enemy contact.
Meyer, with only local team train-
ing, was soon running missions
“across the fence,” i.e., into Cambo-
dia and Laos, first as a radio oper-
ator and later as a one-zero. His
descriptions of these missions are
the essence of the book.

Meyer describes the missions
essentially as he experienced them.
Only rarely does he allow subse-
quently reflection or facts determined
later to intrude into his account. He
is an excellent writer, describing peo-
ple, equipment, events, emotions and
thoughts with accuracy and a dis-
arming frankness.

One of the few faults of this book
is its total lack of maps. Pictures are
limited to two on the book's dust
jacket, but pictures from opera-
tional areas were difficult to take
and to retain: the intelligence oper-
ators demanded everything. The
general reader unfamiliar with the
clothing, equipment and aircraft
Meyer describes might wish to have
a copy of John Plaster's SOG, a
Photo History of the Secret Wars
(Paladin, 2000) within reach.

This book does not purport to be
history. It is a highly personal and
exceptionally detailed memoir. For
such a level of detail to be included
in a book written 35 years after the
events is truly impressive. Across
the Fence is recommended reading
for those who want to know what
Southeast Asia reconnaissance
operations were really like and
who want to know the quality of
the SF men who conducted them.

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Special Warfare