In November, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command will mark the 29th anniversary of the Son Tay Raid by dedicating a statue to “Bull” Simons, who led the raid. Simons is remembered as a dedicated soldier who was loyal to the men who served under him. In honoring his memory, we recognize his service, his duty and his loyalty as qualities for which all SOF soldiers should strive. “Bull” Simons richly deserves such recognition.

Yet in all our memorialization, we have not yet recognized the man who did much to make our modern Army special-operations forces possible. The man whose vision and efforts did most to make psychological warfare and unconventional warfare permanent capabilities in the U.S. Army is unknown to many soldiers who have spent the majority of their careers in SOF. I refer to Major General Robert Alexis McClure.

In this issue, Dr. Al Paddock details Major General McClure’s service and the role that Major General McClure played in the creation of Army SOF. Through diligent research, Dr. Paddock has reconstructed the early days of Army special warfare. His article shows the planning and the effort that were needed to make an Army special-warfare capability a reality.

From his assignments during World War II, Major General McClure acquired a unique appreciation of the value of UW and PSYWAR capabilities. He envisioned a permanent special-warfare capability, and his commitment to that idea caused him to pursue the concept with military and civilian officials after the war. Major General McClure never gave up, despite resistance within the Army and from other agencies. His persistence led to the formation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare and, ultimately, to the creation of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg and to the founding of the 10th Special Forces Group.

Those of us who serve in Army SOF today owe a great debt to Major General McClure. As we search the past for heroes, we could find no one more deserving of honors than the man whom Dr. Paddock has rightfully called the forgotten father of Army special warfare, Robert Alexis McClure. I am confident that Major General McClure will receive the proper recognition that he has so well earned.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra
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Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of Army Special Warfare

by Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr.

Where is the monument to honor the man who provided the vision and the impetus for establishing U.S. Army special warfare? More than 42 years after his death, visitors to Smoke Bomb Hill still find no evidence of his place in special-operations history. In fact, most SOF soldiers are unfamiliar with his name. Robert Alexis McClure is the forgotten father of Army special warfare.

McClure was born March 4, 1897, in Mattoon, Ill. After graduating from Kentucky Military Institute in 1915, he served with the Philippine Constabulary as a second lieutenant. On Aug. 9, 1917, he earned a Regular Army commission and was promoted to first lieutenant. From then until the eve of World War II, he served in a variety of infantry and service-school assignments in China and in the United States. During the interwar years, McClure, like other career officers, found promotion excruciatingly slow; he served in the rank of captain for 17 years.

By 1941, however, McClure was a lieutenant colonel with orders to London, where he was to serve as the assistant military attaché. In swift succession, he earned promotions to colonel and brigadier general, and he became the military attaché to the American Embassy in London. As an additional duty, he served as military attaché to nine European governments in exile. In September 1942, General Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed McClure to his Allied Forces headquarters as chief of intelligence for the European theater of operations. During the next three months, McClure’s career took a new direction — one that would immerse McClure in a new and different field for most of the rest of his life.

In December 1942, from “somewhere in Africa,” McClure wrote to his wife, Marjory: “My new job — for which I was called by
Ike — very hurriedly — is a continual headache — I have what I call the INC Section — I am just creating it.” In preparation for the North African landings, Eisenhower had put McClure in charge of the Information and Censorship Section, or INC, of the Allied Forces headquarters. It was McClure’s job to consolidate several functions for which most Army officers had little preparation: public relations, censorship and psychological warfare. As McClure colorfully stated, the job also carried with it a “slop over into civil affairs.”

The INC was, indeed, an ungainly organization that included military and civilian personnel from the U.S. Office of War Information, or OWI; the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, or OSS; the British Political Warfare Executive, or PWE; and the U.S. Army. McClure vividly outlined the scope of his new responsibilities in a September 1943 letter to Marjory:

We operate 12 high powered radio stations — 6 of them are stronger than WLW in Cincinnati. My Psychological Warfare staff — radio, leaflet, signals, front line, occupation, domestic propaganda personnel, exceed 700. In censorship — troop, mail, and cables, civilian mail, radio, press, cables, telephone for all of North & West Africa, Sicily, etc., over 400 personnel & supervising 700 French. Public relations — press and correspondents — 150 correspondents — 250 personnel — a total “command” of 1500 in an organization never contemplated in the Army.

By the end of the North African and Sicilian campaigns, McClure believed that psychological warfare had become, for him, the “big job,” and he felt good about its contribution: “Our propaganda did a lot to break the Wops — as their emissaries admit — now we have to turn it on the Germans,” he wrote to Marjory. But the “big job” was to become even bigger.

In early 1944, General Eisenhower authorized the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, or PWD/SHAEF, to support the European campaign against Nazi Germany. McClure, as its director, controlled and coordinated psychological warfare in continental Europe. For years afterward, he emphasized that PWD was built upon the trial-and-error experience of his ordeal in starting up and running INC in North Africa — in particular, the Psychological Warfare
Branch. In North Africa and in Europe, McClure’s definition of psychological warfare was quite concise, yet inclusive, by today’s standards: “The dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the enemy’s will to resist, demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters.”

In Europe, PWD made radio broadcasts from OWI transmitters and over the British Broadcasting Corporation; conducted loudspeaker broadcasts on the front lines; and conducted large-scale leaflet operations using specially designated aircraft squadrons. PWD even provided leaflets to be dispersed by the then-novel method of specially designed artillery shells. McClure had four deputies, each representing a civilian agency that contributed personnel to PWD: OWI, OSS, PWE, and the British Ministry of Information. By the end of the war in Europe, PWD controlled the activities of more than 2,300 military and civilian personnel from two countries. As he had in the North African and Italian campaigns, McClure demonstrated his ability to manage personnel of quite different backgrounds and temperaments. It was one of his most successful leadership traits.

But even after V-E day, McClure’s job was far from finished. Eisenhower once again called upon McClure, directing him to participate in planning for the occupation of Germany. McClure jubilantly wrote to Marjory on May 8, 1945:

_The shooting war is over, here! Signed yesterday. Paris is wild with excitement. … With one phase over I am now up to my neck on the control phase. We will rigidly control all newspapers, films, theatre, radio, music, etc., in Germany! My division now publishes 8 newspapers in Germany with 1,000,000 circulation and sends 2 million+ language papers each day by air for displaced persons and POWs. Biggest newspaper enterprise in the world._

Essentially, McClure’s Psychological Warfare Division changed names, becoming the Information Control Division, or ICD. ICD took on a new role as a key player in the reorientation and de-Nazification of Germany. The change was not totally abrupt —
during the combat phase PWD worked closely in support of Civil Affairs with its “consolidation propaganda,” the purpose of which was both to gain the cooperation of the German population in restoring essential services, and to create a public opinion favorable to post-war Allied aims. ICD thus became an integral part of the U.S. military-government (or Civil Affairs) effort in the U.S. portion of occupied Germany. McClure reported to General Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. military governor.

The reorientation of the German population was a formidable task. McClure undertook it in three phases: first, the complete shutdown of all media; second, operation by U.S. forces of selected instruments of information (radio, newspapers, etc.); and, third, a gradual turnover of these instruments, by licensing them to carefully selected Germans. McClure’s aims were to cause individual Germans to renounce Nazism and militarism, and to help them take their place in a democratic society. McClure's ICD organization mirrored the German media, with five “control” branches for radio, press, film, theater and music, and publications. A sixth branch, intelligence, focused on public-opinion research, with emphasis on German bureaucracies, youth, and the church. ICD had a wide-ranging charter, indeed, as McClure wrote to his friend and vice-president of Time-Life, Inc., C.D. Jackson, in July 1946:

*We now control 37 newspapers, 6 radio stations, 314 theatres, 642 movies, 101 magazines, 237 book publishers, 7,384 book dealers and printers, and conduct about 15 public opinion surveys a month, as well as publish one newspaper with 1,500,000 circulation, 3 magazines, run the Associated Press of Germany (DANA), and operate 20 library centers. ... The job is tremendous.*

In the summer of 1948, the Army decided that McClure’s experience could best be used in a similar assignment in the U.S. As chief of the New York field office of the Army’s Civil Affairs Division, McClure was responsible for supporting U.S. reorientation and re-education efforts in the occupied countries of Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea. He reported to Major General Daniel Noce, chief of Civil Affairs in the Pentagon, whose office serviced and controlled all military government in occupied areas. As he had done in his previous assignment in Germany, McClure organized the New York field office into sections for press, periodicals, motion pictures, radio, theater, music, arts, exhibits, libraries, and book rights.

There was, however, another aspect of McClure’s activities during the postwar period that would bear importantly on the future of Army special warfare. After the massive demobilization of U.S. military forces during 1945-46, American concerns about the Soviet Union’s intentions grew in intensity, ushering in the Cold War.

For four years, McClure engaged in a dialogue with a number of high-ranking officers and civilian officials in an effort to rebuild the military psychological-warfare capability that had essentially been dissipated during the general demobilization. In a letter to the War Department in early 1946, McClure advocated the integration of material on psychological warfare into service-school curricula, stating, “The ignorance, among military personnel, about psychological warfare, even now, is astounding.” In June 1947, McClure sent a memo to his old boss from World War II — now Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower — urging, “Psychological warfare must become a part of every future war plan.”

In June 1947, McClure sent a memo to his old boss from World War II — now Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower — urging, ‘Psychological warfare must become a part of every future war plan.’
al Charles Bolte, the Army Staff G3, requested that McClure report to Washington for a few days to help him determine, with respect to psychological warfare, “the further organizational steps necessary to meet the operational requirements of the Korean situation or of a general war.” The latter contingency was key: Even during the Far East crisis, the Army believed that the greater threat lay in a potential invasion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union, and it wanted to create an unconventional-warfare capability primarily for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in Europe in the event of a Soviet invasion. Bolte added, “I know of no one better qualified to assist us in that respect.” For McClure, “a few days,” became the formative years of Army special warfare.

On the basis of McClure’s recommendations, the Army first established a psychological-warfare division in the G3, with McClure as its first chief, and then made it a special staff office reporting directly to the Army chief of staff. Because of his association with the OSS during World War II, McClure appreciated the potential of unconventional warfare, and he lobbied for, and received, staff proponency for UW as well. On Jan. 15, 1951, the Army formally recognized the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, or OCPW — the first organization of its type in Army history. Although McClure’s new office started out with a staff of only five men, that number eventually grew to more than 100.

OCPW’s mission was “to formulate and develop psychological warfare and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policy and to recom-
mend policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in these fields.” McClure organized his office into three divisions: Psychological Warfare, Requirements and Special Operations. The latter was particularly significant, because it formulated plans for the creation of the Army’s first formal unconventional-warfare capability: Special Forces.

Realizing that his firsthand experience was basically in psychological warfare and Civil Affairs, McClure told his staff early on that he was “fighting for officers with background and experience in special operations.” He brought into the Special Operations Division several officers who had World War II or Korean War experience either in guerrilla warfare or in long-range-penetration units.

Two officers who played particularly key roles in developing the plans for the creation of Special Forces were Colonel Aaron Bank and Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann. Bank had fought with the French Maquis as a member of OSS. Volckmann had organized and conducted guerrilla-warfare operations in the Philippines during World War II; during the Korean War, he had planned and directed behind-the-lines operations in North Korea.

Volckmann later remembered that McClure had approached him in Walter Reed Hospital (where Volckmann had been evacuated from Korea) with a request to help organize the Special Operations Division. It was only after being assured that the Army was interested in organized behind-the-lines operations that Volckmann agreed to take the job. Bank later gave Volckmann considerable credit for the “development of position, planning, and policy papers that helped sell the establishment of Special Forces units in the active Army.”

McClure assumed a leading role in “selling” the need for an unconventional-warfare capability to the senior military and civilian leadership. In the face of fierce resistance, ... Special Forces became a reality largely through the persistence of McClure and through the efforts of Bank and Volckmann.

Creating an unconventional-warfare capability was not the only challenge on OCPW’s plate. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the Tactical Information Detachment at Fort Riley, Kan., was the only operational psychological-warfare troop unit in the Army. After its deployment to Korea, the detachment became the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet, or L&L, Company, and it served as the 8th Army’s tactical-propaganda unit throughout the conflict. By April 1951, McClure had requested the activation of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet, or RB&L, Group to assist

the Far East Command, or FECOM, in conducting strategic propaganda; the 2nd L&L company at Fort Riley, a prototype unit; the 5th L&L Company at Fort Riley, scheduled to be sent to FECOM; and the 301st (Reserve) RB&L Group, to be trained at Fort Riley and then shipped to Europe. Thus, while he was in the process of staffing his own unprecedented office — OCPW — McClure moved quickly to assist FECOM in its organization and conduct of both psychological warfare and unconventional warfare, while he concurrently helped the European Command prepare for the employment of both capabilities in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.

One other part of McClure’s vision remained to be accomplished — centralizing the functions of what he called, “the whole field of OCPW.” Psychological warfare possessed a formal lineage and a tra-
dition in the Army, which unconventional warfare did not, and McClure believed that the two capabilities should be combined under a single headquarters.

During that period of postwar budgetary austerity, McClure encountered considerable resistance to this idea, but he was able to convince the Army chief of staff, General J. Lawton Collins, that a central organization was necessary for consolidating the training activities for psychological warfare and Special Forces. Accordingly, in May 1952, the Army formally announced the activation of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission was:

To conduct individual training and supervise unit training in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations; to develop and test Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment employed in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations.

As it was originally established, the Psychological Warfare Center consisted of the Psychological Warfare School, the 6th RB&L Group, a psychological-warfare board (to test materiel, doctrine, techniques and tactics for psychological warfare and for Special Forces), and the 10th Special Forces Group. Colonel Charles Karlstad, former chief of staff of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Ga., was the first to serve as commander of the Center and commandant of the Psychological Warfare School. The Psychological Warfare School's organization reflected the Center's mission. It consisted of a headquarters staff and two instructional divisions — one for psychological warfare, the other for Special Forces.

Initially, the 6th RB&L Group was the largest unit in the Center's force structure. Formed at Fort Riley and then shipped to Fort Bragg in June 1952, the 6th consisted of a headquarters company, the 7th Reproduction Company, the 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company and the 2nd L&L Company. In May 1953, OCPW activated the 12th Consolidation Company under the 6th RB&L Group. The organizational concept of the 6th RB&L Group, the forerunner of today's psychological-operations group, was first employed in Korea. The ancestry of the mobile radio company, however, can be traced to McClure's PWD/SHAEF, which used several such companies to support front-line combat forces in Europe during World War II.

McClure selected Bank from the OCPW staff to command the 10th Special Forces Group. Bank's "command" in June 1952 consisted of seven enlisted men and one warrant officer — a rather inauspicious beginning. But by April 1953, with the aid of vigorous OCPW recruiting efforts throughout the Army, the 10th had increased to 1,700 officers and enlisted men.

Essentially, the 10th Special Forces Group represented a pool of trained manpower from which units or combinations of units could be drawn to execute specific unconventional-warfare missions. At the heart of the group's organization was the operational detachment, or "team," established along the same lines as the OSS operational group. Commanded by a captain, the team, with a first-lieutenant executive officer and 13 NCOs, was capable of infiltrating behind enemy lines to organize, train and direct friendly resistance forces
in guerrilla warfare. Early training focused on the individual skills of the various members of the team: operations and intelligence, light and heavy weapons, demolitions, radio communications, and medical. Each man trained thoroughly in his particular specialty, then participated in cross-training to learn the rudiments of the other skills.

By early 1953, most of McClure’s major programs had been launched; nevertheless, he was surprised to learn that he was being assigned to Iran as chief of the U.S. Military Mission. The rationale was that he had been in a specialized activity too long. The Army chief of staff, General Collins, implied that McClure’s chances for promotion would be enhanced by the new assignment.

In Iran, McClure formed close associations with the Shah and the Iranian senior military. As Collins had predicted, McClure was promoted to major general. In 1956, McClure retired from the Army, ending more than 39 years of continuous active service. While driving cross-country with Marjory to San Clemente, Calif., where they planned to build their dream home, McClure became seriously ill. He died of a heart attack at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., on Jan. 1, 1957, two months prior to his 60th birthday.

Robert A. McClure’s position as the founder of Army special warfare seems indisputable. Over a critical period of 10 years, he made vital contributions to psychological warfare, to Civil Affairs, and to the creation of Army Special Forces. But his most important legacy may have been the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center. From its humble beginning, that institution grew, becoming the Special Warfare Center in 1956 and later evolving into the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School. Yet despite the fact that McClure made all these things possible, his role has gone largely unrecognized. Robert A. McClure remains the forgotten father of U.S. Army special warfare.

Author’s note: I first read about Major General Robert A. McClure during the 1970s, while I was conducting research in the National Archives for my Ph.D. dissertation on the origins of the Army’s special-warfare capability. Having served several tours with Special Forces during the 1960s without ever reading or hearing about him, I was amazed to discover the central role that McClure played in the creation of a permanent psychological- and unconventional-warfare capability. This article is drawn from that dissertation in history at Duke University; from my subsequent book, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (National Defense University Press, 1982); and from my more recent research in General McClure’s personal papers. I am deeply indebted to Colonel Robert D. McClure, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), and his wife, Betty Ann, for giving me complete access to General McClure’s papers.

Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr. completed his 31-year Army career as a colonel in October 1988. His military career included command and staff assignments in Korea, Laos, Okinawa, Vietnam and the U.S. He served three combat tours with SF units in Southeast Asia. Among his varied assignments, Paddock was an instructor of strategic studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; he served in the Politico-Military Division of the Army Staff in Washington, D.C.; he commanded the 6th PSYOP Battalion and the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg; and he was the military member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. Paddock completed his military career as the Director for PSYOP, Office of the Secretary of Defense. A graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College, he earned a B.A. in political science from Park College. Paddock also holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Duke University.
Throughout my career I have served with, fought alongside, and had admiration for the Army aviators who accompany special-operations forces into battle. In Vietnam, few served with more courage or with more distinction than the pilots, crew chiefs and gunners who supported Special Forces. Hovering overhead, often in the face of withering enemy fire, they provided critical fire support and a vital lifeline to their comrades fighting on the ground below.

There is not a day in my life that I do not pause for a moment and reflect on the bravery displayed by one of those aviators, Captain Bob Moeberg. Bob was the pilot of a helicopter that extracted my Special Forces Project Delta team from the jungle after we had spent seven days evading North Vietnamese forces. As Bob maneuvered the aircraft overhead, the crew chief lowered the jungle penetrator; however, even when fully extended, it did not reach all the way down through the triple-canopy jungle, and it was just out of reach for most of my team. We were finally able to lift the team members up to reach the penetrator, and then I jumped up, barely snagging it.

As I was winched up through the jungle canopy, I could see where the rotor blades were striking the treetops. Bob had had to hover that low, risking himself, his crew, and his aircraft just to reach us. As I looked into the cockpit, I could see Bob’s fiercely determined face, a look of intense concentration and absolute focus, tinged by apprehension about enemy fire and whether the blades would survive the beating they had taken from striking the treetops.

I have never forgotten the feel of that vibrating Huey as it rolled out and gained altitude; nor have I ever forgotten the courage of that warrior and his crew as they accomplished a very dangerous mission.

Those aviators who flew with and fought alongside Special Forces in Vietnam will always have a special place in my heart, and their valor is without question. However, during the war and throughout the 1970s, there was no permanent special-operations aviation organization. The tragic experience at Desert One in Iran in 1980 was the event that finally, and with unmistakable clarity, demonstrated the need for the superb rotary-wing capability that the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment now provides. In a very real sense, Desert One was the catalyst that led to the creation of special-operations aviation.

If we compare the venerable Huey of the Vietnam era with the highly sophisticated aircraft in the regiment today — aircraft that are air-refuelable and that are outfit-
ted with the latest avionics and night-vision capabilities — it is easy to see how far we have come in developing special-operations aviation. While the technology has changed dramatically, the courage, skill and determination of the men who flew with Special Forces in Vietnam remain and have flourished in those who fly with the 160th today.

Throughout the short history of the 160th, its aviators have pioneered night flight tactics and techniques, led the development of new equipment and procedures, met the call to duty wherever it sounded, and earned a reputation for excellence and valor that is second to none. From their 1983 baptism of fire in Grenada to today, the 160th aviators have always lived up to their motto, “Night Stalkers Don’t Quit.”

Indeed, the history of the regiment is a tale of courage, honor and glory against seemingly insurmountable odds in faraway places and in skies filled with danger. While there are many noteworthy chapters in the annals of the 160th, an unforgettable episode was written in an ancient, windswept city on the Horn of Africa during the hot, terrible summer of 1993, when elements of the 160th deployed to Somalia as part of Task Force Ranger. The heroism displayed by the regiment’s members in that war-torn country forged a record that will endure forever.

On Oct. 3, 1993, the regiment lost five crewmen and two MH-60 aircraft in Mogadishu to hostile ground fire, and three more aircraft were hit so badly that they had to make emergency landings. In the midst of this chaos, in the most intense firefight since Vietnam, the pilots and crew chiefs of the 160th displayed incredible bravery and valor, as well as a tremendous sense of self-sacrifice.

On that day, in a valiant attempt to res-
cue wounded comrades on the ground below, two very special, special-operations soldiers, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randy Shugart, jumped from a Black Hawk into a blazing firefight. The nation knows about the deeds of these two great NCOs, deeds for which they were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, but few know about the countless acts of valor performed by the members of the 160th in that battle.

After inserting Gordon and Shugart into a hail of fire, the Black Hawk, with the call sign Super 62, went into an overhead orbit to provide close air support. Despite being pounded by extremely heavy fire from automatic weapons and rocked by explosions from volleys of rocket-propelled grenades, Super 62 remained in position, kept aloft by its pilots, Chief Warrant Officer Mike Goffena and Captain Jim Yacone, while its crew, Staff Sergeants Paul Shannon and Mason Hall, covered their fellow soldiers on the ground. To those who were watching, the aircraft seemed, at times, to defy the laws of physics, and it became so badly damaged that Goffena had to make an emergency landing.

While their heroism was noteworthy, it was the norm that day, repeated in innumerable other incidents that took place in the center of Mogadishu. Two other unassuming pilots, true “quiet professionals,” Chief Warrant Officers Keith Jones and Karl Maier, were flying an MH-6 “Little Bird” with the call sign Star 41. Star 41 was literally the cavalry coming to the rescue of the soldiers trapped in a hellish part of that ancient city.

Jones and Maier landed in an alley with just two feet of rotor clearance from the walls on either side. Jones leapt out, fought his way over to two wounded special operators and then struggled back to the air-
craft with them. Meanwhile, Maier held the controls of the helicopter with his right hand while firing his MP-5 submachine gun with his left. Amid a hail of small-arms fire, and with enemy soldiers dead and wounded all around, Star 41 and its crew lifted off with the wounded special operators on board.

Not long after Star 41 had taken off, another Black Hawk, flown by Warrant Officer Dan Jollata, was hovering over the city while two Air Force pararescuemen, or PJs, Master Sergeant Scott Fales and Technical Sergeant Tim Wilkinson, fast-roped in. As Jollata held his hover, a rocket-propelled grenade exploded on the left side of the aircraft. Realizing immediately that his aircraft had been hit and that it was badly damaged, Jollata nevertheless avoided his natural inclination to pull up and get away, knowing that such a move would doom Fales and Wilkinson. Despite the helicopter's damaged main rotor housing and a destroyed cooling system, Jollata held his hover. Only when the PJs were on the ground did he attempt to fly his crippled aircraft back to base.

While all of this was going on, four of the Night Stalkers' AH-6 “Gunbirds” made scores of gun runs — in all, 280 runs over 18 consecutive hours! — providing deadly and accurate fire, some of it “danger close,” to help the soldiers on the ground hold their perimeter. All told, the gunbirds fired more than 50,000 machine-gun rounds and 70 rockets during the battle.

How do you describe these actions to the average American? They are almost unbelievable, even by today's action-movie standards. The fact that the events took place as described here defies comprehension. Uncommon valor was indeed a common virtue that day in the 160th.

There is a passage from scripture that helps us understand such courage. In words that might have been written especially for the Night Stalkers, the Lord speaks to the prophet Isaiah, asking, “Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?” Isaiah answers: “Here am I; send me!”

Whenever the nation calls, the 160th responds: “Here am I; send me!” That response reveals the matchless courage, the spirit of service and self-sacrifice, and the willingness to do or die that lie at the very heart of what the Night Stalkers do, who they are, and why they and all of our other special operators are a national treasure.

General Henry H. Shelton is chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Prior to assuming this position, he served as commander in chief of the U. S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla. General Shelton’s other assignments include commanding general, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg; commander, 82nd Airborne Division; and assistant division commander for operations, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He also served as the Joint Task Force commander during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. General Shelton holds a bachelor’s degree from N. C. State University and a master’s degree in political science from Auburn University. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses, the Air Command and Staff College and the National War College.
Cognitive and Personality Assessment in Special Forces Assessment and Selection

by Major Gary A. Hazlett and Dr. Michael Sanders

In the Winter 1999 edition of Special Warfare, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Diemer and Major Thomas Joyce, authors of “Special Forces Entry-Level Training: Vision for the Future,” state, “Mental evaluations are not a significant part of the current assessment-and-selection process.” This statement suggests that Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, makes no formal attempt to assess the cognitive aspects of SF candidates. But in fact, the current SFAS program uses a variety of measures to assess each candidate’s behavioral stability and cognitive aptitude.

This article will show how the currently available indicators of cognitive aptitude and behavioral stability relate to the candidate’s performance in SFAS and in the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC.

To assess a candidate’s academic potential and cognitive functioning, SFAS relies mainly on four indicators: the soldier’s record of formal education; scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or ASVAB; an achievement test in the area of basic education, or TABE; and the Wonderlic Personnel Test, a brief measure that has a significant correlation to one’s overall intelligence. While other measures may be used to provide supplemental data, these four indicators represent the core components of the cognitive assessment of SF candidates.

Education level

The average SFAS candidate has a high school education and one year of college or equivalent training. Of 4,561 candidates assessed during the past four years, 168 had a general equivalency diploma, or GED, vs. a traditional high-school diploma. The SFAS success rate for these candidates was about half that of the candidates overall. Candidates with GEDs had a 26.8-percent success rate in SFAS — in other words, nearly three out of four were not selected. Of all the soldiers with GEDs who attended SFAS from 1989 to 1998, only 14.4 percent graduated from SFQC. That success rate is also about half that of the group as a whole.

ASVAB testing

The ASVAB yields a number of subscores that reflect a candidate’s aptitude for various kinds of military activities. However, the general technical, or GT, score is considered the best indicator of a subject’s overall cognitive potential. In an adequately normed group, a GT score of 100 indicates that the subject’s performance is average; i.e., it is as good as or better than that of 50 percent of the recruits who made up the normative sample. A GT score of 100 is not equal to an IQ score of 100 (suggesting average-range cognitive potential). A GT score of around 108 is roughly equivalent to a score of 100 (average) on a standardized test.

The minimum GT score for acceptance into SFAS is 100, which ensures that candidates possess an average cognitive aptitude or higher. Over the years, the minimum GT score has varied from 110 to 100, but despite the changing criteria, the average scores of those who volunteer for SFAS and of those who complete the program have changed little over the past decade. The average GT score for SFAS candidates is 115, indicating that in terms of cognitive aptitude and academic abilities, the average candidate ranks among the upper third of all soldiers.

The ASVAB GT data chart reflects the scores of SFAS candidates from 1989 to late 1998.
Because GT scores are not available for most officers, the data primarily reflect the performance of enlisted soldiers.

The graph depicts the success rates for soldiers whose GT scores were in the ranges indicated. Soldiers who scored from 100 to 109 typically had a significantly lower success rate in SFAS. In fact, there was a marked drop in success rates for soldiers who scored below 115. An increase or a decrease in the GT score usually results in a corresponding increase or decrease in the success rate in SFAS. A difference of one or two points in the GT score may seem trivial, but in data from a recent four-year sample, candidates who scored above 110 had a 25-percent higher success rate than those who scored below 110. At the same time, the success rate for soldiers with scores significantly above the average (120 or higher) was not markedly better than for those with average scores.

**Wonderlic Personnel Test**

The Wonderlic Personnel Test is a brief, timed test that measures one's mathematical skills and, to a lesser extent, one's verbal abilities. The Wonderlic norms, developed in 1992, are based on the test scores of more than 118,000 job applicants throughout the civilian population. The Wonderlic correlates closely to other standardized tests of intelligence, which suggests that it is an excellent indicator of an individual's likely cognitive potential.

Ever since SFAS began intellectual testing, it has used the Wonderlic. Early in-house studies established that the average SFAS candidate’s Wonderlic score was well above that of the national average, which is consistent with observations in almost every other measure that has been or is being used in SFAS. SFAS developed its own set of norms, based on a pool of several thousand candidates who attended SFAS in the early 1990s. A recent validation check of that normative data, involving more than 4,000 candidates who attended SFAS between 1995 and 1998, indicated no shift in the distribution of scores.

The average SFAS candidate scores at about the 70th percentile on the larger civilian population norms. When SFAS Wonderlic data are divided into officer vs. enlisted categories, the officers score, on average, above the 80th percentile for civilian norms; the enlisted remain, on average, at or above the 70th percentile.

Like other test scores, lower Wonderlic scores generally predict lower success rates in SFAS. Candidates who score at the 20th percentile or above have about a 46-percent chance of being selected. Candidates who score below the

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**ASVAB GT Score Range and SFAS Success**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GT SCORES</th>
<th>A. 109 or below</th>
<th>B. 114 or below</th>
<th>C. 115 or above</th>
<th>D. 120 or above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS success rates for soldiers at various GT-score levels.
20th percentile are selected about 32 percent of the time. Candidates who score at the 8th percentile or below (around the 27th percentile for civilians) have a 28.8 percent chance of selection. These data demonstrate three points:

- Lower Wonderlic scorers perform significantly poorer in SFAS.
- The general population of soldiers attending SFAS today are on a par with those who attended a decade ago, in terms of cognitive aptitude.
- The average SFAS candidate is a cut above the average soldier and the average civilian job applicant.

The graph above depicts the relationship between a candidate’s percentile scores on the Wonderlic (based on norms for all SFAS candidates) and his success in SFAS. Generally, candidates who score below the 11th percentile are identified as facing a high probability that they will not complete training, primarily because of anticipated academic problems in Phase II of the SFQC. It is worth noting that despite the fact that SFAS places only minimal cognitive demands on candidates, those with higher Wonderlic scores typically are more successful. The critical point appears to be around the 20th percentile: Soldiers with scores above that have a higher-than-average selection rate.

**TABE testing**

The TABE test provides four basic measures of academic skills and achievement: the ability to identify word meanings; basic reading skills and reading comprehension; basic math skills; and written-communication abilities. TABE scores are reported as grade equivalents, or GE’s. The maximum GE is 12.9, which represents the ninth month of the 12th year of school — in other words, the performance level of the average graduating high-school senior. Even if a candidate’s performance level is actually higher than that, his GE will be 12.9.

During 1995-1998, 46 percent of SFAS candidates earned GE scores of 12.9 on all four measures. Forty-two percent of the enlisted candidates scored 12.9s on all four measures, and 61 percent scored 12.0 or higher on all four measures. The data indicate that with any drop from an all-12.9-score, candidates are less likely to succeed in SFAS. In terms of predicting future success in training, the math score is the most definitive of the four measures.

To attend SFQC, candidates must achieve a minimum score of 10.6 in all TABE categories. Candidates may retake the TABE repeatedly prior to attending SFQC.

As the TABE graph demonstrates, when any of the four subtest scores falls below the 12th-
grade level, there is a significant increase in the SFAS-failure rate. Initially, one might assume that the failure rate increases because candidates are dropped by the final board because of their poor academic grades. For the most part, this is not the case, as a later graphic will demonstrate.

**Behavioral reliability**

In addition to assessing a candidate’s intellectual potential, SFAS uses several measures of personality and behavioral tendency to reveal a candidate’s strengths and vulnerabilities, and to identify any risk of behavioral tendencies that might prevent the candidate’s becoming a productive SF soldier. It is important to point out that SFAS candidates very rarely present any tendencies that approximate a formal psychiatric condition. “Risk,” in this context, is defined as the likelihood that a candidate will not complete training because of academic deficiencies or personality vulnerabilities.

On the basis of their psychological test data, SFAS candidates are categorized as either low-, moderate- or high-risk. These categories do not suggest the likelihood of psychiatric problems; they refer to the likelihood that a candidate may fail to complete SFAS or SFQC. A fourth group of candidates may be identified as high-risk because of deficits in their academic or cognitive-aptitude scores. High-risk candidates who complete SFAS are subsequently interviewed to determine whether they are indeed high-risk. The final selection board collects and analyses the information acquired from the interviews as part of the candidate-selection process.

To evaluate behavioral stability and emotional maturity, SFAS uses several tests developed by the United States Army Research Institute (the principal one being ARI Biodata80); the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, or MMPI; clinical-interview evaluations conducted by psychologists during SFAS; and observations by the SFAS cadre. Research to date indicates that the ARI Biodata80 and the MMPI are the most useful.

**ARI Biodata80**

The U.S. Army Research Institute developed ARI Biodata80 in response to requests for a test of personal integrity. The test is designed to provide a variety of information about the candidate, including his level of social maturity in comparison to his peers, and the likelihood of his performing inappropriately under stress. The test uses a unique approach: Test items are keyed to actual behaviors.

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**TABE Score Range and SFAS Failure**

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**Graph depicts SFAS failure rates for soldiers in various subtest-score ranges.**

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**SUBTEST SCORES**

- A. 12.9 on all
- B. Below 12 on any one
- C. Below 11 on any one
- D. Below 10 on any one
- E. Below 9 on any one
- F. Below 8 on any one
- G. Below 7 on any one
rather than to personality concepts, as in the MMPI. The ARI Biodata80 provides information that is strongly predictive of a candidate's inability to complete SFAS. Although such cases may also be identified by the MMPI, ARI Biodata80 is able to pinpoint individuals with significant vulnerabilities who were not identified by the MMPI.

One set of scores on the ARI Biodata80 provides a measure called the SF delinquency scale. Scores on this scale range from 0 (the best) to 5 (the worst). Nearly 80 percent of the candidates score 0. During the past two years, we have established that candidates who score higher than 1 are likely to drop out of SFAS at a fairly high rate. During the next year, we will assess the relationship between the SF delinquency scale and the candidate's performance in the SFQC. We predict that few, if any, candidates with an elevated score on the SF delinquency scale will complete training.

Although the SF delinquency scale is the most predictive of the ARI Biodata80 scores, ARI Biodata80 also provides other useful scores. The U.S. Army Research Institute is currently refining a measure that is linked to a candidate's flexibility in thinking and in problem-solving. That measure, which may hold substantial promise for early identification of soldiers who have the intensive thinking abilities valued by Special Forces, is scheduled to be field-tested next year.

**MMPI**

Since SFAS's inception, we have used the MMPI. It is the most common psychological test in the world, and it is used in a broad range of military and civilian assessment-and-selection programs. Norms vary considerably for different populations and different settings. The norms established for SFAS differ in many respects from the norms used in mental-health settings or in other civilian settings. Test results are helpful in identifying candidates who vary significantly from the SFAS norms. These results are then integrated with other data and serve as a starting point for the interviewing of candidates. However, the majority of candidates are not interviewed.

In the graph depicting the relationship between risk ratings and performance in SFAS and SFQC, the first cluster depicts the representation of the different groups at the start of SFAS, at which time the testing is conducted. Note that by the end of SFAS, low-risk candidates have survived the program at a slightly higher rate than expected. In contrast, soldiers in the high-risk (nonacademic) group compose a smaller proportion of graduates than expected, given

**NOTE:** Graph depicts SFAS failure rates for soldiers with various scores on the SF delinquency scale.
their representation at the start of the class. The greater attrition rate among this group of candidates is due to a higher voluntary withdrawal rate and the results of the review by the final board.

At the start of SFAS, about 8 percent of the candidates are placed in the high-risk category, based on their low Wonderlic scores (high-risk-for-academic-failure group). By the end of SFAS, these individuals compose 10 to 11 percent of the graduates. Generally, these are soldiers who are physically tough but possess only average intellect.

The third cluster in the graph depicts the graduates of the SFQC: soldiers who will subsequently fill team slots in the SF groups. The SFQC is much more demanding than SFAS in regard to academic skills and cognitive aptitude, particularly in the academic portions of Phase II. A training program as demanding and as long as the SFQC tends to produce stress sufficient enough to highlight any vulnerabilities among its students. The graph demonstrates the low likelihood of course completion by individuals who are considered high-risk for failure because of their psychological vulnerabilities, cognitive aptitude or academic deficits.

The key point is that even with a somewhat unrefined strategy of categorization based solely on a limited set of tests, the categorization demonstrates substantial predictive power in terms of identifying those candidates who have a poor chance of success.

Conclusion

The SFAS incorporates methodologies that assess candidates’ intellectual capabilities and relates those capabilities to success in training. The program also assesses psychological strengths and vulnerabilities that are predictive of success in SFAS and in SFQC. These methodologies are continually being evaluated and improved, with the twin goals of providing accurate, reliable and critical information to the command, and of enhancing the effectiveness of the overall assessment-and-selection process. Psychological testing is only one of many tools that can help Special Forces acquire the

**Risk Ratings and Success in SFAS and SFQC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK GROUPS</th>
<th>Color</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low risk</td>
<td>Gray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate risk</td>
<td>Light Gray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High risk – psychological</td>
<td>Dark Gray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High risk – intellectual</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS and SFQC success rates for soldiers in various risk groups.
kind of tough, smart and stressresilient soldiers that it has had in the past, that it needs now, and that it will continue to need in the future. 

Major Gary A. Hazlett is assigned to the Psychological Applications Directorate within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and he manages the psychological-assessment portion of SFAS. His previous assignments include division psychologist for the 82nd Airborne Division; chief of the psychology service in the Department of Psychology and Neurology at Fort Bragg’s Womack Army Medical Center; and SERE psychologist for the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Major Hazlett holds a doctorate in clinical psychology from Indiana State University, and he completed a post-doctorate in clinical neuropsychology in the Department of Neurology at the University of Alabama-Birmingham.

Dr. Michael Sanders has served as chief of the Fort Bragg office of the U.S. Army Research Institute since July 1994. He and other ARI psychologists provide research support to the SOF community on topics that address the life cycle of the soldier, including recruiting, assessment and selection, training and retention. He began service in the Army at Fort Rucker, Ala., as an active-duty aviation psychologist at the Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory. At the Fort Rucker ARI Field Unit, he continued his research on aviator selection, screening, training, performance assessment, and retention. Dr. Sanders has also served as chief of the ARI field unit at Fort Gordon, Ga., where his unit performed research on training-technology enhancements for Signal soldiers.

He holds a master’s and a doctorate in experimental psychology, with an emphasis on human factors.
The 1999 SF Conference: Setting a New Standard

by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein

In April, the Special Warfare Center and School hosted the 1999 Special Forces Conference and Exposition in Fayetteville, N.C., bringing together more than 500 members of the SF community to celebrate the past, to discuss the present and to plan for the future.

The 1999 Special Forces Conference was the most ambitious undertaking of its kind in the history of USAJFKSWCS. From the beginning, the SWCS command strived to make the 1999 conference different from previous SF conferences. The command intended for the conference’s symposiums and workshops to yield recommendations for improvement in various areas. The conference was also designed to engage a wider segment of Special Forces. To achieve that end, conference planners involved SWCS; the National Defense Industrial Association, or NDIA; the Association of the U.S. Army, or AUSA; the Army Special Forces Command, or USASFC; and the Special Forces Association.

Working toward a common goal, these five organizations synchronized their efforts to engage all ranks and all members of the community, both active-duty and retired. Another innovation was the location of the conference at a large hotel/convention center in Fayetteville, which provided an ideal facility for the conference’s diverse activities.

In preparation for the conference, the conference staff mailed more than 6,000 invitations to all active-Army SF personnel identified through the Total Army Personnel Command databases. At the same time, SWCS advertised the event through more than 10 media outlets, including official periodicals, the Fayetteville and Raleigh, N.C., newspapers, Soldiers Magazine, Army Times and Army Magazine. The conference staff also briefed the USASFC chain of command down to the group level, to encourage the widest possible attendance.

A number of Army and SOF senior leaders, active-duty and retired, attended the 1999 conference. Among the key speakers were General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who spoke on “DoD Into the 21st Century”; General Peter Schoomaker, commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, who discussed “SOF, Shaping, Preparing and Responding Now”; General John Abrams, commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, who discussed TRADOC’s link to the emerging regional-engagement concept; Thomas Umberg of the White House Office of National Drug Control, who spoke on “SOF Support to America’s Counterdrug Policy”; and retired Lieutenant General Samuel Wilson, a highly decorated World War II veteran of Merrill’s Marauders and former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who discussed the role of intelligence and “political literacy” in special operations.

Also in attendance were Lieutenant
General William Tangney, commander of the Army Special Operations Command, who presented “ARSOF Into the Future”; and Major General William G. Boykin, commander of USASFC, who presented “The Direction and Focus of SF Command.” The guest list also included 20 other general officers and civilians with strong ties to the SF community or NDIA.

Conference activities began on April 19 with the first Special Forces Open Classic golf tournament, sponsored in part by the AUSA, and an NDIA-hosted social that evening for the conference participants. During the next three days (April 20-22), the conference conducted a number of concurrent activities: three symposiums, 10 workshops and the NDIA exposition.

The symposiums were conducted on separate days. Each supported the conference theme, “Regional Engagement and the Future.” The first symposium, “SF Core Ideology,” sought to identify the core values and the core purpose of Special Forces. The second symposium, “The Regional Engagement Force,” sought to advance SWCS’s development of the regional-engagement concept. The third symposium, “The SF Training Pipeline,” examined the future of Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, and of the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, based upon possible requirements of the regional-engagement force. All conference attendees were invited to participate in the first symposium. The second and third symposiums were intended mainly for senior conference participants (lieutenant colonel and above, CW4 and sergeant major/command sergeant major), but all conference participants could attend.

The concept for all three symposiums was the same. The moderator convened a panel of active-duty and retired members of the SF community. To provide a catalyst for the discussion, the moderator either presented a briefing or introduced guest speakers. The moderator then fielded the audience’s questions and comments, directing them to the appropriate panel members. Each symposium was videotaped so that a post-conference distillation of the discussions could be presented to the SWCS senior leadership.

The collected input from each symposium will also further the progress in three vital areas: SWCS will provide the synopsis of the core-ideology symposium to the Army SF Command to facilitate its initiative to define the SF core ideology. SWCS’s Concepts Development Directorate will use recommendations from the REF symposium to further develop the concept of regional engagement. SWCS will also provide the synopsis of the SF training-pipeline symposium to the U.S. Army Research Institute, or ARI, as feedback for ARI’s SF Pipeline Project. That project, largely the work of ARI’s Dr. Michelle Zazanis, will identify the attributes and the training required for optimal performance by members of SF A-detachments. The SF Pipeline Project also plans to provide recommendations that will make it possible for SFAS to improve the process by which it identifies highly qualified soldiers and for SFQC to provide those soldiers with the best possible training.

The 10 conference workshops were conducted at the same time as the second and third symposiums. Workshop topics were:

- Development of an SF team-sergeant course.
- Standards for SFAS.
- Criteria for SFQC.
- ARSOF simulations.
- Management of unit supplies and ammunition.
- Defining materiel requirements at the lowest level.
• Alternative methods for training SF advanced skills.
• Defining and enhancing force protection.
• Development of future courseware for distance learning.
• Medical implications of SF training.

The workshops were designed to gain input from members of the SF community who had played a minimal role in earlier conferences — personnel in the grades of staff sergeant through master sergeant, WO1 through CW3, and captains and majors. Subject-matter experts conducted the workshops, evaluated the input and provided recommendations to the SWCS senior leadership.

The NDIA exposition was a first for the SF conference. The event, which required no soldier support from SWCS, provided “one stop shopping” for SF. The displays of 43 vendors covered a variety of topics, including electronics, weapons, synthetics, robotics, human engineering, mobility, training and leadership. Conference attendees also had the option of participating in a vendor-sponsored live-fire of some of the weapons, held at the Fayetteville Police Department’s firing range. In a separate event held adjacent to the exposition, the Army Quartermaster School exhibited a field kitchen containing samples of the Army’s latest field rations.

On April 20, SWCS sponsored a memorial ceremony to remember SF personnel killed in action. Conducted at the USASOC Vietnam War Memorial statue, the ceremony included a wreath-laying by Major General Kenneth R. Bowra and retired Command Sergeant Major Franklin D. Miller, an SF Medal of Honor recipient. The ceremony featured remarks by Major General Bowra; Robert L. Jones, deputy assistant secretary of defense for POW and MIA affairs; and Harold Jacobson, president of the SF Association.

Each day of the conference ended with a social event: On the first evening, the SF Association hosted a barbecue. On the second evening, conference participants gathered at a local restaurant for a no-host dinner. On the third evening, the conference concluded with the SF Ball.

This year’s SF Ball was the most heavily attended social event in recent SWCS history. Among the distinguished guests were the keynote speaker, retired Colonel Roger Donlon, who was the first soldier to receive the Medal of Honor during the Vietnam War; and the guest of honor, Ross Perot. A highlight of the evening was a film clip showing Donlon in Vietnam. The footage, furnished by the National Archives, had never before been shown publicly. Another guest, Wayne Newton, received an award in recognition of his service as an entertainer of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam.

The 1999 SF Conference was a hallmark event that will set a standard for conferences in years to come, and SWCS plans to include activities similar to this year’s in future SF conferences. Had it merely captured the interest of all ranks and improved the cohesion of the SF community, the conference would have been a success. But it went beyond that to provide input that will help guide actions critical to the SF community — actions that will continue through next year’s conference and beyond.

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein is director of the Special Operations Propensity Office at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. In 1999 he served as the officer in charge of the Special Forces Conference. Commissioned as an infantry officer, Adelstein served as a rifle-platoon leader with Company C, 4/9th Infantry in Alaska, and as commander of Company C, 2/4th Infantry in Germany. His SF assignments include detachment commander, ODA 573, and commander, Company A, 1/5th SF Group. Adelstein holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a master’s degree in history from Ball State University.
Psychological operations, or PSYOP, has a difficult goal: to change the behavior of target audiences. Other fields — politics, advertising, marketing and health communications, for example — share that goal, and practitioners in these related fields, like those in PSYOP, know that their efforts to stir audiences to action may often be fruitless.

Nevertheless, over the last 20-30 years, these related behavior-change fields have developed methods that have proven to be effective in winning votes, selling products, gaining customers and improving health practices. Their successes are not the result of secret tactics or sneaky techniques, but rather of a disciplined methodology that makes good use of its three components — theory, research and practice — in designing programs to affect target audiences.

Because PSYOP shares a common goal with these related fields, we may be able to adopt their methodology, and PSYOP practitioners can improve their effectiveness by learning from other fields’ approaches to theory, research and practice.

**Apply behavior theory**

While theory is sometimes overlooked by those who are involved in the practical concerns of accomplishing a mission, a fundamental lesson that we can draw from the experience of behavior-change fields is that it is important to base “interventions,” the actions designed to influence an audience, on the best theories of human behavior and behavioral change. Theories, far from being useless academic constructs, can assist practitioners during all phases of a program: from planning through implementation to evaluation.

Behavior theories can explain why target audiences behave as they do, and they can pinpoint specific information that practitioners will need in designing effective interventions. Behavior-change theories can provide guidelines on how to shape program strategies, and they can form the basis for evaluation by making explicit the assumptions about how interventions should work.

Practitioners in behavior-change fields are pragmatic and results-oriented. They nevertheless seem to have a firm understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of their actions. They have a theory-based appreciation of their audience’s behavior, and they can explain exactly how their intervention is supposed to change that behavior.

An understanding of theories can convert a practitioner from a technician into a “professional who ... comprehends the ‘why’ and can design and craft well-tailored interventions ... [who] does not blindly follow a cookbook recipe but constantly creates the recipe anew, depending on the ... nature of the target audience, setting, resources, goals, and constraints.” In short,
theories give practitioners indispensable advantages in establishing the coherence, effectiveness and evaluation of behavior-change interventions.

Officers who are responsible for designing, implementing and evaluating PSYOP programs can gain those advantages by learning and applying the various behavioral theories used in related fields. Certainly not everyone involved in a PSYOP program needs to understand behavioral theory. Subordinate officers and enlisted soldiers can (and in many instances probably should) use standard procedures that facilitate quick and effective work in the field. The officer in charge of the program, however, must be fully aware of theory in order to direct the appropriate research, to design effective interventions, and to carry out monitoring and evaluation.

Civilian researchers who are involved in the program must also understand theory in order to design research that will answer the questions that the officer in charge is asking. Finally, officers in echelons above the officer in charge must understand behavioral theories in order to help select appropriate theoretical approaches, to give guidance on how to apply the theories in action, to evaluate the effectiveness of the program, and to judge the performance of the practitioners.

At times, PSYOP officers will have to rely on their intuition and judgment in deciding what actions to take. Even at those times, however, the officers’ “gut reactions” will be most on target if they result from an internalized understanding of behavioral theory.

Enlisted PSYOP specialists learn printing techniques. While standard procedures facilitate quick work in the field, an understanding of theory would allow practitioners to design more effective PSYOP strategies.
task, formulate specific questions that can be answered by research, develop a plan of action to achieve the behavioral goal, and establish guidelines both for monitoring the progress of the program and for evaluating it when it is over.

Like their fellow behavior-change practitioners in other fields, PSYOP planners should allow others in their field to review their theories and planned operations. This “peer review” can help ensure that the theoretical approach to the operation is consistent, efficient and plausible, and that it is the most appropriate approach for the given situation.

Officers and civilians engaged in designing and implementing PSYOP programs can learn about theories of human behavior from the various behavior-change fields. While each field takes a somewhat different approach, all are practical, and they share many of the same basic theories. PSYOP practitioners therefore have the twin luxuries of being able to approach behavioral theory through whatever field best suits their preferences, and of being able to work effectively with others who approach behavioral theory from a different viewpoint.

Some of the basic theories of human behavior can be found in textbooks on persuasive communications, such as the one written by E.P. Bettinghaus and M.J. Cody, or the one by J.B. Stiff. Among the theories emphasized in persuasive communications are the source-message-channel-receiver model of communication, classical-conditioning theory, social-learning theory, balance theory, cognitive-dissonance theory, psychological-reactance theory, message-learning theory, and the elaboration-likelihood model.

Elaboration likelihood, as well as reasoned action, is also emphasized in textbooks dealing with advertising and in those dealing with consumer behavior used by marketers. The field of social marketing relies heavily on the transtheoretical model or stages of change theory. The field of health promotion uses a variety of theoretical approaches: A recent review of theories used in health-education programs over a three-year period identified 21 different conceptual frameworks, although the health-belief model dominated the field.

As PSYOP gains experience in applying behavior-change theories to its campaigns, it can teach those theories in its training programs, develop a repertoire of theories found to be most effective, and contribute to advancements in behavioral theories that will be of value to practitioners in related fields. For now, however, PSYOP should concentrate on assimilating existing theories and integrating them into ongoing PSYOP programs.

**Base decisions on research**

Behavioral theory provides a blueprint for planning and evaluating behavior-change interventions, but theory is not a goal in itself. Marketers, politicians and
health-care workers do not seek simply to understand the behavior of consumers, voters and patients; rather, they strive to develop effective strategies for changing it.

While theory is invaluable in planning those strategies, practitioners do not blindly apply textbook theories. Behavior-change practitioners are fanatical about research — a practical kind of research that is designed to help them make decisions on operational considerations such as target segmentation, behavior-change strategies, resource allocation, and the choice of strategy elements.

Behavior-change practitioners use research to determine how well their theory explains the behavior of the target audience, to find facts that suggest appropriate approaches and effective interventions, and to test how well their theoretically derived actions actually change the behavior of the target audience.

Primary research of the target audience is an indispensable tool in bridging the gap between theory and practice. In effect, research helps practitioners determine whether what they think they are doing is what they are doing, and whether there is a connection between the actions of their programs and the behavior of the target audience. When research reveals that the connections are weak, the practitioners rethink their approach and revise their program until it works.

PSYOP can best ensure that its actions change behavior in the desired way by conducting practical primary research on the target audience. The other behavior-change fields have found that research is most useful and most efficient when it is performed as an aid in making operational decisions. Presented with a problem to solve or an opportunity to exploit, practitioners perform exploratory research to discover information of general interest about the target audience — its knowledge, attitudes and behaviors.

Once these practitioners have selected a model for action, they turn to formative research to answer basic operational questions: Which target audiences can we address with the most effect? How should we segment those audiences? What specific behavior-change interventions should we undertake? How can we most efficiently allocate our resources to the various segments and interventions? Formative research consists primarily of listening to target-audience members through the use of surveys, personal interviews and focus-group interviews. The aim of formative research is to provide specific information that the theoretical model suggests would be useful in planning interventions.

After behavior-change practitioners have decided on intervention strategies and audience segments, their next step is to pretest their strategies. Pretesting allows the practitioners to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies before they devote any resources to them. In the final step, the practitioners monitor data that tell them how the strategies are doing and how to make changes in the audiences, strategies, or any other elements of the intervention. Monitoring, like formative research, is a process of listening closely to members of the target audience. Monitoring is most useful when it measures the audience’s behavior against the program goals that were suggested by the theoretical model.

Research of the target audience, with its concern for answering the question “What should we do?” at each step of a campaign, provides an ideal paradigm for PSYOP practitioners who seek to design effective interventions. PSYOP practitioners who wish to learn about research methodologies will find an extensive amount of literature available. The field of commercial marketing has taken the idea of practical research to its extreme, and the vast amount of mar-
ket-research literature is perhaps best approached through a standard textbook such as the one written by T.C. Kinnear and J.R. Taylor. The methodology of interviewing focus groups, which originated in the commercial sector but is now being widely practiced in politics, social marketing, health communications and other fields, has a particularly large body of supporting literature, such as the recent guide by Richard Krueger. Books on research methods are also available, as are discussions of research as it is applied in social marketing. The field of advertising offers literature that is especially useful for pretesting, and the fields of economic development, mass communication and health communications have also contributed to the literature on various aspects of research methodologies.

**Adopt a marketing approach**

For the various practitioners who seek to change people’s behavior, practice is the bottom line — the ultimate goal of their craft. Whatever their motivation, practitioners strive to do something that will cause the audience to change its behavior. Most behavior-change practitioners have learned that a marketing approach is the most effective means of designing a program that achieves results.

For many years, behavior-change professionals, such as advertisers and managers of political campaigns, concentrated on communications as a means of convincing or persuading their audiences to behave in desired ways. Nearly all of them now agree, however, that they need to go beyond communications to marketing.

The marketing approach proposes “that success will come to that organization that best determines the perceptions, needs, and wants of target markets and satisfies them through the design, communication, pricing, and delivery of appropriate and competitively viable offerings.” Although the marketing approach originated in the field of commercial marketing, it is applicable in all behavior-change fields, including PSYOP.

The marketing approach also proposes that target audiences will perform a desired behavior only if they are offered something in exchange — something that they want or need, something that they can afford (economically and otherwise), or
something that they can access easily.

There are two parts to successful marketing. The first part is thorough research to determine the perceptions, needs and wants of target markets. The second part is the “marketing mix,” often referred to as the four “Ps”: product, price, promotion and place. This mnemonic device reminds marketers that they must offer their audience something that it values (product); ensure that the costs of the desired behavior (price) are not greater than the value of the product; effectively communicate to the audience the benefits of the offering (promotion); and ensure that the offering is available to the audience at the appropriate time and place (place). Behavior-change practitioners have found that if they consider all four Ps, they will be more successful in obtaining the behavior changes they seek.

At first glance, marketing may not appear to be an appropriate model for PSYOP. After all, PSYOP seeks to compel enemy soldiers to surrender — an action that is clearly not in their best interest. It is also impossible to conduct focus-group interviews with enemy soldiers. But many PSYOP operations — such as managing friendly populations and enemy civilians in wartime, and conducting mine-awareness and drug-prevention campaigns in peacetime — not only address audiences that can be researched but also offer those audiences something of value.

Even in a situation such as surrender, in which the terms “research” and “exchange” seem meaningless, the marketing approach can be applied. While traditional research may be difficult on the battlefield, prisoners of war, defectors, ex-soldiers, informants and others can provide information to researchers who ask the right questions. Surrender itself can be seen as an exchange, suggesting that PSYOP can profitably go beyond simply trying to “persuade” enemy soldiers to surrender, working instead to make surrender easier, more appealing and less costly.

The greatest strength of the marketing approach is that it broadens the scope of actions that are available to the practitioner. Instead of trying to persuade audiences to do something that they do not want to do, we can manipulate the other elements of the marketing mix, thereby making our operations more flexible and possibly more effective.

PSYOP practitioners can learn the marketing approach by reading the literature pertaining to the various behavior-change fields. Books and college courses on commercial marketing are widely available. One important book that outlines the application of market methodologies to social-behavior interventions is Alan Andreasen’s Marketing Social Change. Other works deal with social marketing and marketing in health communications.

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Adopting a marketing approach is, as Kotler and Andreasen point out, mostly a question of developing the proper mindset. If PSYOP practitioners are to implement a marketing approach, they must adopt a “customer-centered” orientation, or in PSYOP terms, they must begin and end all analysis and planning with consideration of the target audience, whose behavior is the ultimate goal of their interventions. A customer-centered orientation would require PSYOP to use all elements of the marketing mix, to broadly define competition, to develop a heavy reliance on research and to perform target-audience segmentation.

Kotler and Andreasen also mention several considerations that an organization should take into account when attempting to introduce a marketing approach into its operations. Among these are recognizing the limited understanding of marketing
among the members of the organization; analyzing the projected nonmarket pressures on the organization; and carefully selecting early marketing projects. Most importantly, however, Kotler and Andreasen emphasize that the acceptance of the marketing approach into an organization is largely a political activity, and that it can occur only with the support of the organization’s top leadership. The introduction of a marketing approach into PSYOP would thus require three changes: PSYOP planners would have to learn about marketing and its methodology of behavior change; PSYOP personnel would have to adopt a more customer-centered mindset; and the PSYOP leadership would have to give the marketing approach its full support.

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7 Glanz, Lewis and Rimer, p. 29.
10 B.L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1998).
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17 Ibid.
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Army Values

Loyalty

Bull Simons

Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons was one of the most charismatic leaders in special-operations history. A gruff man with a wide command of profanity, he inspired loyalty in his men. One subordinate of his during the 1960 White Star training operation in Laos said of him, “I would follow Bull Simons to hell and back for the sheer joy of being with him on the visit.”

Simons responded to that loyalty by carefully planning all his operations so as not to risk any man’s life unnecessarily. He still planned missions that were risky — war is inherently risky — but he took as many factors into account as possible. He came to believe that “the more improbable something is, the surer you can pull it off.”

Simons was commander of the Army component of the Son Tay raid, the 1970 operation designed to rescue American prisoners of war from a camp deep inside North Vietnam. Simons personally selected the raiders and oversaw their training. As he and his soldiers prepared to leave Thailand on Nov. 20, 1970, to conduct the raid, Simons swore that he would leave no man behind. Rather than surrender even one of his men to captivity by the North Vietnamese, he said, he would stand and fight back-to-back with his men. Such loyalty, given and received, marked Bull Simons as a leader of men and makes him an inspiration to current and future generations of special-operations soldiers. — Dr. Richard Stewart
Civilian supremacy has taken on new meaning in the military. Civilians have become mission objectives in those contemporary military operations formerly known as low-intensity conflict, or LIC, and now euphemistically referred to as operations other than war, or OOTW. Whether in Somalia, Iraq, Haiti or the Balkans, military leaders who are accustomed to pursuing military objectives are befuddled by the emergence of civilians as mission priorities. General Hugh Shelton, who commanded operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti prior to becoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it this way: “One word that represents the most vexing legal, political and operational challenge of OOTW is ‘civilians.’”

The vexing role of civilians in OOTW is understandable in light of the contrasting role of civilians in war. In wartime, the defeat of enemy combatants by overwhelming force is the mission priority; civilians are usually considered little more than obstacles to that objective. But in OOTW, mission priorities are reversed. Most OOTW are civil-military in nature; even at the tactical and operational levels, civilian (or public) support is a primary mission objective. To complicate matters, this support is essentially a political objective rather than a military objective, and military leaders have traditionally been taught to avoid political matters.

This reversal of mission priorities may be less confusing if commanders understand the concept of military legitimacy. Military legitimacy deals with the delicate balance between might and right, a balance that shifts dramatically as conditions move from war to peace. The six doctrinal principles of OOTW listed in chapter 13 of FM 100-5, Operations — legitimacy, objective, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and security — with the addition of civil-military relations, might just as well be referred to as the characteristics of military legitimacy. These principles provide a doctrinal context for understanding how civilians relate to mission success in OOTW.

Although the principles of OOTW may be new in military doctrine, they should be familiar to veteran special operators. The principles of OOTW are little more than warmed-over LIC imperatives. They may also appear to be similar to the venerable principles of war (objective, security and unity of command). However, in their application, the principles of

### LIC Imperatives
1. Legitimacy
2. Primacy of the political instrument
3. Unity of effort
4. Restricted use of force
5. Perseverance
6. Adaptability

### Principles of OOTW
1. Legitimacy
2. Objective
3. Unity of effort
4. Restraint
5. Perseverance
6. Security
OOTW have more differences than similarities with the principles of war. The unconventional nature of OOTW may explain why many consider OOTW an inappropriate use of the military.\(^3\)

**Legitimacy**

Legitimacy is the first principle of OOTW, subsuming all others. It provides the moral authority for a government and its military forces to act. Military doctrine acknowledges legitimacy to be the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict.\(^4\)

In wartime, mission success depends upon the successful application of overwhelming military force. But in peacetime, political considerations severely constrain the use of military force. These two scenarios reflect the contrasting requirements of legitimacy in war and in peace — requirements that are derived from values, constitutions, traditions, religion, culture, the law, and public perceptions.\(^5\) Because of the interrelated nature of these sources, they will be abbreviated in this article to law, values, culture and public support. These sources provide the standards and the context for critical decisions that ultimately determine the legitimacy of military force — from the strategic decision of the president to deploy U.S. forces to the tactical decision of a soldier to pull the trigger.

**Law**

The law is at the foundation of legitimacy, providing the standards that give legitimacy its meaning. But without enforcement, these standards have little meaning. The protection of fundamental human rights is the primary purpose of the law and is a mission priority in OOTW. But the concept of human rights under international law has been weakened by the failure to bring known war criminals in the Balkans to justice before the United Nations war crimes tribunal. If Slobodan Milosevic and his henchmen could be brought to trial, the process would do more to discourage the ethnic violence that has ravaged the Balkans than did the NATO bombing campaign.

The human rights that are applicable to military operations and activities are found in international law, in domestic U.S. law, and in host-nation law, all of which are collectively referred to as operational law, or OPLAW. The law of war, actually part of international law, is a major component of OPLAW that has proven to be an adequate standard of military legitimacy in wartime, but not in peacetime OOTW. That is because the law of war applies only when there is armed conflict between nations and when there is a clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Neither of these situations is the norm in OOTW.

The distinction between combatants and noncombatants (the term “noncombatants” includes civilians and prisoners of war) is critical in wartime. Combatants are legitimate targets; noncombatants are not. If no distinction can be made between combatants and noncombatants, the use of lethal force must be severely constrained.

The emerging area of civilian-protection law, or CPL, is the most important component of OPLAW in OOTW. CPL focuses on protecting the human rights of civilians. It is based on the fundamental human rights recognized under international law, but it also includes host-nation law applicable in specific operational areas, international law applicable to specific operational activities, and domestic U.S. law. And while the law of war may not apply in OOTW for the reasons stated above, its principles are often applied by analogy through U.S. policy, mission imperatives and common sense. The provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians in War, for example, are usually applied in OOTW by analogy.\(^6\)

In the final analysis, the legal standards of military legitimacy in OOTW are derived from a complex...
and sometimes shifting panoply of laws and policies that protect human rights in specific operational settings. In comparison, the law of war provides relatively hard-and-fast rules for war-fighting. The importance of human rights to military legitimacy requires that commanders place unusual reliance upon their lawyers, as noted by Lieutenant General Peter Schoomaker, when he was commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command:

_The one legal thing [about OOTW] that sticks out in my mind is human rights. Soldiers need only a basic understanding of human rights rules. But my lawyers had better know this stuff inside and out._

While the law is the foundation of legitimacy, the law seldom dictates command decisions. Legal standards will never eliminate the moral dimension of decision-making upon which legitimacy ultimately depends. Other requirements of legitimacy — values and cultural considerations — are equally important to decision-making in the ambiguous and unforgiving situations that are the norm in OOTW.

**Values**

Values are the context of legitimacy; they are the virtues or the vices that make people who they are and institutions what they are. Values are the product of traditions, religion and culture, and they provide a frame of reference for the decisions that affect issues of legitimacy. As they relate to legitimacy, values might be considered in two categories: national and personal.

National values in the U.S. can be summarized as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. These values are the product of a Judeo-Christian religious tradition and have been enshrined by the U.S. Constitution. They have long been a common thread in the fabric of the U.S. national security strategy. But history has taught us that these values are not always priorities in military operations. In combat operations, these values have little application at the operational and tactical levels, where military objectives predominate. But in OOTW, where threats are ambiguous and political objectives predominate, the promotion of national values can be a litmus test for the legitimacy of U.S. military might.

National values are not absolute; they must be considered broad and flexible concepts with universal application. They are not limited to ethnocentric cultural standards drawn exclusively from U.S. experience. U.S. national values are uniquely interrelated. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law are inextricably bound together. All three are indispensable in fulfilling the requirements of legitimacy. Democracy (majority rule) can be tyrannical if it is not coupled with the protection of minority human rights through the rule of law. But too much emphasis on the rights of individuals or groups can defeat the legitimate (and essential) collective interests of the state. Even the rule of law can be tyrannical if it ceases to serve the purposes of justice.

Personal values, or character traits, have traditionally been associated with military leadership. Duty, integrity, loyalty, selfless service, personal courage, respect and honor are the Army values; the Army recognizes these values as a frame of reference for ethical decision-making. Like national values, personal values reflect our religious heritage, which has at its heart the golden rule. General Dennis J. Reimer, former chief of staff of the Army, put it this way:

_The terms we use to inspire our values — duty, integrity, loyalty, selfless service, courage, respect and honor — inspire the sense of purpose necessary to sustain our soldiers in combat and help resolve the ambiguities of military opera-

A U.S. soldier gives a bag of grain to Somali women. OOTW requires cultural orientation, language capability, and diplomacy in sensitive environments. These requirements have long been the standards for special-operations soldiers.
tions short of war. Leaders of character and competence live these values. We must build and maintain an Army where people do what is right; where we treat each other as we would want to be treated; and, where everyone can truly be all they can be.\(^9\)

If civilian support is important to mission objectives in OOTW, then we need to apply the golden rule beyond our own forces, to include civilians in the operational area.

Personal values influence decision-making when specific standards are inadequate, as is often the case during peacetime operations. But because values are abstract, they can produce conflicting frames of reference. Duty and loyalty, for instance, can mean quite different things to different people. In the Iran-Contra hearings, the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North indicated that even senior military officers can place devotion to duty (no matter how unlawful a mission) ahead of loyalty to the Constitution and its rule of law.\(^10\)

If military personnel differ on the concepts of duty and loyalty, we can expect even more conflict between the military perspective and the civilian perspective regarding these values. The U.S. military is an authoritarian regime within a libertarian society. Individual rights and liberty are valued by civilians above order and discipline, while the opposite is true for military personnel. While such conflicts are of little concern in wartime, they can undermine civil-military relations and legitimacy in peacetime OOTW.

Conflicting values in the form of culture clash can present even more of a threat to mission success. Tribal, ethnic, racial and religious traditions often clash with Western ideals. Behavior that is acceptable in Catholic Latin America may be unacceptable in Islamic Asia. And the cultural norms of both those areas may be different from those of the U.S. culture. Because public support is closely linked to cultural standards, the violation of cultural standards can jeopardize mission success.

**Culture**

For the purposes of this article, culture is that system of values and moral standards, derived from religion and traditions, that characterize a specific society. Cultural issues are pervasive in the increasingly violent strategic environment. Samuel Huntington calls the problem “the clash of civilizations,” and he argues that new strategies must place more reliance on understanding and on cooperative efforts rather than on conventional military power, and that this requires:

> A more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.\(^11\)

Local cultural or moral standards often become obligatory for U.S. military forces when those standards are incorporated into directives, general orders and rules of engagement. But in OOTW, effective leadership extends beyond knowing the rules; it requires cultural orientation, a language capability, and diplomacy in politically sensitive peacetime environments. While these requirements are new for leaders of conventional combat forces, they have long been the standard for special-operations leaders.\(^12\)

The remaining five principles of OOTW, with the addition of civil-military relations, can be considered characteristics of legitimacy. They also underscore the importance of the requirements of military legitimacy, especially the relevance of the law, to mission success.

**Objective**

Objective, the second principle of OOTW, should be read as political objectives, based on the LIC imperative of primacy of the political instrument.\(^13\) In peacetime, the predominance of political objectives over military objectives makes legitimacy the central concern of all parties in a conflict. However, the difficulty in making political objectives, such as public support, a higher mission priority than the more familiar military objectives puts conventional military leaders ill at ease with OOTW.

**Public support**

Public support represents the collective public perceptions that determine and measure military
legitimacy in a democracy. Even in wartime, popular will is recognized as “the center of gravity of a nation’s ability to wage war.”\textsuperscript{14} If popular will is a nation’s center of gravity in wartime, it is even more crucial to legitimacy and mission success in OOTW. The interrelationship between legitimacy and public support is emphasized in special-operations doctrine:

In modern conflict, legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. ... Legitimacy is determined by the people of the nation and by the international community based on their collective perception of the credibility of its cause and methods. Without legitimacy and credibility, special operations will not gain the support of foreign indigenous elements, the U.S. population, or the international community.\textsuperscript{15}

LIC doctrine confirms the importance of public support to strategic objectives, and the importance of military operations to that public support:

In order to accomplish their larger objectives in LIC, military leaders must consider the effect of all their actions on public opinion. The legitimacy of the actions of an armed force, or even individual members of the force, can have far-reaching effects on the legitimacy of the political system that the force supports. The leader must ensure that his [or her] troops understand that a tactically successful operation can also be strategically counterproductive because of the way in which they executed it and how the people perceived its execution.\textsuperscript{16}

Two publics factor into the military-legitimacy equation — the U.S. populace and the populace in the area of operations:

LIC is a political struggle in which ideas may be more important than arms. Therefore the U.S. government, in coordination with allies and host nations, must fight for the minds of the people not only inside the host nation, but also in the U.S. and the international community. Gaining and maintaining popular consensus is essential.\textsuperscript{17}

Domestic public support for peacetime military operations varies with the perception of the threat: The greater the threat, the greater the likelihood of public support for the use of military force, and vice versa. While the public tends to forgive military excesses when the threat is clear, as it was in Desert Storm, it has little tolerance for military excesses and collateral damage when the threat is more ambiguous, as it was in Somalia (and as it is in most OOTW). The recent NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia drew a mixed public reaction; only time will tell whether the military victory contributes to the long-term strategic objective of regional peace with justice.

While we can gain public support in large part by meeting the requirements of military legitimacy, public support has its own unpredictable dynamic. Without a clear and present threat to simplify the issues of military legitimacy in peacetime, domestic public support for overseas military operations is fickle at best. Congressional leaders understand this. Given the dominance of political objectives in OOTW, military leaders must also understand the importance of public support to mission success, as well as those factors that influence it.

The media reflects and shapes the public support needed for political objectives. During the Cold War, the relationship between the media and the military was often characterized by mutual suspicion. The low point came during the Vietnam War, when the military (made paranoid by a hostile media) engaged in unwarranted censorship and cover-ups of military operations. The rocky relationship between the media and the military continued after Vietnam, as evidenced by the Iran-Contra affair and other incidents involving U.S. advisers in politically sensitive areas such as Latin America.

Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the media and
the military has improved. There have been few restrictions on media coverage of military operations, and media coverage has been mostly favorable, contributing to a more positive image of the military. Casualties among journalists in Somalia and in the Balkans have sensitized the media to the need for the military to provide security for all non-combatants. The media’s understanding of this aspect of security will contribute to the public support needed to sustain military and political legitimacy, so long as military leaders do not shoot themselves in the foot by disregarding the requirements of legitimacy.

The First Amendment to the Constitution protects a free press as the cornerstone of liberty. Despite a history of mutual suspicion between the military and the media, recent experience indicates that the two can be allies. Military personnel should understand that it is shortsighted to restrict media coverage of military operations for other than security reasons. To the extent that it reports the truth, the media fulfills an important element of military and political legitimacy — the public’s right to know.

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Clearly defined objectives are therefore a prerequisite of legitimacy and are closely related to the principles of unity of effort and restraint:

A clearly defined and attainable objective — with a precise understanding of what constitutes success — is critical when the U.S. is involved in peace operations. Military commanders should understand specific conditions that could result in mission failure as well as those that mark success. Commanders must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort with other agencies.\(^{18}\)

Unity of effort

Unity of effort, the third principle of OOTW, provides an organizational dimension to military legitimacy and is closely related to political objectives and civil-military relations. Unity of effort is analogous to unity of command, a principle of combat operations. But because OOTW involve a variety of military and civilian personnel, the traditional military chain of command is impractical. Still, mission success depends upon a workable decision-making process and a coordinated effort between the diverse military and civilian components. Mission success also requires military leaders who can combine military proficiency with the finesse of a diplomat:

Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Command relationships may often be only loosely defined, causing commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation rather than command authority to achieve objectives by unity of effort. Military commanders consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic, and psychological in nature.\(^{19}\)

The international dimension of OOTW, especially peace operations, makes unity of effort even more complex:

Whenever possible, commanders should seek to establish a control
structure, such as a civil-military operations center, that takes account of and provides coherence to, all activities in the area. As well as military operations, this structure should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian activities involved in the peace operations. Without such a structure, military commanders need to consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational. This requirement will necessitate extensive liaison with all the involved parties as well as reliable communications. Because peace operations will often involve small-unit activities, to avoid friction all levels must understand the military-civilian relationship.

To achieve unity of effort in OOTW, military leaders must be able to bridge the formidable gap between military matters and diplomatic matters, and they must be able to overcome barriers of culture and language. The demanding qualities of a diplomat-warrior are expected in special-operations forces, but they are often considered inappropriate for conventional combat leaders.

Restraint

Restraint in the use of force is the fourth principle of OOTW, and it is interwoven with all the other principles. It is based on the premise that excessive force causes collateral damage that can undermine the public support required for political objectives and legitimacy. If we learned anything from the Vietnam debacle, it was that no amount of military force can substitute for political legitimacy:

Legitimacy derives from the perception that [military] authority is genuine, effective, and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. No group or force can decree [or force] legitimacy for itself [or others], but it can create and sustain legitimacy by its actions.

The application of restraint in military operations is based on the principles derived from the just-war tradition. These principles (military necessity, discrimination, proportionality and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering) have been incorporated into the law of war and have been applied to OOTW by analogy.

Military necessity justifies the use of offensive force to attain military objectives, but that force must be restrained by the remaining principles of discrimination, proportionality and avoidance of unnecessary suffering. Discrimination limits targets; proportionality requires that the attainment of mission objectives be balanced with the potential for civilian casualties and damage to civilian property. Unnecessary suffering must be avoided across the board.

Standards of restraint are incorporated into the rules of engagement, or ROE. ROE are tailored to each operation. Peacetime ROE are based on self-defense, and they are much more restrictive than wartime ROE because of the primacy of political objectives and the need for public support to achieve them.

In operations other than war, these ROE will be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short-term and long-term goals.

The restricted use of force as a LIC imperative has long underscored the importance of the law and of ROE as requirements of military legitimacy:

The nature of the LIC environment imposes greater limits on the use of military power than is usually the case with conventional warfare. This is reflected in the legal
restrictions and the operational and social restraints usually encountered in LIC. Military operations in the LIC environment may be highly visible and politically sensitive. They require particular attention to international, U.S., and host nation law including multinational and bilateral agreements and Congressional authorizations and appropriations.

Excessive violence can adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short-term and long-term goals. In peace operations, restraint is especially important to both legitimacy and mission success:

Restrains on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment of peace operations. The use of excessive force may adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. The ROE, and reasons for them, need to be understood and regularly practiced by all soldiers since a single thoughtless act could have critical political consequences.

The use of force may attract a response in kind. Its use may also escalate tension and violence in the local area and embroil peace operations in a harmful long-term conflict that is contrary to their aims. For that reason the use of force should be a last resort and should be used when other means of persuasion are exhausted.

In all cases, force will be prudently applied proportional to the threat. In peace operations every soldier must be aware that the goal is to produce conditions which are conducive to peace and not to the destruction of an enemy.

The 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia was an anomaly. The destruction of bridges, utilities and media centers in major cities was reminiscent of World War II, and it most certainly alienated the Serbian population. The bombing campaign seems to be evidence of a lower standard of restraint for strategic air power than for ground forces, having ugly precedents in Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. What was unusual about the NATO campaign was its moral justification: It was not conducted to deter international aggression but to halt ethnic cleansing. Although the bombing campaign was military, its effect on long-term NATO political objectives in the region remains to be seen.

Helping indigenous forces establish law and order out of chaos and then mobilizing the public support required for stable government depends upon realistic long-range political objectives and the patience to achieve them.

Perseverance

Perseverance, or patience, is the fifth principle of OOTW. Political objectives do not often lend themselves to a quick fix, but U.S. law and political expediency have traditionally favored short and decisive applications of combat force in peacetime. The U.S. public has traditionally become impatient with peacetime military operations that involve U.S. casualties.

Public impatience is reflected in the law. The War Powers Resolution (50 USC 1541-1548) requires the president to consult with Congress before committing U.S. forces “where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” It also limits U.S. military involvement in such situations to 60 days without the approval of Congress. The U.S. strikes into Grenada (Urgent Fury) and Panama (Just Cause) reflect the historical bias of presidents and of Congress for quick combat solutions to peacetime security issues rather than for more protracted and controversial OOTW, such as those in Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans, that rely on more extended noncombat activities.

No matter how effective combat operations are, lasting legitimacy ultimately depends upon broad-based indigenous public support. In conflicts that are based on intractable cultural (religious and ethnic) differences, achieving public support, if such a thing is possible, will require unusual perseverance. Helping indigenous forces establish law and order out of chaos and then mobilizing the public support required for stable government depends upon realistic long-range political objectives and the patience to achieve them. Army doctrine cautions commanders that short-sighted quick fixes can threaten strategic aims:

Commanders must assess quick contingency response options against their contribution to long-term, strategic objectives.

If committed forces solve an immediate problem within a nation or region [with military force] but detract from the legitimacy of the government in so doing, they have acted detrimentally against long-term, strategic aims.

Security

Security, the sixth principle of OOTW, complements — and complicates — the principle of
restraint. While lethal force must be restrained to achieve political objectives in peacetime operations, that restraint must be balanced with the need for security, or self-defense: “Regardless of their mission, commanders must protect their forces at all times. The intrinsic right of self-defense always applies.”

Commanders may be responsible for protecting more than their own forces; they may also be responsible for the security of civilians in their area of operations. If so, the requirements of civil law and order make diplomacy and good civil-military relations prerequisites for legitimacy:

Security requires more than physical protective measures. A force’s security will be significantly enhanced by its perceived legitimacy and impartiality, the mutual respect built between the force and the other parties involved in the peace operation, and the force’s credibility in the international arena. Effective public affairs, PSYOP and CA programs enhance security.

As it relates to legitimacy and to the public support required for political objectives, security for civilians is just as important as it is for the military forces. Security is especially important when civilians are interned for any reason. For example, when civilians are interned in temporary refugee camps, military authorities must develop rules and disciplinary procedures for maintaining law and order, much like an occupation force would do. Whether or not the U.S. military is considered to be an occupation force, as long as there is no effective civil-law enforcement, the military has a moral if not a legal obligation to provide security for civilian persons and their property. Experiences in Just Cause in Panama, Restore Hope in Somalia, and Uphold Democracy in Haiti have confirmed the doctrinal principle that military legitimacy depends upon law and order being provided where there is none.

If the predictions of Robert Kaplan in “The Coming Anarchy” prove to be correct, primal violence and the disintegration of traditional military forces could make security the predominant consideration in future OOTW — a contrast with the predominance of restraint in the past. Continuing experience in Bosnia and in Kosovo seems to confirm Kaplan’s predictions. Lasting security in the Balkans will require the cooperation of the Serbs, but the hostile attitudes that were created by the NATO bombing may delay real security in the region. In any event, experience has shown that providing law and order is the first requirement of security, giving the rule of law a new strategic priority in the future.

Civil-military relations

Civil-military relations is not a doctrinal principle of OOTW, but it should be. In situations where civilians are a mission objective, the interrelationship between the military and the civilians can mean the difference between military victory and political defeat.

The priorities of civil-military operations in war are reversed in peace. In wartime, the primary concern regarding civilians in the area of operations is to prevent their interference with combat; civil-military relations are secondary to defeating the enemy with overwhelming force. But in peacetime, public support for political objectives, both at home and in the area of operations, is more important than defeating an ambiguous enemy; civil-military relations become a primary focus of legitimacy in OOTW.

Most OOTW should be consid-
erred civil-military operations because of the primacy of political objectives that depend upon public support. Civil affairs, or CA, refers to the civil-military operations and to the forces that conduct them. CA provides the interface between military forces and civilians that is critical to legitimacy in OOTW. CA doctrine emphasizes civil-military relations as a command responsibility:

Civil Affairs (CA) is an inherent responsibility of command. CA encompasses the activities that military commanders take to establish and maintain relations between their forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are employed.

More than any other military discipline, CA emphasizes the principles of restraint, security and compliance with civilian-protection law as a mission objective, which is:

To assist command compliance with OPLAW requirements, insofar as military circumstances permit, by providing those resources necessary to meet essential civil requirements, avoiding property and other damages to usable resources, and minimizing loss of life and suffering.

The requirements of legitimacy and the principles of OOTW underscore the importance of CA both as a concept and as a capability needed for mission success in the new strategic environment.

The priority of political objectives in OOTW requires that military leaders be adaptable (adaptability is the sixth of the LIC imperatives) — able to think outside the box. A review of the requirements of legitimacy and the related principles of OOTW reveals their unconventional nature, at least relative to conventional combat operations. Some argue that OOTW are inappropriate for and degrade the capabilities of combat forces. They urge the U.S. to avoid military commitments like those in Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans. Perhaps they have forgotten that such operations have been the norm for special operations in LIC, and that they were the norm even for conventional forces prior to World War II.

One response to the ongoing debate about OOTW would be to return the controversial civil-military missions to the special-operations forces who are trained to perform them. If participation in OOTW truly degrades the combat skills of conventional forces, then noncombat forces should assume dominant roles in OOTW. Mission priorities would be reversed: Noncombat forces (such as CA) that play a supporting role in war-fighting would assume the primary role in OOTW; combat forces would take a secondary role. National Guard forces, whose domestic mission is to provide emergency assistance to civil authorities, could also assume a greater role in OOTW.

A realignment of military forces to more closely match their OOTW missions would limit opportunities for active-component combat forces to deploy in peacetime, but it would mollify critics of OOTW, who claim that such operations degrade our combat capability. It would also acknowledge the unique nature of the military capability that is needed to bridge the gap between the limits of diplomacy and war.

Whether we consider OOTW to be conventional operations or special operations, the principle of civilian supremacy applicable to most OOTW supports an enhanced role for reserve-component personnel — civilian soldiers — who have the skills essential for civil-military operations. It should be no surprise that 97 percent of all CA personnel are in the reserves, as are most military lawyers. Unlike combat reservists who have a wartime contingency mission, these civilian-soldiers are not back-ups for active component soldiers; rather, they are part-time operators and advisers in OOTW. In recent years, these civilian-soldiers have demonstrated that they are capable of deploying on short notice for extended tours overseas. They have proven themselves to be critical components of a peacetime-engagement capability.

In summary, the same civilians who are obstacles in combat operations become mission priorities in OOTW. This reversal of priorities can confuse military leaders and jeopardize military legitimacy and mission success. The principles of OOTW give credence to this phenomenon and illustrate the importance and the complexity of legal and political issues in OOTW. Civilian-protection law provides standards and a workable format for applying those standards on the ground, but the standards of restraint are less stringent for air power. Even if the conflicting standards on restraint are reconciled, they can never substitute for

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the moral context of decision-making at all levels.

Following the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia and the exodus of Serbian forces from the embattled province of Kosovo, President Clinton proclaimed that NATO had “done the right thing the right way.” That is a strategic conclusion that is yet to be seen. And questions remain: Did the extensive bombing of infrastructure targets so alienate the Serbian populace as to undermine regional peacekeeping operations? Will Milosevic and his henchmen answer at the Hague for their crimes?44

At both the operational level and the tactical level, the interrelated issues of public support, restraint and security will continue to haunt commanders in the new millennium. In the ambiguous and unforgiving conflict environments of OOTW, the military leader must be competent in military skills; he must demonstrate a knowledge of civilian-protection law and adhere to a sound ethical code; and he must also have the finesse of a diplomat — that is, he must be as comfortable working with civilians as he is with military personnel. That may be beyond the capability of conventional forces, but it is business as usual for special-operations forces. >

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Notes:
1 The activities of OOTW and the reversal of mission priorities therein are discussed in the author’s book, Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 36-48, 133, 135 (hereinafter referred to as Military Legitimacy).
2 For a discussion of military legitimacy and its relationship to the principles of OOTW, see Military Legitimacy, chapter 3. References to doctrinal principles and imperatives are from the following: JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Final Draft, January 1990), p. I-6 (hereinafter referred to as JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07); the principles of OOTW are stated in JCS Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995, at chapter II, which superseded the earlier draft of JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07 (hereinafter referred to as JCS Pub (OOTW) 3-07); FM 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993, at pp. 13-4 (hereinafter referred to as FM 100-5); and FM 100-23, Peace Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994, at pp. 15-18 (hereinafter referred to as FM 100-23). The principles of OOTW have been reordered in this article to correlate them to the LIC imperatives.
3 The principles of war are listed in Appendix A to Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995: Objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity. The principles of OOTW are listed in chapter V of the same publication. For a summary of arguments for and against OOTW, see Military Legitimacy, pp. 155, 156.
4 See JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07, p. 1-26; also see JCS Pub (OOTW) 3-07, pp. II-5.
6 Civilian protection law is the subject of chapter 7 of the Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville, Va.: International and Operational Law Department, The U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s School (JA422 2000)). Human rights is the subject of chapter 6 of the OPLAW Handbook.
7 The evolution of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in diplomacy is covered in chapter 4 of Military Legitimacy.
8 See FM 100-1, The Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army (May 1986), chapter 4; and FM 22-100, Military Leadership (coordinating draft), Department of the Army, June 1988), chapter 4.
9 Letter from General Dennis J. Reimer on Army values, dated 14 May 1997. Also see Military Legitimacy, pp. 21-23, 155-57, and note 59 at p. 163.
13 As to primacy of the political instrument and political dominance, see JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07, p. I-25; JCS Pub (OOTW) 3-07, pp. vi, 1-2; also see FM 100-20, p. 1-8.
15 FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Final Draft, October 1990), pp. 2-29, 30.
16 FM 100-20, p. I-85.
17 JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07, see supra note 2. Mission creep resulting from the lack of a clearly defined mission statement and end state no doubt contributed to the loss of legitimacy for U.S. forces in Somalia follow-
ing the abortive 1993 raid in Mogadishu. See Military Legitimacy, pp. 20, 135.

18 FM 100-23, p. 15. One frustrated U.N. commander characterized the political dilemma as follows: “None of the political leadership can tell me what they want me to accomplish. That fact, however, does not stop them from continually asking me when I will be done.” See OPLAW Handbook, supra note 6, at p. 7-5.

19 FM 100-5, p. 13-4.

20 FM 100-23, p. 16.

21 See Military Legitimacy, pp. 107-15, 135, 136, 155, 156.

22 FM 100-5, p. 13-4; JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07, p. I-26; JCS Pub (OOTW) 3-07, pp. II-5, II-7, II-8; FM 100-20, p. I-9; also see Military Legitimacy, pp. 138-43.


24 Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 December 1989. See generally, OPLAW Handbook, supra note 6, chapter 8.


27 FM 100-23, p. 17.

28 Eliot Cohen has advocated the use of air power against urban infrastructure targets as a matter of national policy, but the inconsistency, if not illegality, of such a strategic policy has not been lost on warriors on the ground who are subject to more stringent standards of restraint. Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 1994), pp. 109, 123. For a discussion of this issue that cites the Cohen article, see Military Legitimacy, chapter 1, pp. 13-19. But see note 44, infra, which takes issue with the premise of the Cohen article in concluding that the NATO bombing campaign was a failure.

29 See generally, Military Legitimacy, pp. 137, 138.

30 FM 100-5, p. 13-4; also see FM 100-23, p. 18.

31 FM 100-5, p. 13-4.

32 FM 100-23, p. 17.

33 See Military Legitimacy, pp. 143, 144.


35 Civil Affairs, or CA, and civil-military operations, or CMO, are closely related terms that are used interchangeably in this context. CA encompasses all activities involving the interface between military and civilian personnel; CA is defined by law as a special-operations activity. CMO is a generic term referring to the use of military forces to perform traditionally nonmilitary activities. See JCS Pub 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, 21 June 1995, pp. I-1, I-2 (hereinafter referred to as JCS Pub 3-57); also see Military Legitimacy, pp. 70, 71, 149-55, 167-78.


37 Ibid., p. I-8; also see pp. II-3, II-4.


39 See Military Legitimacy, pp. 155, 156.


41 Ibid., pp. 170, 171.

42 Ibid., pp. 107-14.

43 Ibid., pp. 166-69, 174-78.

44 At least one author has characterized the NATO campaign as a failure, citing, inter alia, the bombing of “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,” which is prohibited by Article 14 of the 1977 Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention. See Michael Mandelbaum, “A Perfect Failure: NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999, pp. 2, 6.
Early in 1993, Mary Baudar of Winona, Minn., received an invitation from state school officials to attend kindergarten in the fall. The 104-year-old woman was puzzled: She had attended kindergarten years before crayons were even invented. But to the digitally myopic Minnesota computers — which could recognize dates in the 20th century only — Baudar was just another four-year-old born in 1989.

Four years later, in 1997, the Amway Corporation, a $6-billion company based in Ada, Mich., began rejecting a certain batch of solvents used in making cleaning products. According to the manufacturing plant’s computers, the shelf life of the chemicals had expired: The system software read the expiration date of the year 2000 as 1900. In April 1997, Money Magazine reported that the computer network that schedules appointments at three hospitals and 75 clinics in the Philadelphia area crashed when an operator scheduled an appointment after Jan. 1, 2000.

On Sept. 27, 1998, the Kansas City Star reported that an Olathe, Kan., couple had been charged nearly $18,000 in insurance premiums: Premiums that should have been charged in advance for coverage beyond Dec. 31, 1999, were mistakenly posted as being in arrears since Jan. 1, 1900. In the same article, the Star reported that on Feb. 29, 1996, a Kansas school, Johnson County Community College, was unable to unlock its doors: The school’s security computer could not recognize Feb. 29 as a legitimate date, and it refused to unlock doors accessed by magnetic key cards.

The United States’ armed forces have experienced similar digital horror stories. In 1997, according to a congressional report cited in the Sept. 13, 1997, issue of Science News, the Defense Logistics Agency — the organization that manages $1 trillion worth of contracts; supports 1,400 different weapons systems; and maintains the supply of food, clothing, fuel and medicine for the U.S. military — simply struck 90,000 items from its inventory. Since the DLA has 86 automated information systems running 39 million lines of computer code, the error took 400 hours to correct. In September 1997, the Aegis missile cruiser USS Yorktown lost propulsion. The critical failure resulted from a software-data overflow error.

The Year 2000 computer problem, or Y2K, has now become a daily news item as it percolates in the American public consciousness. Perhaps it is time for the U.S. Army to recognize Y2K as the first tangible example of the Information Revolution.

Rolling chaos

Sometime during the late 1950s, computer engineers more or less tacitly agreed to computer-code year dates in a two-digit
format. At the time, that method made sense for three reasons: First, since computer procedures of the day were based mostly on data-entry operations, keyboard operators would save countless keystrokes. Second, the two-digit year format saved significant room on computer punch cards. Finally, the format saved precious space on mass-storage devices. In 1965, one megabyte of magnetic-disk storage cost $761. Today it costs 75 cents, but most computers throughout the world still store date information with only two digits reserved for the year.

As we have seen from the examples above, the two-digit format causes many computers to read the year 2000 as 1900. A task as simple as calculating one’s age for Social Security or military pension payouts can therefore become problematic on many computer systems. If you were born on March 31, 1920, the computer would correctly calculate your age on your birthday in 1998 as 980331-200331=78 years old. On your birthday in the year 2000, however, the computer would calculate your age as 000331-200331=-20 years old. Depending on the computer-code defaults, the system will either crash or render you 20 years old (and ineligible for that fat retirement pension), a newborn, or 20 years unborn.

The costs to sort out the computer code and to fix the Y2K problem are expected to be enormous. The Sept. 19, 1998, issue of The Economist projects a high-end global cost of $530 billion to fix the problem and another $1 trillion to pay for litigation consequences. The Economist’s low-end estimate is a mere $200 billion to $300 billion, but it still expects litigation costs to run to $1 trillion.

While the software side of the Y2K problem will likely cause system crashes and malfunctions, sorting failures, date errors, subtle miscalculations or unexplained system inactivity, there is another side to the problem. The other side may be even more devastating to military and other civil-security organizations.

Despite all the discussion of the Y2K problem, the point is seldom stressed that we are actually facing two distinct problems: The one most often discussed is the information-technology problem (computers and software). But the more sinister problem deals with embedded systems.

Embedded systems monitor, regulate or control the operation of devices, networks and systems. They are generally simple
integrated-circuit chips. They are embedded in all electronic technology, from wristwatches and video games to dedicated processors that control large industrial plants and electric-power grids. Embedded systems have time-sensitive logic written in permanently coded instructions called firmware. These instructions are stored in the chip’s programmable read-only memory. The code cannot be reprogrammed. The embedded chip itself must be found and replaced.

The Gartner Group, a consulting firm based in Connecticut, estimates that 50 billion embedded systems are in use around the world, and that 1-3 percent of them will experience a Y2K-related failure. The Gartner Group estimates that 25 million embedded systems worldwide will have to be replaced in order to prevent mission-critical failures.

Electric power utilities are among the users that are most vulnerable to risk from embedded systems. Estimates place the evaluation, repair and testing phases of a Y2K conversion effort for a medium-sized conventional power plant at 21 months. In a typical power plant, it will cost $30 million-$40 million to find, repair and test the 500 or more noncompliant embedded systems out of the tens of thousands installed. Nor is the problem of embedded systems confined to the power industry. The average automobile may have as many as 20 time-sensitive embedded systems. (Ever wonder how your car knows when to signal that it needs an oil change?) Embedded systems play a dominant role in control technology, and the failure of embedded systems could have a broad and profound effect on all segments of society.

The Day the Earth Stood Still

In the late 1950s, Michael Rennie and Patricia Neal starred in the movie The Day the Earth Stood Still. The premise of the movie reflected the atomic culture of the times: Aliens came to earth to stop the planet from destroying itself with nuclear weapons. To prevent such a catastrophe, the aliens somehow shut down all mechanical devices on the planet. The movie was a moderate success, but all entertainment value aside, its title can serve as a useful illustration of the possible consequences of the Y2K problem to our society and to our military.

During the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, civilization began moving

In complex systems such as modern military organizations, there are no independent elements. The loss of one element may render the entire system ineffective.

DoD photo
toward massive dispersion and distribution. Time was the one common element that could integrate and coordinate the efforts of vastly dispersed organizations and societies. New systems of distributed technologies, such as the railroad, required internal control subsystems to make the whole structure work effectively. Now, in the late 20th century, those control subsystems have been replaced by the technology of the computer revolution. Like silicon sentinels, embedded systems now regulate and monitor the individual components of our distributed technologies, keeping those components operating as a harmonious whole.

The full scope of the Y2K problem and its consequences are still unknown to us, but we can be certain about some of its aspects. First, we know that the Y2K bug is a technological problem that cannot be solved with more technology. It will require a major problem-solving effort that will involve virtually everyone. Second, Y2K is a series of irrevocable and non-negotiable deadlines. We know precisely when the event will occur; there is no mystery or surprise there. We do not, however, know all the consequences of the event. Third, this is perhaps our first major crisis within a complex global system. Complexity theory tells us that complicated systems become complex not because they have many parts, but because their components are tied together by the speed-of-light flow of information.

Consider, for instance, a classic military organization like Napoleon’s army. The army clearly had many moving parts, thanks to organizational innovations such as the division and the corps; but its structure was complicated at best. With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, armies developed a distributed quality that led, among other things, to the emergence of operational art. New, operationally-based formations had to be harnessed together with speed-of-light technology such as the telegraph, which was borrowed from the railroad system.

A complex system, such as a modern army or a society, displays two fundamental characteristics: First, the system’s evolution is determined by the initial condition of the system and by its boundary conditions, or capabilities. For example, the initial deployment of each weapon system prior to a battle will determine both the course of that battle and the outcome. Change the location of a weapon (its initial condition) or its capability, and you change the battle in some way.

Second, a complex system is nonlinear. There are no independent elements in a complex system. Each element of the system interacts with all the other elements. In a rifle squad, for example, the loss of a rifleman does not necessarily lead to a linear (directly proportional) subtraction of the squad’s combat power. The combat cohesion of the entire squad is affected, and as a result the unit may be rendered ineffective for combat. The idea that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (and that the reduction of the whole is greater than a reduction of one of the parts) is an expression of the nonlinear quality of complex systems.

The two characteristics hold true with even greater force for massively complex systems like societies. Essentially, the consequences of the loss of any part of a complex social system cannot be predicted in any mathematical way, because mathematics has evolved to the point that it deals only with fundamentally linear systems.

Contingency planning

Today, there is generally guarded optimism about the likely consequences of the Y2K problem. Only here and there do we hear a note of caution. For instance, the National Football League recently issued a Y2K warning to all its members, noting that the last scheduled game of the 1999 season falls on Sunday, Jan. 2, 2000. The league instructed its teams to consider the Y2K problem when making their travel plans for the last scheduled game. More ominously, National Guard units around the country are developing plans to deal with Y2K contingencies. The Washington Times reported on Feb. 22, 1999, that New Mexico plans to keep all 28 of its National Guard armories open on New Year’s Day.
In Washington, half of that state’s National Guard units will be on duty that day. Lieutenant Colonel Tim Donovan, a spokesman for the Wisconsin National Guard, said, “The business we’re in is to help communities when they’re overwhelmed by an event, a blizzard, riot or other natural or man-made disaster. We have the resources. And many of the consequences being speculated about Y2K are not unlike the things we’ve been doing for years.”

Actions in support of local emergency-management authorities are recognized as the legitimate domain of the active Army. However, as of this writing, there is no evidence of similar contingency planning on the active-Army side. It may be that deployments to stability operations (such as those in Bosnia and possibly in Kosovo), and defensive deployments to places such as Korea have diminished concern about active-Army participation in Y2K contingencies. Whatever role the U.S. Army ultimately plays in addressing Y2K issues, one thing is certain: Active and reserve components are vulnerable to the same Y2K consequences. A battalion commander, for example, standing in his motor pool, cannot, on any given day, answer all of the following fundamental Y2K questions:

- How many embedded systems are in your equipment? Where are they? How can they be detected?
- How many embedded systems in your inventory of equipment rely on date information?
- What kinds of failures do you anticipate? How will embedded-system failures affect the accomplishment of your mission?

No one in the Army knows all the answers to these questions. On Jan. 1, 2000, the question for commanders and staffs may not be, Who will the Army help support because of Y2K problems? Rather the question may be, Who will help support the Army?

Information revolution

Pundits have trumpeted the last few decades of the 20th century as the Information Age. Many of these same pundits have also become self-appointed heralds of an “information revolution.” Since the initial blast of rhetoric, a more reasoned view of the Information Age has begun to emerge. Scholars like Michael Hobart and Zachary Schiffman (Information Ages, 1998) argue that the present information revolution marks the third in a series of information upheavals that go back 4,000 years.
years or more. The first information revolution began with the invention of the alphabet and the rise of literacy. The second began in the 16th and 17th centuries with the development of double-entry bookkeeping, algebra and calculus; and with the emergence of numeracy (the ability to reduce and manipulate packets of numerical information). The most recent information revolution, computeracy (the ability to write the software that controls the computer), began during the Industrial Revolution, when Charles Babbage envisioned a universal calculating machine — a computer.

The Industrial Revolution replaced muscle with machine, but the machine still had to be controlled by the hand of man. At the end of World War II, however, engineers developed computers that could automatically control the machines. Automation was born, creating the so-called information revolution and the new and powerful science of cybernetics — the science of control. The consequences of the embedded-system aspect of the Y2K problem may represent a tangible revolutionary event. In a special sense, the Y2K problem is the information revolution, and it will be its own herald to trumpet its coming on Jan. 1, 2000.

**Virtual info-war**

The three information revolutions of literacy, numeracy and computeracy have all had significant military implications. Literacy has led to the rise of an effective means of commanding and controlling large military formations. Numeracy has led to the emergence of an analytically oriented general staff. Computeracy has led to the automated control of advanced and complex weapons systems such as the cruise missile. Whatever the consequences of the Y2K problem, the overall effect will be the same as if the failed systems had been struck deliberately by a hostile enemy. Perhaps the greatest military significance of the Y2K problem is that it will afford us a practical, real-world exercise in dealing with the consequences of a massive deep-information strike against the entire automated control structure of the industrialized world. The lessons could be staggering.

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Conference attendee provides recommendations

The overall effort (of the 1999 Special Forces Conference) was highly commendable. Overall, the three days in Fayetteville were indeed well-done, and a tip of the beret to Colonel Boyatt and the many people who were involved. I will save time and space by not commenting on the positive aspects of the event. I would like to offer some observations on those areas that I believe need reinforcement.

SF NCO participation. Sitting in the various lectures, panels and working groups, I was surprised by the lack of NCO participation. While there was a sergeant major present every now and then, there simply weren’t enough E6s, E7s and E8s. This is particularly alarming, since SF prides itself on its highly skilled enlisted personnel. Most of us remember learning all of the important things an SF officer must know from an NCO. Where are these men today? They were not visible in the symposiums or in the exhibit areas.

Recommendations:
• Encourage greater participation of SF NCOs.
• Use examples of meaningful lessons learned from NCOs.
• Have SF NCOs run a CAPEX. Challenge them, and let’s see how they do things.

SOF panels. Having been to three SOF symposiums within a year (Washington, Fayetteville and Tampa), I am seeing a “pattern of paublum.” We spend too much time with introductions and light banter, and not enough time discussing hard issues. Canned command briefings look good once; after that, they become boring and, in my opinion, deceptive. We know things are not as positive as the briefings tell us, because we talk with the officers and NCOs (when we can find them). One of the purposes of the symposiums should be to lay a lot of things on the table and say, “Hey, retirees, manufacturers and SF groupies — here’s what our real problems are: bang, bang, bang, and we need your help in fixing them.”

Recommendations:
• Pre-brief panelists. Tell them the symposium isn’t a public-relations drill; it’s a working session with friendlies.
• Shorten the introductions of panelists and of esteemed SF and non-SF. Most of us know who’s who, and if we need a list of assignments and awards, attach a copy of the individual’s Officer Record Brief or resume as a handout.
• Preview the content of panelists’ presentations. If panelists are not willing to submit at least an outline, they shouldn’t be participating.
• Select some panel members who are not associated with SF or the military but who do have expertise in the panel’s subject area. Most of Donovan’s OSS brain trust was made up of nonmilitary people.
• Keep panels small. In some cases, panels were so large that some members never got to speak. This defeats the purpose of a panel.
• Use the Internet for some panel discussions — we’re living in that age.
• Consider events such as an interactive CPX that would involve the audience.
• Get some of the SF groups involved using distance-learning and video-conferencing techniques.

What is Special Forces? I listened to a number of senior people address this issue, and I was astounded at the diverse responses. Someone needs to capture what Special Forces is and tack it up on a high pole for everyone to see, understand and agree with. After all, the meaning of Special Forces is our Holy Grail!

Some of our esteemed seniors seem to have problems with basic truths; i.e., “Special Forces are teachers,” or “Special Forces work well with foreign nations.” I was also surprised by comments such as: “Special Forces is not the Peace Corps,” and “The nation-building mission is killing us.” SF would probably be dead and buried now if we had not become involved in every MTT we could find going to Africa, the Middle East or Central America. SF are outstanding because they are gifted military teachers who specialize in working with foreign counterparts.

I think we should all be concerned by the diversity of the definition of SF within our own community. Unless there is some recognized common ground, we could become all things to all people, and we could experience mission drift.

Special Forces vs. CT. I continue to see a lot of confusion within the Army regarding counterterrorist units and SF. Someone needs to address this issue openly and correct it. CT units and SF are not the same. Because SF is often painted with the CT brush, everyone assumes that the two think alike.
Unfortunately, SF often gets the blame for any missteps taken on the CT side of the fence.

Recommendations:
- Correct the perception before another Mogadishu occurs.
- Look at how the British SAS, the Israelis and the Germans have approached this issue.
- Consider bringing CT out into the open (OPSEC could still be maintained).

Need for a skunk works within special operations. Historically, the most innovative period for special operations was during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Why not today?

Recommendation:
- Create a low-visibility skunk works composition of a variety of talent from outside the SF community to look at problems and issues.

In closing, I think we should all be alarmed when General Abrams says that an armor division could be just as effective in humanitarian-assistance missions as Special Forces. Not one person attempted to take issue with his remark. Abrams’ remark reminded me of a comment made by the late General Richard Stilwell, in one of his old reports on the effectiveness of SF in Vietnam. He praised SF backhandedly, saying how effective they were, but also mentioning the excessive number of senior NCOs on A-teams. One of his final comments was that basically any well-trained infantryman could do what an SF officer does — possibly better. Shortly after that report, the reduction of Special Forces began.

LTC Andrew G. Gembara
U.S. Army (ret.)

‘Who SF are’ related to ‘what SF do’

The Summer 1999 issue of Special Warfare contained an article by Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Christopher Tone defining what we do, and one by CW3 Larry E. Bush defining who we are. What we do and who we are certainly are closely related. Have we as SF changed who we are because SF operations have evolved since our inception? Has SF’s core mission changed? It is appropriate that these discussions are occurring during the transition from one millennium to the next; the answers to these questions will affect not only how the citizen of the future views Special Forces, but more importantly, how we view ourselves.

SF has recently dusted off the old manuals on insurgency and guerrilla warfare; we have discovered that those operations, combined with today’s technology, have relevance in the SF arena of today and tomorrow. We look back to the OSS and to our Vietnam days and say that we are reclaiming our core mission and purpose; I believe that who we are as SF has more in common with the way Aaron Bank thought and with the OSS command climate than with the way Jedburg teams operated. The emphasis was on results, not on documentation and procedure. Men exercised the latitude given them by their commanders, and trust was evident both ways. Theoretically, who we are has not changed. We are a group of people sharing common values, character and capability for which we were assessed and selected to form a Special Force for the specific and unique purpose of conducting unconventional warfare.

Webster defines “unconventional” as not conventional; not conforming to customary, formal or accepted practices. He defines warfare as “the action of waging war; armed conflict; conflict or struggle of any kind.” Throughout the history of conflict, combatants facing greater numbers and better-equipped forces have resorted to unconventional methods, with varying degrees of success. General Giap used unconventional methods in Vietnam. He eventually defeated an enemy who had air superiority and a great advantage in equipment and combat support. Fifteen years later, a combination of ancient and innovative unconventional techniques were used in Afghanistan to defeat another enemy who ruled the skies and had a vast advantage in equipment and materiel support. In both examples, unconventional warfare was not limited to insurgency, intelligence operations or sabotage: It was the principle at the forefront of every operation. As long as there are combatants with less who are fighting enemies with more, there will be a need for unconventional warfare.

Today, geopolitics influences any decision to deviate from customary, formal or accepted military practices. USSOCOM provides the NCA with the unconventional option over a broad spectrum of operations, from counterterrorist strikes to employing a surrogate to sabotage a command’s computer network. All SOF have unconventional aspects, and they should therefore be considered unconventional warriors.

The definition of unconventional warfare should be broad enough to include all SF operations, thus providing a common base on which we can build different terms for the variety of operations we conduct. The following definition is offered:

Unconventional warfare: The use of nonconventional methodology throughout the spectrum of conflict, in order to achieve stated military objectives.

The term “methodology” is used because it refers to the principles that are used in solving problems; “spectrum of conflict” is used because it is a broader term than operational continuum. The definition removes any reference to terms, such as insurgency or subversion, that are associated with GW. Lastly, this definition reinforces the solidarity of SF and serves as the common thread between who we are and what we do.

There was a time when dawn
attacks were unexpected and therefore successful. Dawn attacks eventually became standard practice, until the development and use of “stand to” negated their advantage. This oversimplification illustrates that “unconventional doctrine” can become an antithetical term. The more we strive to delineate, standardize, and measure our training and operations, the more conventional we become. In our operational environment, “conventional” means failure. We must realize that in order for our operations and techniques to remain unconventional, they must constantly evolve.

The operations and the equipment will be different, but let’s ensure that the man remains the same. By adhering to the principles inherent in the definitions of who we are and what we do, we will be successful in what we do.

SFC Gary Harrington
5th SF Group
Fort Campbell, Ky.

Det 101 supported conventional operations

I just read the article, “Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces” (Summer 1999) by Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Christopher Tone. The authors should be complimented for attempting to review and summarize the past history of UW, but the past is vast, and the article contained a statement that I would like to correct.

The article states that there were no Allied conventional efforts (during World War II) in the China-Burma-India theater. That’s not correct. OSS-Detachment 101 deployed company-sized guerrilla units of American-led Kachins to provide unconventional-warfare support to four conventional forces: Merrill’s Marauders, an American Army regiment; the British 36th Division, which was assigned to General Stilwell’s Northern Combat Area Command; the 19th Division of the British 14th Army; and the American Mars Task Force, which consisted of two American regiments. Detachment 101 also deployed battalion-sized Kachin guerrilla units east of the Irrawaddy River, where there were no conventional Allied forces. Because of the lack of American conventional forces, General Dan Sultan later asked Detachment 101 to deploy a number of guerrilla forces across the Shan States to block any attempt by the Japanese Army to threaten the flow of supplies on the Burma Road to China. Detachment 101 was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for effectively carrying out that conventional mission.

The primary mission of the U.S. forces in Burma was to keep the supply lines to China open so we could keep China’s four-million-man army engaging Japanese forces who might otherwise have been used against the Americans in the Pacific. That mission was essential to the success of the war, but the European and Pacific theaters were of higher priority, so few U.S. ground forces could be spared for Burma. Detachment 101, with its economy-of-force capability, had to fill that void as well as it could. It did so with considerable effectiveness.

When OSS-Detachment 101 was organized in April 1942, it became the first organization in U.S. military history created specifically to conduct unconventional warfare behind enemy lines. Detachment 101 was fortunate, (1) because we had time to build an intelligent base before we had to deploy guerrilla forces, (2) because we fought in rugged, mountainous jungle terrain that was hostile to conventional forces and friendly to guerrillas, (3) because the Kachins, our guerrillas, were as much at home in the jungle as the animals were, and (4) because we had the latest technological gadgets to help us: the airplane, the radio and the parachute.

In unconventional warfare, efficient communications and material support are essential to success on the battlefield. The communications people in Detachment 101 built a lightweight, portable radio for field use that was superior to any that had existed prior to that time. Our support people had supply drops of ammunition prepackaged with parachutes ready in a warehouse at an airfield in India so that we could receive an ammunition drop into our perimeter within an hour; if we were surrounded and under attack by a unit of the Japanese army. This support enabled us to perform our missions effectively.

OSS Detachment 101 was an effective and efficient pioneer in unconventional warfare, but its existence was classified as “secret” during World War II. It received very little publicity after the war, because old news is not news, and everyone was tired of hearing about the war.

LTC James R. Ward
U.S. Army (ret.)
Seminole, Fla.

Infosphere has changed nature of war

“Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces,” by Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Christopher Tone, was excellent, but I feel that it was a bit limited, in that it portrays future SF activities taking place in nation-states (or in the case of Kosovo, proto-nation-states). The Information Age has created war forms that go beyond conflict bounded by such Industrial Age geopolitical norms.

While the authors pay some attention to the Information Age in their references to IO and IW, they miss the idea that the nature of war itself has changed because of the infosphere. The examples of Soma-
lia and Rwanda used by the authors demonstrate precisely this point. But instead of adapting to a world in full view of the glare of global TV (as Mohammed Aideed did), they recommend trying to evade.

The Clausewitzian definition of war is that it is the extension of politics that uses the controlled application of violence to constrain the enemy to accomplish our will. That definition, however, has been eroded by the advent of instantaneous global telecommunication, especially global television. It is now possible to affect multiple bodies politic without directly applying force. Why else did the U.S. cut and run from Somalia? The effects of video footage of a handful of U.S. casualties completely upended the U.S. tactical victory.

As another example, consider that the U.S. has been engaged for the better part of a decade in a new kind of war whose main proponent is the stateless ex-Saudi terrorist Usama Ben Laden. That Ben Laden has been successful can be very succinctly put: One individual, primarily self-supported, has managed to engage a superpower with various large-scale acts of violence, and after several years, that man and his cause are still alive … and thriving.

The U.S. inability to stop Ben Laden stems from our insistence on using Cold War-legacy systems and even more archaic thinking in dealing with an asymmetric enemy who has totally adapted himself and his operations to the infosphere; he is in effect a virtual guerrilla whose area of operations is global and four-dimensional. His adaptation to the terrain of the infosphere makes him and his organization amorphous, able to appear and disappear at will.

To end the problem, the U.S. must affect the bodies politic and support mechanisms that allow Ben Laden to carry on his operations. The U.S. must adapt to the infosphere and attempt to out-guerrilla the guerrilla.

This will require Special Forces soldiers who are optimized for this new kind of combat. This means small numbers of extremely well-educated soldiers, fluent in media as well as in languages, and capable of four-dimensional combat against a worthy enemy.

Moreover, why would we organize such future soldiers in a rank structure copied from Industrial Age models? Does Ben Laden have nine grades of enlisted, 10 grades of officer and five grades of warrants?

The Special Forces soldier we will need in the future will be much older. Information warfare is the domain of older soldiers: soldiers who are broadly educated and trained, who can first out-think and then out-fight an elusive enemy in any dimension of the Information Age.

Chuck de Caro
McLean, Va.

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The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is seeking sergeants first class in CMF 37F, Psychological Operations, and CMF 38A, Civil Affairs, who are completing assignments in troop-program units, and who wish to continue serving their respective communities as individual mobilization augmentees, or IMAs. The PSYOP and CA Training and Doctrine Divisions of SWCS's Directorate of Training and Doctrine have IMA positions for soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve, or IRR, to assist in the development of doctrine and training products. Members of the IRR are pre-selected, pre-trained, and assigned to authorized active-duty positions. For more information, telephone Joe Pereira, reserve affairs mobilization planner, at DSN 239-5911 or commercial (910) 432-5911; e-mail: pereiraj@soc.mil.

In accordance with an interim change to AR 670-1, Special Forces-qualified soldiers in CMF 18 who are attending language training at the Defense Language Institute are authorized to wear the green beret. SF-qualified personnel assigned to the Airborne and Special Operations Test Directorate, Test and Experimentation Command, and the Operational Test and Evaluation Command are also authorized to wear the green beret. The beret flash will be the one approved for personnel assigned to SF positions but not assigned to SF units: The flash has a gray border and a green background with three bands — gray, black and purple — from top left to bottom right.

The 1999 sergeant-first-class promotion-selection board selected 17 staff sergeants from CMF 37, Psychological Operations. This represents a selection rate of 31 percent, vs. the Army average of 23 percent. Fourteen of the selectees were from the primary zone, and three were from the secondary zone. Statistics are shown below:

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Effective Aug. 3, 1999, soldiers who attend the SF Qualification Course incur a 24-month service-remaining requirement, or SRR. The requirement is computed from the completion date of MOS training, including any required language or specialized training. Soldiers who cannot meet the SRR must extend or re-enlist before they report to the SFQC. Soldiers who recycle for academic or disciplinary reasons, or who voluntarily recycle, must extend or re-enlist as necessary to meet the SRR before they restart training. The SRR will not be adjusted for soldiers who are recycled through no fault of their own (medical recycle, compassionate recycle, etc.).
The Army has approved skill-qualification identifier “W” for selected positions within CMF 18. To be eligible for SQI W, soldiers must have completed the eight-week Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis and Exploitation Techniques Course, or SFARTAETC, which is conducted by the SWCS. A notification of future change dated June 21, 1999, authorizes early award of SQI W to qualified personnel beginning June 1, 2000. Awarding of the SQI is to be accomplished by the servicing military personnel office. For more information, telephone MSG George Bennett or MSG Brian Bernard, at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

The Psychological Operations Enlisted Branch newsletter has been updated with the latest CMF information and new points of contact. The newsletter is available at http://www.perscom.army.mil/EPsf/37_notes.htm.

The 1999 sergeant-first-class promotion-selection board selected 674 staff sergeants from CMF 18, Special Forces. This CMF 18 selection rate was 51.8 percent, vs. the Army average of 23 percent. Four hundred seventy-seven of the selectees were from the primary zone, and 197 were from the secondary zone. Statistics are shown below:

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<td>11.4 yrs</td>
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Special Forces is seeking enlisted soldiers who want to become SF warrant officers. The 2001 recruiting year will begin in March 2000, and applicants should begin now to prepare their application packets. Applicants must be serving as a staff sergeant or above; must possess a CMF 18 MOS; must have graduated from the SF Operations and Intelligence Sergeants Course or the SF Advanced NCO Course after October 1994; and must have a minimum of three years’ experience at the SF A-detachment level. Applicants must include a current DA Form 330 (Language Proficiency Questionnaire) with a minimum 1+/1+ language proficiency, or possess a minimum score of 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery. Applicants must meet the medical fitness standards for SF duty and the SERE Course, according to AR 40-501, and include an SF warrant-officer-candidate medical screening memorandum completed by the applicant’s surgeon. Applicants must also pass the Army Physical Readiness Test for the 17-21 age group. Applicants must possess at least a secret security clearance and have letters of recommendation from their company, battalion and group commanders, as well as from their group senior warrant officer. Individuals not assigned to SF groups must have a letter of recommendation from their current chain of command and a letter of recommendation from their previous SF-group chain of command. Applicants must be no older than 36. Individuals who have more than 12 years of active federal service but less than 14 years will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Those who are accessed will spend 6-8 years on an A-detachment. SF selection rates to CW3 are around 80 percent, and to CW4, around 76 percent. Interested applicants should contact their group senior warrant officer or telephone CW4 Edwards at the Special Operations Proponency Office, DSN 239-1879 or commercial (910) 432-1879.
DA approves SELCON for captains

Selective continuation in service, or SELCON, has been approved for captains who have been twice non-selected for major. On a selective basis, SELCON will be granted for three years, beginning the first day of the seventh month after the SELCON list is approved (e.g., if the list is published July 15, SELCON will begin Feb. 1). Captains will continue to be eligible for promotion during SELCON status. Currently, the SELCON period is not renewable, and a captain will not be able to retire with fewer than 20 years' service.

YG 80, 86 officers may appeal CFD

Officers in year groups 1980 and 1986 may appeal the results of their career-field designation, or CFD, board only on the basis of material error. Submitting a wrong preference could be considered a material error, subject to the board's determination. Appeals boards will consist of senior officers in the operations career field and the deputy chief of staff for personnel. Officers have 180 days following the adjournment of the CFD board in which to file an appeal.

Minority representation in SF

Special Forces has the lowest minority content of any U.S. Army combat-arms population. Since 1996, the SWCS senior leadership has attempted to increase the branch's minority content. The rationale is that SF, with its worldwide audience, should represent the diversity of American society and demonstrate the opportunities that our democracy affords its citizens. The Special Operations Proponency Office monitors minority content in the SF training pipeline and provides the SWCS commanding general with quarterly updates on the progress of minority soldiers, from recruitment through completion of SFAS. Current data indicates that the rate at which minority soldiers are selected in SFAS is proportionate to the number of minority soldiers who enter SFAS. The focus of SWCS's minority recruiting initiatives is therefore to increase the number of minority soldiers entering SFAS.

In 1998, the Rand Corporation, a nonprofit research and analysis institution, conducted a study for the Secretary of Defense on minority representation and recruiting in special-operations forces. The results of that study were published in the October 1998 report, *Minority Representation in Special Operations Forces*. The study concluded that while minorities are underrepresented in SF, certain initiatives could improve minority representation. The following SWCS minority recruiting initiatives are based on Rand's recommendations and on studies conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute.

- SF minority officers visit historically black colleges and universities and other institutions with sizable minority populations to inform cadets about the branch's opportunities and challenges. These minority role models raise the visibility of SF with cadets who otherwise would have little or no exposure to the branch prior to being contacted by an SF recruiter.
- Each summer, the SF Branch participates in the branch orientation at the ROTC Advanced Camp at Fort Lewis, Wash. That participation reinforces the branch's campus visits during the academic year.
- SF recruiting teams travel year-round to Army posts, promoting SF in com-
bat, combat-support and combat-service-support units. CSS units, with their relatively high minority content, provide a particularly fertile minority recruiting ground. The Army Recruiting Command’s SF advertising campaign and several Armywide periodicals also contain photos of SF minority soldiers. In sum, the SWCS’s minority-recruiting effort, in tandem with that of USAREC, embraces diverse approaches to attract minority soldiers to SFAS. The ultimate goal is an SF community that demonstrates the opportunities that the U.S. affords its citizens, regardless of their race or ethnic background.

This year’s LTC promotion-selection rate for Functional Area 39 was the best so far, exceeding the Army average in all three promotion zones. Of the 22 officers selected for promotion, 16 were fully trained; 13 were graduates of the fully funded FA 39 master’s degree program.

Each year, the President’s Commission on White House Fellows selects promising individuals to serve as White House fellows. Fellows are assigned to work with senior White House officials, cabinet secretaries, or other deputies. They write speeches, help review and draft proposed legislation, answer congressional inquiries, chair meetings, conduct briefings, and otherwise assist high-level government officials. Army officers may apply if they are managed by PERSCOM and meet the following eligibility criteria: be a U.S. citizen; have at least three but not more than 19 years of active federal commissioned service as of September 2000; not be competing for any other Army-sponsored program, fellowship or scholarship; be able to complete a full fellowship and a two-year follow-on assignment; be branched-qualified at current grade; have no adverse actions pending; not be serving in or scheduled to serve in a utilization assignment; meet Army height and weight requirements; and have a graduate degree. Eligible officers should submit DA Form 4187, signed by the applicant’s field-grade supervisor, to their branch at PERSCOM. Interested officers must request permission prior to Dec. 1, 1999. PERSCOM’s Functional Area Management and Development Division will forward applications to those granted permission. The White House Commission is scheduled to make the final selection of fellows in June 2000. The fellowship year will begin in September 2000 and end in August 2001. Fellows must move to the Washington, D.C., area.

Congratulations to the SF officers who have been selected for the Army War College correspondence course — the most demanding correspondence course in the Army. Upon graduation, these officers will be awarded a Military Education Level 1, or MEL1. MEL1 is the Army’s highest level for military education, and it qualifies officers for the Army’s most demanding positions. The correspondence course lasts two years, including two summer phases. Officers enrolled in the class of 2001 are: LTC(P) Len Blevins; COL Gene Thompson; LTC(P) Bob Brady; LTC Ric Cantu; COL Glen Vavra; and COL James Velky. The class of 2000 is midway through the program. Its officers are COL Randy Bissell; LTC Rick Helfer; COL Frank Pedrozo; LTC(P) Gil Perez; and COL Eric Stanhagen. Congratulations are also in order for COL Dave Maki and COL Sid Morgan, who graduated from the program in July.
In preparation for the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games, the Tactical Assault Group, or TAG, of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, and its rotary-wing air support, have been training in the Sydney area to familiarize themselves with local operating conditions. TAG has been Australia’s primary counterterrorism force since 1978. Since 1996, the elite unit has received more than $30 million in upgrades and new equipment to enhance its capabilities. Full-time elements of the 4th Reserve Air Regiment Commando, or RAR, and the New South Wales Police will augment TAG in counterterrorism operations during the Games.

According to August 1999 documents received by a Milan radio station, there is a new European revolutionary group that calls itself the New Communist Party. The documents made note of traditional communist revolutionary goals and the need to fight against the “economic imperialism of Western capitalist societies.” They also indicated that the New Communist Party views the terrorism and violence of the Red Brigades in a positive light, and hinted that the new group sees the need for assassination or other strikes to “continue on the road to revolution.” The announcement of the new group — so far unvalidated by action or other means — may be inconsequential. However, it can also be viewed in a more serious context. Responsibility for the May 1999 assassination of Italian university professor and Labor Ministry adviser, Massimo D’Antona, was claimed two months later by the Red Brigades, a group heavily attrited by Italian authorities in past years. The assassination, one of several acts of European political violence over the last several months, raises questions about future European terrorism. Some specialists assert that successors to the old, largely dismantled terrorist groups — the German Red Army Faction, Belgian Fighting Communist Cells, French Direct Action and Italian Red Brigades — are re-forming and re-learning the clandestine crafts of the 1970s and 1980s. Recruits are said to be drawn from “lost young people, people excluded from capitalism, and opponents of the all-powerful position of NATO and the United States.” Whether such disaffected recruits will eventually constitute serious revolutionary terrorists or whether they will remain terrorist amateurs given to occasional violent acts is an active cause for speculation among some European security specialists.

Japan is planning to develop a greater capability of dealing with the threat of terrorists and guerrillas. The Japan Defense Agency plans to budget for this effort beginning in the year 2000, and it will also stress the need for defense against terrorist groups that use chemical and biological weapons. According to press reports, Japanese military representatives will travel to the United States to learn more about creating and equipping counterguerrilla forces. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force is also creating a research center that will develop a counterguerrilla manual, address the protection of Japan’s critical infrastructure and examine other associated issues. The North Korean press reacted quickly to these developments by noting that Japan is “plotting to
China forms new force for long-range operations

China has reportedly developed a force capable of carrying out long-range airborne operations, long-range reconnaissance, and amphibious operations. Formed in China's Guangzhou military region and known by the nickname "Sword of Southern China," the force supposedly receives army, air force and naval training, including flight training, and is equipped with "hundreds of high-tech devices," including global-positioning satellite systems. All of the force's officers have completed military staff colleges, and 60 percent are said to have university degrees. Soldiers are reported to be cross-trained in various specialties, and training is supposed to encompass a range of operational environments. It is far from clear whether this unit is considered operational by the Chinese. It is also not clear how such a force would be employed. Among the missions mentioned were “responding to contingencies in various regions” and “cooperating with other services in attacks on islands.” According to the limited reporting, the organization appears to be in a phase of testing and development and may constitute an experimental unit. While no size for the force has been revealed, there have been Chinese media claims that “over 400 soldiers of the force are all-weather and versatile fighters and parachutists who can fly airplanes and drive auto vehicles and motor boats.”

South African police unit to battle vigilantism

The high level of violent crime in South Africa has sparked responses by organized and ad hoc vigilante groups. A new police organization characterized as an “FBI-style Special Operations Directorate” is being established to combat urban violence and vigilantism, especially in South Africa’s Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces. A major target of the “Scorpions” (as the police unit is called) will be the vigilante group, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, or PAGAD. Despite its avowed aim to curtail criminality, especially drug trafficking, PAGAD is perceived by the government to be “deliberately subverting the authority of the state.” A second vigilante group — reportedly more exotic in its approach — is the Northern Cape vigilante organization called Mapogoa Mathamaga. It has recently become active in Pretoria. Whether the group’s supposed practice of dangling its victims in front of crocodiles is myth or fact, it is clear that the group has beaten people to death while administering its nonjudicial punishment. The new Special Operations Directorate was supposed to have begun operations Sept. 1. When it is fully operational in December, the organization will consist of 2,000 agents with a variety of intelligence, investigative and other skills.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Major Michael A. Chung, both of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
USASOC to dedicate statue in memory of Bull Simons

On Nov. 19, the Army Special Operations Command will dedicate a statue to the memory of Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons.

The dedication is scheduled for 10 a.m. at the Special Warfare Memorial Plaza across from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

The 13-foot statue is the work of sculptor Lawrence M. Ludtke, of Houston, Texas.

Simons was born in New York state in 1918. He entered the Army in 1941 after having been commissioned through ROTC. During World War II, he commanded a field artillery battery in the South Pacific and later commanded a company in the 6th Ranger Battalion. He left the Army after World War II, only to be recalled in 1951, during the Korean War. He joined the 77th Special Forces Group in 1958 and later commanded the 8th SF Group in the Panama Canal Zone.

Simons is probably best remembered as the leader of the Son Tay Raid, the Nov. 20, 1970, attempt to liberate American prisoners of war held in North Vietnam. Simons died in 1979.

Course teaches SOF medical-sustainment skills

A new course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is designed to refresh the perishable combat medical skills of special-operations medics.

The Special Operations Forces Medical Skills Sustainment Program, or SOFMSSP, began its first class Oct. 17.

The two-week course focuses on trauma care and tactical-combat-casualty care. Of the course’s 88 hours, 60 are in military medicine and trauma management. Topics include emergency surgical procedures such as inserting chest tubes, performing venous cut-downs and establishing surgical airways. The course also includes classes in war-wound management; diseases of military importance; emergency dentistry; environmental emergencies; and nuclear, biological and chemical warfare.

SOFMSSP meets the minimum requirements of the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians as refresher training to recertify current paramedics. The course is not designed to restore currency for those whose paramedic certification has expired.

SOFMSSP is open to the following specialties: SEAL corpsman, special amphibious reconnaissance corpsman, Special Forces medic, Ranger medic, 160th SOAR medic, 528th SOSB medic, and Air Force Pararescuemen who are assigned to the Air Force Special Operations Command. Applicants must have graduated from the Special Operations Combat Medic, Advanced Special Operations Combat Medic or Special Forces Medical Sergeant courses, or from the 300-F1 track that was previously conducted at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Current paramedic certification is not a requirement for attendance.

Application to SOFMSSP can be coordinated through medics’ unit and component surgeons’ office. Medics whose EMT-P credential will expire March 31, 2000, will receive priority for attending the first classes. For additional information, telephone SFC Richard Toth at DSN 236-7775, or commercial (910) 396-7775. Send e-mail to: tothr@soc.mil.

USASOC dedicates Korean War Memorial Stone

On July 9, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command dedicated the Korean War Special Operations Memorial Stone in Fort Bragg’s Special Operations Memorial Plaza.

The stone is intended to commemorate the service of special-operations soldiers who fought in the Korean war. “This is a long overdue ceremony,” said Lieutenant General William Tangney, commander of USASOC. “Today we lay the stone of a tremendous series of organizations that stand tall in our lineage … and what great units they were.

“In a very, very bloody war, in a
very critical time in our nation's history, arose great men — small numbers of men. Men who rose to the call of duty. Men who heard the sound of the distant trumpet and unhesitatingly volunteered ... many of whom remained on active duty after the Korean War to serve within Special Forces and a variety of other units — soldiers who have written an indelible page in American history."

In 1951, the U.S. began a special-operations campaign in Korea, expanding what were formerly intelligence activities into guerrilla operations conducted by psychological, aviation and tactical units under the command of the Eighth Army. The units supported psychological operations, engaged in escape-and-evasion activities and conducted raids against the enemy. In January 1953, 75 officers and enlisted soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group, then headquartered at Fort Carson, Colo., were assigned to the units as advisers and staff personnel. By that spring, 22,000 Koreans had joined forces with the U.S. special-operations forces. — Specialist Jon Creese, USASOC PAO

**SWCS publishes CD-ROMs**

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School recently published two CD-ROMs that will allow planners of civil-military operations to quickly gather information from volumes of data.

The *G5 Staff Planner's Guide* and the *Nongovernmental Organizations Reference Handbook*, prepared by the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine, provide relevant information in concise, portable, hyperlinked formats.

The purpose of the *G5 Staff Planner's Guide* is to place necessary literature into the hands of staff planners, and to aid mission analysis with integrated, quickly referenced doctrine. The CD-ROM includes common civil-military-operations doctrine and its sources, from presidential-decision directives to Army regulations. The guide streamlines diverse CMO planning tasks, enabling users to quickly reference mission-planning data before, during and after their mission analysis.

The *Nongovernmental Organizations Reference Handbook* lists and describes nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and international organizations, or IOs, in order to provide the reader with a fundamental understanding of the diversity of organizations that seek to assist others. The CD-ROM is not all-inclusive, but it lists many of the organizations likely to be in an area of operations both before ARSOF soldiers arrive and after they depart. Hyperlinks take the reader to additional information about NGO and IO structure, capabilities and coordination in joint publications and on the Worldwide Web.

ARSOF units will receive copies of both CD-ROMs through automatic distribution.

**SFWOAC students need to prepare**

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or SFWOAC, advises prospective students to ensure that they have the proper clearances, evaluation reports and prerequisites before they arrive at the Special Warfare Center and School to begin training.

DA PAM 611-21, chapter 6, paragraph 8-30, requires that students possess a top-secret security clearance prior to attending the SFWOAC. Certain training provided during the course requires SCI access, for which a top-secret clearance is mandatory.

AR 623-105, Section VII, Mandatory Reports, paragraph 3-43, states that students must have a Depart-ure on Temporary Duty Officer Efficiency Report, or OER, in order to attend any course of instruction that will result in the submission of an Academic Evaluation Report, or AER. Warrant-officer career-progression and professional-development courses are included. If a soldier’s last OER thru date is more than 90 days prior to the start date of the scheduled class, the soldier must have a Departure on Temporary Duty OER in order to receive an AER from the SFWOAC.

Finally, all students must complete the nonresident Phase 1 training prior to attending resident SFWOAC. Soldiers can enroll in the Phase 1 course as soon as they are promoted to CW2. Soldiers can enroll via the Internet (http://leav-www.army.mil/wocc) or by completing DA Form 145 according to the instructions in DA PAM 351-20, and mailing it to: Army Institute for Professional Development, U.S. Army Training Support Center, Newport News, VA 23628-0001. The course number is 131 F41.

**4th PSYOP Group welcomes new commander**

Colonel Christopher E. St. John took command of the 4th Psychological Operations Group from Colonel Charles P. Borchini in a ceremony held Aug. 24 at Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Plaza.

St. John was previously assigned to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, where he served as director of plans and support, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. His other SOF assignments include detachment commander, 7th Special Forces Group; commander, 8th PSYOP Battalion; deputy commander, 4th PSYOP Group; and a four-year assignment to USSOCOM.

"Soldiers in the 4th PSYOP Group are better equipped than we have ever been before," St. John said. "The quality of the soldiers, noncommissioned officers and officers is the best I have ever seen in my almost 20 years of working with the group."

When the Korean War Memorial opened in Washington, D.C., a few years back, the media repeatedly referred to the Korean conflict as “the forgotten war.” Overshadowed by both World War II and Vietnam, Korea is remembered vaguely, at best.

Many things not well-chronicled happen in war. Sometimes, small but nonetheless “fighting” wars, raging far from the major battlefields, have considerable effect on the “main event,” even if they are overlooked by contemporary observers and missed altogether by historians. The Korean War had such a “side show” conflict — it was the forgotten war’s forgotten war.

In 1951, the United Nations, after coming perilously close to destruction in the South, struck back against the North Korean aggressors, driving them north to the border of the People’s Republic of China, or PRC. It seemed that the Korean conflict would soon be over. But Chinese intervention changed everything: PRC forces poured into North Korea, preventing a U.N. victory and driving U.N. forces back to the middle of the Korean peninsula, where a bloody stalemate ensued.

The U.S. had not long since fought World War II, in which special operations and guerrilla warfare had played important roles. It was time to engage in special warfare again, this time along the China coast, to take some of the pressure off U.N. forces in Korea. Covert action was principally the responsibility of the CIA, which unleashed a paramilitary effort. Remnants of Chinese Nationalist forces, pushed from the China mainland by the communists, were regrouped on Taiwan and on islands off the coast. Mostly irregulars or guerrillas, these Chinese Nationalist troops, aided covertly by the CIA, struck repeatedly against the PRC.

Frank Holober was one of a band of American clandestine warriors marshaled by the CIA to work with those Chinese Nationalist forces. Holober’s now-it-can-be-told story about this small war has been published by the Naval Institute Press in its Special Warfare Series. Raiders of the China Coast: CIA Covert Operations During the Korean War, is an exciting story and a welcome account. The story cannot now be completely ignored by history.

Raiders of the China Coast tells of the former American paratroopers, the smoke jumpers, the small-boat handlers, the demolitions-and-weapons experts, the underwater specialists and the intelligence operators who leveraged their expertise to train, equip, advise and support Chinese Nationalist forces — helping them to strike back in small incursions and occasional big raids.

The communist reaction was disproportionate. A reconnaissance by a few lightly armed Nationalist guerrillas provoked the PRC into fits of excessive response, moving infantry divisions for days, or even weeks, after an incursion. Attacks by larger units caused an even greater response. Captured mainland troops testified to the paranoia. Communist forces thrashing around waiting for or reacting to Nationalist incursions could not be sent to Korea as reinforcements. That, of course, was the whole idea.

Raiders of the China Coast fills a void in the record. For those who took part in the operation, the story is a source of pride. Frank Holober has done a good job, and the Naval Institute Press is to be commended for publishing his book.

Lawrence B. Sulc
St. Helena, S.C.


There are but a few serious books that deserve the high but ungrammatical accolade, “unputdownable.” Black Hawk Down does.
The book describes Task Force Ranger’s bloody fight in Mogadishu in October 1993. The story is told in full, in chronological order, largely from the viewpoint of and in the words of the Ranger participants. The series of incidents by which a quick prisoner-snatch raid became a series of desperate street battles stretching almost a full day is recounted in detail. Each event presages unforeseeable but seemingly inevitable effects. Each effect leads to greater delays, more enemies, more combat and additional deaths.

The first incident, a Ranger seriously injured in a rappelling fall who required immediate evacuation, mildly disrupted the withdrawal plan. The shooting-down of the first helicopter caused a major disruption, requiring the ground force to alter its withdrawal plan in order to recover the helicopter crew. A second downed helicopter imposed greater dispersion of the ground force. It also added further delays. And the longer the force remained on the ground, the longer the armed Somali tribesmen had to strike back at the Rangers.

The story that Mark Bowden relates could also be told by a Greek tragedian or by a cultural anthropologist. The tragedian would tell it as a story of peoples doomed by some transgression. The anthropologist would explain how each contestant was a prisoner of his own culture: the Somalis fighting for their tribe; the Rangers performing their assigned mission in a foreign environment and being led inexorably into a much deeper hazard by their warrior culture’s demand that they stand by the downed helicopter crews. There would be more than a modicum of truth in each of these treatments.

Bowden, however, presents a humanistic story of combat as experienced by the participants. There is little account of the actions and views of headquarters here. Although TF Ranger contained disparate elements of the Army and other services, this is overwhelmingly the story of young Ranger riflemen and machine gunners in a long, bitter, no-quarter street fight against Somali fighters with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades.

Glory disappeared from war early in this century when people became aware of war’s realities. Even honor and respect are almost unknown in the gritty Third World brawls of modern warfare. Neither side, however, need have any embarrassment over this fight. The various elements of the Ranger task force fought against overwhelming numbers. Only discipline, training, tenacity, firepower and individual courage permitted their survival. The Somalis fought against not only the Ranger task force but also the 20th-century military technology of vehicles, communications and armed helicopters. Although probably neither side was satisfied with the battle’s ending, both achieved their ends: the Ranger task force accomplished its tactical goal and kept faith with its comrades; the Somalis defended their tribe and their turf.

The story is so well told that it comes as a surprise that Bowden claims no military background. His descriptions show an appreciation of minor things that would seem to call for military experience: the confusion of combat, an individual’s fear of failure before his first fight, the inanity of recovering a “valuable” rappelling rope under fire, and the value of the cover provided by a small bump in a road. The reviewer, who grew up in an army where calling soldiers “boys” was at least a mortal sin, was irritated by the description of some of the American troops as “D boys,” but the author defends this as common Ranger jargon. This criticism is admittedly a minor objection to an otherwise outstanding description of the Rangers’ travail.

There is much to learn from this account: conventional lessons of tactics, weapons and command; surprising lessons in psychological operations; and lessons concerning complex political environments and coalitions of widely disparate forces. If Bowden’s subtitle is correct, and if Mogadishu is indeed the pattern of “modern war,” then there are some deep and hard lessons there. One of the most salient is that even the most modern technology cannot meet all requirements or guarantee success. Perhaps Black Hawk Down will be read by some of the officials who send soldiers to do tough jobs in nasty places — and possibly even by some of those who continually beat the drum for putting women in front-line combat. It would be well if these groups would think deeply about their goals, the probable effects, and their responsibilities.

Black Hawk Down is strongly recommended to all special operators, irrespective of their grade, unit, skill or specialty.

COL J. H. Crerar
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Vienna, Va.
Special Warfare

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