Probably nowhere in the Army is the importance of reserve-component forces more evident than in special operations.

The majority of our special-operations forces are found in the reserve components: Nearly half of our Special Forces soldiers belong to either Army Reserve or National Guard groups; 87 percent of our PSYOP and 97 percent of our Civil Affairs troops are in the Army Reserve.

Recent military operations have emphasized the value of these reserve components: During Operation Just Cause, there was an urgent need for more Civil Affairs soldiers, and thousands of reservists volunteered, caring for civilians in the combat area, providing shelter to dislocated civilians, and restoring civil government and services quickly so that the Panamanian government could resume its responsibilities.

During Desert Shield/Storm, a number of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units were mobilized, as well as the National Guard's 20th SF Group. Following Desert Storm, Reserve CA personnel assisted the Kuwaitis to rebuild their government and aided Kurdish refugees during resettlement operations in Operation Provide Comfort. The services which RC SOF units performed and the efficiency with which they mobilized were impressive.

Last year's functional alignment of active and reserve components of the Army Special Operations Command was done partly to standardize AC and RC unit training and operations, and in time it will increase USASOC's overall readiness. Army SOF are now aligned along functional lines, with similar AC and RC elements grouped under one commander in the Army Special Forces Command or the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. USASOC oversees training and readiness for National Guard SOF. The Army Special Forces Command has already initiated an evaluation and standardization program to measure all its assigned units by the same standards.

At the Special Warfare Center and School, we no longer have separate qualification courses for active and reserve-component soldiers. All candidates for Special Forces now attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection, and if selected, the SF Qualification Course. Prior to SFAS, reserve-component soldiers attend a two-week SF Pretraining Course to help them improve land-navigation and other basic skills. Since 1989, this course, developed with the help of the National Guard Bureau, has reduced RC attrition by approximately 50 percent.

In September 1992, new tables of organization and equipment for Civil Affairs foreign-intervention, defense and unconventional-warfare battalions will provide reserve-component detachments more precisely tailored for the various CA missions in LIC. As we work to integrate this new RC capability into our doctrinal, operational and organizational concepts, we are also producing mission training plans which will assist commanders of these new units in training for their assigned missions. These MTPs are scheduled to be complete before the changeover to the new TOE. We are also developing instruction, training literature, basic and advanced NCO courses and skill-qualification tests for the new Civil Affairs MOS, designed to give reserve-component CA soldiers better opportunities for training and career advancement.

As we look toward the future, we face a changing threat and a restructuring of the Total Force. Although SOF may not experience the drawdown forecast for conventional units, we may be required to perform new missions and a wider variety of missions than in the past. As we strive to meet the challenge of this new environment, it will be important to maintain the force of trained, capable and ready soldiers that only our reserve-component special-operations forces can provide.

Maj. Gen. David J. Baratto

Special Warfare
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Cover: Helicopter photo courtesy 1/245th Avn. Bn.; USASOC mobilization photos by Bob Jordan
Special Operations in Desert Storm:

Separating Fact from Fiction

The story of U.S. Army special-operations forces in Desert Shield and Desert Storm is a story of quiet professionalism ...

It is a story of hiding in the day and surveilling a 175-mile border at night ...

It is a story of infiltrating behind enemy lines, sabotaging lines of communication and destroying command-and-control targets ...

It is a story of training coalition forces, working with soldiers from countries as unlikely as Syria and Czechoslovakia ...

It is a story of escaping in a helicopter flying so low it had to pull up to get over donkeys' backs ...

It is a story of the first U.S. troops to reach Kuwait City during the liberation of an oppressed people ...

And it is a story of psyching-out the enemy and rebuilding a war-torn nation.

But more than anything else, this is an American success story about courage, confidence and maturity in the best-trained U.S. soldier. It is the latest chapter in the history of the uniquely American art of unconventional warfare.

Special-operations forces

Briefly, U.S. Army special operations are composed of five components made entirely of volunteers.

First, the Special Forces are the Army’s experts at unconventional warfare. Taught to speak foreign languages and blend in foreign cultures, they can survive behind enemy lines and conduct risky long-term reconnaissance missions. They are paratroopers, but they also know how to infiltrate by land and sea without detection, anywhere in the world.

Secondly, Psychological-Operations forces use the tools of communication — loudspeakers, leaflets, and broadcasts — to fire creative propaganda campaigns at target audiences. Their purpose: to neutralize hostile enemy attitudes, and ultimately persuade their audiences to support the United States, all without firing a single round of ammunition.

Thirdly, Civil Affairs units win the hearts and minds of the civilian populace in war-torn nations by coordinating humanitarian relief efforts, like aiding homeless refugees and establishing law and order.

Like Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers are paratroopers trained in foreign languages, two skills that enable them to respond to challenges anywhere in the world.

The 75th Ranger Regiment makes up another component of Army special operations. Rangers are the world’s premier light-infantry experts, capable of spearheading an assault with lightning speed, as they did in Grenada and Panama. They often conduct live-fire and airborne operations at night, and they can project their
force to any part of the world.

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment is the final component of Army special operations. The members of this unit fly helicopters on dangerous missions, most often at night, and proved during Desert Storm that they are among the world's finest rotary-wing pilots.

Desert Storm

Each of these five components was represented in the diverse assortment of special-operations units we sent to the Persian Gulf: Both active-duty soldiers and reservists, they came from locations throughout the United States, but largely from Fort Bragg, N.C.; Fort Campbell, Ky.; Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.; and Fort Devens, Mass.

In Saudi Arabia, these forces were united with Navy and Air Force special-operations units under Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf’s special-operations command, called SOCCENT. SOCCENT’s commander, Col. Jesse Johnson, was the architect of the special-operations effort during the Persian Gulf crisis.

Johnson’s military career has been built in the special-operations community, but a distinction in his past would prove to further qualify him for this unique role. While a student at the Army’s Command and General Staff College, he had developed a friendship with a fellow major from Kuwait who eventually would rise to be the current chief of staff of the Kuwaiti military.

Special operations were among the first units deployed to support General Schwarzkopf. Long before the ground war began, SOCCENT alone was responsible for a 60,000-square-mile area on the Iraqi border 300 miles wide and 200 miles deep.

Coalition warfare

One of the Special Forces’ great successes in the Gulf was coalition warfare, which Schwarzkopf said was a vital contribution to the overall campaign. U.S. Special Forces soldiers were attached to the coalition forces and were their trainers and advisers.

Working with nearly every battalion of the coalition forces, Special Forces would prove to be the glue that held the coalition’s ground forces together throughout the campaign.

Special Forces trained extensively with the Saudi Arabian military, but also with the other Arab countries in the coalition such as Syria and Egypt, and other countries as different as France, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia and Senegal.

And one very important undertaking of the Special Forces was the reconstruction of the Kuwaiti military in exile.

The 5th Special Forces Group sent 106 teams — usually 3-4 men to a team — to work with coalition forces’ forward battalions. One Special Forces battalion alone had a combined 6,000 hours of training with coalition forces in a 13-week period.

In their training, U.S. Special Forces conducted close-air-support missions and defensive training exercises with battalions of coalition forces. The coalition soldiers practiced marksmanship, communications and combat lifesaving.

And while they were rehearsing military tactics, U.S. Special Forces and a Czechoslovakian chemical team trained coalition forces in preparing for nuclear, biological and chemical warfare.

On the Saudi-Iraqi border, U.S. Special Forces patrolled with the Saudi military. Other coalition forces were massed behind them, followed by U.S. ground forces. They conducted border surveillance from forts called mazekas. They patrolled at night because there was no place to hide during the day — they had to return to the mazekas by sunrise.

U.S. Special Forces simply were superb in coalition warfare because they had been specially selected, trained and armed for this unique role. The Army years ago singled them out for their military expertise, then gave them the language and cultural training to communi-
cate with their Arab counterparts. And because Special Forces for years have conducted military training exercises in the Middle East, they alone had the unique expertise to specially train the coalition forces and to keep them glued together.

Other than the battle at Khafji, which involved U.S. Marines, U.S. Special Forces conducted the only combined operations in the campaign. Our Special Forces suffered no medical problems, even though they ate foreign food and drank foreign water along with the coalition forces. Their vast experience in the region played no small factor in their great success.

**Special reconnaissance**

But coalition warfare was not the Special Forces' only mission. Their special-reconnaissance role would prove to be vital: In his now-famous briefing during the final hours of the ground war, Schwarzkopf said: “We put Special Forces deep into the enemy territory ... and they let us know what was going on out there, and they were the eyes out there.”

Special Forces searched for Scud missile launchers behind enemy lines. They targeted enemy command-and-control objectives and lines of communication. They maintained 13 early-warning positions along the Iraqi border from the coastal city of Khafji westward.

While on two special-recon missions, small teams of Special Forces were compromised and found themselves in firefights with Iraqi forces of superior numbers. One of the firefights was six hours long; the other three hours. There were no U.S. casualties in either fight, although one ended in a dramatic escape.

On Jan. 17, 1991, at 2:38 a.m., SOCCENT was permitted to begin Schwarzkopf's campaign, sending operational aviation units behind enemy lines to take out key radar sites.

During the 100 hours of combat, Special Forces reported enemy activity and locations from within Iraqi territory. And during the liberation of Kuwait City, SOCCENT was given the mission to seize, clear and reoccupy the U.S., British and French embassies. Johnson directed the 3rd Special Forces Group, with a company from the 10th Special Forces Group, to retake the U.S. embassy, which they did in the early afternoon of Feb. 28.

During their occupation, Schwarzkopf gave SOCCENT the enormous task of clearing Kuwait City of stray enemy soldiers and ammunition the Iraqis had left behind. Johnson reported, “The entire city was an arsenal.” In the process of clearing the city, Special Forces uncovered five truckloads of valuable Iraqi military documents. When all was clear, SOCCENT reverted to a peacekeeping role in the devastated city.

Special Forces, however, were not the only special-operations units operating in the Persian Gulf. One company from the 75th Ranger Regiment was deployed to give Schwarzkopf a rapid-strike force, if needed. Other forces fought perhaps the most important battle of all: the rebuilding of Kuwait.

**Civil Affairs**

Playing no small role in that battle is our Civil Affairs force. Close to half of the Army’s total Civil Affairs force was deployed. Before the war started, Civil Affairs soldiers were working with the legitimate government of Kuwait and the U.S. State Department, planning for the country’s reconstruction. Called the Kuwaiti Task Force, they were ideal for advising the Kuwaitis because they are the military’s experts in civil adminis-

In this photo, taken through night-vision goggles, special-operations troops fast-rope from an MH-53J Pavlow III helicopter during Operation Desert Storm.

Photo by Greg Ford
toration and in managing basic governmental skills. One of the most significant Civil Affairs accomplishments came before any shots were fired. Civil Affairs soldiers were among the initial deployments for Desert Shield; the Army’s major logistical packages were not — they arrived much later, but the initial demand for logistics was great. Relatively small numbers of Civil Affairs soldiers filled the void by coordinating host-nation support that ultimately amounted to $5 billion in Saudi Arabian contributions.

Thanks to Civil Affairs, commanders had buses and cars for transportation and could refuel at many gas stations at no charge. Our soldiers had bulk water and nutritious food that beat eating MREs. Military units had buildings for headquarters, billets and warehouses, with an adequate power supply and telephones — with no phone bill — which met a large part of our communications requirement.

Army Civil Affairs soldiers were attached to every ground maneuver unit, including the Marines. With these units they acquired support from civilians in the theater and aided other civilians dislocated by the war.

Civil Affairs soldiers prevented major cultural incidents that might have untied the coalition by giving classes on cultural considerations to our deployed forces. They told commanders in the field of cultural considerations, advising them, among other things, of historical, religious and archeological sites important to the innocent civilians we wanted to leave out of the war. They coordinated our efforts in humanitarian aid in Kuwait.

Civil Affairs reservists excel in this area because, in their civilian lives, they are professionals in public health, public safety and public works. They are doctors, attorneys, businessmen — often prominent citizens — who are experts in a certain field, and who use their expertise to help put back on track those civilian lives disrupted by war.

Re-establishing Kuwait’s basic public services was an enormous task. Iraqi forces wreaked massive destruction in Kuwait, and much of what they did not destroy, they looted and removed to Iraq. Medical facilities in Kuwait had virtually ceased to function, as Iraqi occupation forces stripped them of supplies and equipment.

Psychological operations

Psychological-operations forces proved to be a unique force multiplier for the commanders in the field. Leaflets prepared by Army PSYOP specialists were remarkably successful. One leaflet with a picture of a B-52 bomber told Iraqi soldiers in Arabic what day and time they would be bombed next. When the prophecy came true, the leaflets became a very credible source of information.

Along with the Saudis, we produced and distributed leaflets outlining for Iraqi soldiers the correct procedures of surrender. These leaflets led countless Iraqis to surrender safely, while posing a minimum amount of danger to U.S. soldiers.

Radio broadcasts helped break the Iraqi will to fight, and loud-speaker teams supported every ground maneuver unit, including coalition forces. They were credited with saving the lives of combatants as well as civilians.

Special-ops aviation

Another group of soldiers that deserves a tremendous amount of recognition is the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

As mentioned earlier, one of the Special Forces firefights ended in a dramatic escape. During that escape, CWO 4 Jim Crisafulli of the 160th flew his Blackhawk helicopter more than 150 miles into Iraq in broad daylight just several feet off the ground to exfiltrate the team. He was flying so low that he had to pull the chopper up just to get over donkeys’ backs. Mr. Crisafulli volunteered for that mission; he has since been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

In the Persian Gulf War, the 160th flew mission after mission — infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and medical evacuation. Under SOCCENT, the 160th and special operations forces proved to be a unique force multiplier for the commanders in the field. Leaflets prepared by Army PSYOP specialists were remarkably successful. One leaflet with a picture of a B-52 bomber told Iraqi soldiers in Arabic what day and time they would be bombed next. When the prophecy came true, the leaflets became a very credible source of information.

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aviation units from the U.S. Air Force were “100 percent in charge of combat search and rescue,” according to Schwarzkopf.

“When a pilot gets shot down out there in the middle of nowhere, surrounded by the enemy, and you’re the folks that are required to go in and go after him, that is a very tough mission,” Schwarzkopf said.

From the outset of U.S. deployments to the Persian Gulf, special-operations forces infiltrated without being seen, performed dangerous missions in silence, and executed clandestine operations with superb precision. Yet they sought no publicity, no recognition. That's the way American special-operations forces have operated since the American Revolution.

Active and reserve-component special-operations soldiers were called on with other U.S. forces during Operation Provide Comfort to aid the Kurdish refugees in Turkey and northern Iraq. They answered the call by coordinating humanitarian-relief efforts, conducting search-and-rescue missions and developing refugee camps there. Our Civil Affairs elements developed the plan that resettled the Kurds and supplied them with 1.2 million MREs, water and more than 1,400 short tons of bulk food.

We are proud of all the Army's special-operations forces and their superb performance in the Persian Gulf War. They are true national heroes, and we should never be able to say adequately, “Thank you for your skill, your courage and your dedication to the fight for freedom.”

Sgt. Fern Davis of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command helps Kurdish children arriving at the Zakhu resettlement camp during Operation Provide Comfort.

This article was prepared by the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Special Operations Command.
Treating the Animals of Kuwait

by Capt. Bob Vogelsang

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait cost many people their lives. It was also unfortunate for the animals of Kuwait, many of whom barely survived. People always wonder what a “doggy doc” is doing in an SF group. There aren’t any combat-tracker or scout dogs anymore, and any horses left are for show. However, a vet can win a lot of “hearts and minds” in many of the agriculturally-based Third World nations that SF groups may encounter.

Every animal facility I visited in Kuwait had been affected by the war. Only 32 of the original zoo-dwellers of the Kuwait City Zoo could be accounted for. There were no birds left. We found many carcasses, including monkeys, wild boar, leopard, mountain lion, porcupine, antelope and zebra. Luckily John Walsh, a member of the World Society for the Protection of Animals, out of Boston, was on the scene early and made arrangements for the financial and logistical support that allowed the zoo to operate immediately following the retaking of Kuwait.

The zoo’s one elephant and one of the monkeys had been shot by occupying Iraqi troops — the elephant in the right shoulder and the monkey in the right leg. An Air Force explosive-ordnance-disposal team swept the elephant’s wound with a metal detector and located the bullet, which had not gone very deep. The wound was managed by daily flushing and antibiotic application; it eventually healed and scarred over.

The monkey was taken to a combat-support hospital on the outskirts of Kuwait City to be X-rayed. The X-ray showed a mid-shaft femur fracture that was healing crookedly. It also showed metal fragments, confirming our fears that he had been shot. He would need surgery, but that was quite out of reach of the resources we had at the zoo.

One of the zoo’s bears could not use his right rear leg. We thought he might have broken something or might have been shot also. He seemed in good health but would usually just sit in a corner of the cage, and when he did move, he just dragged the leg. Walsh made contact with the Riyadh Zoo and was trying to get treatment for the bear and the monkey when we left.

The real need for medicine and hard work was out in the city. There, many families were keeping their animals in the small courtyards of their houses. One family had about 70 animals tucked away — a regular Old MacDonald’s farm. Throughout the city, animals were suffering from lice and infections. Many were thin and weak from lack of food.

We found a one-ton Holstein bull in a swimming pool — it had been trying to get a drink and fell in. Local residents said the bull had been in the pool for seven weeks. They were feeding and watering him and had drained the pool two weeks before, but five weeks in water had made his feet soft and sore, and they couldn’t get him out. SSgt. Steve Rhine, an SF medic from Co. B, 1/3rd SF Group, and I erected a ramp out of two metal doors, a bench and a metal frame. We covered the ramp with cushions and tied one rope around the bull’s head and neck and put another behind his back legs. It took a lot of fresh grass for bait and many gut-wrenching heaves, but we eventually extricated the bull. We couldn’t locate the owner, so we trailered our bull back to Old MacDonald’s farm.

Much of our time in Kuwait City was also spent at the horse stables near the racetrack. The people at the stables said most of the horses were either taken, let loose or killed by occupying troops. The Kuwaiti government had a complex housing reportedly 200 Arabian horses used in a breeding program. However, during the occupation, the complex was made into a huge ammunition-storage area containing large quantities of tank and artillery rounds, as well as antiaircraft and small-arms ammunition. We found eight of the Arabians hidden in a courtyard; in a large field near the stables we found about 40 badly decomposed horse carcasses.

When the unit redeployed to the U.S., it was hard to leave with so many animals still needing attention. All in all, though, we cared for as many animals as we could with what was available. ☹

Capt. Bob Vogelsang is the veterinary officer for the 3rd Special Forces Group.

March 1992
The challenge of providing emergency food supplies to returning Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq was perhaps the military’s most complicated humanitarian-assistance logistical effort since the Berlin Airlift.

The massive Kurdish repatriation (more than 700,000 civilians) from refugee camps along the Turkish/Iranian border into Northern Iraq demanded emergency resupply of foodstuffs to the Kurdish villages.

“When we conducted our initial village assessments, there was virtually nothing in terms of staple foods in the villages,” said Lt. Col. Michael E. Hess of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, a U.S. Army Reserve unit from The Bronx, New York, responsible for civil-military operations.

The American, British, Dutch, French, Italian, Spanish, Canadian and Australian coalition force focused its humanitarian mission on selecting food-distribution sites and stockpiling goods within the Kurdish communities. The goal was to maintain a 4-7-day supply based upon population estimates. The coalition hoped that by creating village stockpiles, it would encourage refugees to return directly to their villages and bypass temporary displaced-civilian camps.

Major settlement populations grew at enormous rates during May 1991: Zakho City grew from 17,000 to more than 103,000; the Zakho displaced-civilian camp grew from zero to more than 58,000; Dohuk grew from 20,000 to more than 100,000.

Smaller village populations increased at similar rates. Al Amadiyah, a mountaintop village 75 km east of Zakho, swelled from 50 people on May 1 to more than 12,000 by the month’s end.

In spite of the enormous resettlement, food stockpiling and distribution were able to keep pace because of the logistical efforts of the coalition military, the United Nations, CARE International and other relief agencies.

The menu recommended by nutritionists from the United Nations’ World Food Program and CARE considered Kurdish dietary tradition and included 400 grams of wheat flour, 100 grams of rice, 65 grams of pulse (lentils, beans), 33 grams of oil or margarine and 15 grams of sugar. Nutritionists calculated that this meal would yield more than 2,000 calories per day.

Civilian laborers unload sacks of flour at the food warehouse in Sirsenk, Iraq, during Operation Provide Comfort.
with 65 grams of protein and 47 grams of fat. Supplemental menu items included high-protein biscuits, canned meats, canned peas, canned vegetables, tea, salt, baby food and milk.

Initially, food was delivered by truck convoy from Silopi, Turkey, where the coalition forces had established a humanitarian-service support base (a logistics hub and warehouse). But problems encountered at the Turkish/Iraqi border slowed deliveries of food. Convoy operations became more streamlined once food warehouses and supply stores were positioned in Iraq at the newly secured city of Zakho and at the Sirsenk Airfield (50 km east of Zakho).

In the early days of resupply, coalition military trucks were used to rush food deliveries and other emergency items of equipment. U.S. Marine Lt. Col. Paul D. Wisniewski, director of relief logistics at the Silopi humanitarian-service support base, explained, “As the civilian trucks became available, they relieved the need for military transport and made the process of transitioning to civilian agencies much easier.” In May, more than 20,000 tons of relief food and supplies were delivered to 15 locations within the security zone.

Food distribution took place at centralized points such as hospitals, schoolhouses, fire-department buildings and police headquarters. Many of the centers were initially established by U.S. Army Civil Affairs units working with other members of the coalition.

Orderly control of distribution was maintained through the use of ration cards, and most stations used weekly, rather than daily, food distribution schedules. The coalition encouraged members of the local population to assist with registration, inventory, off-loading of trucks and rationing. Local involvement reduced the need for military personnel, emphasized the concept of the military “working itself out of a job,” and built strong community ties.

The fact that the coalition military force planned all its activities with the goal of handing off to civilian agencies made the transition process easier. CARE International was the leading non-governmental organization that proposed to manage and maintain the food-distribution process. CARE representatives arrived in the secured zone in early May. After becoming familiar with the food-distribution operation, they found it so well advanced that CARE could take over all operations at the end of the month. CARE’s team leader in Iraq, Roland Roome, commented, “What was incredible to me was how the military set up all the detailed and complicated systems at such speed with so little prior experience ... It was great working with them — real professionals with a great attitude.”

Capt. David S. Elmo is assigned as the Supply and Services Officer, G-4 Section of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command. He was recalled to active duty for Desert Shield/Storm, served in the J-4 of USEUCOM, and deployed to Combined Task Force Provide Comfort as a logistics operations officer.

A Turkish relief worker for CARE pauses in the midst of Isikveren, a camp in Turkey where 160,000 Kurds camped after their flight from Iraq.
The remarkable performance of our special-operations forces in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Provide Comfort, and the key role played by the United States Special Operations Command in training and equipping those forces, have been instrumental in focusing attention — in Washington and indeed across the country — on one of our most important military capabilities.

Five years ago, our attention was also focused on the special-operations community — in particular, the enactment of the reform legislation that reorganized and revitalized the special-operations capabilities of the Department of Defense. Recently we celebrated the fifth anniversary of that important legislation which enabled us to turn the painful lessons of Desert One into the bold successes of Desert Storm.

We have come a long way in the last five years. As a result of that legislation, we now have a unified command, General Carl Stiner’s U.S. Special Operations Command, that is dedicated to the preparation of special-operations forces for their assigned missions. The Army, Navy and Air Force have established major commands for their special-operations forces. Additionally, my office in the Pentagon was established as a high-level focal point for all special-operations and low-intensity-conflict activities of the Department of Defense.

We also now have a separate funding category for special-operations forces, known as Major Force Program 11, in the defense budget. And the Special Operations Research, Development and Acquisition Center, recently established at USSOCOM, will help to ensure that special-operations forces continue to get the best — and most appropriate — technology, equip-
ment and materiel for their unique missions.

There is also much to celebrate in the strengthened stature and revitalized capabilities of the special-operations community; their exceptional performance in Panama, the Gulf and elsewhere serves as the most vivid proof. Given the national-security challenges that we are most likely to face in the future, and considering the most likely scenarios that would require the application of military assets, the strengthening of these capabilities couldn't have happened at a better time.

The world has changed dramatically over the last few years, and special-operations forces, including Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces, will provide an increasingly important capability for promoting and protecting vital U.S. interests around the world.

I'd like to tell you why, and to describe why the dramatic changes in the international security environment have magnified — and will continue to magnify — the importance of special-operations forces as an instrument of national policy.

Changing World

Without question, the world political picture is becoming more complex. Despite the already visible benefits of diminished East-West tensions, the world that we confront today is even more complicated than it was only a few years ago.

Increased U.S.-Soviet cooperation has significantly reduced the risk of nuclear war. But the end of the Cold War has not resulted in the end of all conflict. There will still be numerous conflicts that either directly or indirectly threaten U.S. interests.

The demise of the Soviet Union has changed our strategic focus from one of bipolar confrontation and the possibility of global war to that of a multipolar world of regional and trans-regional threats. The rationale for this shift is evident in recent events in the Middle East, the challenge of controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Third World, and the threats posed by drug trafficking, insurgency and terrorism — all of which contribute to a less stable world.

Though conflicts appear to be winding down in El Salvador, Angola and Afghanistan, and democratically elected governments have taken power in countries ranging from Czechoslovakia to Nicaragua, it is evident that peace is not breaking out all over. A glance at any newspaper will help to illustrate my point. Every day the pages are filled with stories about drug kingpins and reports of civil wars, terrorist attacks, successful and unsuccessful coups, and a range of other low-intensity conflicts — each of them unique — raging across the globe.

President Bush has stated that now, in the absence of the Soviet threat, our most formidable enemy is instability. There has been enormous change since the Berlin Wall came down only two years ago: It is like the day when Lord Cornwallis surrendered to George Washington at Yorktown, and the British band played a song called "The World Turned Upside Down."

The general level of instability in the Third World is increasing, as poverty and injustice persist and development proceeds unevenly. The quest for freedom and democracy will continue to spur populations to action that will, at times, be violent. Centuries-old ethnic rivalries, religious animosities and territorial disputes may remain unresolved, and, in some places, even resurface with new vigor.

Overpopulation, rapid urbanization, environmental degradation and disease, rising nationalism and other phenomena will place severe strains on institutions, governments and alliances. Widely available and sophisticated conventional and nuclear armaments, coupled with new means to deliver them, will render the international arena even more volatile and unstable.

Though these phenomena may individually threaten the very survival of our nation, vital U.S. interests at home and abroad can be adversely affected by the low-intensity conflicts they generate. To illustrate my point, drug trafficking has created social and economic dislocations here at home — in our cities, our towns and our schools. Internationally, terrorists have targeted American citizens and businesses overseas.

While it may be counter-intuitive, I believe that these low-intensity-conflict threats to the United States are likely to increase in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Conventional deterrence has been significantly enhanced as a result of the military superiority, determination and will that the United States demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. At least in the near term, potential adversaries will be less willing to confront us directly.

Instead, those who wish to challenge American resolve and those who are determined to pursue
interests that are counter to ours will do so indirectly, by threatening American lives and property and undermining institutions and values that promote democracy and civil liberties. They now clearly understand that the only means available to them will be various forms of indirect aggression such as terrorism, insurgency, proxy warfare and drug trafficking. Adding fuel to the fire is the fact that these means can provide them with a low-cost, low-risk and high-visibility geo-strategic payoff.

Addressing these unconventional threats does not mean that U.S. forces will become engaged in every conflict. However, if American force is brought to bear in such situations, then there is the likelihood that special-operations forces will be called upon.

New defense strategy

Let me now turn to our defense strategy and describe briefly the role of SOF in implementing it. Dealing with broader, and somewhat more ambiguous threats — many of which will arise from the sources of instability I described earlier — requires a defense strategy that deters and defeats aggression at all levels of conflict in a changing global environment. To respond to these changes in the national-security environment, as well as to address our need to remain engaged in shaping it, the President and the Secretary of Defense have developed a new defense strategy. The four fundamental principles of this new strategy are to:

• Ensure strategic deterrence
• Exercise forward presence in key areas
• Respond effectively to crises
• Retain the ability to reconstitute forces if necessary.

Peacetime engagement

It was August 1990, in a major foreign-policy address in Aspen, Colo., when President Bush first articulated this new four-pronged approach. In that same speech, he also spoke of “peacetime engagement” as a framework for our defense policy in the environment short of war. Since then, the term peacetime engagement has been gaining currency in the lexicon of Pentagon policy makers.

Specifically, the President stated that: “What we now require is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing, without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today’s world as in the time of conflict and Cold War.”

In congressional testimony, Secretary of Defense Cheney amplified the President’s statement, declaring that: “To help deter low-intensity conflicts and promote stability in the Third World, we must have innovative strategies that support representative government, integrate security assistance and promote economic development. Our approach for doing this is peacetime engagement — a coordinated combination of political, economic and military actions, aimed primarily at countering local violence and promoting nation-building.”

Peacetime engagement reflects a shift from global to regional crisis management and puts a premium on regional political-military problem-solving and operations short of war. ... Special-operations forces will play a key role in implementing this policy.”

Among those missions which fall under the rubric of peacetime engagement, SOF have already decisively demonstrated their ability to respond effectively to short-notice contingencies and to conduct the wide range of actions required to deter regional conflict and to combat terrorism, insurgencies and drug trafficking.

Given their expertise as teachers and trainers, their language skills, regional orientation and cultural awareness, SOF are ideally suited to provide training and assistance to allied and friendly nations facing internal security threats. They provide a politically acceptable, rapidly deployable and readily sustainable option. And they will continue to be involved in a variety of activities which seek to foster democratic values and pluralism, and to promote...
nation-building in the developing world.

Additionally, as a result of their well-publicized recent efforts aiding the Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort and assisting the flood-ravaged people of Bangladesh in Operation Sea Angel, we are also likely to see an increase in the use of special-operations forces in the conduct of humanitarian-assistance missions around the world. The bottom line is that special-operations forces will increasingly be called upon to provide assistance to developing countries in response to future crises, and there will be additional opportunities for their employment as the United States remains engaged in the process of shaping its national-security environment.

Causes for optimism

Earlier I stated that we have great cause for optimism as the special-operations community faces the formidable challenges of the future. Already in the last five years since the creation of my office and the U.S. Special Operations Command, the United States has greatly improved its special-operations capabilities.

The visibility, organizational strength and resources that were unavailable in the past are now ours. The revitalization of our elite forces has resulted in force-structure increases and enhanced readiness. The ability of special-operations forces to infiltrate and exfiltrate teams has been improved and expanded. We must sustain the momentum we have gained.

SOF's performance was outstanding in Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, as well as in the numerous other operational missions they have conducted over the last few years. Their successes have proven their value and ability to make unique contributions toward promoting and protecting U.S. interests around the world.

As Secretary Cheney said recently, "We are seeing what it means to be a democratic superpower. It doesn't mean instant solutions to all of our problems. It doesn't mean playing the role of the world's policeman. It does mean being in a position to act on our principles and our interests — without being hostage to the arsenals of a hostile power." Special-operations forces are one key instrument of national policy that provide us with that capability.

If recent trends are any indication of the future, the number and kinds of missions assigned to special-operations forces will continue to expand. In a volatile and turbulent world, where rapid change is the only reliable norm, well-trained and equipped special-operations forces will undoubtedly be called upon to face the tough, delicate and unexpected challenges that other components of the Department of Defense are not equipped to meet.

“In a volatile and turbulent world, where rapid change is the only reliable norm, well-trained and equipped special-operations forces will undoubtedly be called upon to face the tough, delicate and unexpected challenges that other components of the Department of Defense are not equipped to meet.”

As I just alluded, the changes we will see in the next few years will not be just those in the international political arena. Domestic economic pressures and other factors will also have an impact on the near-term and future shape of the Department of Defense. In that regard, it is encouraging to know that both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated their commitment to preserving and protecting our special-operations capabilities in the current defense drawdown. Though special-operations forces represent only about one percent of the total DoD budget, they provide a substantially greater return to the nation, and their recent successes validate the wisdom of continuing to invest in them in the future.

As the noted 19th-century physician and poet Oliver Wendell Holmes said, "I find the great thing in this world is not so much where we stand, as in what direction we are moving." We can all take pride in the fact that our special-operations forces are clearly moving in the direction of improved capability and increasing importance to U.S. national security. In this complex and rapidly changing international environment, special-operations forces will continue to be a highly effective force for the promotion and protection of vital U.S. interests abroad.

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On Nov. 26, 1990, the concept of "The Total Army" came one step closer to reality with the redesignation of the U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command as the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.

The redesignation was part of a functional alignment that organized components of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command along functional rather than component lines: All Special Forces units are now aligned under the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, and all Civil Affairs and PSYOP units under USACAPOC.

The redesignation was part of a long process of functional alignment of active and reserve-component Civil Affairs and PSYOP forces under one command. To understand the value and effectiveness of the functional realignment, it is necessary to look at the history of the command.

History

USACAPOC is an indirect result of the Defense Authorization Act of 1987, which mandated the creation of a unified command to provide theater commanders-in-chief with the capability to conduct special-operations activities with joint SOF. SOF includes Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Rangers and Special Operations Aviation, and most are in the Army.

After the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command in April 1987, the 1st Special Operations Command retained command and control of all active Army SOF, but Army reserve-component SOF units, which include two SF groups, 96 percent of CA and 86 percent of PSYOP, were left dispersed among 22 Army Reserve commands, making effective command and control difficult. The need for unified command and control for Army Reserve SOF may have been obvious, but it did not come easily.

The first step involved the consolidation of RC SOF units into one Army Reserve command in each Army region. While this was a step in the right direction, command and control of RC SOF remained split between ARCOM commanders and 1st SOCOM. After much discussion and negotiation at the highest levels, the concept of a major subordinate command for RC SOF was agreed upon.

That was only the beginning. There were many issues to be resolved, including how, when and by whom command responsibilities would be assumed to ensure unit readiness. The two principal parties developing the proposed RC command were the U.S. Army Forces Command and 1st SOCOM, whose representatives briefed 21 Army staff agencies before briefing the Chief of Staff of the Army in June 1989.

Based on the CSA's guidance, the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve; FORSCOM; and 1st SOCOM developed a time-phased plan for command and control of Army SOF under a major command with two major subordinate commands. Each MSC would be commanded by a major general: 1st SOCOM would include all active-component Army SOF, and the U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command would include all RC SOF.

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the senior command for all Army elements of USSOCOM, would assume command and control of all active Army SOF from FORSCOM. The ARCOMs would continue to play a key role in the relationship between Reserve SOF units and the USAR SOC and continue to maintain defined logistical, administrative and personnel functions.

Under this plan, implemented with USAR SOC's provisional activation on Dec. 1, 1989, USAR SOC became the home of the 11th and 12th Special Forces groups, 36 of the 37 Army CA units and 34 of the 35 Army PSYOP units. (The only active-component PSYOP and CA units are the 4th PSYOP Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, both at Fort Bragg).

This arrangement still left units organized along component lines.
With the redesignation as of USAR SOC as USACAPOC, all Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, active and reserve-component, are now assigned to one command, headed by Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Hurteau. The other elements of USAR SOC, the 11th and 12th SF Groups, are now part of the USASFC.

**Elements**

USACAPOC active forces are the 4th Psychological Operations Group and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. Its Army Reserve units are the 351st Civil Affairs Command, Mountain View, Calif.; 352nd Civil Affairs Command, Riverdale, Md.; 353rd Civil Affairs Command, Bronx, N.Y.; 360th CA Brigade, Columbia, S.C.; 361st CA Brigade, Pensacola, Fla.; 308th CA Group, Homewood, Ill.; 321st CA Group, San Antonio, Texas; 2nd PSYOP Group, Cleveland, Ohio; 5th PSYOP Group, Washington, D.C.; and the 7th PSYOP Group, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

Because USACAPOC is primarily a reserve-component command, it is similar to other ARCOMs which are also authorized a major general commander. As with ARCOM units, USACAPOC units have contingency wartime missions upon mobilization. Unlike ARCOM units, however, USACAPOC’s chain of command does not include any continental army command or FORSCOM. The unique chain of command reflects the unique mission of USACAPOC: special operations which emphasize peacetime missions in low-intensity-conflict environments and support to the conventional commander.

The peacetime missions of RC SOF present special challenges for USACAPOC, since RC forces have traditionally been oriented to wartime contingency missions which require mobilization before RC units become operational. In both Grenada and Panama, CA reservists volunteered individually, but USAR units were not activated since there was no mobilization. Operation Desert Shield/Storm presented a different challenge.

**Just Cause**

Although planning for Operation Just Cause had called for participation of reserve-component Civil Affairs units, those plans had assumed that reserve forces would be mobilized. The decision by the National Command Authority not to mobilize reserve forces left only the one active-duty CA unit, the 96th CA Battalion, to accomplish a major CA mission. The Army had to fall back on individual volunteers, and what was then the U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command began to identify CA specialists and structure the force that the U.S. Southern Command would need.

Within 24 hours of the initial insertion of U.S. forces into Panama on Dec. 19, 1989, USAR SOC had informally notified its major subordinate headquarters throughout the United States to begin soliciting volunteers for a CA staff for Panama. More than 600 Reserve soldiers answered the call, and this number grew to thousands before the operation was completed. By Dec. 23, USAR SOC had selected 25 individual reservists, from various CA units, who had the necessary military experience and who were willing to spend 139 days on active duty.

Numerous civilian and military personnel at Fort Bragg worked to get these soldiers, and those who would follow, to Fort Bragg and processed for overseas deployment. They had the initial 25 CA soldiers in Panama by Dec. 26.

USAR SOC was also working to arrange for the deployment of the next increment. In contrast to the selection process for the CA staff, USAR SOC became primarily interested in reservists’ civilian skills. Information on the volunteers, as well as the demands from Panama, were fed into a computer data base to identify the necessary experts in health, public works and utilities, public safety, dislocated civilians, public communications, transportation, and administrative and communications skills.

Once these Reservists were identified, USAR SOC saw to it that the soldiers were transported to Fort Bragg, processed and shipped to Panama. By early January 1990, the second increment of more than 80 CA soldiers was in Panama.

**Desert Shield/Storm**

The Persian Gulf crisis tested the military's ability to move more than
500,000 personnel and all of their equipment in record time to the Middle East. Moreover, it tested the ability of newly configured Army SOF commands to work together under pressure.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Colin Powell argued for rapid, wholehearted deployment of U.S. military might. As Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command, took command of U.S. forces, the Joint Central Command pulled its Middle East mobilization plan (a plan that included USACAPOC) off the shelf and revised it for use against Saddam Hussein.

CA and PSYOP planning to support CENTCOM had begun long before any reserve units were actually mobilized and deployed — the 4th PSYOP Group and 96th CA Battalion had conducted extensive coordination with CENTCOM. An assessment team was deployed into theater to determine mission-support requirements and manpower needs. After careful evaluation and consideration by the 4th POG, CENTCOM, USACAPOC and Army leadership, a PSYOP and CA support concept plan was developed which included mobilization and deployment of specific PSYOP and CA units. Once mobilization orders came, USACAPOC notified subordinate units identified for deployment. Within less than 12 months of “Just Cause,” the new command was preparing to deploy soldiers for “Desert Shield.”

Validation included standard medical, dental and administrative checks common to a preparation of replacements for overseas movement, but soldiers also had to meet SOF standards on the PT test, the rucksack march, orienteering and weapons qualification. Soldiers were also interviewed to ensure their MOS technical proficiency. Only after they met both FORSCOM and SOF requirements were soldiers deployed. Those who did not meet the requirements or who had medical profiles stayed in a holding company until they were fit to deploy.

As units arrived at Fort Bragg, the 351st-USACAPOC team identified their requirements and scheduled them for training, medical exams and record checks. They established billeting and mess support and accessed units into active duty; they confirmed security clearances and completed necessary personnel actions such as cross-leveling and fillers.

Mobilization came quickly, and its demands were harsh on soldiers arriving at the mobilization site. But as units completed their validation and training, those same soldiers felt the confidence and strength achieved by hard work and training.

**Future operations**

USACAPOC missions have a unique feature which is well-suited to its citizen-soldiers. It is the requirement that they work closely with indigenous civilians in the area of operations, as well as with civilian representatives of U.S.
agencies, usually under the direction of the U.S. ambassador's country team. Military activities in LIC focus on public support for politico-military objectives, and CA and PSYOP personnel have vital roles in mobilizing public support.

Civil-military relationships and public support for politico-military objectives are essential in at least five of the 10 special-operations activities of USSOCOM: CA, PSYOP, humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare.

In the hostile and politically ambiguous environment of LIC, the soldiers of USACAPOC should be able to interrelate with U.S. and indigenous civilians with the finesse of diplomats. As civilians with unique military skills needed in LIC, USAR personnel can bridge the gap between diplomacy and military operations, an essential task in peacetime military operations.

In addition to civil-military relations, mission success in LIC depends upon an integrated effort of active and reserve forces of all services. While USSOCOM is a unified command and is responsible for the readiness of all SOF, its forces will become operational in peacetime or wartime under the command and control of geographical theater commands. The United States Southern Command is one such unified command that has relied heavily on SOF in its theater of operations.

Because many SOF missions are peacetime-oriented and mobilization during peacetime is not necessary for mission accomplishment, individual-volunteer theater augmentation will continue to be executed unless some change in the law requires effective integration of USACAPOC units into theater-Army peacetime operations.

Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm have demonstrated that USACAPOC is an operational command that complements USASFC and the Navy and Air Force special-operations commands within USSOCOM. While the Marine Corps has organic CA elements, and other services have limited PSYOP capabilities, the CA and PSYOP units of USACAPOC will be tasked to support all services during peace or war. Because peacetime LIC missions place heavy reliance upon CA, PSYOP and SF activities and there is limited CA and PSYOP capability in the active component, the citizen-soldiers of USACAPOC must be prepared to become operational much quicker than their conventional RC counterparts. In this regard, USACAPOC represents the “Ready Reserve.”

With the Soviet threat diminishing, LIC is emerging as the most likely threat to U.S. security interests in the years ahead. Mission success in LIC will depend upon effective CA and PSYOP activities in coordination with other military and civilian activities, and the soldiers of USACAPOC stand ready to lend their unique contributions. ☚

Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Hurteau is the commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. His previous assignments include service as the 1st Special Operations Command’s deputy commanding general for reserve affairs, chief of staff of the 120th Army Reserve Command, Fort Jackson, S.C., and commander of the 1st Special Operations Command Augmentation Detachment at Fort Bragg. A 1959 graduate of The Citadel, he has completed the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Armor Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.

Maj. Robert D. Hayner, USAR, is the public affairs officer for the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. Major Hayner has served in a variety of assignments with the 82nd Airborne Division, the North Carolina National Guard and the Army Reserve. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Illinois Benedict College in Lisle, Ill., and a master’s degree from Webster University in St. Louis, Mo. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Combined Arms Officer Advanced Course and the Army Command and General Staff College.

Newly mobilized Civil Affairs soldiers conduct a rucksack march as part of their validation at Fort Bragg during Operation Desert Storm.
The 200K Call-up:

Just Cause vs. Desert Shield

by Col. Frederick C. Oelrich, USAR

Our nation’s military mobilization plans provide for a mix of units, some already mobilized (the active component), some units to be mobilized (the reserve component), and additional units to be generated or created, then mobilized.

Congress has provided the president with a flexible management tool to use in an impending emergency whereby he can call up to 200,000 Selected Reservists (those in units and certain Individual Mobilization Augmentees) to augment the active force. This authority is intended for use to augment the active component in contingencies short of partial mobilization or to activate units required in advance to support a broad-range mobilization.

There are important differences between partial mobilization and the selected reserve call-up authority, both written into the law and in the intent of Congress. Under partial mobilization [10 USC 673(a)] the Secretary of Defense (or Secretary of Transportation for the Coast Guard) can call up to one million members of the Ready Reserve for a period of up to 24 months. The biggest difference is that under partial mobilization, DoD can not only call the members of the Selected Reserve, but can also call members of the Ready Reserve.

Partial mobilization is needed when the duration or size of the conflict outgrows the authorities of the 200K call-up. Looking at possible threats that might remain after Desert Storm, partial mobilization may not be needed again, that is, for up to the entire one million, but may need to be used only sparingly when the requirement for reservists slips over 200K. Our main concern must be with the kinds of contingencies we will be most likely to face in the future. Of course, larger mobilizations must always be of concern, to ensure preparation against a war that could greatly endanger our nation and our way of life.

Mobilization is a process, a continuum. All too often the services and our national decision makers have viewed mobilization as an event, M-Day. The call-up of 200,000 Selected Reservists has been thought of as a provocative escalatory step on the road to war. In most circumstances, a call-up of this many reservists would send an extremely strong political signal to our friends, enemies and our population. The active components have asserted that early notification of reservists could lead to a security breach. And, a 200K call-up also could invoke the “War Powers Act.”

Yet these assumptions are not necessarily true, and we must realize that this “event” mentality is the antithesis of our national policy of Graduated Mobilization Response.

GMR

Desert Shield served as a crucial test of GMR, a concept that originated late in the Carter administration. Most operations plans then in being were aimed at a large conventional war in Europe and were inappropriate for smaller contingencies. Certain individual and bite-sized mobilization actions could be used as responses and become a deterrent, whereas the large mobilization actions/events (e.g., declaration of a national emergency) envisioned for Europe would be too much and too escalato-

Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any branch of the military services. Portions of this article appeared previously in the Reserve Officers Association National Security Report under the titles “The 200K Call-up: Myth or Reality?” (August 1990) and “Graduated Mobilization Response: Show of Force on the Arabian Peninsula” (October 1990). They are reprinted with permission.
ry. The GMR concept has become DoD policy and is now being institutionalized in the services.

GMR covers the waterfront of political and economic actions as well as military actions, and during Desert Shield, President Bush used a coordinated arsenal of political, economic and military actions to show our national resolve and call Iraq's hand at each turn. GMR demonstrated the potential for mobilization to be used to deter aggression through each step of the crisis.

Prior to Desert Storm there had been a certain reluctance among the leadership of the active component in calling the reserve components. That paranoia was probably associated with the national policy against the use of the reserves in Vietnam. That past reluctance to use reservists was compounded by confusion concerning the 200K call-up.

At an early 1990 (prior to Desert Shield) conference of the Army leadership attended by officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, many of the general officers believed the 200K call-up was an escalatory event that, if implemented, would require all 200,000 reservists to be called at once.

A 1989 Joint Chiefs of Staff mobilization exercise, "Proud Eagle," showed similar confusion. Most thought the 200K call-up was a scenario-independent plan with preplanned, predetermined units, i.e., one list of required units and individuals reflective of the Cold War.

As mentioned above, mobilization must not be seen as a series of specific manpower events that lead to war. Mobilization must be considered a process, flexible and adaptive enough to accommodate any level or type of threat. The reserve components are in being and paid by the taxpayers. It should be expected by the taxpayers and the reservists that the reserves will be available for use in any crisis.

As you read this article, the nation is under a "silent call": mobilized Air Force reserves are flying airlift and tanker missions, providing the C-130 airlift and A-7 fighter support to U.S. Southern Command and providing half the crews to fly Military Airlift Command aircraft. Navy Reservists are flying passengers and cargo in C-9s, and Civil Affairs Reservists are on duty in Haitian refugee camps.

An examination of recent military history shows a contrast between operations which followed plans to mobilize reserve components and those which did not.

**Just Cause**

During the "Just Cause" operation in Panama, Air Reserve components were used routinely from the onset, by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the North American Air Defense Command as well as the Air Force, while the Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve components were not. (The Army also quietly provided Southern Command with about half of the Reserve individual mobilization augmentees that would augment SOUTHCOM in wartime.)

Only some Army National Guard military police units which happened to be in Panama for annual training and Army Reserve Civil Affairs volunteers who came later were allowed to participate. Army reserve-component full-time-manning personnel were not permitted to volunteer.

In planning for the operation, the staff of the U.S. Army Southern Command recognized early the need for Army Reserve CA units to assist with the re-establishment of the civilian government and nation rebuilding. But when the "Just Cause" troop list was received at SOUTHCOM just before the operation, it showed no CA units. On Dec. 19, the day before military operations began, SOUTHCOM sent an immediate message to the JCS with an urgent request for a small call-up of five USAR CA units. Initial staffing action was begun and the Army went so far as to prepare the orders.

The request to call the Reserve Civil Affairs units was never elevated to the Secretary of Defense. It is not clear that the political leadership knew that they could call only the five small non-escalatory units, and the action was not staffed with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

The Army and Joint Staff continued working the action until early Christmas Day, when the decision to use volunteers was made. Finally, on Dec. 26, a message was sent to SOUTHCOM approving the use of up to 300 CA volunteers. We all saw in the news the civil unrest and lack of basic governmental services caused by the Civil Affairs void during the first few days of the operation.

The Army Reserve was ready to respond, either with units or volunteers. Before the decision was reached to use volunteers, a small management team was established to identify and/or process volunteers. The Army Reserve Personnel Center had developed a management system to rapidly identify skills needed and order Reservists to active duty, cutting through the usual red tape. This system — people and software — worked very, very well.

The SOUTHCOM commander praised the performance of the Reservists, and the persons doing the actual processing also performed well. Once a problem was identified, it was addressed in a professional manner; but there were problems. For example, the National Guard MPs that stayed on beyond the annual training period had civilian employment problems when they got back home: their employers were unaccustomed to anything other than a two-week training period scheduled far in advance.

The Army had not previously accomplished a hand-off from Forces Command to the 1st Special Operations Command, and this caused turf battles. The equipment
stayed with the FORSCOM unit while the individual volunteers were marshalled at Fort Bragg.

Several Reserve volunteers arrived at Fort Bragg only to be sent back home — two after being ordered to active duty, and several others with the promise of up to 139 days active duty. They may have had the wrong skills or were insufficiently fluent in Spanish or determined to be unqualified for overseas deployment. (Yet many who spoke no Spanish at all were used.)

As many were from the Southeast or Southwest, they could have most efficiently travelled directly to Panama, then returned home. But they needed to be processed by and receive equipment from the 1st Special Operations Command. (Those from units individual and unit equipment stayed behind with the FORSCOM unit. Neither would 1st SOCOM accept FORSCOM overseas-preparedness qualifications.) After processing, they were required to wait for transportation to Panama, and the Reservists had a low transportation priority.

Many arrived at Fort Bragg without necessary records. Since the Gander, Newfoundland, crash several years ago, there is confusion about hand-carrying records, and as shot records were unavailable, they were given all the shots required for the theater; they were also all given dental panograms.

As they arrived as volunteers, they were issued individual clothing and equipment from Fort Bragg, and unit equipment items such as vehicles had to be borrowed to accompany the Reservists to Panama.

When they arrived in Panama, there were additional problems. They were billeted all over the Pacific side and had to find their own way to Quarry Heights the first several days. The equipment items they brought were insufficient, and items like field desks were improvised or acquired on the economy, some at personal expense.

The improvised structure had no unit identification code, so they had no way to enter into the Army support system. Those that worked with Panamanian Civil Agencies were told to bring minimum baggage, then found they were required to wear civilian clothes. They worked in areas where tactical vehicles were inappropriate, and some rented cars.

Another problem was command and control. The reservists came from strategic nation-building kinds of Civil Affairs units. They worked with an active tactical Civil Affairs battalion, a unit whose mission was only to re-establish government, then move on with the combat troops.

The Army Reserve Civil Affairs Task Force worked for and within five different command-and-control relationships in the first several weeks. Then, those that arrived after Jan. 31 were informed, after the fact, that they would not receive a campaign ribbon. Some of the returning volunteers expressed a reluctance to volunteer again; not because of the mission, but because of the way they were treated.

They believed that, because they were volunteers, the active Army felt less obligation to support them than if they had been part of a unit that had been mobilized. Some members of the 358th CA Group, the one used for Grenada, had expressed the same reservations after their return.

Some in the Army cited these problems as reasons not to use reservists in the future. Fortunately, their recommendations were not heeded.

Desert Shield

Desert Shield marked the first use of the graduated mobilization response and the first-ever use of the Presidential 200K call-up authority. The political reluctance to call the reserves that had been previously widely espoused simply did not exist with this President and Secretary of Defense (and probably would not have existed during Just Cause, either, if the military community had asked for reservists to be called.)

Before the operation began, the U.S. Central Command had developed a series of plans for contingencies...
cies in the Middle East, but it believed the war would, most likely, occur in Iran. Although there was a plan in development for the defense of Saudi Arabia, the J oint Staff was in the process of developing a series of geographic contingency plans including requirements for a re-
serve call-up unique to that area of the globe. However, at the onset of
the crisis there was no one complete list of reserve units unique to the
requirement.

The J oint Staff recognized the need for reserve units very early on
and called in the service planners to alert them of the impending need
for a call-up and to task them to develop detailed troop lists. Both
FORSCOM and CENTCOM requested use of the call-up author-
ity early in the second week of the crisis.

At the onset, the Chairman of the J oint Chiefs of Staff discussed a
call-up with the Secretary of De-

fense and the President and
received concept approval. Action
officers on the J oint Staff worked
on the call-up to determine when
and how many, not if it were to
happen.

The plans required modification,
and the types of units, then the indi-

idual readiness of units, had to be
considered. Many of the senior lead-
ership, military and civilian, were
unfamiliar with the mobilization
process, and others were still orient-
ed toward a general mobilization for
a large war, not graduated mobiliza-
tion response for a contingency.

Some wanted an immediate call-
up of a few units that were most
needed, others thought they were
obligated to work toward the total
of 200,000, and yet others wanted a
complete and completely staffed
package to announce as an event —
all in one shot.

The dimensions that were exam-
ined were: how soon were reserve
units needed; how soon they could
be mobilized; if they were to be
deployed, when would there be a
priority to provide them transporta-
tion; how many and what types of
units would be needed; and what
units, by type, would be needed in
the event the crisis broadened.

Flags (unit identification) were
determined by using first the units
that had been identified in CENT-
COM’s plans and were of sufficient
readiness. Then other units were
selected on the basis of previously
planned missions, active/reserve
command structure, linkages and
unit readiness.

Although the following remarks
are biased toward the reserves, that
is not to infer the deployments did
not go well, or that deployed units
did not do well. Quite the opposite
is true; the mobilization process
went well and GMR worked.

The services adopted the “Total
Force” policy (e.g., integration of
the reserve components as an inte-
gral part of the services’ war plans)
at the end of the Vietnam era, but
the Air Force seems to be the only
component to have really integrat-
ed regular use of reservists. Use of
Air Force Reserve airlift aircraft
and crews has become so routine as
to be transparent to the user
whether the mission is active or
reserve.

During Desert Shield, beginning
on Aug. 7, 1990, Air Force Reserve
and Air National Guard crews had
flown about 35 percent of the Mili-
tary Airlift Command strategic mis-
sions, with 9,000 volunteers, before
a call-up was enacted. The reserve-
component units estimated that
they could operate for 30 to 45 days
with volunteers before a call-up
would be necessitated.

The Army has placed many of its
support units needed for any other
than the most minor contingency in
the reserve components. This did
not happen as a single event, but
happened over time in congression-
ally mandated tooth-to-tail and
other restructuring efforts, mostly
for budget purposes.

With the preoccupation with a
war in Europe, mobilization of sup-
port troops along with combat
troops fit nicely into the reinforce-
ment plans. Examples of support
units required for the contingency
in the Persian Gulf include well-
drilling detachments, water-purifi-
cation and pipeline units, and units
needed for desert survival. These
units are found mostly in the Army
Reserve.

The Army troop list for CENT-
COM’s plans included the 82nd Air-

borne, 101st Airmobile, and 24th Mechanized Divisions. The 24th Mech. has a “round-out” brigade, the 48th, from the Georgia National Guard. (A round-out unit is an Army National Guard or Army Reserve unit that is an integral part of the active parent unit, trains with the active unit and is planned to fight with its parent unit.)

The Army chose to deploy the 197th Infantry Brigade in lieu of the 48th. The 197th is the Infantry School Brigade and needed many fillers from elsewhere in the Army to bring it up to strength with qualified individuals to achieve a “readiness” level high enough to meet deployment standards.

There may have been good and cogent reasons not to call the 48th right along with the rest of the 24th, but the decision was made unilaterally without consultation with or an explanation to the Reserve Component leadership. This decision immediately caused some real problems in the active and reserve planning communities because of the seemingly abrupt departure from the “Total Force” concept. How are we to plan for use of round-out units in future contingencies?

There is now discussion in the Army about calling only company- and battalion-level support units, without their reserve command structure. The Army has a program aligning peacetime and wartime command structures, the Capstone program, that previously most had considered to be sacrosanct. These decisions not to fully utilize the Total Force in the Army have partially destroyed the relationship between the components as it previously existed. There is also some question as to what role Army reserve components would play in contingencies short of general war in the future.

Overriding the parochialism of the Desert Shield crisis should be the experience and lessons learned from this real mobilization exercise. We should come away from this contingency much better equipped to implement a deterrent strategy, to use deterrent-force packages and deployment modules and to conduct contingency operations if the deterrence fails.

Use of Reserves

There are many arguments pro and con regarding use of the reserves. Many of the political leadership have an outmoded stereotype of the reserve components. The reserves of today are all volunteers. None are serving to evade the draft. Those opposing the use of reserves cite as their reasons: poor readiness, lack of political courage to enact a call-up, possible strategic security breaches, and escalatory signals from mobilization.

Some also strongly believe war should be left only to professionals. Others on the same side of this coin believe that because career military folks are paid fighters, their lives are somehow less valuable, and that active forces should always be used up first.

Those favoring reserves say that reservists are less expensive, remarkably ready in consideration of training time and resourcing, and that they permit citizens to contribute in a dual status — constructive community member in peacetime and trained military member in a military emergency. A large reserve structure also places more of the burden for national security on the populace.

Most agree that reserves are of limited value if they are not to be used. Reserves do have deterrent value, but if that is the only purpose, they may not be worth the expense of being maintained at the current high state of readiness. Reserves should be used in contingency; to justify the expense to the taxpayer and to assure the viability and vitality of the reserves themselves.
Gradual use of reserves, beginning with volunteers, is the most sensible approach — and the approach used in Desert Shield. Although the reserve community can argue with the services about the details, the Joint Staff did a very good job of managing the call-up and implementing GMR.

Service differences

During "just cause" the use of the Air Force reserve components went well because to them it was routine. The use of the Army reserve components did not go as well.

The reason is twofold: first there is confusion concerning the use of reserves, and second, the makeup of the units in the Air Force and Navy reserve components is basically different from that of the Army and Marine Corps reserve components. Because of this difference, the services plan and react differently.

Air Force Reserve and Naval Reserve personnel are significantly older, and the units have more officers and a higher enlisted rank structure. They are more equipment-intensive, are manned by prior-service persons and can field teams or crews to operate their equipment. They typically are employed from their home base or port.

For example, an aviation unit can generate a crew or crews to operate a portion of their equipment on a regular basis. Many, including the technicians, have military leave from their employment as well as vacations that permit double pay for up to six weeks a year while on active duty. This permits many of these units and individuals to be employed.

In contrast, Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve units are labor-intensive, requiring numerous low-ranking individuals who must accomplish interdependent or interrelated tasks in a coordinated way to do the mission. These units typically deploy to the place of employment. To say it another way, the privates do the fighting away from home. The Army and Marine Corps reserves must recruit and train their personnel at the entry level and employ them as a unit.

The Army has not been doing routine deployments of reserve support units for operational missions. It does often deploy reserve units for annual training and during annual training in support of exercises. However, it does not use the same teams or crews and support structure habitually.

Why can the Air Force Reserve components be used routinely for operational missions and the Army reserves cannot? It is because the entire personnel mobilization procedure is based in the law (10 USC, Sections 672 and 673) upon the phrase, “without the consent of the persons affected (members concerned).”

When an entire unit is required, and the Army thinks in units, it is called, “without their consent,” because in all likelihood not all would volunteer. Yet often the needs for the unit function can be met with individuals and teams, rather than calling up the unit as a whole. The Air Force approach operating under the “silent call” facilitates this.

Use of volunteers

In today's environment some reservists can volunteer twice, first to be in a unit, then to accomplish routine military missions. The reserve aircrews that fly operational missions in peacetime are volunteers, and this works very well, because only the part of the unit that is used gets paid.

The support structure for the personnel comes from the local community, supported by the local economy, rather than an active base funded from the defense budget. This also works well because they do it routinely.

When there are enough reserve volunteers with the right skills available for a long-enough time, we do not need the 200K call-up. The Army and Marine Corps do have some units that can be used as crews, teams or individuals. Plans should be made for, and persons volunteer for, contingencies before they happen.

A linguist unit might be an example. A nation-building Civil Affairs unit is another example. This type of call-up is not an escalatory event and can provide the additional or specialized personnel needed for smaller and very flexible responses.

The military, at times, seems to forget that war is an extension of politics. By being so enamored with war fighting, we have slighted the political dimension. And, most assuredly, the political dimension in low-intensity conflict is more important strategically than the military dimension. The official after-action report for Grenada ended at 72 hours. Now, more than 10 years later, we are still sending Civil Affairs teams to Grenada to assist with nation-building. It may be that in some contingencies, war-fighting units may not be appropriate, where nation-building units are.

When entire units are needed, or it appears the requirement will be of a long duration, the 200K call-up can and should be used incrementally, to obtain the units or individuals needed, to match the requirement. There exists a base-case plan and the various contingency plans with reserve 200K troop requirements laid against them.

As the Joint Staff studied and exercised crisis management, it became apparent that most probably the events leading up to a crisis would:

- Not happen all at once.
- Be different from the assumptions in the plan or be at a place with no written plan.
- Be such as to require modification of existing plans prior to execution.

Because events cannot be exactly predicted, mobilization plans must allow for the maximum flexibility.
and latitude. Current planning is for generic 200K call-up plans to support contingencies in various parts of the world. There is even talk of a strategic lift augmentation call-up plan. For example, any contingency in the Pacific will require logistics units at air and sea ports along the west coast and in the objective area. The same is true for Atlantic contingencies and the east coast.

The larger the contingency, the more RC support units; then, as the crisis moves up the scale and many AC units are committed, RC combat units will be called. The concept is to use the deliberate planning procedure and then modify the appropriate plan at time of execution. This is a common-sense approach.

There is an ongoing action within the Department of Defense to reinstitute the policy of “The first to fight, the first to receive equipment.” In the Army the “first to fight” is reflected in the Department of the Army Master Priority List. The DAMPL is based on a war in Europe (although it is subject to change in the near future), as are the priority systems of the other services. It would make far more sense to determine which units are the most likely to be needed in a low-intensity conflict and equip them first.

Under the new philosophy of “adaptive planning,” force packages are being prepared for exerting a measured military response in anticipation of a crisis, under the umbrella of graduated mobilization response. This response could move some active forces and, at the same time, give a political signal that is not totally escalatory.

The “rapid reaction” force packages at the lower end of the spectrum have few or no reservists other than strategic airlift. And, as the contingencies become more intense, more reservists will be required. There is still reluctance on the part of the active-component decision makers to plan for using reservists in any crisis short of general war.

The previous Chief of Staff of the Air Force had asked for plans to support contingencies without the use of the reserve programs that are routinely working so well now. The Marine Corps observed the Army problem with calling Reserve CA units to active duty and has organized active Marine Corps Civil Affairs units out of the Reserve. The Navy is planning to take missions from the Navy Reserve.

This is a result of the “all or nothing” syndrome and contrary to the intent and philosophy of GMR. In recent years we have routinely employed reserve units and individuals, not only to accomplish active support missions, but also to provide assistance after Hurricane Hugo and the San Francisco and Armenian earthquakes. The National Guard is assisting daily in the war on drugs, hauling water and providing emergency power to communities with utility problems, and standing by, just in case a big war occurs.

As the mobilization continuum is examined, moving from peacetime to large-scale wars, there are many opportunities for reservists to be used as volunteers. This provides a far wider range of responses and capabilities than using only the active component, and it is free of any previous paranoia associated with the 200K call-up.

We must get on in the aftermath of Desert Storm with an eye to the future. A flexible, modular, expandable, resourced force structure must be designed to make the best and most efficient use of each of the components. Some reserve units should be included in contingency planning, taking advantage of the strengths of some types of reserve units, and other units must form the basis of our mobilization potential. Some fixes can be done in-house, others will require legislation, but all will require forward-thinking leadership.

To be used effectively, units or elements required must be identified, trained and, if possible, used routinely; so that when it’s time for emergency use, they are ready, and the parent service is ready to, and accustomed to, supporting them. 

Col. Frederick C. Oelrich, USAR, is currently on active duty, recalled from retirement by the Secretary of the Army to serve as national coordinator for the NATO Reserve Officers Congress, to be held in Washington, D.C. in August 1993. Prior to his current assignment, he served on the staff of the National Defense University. He is on a leave of absence from his job as a national readiness officer for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Colonel Oelrich has served in the Army reserve components since 1956. He has completed numerous military schools and is a 1986 graduate of the National War College. He has earned a Ph.D. from the University of Texas and has taught economics and statistics.
The functional realignment which created the U.S. Army Special Forces Command on Nov. 27, 1990 had significant impact on reserve-component Special Forces groups.

With the creation of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, these reserve-component Special Forces groups are aligned with their active counterparts and are organized, trained, and have their readiness certified and validated according to the same standards.

RC Special Forces groups trace their history back to the early years of Special Forces. In the early 1960s, seven SF groups were activated in the Army Reserve — the 2nd, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 17th and 24th — and four in the Army National Guard — the 16th, 19th, 20th and 21st. Following deactivations in 1966, the Army Reserve was left with the 11th and the 12th and the Army National Guard with the 19th and the 20th.

These reserve-component units make up about half of the SF manpower and are widespread geographically. The 11th SF Group, headquartered at Fort Meade, Md., has units in New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, Georgia, Ohio, North Carolina, New Jersey and Florida. The 12th SF Group, headquartered in Arlington Heights, Ill., has units in Washington, Missouri, Oregon, Texas, Oklahoma and California. The 19th SF Group, headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah, has units in Colorado, West Virginia, Rhode Island and Arizona.

The 20th SF Group, headquartered in Birmingham, Ala., has units in Mississippi, Maryland and Florida.

**Qualification**

In the past, training courses were different for active and reserve-component SF. The RC SF Qualification Course was a six-phase program (at that time, the active program was three-phases) which combined resident training during annual training periods with training by correspondence course. Qualification of RC soldiers took an average of six years.

The RC Special Forces Qualification Course has been phased out. All new Special Forces soldiers go through the same Special Forces Qualification Course (now two phases). An individual recruited off the street for an RC SF group goes to basic training, advanced individual training, airborne school and the Primary Leadership Development Course before he comes to Fort Bragg for pretraining and Special Forces Assessment and Selection. (See “SF Pretraining,” pp. 30-31. — Ed.) If he is selected in SFAS, he then attends the SFQC. Since the Q-Course now contains the SF Basic NCO Course as well, when
the soldier graduates from the SFQC and reports to his unit, he will also be a BNCOC graduate. This allows the unit commander to concentrate on sustainment and unit training instead of having to worry about continued MOS training for RC SFQC graduates.

Command and control
Before the creation of USASFC, the 11th and 12th SF Groups reported directly to the 97th and 86th Army Reserve Commands, respectively. The ARCOMS, in turn, reported through First Army and Fourth Army, respectively, to Army Forces Command. The 19th and 20th SF Groups, since they are National Guard, reported to their state adjutants general and the National Guard Bureau.

With the new organization, the 11th and 12 Groups are under the command and control of the SF Command. The 19th and 20th Groups still report to the state adjutants general and the National Guard Bureau; USASFC has training oversight.

Certification and Validation
The USASFC certification and validation program, instituted by the command's first commander, Maj. Gen. James A. Guest, is designed to ensure that SF soldiers in reserve-component units maintain the same standards of training and readiness as the active-duty units. Despite having full-time civilian occupations, RC soldiers must make the time to stay physically fit and perform additional training in excess of the days for which they are reimbursed. These soldiers are ready to leave their civilian jobs and their families to perform the same challenging assignments as their counterparts on active duty. Therefore, they must meet the same standards.

The strength of Special Forces has always been the A-detachment. It is the same in the RC Special Forces. By being trained well and trained to standards, RC SF sol-
Soldiers and operational detachments give USASFC the capability to task-organize for special missions by drawing on the wealth of civilian job expertise in the reserve components.

**Desert Storm**

On Jan. 23, 1991, the 20th SFGA was activated in support of Operation Desert Storm — the first time that an RC SF group had been called to active duty. A number of other RC Special Forces soldiers eagerly volunteered to serve during the operation. Twenty-six SF medics from the USAR were called to active duty and served with distinction in the Kuwaiti theater of operations as members of the 5th SF Group. Following Desert Storm, about 40 members of the 20th Group, mostly engineers, linguists and medics, went to Turkey for Operation Provide Comfort, the Kurdish relief effort. Fourteen of the USAR SF medics also served in Operation Provide Comfort with the 10th SF Group, following their redeployment from Saudi Arabia.

The future will likely see an increased participation of RC SF in worldwide missions. USASFC, through streamlined command and control, verified combat readiness and standardized training, will help to maximize the effectiveness of this valuable asset which can play a vital part in achieving U.S. objectives worldwide.

Col. Joseph K. Dietrich is currently assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command as the Senior USAR Adviser. His previous assignments include Senior Reserve Component Coordinator for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Senior USAR Adviser for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Chief of Staff of the Reserve Special Operations Group and Senior USAR Adviser to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. A 1966 graduate of the Special Forces Officer Qualification Course, he served with the 1st SF Group as commander of an A-detachment and a B-detachment, and with the 5th SF Group in Vietnam as an A-detachment commander and as commander of a mobile-strike-force battalion.
On the evening of Jan. 31, 1991, around 11:30, Col. Stewart Michelini was asleep when the phone rang. It was a phone call that would make history and entail an awesome burden for the officer who was responsible for more than 1,400 National Guardsmen activated to support Operation Desert Storm.

Michelini is the commander of the 20th Special Forces Group, a National Guard unit headquartered in Birmingham, Ala. The 20th's SF soldiers were called to Fort Bragg for a train-up period and possible direct involvement in the Persian Gulf war. It was the first time in history that any reserve-component Special Forces group had been called to active duty by the President of the United States for a war effort. The activation would prove to be a learning experience for both the 20th Group and its regular-Army counterparts.

After the mobilization order came, the 20th Group staff set about the task of alerting all group members through the unit pre-planned call-up system. The citizen-soldiers received their marching orders, and the 1,400-man unit, spread out over the states of Alabama, Mississippi, Florida and Maryland, began packing for mobilization and movement to Fort Bragg on Feb. 23.

Despite the massive nature of the move, "We moved all of our people and 250 pallets of equipment without incident and got here on time," Michelini said. The move left nothing in the 20th's armories. "They were stripped of everything because we expected to be on active duty for a year. One of the things that helped us was that we've done a whole lot of overseas deployments, so packing everything up and moving is not a strange thing to us."

"After being here (Fort Bragg) for only three days we were set up and operational," said Michelini. "But it looked like we'd been here for months. One of the reasons the mobilization was so successful is because of the help we received from Special Forces Command. When we came on line we were treated like any other SF Group."

Another thing for the 20th to be proud of is its performance during mobilization process, Michelini said. Generally, an activated reserve-component unit loses 8-10 percent of its personnel during in-processing because of physical disqualification. At that rate, the 20th, with 1,400 soldiers, stood to lose as many as 140 soldiers. It lost only seven.

Although the war in the Persian Gulf ended only days after 20th Group's arrival at Fort Bragg, the conflict's end was not the signal to send the newly federalized troops home. There would still be an intense train-up period of certification and validation that was already scheduled had the war continued or not. Certification and validation is a program to ensure that SF soldiers can still perform individual common skills learned during the Special Forces Qualification Course and that whole elements of a group — A-detachments, B-detachments, forward operational bases, and Special Forces operational bases — function integrally toward their overall mission.

"When we look at the training process, we've certified every element in 20th Group — three FOBs, nine B-teams, and 42 A-teams," said the group's deputy commanding officer, Lt. Col. Travis Guthrie. "We did this in an intensified training cycle, validating three battalions in about a 45-day cycle, whereas the active (SF) components certify one battalion in 90 days. I think that speaks for itself."

Because of the opportunity to certify and validate the entire group during the deployment, Michelini said, the 20th is three years ahead of the "power curve" in its training schedule.

"I think prior to our coming here there were some doubts as to whether we could take our group and transform it into a viable force," Guthrie said.

"There is certainly better rapport with Special Forces Command," said Guthrie. "I think that everyone at SF Command was surprised by our professionalism and the spirit with which we performed. It's a real tribute to the dedication of our men. They have to do a lot of training on their own time."
“It’s also important to understand that the standards in SF, reserve-component or active, are greater than the rest of the Army,” Guthrie said. “All of our people have to fire expert with both the rifle and pistol.”

During individual certifying tasks, 100 percent of the group’s soldiers completed the 20-mile, 55-pound rucksack march in the eight-hour time limit. This included one 56-year-old A-team member and another, a police officer in his civilian profession, who was recovering from a gunshot wound which he received to the leg six months earlier. In other individual testing, the 20th’s success rate was between 96 and 100 percent.

Not only did 20th Group learn a great deal, but so did the 7th SF Group’s 2nd Battalion, which was primarily responsible for overseeing the training of the Guardsmen.

Guard and Reserve units often contain a large number of combat veterans, in the 20th many of them are also former active SF. Further broadening the scope of knowledge in Guard and Reserve units that can be used in military planning and operations are the professions of these citizen-soldiers.

“There was tremendous cross-fertilization of ideas,” according to Maj. Steve Causey, 2/7th operations officer. “Being the Army’s newest branch (SF) and not having specific doctrine, there are challenges. There’s no manual that says ‘do it this way.’ A lot of these guys in 20th have a lot of good experience. Suddenly, you see lots of good ways to do things. Training with 20th Group has been a very enlightening experience.”

Most of 20th Group left Fort Bragg on May 17 and demobilized from federal duty May 23. But before leaving Fort Bragg, the group held a demobilization ceremony at Pike Field, including a pass-in-review by an entire Special Forces group, a rarity because of the very nature of their mission: they may be broken up in deployments all over the world at any given time.

But while most members of the unit looked forward to demobilization, some of the Guardsmen decided to become full-time soldiers. Guthrie said he fully expected to lose some people to the active side of the house. “We have some very sharp men in our unit and I’m sure the active Army would like to have them, but I’m also sure we’ll see them again. Eventually, we’ll get them back and they’ll be better SF soldiers.”

The Special Forces community, active and reserve, will be able to use what has been learned from this mobilization as a building block on which to base the next possible activation of the 20th Group or another RC Special Forces unit.

Michelini said that he is very proud and pleased with the standards which the 20th Group has met, and although the group was deactivated, he is sure that it will be called again when needed.

Capt. Paul Roberts, A Co., 2/7th SF Group, said that relative to other RC units their same size, “20th Group shone like a star.” And 7th Group’s Causey said, “They have met the training standards and could be employed in any operational area of the world.”

Sgt. Scott D. Hallford is a member of B Company, 1st Battalion, 20th SF Group, based in Mobile, Ala. A veteran of 12 years’ service in the reserve components, he has spent all his time in either the 11th or 20th SF Groups. In his civilian occupation, Sergeant Hallford is a staff writer for the base newspaper at the Pensacola Naval Air Station.

An SF NCO performs a jumpmaster’s pre-inspection prior to an airborne operation during the 20th Group’s certification and validation.
SPECIAL FORCES PRETRAINING

by Lt. Col. George Rollins

In 1989, the Special Warfare Center and School and the Army National Guard began a new training program that has doubled the success rate of reserve-component soldiers in Special Forces Assessment and Selection.

The two-week Special Forces pretraining program allows students to review basic land-navigation skills, learn rucksack marching and swimming techniques, teach classes, practice rope climbing and develop a proper attitude for Special Forces through extensive contact with Special Forces cadre role models.

Pretraining also briefly defines the role of Special Forces and reviews basic soldier skills such as operations orders and first aid. Since physical conditioning is key to successful Special Forces training, pretraining attempts to improve the soldier’s fitness level by demonstrating proper techniques. It is not designed to get a soldier into physical condition; this has to be done by the soldier several weeks prior to pretraining.

From a cursory observation, the concept of pretraining is very simple. In actuality, the establishment of a viable program required detailed planning, coordination and execution. The concept of the present Special Forces pretraining program originated with the National Guard Bureau in July 1986. Reserve components were confronted with a high attrition rate in Special Forces training: During fiscal years 1986, 1987 and 1988, reserve soldiers averaged a 65-percent attrition rate. Depending on MOS and rank, the attrition rate ranged from about 50 percent for officers to 80 percent for initial-entry enlisted soldiers. In some cases, such as 18D (medical sergeant) initial-entry soldiers, the attrition rate ran about 85 percent. Overall, less than 35 percent of reserve-component Special Forces candidates were successfully completing Special Forces training.

The immediate question to be answered was: Could this high attrition rate be overcome or reduced? The problem had to be defined before any remedies could be suggested, and to detail specific reasons for student course losses, the entire Special Forces training program had to be analyzed to determine where the losses were occurring.

The four major sections of Special Forces training at that time were: Special Forces Assessment and Selection; Qualification Course Phase 1 (basic skills), Phase 2 (MOS-specialty training), and Phase 3 (field-training exercise). (As of Oct. 1, 1990, the Special Forces Qualification Course was realigned as follows: Phase 1 [CMF-18 MOS] — 16 weeks, and Phase 2 [SF Branch] — eight weeks.) Each area had training losses. In SFAS, losses were due to weaknesses in swimming, attitude, rucksack marching, rope climbing and general physical conditioning. In Phase 1, the principle causes of attrition were weak land-navigation and tactical skills. In Phase 2, especially in medical training, the majority of losses were due to lack of self-confidence and academic proficiency. In Phase 3, the primary cause of attrition was lack of teamwork, cooperation and leadership.

The best way to overcome attrition seemed to be to offer a program which would teach, coach and improve the skills necessary for students to complete Special Forces training. Courses already being conducted provided most of these skills: the Primary Leadership Development Course, Infantry one-station unit training and the Special Forces Qualification Course, Phase 1. Using these courses as a basis, the Special Warfare Center and School and the National Guard Bureau developed a program of instruction. Other approaches, such as having students teach classes, showing military movies, counselling students in-depth, and using Special Forces instructors as role models, were also included. Training subjects and scheduling were crucial because pretraining would immediately precede SFAS and could not wear students down physically. Pretraining’s emphasis, therefore, had to be on attitude, not physical fitness.

Having a course-of-instruction proposal, pretraining needed instructors, students, facilities and
oversight. The latter two were provided by the proponent of Special Forces, the SWCS. Pretraining at the SWCS would benefit from direct input by Special Forces subject-matter experts and development of a good Special Forces' attitude in the students. The first two areas, instructors and students, were to come from reserve-component SF groups. The National Guard offered its own, full-time, 12-man Special Forces detachment as instructors. This detachment, assigned to the 19th Special Forces Group in Utah, had to come to Fort Bragg on a regular basis, both for initial coordination of resources and to conduct the classes. During the January-August 1989 period, SWCS and the 19th Group coordinated training areas, classrooms, billets, messing and equipment; rehearsed and certified instructors; and forecast student projections.

In September 1989, pretraining was ready for execution. The first formal course was held in November 1989 for 53 students. Of these soldiers, 35 were ineligible for Special Forces training: Six were weak swimmers, 23 had no Special Forces physicals, and six needed waivers. After pretraining, all 53 soldiers entered SFAS. When SFAS concluded three weeks later, 39 of these 53 were selected — 75 percent. This high success rate continued through fiscal year 1990. For the first year, pretraining soldiers had a 72-percent selection rate in SFAS.

For its first two years, most of SF Pretraining's students came from the reserve components. Desert Shield/Storm changed that. During that period, most active-duty candidates for Special Forces training were deployed to the Middle East. To fill the resulting void in Special Forces training, the Army began recruiting personnel who had recently left the military — through the 18X prior-service program. Since most of them needed refresher training, all 18X personnel began attending SF Pretraining.

Near the end of Desert Storm, the 20th SF Group activated, and about 250 of its soldiers went to pretraining as well. In all, during Desert Shield/Storm, pretraining prepared more than 600 active and National Guard personnel to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection.

Pretraining, in combination with the Primary Leadership Development Course, has greatly improved reserve-component success in Special Forces training. To allow successive attendance, the schedules of airborne, PLDC, pretraining, SFAS and SFQC are aligned. This provides reserve-component soldiers the opportunity to complete all their Special Forces training in one extended period.

In summary, the purpose of pretraining is to teach and coach the skills necessary to complete Special Forces training. The fundamental premise is that Special Forces instructors will be role models whom candidates will want to emulate. Pretraining that is properly conceived, planned and executed can produce the required results: a higher selection rate, without sacrificing the overall quality of training or lowering standards.

Lt. Col. George A. Rollins is the Army National Guard Adviser to the Special Warfare Center and School. He is a Special Forces-qualified aviator with several years' experience in both active and National Guard forces. Colonel Rollins holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, master's degrees from the Naval War College and Central Michigan University, and is a candidate for a master's degree in government from Harvard University.
Oklahoma's Thunderbird patch of WWII fame has found new distinction in the realm of special operations. Now the mark of the Oklahoma Army National Guard's 1-245th Aviation Battalion, it is the symbol of one of the most specialized helicopter units possible for today's modern warfare.

Officially known as the 1st Battalion, 245th Aviation (Special Operations) (Airborne), the unit had its beginning in 1978 as a fledgling unit of 50 people, three UH-1M attack and two OH-58 light observation helicopters. With the failure of "Desert One" to free hostages in Iran in 1980, the Army rapidly accelerated its efforts to develop a skilled, well-equipped reserve-component special-operations aviation unit. The new unit would augment the active component's ability to conduct independent SOF operations. The Army and the National Guard Bureau selected Oklahoma to become the home base, and the 1-245th was selected as the basis of the new unit.

**Year-round training**

By 1981, year-round annual-training periods for the 1-245th had become commonplace. Teams of aircraft, crews and support personnel flew to various locations across the U.S. to support SOF training and operations. Often several teams deployed to different locations at the same time, testing the battalion's ability to maintain control and effective logistical and administrative support of its assets. Night-vision-goggle training was top priority. Long-range deployments during darkness were made on a continuing basis to remote airstrips and confined landing zones. For more distant operations, battalion aircraft were ferried, along with other Army and Air Force special-operations units, in Air Force C-130 transports. Training and development continued, and by 1985, the battalion's mission had been refined to air support of SOF missions.

In February 1985, under the Capstone program, which aligns peacetime and wartime command structures, the battalion was Capstone aligned with the 1st Special Operations Command (now Army Special Operations Command) at Fort Bragg, N.C. Since then, this special-operations aviation battalion has grown to more than 380 skilled personnel. Their specialties range from aircrewnmen, aircraft and ground-vehicle mechanics, flight operations, intelligence, administrative and supply specialists to airborne-qualified forward-area-refueling-point operators.

In September 1991 the battalion reorganized and now consists of Headquarters and Headquarters
Company; Company A, with all UH-60 Blackhawks; Companies B and C, with UH-1H Hueys; and Company D for aviation intermediate maintenance. The Army National Guard Bureau is also considering adding an Oklahoma special-operations aviation company attached to the 1-245th, which would add C-23B fixed-wing capabilities for support of SOF.

The unit takes pride in its ability to sustain short or long-range operations worldwide. Pilots are prepared to fly over land or at sea, night or day, in support of special-operations forces, whether Special Forces, Rangers, or other specialized units.

**Night-vision flights**

The battalion’s pilots frequently fly after dark, wearing night-vision goggles, in order to deliver or retrieve special-operations cargo. Their missions and training require flying in all conditions, enduring temperature extremes, high winds and reduced visibility. Their specialty is flying nap-of-the-earth missions in virtually all types of terrain, including plains, desert or mountainous regions. Such exacting conditions require the utmost in skill from every battalion member, from the pilot to the maintenance and support soldiers at home base.

As of this writing, the 1-245th’s pilots, some of whom have formerly flown for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, have flown approximately 296,000 hours, an average of 2,200 hours apiece. In 1989, they flew more than 7,550 hours in support of SOF, in various training exercises, and for NVG and mission qualification. In 1990, the battalion pilots flew more than 8,750 hours to support specialized missions in the U.S. and OCONUS.

Altogether, the 1-245th has flown thousands of hours under night-vision-goggle conditions, and unit members refer to themselves as “the Lords of Darkness.” Pilots have an average of approximately 170 hours of NVG time — those with three or more years’ experience average more than 350 hours of NVG time, and most instructor-pilots have flown from 600 to 700 NVG hours. The battalion’s high-time NVG pilot has logged more than 1,000 hours.

**Two facilities**

As the 1-245th has grown in size, its bases of operations and its equipment have grown as well. Currently, the unit has 37 aircraft located at Oklahoma’s two U.S. Army aviation-support facilities, AASF-Tulsa and AASF-Lexington, about 100 miles apart.

The newer AASF is at Tulsa, where a $7-million complex was dedicated Aug. 26, 1989. The 50-acre site is located east of the Tulsa International Airport and houses the battalion’s Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Company A, Company C and Company D. It features a two-story National Guard armory, a combined aviation-intermediate-maintenance-level aircraft hangar and flight-operations center, and a new organizational-maintenance-shop building. A 2,000-foot autorotation runway...
and helicopter parking ramps accommodate the battalion’s Tulsa-based special-ops aircraft.

The other complex is located near Lexington, Okla. It was established in 1975 and is the home of Company B. In addition to its armory, flight ops, aircraft-maintenance facility and special fire-fighting and crash-rescue complex, this base also houses the battalion’s aviation medical center.

Between these two AASF complexes, the Oklahoma pilots and crews maintain and man the battalion’s UH-1H lift helicopters and UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. Fifty pilots are based at AASF-Tulsa and 50 at AASF-Lexington. Company A in Tulsa has recently undergone aircraft redistribution and now has its full complement of 15 special-ops-equipped Blackhaws. Company B in Lexington is planning and currently training for its scheduled replacement fleet of 16 MH-47E Chinook helicopters, scheduled to arrive during fiscal year 1993.

In an article in the Oklahoma National Guard’s January 1991 On Guard, Col. Leroy Wall, commander of Oklahoma’s Troop Command (Aviation), described the MH-47E as specially designed for medium-range special-operations missions. “This helicopter is capable of higher speeds, longer range, air-to-air refueling, and is better armed and has a larger troop capacity than the UH-1s we are presently using,” Wall said. He added that the Chinooks will have state-of-the-art avionics and night-vision capabilities.

**Drug interdiction**

In tune with the times, the 1-245th is trained, equipped and experienced to meet the growing demands of the nation’s war on drugs.

Several pilots and crews have already flown special missions in support of drug-interdiction operations in Oklahoma and the desert Southwest. In these missions, the battalion’s ability to work closely with civilian law-enforcement, federal agencies and joint military forces has been successfully tried and tested.

**Personnel profile**

The average “Lord of Darkness” is 28 years old. A large percentage of the veteran NCOs and officers...
have served either one or two tours in Vietnam, Korea or Germany, either in aviation or ground combat units.

At both the Tulsa and Lexington facilities, a combined force of nearly 150 full-time Army guardsmen serves in command or staff positions, maintenance support or instructor-pilot roles. On the average, members of the battalion serve the equivalent of 75 or more days on active military duty each year. Aviators, selected crewmen, staff officers, NCOs and airborne personnel, however, spend an average of 122 days each year on active duty. Simply stated, these citizen-soldiers spend more than one-third of their time wearing the uniform, ready to support active, National Guard or Army Reserve special-operations forces.

Their duty normally includes annual-training periods, key-personnel upgrade programs, basic mission qualification and specialized programs such as the Army Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course. The latter is conducted at the Special Warfare Center and School and in Oklahoma by SWCS mobile training teams. Pilots and crews also receive U.S. Navy training in carrier-landing qualification and underwater egress — using the Navy’s 9D-5 helo/dunker device, crew members learn to survive water crashes and to escape from their craft underwater.

Despite being in excess of 100-percent strength every year since 1984, the battalion keeps making room for more. Noted for its low turnover rate, the 1-245th is currently at 100 percent of its authorized strength and could easily increase its manpower if required.

In 1987, the Army Aviation Association of America named the 1-245th the outstanding Army National Guard aviation unit of the year for FY 86. The unit’s superb safety record in light of the type and nature of its specialized forces continues to honor the high level of competency and know-how of its members.

Exercise support

The long list of SOF units with which the 1-245th has trained is an indication of its stature and experience level. The battalion has deployed, trained or served with active- and reserve-component Army special-operations forces on such exercises and operations as Casino Gambit 86 in Puerto Rico; Cabanas 86 in Honduras; Label Vista II and III at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.; Erawan 87 in Thailand; Lempira 87-4 and 88 in Honduras; Operation Balkatan in the Philippines; maintenance training throughout the U.S. and at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Operation Jaguar Bite at Fort Campbell, Ky., and Operation Larkspur Bounty 89 at Camp Williams, Utah.

Nearly 100 members of the 1-245th supported the 19th SF Group in June 1990 during “Golden Star,” a 17-day exercise in Alaska involving close to 1,100 National Guard members from several states. Flying Alaska’s UH-1 Hueys during the exercise, the Oklahoma aviators inserted Special Forces teams into various areas when those teams couldn’t parachute in. Helicopters were equipped with special landing skids to keep them from sinking into marshy areas when they landed troops.

The true measure of the 1/245th still rests with the future. If Oklahoma’s proud past and its heritage are typical of what to expect down the road, then the men of the 1st Battalion, 245th Aviation, “The Lords of Darkness,” will continue to be rated highly among those units and special-operations forces whose purpose in life is stated on the 1-245th’s regimental crest: “Not for ourselves alone.”

SSgt. Gregg Bond is the former senior intelligence NCO for the 1-245th Aviation. A veteran of 12 years active military service, he served two tours in Vietnam as a combat helicopter pilot and infantry officer. A native Oklahoman, he joined the Oklahoma National Guard in March 1987, after 17 years of service separation.
The Reserve Component Special Forces Soldier

An Asset with Special Capabilities

by Capt. Michael A. O’Brien

With the future of warfare directed more and more toward low-intensity conflict, the need for Special Forces personnel will continue to grow, and with half the SF force in the reserve components, it is not inconceivable that future SF operations might contain a mixture of AC and RC soldiers.

The active-component Special Forces commander who finds himself in charge of RC SF soldiers may be uncertain what their capabilities are and how best to employ them. He may have had little or no exposure to Army Reserve and National Guard SF personnel. He may wonder whether he has been saddled with a mob of overweight, overage and under-trained “weekend warriors” or instead been blessed with an operational detachment possessing abilities and skills not found in his own unit.

The RC SF soldier must meet the same standards and complete the same training as an active-component SF soldier; however, the RC soldier is somewhat different in nature. An SF leader, when commanding RC personnel, must learn to recognize and understand these differences in order to use this type of soldier to the best advantage.

Positive aspects

Many RC SF soldiers, as a result of their civilian occupations, possess skills not found in active-component SF detachments. All detachment operations sergeants have completed the Operations and Intelligence Course, but how many are also master electricians? How many detachment commanders hold multi-engine and instrument ratings as pilots? How often will the detachment medic be a registered nurse who works at the hospital emergency room and is also a professional artist?

By surveying the RC SF soldiers under his control, the SF commander may find that he has doctors, lawyers, firemen, police officers, computer engineers, railroad workers, telephone-company technicians and their combined knowledge available for his use.

The skills of the soldiers cited above are all applicable to the different SF missions. During a recent Army Training and Evaluation Program exercise, the engineer sergeant for a National Guard operational detachment cited in his portion of the briefback highly technical target data and displayed a familiarity with civilian communications equipment to which SF engineers are not normally exposed.

The senior AC evaluator questioned the sergeant’s description of the interior of a building in which the sergeant had never been and his ability to identify pieces of equipment that would have to be damaged or destroyed in order to disable a communications relay site.

The evaluator learned that two detachment members were employed by a telephone company as technicians and that a third soldier, normally employed as a computer-systems engineer, knew how to disrupt the relay site’s control equipment.

An NCO who works with complex equipment on a daily basis doesn’t require additional training in order to render it inoperable. A soldier who is a general contractor in his civilian occupation can plan and build a complex structure, while an active-component engineer would likely require some form of assistance. These “extra” skills enable the SF commander to accept, plan and complete missions without requests for additional training or extra personnel.

A particular strength of RC SF lies in the extended periods of time that individual soldiers serve together on a detachment or at least within the same company. It is not unusual to find detachments in which soldiers have been together for 4-5 years. Although all military units experience some turnover each year, the number of soldiers lost to extended schools, post commitments, promotions and discharges is much lower in RC SF units. This durability results in RC detachments with long-term working relationships and greater mission proficiency.
SF commanders will also find a wealth of military experience at the soldier level in the RC detachment. Enlisted SF personnel often spend several years in the same position on a detachment. The stability within the detachment produces a soldier who has worked in his MOS for many years instead of the 2-3 years sometimes encountered on AC SF detachments.

This stability is due to several factors: The RC SF soldier is usually well-settled in the civilian community. A soldier who remains at the same job for several years is likely to maintain his Reserve or National Guard association for the same period of time. The paycheck that the RC SF soldier receives for his military duty also becomes a stabilizing influence as the years pass.

RC SF officers, many of whom have served as SF-qualified enlisted men, often remain in place as detachment commanders for a similar 4-5-year period. In a survey of one SF company in the 20th SF Group, the commanding officer, the executive officer and three of the six detachment commanders had all served as enlisted men, with all but one having been SF-qualified prior to commissioning. Junior officers still serve as detachment executive officers in RC units when special-operations technicians are not assigned.

Finally, many RC SF officers and NCOs stay with their units because it is an SF unit. Promotion and opportunity may be available elsewhere, but as the RC unit is not their primary source of income, many soldiers can do something they enjoy in lieu of searching for increased income.

This depth of experience gained over years can be compared to the shorter but more intense operational and training experience found in the active components. Typically RC SF soldiers have trained or operated with the civilian or military personnel of five or six countries. During the period 1987 through 1989, personnel from the same 20th Group SF company described earlier operated in five countries and instructed military personnel of three nations at locations in the United States.

Two of the most important qualities an SF soldier can have are maturity and the ability to interact favorably with persons of other cultures. These qualities are not taught; they are the result of age, life experience and education. The RC SF soldier is typically a little older than his AC counterpart. His civilian employment often involves supervision of others and results in the ability to get others to do what he wishes them to do. The RC soldier’s education level is often higher than his counterpart on an AC detachment as the result of having had more time to pursue educational goals. Typically NCOs in RC SF units have more than two years of college.

Negative aspects

Although the characteristics of RC units as described above present many advantages to the commander, that commander must also be aware of the negative aspects inherent in RC SF units. These must be recognized and planned for; however, they do not present long-term problems.

The SF commander will find that RC SF soldiers are in good physical condition. Most personnel in a typical RC SF company engage in a physical-fitness program on their own, as they recognize that conditioning cannot be maintained by training only during drill periods. Instead, physical training during a unit assembly (drill weekend) serves as a tool for monitoring the fitness of company personnel. A soldier who cannot handle weekend activities is counseled and retested the following month.

Although the RC SF soldier is serious about his physical condition, any off-duty physical-conditioning program must be juggled with civilian employment. While there may be a good number of exceptions to the rule, a full-time job does not usually allow for ruck-sack marches every week. The work schedule which allows for physical conditioning each day is not often found in the civilian work place.

The RC SF soldier may also be limited in his exposure to certain types of training. The training available to a RC SF unit is, for the most part, dependent on the location of the unit. A unit situated in one of the western mountainous states will have a great deal of training in mountain operations. Ocean-type water operations and tropical weather training will likely be limited to one or two times per year.

As a function of the unit’s location, the RC SF unit may have access to a military reservation that can provide specific types of training facilities. Units close to an Army post with a MOUT training facility will have more of an opportunity to train in that aspect of warfare than units which must travel long distances to reach the facility or who are forced to make do with what is available locally.

On an individual level, it is very difficult for most RC SF soldiers to attend schools that are several weeks in length. Although the desire to go to the school is present, the ability to attend without affecting civilian job responsibilities or the family finances is not. Most employers are not enthusiastic about losing what may be a key employee for several weeks at a time. Many RC personnel take a pay cut when they are on active duty, and the loss to the family bank account must be taken into consideration.

The SF commander, however, should not assume that the training experienced by the RC SF soldier is limited to two days a month and the traditional two weeks in the summer. In most RC SF units, the 39 training days per year is a thing of the past; the RC SF soldier serves extra training days, attends
additional short-term schools and fulfills operational commitments such as drug-interdiction missions.

Finally, the RC SF soldier may not have the same equipment that his AC counterparts possess. Many, if not all, RC SF groups still maintain the M16A1 and the M1911A1 as the issue weapons, while the AC SF groups are using the M16A2 and the 9mm Beretta. This does not mean, however, that RC SF are equipped with obsolete items. Gore-Tex clothing has been issued in many groups, communications equipment is the same as found in the AC units, and equipment such as the new outboard motors and Zodiac inflatable water craft are on-hand and being used in training.

The SF commander, when controlling RC SF detachments, does not have to anticipate re-equipping the RC detachment. He does, however, need to be aware of the differences that exist in the equipment assigned to these units and plan for logistical problems.

Although there has been a vigorous debate over the years as to whether or not RC SF units could survive in the special-operations environment, or whether RC units should exist at all, those issues are now becoming moot.

Reserve-component SF personnel, both as members of detachments and as individuals, have repeatedly participated in both CONUS and OCONUS special-operations exercises, mobile training teams, civic-action missions, humanitarian projects, the certification and validation process and drug-interdiction missions.

Currently only 50 percent of all SF are on active-duty status. With the complete manning of the 3rd SF Group, that percentage will grow only to approximately 55 percent. The RC SF soldier is and will be a part of the special-operations community for the foreseeable future. As demands on SF personnel increase in the future, the AC SF commander, whether he prefers to or not, will likely be involved with RC SF soldiers. It is imperative that both active-duty commanders and individual SF soldiers understand and appreciate this asset with special capabilities.

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Notes:
1 Although an understanding of the RC SF soldier would appear to be important in these days of the Total Force policy, the author is aware of only one commentary on this area. See Hans Halberstadt, Green Berets: Unconventional Warriors (Novato, Cal.: Presidio Press, 1988), pp. 27-30.
In the Army's 1967 Field Manual 31-23, Stability Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine was defined as "the full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."

Today, foreign internal defense is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."

Conceptually, little has changed in more than two decades. Today's doctrine remains essentially the same as that prevailing at the height of the Vietnam war. However, FID today is not the same as it was 20 years ago. The definition hasn't changed, but the world has, and the mission has. The Cold War is over. Zealous, knee-jerk anti-communism is no longer in vogue. Obsessive anti-communism has suddenly become anachronistic.

As we enter the last decade of the 20th century, FID will no longer emphasize efforts to establish governments ideologically opposed to communism, but instead will encourage constructive programs emphasizing the building of viable, progressive and responsible governments capable of providing for their people's needs in today's interdependent global community.

**Changing role**

The U.S. role in FID will range from the less-likely unilateral support for a friendly government to a much more likely multinational coalition to assist a nation in taking its place in an emerging world order considerably more diverse and actually more challenging than the bipolar world we have known. While superpower confrontation appears unlikely, subversion, insurrection, rebellion, insurgency and revolution are sure to occur in many areas of the world. For a wide variety of reasons, established governments will continue to be threatened by forces striving to overthrow and replace them.

Some reasons for rebellion are just; others are not. Human-rights abuses, lack of social mobility, unjust economic conditions, ethnic or religious discrimination, and governmental unresponsiveness or basic incompetence are among arguably justifiable reasons for rebellion when no other avenue for change is available. Our own Declaration of Independence eloquently affirms "the right of the people to alter or to abolish" an unjust government. Moreover, that revered declaration of 1776 asserts that "it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security."

However, it is obvious that not all rebellions against constituted governments are just. Some are undertaken by ethnic, political or social groups seeking dominance for their own parochial interests. Frequently, legitimate governments are threatened and challenged by violent groups characterized by an unwillingness to recognize fundamental human rights and democratic principles. Legitimate governments dedicated to the interests of their citizenry must provide the secure environment necessary for economic, social and political progress. It will be to assist these deserving governments under challenge that the U.S. military will be called on to execute its FID mission.

Foreign internal defense is a legislated and primary mission for the U.S. Special Operations Command. It is most timely for USSOCOM to examine thoroughly and identify specifically its proper role in the accomplishment of FID missions in achieving U.S. national objectives. FID requires a multi-agency coordinated effort in the pursuit of economic, social, political and military objectives. FID is not a purely military mission, for it is undertaken for broader economic, social and political goals. Accordingly, the military will not be the lead agency in the national effort, but it will be subordinate to and in support of the larger political purpose.

**Requirements**

The FID mission requires a highly skilled military force — one with significantly more skills than those...
traditionally associated with the military. Political skills are critical. Fundamental is regional knowledge, including a firm appreciation of historical, political, cultural and socio-economic realities. Successful FID operations require strong interpersonal skills demonstrated by an ability to work effectively with people from diverse backgrounds, both U.S. and foreign. FID skills include not only understanding the operational region but also having the ability to work with allies in a multicultural arena, frequently without U.S. hegemony.

An important consideration for future FID is the likelihood that the U.S. military may not be the leading foreign element supporting a country needing assistance. Just as the military is in a subordinate role to the political in FID, the U.S. itself may serve in a subordinate role to the regionally oriented commander-in-chief, quite possibly under a non-U.S. commander. Such a role will be much more challenging for U.S. military leaders, requiring them to gain respect, authority and influence through competence, diplomacy and professionalism rather than simply assuming command.

The FID mission will continue to stress developing indigenous capabilities so that threatened countries become able to solve their own problems and promote legitimate, responsible, good governments. FID efforts will be geared to resist threats from both the left and the right.

As in the past, FID missions will be undertaken in many Third World areas which have faced turmoil during most of the 20th century. However, FID will now be possible in areas heretofore never envisioned, such as Eastern Europe and even sections of the Soviet Union. Such an effort with our erstwhile adversaries will indeed attest to a truly new world order. Moreover, the example and experience of United Nations action against Iraq may be a harbinger of a new international order where the most common and probable application of military force will be to thwart oppression in its many and varied forms. This may sound somewhat utopian and quite foolishly optimistic, but FID may well make a valuable contribution to the ultimate well-being of mankind and to a benevolent and peaceful world order.

**SOF responsibility**

Because of the unique characteristics of special-operations forces which make them especially appropriate for FID, USSOCOM must play a prominent role in FID planning and operations. Not only do SOF have a specifically assigned FID responsibility, but their language skills, area orientation and capability for independent action make them ideally suited for the FID mission. USSOCOM therefore can be expected to provide the regional commanders-in-chief with the expertise they need to accomplish their varied FID missions. Moreover, as there will be considerably fewer U.S. personnel deployed overseas than before, the CINCs will be required to look to USSOCOM for the specialized skills and talent essential for successful FID operations.

The FID mission will not call for a large number of people, but only those people with the appropriate skills are likely to be successful. Although FID will involve forces other than SOF, the unique characteristics of USSOCOM make it most capable of assuming the overall responsibility for preparing and providing the force to accomplish the FID mission. USSOCOM therefore must ensure that military personnel assigned FID responsibilities are prepared to operate on both a unilateral and a multinational basis. Moreover, USSOCOM, in coordination with the theater CINCs, must develop an effective analytical capability both to identify potential FID environments and to assess existing FID operations.

**Training for FID**

In preparing the force for FID, the key factor is the establishment and conduct of appropriate specialized training for FID. FID education must aim at promoting a mindset which sees opportunity for the
military to contribute to the development of a peaceful world order and to influence the world for the betterment of mankind. This may be somewhat grandiose, but FID indeed emphasizes the non-combat aspects of military operations in support of economic and social development. Perhaps the most idealistic vision of the FID soldier is the image of the traditional western movie cowboy — a do-gooder ready to confront and overcome evil in order to make life safe and prosperous for the innocent farmer, rancher or city dweller. Essentially, the goal of FID is to establish an honest and resourceful local sheriff who can form a posse to safeguard the interests of the citizenry.

USSOCOM must establish primacy in training for FID. It can build upon the current FID/IDAD Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and stress the psychological, economic, political, intercultural and military aspects of FID. Specialized training for FID must address intelligence, psychological operations, civil-military operations, economic development, counterinsurgency, interagency cooperation, U.S. foreign policy, regional studies, international relations and security assistance. A joint center for FID studies may be appropriate to educate military, both U.S. and foreign, and civilian students from U.S. governmental agencies and departments involved in FID. Certainly, if FID is a major U.S. military mission and an important foreign-policy activity, it follows that thorough, effective and suitable training for FID is essential.

As USSOCOM develops competent personnel for FID, it should establish a personnel program to retain and refine such expertise by providing alternate assignments in the region and at USSOCOM. This would be most advantageous in providing both CINCs — the regional and USSOCOM — with qualified, trained, well-educated and experienced personnel.

As the international arena changes from a bipolar superpower environment into a more balanced interdependent global entity, it is important that the role of the U.S. in FID be examined. The benefits of FID for the U.S. are numerous. Intangible benefits such as increased U.S. prestige, good will, and international understanding and trust are worth pursuing. More important, however, are the strengthening of U.S. security and economic alliances and the encouragement of a global political stability which makes conflict or war less probable. In this post-Cold War era, such lofty goals for FID are not merely fanciful, for the opportunity to foster a just, humanitarian and progressive new world order is real.

Terry Doherty is currently assigned to the SWCS Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization as a social scientist; he is the former chief of the SWCS Low-intensity Conflict Branch. A retired Army officer, he served in a variety of active-duty assignments which included duty as a military attaché, serving as director of three separate departments at the JFK Center, advisory and command tours in South Vietnam and service as assistant professor of military science at Fordham University. He has earned a BA from Providence College, an MA in political science from Villanova University and a master of technology for international development from North Carolina State University.
Tuesday, July 26, 1977, was a sultry summer day at West Point. The Most Holy Trinity Chapel was filled with family and friends who had come to pay their last respects to Col. Eleazar “Lee” Parmly. Lee and Marie Parmly had been married at Holy Trinity after his graduation from the Military Academy in 1946, but Marie was conspicuously absent from the funeral mass — she lay hospitalized in Georgia with broken legs and ribs and facial lacerations incurred in the automobile accident that had taken Lee’s life. They had been traveling from St. Augustine to Kansas City for a religious conference when their van struck a tractor-trailer near Tifton, Ga.

Still, the mass was celebrated by 10 priests, the five Parmly children, four grandchildren, family and Army friends and a contingent of Special Forces soldiers. At the family’s request, it was a joyful occasion, with no cause for grief. Friends and family gathered to discuss their memories of Lee Parmly — of the times when he returned to the Academy, and of other memories of the man over the many years.

Eleazar Parmly is a name out of history. Lee’s great-grandfather, the first Eleazar, had been president of Dartmouth College. Eleazar III graduated from West Point in 1924 and served 23 years in the field artillery. Lee’s brother Tut Parmly also chose field artillery after he graduated from the Military Academy in 1950. Lee’s choice in 1946 was infantry and airborne — no surprise, for he had been an outstanding cross-country runner and miler on the track team.

After graduation, Lee had returned to West Point for two assignments: from 1961 to 1964 as a member of the Tactical Department and from 1972 to 1975 as Treasurer of the Academy. As a member of the Tactical Department, Lee Parmly was one of the institution’s more colorful characters, affectionately known throughout the Corps of Cadets as “Ranger Major Parmly.” Although sworn to secrecy concerning a year’s mission with the CIA in Laos, he was a visible and outspoken proponent of the Special Forces.

At that time, the status of Special Forces had been enhanced by President John F. Kennedy, who came to West Point to address the graduating class of 1962. In that speech Kennedy described a new kind of war differing from the nuclear strategy so prominent in the late 1950s. He talked of “war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression.” He made a plea for the Special Forces, and sitting in the field house, Parmly was elated. He was in his element, where young leaders for war would be schooled. He was, as he thought, in the right place at the right time. Little did he suspect that of that 600-man graduating
class, 439 would serve in Vietnam and 19 would die there.

**Twin loyalties**

The account of Lee Parmly's own service in Southeast Asia is both a character study and a lesson in history and tactics. Lee Parmly was a Special Forces soldier whose background and combat experience had developed warrior tendencies; he was also a deeply religious man with respect for human dignity and misgivings about the American presence in Southeast Asia. These twin loyalties haunted him during his time in Southeast Asia and afterward.

It is rare for a soldier in combat to find time, or to possess the talent and energy, to record what goes on around him. It is fortunate that Lee Parmly's exploits have come to light, supported by three accounts that he prepared without the slightest thought that people might come upon them after his death. One is a tape prepared in 1977 at the request of a sixth-grade class in American history in Morehead, Ky., of which his niece, Carolyn West, was a member. The students sent their request for the tape along with eight questions for the colonel to answer.

A second source is a letter to his wife dated Nov. 12, 1966, written just after his return from the Plei Trap Valley operation during the Vietnam War. Finally, we can resort to notations from his diaries to show the sources of Lee's faith and the reasons for his being an officer. In Lee Parmly's case, his diaries said what he meant — he wrote the entries in ink, with scarcely a strike-over. In them one can see the agony and the judgment of a man who loved life and adored the Church and knew the meaning of death.

In the tape he prepared for the history class, Parmly summarized his service in Southeast Asia:

1. I served three tours in the Army in Southeast Asia and I'm able to comment as a witness on three of the stages of our nation's involvement in the efforts of the intervention by communists to spread control over Southeast Asia. My first tour was from 1955 to 1958. I was in Thailand with the Joint United States Advisory Group. There I observed and participated in the combined efforts ... to confront the communist-directed nationalistic takeovers of the three protocol nations of the former French colony of Indochina — Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. I traveled to Cambodia and Vietnam and also to Hong Kong, to the Philippines and Burma, and to India, those three years that I was in Thailand. ...

2. My second tour in Southeast Asia began two years later in 1960 and went for a little over a year, to 1961. I was on a secret mission to Laos. I was used as an adviser on anti-guerrilla warfare on the United States Military Advisory Team in Laos.

3. Eventually I became the main adviser for the commander of the Laotian Army units which formed a counter-revolutionary force ... against the Neutralists of Kong Le who overthrew the government in August of 1960. The Pathet-Lao Communists assisted Captain Kong Le and his coup d'état in fighting against the Royalists of General Phoumi Nosavan, and then eventually the Communist Pathet-Lao absorbed Captain Kong Le's Neutralist party into the Communist party. ...

**Laos**

Lee Parmly's combat experience in Laos deserves further explanation. When he arrived in Laos in the summer of 1960 (for what he calls a "secret mission to Laos"), all Laotian operations were done with advice and support of U.S. Special Forces advisers who were incognito. They were all "civilians" — placed on the retired list, paid by CIA and not the U.S. Army, because the Geneva Agreement prohibited American military personnel in Laos. The quasi-military organization set up to accommodate the phantom U.S. presence in Laos was known as the Programs Evaluation Office.

As a Special Forces volunteer in this early experiment, Parmly was an important field operator. He was advising and seeking to organize the lethargic forces of the Royal Laotian Army just as North Vietnamese and Russians were advising the opposing Pathet-Lao. According to a 1961 article in Time magazine, "unmarked U.S. transport planes loosened red and white parachutes that floated down the supplies of war: ammunition, clothing and food. Only a few miles away, across the canyon or a hill, Russian Ilyushins bounced onto rough turf runways bearing howitzers, mortars, assault guns and communist technicians to man them. Among all the crises around the world, only in remote and rugged northern Laos were communists and anti-communists armies lined up for war."

The countercoup to recapture Vientiane from Kong Lee was an event to which Parmly was a witness — more than that, a participant. As Shelby Stanton describes the battle:

"On 9 August 1960 Captain Kong Lee, the commander of the crack 774-man Bataillonne de Parachutiste posted to the mud flats outside Vientiane after hard fighting on the Sam Neua front, staged a coup d'état while most Laotian governmental officials and military leaders were in Luang Prabang. ... The countercoup advance toward Vientiane started on 25 November 1960, spearheaded by Special Forces officers and sergeants with the forward units. General Phoumi Nosavan's Groupement Mobile I (roughly equivalent to a brigade) fought through heavy resistance, stormed across the Ca Dinh river, and recaptured the town of Pak Sane. On 13 December 1960 Special Forces soldiers jumped into the critical crossroads of Ban Tha Deua (just south of Vientiane) with the 1st and 3rd Bataillons de Parachutiste and..."
pushed aside light opposition. Two days later Vientiane was surrounded. The battle for the capital began, during which the U.S. embassy was hit by artillery fire and burned out. The capital fell after sharp rearguard fighting on 17 December 1960, and a new Laotian government was declared by the victors. 35

Parmly's diary contains a daily accounting of these early stages of American involvement in Laos. The first half of his tour (April-October, 1960) was devoted to training the Royal Laotian Army. Stanton explains the situation as follows: "Before Gen. Phoumi Nosavan could get moving, some of his line troops were trounced by tough Kong Le paratroopers led by Pathet-Lao commanders. Col. Albert Brownfield (Deputy Chief of Program Evaluation Office) located in Savannakhet, and Parmly's superior, decided to invigorate the counter-coup command with the rebel MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) Special Forces team. Finally released from all tripartite training restrictions, the Special Forces enjoyed a new freedom of action as operational advisors instead of as technical trainers. 36

Parmly showed this change in his diary for Oct. 20: "Told I'm to take Ispen Team (James Ispen was in command of an eight-man Special Forces field training team) from Pakse to Thakhet to run Boun Leut Operation. Terrific-fabulous." Brigadier General Boun Leut was the Laotian field commander. His immediate subordinate was a Colonel Sunthorn. Parmly at last was about to realize his ambition to engage in combat. Three days later his diary reports: "Inspected training and organizing the South Vietnamese special forces coming into Laos, Parmly returned to headquarters at Savannakhet to report his experiences before departure for home.

Vietnam

About this time President Kennedy approved use of Special Forces as trainers and advisers to South Vietnam. With three years in Thailand and service in Laos, Parmly was prepared for important work — training and organizing the South Vietnamese special forces — which eventually brought him back to Southeast Asia. The tape describes his next experience:

My third tour in Southeast Asia was from August 1966 to August 1967, when I was in Vietnam as commander of several United States-forces units fighting against the Vietnamese guerrillas as wel
as the regulars of the North Vietnamese Army. My tour in Vietnam was limited to the northern two-thirds, but I was all over that major portion of the country.

My U.S. soldiers — there were about 400 of them — advised and led over 40 battalions of irregular soldiers, who were more capable than guerrillas but certainly less capable than professional soldiers. ... We organized and equipped them ourselves and we used them to wage war on the enemy from three dozen separate and very, very isolated and fortified camps. They were strategically located in the country of South Vietnam, either in the mountains or the jungles that were controlled by the enemy... We also placed the camps along the border, provocatively located astride the main routes of infiltration for the North Vietnamese coming across the borders from Cambodia, from Laos and from the DMZ in the north. We also located some of our camps in valleys and in places that were main avenues of attack by the communists if they were to try to hit any of the major cities in the northern part of Vietnam.

My area covered 17 provinces. Our Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group battalions and their camps — there were three dozen of them — were working closely all the time with the South Vietnamese Army, the local units of the South Vietnamese Defense Forces, and with the United States Army and Marine Corps when they conducted campaigns or established bases that were within the operational areas of my responsibility.

At this point, having set out the locales of his service in Southeast Asia, Parmly reflected on what he was up against.

Those are my three tours. Three years in the last half of the 1950s in Thailand, one year in the first part of the 1960s in Laos, and one year toward the middle part of the 60s in Vietnam. And I saw various aspects of the developing war in Thailand, the early efforts of the communists to stir up discontent among the Chinese and other minority populations in Thailand, or among the people who live in the mountains away from the control of the main government in the cities, and trying to incite them to side with the communists and overthrow the legitimate governments in Thailand.

In Laos the communists were much more aggressive, they were much more organized and were led by a former Laotian prince (Prince Souphanouvong) who had become a communist. His Laotian soldiers, called the Pathet-Lao, had been trained in southern China and were being advised by Vietnamese and Russians as they fought against the Royalists whom I was advising. This was a much more elaborate war, much more elaborate than the insurgency going on in Thailand.

When I got into Vietnam the main-force units of the North Vietnamese Army, assisted by the irregular Viet Cong soldiers, were carrying on a major war against the standing army of South Vietnam... greatly assisted by, almost dominated by, the U.S. forces and several other allies — the Koreans, the Thais, the Australians primarily — units in Vietnam.

On the tape, Parmly explained why he became involved in the war.

I was actively in the war in 1960 and 1961 in Laos, and in 1966-1967 in Vietnam because I volunteered for that duty. Since I was a professional soldier in the United States Army it was my belief that my sole reason for being employed was to train American citizens into becoming good, competent soldiers during peacetime periods and then to lead those soldiers and officers in battle whenever we were at war. Many Americans were drafted and sent to the war zone in Vietnam when our presidents agreed to move Army, Marine, Navy and Air Force units from the United States to Southeast Asia.

And here came a surprisingly frank admission.

I was not in favor of those decisions. Of course, they didn't ask me. I didn't agree with them because I agreed with the advice of General of the Army Douglas Mac-
Arthur when he said that the U.S. should never again allow itself to become involved directly in a regular land war in either Eastern or Southeast Asia. He knew firsthand, from years of experience, the absolutely impossible terrain that we would have to contend with on the strange battlefields where our men would have to fight at a tremendous disadvantage against people who were at home on that terrain. He knew firsthand the climatic and health conditions of Southeast Asia that would debilitating and psychologically depress U.S. soldiers, and he knew firsthand the cultural, philosophical, religious and political beliefs of the Asiatics, so different from ours.

I volunteered to serve as a professional soldier in Southeast Asia in a United States unit that was composed only of volunteer professional soldiers. That was the Special Forces, as some people call it, the Green Berets. I was offered some very juicy desk jobs in Saigon and some very attractive command jobs in United States brigades in Vietnam, but I turned them down because I sensed the conflict that I would experience within myself if I had to order or lead United States men who had been drafted and ordered by blind politicians and generals to fight in a war that those draftees didn’t believe in (and) that I could not, in conscience, convince them they should believe in.

I went into the war because I wanted to. That was a very selfish decision on my part, because my wife and our children did not want me to volunteer. But I felt obliged to make good on the commitment that I made on the first of July in 1943 when I joined the Army and raised my hand in an oath “to serve the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” And I felt obliged to utilize the skills that I had been taught as a professional soldier and was being paid by the taxpayers to use, when they called me. It’s just like a fireman who doesn’t like to see someone’s house burn down. He doesn’t want to get burned himself or exposed to death fighting that fire, but, nevertheless, he is a willing and even an anxious volunteer to join in putting out the fire.

Plei Trap

Lee Parmly may have had second thoughts about volunteering for that tour in Vietnam when he and his small task force of Montagnard strikers became heavily engaged with superior North Vietnamese regular forces during the Plei Trap Valley operation in November 1966.

Parmly arrived in the highlands in August, 1966 as commander of Co. B, 5th Special Forces Group at Pleiku, about the time that lead elements of the 4th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Arthur S. Collins, were arriving from Fort Lewis, Wash.

The 4th Division was still unblooded when Operation Paul Revere IV was being planned as the first operation controlled by the division in Vietnam. Radio intercepts indicated that several North Vietnamese regiments had crossed the border from Cambodia and were in the mountains north of Plei Djerang, north of Duc Co, but nearer Pleiku and farther from the border. Parmly’s Montagnards would support the Division’s 2nd Brigade.

As Shelby Stanton describes it, “Parmly was horrified at their (the 4th Division’s) first battle plan to insert Task Force Prong (named for Colonel Prong, the Vietnamese commander of Kontum Special Military District) between two divisional battalions ‘on an axis of advance by phase lines.’ He immediately requested that the CIDG be simply employed moving along the Cambodian border, so he could con-
trol them with reference to a fixed area boundary. The division relentless, and Task Force Prong was airborne to (landing zone) Lane on the morning of Nov. 8, 1966, already secured by a company of the 2nd battalion, 8th Infantry.”

Parmly discusses the situation in his tape to the sixth-grade class.

We had been operating for about three days on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which was located just on the Vietnam side of the Cambodian border about 45 miles west of the city of Pleiku. The place I was in was called the Plei Trap. I was on a mission to protect the left flank of the 4th United States Infantry Division that was making a massive attack that we called Operation Paul Revere IV.

I had been in three battles along that stretch of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the day before ... and when General Walker asked me to go back down that trail and attack a line of bunkers I discovered with my Montagnard irregulars so that his U.S. soldiers could attack the flank of the enemy defenses and surprise them. I knew what he was asking me was pretty risky. I had already stirred up a hornet's nest the day before in my three battles and I knew that the enemy were watching for me. When I turned around and went down that trail to attack their main trenches and pill-boxes, I knew that they would be aware of it immediately and they would have time to lay an ambush for me. The reason I felt that was because if I had been in the enemy's position, that is exactly what I would have done. But, anyway, I agreed to do what General Walker had asked me to do because I thought my soldiers could handle it, and I knew that the United States forces, with their artillery and air (support) would be there to help me ...

In his book, West to Cambodia, S.L.A. Marshall has devoted an entire chapter, titled “A Small Problem of Command,” to Parmly's role in this operation. Marshall further explains Parmly’s reservations: Here was a lightly armed force of Montagnards, trained mainly for screening and reconnaissance, being asked to go after a fortified line protecting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. According to Marshall, it was Maj. Gen. Arthur Collins, the 4th Division commander, not Brig. Gen. Glenn Walker, the assistant division commander, who asked Parmly, “Can your people then move south along the trail and pin them from the front so Charley Company (Co. C, 1/14th Infantry Bn.) can roll them up?”

“I am sure that by now they will be waiting for us on the trail,” Parmly replied, “but I think that with 185 men I ought to be able to take them.”

Marshall follows with his own perspective. “One may idly wonder if a realist's view of tactical circumstances conditioned these judgements. Parmly, the only one who had seen the ground, might have urged more caution. Or having a real go at it with all possible heavy weapons might have been weighed as a more promising option. Most likely, in these circumstances, all command levels react too strongly, like beagles scenting game.”

In the tape, Parmly describes briefly the events in the Plei Trap ambush:

At the exact place that I would have set up an ambush, the North Vietnamese battalion commander had set up an ambush, what we call an L-shaped ambush. If you can visualize an "L" on the trail, the bottom part of the L crosses the trail so that it acts like a gate to stop me. (See drawing, p.48) The enemy soldiers on that part of the ambush would stop my advance and the long part of the L is along the side of the trail parallel to the trail and the long axis of my column and when they fired they would be able to shoot right into the sides of my soldiers and pretty neatly wipe us out. Because I anticipated an ambush, I had put guards out about fifty yards on each side of the flanks of my column going along the trail.

I walked with the point, with the scouts, at the very front of the column, so as to keep them alert and not be surprised. We were going through some fairly dense jungle. All of a sudden it came to a rather open, clear area where I expected the ambush would be because the enemy would be able to see us and have good fields of fire and yet there was a lot of underbrush and shrubbery that they could hide in, and that's where they were. As we were going through the thick jungle, before we got to the clearing, the flank guards had had a hard time of it and had fallen behind. In fact, they were so far behind they weren't going to do me any good as a warning. So I stopped the column on the trail just at the edge of the open area and I went back and walked over into the jungle and found the left flank guard. Divine Providence, if you will, it was a good thing that I walked over to the left guard first because if I had walked to the right flank guard, I would have walked right into the long part of the L ambush, as they were on the right-hand side of the trail ... 

In his letter to Marie dated Nov. 12, 1966, Parmly gives an extraordinary account of excitement and fury during four days of continuous close combat in the Plei Trap Valley. None of the other references contains the detail or the insight of this account. His letter contains a plethora of lessons about small-unit leadership in combat and some hint of his religious convictions.

Sat - 12 Nov

Marie Darling

Your hubby is one happy, relieved, and strong believing individual right now. I'm back at the Battalion Cp (Command Post) of the 1st Bn., 14th Infantry from the 3rd Bde/ 25th Div. During the last four days — 8-11 Nov — I've been in close continuous combat and really earned my CIB (Combat
Infantryman’s Badge). As I told you (or was it Mike) in my 7 Nov tape, I was taking a 3 Company Force of strikers into the Plei Trap area to work with Col. Miller’s Bde of the 4th Division (2nd Bde) and we really found Charlie. We engaged three separate North Vietnamese Regular Companies in five major engagements. With me were Maj. Buttermore, Capt. Berry, Capt. Casto, Sgts. Caro, Quigley, Lewis, Wyatt, Mitchell and Simmons and Bill Simpson.*

With the 3rd Mike Company on a separate operation were Capt. Sincere, Lt. Jacobelly and Sgt. Huff. Only Buttermore, Sincere and Berry were not wounded. Sgt. Mitchell was killed after being twice-before wounded in the same battle. Jacobelly got a bad gut shot and Simmons got a round in his leg that tore out his thigh bone. All the rest of us were only slightly wounded and weren’t evacuated, except I sent Quigley back because a wound was infecting, and Huff couldn’t walk well with an old wound so he went back.

Out of our 330 strikers, we’ve had 25 killed and 11 missing presumed dead, and 63 wounded. I had one Sgt. of an Artillery Liaison Team attached to me have an eye shot out. So far we’ve only counted 79** dead NVA and are sure of 4 wounded. We’ve captured 2 NVA and a whole mess of enemy weapons to include two anti-aircraft machine guns. I gunned down one NVA at about 40 yards range yesterday. I had just gone to the left flanking element as we approached what I thought might be a likely ambush site. The left flank security was lagging behind and I grabbed the lead man by the shirt and leg pulling him showed him where I wanted him to go and how fast. Suddenly an NVA soldier in khaki stood up about 3040 meters in front of me and in a crouching position was watching the head of the column on the trail and didn’t see me. (See drawing) I leveled on him with my M-16 Armalite and sprayed him with a 20-round burst. It got him — but more important it warned our entire force. Our people hit the ground and began firing before the NVA were ready. They would have sprung the ambush when our column reached the dotted arrow and would have probably slaughtered those on the trail. (Parmly’s letter contains a rough sketch of the ambush with his column’s progress marked by arrows; a dotted arrow marks the point in the column’s advance, the bottom of the “L,” at which the NVA troops intended to spring the ambush.) I rushed over to the command post group and Sgt. Lewis said branches were breaking all around me as the enemy tried to cut me down. Buttermore, Casto, his two radio operators Simmons and Mitchell, Lt. Mike LaPolla and his radio operator attached to me and the attached artillery team of Capt. Komornik, Lt. Fosdick and 4 Sgts. They were laying on the edge of the trail and I hunkered down at the head (south end) of the column and said to organize a perimeter with the radios in the center. I said (or my guardian angel said) I’ll get behind the tree with my pack acting as a shield on the trail side of me. I dropped into a prone position losing my cap in the process. When the grenade went off, I felt a pain of “bee-sting” sensation on my back and neck and then went on firing. Later, in our final perimeter I found a swelling on the small of my back (no broken skin) a small blood clot on the base of my skull at the back of my neck and this morning discovered a scabby sore on the left side of the top of my head. I just about as cheap a Purple Heart as anyone could get. Dave Casto was mad and stood up behind the anthill — when the NVA stood up with his arm cocked to throw the third grenade, Dave cut him in half with his M-16 and the grenade dropped beside the thrower and blew up harming only

* Bill only stayed 2 days and missed the L Shaped Ambush.
** The number keeps going up as more are found.

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Left: Parmly’s drawing of the Plei Trap ambush. This version, done some time later, shows considerably more detail than the one which he included in the letter to his wife.
the NVA if he were not already dead. I just then the aircraft (Gene Deatrick’s A-1Es) arrived. I had talked with a Capt. Partridge who was flying over us in a FAC OIE (L-19 Piper Cub). I said tell the CO of the 1st Air Command Squadron at Pleiku that his classmate was in deep s—t and to come to the rescue. Gene did.\(^{12}\) I told him to fire on anything more than 5 meters west of the trail and they swooped down at tree top level machine gunning, firing rockets and dropping napalm. They just kept circling and shaking the ground beside us so violently that we couldn’t talk clearly. But that saved us, although we didn’t realize it then.

Chuck Buttermore had hopped across the trail to my rear and was with LaPolla. We couldn’t chance dragging Simmons across. Everyone was tossing smoke grenades to them and was encircling us. I another NVA platoon had followed pinned down at their front plus envelop the enemy, that they were Company around our east flank to tried to bring the Plei Djereng out from Capt. Berry, who had have done us in for sure. I found a dead NVA soldier. Mortars would have mortars because I picked mortar before ever reaching us. Rounds would hit a tree over the trail because the trees and beyond our shots. He was in a position formed by felled leaves that had been felled but enough of them had been somewhat cleared.

It was a hilltop in the dense jungle to carry Simmons out, and left the PRC-64 behind. Both the 72 and 64 would be rich prizes for the enemy. They all finally made it into the dense tangle of jungle to the east. Sgt. Caro called to me and I swung south into his perimeter. He was too far away for hand grenades plus the foliage was too thick.

I didn’t describe the battlefield. It was a hilltop in the dense jungle that had been somewhat cleared. There were a lot of large trees that had been felled but enough of them were still there to make it impossible to fire mortars at us because the rounds would hit a tree over the mortar before ever reaching us. They had mortars because I picked up an 82mm mortar round beside a dead NVA soldier. Mortars would have done us in for sure. I found out from Capt. Berry, who had tried to bring the Plei Djereng Company around our east flank to envelop the enemy, that they were pinned down at their front plus another NVA platoon had followed them and was encircling them. I told Chuck to arrange to extract the wounded to the east and I was going to organize a perimeter where the Plei Djereng Company was. I decided to do this because the enemy would have to move out of their prepared positions to attack us there and I wanted to get away from the trail which was not only too hot but also pretty close to the air strikers. We had three PRC-25 radios, 1 PRC-72 and one PRC-64. Simmons had been carrying the PRC-72 and I didn’t want it or any of my belongings to be abandoned to the enemy. They’d have to get souvenirs off of me over my dead body (which at the time was no joke). I dashed across the trail, grabbed the 45-pound radio and Simmons’ pack (total about 70 pounds) and dragged it back across the trail into a thicket. It was too heavy to put on and Sgt. Lewis (who I didn’t know was on my side of the trail) came to help me. I put it on atop my pack — told Lewis to go back to cover the CP Group’s withdrawal and I took off through the dense tangle of jungle to the east. Sgt. Caro called to me and I swung south into his perimeter and began organizing a group to try to break out east to the stream. I told Mitchell to go with him and gave Sgt. Wyatt the PRC-72 to carry. Two of the PRC-25s had been shot up on the trail and Dave Casto dropped his pack without thinking to carry Simmons out, and left the PRC-64 behind. Both the 72 and 64 would be rich prizes for the enemy. They all finally made it into the perimeter and we told the planes to plaster the area on top of the hill and 100 meters east of the hill.

We heard a lot of shooting to our east and pretty soon Sgt. Caro’s group staggered into the perimeter. The road to the east was closed and we were completely surrounded. A quick count showed about forty-five missing, over a dozen wounded and Caro said Mitchell was badly hit and four strikers were still with him. I said get him and he went by himself back, picked Mitch up with the help of the strikers and rushed the fifty yards back. I was with Fosdick working the radio to get in artillery because the planes were running out of gas and ammo.

I could see Caro and Buttermore working over Mitch giving oral respiration and other techniques but he died. We figured we’d join him pretty soon.

The artillery started coming in at this time and “Fearless” Fosdick coolly and calmly “walked” it all around us. I talked to Col. Miller and others on the radio begging for a relief column and he said he’d do his best. He did. Just at sunset a company about 800 meters to our SE and another rifle company (C Co. on the SE and A Co. on the NE)\(^{13}\) landed at the landing zone, LZ Lane, and was coming from the NE. Everyone said “hold on” and I said “thanks for the advice.”

I am proud to say I was completely calm and resigned — so was everyone else. Even the strikers who were aware of the gravity of the situation seemed to say they’d sell their lives dearly. One squad rushed out to knock off an AK-47 and did it with grenades and an M-79 grenade launcher. The artillery was within 50-100 yards of us but we were not getting hurt and the firing was dying down. By this time four hours (an eternity) had passed since I’d killed the first man at p.m. (Parmly’s letter leaves this blank.) The enemy firing had died down, only our artillery was shattering the silence, the airplanes were gone, our perimeter was tight (only 50 meters in diameter), there was dense undergrowth that the enemy would have to nosily come through to reach us, a

Right: The first of two pages in Parmly’s diary recording the events of Nov. 10, 1966, the day of the Plei Trap ambush.

Took PSD get to LZ w/ Sungsun - Group ordered him to get out - I can

flag - sent report to NAF on HCM Trail - Gen. Walker, Col. Willen, Ltc

Kimbrell, and Metzler, in w/ C Co 1/14 (305) - LZ Brindels Sup

PH-118-LD arty FC Team VBC Fosback, Sgt - and others.

Infiltration 0745-0810, Plmn C Co (17) South & West on set side show

from LZ - PSD to CP South down HCM Trail - drive enemy from hill

South of stream where held up PSD yesterday (605 505) - Set up

concentration on hill (605 515) and 2 hrps (607 520) and (606 509) - Gene

Open 0 to all U.S. CID DCS - watch for ambushers at 3 con locations.

FC Team w/nig 1100 told on LZ alone - sent 2 gyus w/ Foliage -

net 1145 punct NVA slim units from N down trail - 1/15 NVA WIA,

2/CIDC (dock) 1/15 NVA drove down trail & LT (pos. rec. patrol
to check chopper activity for me in more or take us out) - (Now they know)

W/SCOW

1230 moved out from Pan Pts point w/ Butterwa and US-DUC Co

on E flank w/ WyGt, PSD put left flank w/ canco, PSD (C) w/ Berry for

rear security and reception force to E in event of contact. Passed

1st PGS w/ in evident. On approaching "dead man" hill became careful.

PSD got fall behind on left - wait over and got held down by

short-pulled after me for 300 - saw NVA in crowd watching column.

Exhert cut him down w/ 30's burst - rushed ford w/ Brens en my

tail - bullets riding all around - on ford but ground and

opened up - saw my ambush powered in all fire on front and

right. Couldn't find NVA body - Lewis said to get down quick -

joined CP group on trail - called for Berry to bring up reaction force

on left and swoop - called for FAC - from N-65 on trail - Randy, Simon,

Butterwa, Mitchell, Coats, LNO Party, FO Party, Sogolle on E side in

brush. I said "let's clean the trail" and dropped behind a tree

1315 made contact - 2/NVA KIA, 2/WIA - our only xof late 1330
dense canopy was overhead. Two companies were on the way (one with a surgeon brand-new in country) and night was falling rapidly. We wouldn’t carry our wounded out and have enough men to fight. We were tired — spent — and I said let’s stay put. Col. Miller advised breaking out in small groups, but I said we won’t leave a single wounded man and will only travel and fight as a unit. We heard that 30 men had retreated to LZ Lane, which pretty much accounted for everyone. We fired flares over our perimeter for 5 hours and the two companies arrived simultaneously at 12:15 (midnight). You could feel the drama in the air and those troops performed a Herculean effort coming through dense trackless jungle, full of enemy for all they knew, with only flares to guide on and our urging to keep them going. Those U.S. GIs were real pretty. They formed a circle around us 100 meters in diameter and found four dead NVA — that’s how close they were. All of us except Fosdick went to sleep. He kept artillery coming all night. I went to sleep at 0200 after the Doc assured me each man (including one of Fosdick’s radio operators who lost his right eye) was in the best shape possible and the two U.S. companies were dug in.

At sunrise I took a platoon up to the scene of the afternoon’s fight and we found a total of ten NVA bodies, our PRC-64, lots of packs and gear our troops had abandoned and one more dead striker. Our total count was 1 USSF KIA, 4 USSF MIA, 1 U.S. MIA, 4 CIDG KIA, 23 CIDG MIA, none missing. I’m proud of my men — U.S. and CIDG, and they are proud of me. Guess we’re kinda proud of each other. My guardian angel and your prayers were all working overtime — I even found time to rush through a fervent Rosary — and it all paid off. Thank you all. We spent another night, last night, on the hill to make a helicopter landing zone to extract the wounded. They all came out in dust offs yesterday evening and one rifle company stayed with me to increase our security. One of our ambushes last night got 3 NVA on the trail to the south and our ambush on the trail to the north (at 0430) reported enemy were slipping up on them. We pulled the ambushes in, plastered the area with artillery, and if they were planning an attack at dawn we discouraged ‘em. We found another dead NVA this morning and now we are all out.

You can thank your friend Col. Kelly (Col. Francis Kelly, commanding officer, 5th Special Forces Group). He sent me copious words of praise and congratulations through Bill Simpson and ordered me to never put myself in that kind of a dangerous situation again. I really think he didn’t want to lose me — not that way. So I’m rotating my three tired but valiant companies with another Mike Company and A Company from Plei Me. I will work back at Col. Miller’s Brigade Headquarters, Chuck Buttermore will stay with one U.S. battalion HQ. and Capt. Sincere the other. We’re not finished with the fight but that is it for that one hairraising phase.

Glad I can tell you about this in person. Happy to be back and alive you may be sure. I’m anxious to shave and bathe and find out if there’s any mail. Bye for now –

All My Love –
Lee

Brig. Gen. David A. Bramlett, currently commandant of cadets at West Point, has helped to explain the midnight relief operation of the encircled CIDG force in the Plei Trap. In November 1966, 1st Lt. Bramlett was the executive officer for Company C, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry in the Plei Trap Valley. When the L-shaped ambush was sprung prematurely by Parmly’s firing at the NVA captain, Company C was near enough to receive some spent rounds from the firefight. Capt. Audley M. Federline, the C Company commander, requested permission to move northwest across the stream to relieve the encircled CIDG force. One of our ambushes last night got 3 NVA on the trail to the south and our ambush on the trail to the north (at 0430) reported enemy were slipping up on them. We pulled the ambushes in, plastered the area with artillery, and if they were planning an attack at dawn we discouraged
for keeps, like players on both sides who know and accept the fact that some are going to be killed. This is a fatalistic but a very practical viewpoint, and most professional soldiers don’t worry about being wounded or killed. For attitude, you might say their heads are in the sand, but it’s kind of summed up in the belief that when your time is up, a bullet will come in that has your name on it and you’ll get it. Also, our training tells us that it is an honor to die fighting for your unit and for your country. ... You could say that all professional soldiers share this philosophy just like all professional football players accept the odds that they will sustain serious injury to their knees, shoulders, etc., as a price for playing pro ball.

I found it hard to order my men into situations where I knew that some would be killed. Wherever possible I went with them to share the dangers, and this way it eased my conscience a little bit about giving these orders. Being in the Special Forces, which was an all-volunteer unit of highly trained professionals, I had trouble keeping my men out of danger. In the Plei Trap operation where I was wounded, every one of my men begged me to take them with me when I went out (on the operation), and I had to turn down a lot of my soldiers who wanted to go. I could only take 12 of them. They knew it was going to be a good scrap and they wanted to be with me in it. Sergeant Mitchell ... begged me for the chance to go. He was returning to the States in a few weeks, after a year of duty as my radio chief, and he didn’t take his eyes off where I had been, and therefore he didn’t see me when I moved, and he was delivered into my hands. I’m not proud that I shot him. I wish I could have avoided doing it. But I didn’t do what I was trained to do. Now that I have confessed my feelings and gotten it off my conscience, I feel God has forgiven me, even though the North Vietnamese officer maybe hasn’t. I hope I never kill anyone again. And I hope none of you, in your class, Carolyn, will ever be expected to kill in a war or that any of you will take the life of another either by accident or on purpose.

Contemporary questions of spiritual conflicts with a soldier’s code were nothing new for Lee Parmly. For years he had studied Biblical references concerning warfare and soldiers. He gathered these findings in a “Christian Soldier” file. Below are some extracts from that material, used during one of his “Christian in the Military” seminars for cadets at West Point in March 1973.

“Does God intend that the Christian is to follow blindly, no matter
what the human institution's orders are? Absolutely not! And with such excellent credentials as...

“Peter & John who refused to stop speaking in the name of Jesus because God had commanded them to do this thing (Acts of the Apostles 4:11-20).

“Peter and the other apostles, who again refused to stop speaking in the name of Jesus because they felt they were obligated to obey God rather than man (Acts 5:29).

“Note that in the first example cited above, Peter and John did not claim exemption from man’s law, but only that they felt obligated to obey the ‘higher authority,’ and therefore it was up to the human institution to determine whether they were doing right or not. Verse 21 gives the outcome.

“Can we claim a higher authority as cause to disobey man’s laws? Yes, but we’d better be certain of our authority before doing so, and even then we must be prepared to suffer whatever consequences are forthcoming.”

This was followed in the Christian-soldier file by a discourse on killing an enemy in combat.

“The scriptures exhort us in many places not ‘to kill.’ Those places in the New Testament that do, and there are many, use the Greek word ‘phoneuo,’ which means ‘to murder,’ i.e., intentional premeditated killing (see Matthew 5:21; 23: 31 & 35; Romans 13:9; James 2:11, 4:2, 5:6 for some examples). A couple of other Greek words translated ‘to kill’ in the New Testament are ‘apokteino’ (put to death) and ‘thuo’ (to sacrifice).”

The crux of this, in Parmly’s mind, is that one can have concern for an enemy as a person, yet still put him to death as representing an instrument of an enemy government.

The authors do not intend to expose the readers to all the thought that Lee Parmly devoted to reconciling the fundamental dilemma between religious belief and violence. Suffice it to say that he devoted great energy to such reconciliation. In the final analysis, he was at peace with his profession, which exposed him to situations requiring difficult choices. His son, David says, “I’m certain that Dad wrestled with his conscience often after Vietnam but his solid spiritual foundation served him very well indeed. It is interesting to note that Dad’s diary makes special mention on days when he did not get to Mass, even at times of frantic activity.”

‘Dumb war’

Parmly’s frankness caused S.L.A. Marshall to describe him as one of the Army’s most outspoken officers.18 Consider the way in which he handled rebellious students of Johns Hopkins University while on ROTC duty in the early 1970s. With the war in Vietnam, draft-age college students were rioting. In uniform, Parmly would confront the Students for a Democratic Society as if they were West Point cadets at the opposite end of the political spectrum. He disarmed these angry students by his enthusiasm and sincerity. He describes one encounter for the history class:

“I once told a rioting bunch of college students that my personal and private thoughts of the Vietnam War were that it was a dumb war. Those were the words I used: dumb war. That remark was printed in the Baltimore and Washington newspapers and I got a call from the Pentagon asking me to explain why I made that derogatory remark on the way I thought of the war. I answered the Pentagon spokesman, that if he picked any war in history and picked either side of that war, that I could prove that as a means of solving the problems of that country that it was a dumb war to that side. He said nothing, and I never heard any more about the incident. War is hell. War is also stupid and unnecessary. If we would only love ourselves and each other as God loves us, there would be no more wars. There wouldn’t even be rumors of war.”

Lee Parmly was born, bred and trained to be a professional soldier, to give his life for his country, if necessary. When the chips were down that terrible night in the Plei Trap, when his small band of Montagnards and Special Forces soldiers were defending in a tight perimeter, he refused to break out as Colonel Miller advised. Better to be overrun and die as a unit than abandon the wounded who could not be carried on a breakout.

But there was one element of Lee’s character that was not taught in his West Point curriculum nor in service schools — his strong religious beliefs. He credited his guardian angel and the Holy Spirit for warning him to jump from the trail just before the AK-47 automatic rifle blasts filled the area where he was standing. In the thick of the Plei Trap battle, he even found time to “rush through a fervent rosary.” While in Southeast Asia he seemed to know the priest in every village or hamlet near his area of operation.

Record of service

His service to the church did not go unrecognized. On Nov. 7, 1966, in a ceremony at I Corps Headquarters in Pleiku, Father Sampson (later chief of chaplains), representing the Vatican, presented Parmly with the highly respected Benemerenti Award that, for the Roman Catholic faith, is comparable to the Distinguished Service Cross.

Parmly was driven by Christian compassion, yet he was every inch a soldier, as his record of service bears out. Love for his fellow man was Lee’s guiding principle. He never joined an organization or supported a cause just to be numbered as a member. He anxiously assumed leadership and took responsibility.

Active in scouting as a youth, Parmly contributed more than 30 years of leadership in the Boy Scouts of America, serving as a leader in 15 Scout, Explorer and Order of the Arrow units. He held the Vigil Honor of the Order of the

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had decided on the field of gerontological counseling psychology. The Parmlys da that would have led to a Ph.D. in the program at the University of Florida in 1982. Parmly had applied for a graduate fellowship at the University, Parmly had returned to Florida in 1982. Normally a man in this position would attract little attention among cadets and junior officers. Not so with him.

Those were trying times for the clergy at service academies. The Supreme Court would soon rule that compulsory chapel was unconstitutional. Parmly’s answer was to “turn on” the Corps and young officers by making religion interesting — even exciting, and the Parmlys had a substantial influence on the religious life of cadets and young officers and wives. Supporters flocked to Lee’s seminars on “The Christian in the Military.”

On one occasion he met with the Parish Council to attempt to change the conservative services at Most Holy Trinity, but to no avail. Services remained as rigid as the West Point toy that, according to cadet lore, “you wind up and it stands still for 150 years.”

After retiring from the Army, Lee and Marie volunteered as teachers of a religious course on marriage to high school seniors at St. Joseph’s Academy in St. Augustine, Fla. At the time of his death in 1977, Lee Parmly had applied for a graduate program at the University of Florida that would have led to a Ph.D. in counseling psychology. The Parmlys had decided on the field of gerontology, in which Marie later received a B.S. degree, to allow them to work with the large number of elderly persons in the environs of their retirement home in St. Augustine.

Lee Parmly’s final resting place is the West Point Cemetery, along with other comrades of the Long Gray Line. It is not surprising that Lee’s widow continues the spiritual work they had undertaken together. Marie has since spent years in Mexico assisting the poor as a Maryknoll lay missioner, not unlike Lee’s work with the Montagnards in their struggle for justice and peace.

In writing about Lee Parmly, the authors have chosen to emphasize his military service in Southeast Asia and his religious convictions to show how he was able to reconcile the two. His courage and dedication to the cause, even one he considered questionable, should serve as fertile ground for study by future military leaders.

Retired Army Col. Richard L. Gruenther was a West Point classmate of Lee Parmly’s. Colonel Gruenther served as a rifle company commander during the Korean War and as a brigade commander during Vietnam. In Vietnam he operated throughout much of the II Corps area, which was served by Parmly’s CIDG units.

David W. Parmly received a Regular Army ROTC commission from the University of Florida in 1982. He served as a cavalry platoon leader in Europe and as a tank company commander in the U.S. before resigning as a captain of Armor in 1990 to pursue a management career in the civilian world.

Notes:
1 “Eleazar Parmly IV to Carolyn West and Shelby Stanton, 3rd gradeway, 1977,” tape from the Parmly family collection.
4 Ibid., p. 22.
The shock waves generated by the skyjackings of the 1960s and the indelible images of the horrors of the Munich Massacre confronted both academics and policy makers with major challenges.

For the academic, there were the halting efforts to define and understand the underlying causes and dynamics of a form of violence that one pioneering authority aptly called “a new mode of conflict.” For the policy maker, there was the more pressing challenge of fashioning responses to the incidents of carnage that seized the world headlines and intimidated a global audience.

Since those early days, the state of the art in countering terrorism has been marked by the massive proliferation of books and periodicals that have made terror a field of academic specialization. In addition there is now a body of doctrine, policies and techniques which are directed at meeting terrorists’ threats and incidents. Yet, for all the activities in the halls of academia and the councils of state, it still remains to be seen if the international order now understands or can effectively deal with what has become an enduring challenge to a fragile and now profoundly changing international order.

The current state of open-source counterterrorism knowledge and capabilities is to a considerable degree represented in the four books reviewed in this article. Donald J. Hanle’s Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989) addresses recurrent and fundamental questions of where terrorism fits in the nature and dynamics of human conflict, while Maxwell Taylor’s The Terrorist (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988) examines terrorism from a psychological perspective.

In contrast to the primarily academic approach of the first two books, the remaining works are written by individuals who have combined their academic backgrounds with extensive operational experience in combating terrorism. Neil C. Livingstone’s The Cult of Counterterrorism (Lexington Books, 1990) provides an insider’s view of counterterrorism from an individual who has been a security consultant, while Robert Kupperman and Jeff Kamen’s Final Warning: Averting Disaster in the New Age of Terrorism (Doubleday, 1989) enables the reader to share insights on the future of terrorism from a scientist who has been involved in the formulation of counterterrorism policy and a journalist who has covered terrorist acts for the mass media.

Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare

Hanle’s book is the outgrowth of a thesis he wrote at the Naval Postgraduate School. The author initiates his analysis by surveying major doctrines, principles and elements associated with the study of war. The first half of the book is an
excellent overview of war's elements and principles. By drawing on the classic writings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and contemporary scholars, the author provides a good description of the nature and approaches to the study of warfare. The chapters may be slow going to the reader not versed in military affairs, but they could almost stand alone as a primer for the study of war in a basic class in national-security studies.

Chapter 3, “The Principles of War: Factors Governing the Use of Force in War,” provides the foundation for Hanle’s perspective on terrorism. He establishes three criteria for warfare: the use of lethal force for political objectives, the employment of force on a moral plane (the psychological and sociological objectives of conflict) and the employment of force against force (reciprocity).

Hanle then notes how technological change, particularly in reference to the coming of the nuclear age, has enhanced the importance of “social warfare”—with its emphasis on controlling a population through intimidation and other non-military measures. He therefore lays the foundation for an understanding of why and how unconventional warfare, and more specifically, terrorism, are employed as an alternative to the dangers of direct military confrontation by the superpowers.

In the ensuing chapters the author identifies three major types of terrorism: apolitical, which includes psychotic, criminal and criminal acts; revolutionary (also called repression terrorism), which involves the mobilization of the population, particularly in the context of revolutionary war; and state terrorism, where lethal force is used by the state to weaken the population’s will to resist. Under the latter heading, the author also discusses military terrorism, where terroristic force is used by military forces within “a targeted entity” and state-sponsored terrorism, where surrogate forces are used outside of the supported state.

In his conclusion, Hanle contends that revolutionary, military and state-sponsored terrorism qualify as forms of war which can be countered by the use of military forces applying the principles of war. His view that apolitical terrorism does not meet the criteria of warfare should be considered by policy makers who are now calling for the increased employment of military forces in the law-enforcement arena, particularly in regard to the “war” on drugs.

Terrorism: The Newest Face of War explores familiar material related to the continuing debate over the nature of terrorism and where it fits, particularly in reference to armed conflict. While he surveys well-traveled ground, Hanle provides a refreshing approach to the way in which military doctrine and principles can be used as one means of developing alternatives to combatting terrorism.

The Terrorist

Maxwell Taylor in TheTerrorist takes a “psychological perspective” in the study of terrorism. More specifically, the author employs an “essentially behavioral and descriptive approach to psychology... (which stresses) the importance of the consequences of our behavior in its development and expression” instead of using “more common approaches... which tend to assume that psychological manifestations of terrorism are ‘attributes’ of the individual.” (p. 12.)

In developing his approach, the author effectively indicates the difficulties of identifying common psychological attributes of terrorism. He takes the position that while terrorism “may perhaps be special in the mixes of attributes it displays, those attributes are not necessarily unique to terrorism — they are shared by other kinds of situations and events.” (p. 38.) Such a view should be of concern for those who wish to explain the behavior of terrorists based on psychological profiles and the concept of a terrorist “mindset.”

Taylor addresses the “social ambiguity” surrounding the identification of the major aspects of terrorism and indeed takes on the challenging and frustrating tasks of offering a definition of what he refers to as “terrorist action.” It is a lengthy definition which essentially restates characteristics that have commonly been associated with terrorism, namely “the use of violence, or the threat of violence by the terrorists to achieve political ends.” (p. 71.)

The author very effectively underscores the dangers of trying to categorize and therefore outwardly understand terrorism by simply viewing it as a form of abnormal behavior. While those who resort to terrorism may be defined as acting abnormally in the context of what he calls “a social definition,” behaviorally, the terrorists may be engaging in what can be regarded as rational acts based on their past experiences.

I would particularly recommend Chapter 5, “Fanaticism,” in which the author engages in a fruitful discussion of the importance of cross-cultural considerations. It helps to
underscore the fact that while the fanatic may be viewed as engaging in extreme behavior, such behavior may not be extreme if understood in the context of the culture in which he or she was brought up. Dr. Taylor, by drawing on existing literature and his own analysis, has indeed advanced our understanding of the psychological dimensions of terrorism.

The Cult of Counterterrorism

The Cult of Counterterrorism offers the reader quite a different approach in assessing contemporary responses to terrorism, with an emphasis on the experience of the United States. The book will be of interest to the general reader, for while it deals with an inherently serious topic, the author provides very readable insights into some of the unique characters and organizations that exist in the counterterrorism world.

The book will also interest those who specialize in the policy and operational aspects of counterterrorism, for they will be familiar with a number of the personalities and firms that are discussed. Livingstone, from his vantage point of being directly involved in the often-fragmented counterterrorism “community,” provides a colorful account of the cult of counterterrorism.

He initially shows how counterterrorism has become a very big business, inhabited by individuals and organizations who often have a vested interest in playing on the fears of terrorism as a means of generating income. More specifically, through his portrayal of what he calls “The Fear Industry,” Livingstone illustrates how highly diverse firms dealing with different aspects of counterterrorism are of uneven quality, ranging from the highly respected security services to the mercenary schools that play on the fantasies of would-be Rambos. The great variations in professional and ethical behavior within the fear industry serve to underscore the fact that there is a pressing need for more rigorous regulation of such firms on the state, local and national level.

Livingstone provides a real-life adventure story of one of the security services, Corporate Training Unlimited, and its rescue of a 7-year-old girl from Jordan. Doubtless there will be a made-for-television version of the story in the future.

For those who have an academic specialization in terrorism, Chapter 5, “Writing Terrorism to Death,” will be of particular interest. The author is a man of strong opinions and is not afraid to express them. He offers his view on the best writers in the field and then proceeds to note what he regards to be the 10 worst books on terrorism.

The reader will have to make his or her own judgment concerning Livingstone’s assessments. His discussion of the colorful career of Bob Brown, the publisher of Soldier of Fortune, illustrates how the counterterrorism/survivalist industry has become a very big business. The Omega Group, for example, which publishes Soldier Of Fortune and related publications, is “estimated to have a gross annual sale of $5 million.” (p. 207.)

In Chapter 7, “Oliver North’s Passionate War Against Terrorism,” the author shows what a “can-do” Marine lieutenant-colonel can do in the absence of a clearly defined policy, systematic implementation and the failure of the oversight process. While the legal ramifications of the Iran/Contra Affair are still to be resolved, one can agree with the following observations on North by the author. “He became a modern-day warlord, deftly manipulating the levers of power ... Whether one regards him as a dedicated patriot or a one-man wrecking crew, North clearly was a man of action, not of reflection, who had little patience for endless political debates concerning policy and nuance.” (p. 290.)

The Cult of Counterterrorism does not offer particularly innovative material to the field of terrorism studies, but it is a lively, entertaining and, at times, sobering chronicle of man’s foibles in this age of terrorism.

Final Warning

The last book, Final Warning: Averting Disaster in the New Age of Terrorism, offers a discussion of new and often highly innovative and technical terrorist threats that authorities will face in this new decade. The authors note that future terrorists will seek novel ways to attract a jaded media and public who have grown used to the conventional acts of skyjacking, bombings and hostage-taking. Perhaps even more ominous is the potential that these incidents will involve mass casualties as a result of the resort to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons against the social and political order.

Kupperman and Kamen make a particularly telling case for the emergence of what they refer to as “infrastructure terror attacks” which will assault the soft underbelly of technologically dependent societies through their grid systems, computers and other facilities.

In their wide-ranging assessment of future trends, they also contend that the Soviet Union, which has
been charged with supporting terror networks, will increasingly be faced with outbreaks of domestic terrorism fueled by ethnic conflict and other forms of violence now coming to the fore. The authors conclude that this will lead Moscow to seek further cooperation on antiterrorism measures with the United States.

After providing an assessment of the current threat, which includes the activities of various Islamic fundamentalist groups and continued Syrian involvement in state sponsorship, the authors make a telling case for the view that “under-trained, overstressed, and poorly managed antiterrorism programs in the United States and Western Europe... has made it easy for... terrorists to succeed.” (p. 69.) Certainly the tragedy of Pan Am 103 is a testament to that reality.

The authors then discuss “techno-terror” and portray a chilling Middle Eastern scenario of the use of nerve gas. They then assess the means of dealing with terror and, in contrast to Taylor’s military perspective, suggest that “effective law enforcement is an indispensable — perhaps the indispensable — tool in the counterterrorism arsenal of free society.” (p. 123.)

Kupperman and Kamen discuss the very familiar issues associated with what the media’s role and responsibilities should be in covering terrorism. Their interviews with such commentators as Tom Brokaw and Bernard Shaw illuminate the constant problems associated with attempting to reconcile the need for ethical behavior with the pressures involved in getting the story.

In the final section, after providing readers with parts of the transcript of a command-post exercise for dealing with a terrorist incident, the authors make a solid case for the use of simulations to train crisis managers and policy makers in dealing with present and future threats.

Final Warning can help to sensitize both the public and policy makers to a danger to the civil order that will not only continue but be subject to invidious innovation in the immediate future.

The four books reviewed here serve to underscore that we have come a long way in combating terrorism since the days of the 60s and the nadir of the Munich Massacre. But we must also recognize that terrorists have also “refined” their capabilities to engage in individual and mass destruction.

Hanle effectively addresses the continuing discussion on the nature of terrorism, Taylor provides insights on our growing knowledge of the psychology of terrorism, Livingstone gives us a very readable account of the current world of counterterrorism, and Kupperman and Kamen sound the warning of future threats and the need to develop effective responses. We have learned a great deal, but so have our adversaries. >_<

Stephen Sloan is a professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma. While on leave from the University, he headed a counterterrorist practice for a Washington, D.C., firm and was a senior research fellow at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Professor Sloan specializes in the areas of terrorism, low-intensity conflict and security administration.
Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

**SF officers to participate in Army Acquisition Corps**

The special-operations proponent, Maj. Gen. David J. Baratto, has decided that Special Forces officers will participate in the Army Acquisition Corps. This decision was based on the fact that the special-operations community has its own funds and budget, and Special Forces needs to become a key player in the Acquisition Corps, according to Maj. Jean-Luc Nash of the Special Operations Proponenty Office. The Special Forces force structure will include developmental, product-manager, program-manager and other leadership positions. These will range in rank from major to colonel and will exist at all major special-operations headquarters, especially USASOC. Public Law 98-525, Public Law 99-145, and the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act establish strict guidelines for education, training, experience and service requirements, and advanced civil schooling is an integral part of the training process. Although AAC officers are controlled by Army Acquisition Branch rather than Special Forces Branch, SF officers in the AAC will have a tremendous impact on the future of special operations by bringing their SF experience into the acquisition process, Nash said. The SWCS Directorate of Combat Developments is holding a board to recommend which positions to develop and identify within the special-operations force structure as AAC positions. The board will also recommend within which of the three AAC functional areas — FA 51 (Research, Development and Acquisition), FA 53 (Systems Automation Officer), and FA 97 (Contracting and Industrial Management) SF should participate. Volunteers in FA 51 and FA 53, if selected, will be accessed into the AAC in their eighth year of service. FA 51 and FA 53 officers who do not volunteer will remain FA 51 and FA 53 without the 4M (trainee) and 4Z AAC additional skill identifiers. A recent Army personnel change reduces FA 97 to one-third its present size and accesses those remaining officers into the AAC. Department of the Army is sending letters to FA 97 officers explaining the changes and reclassification procedures.

**Some FA 39 officers may not be competitive**

Dual-tracked FA 39 officers with two or more consecutive tours in their functional area may be considered “de facto” single-track officers by PERSCOM and picked up involuntarily for nominative assignments, according to the Special Operations Proponenty Office. This would prevent them from returning to a branch assignment and could make them non-competitive in their basic branch. Officers who fit this category should contact their basic branch or the PERSCOM FA 39 assignments officer.

**FA 53 has new areas of concentration**

New areas of concentration for Functional Area 53, Systems Automation Officer, are: 53A, Systems Automation Management; 53B, Systems Automation Engineering; 53C, Systems Automation Acquisition (Army Acquisition Corps); and 53X, Designated Systems Automation trainee. 53B will be a hard skill, encompassing software and hardware engineering. Officers in 53A will attend a 10-week course at the Computer Science School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., and will serve as consultants, staff officers, managers or commanders (in non-Officer Professional Management System commands).
Listed below are statistics which show how Special Forces warrant officers fared on the FY 91 CWO 3 promotion board compared to the Army as a whole:

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Promotion opportunities to CWO 3 remain excellent, and to CWO 4 even better, according to CWO 3 Bobby Shireman of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Shireman reminds warrant officers who will be eligible in FY 92 of the importance of updating their officer record briefs.

The SF Branch reminds officers that the two principal factors influencing officer assignments are Army requirements and the Officer Distribution Plan. ODP is the way that the Army matches assignments of the officer population against TOE and TDA authorizations. It determines how many officers by grade and specialty can be assigned to a given major command or installation. When an assignments officer says he can't assign a soldier to a particular post because it is over ODP, it means the post is projected to be balanced or over in that officer's grade and specialty. Other general assignment considerations include:

- Grade, career field, education and experience
- Professional-development needs of the officer
- Availability
- Policy considerations — PCS costs, stabilization and tour equity
- Officer's potential for advancement
- Officer's personal preferences or family considerations
- Date of projected command designated position list; location of command

These factors result in the following officer-assignment priorities:

Captains — New SF captains go immediately to detachment command for basic branch qualification; following ODA command, captains can expect 18-away-from-troops or functional-area assignments; some officers may attend advanced civil schooling to support functional-area development.

Majors (and promotable captains) — Resident command-and-staff college selectees go to those schools as soon as possible; maximum resident CSC graduates go to troops for branch qualification; many go to joint-duty assignments for early designation as joint-specialty officers or to functional-area assignments; some senior majors are positioned with troops before consideration for lieutenant-colonel battalion command.

Lieutenant colonels — Some command SF battalions; many will serve in joint-duty assignments or functional-area assignments.
The fiscal-year 1991 Special Forces Accession Board for year-group 1988 officers met Sept. 23-25 to select officer volunteers to begin Special Forces training. Acceptance of further applicants will be limited to those needed to round out the year-group's goal. No further applications for rebranching from YG 84 have been accepted since March 1991, and YG 85 closed Sept. 1, 1991, according to Maj. Jean-Luc Nash of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Nash encourages applicants for rebranching to submit their applications in their third or fourth year of service. The accession board occurs in their fourth year of service. Officers will be considered for major in their ninth year, and there is a limited time for Special Forces Assessment and Selection, the Special Forces Qualification Course, language training, officer advanced course, 12-18 months' service as an SF detachment commander, CAS, and functional-area training, Nash said.


The following list may help officers who need to contact PERSCOM about promotions, assignments or professional development:

**SF Officer Branch**
- Col. Kavin L. Coughenour, Branch Chief, DSN 221-3173, comm. (703) 325-3173
- Maj. Charles T. Cleveland, Field Grade Assignments, DSN 221-3169, comm. (703) 325-3169
- Maj. Hector E. Pagan, Company Grade Assignments, DSN 221-3175, comm. (703) 325-3175
- Capt. Christopher Perkins, Prof. Development, Accessions, DSN 221-3178, comm. (703) 325-3178

**Officer Functional Area 39**
- Capt. (P) Russ Medina, FA 39 Assignments Manager, DSN 221-3115, comm. (703) 325-3115

**Warrant Officers**
- CWO 4 John McGuire, WO Assignments Manager, DSN 221-7841, comm. (703) 325-7841

Mailing address: U.S. PERSCOM; Attn: TAPC-ope-SF (for SF officers), TAPC-OPB-A (for FA39), TAPC-OPW-II (for WO); 200 Stovall St.; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414 (SF), -0411 (FA 39), -0400 (WO).
**Enlisted Career Notes**

**Special Warfare**

**CMF 18 soldiers to receive additional promotion points**

Soldiers in Career Management Field 18 will now receive up to 60 promotion points for completion of the Special Forces Qualification Course/SF Basic NCO Course. (SF BNCOC is taught as part of the SFQC.) The additional points can be used to compete for promotion beginning April 1, 1992; there will be no retroactive promotions based on the new policy, according to Sgt. Maj. Bill Frisbie of the SWCS Special Operations Propensity Office. Local personnel service centers will add points according to a formula in PERSCOM message 121500Z Dec 91 and notify soldiers of their new scores. For further information contact Sgt. Maj. Bill Frisbie at DSN 239-9002/2415, commercial (919) 432-9002/2415.

**PERSCOM, ARPERCEN offices can answer soldiers’ questions**

SF soldiers in grades E-6 through E-8 who have questions or comments about professional development or assignments should contact Capt. (P) Jeffrey Waddell or MSgt. Thomas Rupert at PERSCOM’s Enlisted Management Directorate. Address correspondence to: Commander; PERSCOM; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452. Phone AV 221-8340, commercial (202) 325-8340. Army Reserve SF enlisted soldiers should contact SFC Ron Williamson at the Army Reserve Personnel Center. Address correspondence to: Commander, ARPERCEN; Attn: DEAR-EPA-SF; 9700 Page Blvd.; St. Louis, MO 63132. Phone DSN 892-2223, commercial (314) 538-2223, toll-free 1-800-325-4743.

**SF ANCOC to run three classes in 1992**

The Special Forces Advanced NCO Course is scheduled to run three classes in 1992: Class 01-92 — Jan. 6-April 2; Class 02-92 — May 4-July 28; and Class 03-92 — Sept. 8-Dec. 4. Soldiers should plan to report one day prior to the class start date. The 12-week course is divided into three phases: common leadership training, SF MOS-specific skills and SF common skills. Soldiers may attend either TDY or TDY in conjunction with a PCS move. To be eligible, soldiers must have a secret security clearance and have graduated from the Basic NCO Course. For more information, contact the SF Enlisted Management Directorate at PERSCOM, DSN 221-5497, commercial (202) 325-5497, or the Enlisted Training Branch, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS, DSN 239-5000, commercial (919) 432-5000.

**PSYOP BNCOC scheduled for March 1992**

The SWCS NCO Academy is scheduled to run the Psychological Operations Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course March 23-April 29, 1992. Students should report one day prior to the starting date for inprocessing. PSYOP BNCOC is five weeks, three days long and is conducted once per year. It emphasizes PSYOP-related subjects, intelligence functions and common-core leadership tasks. The Army Personnel Command nominates the best-qualified soldiers to attend training, and unit commanders have the option to approve, substitute for, or defer a candidate. For further information contact MSgt. Phil Snyder, SWCS Special Operations Propensity Office, at DSN 239-6406, commercial (919) 432-6406.

March 1992
For three decades, spokesmen for the now-former Soviet Union reserved some of their harshest condemnations of Western military establishments for U.S. Army special-operations forces. Recently, however, some Soviet commentary on U.S. SOF has been clearly complimentary. One author expressed admiration for the “professional efficiency” of U.S. SOF in Just Cause, and suggested that the Soviets might “borrow” from the U.S. experience of fielding and employing a spectrum of light and special-operations forces — but for use in internal-security and stability actions. In discussing Soviet military spetsnaz training and activities in late 1990, the article said that spetsnaz groups studied the U.S. effort to rescue American hostages in Tehran, concluding: “the operation of the U.S. reconnaissance service ... was prepared for in a quite well-thought-out and thorough manner – it was broken off purely because of events.” The author said that Soviet spetsnaz treat U.S. SOF with neither arrogance nor uncritical approval, noting, “Professionals respect professionals.” These assessments, stripped of ideological condemnations that characterized much of earlier reporting, highlight an intention to assess, and possibly draw on, U.S. special-operations experience as members of the commonwealth restructure their own military and security forces.

A December 1990 interview with the commander of the Polish Capital Police Command Counterterrorist Division highlighted that unit’s missions and training. According to the commander, the unit is charged with countering both criminal and political violence. The unit has been involved in protecting Polish and visiting foreign leaders; countering hijackings and hostage situations; and giving unspecified kinds of assistance in natural disasters. Unit training includes parachute, alpine, diving and skiing programs; as well as armed and unarmed combat, including sniper skills. Some members of the unit are said to be military reservists assigned to the 6th Assault Landing Brigade, an elite Polish airborne/air-assault unit.

Recent Soviet commentary favorable to U.S. Army special-operations forces

New aspects of illegal arms trafficking in former USSR

The acquisition of illegal arms by “terrorist” groups within the former USSR has become a major problem for military and security forces charged with controlling interethnic and national conflicts and responding to violence of all types. For several years, weapons have been stolen from military and security-force warehouses, illegally purchased from soldiers and police, and seized by nationalist or criminal groups in armed attacks on isolated garrisons. As a result, thousands of assault rifles and machine guns, as well as mortars, grenade launchers and other weapons, have found their way into illegal groups of various types. In March 1991, a military spokesman from the Soviet Main Missile and Artillery Directorate pointed to an alarming new development — the production of assault rifles and pistols in clandestine shops. According to the Soviet officer, recovered weapons produced in these shops are of high quality and clearly turned out by skilled specialists. Some models even included inscribed serial numbers, underscoring the increasingly organized nature of weapons production.
Military establishments of former Warsaw Pact member-states have begun to examine war-fighting approaches that depart from the Soviet-Warsaw Pact coalition model. A 1990 article in a Polish military journal noted that future battlefields would see units operating in isolation, and it discussed the prospect that such units could become encircled. Under those circumstances, the author noted, if "there is no communication from the superior, the subunit has not received another mission, and there is not a chance of breaking through to its own troops, then the subunit should transition to battle in the form of partisan or special actions." This statement suggests that at least some Polish military theorists may be considering unconventional war-fighting approaches under some circumstances. Polish armed forces are being reduced sharply in size, with some units redeployed eastward. The emergence of some kind of "people's war" concept to deter a larger and more powerful neighbor would be an intriguing dimension to evolving military posture.

With a drug-cultivation problem in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union that evokes comparisons with Colombia, 1991 reports indicate that Ministry of Internal Affairs Militia Detachments of Special Designation, or OMON, are being employed in drug-eradication efforts. OMON units gained notoriety for their repressive and lethal activities in the Baltic republics and are based in many other republic areas. Created to deal with terrorist incidents, serious criminal activities and the "maintenance of public order," they are organized like SWAT teams or light infantry, depending on their roles. With rapidly increasing poppy and marijuana cultivation, the continuing problem of wild and cultivated hemp, and the growing phenomenon of armed traffickers, at least some Central Asian republics are now using OMON forces. In Tajikistan, for example, OMON elements are delivered by helicopter to "plantations." OMON forces destroy the crops manually, break down fences around the plots and destroy homemade watering systems. The loosening control of central authorities, the desperate need for hard currency and the move to a market economy are expected to result in an explosion of narcotics problems. As a consequence, "Soviet" or republic counternarcotics efforts may acquire an increasingly militarized character.

The Public Security and National Defense Council, or CONASEPUDEN, headed by former Noriega minister Menalco Solis, plans to train and add 300 new members to the 600-man Presidential Protection Services. The new personnel will be equipped from an arms inventory that includes RPG-18 and Light Anti-Tank Weapon rocket launchers, Galil and M-16 rifles, Uzi and Ingram submachine guns, M-60 machine guns, many crates of fragmentation grenades and other small arms. CONASEPUDEN is a relatively new organization which was created and organized in response to Cabinet decrees issued in 1990 and 1991. According to Panamanian reporting, many community members are apprehensive about CONASEPUDEN and its militarized and investigative components, fearing that they could become partisan paramilitary groups such as those that existed in the past.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
SOF units under new commanders

Two special-operations organizations at Fort Bragg have recently received new commanders.


General Downing was formerly commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, also based at Fort Bragg. He has served as commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, deputy commanding general of the 1st Special Operations Command and director of the U.S. Special Operations Command’s Washington, D.C., office.


USASOC, with a strength of 27,000, is made up of soldiers from both active and reserve forces and is the Army component of the U.S. Special Operations Command, based at MacDill AFB, Fla. It provides Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers to support U.S. theater commanders worldwide.


General Shachnow was formerly the commander of the Army's Berlin Brigade. He has held a variety of Special Forces assignments and had last served at Fort Bragg as chief of staff and deputy commanding general of the 1st Special Operations Command.

General Guest’s new assignment is as director of operations for the U.S. Special Operations Command.

The Army Special Forces Command, 9,500 strong, is made up of active and reserve Special Forces groups and support units. The command was established in November 1990 as part of a functional realignment of forces assigned to the Army Special Operations Command.

3rd Special Forces Group flash

3rd SF Group activates 2nd Battalion

The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group was activated during ceremonies at Fort Bragg Nov. 1.

The new battalion is commanded by Lt. Col. Robert M. Bailey; its command sergeant major is CSM Clinton R. Davis.

Originally activated at Fort Bragg in 1963, the 3rd SF Group was deactivated in December 1969. Reactivated in June 1990, it now consists of a headquarters and two battalions, with a third battalion scheduled for activation in 1992. The group will number approximately 1,400 soldiers when fully manned, according to Maj. Craig Barta, public affairs officer for the Army Special Forces Command.

USASOC names soldier, NCO of the year

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command recently announced its selections for soldier and NCO of the year following competition held at Fort Bragg.

Sgt. Michael E. Nesbitt, 3rd Ranger Battalion, Fort Benning, Ga., and Spec. Michael J. Russell, 1st Ranger Battalion, Hunter Army Airfield, Ga., took top honors as NCO and soldier, respectively.

Runners-up were Sgt. Anthony D. Hardie and Spec. Sean M. Summers, both of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command’s 4th PSYOP Group.

Also competing for NCO and soldier honors were SSgt. John Gard and Cpl. Allen Davis of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Cpl. Dennis Keller and Spec. Karl Campbell of the Army Special Forces Command, and SSgt. Shawn Jones and Spec. Ronald Kitchens of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Ky. Each of the contestants in the USA-SOC competition had previously been chosen soldier or NCO of the year within their own commands.

SF Command opens Center for Special Ops Law

The Army Special Forces Command has announced the opening of a new facility designed to serve as a legal and doctrinal database for Special Forces soldiers.

The Center for Special Opera-

USARC is temporarily located at Fort McPherson, Ga., on the southern edge of Atlanta, and will likely move into leased facilities in the Atlanta area as it grows toward its full strength of some 700 military and civilians, Brumfield said.

Army closes post at Bad Tölz

Flint Kaserne in Bad Tölz, Germany, long the home of the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, closed July 15, 1991, in a ceremony attended by hundreds of local residents, soldiers and former members of its military community.

During the ceremony, eight Special Forces soldiers parachuted in with the official orders closing the post. Speaking to those in attendance, Maj. Gen. Eugene L. Daniel, deputy commander of the U.S. Army VII Corps, said the closure was not an occasion for sadness but a reason to rejoice, since it resulted from the end of the Cold War.

Also addressing the crowd was retired Col. Aaron Bank, 88, who activated the 10th SF Group, the first Special Forces unit, at Fort Bragg in 1952 and was commander of the 10th when it moved to Bad Tölz in 1953.

“Special Forces men (are) now and always will be a special breed of men — daring soldiers who will accept calculated risks, risks that go beyond the normal call of duty,” Bank said.

The 10th Group was headquartered at Bad Tölz until 1968, when it moved to Fort Devens, Mass., leaving a battalion-sized element deployed at Bad Tölz.

The 1/10th remains in Germany, stationed at Panzer Kaserne in Boblingen, a suburb of Stuttgart.

(As reported by Joseph Owen, European Stars and Stripes – Ed.)

CA units, SWCS to develop mission training plans

The Special Warfare Center and School and Civil Affairs field units are working to develop nine new mission-training plans to reflect upcoming changes in CA unit organization and force structure.

In 1992, new tables of organization and equipment for Civil Affairs will modify unit structure to support a wider range of missions. For-
Delta seeks recruits

The 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta is currently recruiting worldwide for soldiers to plan and conduct a broad range of special operations. Delta is the U.S. Army's special-operations unit organized for the conduct of missions requiring a rapid response with surgical application of a variety of skills. Because of this, Delta's soldiers are carefully selected and specially trained.

Delta affords officers and NCOs unique opportunities for professional development. Both undergo the same assessment, selection and training and, after training, are assigned to operational positions within the unit. Training and experience gained while in Delta are much in demand, and soldiers will enjoy expanded assignment opportunities.

Officers may command at the captain, major and lieutenant-colonel levels and serve as executive and operations officers. There are also staff positions at DoD, JSOC, DA, USASOC, USSOCOM and other joint headquarters, as well as interagency postings, which will be available to officers because of their training and experience.

NCOs have leadership opportunities in the unit through sergeant major. There are also opportunities to serve on senior staffs as the resident expert and adviser on unique special operations. In addition to exceptional training, NCOs have increased levels of responsibility and sufficient authority to complete their assigned missions. They routinely operate throughout the world alone or in small, NCO-led teams.

Delta conducts worldwide recruiting twice a year prior to its fall and spring assessment-and-selection courses. Recruiting for the fall course begins in Europe in March. All other locations are recruited from April-July. Recruiting for the spring course begins in Europe in September and other locations from October-January. Call Delta's recruiters at the numbers listed below for specific information on the next recruiting drive.

General prerequisites (officer and NCO) are:
- Volunteer
- Army active-duty, Reserve or National Guard (Reserve and National Guard must meet eligibility requirements for entry onto active duty).
- Male
- U.S. citizen
- Pass a HALO/SCUBA physical and eye examination
- No limiting physical profile
- Airborne-qualified or volunteer for airborne training
- Pass a background security investigation and have at least a secret clearance
- Minimum age of 22
- No history of recurring disciplinary action
- Pass the five-event physical-fitness qualification test (inverted crawl; run, dodge and jump; push-up; sit-up; and two-mile run) and 100-meter swim, all while wearing fatigues (or BDUs) and boots. NCO prerequisites are:
  - Rank of sergeant (E-5) thru sergeant first class (E-7)
  - Four years’ minimum time in service
  - Passing SQT score in primary MOS (MOS immaterial)
  - Minimum GT score of 110
  - Two years’ active service remaining upon selection.

Officer prerequisites are:
- Captain or major (branch immaterial)
- Advanced-course graduate
- College graduate (BA or BS)
- Minimum of 12 months’ successful command (company, battery, troop, Special Forces A-detachment, or aviation platoon). For information on the unit, its
prerequisites and training, call Delta recruiters at DSN 236-0689/0649 or call collect on the commercial line, (919) 396-0689/0649.

Delta is also interested in the following MOSs in a support role: 18D3P/4P, 33T3P/4P, 43E3P, 55R3P, 63B3P, 71L3P, 75D3P and 96B4P/5P. For information on support prerequisites and assignment opportunities, call Delta's support recruiter, MSgt. Fred Johnson, at DSN 236-0960/0610, or call collect on the commercial line, (919) 396-0960/0610.

USAR linguist unit looking for new members

The First U.S. Army Reserve Linguist Unit is looking for members who want to practice their language skills and improve their proficiency.

The unit is a non-pay reinforcement training unit whose members drill for retirement points. It is open to language-qualified Army Reservists of all ranks and specialties. Reservists who are members of troop program units are not eligible unless they transfer into the Individual Ready Reserve or become Individual Mobilization Augmentees.

Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the unit has detachments in Columbia, S.C.; Houston, Texas; San Diego, Calif.; Fort Meade, Md.; Norfolk, Va.; Pittsburgh, Pa. and New York City.

For information write: First U.S. Army Reserve Linguist Unit (RTU); c/o Defense Language Institute; 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 507; Arlington, VA 22202-4306.

SF MQS manuals delayed

SF Branch manuals for the Military Qualification Standards System Level II were delayed in printing but have now been distributed.

The original SF manuals were returned for reprint, according to Carol Bushong of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Individual Training Division. Once reprinted, they were mailed, along with the Infantry Branch manual, to each company-grade officer in Special Forces. The manuals were mailed in January; officers who have not received them should contact Carol Bushong at DSN 239-9802, commercial (919) 432-9802.

OSS records open at National Archives

The National Archives has now opened the bulk of its records dealing with the Office of Strategic Services to public examination and research.

The OSS, forerunner to both the Central Intelligence Agency and Army Special Forces, was a World War II organization which conducted intelligence analysis and special

operations. Its records include correspondence, reports, maps, photographs, film footage and captured propaganda.

The most recent addition to the records consists of more than 3,000 cubic feet of declassified material acquired from the CIA since 1980. For more than a decade, the National Archives has worked to declassify, arrange, describe and index the materials, said Lawrence McDonald, a projects archivist at the National Archives. Earlier Archives OSS holdings consisted of approximately 1,000 cubic feet of records received from the State Department after World War II and opened to the public in 1976.

Materials from the CIA records have been gradually made available as work on them was completed. Only a few hundred cubic feet of records remain to be added, and the opened records now amount to nearly 5,000 cubic feet, enough to fill a large house, McDonald said.

While the Archives expects that the records will be used mainly by historians and researchers, the collection is open to anyone who requests access. The OSS records are currently receiving some of the heaviest reference of all the holdings in the National Archives, McDonald said.

The value of the records lies in their comprehensive nature, said McDonald, who has worked with the records since 1985. “Because OSS intelligence collection and analysis covered every theater, the records are a précis of the war. If you somehow lost all the other records of the Second World War, you could still write a pretty good history from these records.”

President Franklin Roosevelt established the OSS in June 1942 from the Office of Coordinator of Information, formed a year earlier to collect intelligence related to national security. OSS retained COI’s leader, William Donovan, and expanded to perform a number of activities, including espionage and counterespionage, propaganda development, and covert-action operations behind enemy lines. These covert operations included the Jedburgh mission, which sent three-man teams into France, Belgium and Holland to organize guerrilla operations against the Germans, and Detachments 101 and 202, which organized native guerrilla forces against the Japanese in Asia.

From OSS intelligence operations came the experienced personnel needed to form the CIA in 1947, and from its guerrilla-warfare operations came the Army’s Special Forces, formed in 1952.

Immediately following the war,
President Truman disbanded the OSS, and its records went either to the Department of State or to the War Department’s Strategic Studies Unit, a small cell of OSS veterans which later formed the nucleus for the CIA.

Records acquired by the State Department were primarily those from the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, which collected information and produced analysis on a wide variety of subjects, McDonald said. The bulk of the records, including those dealing with intelligence, covert operations and propaganda development, became part of the CIA’s OSS archive and were not available for public examination until after they were transferred to the National Archives in 1980.

**Special Forces Ball to be held in April**

The Special Forces Ball is scheduled to be held April 10 in Fayetteville, N.C., to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Special Forces Branch.

The ball, open to all past and present SF officers, warrant officers and enlisted soldiers, will be held at the Howard Johnson Convention Center. Time and cost are to be announced. For further information, contact SFC Ette Zimmer at DSN 239-1717, commercial (919) 432-1717, or Maj. Jean-Luc Nash at DSN 239-9002, commercial (919) 432-9009.

**PSYOP course offers option for FA 39 training**

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has recently endorsed the U.S. Army School of the Americas’ Psychological Operations Course, providing an additional training opportunity for soldiers in special operations.

Officers in Functional Area 39B (PSYOP) with a regional orientation toward Latin America may now take the SOA PSYOP Course as a full-credit alternative to the six-week SWCS PSYOP Course in attaining 39B qualification.

Even though its content is the same, the SOA course is longer — 11 weeks compared to six — because of additional practical exercises, according to Maj. Jose Martinez, FA 39 manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. But the SOA course offers soldiers the opportunity to improve language skills, heighten cultural awareness and establish personal relationships with the future military leaders of Latin America.


The SWCS has also requested that SOA develop a Civil Affairs Course based on the SWCS Civil Affairs Course. This course could provide a similar training opportunity for officers in FA 39C (CA). SOA is currently analyzing Latin American demand for the course, Martinez said.

For more information on FA 39 training, contact the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office at DSN 239-6406, commercial (919) 432-6406. For specific information on the SOA PSYOP Course, contact SOA Directorate of Training and Doctrine, DSN 835-1914, commercial (404) 689-1914.

**New equipment will improve SOF infil/exfil capabilities**

Three equipment projects currently under development at the Special Warfare Center and School will greatly improve infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special-operations forces.

The Fast Rope Insertion/Extraction System will allow soldiers to infiltrate and to be extracted from landing zones which are not suited for helicopter-landing operations.

The FRIES consists of a 1 3/4-inch polyester-fiber rope with a loop at one end for attachment to a mounting bracket inside the helicopter. During fast-rope, soldiers slide down the rope — a method which is faster than rappelling. The lower end of the rope has six bridle loops to which soldiers can attach vests which they wear for extraction by stabilized-body operations. STABO vests are included with the system, but they are the same as vests currently in use for STABO, according to Capt. Samuel Young, chief of the Infil/Exfil Branch of the SWCS Directorate of Combat Developments.

The rope comes in lengths from 60-120 feet. It must be strong enough to support the weight of six men and their equipment and is designed to have a tensile strength of 35,000 pounds, Young said.

The extraction capability of FRIES is currently restricted to specially modified MH-60s and MH-47s which have an I-shaped mounting bracket. The H-shaped mounting brackets still found on some helicopters could fail during extraction operations with FRIES, Young said, and units will not be able to use FRIES for extraction on those helicopters until modifications have been made.

FRIES is planned to be issued to SF and Ranger units at the rate of 80 per group and 45 per Ranger regiment. Fielding of FRIES will be delayed until after the revision of
The system consists of two 370-square-foot parachutes and an adjustable harness. Both parachutes are ripcord-activated, and the reserve may also be deployed by a jet-tisoned main parachute. The harness will also accommodate an automatic opening device and an oxygen system.

Both canopies are capable of supporting a 360-pound rigid weight (jumper plus equipment). The MC-4 was designed and tested for use at altitudes between 2,000 and 25,000 feet. Its higher opening altitudes give it a greater lateral-transverse capability than the current MT1-XX free-fall parachute system, Young said.

The system has been under development since 1983 and has undergone changes in requirements, testing and numerous modifications, Young said. It has now been type-classified in the Army supply system. Fielding of the MC-4 will begin as soon as final approval of its technical manual has been granted, probably during March 1992.

Once the system has been fielded, soldiers who have suggestions for modifications to the MC-4, or for any infiltration, exfiltration or resupply items, should forward suggestions through their chain of command to Commander, US Army Special Forces Command; Attn: AOJK-CD-ML. For further information contact Capt. Samuel Young at DSN 239-9901/1816, commercial (919) 432-9901/1816.

**SWCS publishing new SF Soldier’s Manuals**

The Special Warfare Center and School is publishing a new series of soldier’s manuals to assist Special Forces NCOs and officers.

Several new soldier’s manuals have already been published recently by the SWCS:
- STP 31-18B3/4-SM-TG, SF Weapons Sergeant, October 90
- STP 31-18C3/4-SM-TG, SF Engineer Sergeant, October 90
- STP 31-18E3/4-SM-TG, SF Communications Sergeant, October 90
- STP 31-18F4-SM-TG, SF Assistant O&I Sergeant, June 91
- STP 31-18I1-MOS, SF Company Grade Officer’s Manual, July 91

A new edition of the SF basic tasks manual was published in September, and a new soldier’s manual for SF medical sergeants is scheduled to be published in late 1992, according to MSgt. J. John K. Thomas of the Individual Training Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

Even though ITD develops the soldier’s manuals and maintains some copies for review and reference, it does not stock copies for distribution, Thomas said. Army AG publications centers automatically send copies to all units which have publications accounts with an established requirement for those manuals.

Unit publications officers should establish requirements for soldier’s manuals for each MOS in the unit, Thomas said, to ensure that they receive new and revised editions as they are published. In the back of every soldier’s manual is a reference section listing manuals relevant to the MOS. ITD recommends units make lists of required manuals from this reference section (including number of copies required) and add them to their unit’s publications requirements. Supplies of manuals can be ordered from the Baltimore Publications Center using DA Form 4569. For more information on publications accounts, refer to DA Pam 310-10, The Standard Publication System: Users Guide.
Book Reviews

Armies in Low Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis.

Low-intensity conflict is generally considered to be the major topic for study by today’s Army. Even those formerly obsessed with the “Fulda Gap” mentality now concede the necessity of studying and reacting appropriately to LIC situations. The near-universal acceptance of LIC makes this book important for our study.

The book’s organization is appropriate. The editors introduce the subject and define terms, providing a common foundation from which the reader can later make more valid comparisons. Next, different authors analyze in turn the American, Israeli, French, Canadian and British experiences in LIC. While the writing styles of the authors are somewhat diverse, they share a heavy academic flavor and a strong emphasis on history. Potential readers should not be put off by the style— for the most part, it maintains its readability.

Scholarship is one of the book’s strongest points: it is of a very high quality throughout. The data is mostly historical, but some modern statistics have been gathered with care and determination.

The Canadian chapter looks deeply at “peacekeeping” operations. The Canadians are experts at this, and the chapter is quite instructional.

The final major chapter looks at British operations in Northern Ireland, which are of a particular interest. The British policy of pre-emptive strikes against terrorists identifies a key issue, “When do we strike pre-emptively?” Americans will not like pre-emptive operations, no matter how deeply Congress directs that the military involve itself in the drug war. For this reason, the British experience could be a big help.

This book is neither great nor simple; it is truly intellectually challenging. It comes recommended with the qualification that the reader must have some appreciation of history and policy to attempt to fully understand the important analysis within. Serious students of LIC should read it, as should “layman” soldiers. LIC is here to stay, and it behooves us to learn from the mistakes of our predecessors.

Maj. Steven P. Bucci
7th SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.


Mates and Muchachos is an important analysis of the concept of military cohesion. The book should be read as a modern accompaniment to S.L.A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire. Stewart researched the issue well, using both Argentine and British sources. The book is written in a straightforward style and is well-organized, with each chapter reinforcing the next.

Stewart’s research shows that the experience of both the British and Argentine armed forces in the Falklands War reinforces lessons on military cohesion from previous conflicts. Additionally, Stewart describes military cohesion as multi-
dimensional bonding; made up of horizontal (peer) bonding, vertical (leadership) bonding, organizational (institutional) bonding and societal (civic) bonding. Stewart stresses that soldiers need to form bonds at each level. Interviews with veterans of both sides strengthen her arguments supporting the importance of all the dimensions of military cohesion.

Of particular importance is the dimension of organizational bonding. The author credits much of the British success in the Falklands War to the British regimental system, which is built upon tradition, pride and honor. British Marines and members of the Para and Guards Regiments fought hard, because they felt the honor of the regiment was at stake. The author quotes one British colonel as saying, “In the Second World War we marched from Normandy to Berlin. We can bloody well march 80 miles to Stanley.” Stewart contrasts this system to the organization of the Argentine Army, largely made up of one-year conscripts.

Unfortunately, Stewart’s argument supporting societal bonding is unsound. She correctly shows how culture, societal values and the defense budget all contribute to combat effectiveness. However, she weakens her argument by launching into training, doctrine and tactics. These topics, while relevant, do not belong in an argument supporting societal bonding. Additionally, the book could use a good proofreading by someone more familiar with military organization and terminology. Passages such as “two battalions per artillery battalion,” and “The 3rd Artillery Infantry Brigade,” detract from the author’s arguments and overall credibility. Furthermore, the author makes use of erroneous data from military history on several occasions. For example, in one passage discussing the burden of command, she uses the case of “Lee at Vicksburg” to support her argument. In fact, Lee was 1,500 miles away from Vicksburg at a place called Gettysburg. But, despite the error, she makes her point.

Despite its flaws, Mates and Muchachos is an excellent study on why soldiers fight. Understanding soldiers is crucial to all leaders, and this book is recommended.

Capt. Robert J. Gaddis
USAF FKSWC
Fort Bragg, N.C.


Whenever retired Army Col. Rod Paschall has something to say, members of the special-operations community ought to listen. Paschall is an intelligent, articulate, well-read and experienced soldier with an impressive grasp of military history. His latest book, LIC 2010: Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century, is an attempt to chart “the likely course of low-intensity conflict over the next two decades.”

The book is interesting, though relatively lightweight, reading. Some parts of the book are far too superficial, e.g., the author’s discussion of Soviet special-purpose forces. The text is well-organized, the writing style is fairly clear, and the author offers several unique insights on his subject. The coverage of the topic is basically complete, but is not comprehensive. The weakest points in the book are its definitions and objectivity.

Paschall gets into deep trouble in his first chapter by presenting various cursory definitions that apply to the subject of the book. “Low-intensity conflict” is a subset of “war,” as opposed to relative points on the operational continuum stretching from peacetime competition through conflict to war. Political and social struggle associated with insurgence are “warfare.” “Peace” is merely “an absence of fighting.” “War” is “armed conflicts in which there were at least 1,000 deaths per year.” “Foreign internal defense” is “a euphemism for counterinsurgency” (the military’s role which the author later says should be “thrown into the rubbish heap of history” and replaced by private contractors).

None of the definitions offered by Paschall square with the official definitions used within government and academic circles today, nor are they competent substitutes. Paschall’s claim that “they accurately represent the intent of the U.S. Army definitions” is simply not so. Paschall’s attempt to define his subject is thus quite confused and confusing.

The book displays strong biases and a degree of short-sightedness. The author is “battle-focused,” emphasizing “bang and boom” military action over other, nonviolent applications of the elements of power. He is infatuated with the laser rifle, cruise missile, resupply operations and direct-action “commandos.” He makes a good point on the irrelevancy of arbitrary academic requirements for most officers, but he does not address the fact that polit-
ical, social and cultural awareness in depth are important traits of military leaders in LIC environments, outside of the relatively short periods of activity devoted to killing guerrillas. Similarly, a range of other important aspects of LIC get no or scant mention.

Despite (or perhaps because of) the uneven qualities of this book, it is useful for starting arguments among special-ops personnel of varied backgrounds and experiences. It is not useful for settling any of these. Regrettably, the book is far too short, lean and expensive to be worth purchasing by members of the special-operations community.

Maj. William H. Burgess III
3rd SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.


Roger Hilsman skillfully weaves together his experiences as a West Point cadet, soldier, scholar and statesman in a candid and occasionally humorous recollection of his experience as a guerrilla leader with OSS Detachment 101 in Burma.

If the reader is expecting detailed accounts of Detachment 101 or other guerrilla operations, he may be disappointed. Hilsman provides background information, but the focus is on his experience. He does not present himself as Lawrence of Arabia or an early version of Rambo, but as a thoughtful, inexperienced young infantry officer with common human fears and foibles.

After lengthy reminiscing about his youth and abbreviated years at West Point, Hilsman recounts his first action as an infantry platoon leader in Burma. His ill-equipped and disorganized regiment was committed piecemeal to reinforce Merrill’s Marauders at Myitkyina. Casualties in Hilsman’s company exceeded 90 percent and attested to the difficulty of their task and lack of adequate preparation. Hilsman himself was seriously wounded while on a reconnaissance patrol.

Following his stay in the hospital, Hilsman, not overjoyed with the prospect of leading men in frontal attacks on pillboxes, sought some other line of employment. Seeking a means by which he could better exercise control over his own fate, Hilsman volunteered for Detachment 101. Initially, he was assigned as the OSS liaison officer with the British 14th Army. Subsequently, he requested and was given command of a guerrilla battalion composed of Chinese, Karens, and Shan.

Lacking any formal training in the theory of guerrilla warfare, Hilsman formulated his own ideas around the general rule of Det. 101 — keep moving and never spend two nights in the same place. Hilsman maintained that “Guerrillas should never try to take and hold ground,” “Safety lies in movement,” and “Stay on the good side of the natives.” Lastly, he concluded, “When pursued, safety is not acquired by retreating toward friendly lines, but by moving deeper into enemy territory.” Basic ideas?

Absolutely, but ones that frequently spell the difference between success and disaster. Valuable practical advice on guerrilla stratagems, based upon first-hand experience, are liberally sprinkled throughout this easily read text.

Hilsman’s epilogue, “Burma’s Lessons for Vietnam,” is of special interest. The discussion of the application of strategy, airpower and large conventional forces in what some would argue was essentially a guerrilla war is a debate worth revisiting. Although occasionally distracted by his frequent, unnecessary defense of President Kennedy’s intentions and policies in Southeast Asia, Hilsman includes sufficient points on guerrilla warfare to warrant close study.

Retired Col. Jerry King, USA
Tampa, Fla.


Retired Col. David Hackworth has written the story of his time in the U.S. Army from 1946 to 1971. It chronicles his initial assignment in Italy, combat duty and battlefield commission in Korea, life in the peacetime Army, and his several tours in Vietnam. Although Colonel Hackworth doesn’t list his own awards and qualifications, he was a “comer” and would have gone further if not for the disillusionment with the Army and Vietnam which caused him to speak out publicly and leave the service.

The book is interesting if for no other reason than to follow the career of a great soldier and to hear his war stories. The intent, though, is to describe what happened to the Army leading up to Vietnam and to show those things which eventually caused Hackworth to leave in disgust. He shows vividly the “two armies” of peacetime managerial
bureaucrats and the warriors. His contention is that in Vietnam, contrary to other U.S. conflicts, the peacetime leadership was not superseded by the warriors. The result was that the Army made numerous mistakes in policy matters and in tactics.

This book is believable reading and is well-presented. The problems it describes are, to a large degree, still with us, and Hackworth's final section discusses some of our current faults. It is constructive criticism which professional soldiers should take as such. It is also good professional reading for the topic of the "next Vietnam" and how we should do things differently if we fight again in another unconventional war.

Maj. Gregory T. Banner
U.S. Milgroup
El Salvador


Armed Forces & Modern Counterinsurgency examines major counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by seven countries since World War II. Rather than merely presenting historical descriptions or tactical analyses of those counterinsurgency campaigns, the book examines the civil-military philosophies, strategies and tactics used.

In the introduction, the editors discuss elements necessary to conduct a successful counterinsurgency: integration of military, political, and economic efforts; a unified political and military chain-of-command responsible for conduct of the campaign; a chain-of-command that is both "clean," and clearly understood by all prosecutors of the campaign; effective intelligence collection and dissemination; use of local assets (e.g., people) whenever possible; and, the need to be flexible.

The book then examines the campaigns in light of the presence and effectiveness, or lack thereof, of these essential elements.

The first two chapters, the book's best, examine the British Army's campaign in Dhofar, Oman, and the French Army's campaigns in Indochina, Algeria and Chad. These chapters present both armies' philosophies, strategies and tactics, as they evolved through the campaigns.

The third chapter examines American involvement in the Vietnam War. The author focuses on the war's counterinsurgency aspects and blames America's failed effort on three problems: an almost total lack of integration of military, political and economic efforts; a divided political and military chain-of-command responsible for conduct of the war; and a chain-of-command so convoluted and complex that no one could understand its intricacies. Additionally, problems in the dissemination of intelligence contributed to the failed effort. While the topic will generate at least some controversy among American military readers, the chapter presents a perspective on the war that should interest all SOF personnel.

The analysis of Uruguay's fight against the Tupamaros is interesting for two reasons: it is the only urban insurgency examined in the book; and, in the process of crushing the insurgency, the Uruguayan Army also crushed the country's democracy. Analyses of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa are interesting not only in themselves, but also because of the influence the British Army and its experience in Malaysia had on both these African armies and their campaigns against black nationalist guerrillas.

An interesting lesson of this book is that all of the campaigns examined, with the exception of Uruguay (the only urban insurgency), used resettlement as a counterinsurgency technique — with varying, though often negative, results. However, those negative results were due to the ineffectual and short-lived commitments to making resettlement work. Armed Forces & Modern Counterinsurgency is not merely an interesting historical account of various counterinsurgency campaigns, it is also a valuable "lessons learned" text.

Capt. Tim M. Mather
Co. A, 2/11th SF Group
Fort A.P. Hill, Va.

Carl von Clausewitz's magnum opus, On War, is one of the most-quoted but least-read classics of military literature. This is indeed unfortunate because it is the single most comprehensive military-political work on the nature of war ever written, and this translation by scholars Peter Paret and Michael Howard is the best available.

Written in the early 1800s against the backdrop of more than two decades of European warfare, On War is in a class by itself. Clausewitz is able to bring the force of his personal experience as well as in-depth historical knowledge into his analysis. Unlike other works on the same topic, his does not consider conflict in isolation, but analyzes warfare as an extension of politics.

The son of a soldier, Clausewitz first experienced war first-hand as a 12-year-old lance corporal in 1793. He rose in rank rapidly because of personal competence, as opposed to noble birth. He attended the most prestigious military school of his day, the Berlin War College, under the brilliant military scholar, General Scharnhorst. Clausewitz graduated first in his class in 1803 and began a highly successful career as an officer in the Prussian Army. He fought in numerous campaigns across Europe against the French under Napoleon, and he later fought against a short-lived alliance of France and Prussia in the service of the Czar of Russia. His most distinguished positions were those of chief of staff of two different corps and superintendent of the War Academy in Berlin.

Although Clausewitz discusses all manner of war-fighting in his eight chapters, it is his discourse on understanding the true nature of war that is most valuable to contemporary military scholars. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, reflects a great deal of his wisdom.

Clausewitz takes the position that war is always subordinate to political goals. He differs from Sun Tzu, who believed that once war began, it was the general who conducted the war until the enemy was defeated. In other words, military, not political concerns dominated the strategic war-planning process. Clausewitz supports a concept of limited war, defined by a limited political goal: one where the complete destruction of an enemy army might not be necessary.

This is not to imply that Clausewitz was in favor of conducting war by half-measures. He firmly believed that all possible force should be brought to bear on the enemy's "center of gravity. To be successful in war, one must find and destroy the single most critical element of national power which allows his adversary to fight — whether it be national will, logistics or economics. It was a radical thought for its time: the clash of armies had decided political questions in Europe for hundreds of years.

Clausewitz's work was published, unfinished, after his death. The editors make it clear in their introduction that Clausewitz recognized that On War required a great deal of revision, but his death prevented him from completing the work.

Even with the understanding that On War was unfinished, and that it was written in the context of his times, Clausewitz's book remains the single most valuable text for understanding war, and it should be required reading for all professional soldiers.

Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.
4th PSYOP Group
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This book is all that it says it is and more. It is indeed a personal memoir by the chief of operations of the Office of Strategic Services' Special Intelligence Section in Italy. It is also a carefully prepared, well-written and documented study of all aspects of the fight to establish an intelligence network in Italy in World War II.

Corvo is obviously interested in straightening out what he perceives as misconceptions or half-truths contained in other accounts of the OSS in Italy. He does so in an authoritative and complete fashion. His work should stand as an invaluable primary source for anyone attempting to tell the story of the OSS in World War II. It is the insider's story, providing accounts of numerous nasty bureaucratic struggles about methods, control, lines of authority and intelligence practices.

Corvo certainly has a fascinating story to tell: one with continuing application to the special-operations and intelligence communities today. One is continually struck by the resemblance in the goals, meth-
ods and personnel of the OSS and today's Special Forces. Even though Corvo was operations head of the Special Intelligence Section of OSS Italy (SI involving covert activities, civilian clothes and false identities) rather than the Special Operations Section (raids, sabotage, guerrilla war and partisan support), his comments and lessons on deep-penetration missions are invaluable.

Corvo has given us a “worms-eye” view of his section of the OSS from mid-1942 to the disbanding of the OSS in 1945. His first involvement with OSS was indicative of the nature of this new office, formed by William Donovan only after the start of the war. Bored with his duties at the Quartermaster School at Camp Lee, Va., then-Private Corvo sent through channels, unsolicited, a complete plan for subversive warfare and intelligence collection against Sicily in July 1942, four months before the allied landings began in North Africa — the essential first step to such an operation. The plan eventually made it to the OSS and, with Corvo’s personal brand of enthusiasm and naiveté in arranging for meetings with his state senator and other officials, earned him an introduction and a transfer into the OSS.

Once in the OSS, Private Corvo proceeded to contact all of his friends and Italian organizations to put together the nucleus of an Italian SI team. The ad-hoc nature of this practice led him into numerous blind alleys and, in one instance, to his arrest in New York City by agents of the Counter-Intelligence Corps who were suspicious of this second-generation Italian recruiting espionage agents.

Corvo, by now a lieutenant, since the presence of a private at high-level planning meetings led to some awkwardness, soon found himself in Algiers, where the OSS was desperate “to justify its presence in the field.” Allied planners were by no means enthusiastic about the OSS. Its involvement in the North African landings was minimal, and it simply did not have the assets to launch deep penetrations of Sicily. Nor did it have the organizational clout. The British Special Operations Executive and MI-6 (Foreign Intelligence) were also less-than-cooperative at times. Apparently they felt that their expertise and contacts in Italy and the Balkans put them in the driver’s seat for all intelligence missions, and they were not pleased to see a rival organization developing.

Learning from its failures, the Italian SI section coordinated mule-train infiltrations through U.S. lines after the invasion of Sicily. It was also involved in negotiations which led to the surrender of Italy. However, it was run on a shoestring with borrowed expertise (from the British), borrowed boats (from the Navy), no airplanes (only in August 1944 did 30 C-47s arrive for regular OSS use), shortages of equipment (at one time only 11 radios were operational) and inherent courage despite the failures. With the failures came attempts by other parts of the OSS to take over personnel and missions from the SI section. The result was lost time, conflicting missions and, occasionally, foolish and sacrificial missions in order to “score points” in the bureaucratic struggle for survival or expansion. Corvo’s sections on this petty war are the most illuminating and the most infuriating in the book. The jealousy and maneuvers of the OSS officials at all levels show few of them in a good light and make it all the more remarkable that SI was able to perform as well as it did.

Corvo is to be commended for his candor in setting the record straight, even if it is uncomfortable. This is a book well worth reading. It drives home again some SOF “truths” which cannot be repeated too often: “Quality is more important than quantity,” “People are more important than hardware,” “Quality people cannot be mass-produced,” and “You cannot create an organization of quality people quickly after the need arises.” Corvo proves these truths by showing us the unvarnished reality of building an organization in haste, even with quality people, and all the costs that haste entailed. This memoir adds to the heritage of the OSS which, despite CIA claims to the contrary, belongs at least in part to special-operations forces, especially in terms of personnel, methods and techniques. We can learn about our past from this book.

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